fix: harden identity HTTP transport

docs/development/api.md

@@ -5,6 +5,10 @@ one Ekklesia-owned route to resolve the current principal. It does not add a Das
 Mobile Surface, and it does not add roles, permissions, or a platform-owner concept — see
 [ADR 0011](../architecture/decisions/0011-identity-http-transport-and-public-enrollment.md) for the
 full architectural decision and [Identity](identity.md) for the identity foundation this builds on.
+A follow-up corrective slice hardened this transport (sanitized Better Auth logging,
+production-equivalent origin/CSRF protection under the test runner, bounded identity database
+timeouts, idempotent shutdown, and pinned password-length boundaries) without changing any of the
+above; see [ADR 0012](../architecture/decisions/0012-identity-origin-csrf-protection-under-test.md).
 
 ## What this is, and is not
 
@@ -109,8 +113,12 @@ is `null`. The caller must call `/api/auth/sign-in/email` explicitly afterward.
 per the pinned Better Auth release, `autoSignIn: false` activates its built-in email-enumeration
 protection, so a duplicate sign-up returns the same `200` shape (with a fresh, unrelated random id)
 whether or not the email was already registered, rather than revealing which. No custom
-cryptography replaces Better Auth's own password hashing, and its default password-length policy
-(8–128 characters) is kept unmodified.
+cryptography replaces Better Auth's own password hashing. Password length is pinned explicitly to
+8–128 characters (`minPasswordLength`/`maxPasswordLength` in `core/src/identity/runtime.ts`) rather
+than left on Better Auth's fallback default — the pinned release's default happens to be the same
+8–128 range, but an implicit default can change silently on a future Better Auth upgrade, while an
+explicit value cannot. `apps/api/tests/api-http.integration.ts` proves the exact boundary against a
+real server: 7 characters rejected, 8 accepted, 128 accepted, 129 rejected.
 
 ## Origin, CORS, and cookies
 
@@ -121,19 +129,67 @@ since `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` cannot be combined with `Access-Control-A
 true`); a disallowed origin never receives the header at all, though the request itself may still
 be processed — CORS is a browser-enforced, response-header mechanism, not a server-side gate. A
 request with no `Origin` header at all (native or server-to-server clients) is unaffected by CORS.
+Note this is narrower than it sounds for `/api/auth/sign-in/email` and `/api/auth/sign-up/email`
+specifically: any client built on the Fetch API — every browser, and also Node's own `fetch()` —
+automatically sends a `Sec-Fetch-Mode: cors` header on every request, and Better Auth's first-login
+CSRF protection treats that as "this came from a Fetch client" and requires a trusted `Origin` (or
+`Referer`) on those two routes regardless of whether a cookie is present. A genuinely non-Fetch
+caller (curl, or most backend HTTP client libraries, which send none of the `Sec-Fetch-*` headers)
+is unaffected and needs no `Origin` header at all — see the dedicated raw-socket test in
+`apps/api/tests/api-http.integration.ts` for the exact distinction proven against a real server.
 
-Better Auth's own CSRF/origin protections are never disabled
-(`advanced.disableCSRFCheck`/`advanced.disableOriginCheck` are never set). Verified directly
-against the running compiled server: any non-`GET`/`HEAD`/`OPTIONS` request carrying a session
-cookie must also carry a trusted `Origin` (or `Referer`), or Better Auth itself rejects it with
-`403`. See ADR 0011 for the exact verification method and an important caveat about reproducing
-part of this guarantee inside the automated test suite.
+Better Auth's own CSRF/origin protections are explicitly kept on:
+`core/src/identity/runtime.ts` sets `advanced: { disableCSRFCheck: false, disableOriginCheck:
+false }`. This is deliberately explicit rather than left unset — the pinned release's own default
+is environment-sensitive (`skipOriginCheck` falls back to `true`, silently disabling both origin
+and CSRF checking, whenever `isTest()` is true, which Vitest's default `NODE_ENV=test` triggers),
+so an unset config would mean origin/CSRF protection is silently off under the test runner and on
+in production. Setting both flags explicitly removes that environment-sensitive branch entirely,
+so `pnpm test:migrations:integration` now automatically proves the exact production behavior: any
+non-`GET`/`HEAD`/`OPTIONS` request carrying a session cookie must also carry a trusted `Origin` (or
+`Referer`), or Better Auth rejects it with `403` (and the presented session remains valid
+afterward); a no-cookie first authentication attempt from an untrusted origin is rejected the same
+way; a trusted origin is accepted in both cases; and a denied origin never receives a permissive
+CORS header. See [ADR 0012](../architecture/decisions/0012-identity-origin-csrf-protection-under-test.md)
+for the root-cause investigation and the full account of what changed.
 
