Bump the root and every platform workspace package from 0.1.0 to 0.1.1, so
the platform reports the version the v0.1.1 tag will carry. Module discovery
checks compatibility.platform against the root version and
compatibility.moduleSdk against @ekklesia/module-sdk; both stay inside every
existing ^0.1.0 range, so no module needs a new range. Everything since v0.1.0
is additive (health endpoints, Dashboard serving, production dependency
declarations, the deployment image and Compose project).
templates/module keeps 0.1.0: it is a module, versioned on its own, and its
manifest, source, and tests carry its own product version.
Mark ADR 0044 Accepted. Slices 1-4 are implemented and proven by CI's image
build and deploy smoke; slice 6 (scheduled backups and the restore
procedure) remains its open item.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
Implement ADR 0044's reference deployment as a base Compose file plus
overlays, so an installation that already runs a proxy can use the base
alone.
- compose.yaml: api, postgres, object-storage, and the operator-only
migrate (profile ops, plan by default). No published port. api and
migrate run init, read-only, tmpfs /tmp, cap_drop ALL,
no-new-privileges. postgres is only on the internal data network.
- TLS everywhere from one installation-private CA: PostgreSQL TLS 1.3
only, with pg_hba rejecting every non-TLS connection, and the API on
verify-full via EKKLESIA_DATABASE_CA (PEM text). SeaweedFS serves S3
over HTTPS (ADR 0030 requires https in production), trusted by the
API through NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS. No Core change.
- compose.proxy.yaml + Caddyfile.example: Caddy pinned by digest, ACME
HTTP-01 (DNS-01 documented), routes /, /api/*, /display/*, /assets/*
to api and refuses everything else; the storage hostname preserves
Host. The API trusts exactly the proxy's fixed /32 on an edge network
whose dynamic range excludes the fixed addresses; Caddy overwrites
X-Forwarded-For and strips caller-supplied forwarding headers.
- compose.tunnel.yaml: cloudflared pinned by digest, token from its own
env file; Caddy honors CF-Connecting-IP only from its fixed address.
- Four per-service root-owned env files, examples with no values;
scripts/init-tls.sh (idempotent, never overwrites a key) and
scripts/gen-secrets.sh (prints only).
- CI: pnpm deploy:config in ci:verify for all three combinations, and a
deploy-smoke job (scripts/smoke-deploy.sh) proving readiness, the
Dashboard, signed storage delivery, the client-address chain, initial
owner sign-in/out, verify-full database TLS, and Doctor through the
proxy, against disposable services. tests/deploy.test.ts pins the
structural guarantees.
- ADR 0044 (still Proposed) amended to match: API-to-storage HTTPS,
DNS-01 needs a custom Caddy build and tunnel-only needs DNS-01, the
tunnel's origin TLS settings live in the Cloudflare dashboard, port
80 serves HTTP-01, and secrets are one env file per service.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
A fresh production installation deadlocked. ADR 0034 gave Ekklesia a login
page and ADR 0019 gave it a single-use platform-owner bootstrap, but that
bootstrap grants ownership to a user id that already exists and has no way
to bring one into being. Public signup is disabled by default and
production cannot enable it at all, so a newly deployed instance had a
login page, no account, and no supported way to create one — only hand-
written SQL or briefly opening public registration.
pnpm identity:create-initial-owner -- --email [email protected]
creates the identity and grants it ownership, in the same shape as the
other operator commands: trusted local tooling, reachable only by someone
who already holds the database credentials, serving no HTTP route. No
/signup, /register, or /setup route is added, no bootstrap endpoint, and
no setup token; public signup stays disabled in every environment and a
test asserts a freshly bootstrapped deployment still refuses
/api/auth/sign-up/email.
The identity is created through Better Auth's own sign-up path, so
hashing, salting, normalization and the 8-128 bound are the identity
system's rather than a second implementation that could drift. Because the
server's instance refuses account creation, the command builds its own
in-process instance; nothing in apps/api imports it and the running
server's posture is untouched.
