fix: enforce production transport policy

Every PostgreSQL connection this repository opened was plaintext, in every
environment: no connection site set `ssl` at all, so credentials, session
tokens, and row data crossed the network in the clear and nothing in
configuration, startup, or `pnpm doctor` said so. The public identity URL
boundary was also looser than it appeared.

`core/src/database/transport.ts` is now the one typed policy. It has exactly two
modes: `verify-full` (TLS required, certificate chain verified, and server
identity verified against the configured host — the production default) and
`disable` (the development/test default, refused outright in production). There
is deliberately no encryption-only `require` mode, no chain-only `verify-ca`,
and no `rejectUnauthorized: false` escape hatch anywhere in the configuration
surface; every loose or aliased spelling is rejected in both environments, so a
typo never quietly becomes a weaker mode. Production has no plaintext exception
at all, not even for a loopback database — a connection string cannot prove the
database is process-local.

Verification is certificate *and* hostname. The policy supplies an explicit
`checkServerIdentity` pinned to the host parsed from DATABASE_URL, because the
pinned driver sets TLS `servername` only for non-IP hosts and Node performs no
identity check when it is unset — so `rejectUnauthorized: true` alone accepts a
certificate from any host the trusted CA ever signed when connecting by IP.
Both halves are proven against a real TLS-enabled PostgreSQL, including that the
same connection without the pinned callback succeeds. Every CA, certificate, and
key is generated at test runtime and deleted afterwards.

A DATABASE_URL may no longer carry its own TLS parameters. The pinned driver
merges parsed connection-string values over explicitly passed options, so a
`?sslmode=disable` in the URL would silently replace the policy's verified `ssl`
object; that now fails with a stable code, reported by both `pnpm doctor` and
the migration CLIs rather than as "failed unexpectedly".

One shared environment reader keeps `process.env` out of Core's reusable
constructors, and every executable that opens a connection resolves the policy
identically: the API (validated before any pool, Better Auth instance, module
runtime, or listener exists), both migration commands, the bootstrap CLI, and
Doctor's own connection. Doctor reports it as a blocking failure, never a
warning, naming only the effective mode.

Separately, the identity base URL and every trusted origin must now be exactly
one canonical origin — the WHATWG origin serialization must equal the supplied
string — so a path, trailing slash, credentials, explicit default port, or
non-canonical case is rejected rather than normalized into something that no
longer matches what a browser sends. Production's loopback rejection now
classifies the address instead of comparing against three literals, covering
`.localhost`, all of 127.0.0.0/8, 0.0.0.0, `::`, expanded and IPv4-mapped
forms. This is a configuration-shape guarantee only: it does not resolve DNS or
prove reachability, and TLS protects the connection, not the exposure.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>

apps/api/tests/lifecycle.test.ts

@@ -460,6 +460,59 @@ describe("Ekklesia API shutdown lifecycle", () => {
     expect(poolEnd).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
   });
 
+  it("refuses an unsafe production database transport before any pool, Better Auth instance, module runtime, or server exists", async () => {
+    const poolEnd = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined);
+    poolConstructor.mockImplementation(function fakePool() {
+      return { end: poolEnd, on: vi.fn() };
+    });
+    betterAuthMock.mockReturnValue({ api: { getSession: vi.fn() }, handler: vi.fn() });
+    mockSuccessfulServe();
+
+    // Both an explicit production plaintext selection and a URL that would silently downgrade the
+    // policy are rejected in `createApiRuntimeConfig` — the same boundary the executable entry
+    // point calls before `startApi` — so no runtime resource is ever constructed to leak.
+    for (const [label, input] of [
+      [
+        "explicit production plaintext",
+        {
+          databaseTransport: { mode: "disable" },
+          databaseUrl: "postgresql://ekklesia:[email protected]:5432/ekklesia",
+        },
+      ],
+      [
+        "connection-string TLS downgrade",
+        {
+          databaseUrl:
+            "postgresql://ekklesia:[email protected]:5432/ekklesia?sslmode=disable",
+        },
+      ],
+    ] as const) {
+      let captured: unknown;
+      try {
+        createApiRuntimeConfig(
+          {
+            host: "127.0.0.1",
+            identity: {
+              baseUrl: "https://identity.example.test",
+              secret: "correct-horse-battery-staple-0123456789",
+              trustedOrigins: ["https://identity.example.test"],
+            },
+            port: 0,
+            ...input,
+          },
+          { environment: "production" },
+        );
+      } catch (error) {
+        captured = error;
+      }
+      expect(captured, `expected ${label} to be rejected`).toBeInstanceOf(Error);
+      expect(poolConstructor).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+      expect(betterAuthMock).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+      expect(serveMock).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+      expect(poolEnd).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    }
+  });
+
   it("closes an already-created database pool when the server fails to bind its listen address", async () => {
     const poolEnd = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined);
     poolConstructor.mockImplementation(function fakePool() {