 Cookies keep Better Auth's defaults: `HttpOnly` always, `SameSite=Lax` always, `Secure` when the
 configured base URL is `https://`. Cross-subdomain cookies are not enabled and no cookie `Domain`
 attribute is set, so every cookie is host-only. Trusted proxy headers are not configured in this
 slice — a deployment behind a reverse proxy is future work.
 
+## Logging
+
+Two independent, complementary layers, both configured explicitly in `core/src/identity/runtime.ts`
+rather than left on any environment-sensitive default:
+
+1. **`logger`.** Better Auth's own default (`level: "warn"`, plain `console.*` output) is replaced.
+   The pinned release's log call sites are not a stable, fully-audited contract — several pass a
+   raw internal exception, and at least one (the origin-check middleware) interpolates a
+   user-controlled `Origin` header directly into the message text. Rather than sanitize each call
+   site's message and arguments individually, Core's logger configuration drops the message and
+   every argument entirely and emits only a fixed, generic string
+   (`"[identity] Better Auth reported an error."`) via `console.error`, and only for error-level
+   events — nothing is ever emitted for warn/info/debug.
+2. **`onAPIError: { throw: true }`.** Discovered while testing (1) above: the pinned release's own
+   HTTP transport dependency, `better-call`'s router, has an *unconditional*
+   `console.error("# SERVER_ERROR: ", error)` fallback for any thrown value it does not recognize
+   as one of Better Auth's own `APIError`s — this fires before Better Auth's `logger` option is
+   ever consulted, so no `logger` configuration can reach it. `onAPIError.throw: true` closes that
+   gap: Better Auth's own deliberate `APIError`s (wrong password, invalid origin, disabled sign-up,
+   password out of bounds, ...) still resolve to their normal, correct HTTP response completely
+   unaffected, but a genuinely unexpected failure (for example a database outage mid-request) now
+   propagates out of `auth.handler()` instead of being caught and printed raw internally by
+   `better-call`, reaching `handleAuthRequest`'s own try/catch and becoming a sanitized
+   `IdentityRuntimeError` like any other unexpected failure — and nothing is logged at all.
+
+Both apply in every environment, including under Vitest: neither is a `NODE_ENV=test` special case.
+A focused unit test (`core/tests/identity-runtime.test.ts`) simulates a hostile log call (a raw
+exception carrying a password, a host, a port, a filesystem path, and a rejected origin) and asserts
+none of it reaches `console.error`, and separately asserts `onAPIError` is configured; a live
+integration test forces a real identity-database failure through Better Auth's own sign-in handler
+and asserts nothing at all reaches `console.error`/`warn`/`log` in the real process.
+
 ## Rate limiting
 
 Better Auth's built-in rate limiting is always enabled, including by the executable entry point —
@@ -146,13 +202,30 @@ trusted-proxy IP policy is configured, Better Auth may fall back to a single sha
 rather than a genuine per-client bucket. This is not yet the final, distributed, production-grade
 abuse-control design.
 