The sign-up result is verified rather than trusted. Better Auth returns a
fabricated success for an already-registered address — a user object whose
id was never persisted, database unchanged. That is correct enumeration
defence on a public endpoint and a trap here, so the identity is always
read back from the database and that read, not the response, is what the
grant uses.
An existing usable identity is adopted: ownership is granted and its
password left alone, reported as an adoption rather than a creation. This
is the recovery path for the one partial failure possible, since sign-up
commits on Better Auth's connection and the grant is a separate
transaction. A credential-less row is refused instead — making it an owner
would consume the single use on an identity nobody can authenticate as. A
password is never reset and an account is never taken over.
Whole invocations are serialized by an advisory lock on their own key, so
a race cannot leave a stray signable-in account behind; the grant's own
locked single-use transaction is unchanged. There is no --force or reset.
The password is prompted for invisibly or read from stdin, never from
argv (--password is refused with an explanation) and never from an
environment variable, so nothing about it becomes permanent deployment
configuration. The command needs DATABASE_URL and nothing else — verified
that sign-up needs no secret, base URL, or trusted origins, and that the
resulting account signs in through a separately configured server — so the
first owner can be created before TLS or DNS exist. It never migrates.
Proven end to end rather than at the database: a fresh installation is
bootstrapped, signed in through the real browser login transport with
signup disabled, its principal read, and used to open an owner-protected
resource that stays closed to anonymous callers.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
Ekklesia had no notion of a module being on or off: the accepted module set
was exactly "whatever discovery found on disk", and `ModuleLifecycleStage`
named nine states nothing produced or consumed. This replaces that vocabulary
with two axes that real code produces — persistent, administrator-owned
configuration (`enabled`/`disabled`) and per-boot runtime observation
(`running`/`disabled`/`blocked`) — and wires them through startup.
- One Core table (`ekklesia_core_module_state`, migration 0004) holding only
`module_id` and `enabled`. A module with no record is enabled by default, so
deploying a module is still sufficient to run it and discovery never needs an
initialization write. A record for an undeployed module is retained and
ignored, so redeploying restores the decision.
- `resolveModuleEligibility` is pure: a disabled module transitively blocks
every module that *requires* it (module and capability edges alike) with a
structured reason naming the provider; optional dependencies never block; and
a missing, incompatible, or cyclic dependency stays discovery's concern.
- `startApi` starts only the eligible set and builds the UI publication
registry from that same list, so routes, artifacts, browser inventory, and
Dashboard navigation all follow one authoritative set. A disabled module is
never imported, so there is no per-request enablement check anywhere.
- Startup stays all-or-nothing, deliberately; there is consequently no `failed`
runtime state. `pnpm modules:enable`/`modules:disable` is the out-of-band
recovery path for a module that breaks startup.
- Changes take effect at the next start, and the read model reports
configuration, runtime, and `restartRequired` separately rather than claiming
a module stopped when it has not.
- Migration participation and permission composition still span the deployed
and discovered inventories respectively, unchanged.
- New restricted platform permission `core.modules.lifecycle.manage` gates both
reading and changing enablement, at a sibling prefix (`/api/v1/module-lifecycle`)
that cannot collide with the module route namespace.
- `pnpm doctor` gains a `modules.lifecycle` check so "why is this module
unavailable?" is answerable without reading logs.
See ADR 0028.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
Wires Core's identity and authorization domains into apps/api over one
shared, validated PostgreSQL pool; adds an explicit, single-use,
concurrency-safe platform-owner bootstrap CLI; adds a smallest-possible
immutable permission registry with one Core-owned restricted permission
(core.authorization.grants.manage); and adds reusable Hono authorization
enforcement plus a narrowly scoped /api/v1/grants HTTP API for managing
explicit grants only, gated by an exact trusted Origin on every mutation.
Adds Core-owned identity contracts, a Core-owned Better Auth database schema
(ekklesia_core_user/session/account/verification), a first-class Core-owned
migration source that coexists with module-owned migrations under the exact
existing migration system, and an explicit Better Auth construction boundary.
No authentication endpoint or sign-in UI is exposed yet (ADR 0010).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
