feat: add a host-provided outbound email transport

Ekklesia could authenticate people and pair devices but could not send a
single message. Better Auth has been configured with emailAndPassword
since ADR 0011 and neither of its mail hooks — sendResetPassword and
emailVerification.sendVerificationEmail — was ever implemented, so email
verification, password recovery, and invitations were all blocked on the
same missing thing.

That missing thing is a transport, not a Google Workspace integration.
Email is now a host-provided infrastructure service with a provider seam,
shaped exactly like object storage: feature code says "send this
transactional message" and the provider owns the host, port, TLS,
credentials, connection behaviour, and every transport error. No
provider's hostname appears anywhere in Core, and a test asserts it.
Google Workspace SMTP Relay is the expected first deployment and a
compatibility target — the same variables address Microsoft 365, a
transactional provider, or a local Postfix.

The contract is deliberately tiny: one recipient or a small bounded list,
a subject, text and/or HTML, an optional reply-to, and nothing else. There
is no `from` field at all — the sender is host configuration, so no
feature and no future module can choose who mail appears to come from,
which is how a platform otherwise acquires an impersonation primitive.
Control characters are refused rather than stripped in addresses, display
names, subjects, and reply-to values; writing that rule down was not
enough, because the first implementation trimmed an address before
checking it and silently accepted a trailing carriage return until a test
caught it.

Security modes are named rather than inferred from a boolean and a port,
which is genuinely ambiguous: `secure: false` on 587 means "connect in the
clear and hope STARTTLS is offered". `starttls` sets requireTLS so a
stripped upgrade fails the send instead of continuing in plaintext,
production refuses `plaintext` outright, and certificate verification has
no off switch. Credentials are optional as a pair, because a relay
authorized by source IP has neither and requiring them would make the
intended production arrangement unconfigurable; half a pair fails loudly.

Connection, greeting, and socket timeouts are all explicit — the
object-storage pass already showed what a network client on library
defaults does to a request. Nothing retries: a failure after the message
data has gone out is ambiguous, and retrying it turns one password-reset
request into several emails, so this is a single bounded attempt and
deliberately not an exactly-once promise.

Email stays optional. An installation with no SMTP host is a complete
deployment, nothing sends at startup, and constructing the transport opens
no socket. There is no POST /api/v1/send-email and no route that touches
the provider — an authenticated send endpoint is an open relay with extra
steps. Modules get nothing either; services are added one at a time when
something real needs one, and nothing does yet.

Proven against a real in-process SMTP server rather than a mock: delivery
with the host's sender on the wire, authentication and its sanitized
refusal, a rejected mailbox distinguished from an outage, a refused
connection, a silent server hitting its deadline, and a starttls transport
refusing to continue when the upgrade is not offered. No test sends real
email and no live credential exists in this repository or in CI.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>

docs/development/identity.md

@@ -279,6 +279,32 @@ wins, so a browser holding both remains a person.
 `/api/v1/principal` reports a device as `anonymous` on purpose. It is the endpoint the Dashboard uses
 to decide whether a person is signed in, and a device is not one.
 
+## Outbound email and the verification seam
+
+Ekklesia has a host-provided SMTP transport
+([ADR 0037](../architecture/decisions/0037-host-provided-outbound-email.md), see
+[Outbound email](email.md)) — but **no identity flow uses it yet.**
+
+Better Auth exposes exactly two hooks for the flows that need mail, and this repository configures
+neither:
+
+| hook | flow |
+| --- | --- |
+| `emailAndPassword.sendResetPassword({ user, url, token })` | Password reset |
+| `emailVerification.sendVerificationEmail({ user, url, token })` | Email verification |
+
+Phase 7C Pass 2 implements them over the mail transport. `startApi` already constructs the provider
+and closes it on every shutdown path, so the remaining work is to inject it into
+`createIdentityRuntime` and write the two message bodies.
+
+**The `url` and `token` those hooks receive are credentials.** The entire security of both flows is
+that only the recipient sees them, so they must never be logged, never appear in an error, and never
+reach a diagnostic. The transport already logs nothing and refuses to echo a message body.
+
+Until that pass lands: email verification, password recovery, and invitations do not exist, and
+`requireEmailVerification` stays off — turning it on without a working sender would lock every
+account out.
+
 ## Creating the first platform owner
 
 A fresh installation has a login page and nothing to log in to. Public registration is disabled by