+## Database connection limits
+
+`apps/api/src/server.ts` configures the identity PostgreSQL pool (`createIdentityDrizzleDatabase`,
+`core/src/identity/database.ts`) with both a connection timeout and an operation timeout (10
+seconds each), the same bounded, validated pattern `core/src/migrations/postgres-database.ts`
+already uses. `connectionTimeoutMillis` alone only bounds *establishing* a connection; it does
+nothing once a query is already running on one. The operation timeout additionally sets `pg`'s
+`query_timeout` and `statement_timeout`, so a hung or unexpectedly slow query is aborted rather than
+holding a pool connection (and its caller) indefinitely. An invalid timeout (non-integer, zero,
+negative, or larger than PostgreSQL's own maximum) is rejected as configuration error before any
+pool is constructed, sanitized the same way an invalid connection string already is.
+
 ## Graceful shutdown
 
 `startApi()` (the composition function `apps/api/src/server.ts` exports, used by both the
-executable entry point and tests) returns `{app, server, shutdown}`. `shutdown()` is idempotent: it
-stops the HTTP listener from accepting new connections and lets in-flight requests finish, then
-closes the PostgreSQL pool. The executable entry point wires `SIGINT`/`SIGTERM` to call it and
-exits afterward; a startup failure after the database pool was already created (identity
+executable entry point and tests) returns `{app, server, shutdown}`. `shutdown()` memoizes one
+shared promise the first time it is called: every caller, concurrent or sequential, awaits the
+exact same listener-drain-then-pool-close operation, and that operation runs exactly once no matter
+how many times `shutdown()` is called. It stops the HTTP listener from accepting new connections and
+lets in-flight requests finish, then closes the PostgreSQL pool. The executable entry point's
+`SIGINT`/`SIGTERM` wiring is extracted into `installShutdownSignalHandlers(running, exit)` — the
+same function production composition uses, but independently testable with a fake `running`/`exit`
+so a test can trigger "a signal arrived" without sending a real process signal or invoking the real
+`process.exit`. A startup failure after the database pool was already created (identity
 construction failure, or the server failing to bind its listen address) always closes that pool
 before the failure propagates.
 

docs/development/identity.md

@@ -149,6 +149,23 @@ exported from `@ekklesia/core/identity`, exposes `auth.api`, Better Auth's sessi
 Drizzle adapter, the raw database, a session token, or Better Auth configuration. `apps/api` is the
 only current consumer of this boundary; see [API](api.md).
 
+Construction also explicitly configures four things the pinned release would otherwise leave on an
+environment-sensitive or implicit default, all covered by [ADR 0012](../architecture/decisions/0012-identity-origin-csrf-protection-under-test.md)
+and [API](api.md#logging):
+`advanced.disableCSRFCheck`/`disableOriginCheck` are both pinned to `false` (the default silently
+skips both under a test runner), Better Auth's `logger` is replaced with one that drops its message
+and arguments and emits only a fixed, generic string for error-level events, `onAPIError: { throw:
+true }` routes a genuinely unexpected failure out to `handleAuthRequest`'s own sanitized boundary
+instead of letting Better Auth's `better-call` transport dependency log it raw through a path no
+`logger` configuration can reach, and `emailAndPassword.minPasswordLength`/`maxPasswordLength` are
+pinned to `8`/`128` instead of left on Better Auth's fallback default.
+
+`createIdentityDrizzleDatabase` (`core/src/identity/database.ts`) also accepts an optional
+`operationTimeoutMs`, applied as both `pg`'s `query_timeout` and `statement_timeout` — bounding a
+hung or slow query, which `connectionTimeoutMs` alone cannot do since it only bounds establishing
+the connection. `apps/api` sets both timeouts explicitly (see [API](api.md)); an invalid value is
+rejected the same sanitized way an invalid connection string already is.
+
 ## What is not operational yet
 
 No email verification, password recovery, invitation flow, email delivery, social or OAuth

