fix: enforce production transport policy

Every PostgreSQL connection this repository opened was plaintext, in every
environment: no connection site set `ssl` at all, so credentials, session
tokens, and row data crossed the network in the clear and nothing in
configuration, startup, or `pnpm doctor` said so. The public identity URL
boundary was also looser than it appeared.

`core/src/database/transport.ts` is now the one typed policy. It has exactly two
modes: `verify-full` (TLS required, certificate chain verified, and server
identity verified against the configured host — the production default) and
`disable` (the development/test default, refused outright in production). There
is deliberately no encryption-only `require` mode, no chain-only `verify-ca`,
and no `rejectUnauthorized: false` escape hatch anywhere in the configuration
surface; every loose or aliased spelling is rejected in both environments, so a
typo never quietly becomes a weaker mode. Production has no plaintext exception
at all, not even for a loopback database — a connection string cannot prove the
database is process-local.

Verification is certificate *and* hostname. The policy supplies an explicit
`checkServerIdentity` pinned to the host parsed from DATABASE_URL, because the
pinned driver sets TLS `servername` only for non-IP hosts and Node performs no
identity check when it is unset — so `rejectUnauthorized: true` alone accepts a
certificate from any host the trusted CA ever signed when connecting by IP.
Both halves are proven against a real TLS-enabled PostgreSQL, including that the
same connection without the pinned callback succeeds. Every CA, certificate, and
key is generated at test runtime and deleted afterwards.

A DATABASE_URL may no longer carry its own TLS parameters. The pinned driver
merges parsed connection-string values over explicitly passed options, so a
`?sslmode=disable` in the URL would silently replace the policy's verified `ssl`
object; that now fails with a stable code, reported by both `pnpm doctor` and
the migration CLIs rather than as "failed unexpectedly".

One shared environment reader keeps `process.env` out of Core's reusable
constructors, and every executable that opens a connection resolves the policy
identically: the API (validated before any pool, Better Auth instance, module
runtime, or listener exists), both migration commands, the bootstrap CLI, and
Doctor's own connection. Doctor reports it as a blocking failure, never a
warning, naming only the effective mode.

Separately, the identity base URL and every trusted origin must now be exactly
one canonical origin — the WHATWG origin serialization must equal the supplied
string — so a path, trailing slash, credentials, explicit default port, or
non-canonical case is rejected rather than normalized into something that no
longer matches what a browser sends. Production's loopback rejection now
classifies the address instead of comparing against three literals, covering
`.localhost`, all of 127.0.0.0/8, 0.0.0.0, `::`, expanded and IPv4-mapped
forms. This is a configuration-shape guarantee only: it does not resolve DNS or
prove reachability, and TLS protects the connection, not the exposure.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>

core/src/migrations/postgres-database.ts

@@ -1,4 +1,8 @@
 import { Client, type ClientConfig, type QueryResultRow } from "pg";
+import {
+  type DatabaseTransportPolicy,
+  databaseTlsConnectionOptions,
+} from "../database/transport.js";
 import type {
   AppliedMigrationRecord,
   MigrationDatabase,
@@ -76,6 +80,10 @@ export class PostgresMigrationDatabaseError extends Error {
 export interface PostgresMigrationDatabaseOptions {
   readonly connectionTimeoutMs?: number;
   readonly operationTimeoutMs?: number;
+  /** The validated transport policy (`core/src/database/transport.js`). Every production executable
+   * that plans or applies migrations passes one; omitting it keeps the pre-existing plaintext
+   * behavior used by the disposable loopback PostgreSQL harness. */
+  readonly transport?: DatabaseTransportPolicy;
 }
 
 interface HistoryExistenceRow extends QueryResultRow {
@@ -178,8 +186,16 @@ function createClientConfig(
     "The PostgreSQL operation timeout is invalid.",
   );
 
+  // Also rejects a URL carrying its own TLS parameters, so `pg`'s connection-string precedence
+  // can never silently replace this policy with a weaker one.
+  const ssl =
+    options?.transport === undefined
+      ? undefined
+      : databaseTlsConnectionOptions(connectionString, options.transport);
+
   return {
     connectionString,
+    ...(ssl === undefined ? {} : { ssl }),
     ...(validatedConnectionTimeoutMs === undefined
       ? {}
       : { connectionTimeoutMillis: validatedConnectionTimeoutMs }),