Ekklesia

48 Commits 4 Branches 8 Tags

3 Commits

Include renames

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
ekklesiaandClaude Opus 5	1161f5a076	fix: fail closed on production signup Production configuration accepted publicSignupEnabled: true and started a working Identity/API runtime, even though Ekklesia has no verified email, invitation requirement, CAPTCHA, or durable shared/edge limiter — Doctor merely reported "Public signup is explicitly ENABLED" as a pass. validatePublicSignupEnabled now takes the same IdentityEnvironment the rest of this config validates against and throws the stable PUBLIC_SIGNUP_UNSUPPORTED_IN_PRODUCTION whenever the parsed value is true in production. Parsing stays separate from the policy, so a malformed value still reports PUBLIC_SIGNUP_ENABLED_INVALID everywhere. Because the executable entry point validates configuration before startApi, such a deployment fails before any pool, Better Auth instance, module runtime, or listener exists, and Doctor reports NOT READY via its existing IdentityConfigError path. Development and test composition still enable it explicitly through the identical typed path. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>	2026-07-26 15:58:08 -05:00
ekklesiaandClaude Sonnet 5	cafd513019	fix: secure authentication request identity Replace Better Auth's default trust of a caller-controlled X-Forwarded-For with a platform-owned client-address resolution boundary: direct mode (the safe default) trusts only the real socket peer, and an explicit trusted-proxy mode requires a header name, a concrete trusted-proxy list, and only honors a forwarded chain from an actual trusted peer. This closes a rate-limit bypass where rotating a spoofed header let a caller choose a fresh bucket on every request. Public sign-up is also disabled by default and requires an explicit typed opt-in, using Better Auth's own disableSignUp gate so no email-existence leak or second signup path is introduced. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>	2026-07-26 12:20:51 -05:00
ekklesia	91d8f5946f	feat: expose core identity transport CI / verify (pull_request) Successful in 27s Details CI / infrastructure-smoke (pull_request) Successful in 19s Details CI / migration-smoke (pull_request) Successful in 26s Details	2026-07-21 19:15:14 -05:00

Author

SHA1

Message

Date

ekklesiaandClaude Opus 5

1161f5a076

fix: fail closed on production signup

Production configuration accepted publicSignupEnabled: true and started a
working Identity/API runtime, even though Ekklesia has no verified email,
invitation requirement, CAPTCHA, or durable shared/edge limiter — Doctor
merely reported "Public signup is explicitly ENABLED" as a pass.

validatePublicSignupEnabled now takes the same IdentityEnvironment the rest
of this config validates against and throws the stable
PUBLIC_SIGNUP_UNSUPPORTED_IN_PRODUCTION whenever the parsed value is true in
production. Parsing stays separate from the policy, so a malformed value
still reports PUBLIC_SIGNUP_ENABLED_INVALID everywhere. Because the
executable entry point validates configuration before startApi, such a
deployment fails before any pool, Better Auth instance, module runtime, or
listener exists, and Doctor reports NOT READY via its existing
IdentityConfigError path. Development and test composition still enable it
explicitly through the identical typed path.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>

2026-07-26 15:58:08 -05:00

ekklesiaandClaude Sonnet 5

cafd513019

fix: secure authentication request identity

Replace Better Auth's default trust of a caller-controlled X-Forwarded-For
with a platform-owned client-address resolution boundary: direct mode (the
safe default) trusts only the real socket peer, and an explicit trusted-proxy
mode requires a header name, a concrete trusted-proxy list, and only honors a
forwarded chain from an actual trusted peer. This closes a rate-limit bypass
where rotating a spoofed header let a caller choose a fresh bucket on every
request. Public sign-up is also disabled by default and requires an explicit
typed opt-in, using Better Auth's own disableSignUp gate so no email-existence
leak or second signup path is introduced.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>

2026-07-26 12:20:51 -05:00

ekklesia

91d8f5946f

feat: expose core identity transport

CI / verify (pull_request) Successful in 27s

Details

CI / infrastructure-smoke (pull_request) Successful in 19s

Details

CI / migration-smoke (pull_request) Successful in 26s

Details

2026-07-21 19:15:14 -05:00