docs/development/testing.md

@@ -14,15 +14,21 @@ module migration discovery, identity schema drift detection, formatting, linting
 Migration-runner unit tests use a narrow database/session port to prove deterministic planning,
 approval, transaction orchestration, cleanup, and sanitized errors. They do not claim to prove
 PostgreSQL behavior. Identity unit tests cover branded opaque-ID contracts, principal shapes,
-configuration validation (secret, base URL, and trusted-origin rules), the Core identity runtime
-(explicit construction, exact schema mapping, only email/password and rate limiting enabled,
-sanitized failures, and that a database outage during principal resolution is never silently
-reported as anonymous), and Core migration discovery (deterministic ordering, the reserved `core`
-identity, and collision rejection) — all without a live database. `apps/api`'s own unit tests cover
-its pure Hono app factory (route shapes, CORS allow/deny/preflight, deterministic 404 and sanitized
-error responses), its runtime configuration, and that importing any of its modules — including the
-executable server module without calling its exported `main` — never reads the environment,
-connects to PostgreSQL, or starts a server.
+configuration validation (secret, base URL, and trusted-origin rules), bounded/validated
+connection and operation (`query_timeout`/`statement_timeout`) database timeouts, the Core identity
+runtime (explicit construction, exact schema mapping, only email/password and rate limiting
+enabled, an explicit `advanced.disableCSRFCheck`/`disableOriginCheck: false` pair, an explicit
+error-only sanitized logger that strips Better Auth's own message and arguments regardless of what
+they contain, pinned 8–128 password-length bounds, sanitized failures, and that a database outage
+during principal resolution is never silently reported as anonymous), and Core migration discovery
+(deterministic ordering, the reserved `core` identity, and collision rejection) — all without a
+live database. `apps/api`'s own unit tests cover its pure Hono app factory (route shapes, CORS
+allow/deny/preflight, deterministic 404 and sanitized error responses), its runtime configuration,
+its idempotent shutdown lifecycle (concurrent callers share one server-close-then-pool-close
+promise; a startup failure after the pool was already created still closes it; `SIGINT`/`SIGTERM`
+wiring is exercised through an injectable exit function rather than the real `process.exit`), and
+that importing any of its modules — including the executable server module without calling its
+exported `main` — never reads the environment, connects to PostgreSQL, or starts a server.
 
 `pnpm verify` is intentionally Docker-free. It never plans or applies migrations against a live
 database.
@@ -65,13 +71,26 @@ automatic session, per `autoSignIn: false`), explicit sign-in producing a host-o
 anonymous shapes, sign-out actually invalidating the session, a malformed or missing cookie
 resolving as anonymous, duplicate sign-up creating no second identity row, two distinct accounts
 producing identical principal shapes with no elevation and no owner/role/permission data at the
-database level, no plaintext password ever stored, CORS never returning an allow-origin header for
+database level, no plaintext password ever stored, the exact 8–128 password-length boundary (7
+rejected, 8 accepted, 128 accepted, 129 rejected), CORS never returning an allow-origin header for
 an untrusted origin, Better Auth's handler being unreachable outside `/api/auth/*`, a database
 outage during principal resolution producing a sanitized `503` rather than a false anonymous `200`,
 starting the API against an unmigrated database creating no tables at all, and a clean listener/pool
-shutdown. See [ADR 0011](../architecture/decisions/0011-identity-http-transport-and-public-enrollment.md)
-for one CSRF/origin guarantee that was verified manually against the real server but could not be
-reproduced reliably inside this test runner, and is documented rather than silently asserted.
+shutdown.
+
+The same suite also proves Better Auth's own origin/CSRF protection is production-equivalent under
+the test runner, not just in a plain Node script: a no-cookie first authentication attempt succeeds
+from a trusted browser origin and is rejected (`403`, no permissive CORS header, no leaked detail)
+from an untrusted one; a cookie-bearing state-changing request (sign-out) is rejected the same way
+from an untrusted origin, and the presented session remains valid afterward, proving the rejected
+request never reached sign-out logic. See
+[ADR 0012](../architecture/decisions/0012-identity-origin-csrf-protection-under-test.md) for why
+this previously could not be reproduced reliably under Vitest (Better Auth's own default silently
+skips these checks whenever `isTest()` is true, unless `advanced.disableOriginCheck` is set
+explicitly) and how the fix removes that gap entirely. A further scenario forces a real identity
+database failure and asserts, against actual `console.error`/`warn`/`log` output, that Better
+Auth's own internal error logging — configured explicitly in `core/src/identity/runtime.ts` — never
+emits a raw exception, SQL, connection detail, or the rejected request's origin.
 
 CI runs the same command in the dedicated `migration-smoke` job. After this change is merged, add
 the following pull-request status context to `main` branch protection: