fix: enforce production transport policy
Every PostgreSQL connection this repository opened was plaintext, in every environment: no connection site set `ssl` at all, so credentials, session tokens, and row data crossed the network in the clear and nothing in configuration, startup, or `pnpm doctor` said so. The public identity URL boundary was also looser than it appeared. `core/src/database/transport.ts` is now the one typed policy. It has exactly two modes: `verify-full` (TLS required, certificate chain verified, and server identity verified against the configured host — the production default) and `disable` (the development/test default, refused outright in production). There is deliberately no encryption-only `require` mode, no chain-only `verify-ca`, and no `rejectUnauthorized: false` escape hatch anywhere in the configuration surface; every loose or aliased spelling is rejected in both environments, so a typo never quietly becomes a weaker mode. Production has no plaintext exception at all, not even for a loopback database — a connection string cannot prove the database is process-local. Verification is certificate *and* hostname. The policy supplies an explicit `checkServerIdentity` pinned to the host parsed from DATABASE_URL, because the pinned driver sets TLS `servername` only for non-IP hosts and Node performs no identity check when it is unset — so `rejectUnauthorized: true` alone accepts a certificate from any host the trusted CA ever signed when connecting by IP. Both halves are proven against a real TLS-enabled PostgreSQL, including that the same connection without the pinned callback succeeds. Every CA, certificate, and key is generated at test runtime and deleted afterwards. A DATABASE_URL may no longer carry its own TLS parameters. The pinned driver merges parsed connection-string values over explicitly passed options, so a `?sslmode=disable` in the URL would silently replace the policy's verified `ssl` object; that now fails with a stable code, reported by both `pnpm doctor` and the migration CLIs rather than as "failed unexpectedly". One shared environment reader keeps `process.env` out of Core's reusable constructors, and every executable that opens a connection resolves the policy identically: the API (validated before any pool, Better Auth instance, module runtime, or listener exists), both migration commands, the bootstrap CLI, and Doctor's own connection. Doctor reports it as a blocking failure, never a warning, naming only the effective mode. Separately, the identity base URL and every trusted origin must now be exactly one canonical origin — the WHATWG origin serialization must equal the supplied string — so a path, trailing slash, credentials, explicit default port, or non-canonical case is rejected rather than normalized into something that no longer matches what a browser sends. Production's loopback rejection now classifies the address instead of comparing against three literals, covering `.localhost`, all of 127.0.0.0/8, 0.0.0.0, `::`, expanded and IPv4-mapped forms. This is a configuration-shape guarantee only: it does not resolve DNS or prove reachability, and TLS protects the connection, not the exposure. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
This commit is contained in:
ekklesia
co-authored by
Claude Opus 5
Claude Opus 5
parent
7a0f624fc3
commit
6b6b77c105
@@ -0,0 +1,331 @@
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import { execFile } from "node:child_process";
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import { mkdtemp, readFile, rm, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises";
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import { tmpdir } from "node:os";
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import path from "node:path";
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import { promisify } from "node:util";
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import { Client } from "pg";
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import { afterAll, describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
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import { databaseTlsConnectionOptions } from "../src/database/transport.js";
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const run = promisify(execFile);
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/**
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* Real TLS proof for the production transport policy, exercised through the pinned `pg` client
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* against a disposable, TLS-enabled PostgreSQL container.
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*
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* Every certificate, key, and CA used here is generated at test runtime into an isolated temporary
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* directory and deleted in `afterAll` — no private-key material is committed to this repository.
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* The container, its name, and its published loopback port are likewise disposable and removed in
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* `afterAll` even when an assertion fails.
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*/
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const containerName = `ekklesia-database-tls-${process.pid}`;
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let certificateDirectory: string | undefined;
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let containerStarted = false;
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let boundPort: number | undefined;
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class TlsHarnessError extends Error {
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constructor(message: string) {
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super(message);
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this.name = "TlsHarnessError";
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this.stack = `${this.name}: ${this.message}`;
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}
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}
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async function openssl(args: readonly string[], cwd: string): Promise<void> {
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try {
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await run("openssl", [...args], { cwd });
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} catch {
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// Never surface openssl's own stderr: it can echo paths from the harness environment.
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throw new TlsHarnessError("The disposable TLS material could not be generated.");
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}
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}
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/** Generates a private CA, a server certificate signed by it whose only SAN is `DNS:localhost`,
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* and an unrelated second CA. The deliberately narrow SAN is what makes the hostname-mismatch
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* assertion below meaningful: reaching the very same server through `127.0.0.1` must fail. */
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async function generateCertificates(directory: string): Promise<void> {
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await openssl(
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[
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"req",
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"-new",
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"-x509",
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"-days",
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"1",
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"-nodes",
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"-out",
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"ca.crt",
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"-keyout",
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"ca.key",
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"-subj",
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"/CN=Ekklesia Disposable Test CA",
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],
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directory,
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);
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await openssl(
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[
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"req",
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"-new",
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"-nodes",
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"-out",
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"server.csr",
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"-keyout",
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"server.key",
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"-subj",
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"/CN=localhost",
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],
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directory,
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);
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await writeFile(path.join(directory, "san.cnf"), "subjectAltName=DNS:localhost\n");
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await openssl(
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[
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"x509",
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"-req",
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"-in",
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"server.csr",
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"-CA",
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"ca.crt",
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"-CAkey",
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"ca.key",
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"-CAcreateserial",
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"-out",
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"server.crt",
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"-days",
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"1",
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"-extfile",
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"san.cnf",
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],
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directory,
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);
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await openssl(
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[
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"req",
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"-new",
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"-x509",
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"-days",
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"1",
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"-nodes",
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"-out",
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"other-ca.crt",
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"-keyout",
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"other-ca.key",
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"-subj",
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"/CN=Unrelated Test CA",
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],
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directory,
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);
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}
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async function docker(args: readonly string[]): Promise<string> {
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const { stdout } = await run("docker", [...args]);
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return stdout.trim();
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}
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async function startTlsPostgres(directory: string): Promise<number> {
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// The certificate/key are copied *inside* the container and re-owned before PostgreSQL starts:
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// PostgreSQL refuses a key file that is not owned by the database user or root, and a bind-
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// mounted host file keeps the host's ownership.
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await docker([
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"run",
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"-d",
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"--name",
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containerName,
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"-e",
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"POSTGRES_DB=ekklesia_tls",
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"-e",
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"POSTGRES_USER=ekklesia_tls",
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"-e",
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"POSTGRES_PASSWORD=ekklesia_tls",
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"-v",
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`${directory}:/certs-src:ro`,
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"-p",
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"127.0.0.1:0:5432",
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"--entrypoint",
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"/bin/sh",
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"postgres:18.4-alpine3.24",
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"-c",
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"mkdir -p /tls && cp /certs-src/server.crt /certs-src/server.key /tls/ && " +
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"chown postgres:postgres /tls/server.* && chmod 600 /tls/server.key && " +
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"exec docker-entrypoint.sh postgres -c ssl=on -c ssl_cert_file=/tls/server.crt " +
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"-c ssl_key_file=/tls/server.key",
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]);
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containerStarted = true;
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const published = await docker(["port", containerName, "5432"]);
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const match = /^127\.0\.0\.1:(\d+)$/u.exec(published.split("\n")[0]?.trim() ?? "");
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if (!match) {
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throw new TlsHarnessError(
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"The disposable TLS PostgreSQL port is not bound safely to loopback.",
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);
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}
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return Number(match[1]);
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}
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/** Bounded readiness polling — never an arbitrary sleep. Resolves once the server accepts a TLS
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* connection, or fails after the deadline. */
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async function waitForTlsReadiness(port: number, ca: string): Promise<void> {
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const deadline = Date.now() + 60_000;
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let lastError: unknown;
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while (Date.now() < deadline) {
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const client = new Client({
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connectionTimeoutMillis: 3_000,
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database: "ekklesia_tls",
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host: "localhost",
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password: "ekklesia_tls",
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port,
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ssl: { ca, rejectUnauthorized: true },
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user: "ekklesia_tls",
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});
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try {
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await client.connect();
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await client.end();
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return;
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} catch (error) {
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lastError = error;
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try {
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await client.end();
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} catch {
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// The failed client is already unusable; nothing to clean up beyond this.
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}
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await new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, 250));
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}
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}
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throw new TlsHarnessError(
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`The disposable TLS PostgreSQL did not become ready: ${String(lastError)}`,
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);
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}
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async function connectWith(
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host: string,
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port: number,
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ssl: ReturnType<typeof databaseTlsConnectionOptions>,
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): Promise<{ encrypted: boolean }> {
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const client = new Client({
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connectionTimeoutMillis: 5_000,
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database: "ekklesia_tls",
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host,
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password: "ekklesia_tls",
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port,
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...(ssl === false ? {} : { ssl }),
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user: "ekklesia_tls",
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});
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try {
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await client.connect();
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const result = await client.query<{ encrypted: boolean }>(
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"SELECT ssl AS encrypted FROM pg_stat_ssl WHERE pid = pg_backend_pid()",
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);
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return { encrypted: result.rows[0]?.encrypted === true };
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} finally {
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try {
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await client.end();
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} catch {
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// Closing an already-failed client is not itself a test failure.
