Ekklesia had no notion of a module being on or off: the accepted module set
was exactly "whatever discovery found on disk", and `ModuleLifecycleStage`
named nine states nothing produced or consumed. This replaces that vocabulary
with two axes that real code produces — persistent, administrator-owned
configuration (`enabled`/`disabled`) and per-boot runtime observation
(`running`/`disabled`/`blocked`) — and wires them through startup.
- One Core table (`ekklesia_core_module_state`, migration 0004) holding only
`module_id` and `enabled`. A module with no record is enabled by default, so
deploying a module is still sufficient to run it and discovery never needs an
initialization write. A record for an undeployed module is retained and
ignored, so redeploying restores the decision.
- `resolveModuleEligibility` is pure: a disabled module transitively blocks
every module that *requires* it (module and capability edges alike) with a
structured reason naming the provider; optional dependencies never block; and
a missing, incompatible, or cyclic dependency stays discovery's concern.
- `startApi` starts only the eligible set and builds the UI publication
registry from that same list, so routes, artifacts, browser inventory, and
Dashboard navigation all follow one authoritative set. A disabled module is
never imported, so there is no per-request enablement check anywhere.
- Startup stays all-or-nothing, deliberately; there is consequently no `failed`
runtime state. `pnpm modules:enable`/`modules:disable` is the out-of-band
recovery path for a module that breaks startup.
- Changes take effect at the next start, and the read model reports
configuration, runtime, and `restartRequired` separately rather than claiming
a module stopped when it has not.
- Migration participation and permission composition still span the deployed
and discovered inventories respectively, unchanged.
- New restricted platform permission `core.modules.lifecycle.manage` gates both
reading and changing enablement, at a sibling prefix (`/api/v1/module-lifecycle`)
that cannot collide with the module route namespace.
- `pnpm doctor` gains a `modules.lifecycle` check so "why is this module
unavailable?" is answerable without reading logs.
See ADR 0028.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
Phase 6D pass 1. The shell's navigation was a flat list of module ids, which
is not a usable experience — and the obvious fix carries an obvious trap.
Letting a module declare its folder, or modelling "Media" as something
Livestream and Video belong to, turns a rendering preference into
architecture: a folder becomes an owner, membership starts to look like a
dependency, and the flat module graph acquires a hierarchy nobody decided on.
So the rule comes first: a Dashboard group is a label on a rendering bucket.
No manifest, no version, no artifact, no API, no lifecycle; nothing depends on
it. Livestream depends on Video because it calls Video's functionality, and
that orders startup. Livestream is shown under Media, and that orders nothing.
No parent module, child module, owning module, or group-derived dependency
appears anywhere in the contracts.
No manifest change and no version 5. `manifest.name` has been required since
version 1 and already is the module's product identity, so the shell renders
"Livestream" instead of `livestream` with nothing added. `suggestedGroup` is
deliberately deferred rather than shipped: it would force a hard
manifest-version cutover for a hint, and its only correct semantics needs
initialization logic that risks a suggestion overwriting an administrator's
decision. Defaulting and ownership are different things.
Two Core tables (migration 0003) hold groups and placements — server-side,
because a church configures its Dashboard rather than one browser;
platform-global, because no organization model exists to scope them to.
`group_id` is `on delete set null`, so deleting a group ungroups its modules
and a dangling reference is impossible. `module_id` carries no foreign key,
because modules are packages rather than rows, so a placement for an
uninstalled module is retained and restores its position on reinstall.
`resolveDashboardNavigation` is a pure function of configuration plus the
mountable set: an unplaced module is ungrouped and visible with no
initialization write, an absent module renders nothing, empty groups are kept,
and ordering is total with the module id as final tie-break.
`GET /api/v1/dashboard/navigation` returns the resolved view, layered on top of
the host-neutral module UI inventory rather than merged into it — each generic
descriptor is embedded untouched, so a standalone host never inherits Dashboard
semantics. Reading needs the permission the inventory already needs; organizing
needs the new platform permission `core.dashboard.navigation.manage` through a
narrow, idempotent, closed-validation mutation contract. No editor UI.
The flatness rule is executable: a test discovers real fixtures with a genuine
dependency, arranges them four ways including both in one folder and the
dependency inverted in presentation, and asserts discovery order, dependency
declarations, and the module set stay byte-identical. The end-to-end test
organizes a real installation through the real API, mounts a module from inside
a group, moves it, and asserts the navigation entry is byte-identical across the
move and still mounts the same artifact.
The shell's client for the generic inventory became dead code and was removed
rather than kept speculatively; the endpoint itself is unchanged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
Every PostgreSQL connection this repository opened was plaintext, in every
environment: no connection site set `ssl` at all, so credentials, session
tokens, and row data crossed the network in the clear and nothing in
configuration, startup, or `pnpm doctor` said so. The public identity URL
boundary was also looser than it appeared.
`core/src/database/transport.ts` is now the one typed policy. It has exactly two
modes: `verify-full` (TLS required, certificate chain verified, and server
identity verified against the configured host — the production default) and
`disable` (the development/test default, refused outright in production). There
is deliberately no encryption-only `require` mode, no chain-only `verify-ca`,
and no `rejectUnauthorized: false` escape hatch anywhere in the configuration
surface; every loose or aliased spelling is rejected in both environments, so a
typo never quietly becomes a weaker mode. Production has no plaintext exception
at all, not even for a loopback database — a connection string cannot prove the
database is process-local.
Verification is certificate *and* hostname. The policy supplies an explicit
`checkServerIdentity` pinned to the host parsed from DATABASE_URL, because the
pinned driver sets TLS `servername` only for non-IP hosts and Node performs no
identity check when it is unset — so `rejectUnauthorized: true` alone accepts a
certificate from any host the trusted CA ever signed when connecting by IP.
Both halves are proven against a real TLS-enabled PostgreSQL, including that the
same connection without the pinned callback succeeds. Every CA, certificate, and
key is generated at test runtime and deleted afterwards.
A DATABASE_URL may no longer carry its own TLS parameters. The pinned driver
merges parsed connection-string values over explicitly passed options, so a
`?sslmode=disable` in the URL would silently replace the policy's verified `ssl`
object; that now fails with a stable code, reported by both `pnpm doctor` and
the migration CLIs rather than as "failed unexpectedly".
One shared environment reader keeps `process.env` out of Core's reusable
constructors, and every executable that opens a connection resolves the policy
identically: the API (validated before any pool, Better Auth instance, module
runtime, or listener exists), both migration commands, the bootstrap CLI, and
Doctor's own connection. Doctor reports it as a blocking failure, never a
warning, naming only the effective mode.
Separately, the identity base URL and every trusted origin must now be exactly
one canonical origin — the WHATWG origin serialization must equal the supplied
string — so a path, trailing slash, credentials, explicit default port, or
non-canonical case is rejected rather than normalized into something that no
longer matches what a browser sends. Production's loopback rejection now
classifies the address instead of comparing against three literals, covering
`.localhost`, all of 127.0.0.0/8, 0.0.0.0, `::`, expanded and IPv4-mapped
forms. This is a configuration-shape guarantee only: it does not resolve DNS or
prove reachability, and TLS protects the connection, not the exposure.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
Add a real installed-module fixture (core/tests/fixtures/module-database-integration/db-facade)
with its own manifest, Drizzle schema, drizzle-kit-generated migration, and permissioned HTTP
routes, then exercise it end to end in a new apps/api PostgreSQL integration suite: explicit
migration application before the module runtime starts (never auto-created), start/stop/HTTP
handlers sharing one ModuleDatabase facade by reference, authorized read/mutation/transaction
commit and rollback against real PostgreSQL, denied/rejected-origin/OPTIONS/HEAD requests never
reaching the module or its table, and both a module-caught and an uncaught real database failure
sanitizing exactly as pass 1 established. Registered alongside the existing suites in
vitest.migrations.integration.config.ts; no production code, schema, or migration changed.
Wires Core's identity and authorization domains into apps/api over one
shared, validated PostgreSQL pool; adds an explicit, single-use,
concurrency-safe platform-owner bootstrap CLI; adds a smallest-possible
immutable permission registry with one Core-owned restricted permission
(core.authorization.grants.manage); and adds reusable Hono authorization
enforcement plus a narrowly scoped /api/v1/grants HTTP API for managing
explicit grants only, gated by an exact trusted Origin on every mutation.
