Commit Graph
4 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
ekklesiaandClaude Sonnet 5 d3c6bd73d3 fix: enforce API request limits
Add a single platform-owned request-body policy (hono/body-limit) with
small, named limits for Better Auth and Core's grant-mutation endpoint, and
a new required maxBodyBytes field on the executable module route contract so
every module route makes a conscious no-body-or-bounded-body choice, capped
at a platform ceiling. Every oversized request gets one sanitized 413
contract and never reaches business logic, authorization, or a handler.
Also configure finite Node header/request/keep-alive timeouts, including the
non-obvious connectionsCheckingInterval needed for them to take effect
promptly, so a slow-header or slow-body connection cannot hold a socket
indefinitely.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
2026-07-26 12:29:24 -05:00
ekklesia 510d76f7c2 docs: correct module authorization comments
CI / verify (pull_request) Successful in 26s
CI / infrastructure-smoke (pull_request) Successful in 20s
CI / migration-smoke (pull_request) Successful in 27s
2026-07-24 17:59:48 -05:00
ekklesia df2af0a3e0 fix: enforce registered authorization permissions
CI / verify (pull_request) Successful in 25s
CI / infrastructure-smoke (pull_request) Successful in 11s
CI / migration-smoke (pull_request) Successful in 27s
Two related fail-closed gaps let a well-formed but never-declared
permission id slip through:

- POST /api/v1/grants created explicit grants for any well-formed
  PermissionId without checking the injected permission registry,
  allowing dormant grants for invented identifiers that could become
  effective the moment those identifiers were registered later.
- createAuthorizationEvaluator validated the permission id only inside
  the restricted-baseline branch, so a malformed permission combined
  with the public or authenticated baseline could still return allowed.

Both now fail closed: the grants route checks the target permission
against the trusted registry before calling store.createGrant (sanitized
403, no store or audit write), and the evaluator validates permission
shape before any baseline is allowed to return an allowed decision,
without adding a registry dependency to the evaluator itself.

The live integration lifecycle test switched from an unregistered
calendar.events.read to the registered core.authorization.grants.manage
permission, since module permission registration does not exist yet.
2026-07-23 11:44:45 -05:00
ekklesia 1363608552 feat: add authorization bootstrap and HTTP enforcement
Wires Core's identity and authorization domains into apps/api over one
shared, validated PostgreSQL pool; adds an explicit, single-use,
concurrency-safe platform-owner bootstrap CLI; adds a smallest-possible
immutable permission registry with one Core-owned restricted permission
(core.authorization.grants.manage); and adds reusable Hono authorization
enforcement plus a narrowly scoped /api/v1/grants HTTP API for managing
explicit grants only, gated by an exact trusted Origin on every mutation.
2026-07-23 11:16:32 -05:00