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}
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}
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}
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afterAll(async () => {
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if (containerStarted) {
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await docker(["rm", "-f", containerName]).catch(() => undefined);
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}
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if (certificateDirectory) {
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// Removes the generated CA, server certificate, and every private key.
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await rm(certificateDirectory, { force: true, recursive: true }).catch(() => undefined);
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}
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});
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describe.sequential("production PostgreSQL TLS policy against a real TLS endpoint", () => {
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it("starts a disposable TLS-enabled PostgreSQL with runtime-generated certificates", async () => {
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certificateDirectory = await mkdtemp(path.join(tmpdir(), "ekklesia-tls-"));
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await generateCertificates(certificateDirectory);
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boundPort = await startTlsPostgres(certificateDirectory);
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const ca = await readFile(path.join(certificateDirectory, "ca.crt"), "utf8");
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await waitForTlsReadiness(boundPort, ca);
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expect(boundPort).toBeGreaterThan(0);
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});
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it("connects successfully, and encrypted, when the certificate is trusted and its identity matches the host", async () => {
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const ca = await readFile(path.join(certificateDirectory as string, "ca.crt"), "utf8");
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const ssl = databaseTlsConnectionOptions(
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`postgresql://ekklesia_tls@localhost:${boundPort}/ekklesia_tls`,
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{ certificateAuthority: ca, mode: "verify-full" },
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);
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const { encrypted } = await connectWith("localhost", boundPort as number, ssl);
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expect(encrypted).toBe(true);
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});
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it("refuses a certificate that does not chain to the configured CA", async () => {
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const otherCa = await readFile(
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path.join(certificateDirectory as string, "other-ca.crt"),
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"utf8",
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);
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const ssl = databaseTlsConnectionOptions(
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`postgresql://ekklesia_tls@localhost:${boundPort}/ekklesia_tls`,
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{ certificateAuthority: otherCa, mode: "verify-full" },
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);
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await expect(connectWith("localhost", boundPort as number, ssl)).rejects.toMatchObject({
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code: "UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE",
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});
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});
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it("refuses a trusted certificate whose identity does not match the host being connected to", async () => {
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// The server certificate's only SAN is `DNS:localhost`, so reaching the identical server via
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// its IP address is a genuine hostname mismatch. This is the case the pinned driver does *not*
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// catch on its own: `pg` sets `servername` only for non-IP hosts, and Node performs no identity
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// check when it is unset, so `rejectUnauthorized: true` alone would accept this connection.
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const ca = await readFile(path.join(certificateDirectory as string, "ca.crt"), "utf8");
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const ssl = databaseTlsConnectionOptions(
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`postgresql://[email protected]:${boundPort}/ekklesia_tls`,
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{ certificateAuthority: ca, mode: "verify-full" },
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);
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await expect(connectWith("127.0.0.1", boundPort as number, ssl)).rejects.toMatchObject({
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code: "ERR_TLS_CERT_ALTNAME_INVALID",
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});
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});
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it("proves the gap the policy closes: chain-only verification would accept that same mismatch", async () => {
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const ca = await readFile(path.join(certificateDirectory as string, "ca.crt"), "utf8");
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// Exactly what `ssl: { ca, rejectUnauthorized: true }` alone does — no pinned
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// `checkServerIdentity`. It connects, which is why the policy supplies one.
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const { encrypted } = await connectWith("127.0.0.1", boundPort as number, {
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ca,
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rejectUnauthorized: true,
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});
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expect(encrypted).toBe(true);
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});
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it("cannot satisfy verify-full against a plaintext-only PostgreSQL endpoint", async () => {
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// The disposable plaintext PostgreSQL the rest of the integration suite uses.
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const plaintextUrl = process.env.EKKLESIA_MIGRATION_TEST_DATABASE_URL;
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if (typeof plaintextUrl !== "string" || plaintextUrl.trim() === "") {
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throw new TlsHarnessError("The plaintext integration database is not configured.");
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}
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const parsed = new URL(plaintextUrl);
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const ca = await readFile(path.join(certificateDirectory as string, "ca.crt"), "utf8");
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const ssl = databaseTlsConnectionOptions(plaintextUrl, {
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certificateAuthority: ca,
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mode: "verify-full",
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});
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const client = new Client({
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connectionTimeoutMillis: 5_000,
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database: parsed.pathname.slice(1),
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host: parsed.hostname,
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password: decodeURIComponent(parsed.password),
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port: Number(parsed.port),
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...(ssl === false ? {} : { ssl }),
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user: decodeURIComponent(parsed.username),
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});
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try {
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await expect(client.connect()).rejects.toBeTruthy();
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} finally {
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try {
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await client.end();
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} catch {
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// Already unusable.
