3 Commits

Include renames

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
ekklesiaandClaude Opus 5.5	167b4c4f14	feat(deploy): add the reference deployment Compose project ... Implement ADR 0044's reference deployment as a base Compose file plus overlays, so an installation that already runs a proxy can use the base alone. - compose.yaml: api, postgres, object-storage, and the operator-only migrate (profile ops, plan by default). No published port. api and migrate run init, read-only, tmpfs /tmp, cap_drop ALL, no-new-privileges. postgres is only on the internal data network. - TLS everywhere from one installation-private CA: PostgreSQL TLS 1.3 only, with pg_hba rejecting every non-TLS connection, and the API on verify-full via EKKLESIA_DATABASE_CA (PEM text). SeaweedFS serves S3 over HTTPS (ADR 0030 requires https in production), trusted by the API through NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS. No Core change. - compose.proxy.yaml + Caddyfile.example: Caddy pinned by digest, ACME HTTP-01 (DNS-01 documented), routes /, /api/*, /display/*, /assets/* to api and refuses everything else; the storage hostname preserves Host. The API trusts exactly the proxy's fixed /32 on an edge network whose dynamic range excludes the fixed addresses; Caddy overwrites X-Forwarded-For and strips caller-supplied forwarding headers. - compose.tunnel.yaml: cloudflared pinned by digest, token from its own env file; Caddy honors CF-Connecting-IP only from its fixed address. - Four per-service root-owned env files, examples with no values; scripts/init-tls.sh (idempotent, never overwrites a key) and scripts/gen-secrets.sh (prints only). - CI: pnpm deploy:config in ci:verify for all three combinations, and a deploy-smoke job (scripts/smoke-deploy.sh) proving readiness, the Dashboard, signed storage delivery, the client-address chain, initial owner sign-in/out, verify-full database TLS, and Doctor through the proxy, against disposable services. tests/deploy.test.ts pins the structural guarantees. - ADR 0044 (still Proposed) amended to match: API-to-storage HTTPS, DNS-01 needs a custom Caddy build and tunnel-only needs DNS-01, the tunnel's origin TLS settings live in the Cloudflare dashboard, port 80 serves HTTP-01, and secrets are one env file per service. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>	2026-10-01 20:59:38 -05:00
ekklesiaandClaude Opus 5	27088fc054	fix: run the TLS integration harness under a containerized job ... The `migration-smoke` job fails on the Gitea runner at `docker port ekklesia-database-tls-<pid> 5432` with `no public port '5432' published`; the later invalid-URL and `ECONNREFUSED 127.0.0.1:5432` failures all cascade from it. Gitea executes the job inside a container and drives sibling containers through the runner's Docker daemon. The harness held two host-only assumptions, both reproduced in a nested job container and fixed here. Bind-mount source paths are resolved by the daemon against the runner host's filesystem. The certificate directory is created in the job container's `/tmp`, which does not exist there, so the daemon silently creates an empty directory, the entrypoint's `cp` fails, the container exits, and `docker port` reports no published port for an exited container. The material is now transferred with `docker cp` into the created-but-not-yet-started container, which crosses the daemon boundary correctly in both topologies, and only the server leaf and its key are transferred — both CA private keys stay in the harness directory. A published port lands on the runner host's loopback, a different network namespace from the job container's; measured, a container the daemon published at `127.0.0.1:32907` is `ECONNREFUSED` at that address from inside the job container. Under a containerized job the harness now publishes nothing and joins both containers to one isolated user-defined network, reaching PostgreSQL by container DNS on 5432. Direct-host runs keep a random port pinned to loopback via Docker's `127.0.0.1::5432` form. `compose_job_network_job_container` exports the topology decision the integration script already made, so there is still exactly one detector. Every TLS assertion is preserved, and the certificate identity is generated from the host actually connected to — `localhost` directly, the container's DNS name otherwise. The mismatch and chain-only controls use the TLS container's address on the isolated network rather than a hardcoded one, and the certificate carries no IP SAN, so verify-full still fails with `ERR_TLS_CERT_ALTNAME_INVALID`. Correcting one measurement in passing: chain-only verification does not skip the identity check. For an IP host `pg` omits `servername` and hands `tls.connect` a bare socket with no host, and `net.Socket._host` is null for an IP literal, so Node checks the fixed fallback name `localhost` — never the address dialled. A certificate whose only SAN is `DNS:example.invalid`, reached chain-only over `127.0.0.1`, is rejected with `Host: localhost. is not in the cert's altnames`. The direct-host control therefore only ever passed because its SAN was `DNS:localhost`. The SAN set now always includes that fallback name so the control proves the same gap in both topologies, and the stale claim is corrected in the transport doc comment. No production behavior changes. Teardown also removes the container's anonymous volume, the isolated network, and the job container's attachment, after success and failure alike. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>	2026-07-29 21:42:26 -05:00
ekklesia	831a48187c	test: add PostgreSQL migration integration coverage	2026-07-21 09:37:15 -05:00