3 Commits

Include renames

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
ekklesia	a0e9948820	fix(storage): recognize errors across module packages	2026-10-10 10:54:13 -05:00
ekklesiaandClaude Opus 5	7ff063b87a	feat: deliver module objects directly to browsers through opaque read URLs ... ADR 0030 left exactly one way to get an image to a browser: read the object into the module's process and write it back out of a module HTTP route. Every byte of every asset travelled storage -> Ekklesia -> browser. For the slideshow this platform exists to replace that means Ekklesia in the path of every image on every display, permanently, for bytes that never change — and it would make Ekklesia responsible for re-implementing byte ranges, without which video seeking cannot work at all. A module can now ask a logical bucket for a temporary browser URL: const { url, expiresAt } = await assets.createReadUrl("slides/welcome.png"); The contract names intent, not mechanism. There is no signing, expiry format, endpoint, or bucket in it — a host with no S3 anywhere could satisfy the same method, which is what keeps a future single-module standalone host able to implement it. The URL is opaque to module code and a bearer capability to whoever holds it, so a module authorizes the request in its own route before asking: storage bounds reach, never identity. Lifetimes run one minute to six hours, fifteen by default, and out-of-range values are refused rather than clamped, so "expires forever" is unreachable. Logical keys stay canonical state; URLs are generated on demand and never persisted or logged. The provider endpoint and the browser delivery origin are separated because measurement showed they cannot be collapsed: an S3-compatible signature covers the request Host, so a URL signed for one origin and rewritten to another is rejected. The browser-facing origin is therefore a signing input (S3_DELIVERY_ENDPOINT), defaulting to S3_ENDPOINT — so the standard deployment configures nothing and delivery just works. The scheme is not signed, so a reverse proxy may terminate TLS provided it passes the original Host through; that is pinned by a test rather than described and hoped for. Read URLs are stable within a window of one third of their lifetime. Signing is a pure function of the clock, so naive re-signing yields a new URL per second — a guaranteed browser cache miss, and the reference client keys its <img> by URL, so an unchanged image would be torn down and re-downloaded continuously. Quantizing the signing timestamp makes repeated calls byte-identical while leaving at least two-thirds of the lifetime; Cache-Control is set at signing time to the guaranteed remainder, because the pinned SeaweedFS image sends none of its own. Verified against live SeaweedFS: byte ranges answered directly with 206 and a correct Content-Range, so no range proxy is needed in Core; signing is local (200 URLs in 66ms), so no batch API is needed; unsigned requests for the same object are refused, so delivery never depends on a public bucket; tampered signatures, swapped keys, and swapped buckets all rejected. Signed write and delete URLs are deliberately not built. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>	2026-08-23 17:12:07 -05:00
ekklesiaandClaude Opus 5	b9ca0d560d	feat: add host-provided module object storage ... `manifest.storage.buckets` has existed since manifest version 1 and meant nothing — discovery validated it and no code read it. This turns it into a real capability, which is what stands between Announcements and the module system: that product currently fetches a hardcoded LAN S3 endpoint, parses ListObjectsV2 XML by hand, and hands the browser direct object URLs. - A module declares a logical bucket and receives a scoped facade at `context.storage` — list, head, get, put, delete. The contract names no provider: no endpoint, region, credential, or physical bucket is reachable from it, which is what lets the same module run under a future standalone host over its own or a shared S3-compatible service. - Core's first provider speaks S3 through the AWS SDK. SeaweedFS is the deployment target (ADR 0004), never an API name. Probing the pinned image found `CreateBucket` reporting `BucketAlreadyExists` rather than AWS's `BucketAlreadyOwnedByYou`; treating only the AWS spelling as success would have failed every second boot. A live test pins it. - Logical → physical mapping is deterministic and collision-safe: an installation prefix, the module and bucket ids joined by `--` (which cannot occur inside either identifier, so `a-b`+`c` and `a`+`b-c` cannot collide), and a digest over the full untruncated identity. Two modules declaring `assets` always get separate namespaces; neither can see the physical name. - Declaring a bucket is now a requirement: with no provider configured the module is `blocked · storage_unavailable` through ADR 0028's existing resolver, propagating to required dependents. An installation with no object storage stays a complete deployment. - Binding availability is not provider health. Eligibility asks whether storage is configured, never whether it answered; bucket creation is lazy on first use so a storage outage cannot stop the platform booting; a running module whose store blinks stays running and retries. Nothing deletes a bucket. - Credentials are deployment-supplied, never persisted, never routed through module configuration, and never visible to modules, module UI, diagnostics, or API responses. Provider errors translate to a closed code set carrying no endpoint, bucket, request id, or XML. - Retires ADR 0029's transitional `bucket` configuration key. No manifest version change. The template declares no bucket, so it still runs without S3. See ADR 0030. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>	2026-08-23 08:45:53 -05:00