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}
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}
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});
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});
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@@ -0,0 +1,303 @@
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import tls from "node:tls";
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import { describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest";
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import { reportMigrationCommandError } from "../src/cli/migration-command-errors.js";
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import {
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assertNoConnectionStringTlsParameters,
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assertProductionDatabaseTransport,
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createDatabaseTransportPolicy,
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databaseHostFromUrl,
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DatabaseTransportError,
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databaseTlsConnectionOptions,
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describeDatabaseTransport,
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} from "../src/database/transport.js";
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const productionUrl = "postgresql://ekklesia:[email protected]:5432/ekklesia";
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describe("createDatabaseTransportPolicy", () => {
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it("defaults to certificate-verified TLS in production and plaintext in development", () => {
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expect(createDatabaseTransportPolicy()).toEqual({ mode: "verify-full" });
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expect(createDatabaseTransportPolicy({}, { environment: "production" })).toEqual({
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mode: "verify-full",
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});
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expect(createDatabaseTransportPolicy({}, { environment: "development" })).toEqual({
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mode: "disable",
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});
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});
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it("refuses plaintext in production", () => {
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let captured: unknown;
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try {
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createDatabaseTransportPolicy({ mode: "disable" }, { environment: "production" });
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} catch (error) {
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captured = error;
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}
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expect(captured).toBeInstanceOf(DatabaseTransportError);
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expect(captured).toMatchObject({ code: "DATABASE_TLS_REQUIRED_IN_PRODUCTION" });
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});
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it("rejects every loose, aliased, or coercible mode spelling in both environments", () => {
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for (const mode of [
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"VERIFY-FULL",
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"Verify-Full",
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" verify-full",
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"verify-full ",
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"require", // encryption-only: deliberately unsupported
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"verify-ca", // no hostname verification: deliberately unsupported
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"prefer",
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"no-verify",
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"allow",
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"true",
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true,
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false,
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1,
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0,
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"",
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null,
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]) {
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for (const environment of ["production", "development"] as const) {
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let captured: unknown;
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try {
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createDatabaseTransportPolicy({ mode }, { environment });
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} catch (error) {
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captured = error;
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}
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expect(captured, `expected ${JSON.stringify(mode)} to be rejected`).toMatchObject({
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code: "DATABASE_TLS_MODE_INVALID",
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});
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}
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}
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});
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it("accepts an optional private CA and rejects an empty one", () => {
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expect(
