57df2e15f24247b4ca40aaf36de1dc64a47e9744
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Commits
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796ad4f16e |
test: give Core's import-safety tests a timeout that holds under full verify load
CI / verify (pull_request) Successful in 1m5s
CI / infrastructure-smoke (pull_request) Successful in 37s
CI / migration-smoke (pull_request) Successful in 1m55s
CI / image-build (pull_request) Successful in 24s
CI / deploy-smoke (same-origin) (pull_request) Successful in 49s
CI / deploy-smoke (split) (pull_request) Successful in 1m31s
Four Core tests prove that importing a module has no side effects. Each one does a cold dynamic import() of a large Core source graph inside its test body: - doctor-import - module-http-import - cli-bootstrap-platform-owner - cli-create-initial-owner (its first test) Vitest transforms and evaluates that graph on demand, so the CPU-bound cost counts against the default 5 s per-test timeout. Ordinary test files import at the top level, outside any test timeout. There is no subprocess, shared resource, or test bug. Measured on six cores: - alone: 0.7–1.2 s; - alongside five other packages' suites, as in a full pnpm verify: 3.0–5.4 s (doctor-import reached 5,400 ms). A shared IMPORT_SAFETY_TEST_TIMEOUT_MS of 30 s (core/tests/support/ import-safety.ts) now applies to exactly these four tests. That is about five times the slowest time measured under load, the same as the repository's integration-test timeout, and still bounded, so an import that genuinely hangs fails. Assertions, coverage, the global Vitest timeout, parallelism, and production code are unchanged; there are no retries. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]> |
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c8fa13dd6a |
feat: create the initial platform owner from an operator command
A fresh production installation deadlocked. ADR 0034 gave Ekklesia a login
page and ADR 0019 gave it a single-use platform-owner bootstrap, but that
bootstrap grants ownership to a user id that already exists and has no way
to bring one into being. Public signup is disabled by default and
production cannot enable it at all, so a newly deployed instance had a
login page, no account, and no supported way to create one — only hand-
written SQL or briefly opening public registration.
pnpm identity:create-initial-owner -- --email [email protected]
creates the identity and grants it ownership, in the same shape as the
other operator commands: trusted local tooling, reachable only by someone
who already holds the database credentials, serving no HTTP route. No
/signup, /register, or /setup route is added, no bootstrap endpoint, and
no setup token; public signup stays disabled in every environment and a
test asserts a freshly bootstrapped deployment still refuses
/api/auth/sign-up/email.
The identity is created through Better Auth's own sign-up path, so
hashing, salting, normalization and the 8-128 bound are the identity
system's rather than a second implementation that could drift. Because the
server's instance refuses account creation, the command builds its own
in-process instance; nothing in apps/api imports it and the running
server's posture is untouched.
The sign-up result is verified rather than trusted. Better Auth returns a
fabricated success for an already-registered address — a user object whose
id was never persisted, database unchanged. That is correct enumeration
defence on a public endpoint and a trap here, so the identity is always
read back from the database and that read, not the response, is what the
grant uses.
An existing usable identity is adopted: ownership is granted and its
password left alone, reported as an adoption rather than a creation. This
is the recovery path for the one partial failure possible, since sign-up
commits on Better Auth's connection and the grant is a separate
transaction. A credential-less row is refused instead — making it an owner
would consume the single use on an identity nobody can authenticate as. A
password is never reset and an account is never taken over.
Whole invocations are serialized by an advisory lock on their own key, so
a race cannot leave a stray signable-in account behind; the grant's own
locked single-use transaction is unchanged. There is no --force or reset.
The password is prompted for invisibly or read from stdin, never from
argv (--password is refused with an explanation) and never from an
environment variable, so nothing about it becomes permanent deployment
configuration. The command needs DATABASE_URL and nothing else — verified
that sign-up needs no secret, base URL, or trusted origins, and that the
resulting account signs in through a separately configured server — so the
first owner can be created before TLS or DNS exist. It never migrates.
Proven end to end rather than at the database: a fresh installation is
bootstrapped, signed in through the real browser login transport with
signup disabled, its principal read, and used to open an owner-protected
resource that stays closed to anonymous callers.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
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