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createDatabaseTransportPolicy({ certificateAuthority: "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----" })
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.certificateAuthority,
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).toBe("-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----");
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for (const certificateAuthority of ["", " ", 42]) {
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let captured: unknown;
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try {
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createDatabaseTransportPolicy({ certificateAuthority });
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} catch (error) {
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captured = error;
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}
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expect(captured).toBeInstanceOf(DatabaseTransportError);
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}
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||||
});
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it("never carries the offending mode or CA material in the thrown error", () => {
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let captured: unknown;
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try {
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createDatabaseTransportPolicy({ certificateAuthority: "SUPER-SECRET-CA", mode: "sslmode=x" });
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} catch (error) {
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captured = error;
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}
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const publicText = `${String(captured)}\n${
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captured instanceof Error ? (captured.stack ?? "") : ""
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}\n${JSON.stringify(captured)}`;
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expect(publicText).not.toContain("SUPER-SECRET-CA");
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expect(publicText).not.toContain("sslmode=x");
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});
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});
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||||
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describe("assertNoConnectionStringTlsParameters", () => {
|
||||
it("rejects every TLS parameter the pinned connection-string parser recognizes", () => {
|
||||
for (const parameter of [
|
||||
"ssl=true",
|
||||
"sslmode=disable",
|
||||
"sslmode=require",
|
||||
"sslmode=verify-full",
|
||||
"sslcert=/tmp/c.crt",
|
||||
"sslkey=/tmp/c.key",
|
||||
"sslrootcert=/tmp/ca.crt",
|
||||
"sslpassword=x",
|
||||
"sslnegotiation=direct",
|
||||
"uselibpqcompat=true",
|
||||
"SSLMODE=disable", // case-insensitive
|
||||
]) {
|
||||
let captured: unknown;
|
||||
try {
|
||||
assertNoConnectionStringTlsParameters(`${productionUrl}?${parameter}`);
|
||||
} catch (error) {
|
||||
captured = error;
|
||||
}
|
||||
expect(captured, `expected ${parameter} to be rejected`).toMatchObject({
|
||||
code: "DATABASE_TLS_CONNECTION_STRING_CONFLICT",
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it("allows an unrelated parameter", () => {
|
||||
expect(() =>
|
||||
assertNoConnectionStringTlsParameters(`${productionUrl}?application_name=ekklesia`),
|
||||
).not.toThrow();
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it("rejects a non-PostgreSQL or malformed URL", () => {
|
||||
for (const url of ["", "not-a-url", "mysql://db.example.test/x", "http://db.example.test"]) {
|
||||
let captured: unknown;
|
||||
try {
|
||||
assertNoConnectionStringTlsParameters(url);
|
||||
} catch (error) {
|
||||
captured = error;
|
||||
}
|
||||
expect(captured).toMatchObject({ code: "DATABASE_URL_INVALID" });
|
||||
}
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
describe("databaseTlsConnectionOptions", () => {
|
||||
it("produces no TLS options at all when the policy disables TLS", () => {
|
||||
expect(
|
||||
databaseTlsConnectionOptions("postgresql://127.0.0.1:5432/ekklesia", { mode: "disable" }),
|
||||
).toBe(false);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it("enables chain verification and pins hostname verification to the configured host", () => {
|
||||
const options = databaseTlsConnectionOptions(productionUrl, { mode: "verify-full" });
|
||||
expect(options).not.toBe(false);
|
||||
if (options === false) {
|
||||
throw new Error("expected TLS options");
|
||||
}
|
||||
// There is no configuration path that produces `rejectUnauthorized: false`.
|
||||
expect(options.rejectUnauthorized).toBe(true);
|
||||
expect(typeof options.checkServerIdentity).toBe("function");
|
||||
expect(options.ca).toBeUndefined();
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it("checks the certificate against the configured host, not against whatever SNI the driver set", () => {
|
||||
// The pinned driver sets `servername` only for non-IP hosts, and Node skips identity checking
|
||||
// entirely when it is unset — so the policy must pin the host itself. This asserts the
|
||||
// supplied callback ignores the passed servername and uses the configured host.
|
||||
const options = databaseTlsConnectionOptions(productionUrl, { mode: "verify-full" });
|
||||
if (options === false || !options.checkServerIdentity) {
|
||||
throw new Error("expected a checkServerIdentity callback");
|
||||
}
|
||||
const spy = vi.spyOn(tls, "checkServerIdentity").mockReturnValue(undefined);
|
||||
try {
|
||||
options.checkServerIdentity("attacker-supplied.example", {} as tls.PeerCertificate);
|
||||
expect(spy).toHaveBeenCalledWith("db.example.test", expect.anything());
|
||||
} finally {
|
||||
spy.mockRestore();
|
||||
}
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it("uses the bare address for an IPv6 host so identity checking sees a usable value", () => {
|
||||
expect(databaseHostFromUrl("postgresql://[2001:db8::1]:5432/ekklesia")).toBe("2001:db8::1");
|
||||
expect(databaseHostFromUrl("postgresql://db.example.test:5432/ekklesia")).toBe(
|
||||
"db.example.test",
|
||||
);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it("passes an explicit private CA through unchanged", () => {
|
||||
const certificateAuthority =
|
||||
"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\nprivate-ca\n-----END CERTIFICATE-----";
|
||||
const options = databaseTlsConnectionOptions(productionUrl, {
|
||||
certificateAuthority,
|
||||
mode: "verify-full",
|
||||
});
|
||||
if (options === false) {
|
||||
throw new Error("expected TLS options");
|
||||
}
|
||||
expect(options.ca).toBe(certificateAuthority);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it("refuses to build options for a URL carrying its own TLS parameters", () => {
|
||||
let captured: unknown;
|
||||
try {
|
||||
databaseTlsConnectionOptions(`${productionUrl}?sslmode=disable`, { mode: "verify-full" });
|
||||
} catch (error) {
|
||||
captured = error;
|
||||
}
|
||||
expect(captured).toMatchObject({ code: "DATABASE_TLS_CONNECTION_STRING_CONFLICT" });
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
describe("assertProductionDatabaseTransport", () => {
|
||||
it("permits verified TLS in production and any validated policy in development", () => {
|
||||
expect(() =>
|
||||
assertProductionDatabaseTransport(productionUrl, { mode: "verify-full" }, "production"),
|
||||
).not.toThrow();
|
||||
expect(() =>
|
||||
assertProductionDatabaseTransport(
|
||||
"postgresql://127.0.0.1:5432/ekklesia",
|
||||
{ mode: "disable" },
|
||||
"development",
|
||||
),
|
||||
).not.toThrow();
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it("refuses production plaintext, including for a loopback database — there is no production exception", () => {
|
||||
for (const url of [
|
||||
productionUrl,
|
||||
"postgresql://127.0.0.1:5432/ekklesia",
|
||||
"postgresql://localhost:5432/ekklesia",
|
||||
"postgresql://[::1]:5432/ekklesia",
|
||||
]) {
|
||||
let captured: unknown;
|
||||
try {
|
||||
assertProductionDatabaseTransport(url, { mode: "disable" }, "production");
|
||||
} catch (error) {
|
||||
captured = error;
|
||||
}
|
||||
expect(captured, `expected production plaintext to ${url} to be refused`).toMatchObject({
|
||||
code: "DATABASE_TLS_REQUIRED_IN_PRODUCTION",
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
describe("migration CLI transport reporting", () => {
|
||||
it("reports the stable transport code instead of a generic 'failed unexpectedly', and leaks nothing", () => {
|
||||
const captured: string[] = [];
|
||||
const errorSpy = vi.spyOn(console, "error").mockImplementation((...args: unknown[]) => {
|
||||
captured.push(args.map(String).join(" "));
|
||||
});
|
||||
try {
|
||||
for (const url of [
|
||||
`${productionUrl}?sslmode=disable`,
|
||||
"postgresql://ekklesia:[email protected]:5432/ekklesia?ssl=true",
|
||||
]) {
|
||||
try {
|
||||
databaseTlsConnectionOptions(url, { mode: "verify-full" });
|
||||
} catch (error) {
|
||||
reportMigrationCommandError(error);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
try {
|
||||
createDatabaseTransportPolicy({ mode: "disable" }, { environment: "production" });
|
||||
} catch (error) {
|
||||
reportMigrationCommandError(error);
|
||||
}
|
||||
} finally {
|
||||
errorSpy.mockRestore();
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const output = captured.join("\n");
|
||||
expect(output).toContain("[DATABASE_TLS_CONNECTION_STRING_CONFLICT]");
|
||||
expect(output).toContain("[DATABASE_TLS_REQUIRED_IN_PRODUCTION]");
|
||||
expect(output).not.toContain("failed unexpectedly");
|
||||
// The connection string, its credentials, and its host never reach operator output.
|
||||
for (const secret of ["hunter2", "db.example.test", "secret", "sslmode=disable"]) {
|
||||
expect(output).not.toContain(secret);
|
||||
}
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
describe("describeDatabaseTransport", () => {
|
||||
it("describes the effective mode without revealing any connection detail", () => {
|
||||
expect(describeDatabaseTransport({ mode: "verify-full" })).toBe(
|
||||
"TLS required with certificate and hostname verification.",
|
||||
);
|
||||
expect(
|
||||
describeDatabaseTransport({ certificateAuthority: "SECRET-CA", mode: "verify-full" }),
|
||||
).toBe(
|
||||
"TLS required with certificate and hostname verification (explicit private CA supplied).",
|
||||
);
|
||||
expect(
|
||||
describeDatabaseTransport({ certificateAuthority: "SECRET-CA", mode: "verify-full" }),
|
||||
).not.toContain("SECRET-CA");
|
||||
expect(describeDatabaseTransport({ mode: "disable" })).toBe(
|
||||
"TLS disabled (development/test plaintext).",
|
||||
);
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
@@ -87,6 +87,8 @@ Data definitions
|
||||
0 migrations · checksums valid
|
||||
|
||||
PostgreSQL
|
||||
✓ Database TLS verified
|
||||
TLS required with certificate and hostname verification.
|
||||
○ Connection check skipped
|
||||
DATABASE_URL is not configured.
|
||||
○ Migration plan skipped
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -206,6 +206,7 @@ describe("Ekklesia Doctor diagnostics", () => {
|
||||
"modules.permissions",
|
||||
"schemas.discovery",
|
||||
"migrations.discovery",
|
||||
"database.transport",
|
||||
"postgresql.connection",
|
||||
"postgresql.plan",
|
||||
"identity.configuration",
|
||||
@@ -255,9 +256,15 @@ describe("Ekklesia Doctor diagnostics", () => {
|
||||
dependencies({ createMigrationDatabase, planMigrations }),
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
// Doctor's own read-only connection carries the same validated transport policy every other
|
||||
// executable uses — it defaults to certificate-verified TLS, exactly like production.
|
||||
expect(createMigrationDatabase).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
|
||||
"postgresql://not-rendered.invalid/ekklesia",
|
||||
{ connectionTimeoutMs: 10_000, operationTimeoutMs: 10_000 },
|
||||
{
|
||||
connectionTimeoutMs: 10_000,
|
||||
operationTimeoutMs: 10_000,
|
||||
transport: { mode: "verify-full" },
|
||||
},
|
||||
);
|
||||
expect(planMigrations).toHaveBeenCalledOnce();
|
||||
expect(check(report, "postgresql.connection")).toMatchObject({
|
||||
@@ -702,6 +709,57 @@ describe("Ekklesia Doctor diagnostics", () => {
|
||||
expect(report.result).toBe("not-ready");
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it("passes database transport by default, reporting verified TLS without revealing any connection detail", async () => {
|
||||
const report = await diagnoseEkklesia(
|
||||
{ ...options("postgresql://admin:[email protected]:5432/ekklesia") },
|
||||
dependencies(),
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
const transport = check(report, "database.transport");
|
||||
expect(transport.status).toBe("pass");
|
||||
expect(transport.summary).toBe("Database TLS verified");
|
||||
const rendered = JSON.stringify(transport);
|
||||
expect(rendered).not.toContain("hunter2");
|
||||
expect(rendered).not.toContain("db.internal.example");
|
||||
expect(rendered).not.toContain("postgresql://");
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it("blocks readiness when a production deployment would reach PostgreSQL without verified TLS", async () => {
|
||||
for (const [label, extra] of [
|
||||
["explicit production plaintext", { databaseTransport: { mode: "disable" } }],
|
||||
[
|
||||
"connection-string downgrade",
|
||||
{ databaseUrl: "postgresql://db.example.test/ekklesia?sslmode=disable" },
|
||||
],
|
||||
["malformed mode", { databaseTransport: { mode: "require" } }],
|
||||
] as const) {
|
||||
const report = await diagnoseEkklesia(
|
||||
{ ...options("postgresql://db.example.test/ekklesia"), ...extra },
|
||||
dependencies(),
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
const transport = check(report, "database.transport");
|
||||
expect(transport.status, `expected ${label} to block readiness`).toBe("failure");
|
||||
expect(transport.summary).toBe("Database transport unsafe");
|
||||
expect(report.result).toBe("not-ready");
|
||||
expect(doctorExitCode(report)).toBe(1);
|
||||
}
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it("passes development plaintext only when development is explicitly selected", async () => {
|
||||
const report = await diagnoseEkklesia(
|
||||
{
|
||||
...options("postgresql://127.0.0.1:5432/ekklesia"),
|
||||
databaseEnvironment: "development",
|
||||
},
|
||||
dependencies(),
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
const transport = check(report, "database.transport");
|
||||
expect(transport.status).toBe("pass");
|
||||
expect(transport.summary).toContain("disabled");
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it("passes client-address configuration with direct mode when nothing is configured", async () => {
|
||||
const report = await diagnoseEkklesia(options(), dependencies());
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -179,6 +179,126 @@ describe("Core identity configuration", () => {
|
||||
expect(config.baseUrl).toBe("http://localhost:3000");
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it("requires the base URL to be exactly one canonical origin, rejecting every non-origin component", () => {
|
||||
for (const baseUrl of [
|
||||
"https://id.example.test/", // a bare trailing slash is a path; `URL.origin` is slashless
|
||||
"https://id.example.test/auth", // Better Auth is never mounted beneath a configurable path
|
||||
"https://id.example.test?a=1",
|
||||
"https://id.example.test#fragment",
|
||||
"https://user:[email protected]",
|
||||
"https://:[email protected]",
|
||||
" https://id.example.test ",
|
||||
"https://ID.EXAMPLE.TEST", // non-canonical hostname case
|
||||
"https://id.example.test:443", // redundant default port
|
||||
"http://id.example.test:80",
|
||||
"ftp://id.example.test",
|
||||
"id.example.test",
|
||||
]) {
|
||||
let captured: unknown;
|
||||
try {
|
||||
createIdentityConfig({ ...validInput(), baseUrl }, { environment: "production" });
|
||||
} catch (error) {
|
||||
captured = error;
|
||||
}
|
||||
expect(captured, `expected ${JSON.stringify(baseUrl)} to be rejected`).toMatchObject({
|
||||
code: "BASE_URL_INVALID",
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it("stores the base URL and trusted origins as one identical canonical origin representation", () => {
|
||||
const config = createIdentityConfig(
|
||||
{
|
||||
...validInput(),
|
||||
baseUrl: "https://id.example.test",
|
||||
trustedOrigins: ["https://id.example.test", "https://dashboard.example.test:8443"],
|
||||
},
|
||||
{ environment: "production" },
|
||||
);
|
||||
expect(config.baseUrl).toBe("https://id.example.test");
|
||||
expect(config.trustedOrigins).toEqual([
|
||||
"https://id.example.test",
|
||||
"https://dashboard.example.test:8443",
|
||||
]);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it("rejects every loopback and unspecified-host spelling in production, for the base URL and trusted origins alike", () => {
|
||||
// Canonical spellings the WHATWG parser preserves — these must be rejected as production
|
||||
// policy failures, by the identical classifier on both fields.
|
||||
const canonicalLoopback = [
|
||||
"https://127.0.0.1",
|
||||
"https://127.0.0.2", // the full 127.0.0.0/8 block, not just .1
|
||||
"https://127.255.255.254",
|
||||
"https://[::1]", // IPv6 loopback, compressed
|
||||
"https://[::ffff:7f00:1]", // IPv4-mapped loopback, hexadecimal notation
|
||||
"https://localhost",
|
||||
"https://app.localhost", // RFC 6761 reserved namespace
|
||||
"https://0.0.0.0",
|
||||
"https://[::]", // IPv6 unspecified
|
||||
"https://[::ffff:0:0]", // IPv4-mapped unspecified
|
||||
];
|
||||
for (const value of canonicalLoopback) {
|
||||
let baseCaptured: unknown;
|
||||
try {
|
||||
createIdentityConfig({ ...validInput(), baseUrl: value }, { environment: "production" });
|
||||
} catch (error) {
|
||||
baseCaptured = error;
|
||||
}
|
||||
expect(baseCaptured, `expected base URL ${value} to be rejected`).toMatchObject({
|
||||
code: "BASE_URL_LOOPBACK_IN_PRODUCTION",
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
let originCaptured: unknown;
|
||||
try {
|
||||
createIdentityConfig(
|
||||
{ ...validInput(), trustedOrigins: [value] },
|
||||
{ environment: "production" },
|
||||
);
|
||||
} catch (error) {
|
||||
originCaptured = error;
|
||||
}
|
||||
expect(originCaptured, `expected trusted origin ${value} to be rejected`).toMatchObject({
|
||||
code: "TRUSTED_ORIGIN_LOOPBACK_IN_PRODUCTION",
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it("rejects non-canonical loopback spellings structurally, never as a misleading production-policy failure", () => {
|
||||
// WHATWG canonicalization folds some of these into `127.0.0.1`; others simply are not the
|
||||
// canonical origin text. Either way the honest answer is "this is not a canonical origin".
|
||||
for (const baseUrl of [
|
||||
"https://127.1",
|
||||
"https://2130706433",
|
||||
"https://0x7f000001",
|
||||
"https://[0:0:0:0:0:0:0:1]", // expanded IPv6 loopback
|
||||
"https://[::ffff:127.0.0.1]", // mixed IPv4-mapped notation
|
||||
"https://LOCALHOST",
|
||||
]) {
|
||||
let captured: unknown;
|
||||
try {
|
||||
createIdentityConfig({ ...validInput(), baseUrl }, { environment: "production" });
|
||||
} catch (error) {
|
||||
captured = error;
|
||||
}
|
||||
expect(captured, `expected ${baseUrl} to be structurally rejected`).toMatchObject({
|
||||
code: "BASE_URL_INVALID",
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it("still accepts canonical loopback development origins", () => {
|
||||
const config = createIdentityConfig(
|
||||
{
|
||||
...validInput(),
|
||||
baseUrl: "http://localhost:3000",
|
||||
trustedOrigins: ["http://localhost:3000", "http://127.0.0.1:5173"],
|
||||
},
|
||||
{ environment: "development" },
|
||||
);
|
||||
expect(config.baseUrl).toBe("http://localhost:3000");
|
||||
expect(config.trustedOrigins).toEqual(["http://localhost:3000", "http://127.0.0.1:5173"]);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it("defaults publicSignupEnabled to false when entirely omitted", () => {
|
||||
const config = createIdentityConfig(validInput(), { environment: "production" });
|
||||
expect(config.publicSignupEnabled).toBe(false);
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user