7 Commits

Include renames

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
ekklesiaandClaude Opus 5.5	f63f80f2f0	feat: support split Dashboard and API origins (ADR 0045) ... An installation can now serve the Dashboard and the API on sibling hostnames (dash./api.) beside the default same-origin topology, from one image and with configuration alone. - The Dashboard learns its API origin at run time: the built page carries one empty <meta name="ekklesia-api-origin">, which the API fills with its identity base URL's origin at startup, before computing the page's ETag. The shell accepts only a canonical http(s) origin and otherwise fails closed without making a request. The build-time EKKLESIA_API_BASE_URL is gone from the bundle; the development server injects the same element. - The display host stays on the API's origin, so its device cookies, requests, and offline cache are unchanged. - The API trusts its own origin (trusted origins plus the identity base URL), as Better Auth already does, so the display page's mutations pass the origin check without operators listing it. - Doctor validates EKKLESIA_DASHBOARD_ORIGIN exactly as the API's startup does (it previously skipped it), reports the topology without printing hostnames, and warns when split hostnames are not siblings. - The module UI contract states the CORS header limit (safelisted headers plus Content-Type, safelisted response headers only). - Reference deployment: Caddyfile.split.example (Dashboard hostname serves / and its script; API hostname serves /api/*, /display/*, and the display script; each refuses the other's paths) and EKKLESIA_DASHBOARD_HOSTNAME in the proxy overlay and env examples. - The deploy smoke test runs either topology (CI runs both). The split run installs the module template as a test-only module, checks per-hostname routing and exact CORS, then drives a digest-pinned headless Chromium over the DevTools protocol, with no added dependency: sign-in on the Dashboard hostname, the session cookie host-only on the API hostname, the module UI imported cross-origin and its credentialed request succeeding, the display and its service worker on the API hostname, and sign-out. ADR 0045 is marked Accepted. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>	2026-10-03 14:47:36 -05:00
ekklesiaandClaude Opus 5	bb7a9eb351	fix: let the display worker ignore requests it does not handle ... The fetch listener called `respondWith` for every request and re-issued the unrecognized ones itself. That routes the whole page through the worker, re-sends request bodies from a different context, and makes the worker's presence observable on requests it has no interest in. Classify synchronously and respond only for the shell and artifact URLs this worker actually owns. Not responding is what leaves the browser doing exactly what it would have done without a worker at all — which is the property the allowlist was written to preserve. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>	2026-08-27 16:17:04 -05:00
ekklesiaandClaude Opus 5	ca3f37d5f9	feat: let a display survive its network — as code, not as authorization ... A display is the one surface expected to outlive its network: a television on a wall in a building whose uplink is a consumer router, with nobody standing in front of it. When that uplink drops and the screen reboots, the browser shows its own error page — not the display shell, not an Ekklesia message, nothing that recovers on its own, because there is no Ekklesia code left running to recover. Cache the shell and the declared code, in a service worker scoped to `/display/`: the page, the host script, the module's display artifact, and every contributed renderer that display actually mounted. All of them are code whose bytes already confer no authority, and all of them are addressed by a URL carrying an exact version. Cache nothing else, ever. Not the descriptor, not `/api/v1/principal`, not a module or platform API response, not the realtime stream, not a pairing exchange, and not any cross-origin request — which is what a signed object-delivery URL is. It is an allowlist rather than a deny list, so the cost of forgetting a new endpoint is that code goes uncached rather than that a permission decision gets stored. The consequence is stated rather than papered over: a display cannot render module content while offline. Mounting needs a descriptor, a descriptor is authorization-bearing, and it is never cached — so a revoked device stays revoked and cached code can never manufacture current authorization. What the cache buys is that a kiosk rebooting mid-outage boots into Ekklesia's own offline state and keeps retrying, that reconnecting mounts with nothing left to download, and that a hiccup fetching 600 KB of artifact after the tiny descriptor already resolved falls back to identical bytes instead of failing the display. Network-first everywhere, so a screen picks up new code the moment the server returns and can never be trapped on an obsolete build — the failure mode a cache-first worker produces on a screen nobody visits. Only a complete same-origin 200 is stored. Cache names carry a policy version and superseded generations are deleted; artifacts are pruned to the current version per module, keeping every artifact belonging to that version because a display artifact and its contributed renderers share one. The worker never caches itself. The page gets a small signal built from two sources, because either alone lies: `navigator.onLine` is optimistic behind a captive portal, and only the worker knows it actually served from cache. A display shows a quiet corner indicator rather than blanking a lobby wall, and resolves its descriptor again by itself when the network returns — nobody presses Retry on a lobby TV. Every caching decision lives in a module that touches no global, so the behaviour is exercised directly rather than through a worker a test runner cannot host. Registration is an enhancement: no service workers, plain HTTP, or a refusing policy all leave a display that works exactly as before. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>	2026-08-27 16:08:34 -05:00
ekklesiaandClaude Opus 5	c444ff570b	feat: let one module contribute a browser renderer to another's capability ... The platform has had a complete story for one module using another's *backend* since ADR 0006 — capabilities, versioned ranges, provider registration. It has had none at all for one module using another's *browser* code, and every workaround is wrong in a way that matters: a consumer cannot import a peer module, it cannot re-implement a renderer for a domain it does not own, and a second `entrypoints` role would put the platform in charge of deciding when a slot inside someone else's screen should be filled. Add a generic browser contribution. `manifestVersion: 7` declares one: namespaced id, its own version, a target capability, a compatible range, and one artifact. That is the complete list, and the omissions are the decision — no payload schema, slot, ordering, or rendering hint exists anywhere, so Core cannot learn what a slide is because the declaration cannot express it. Discovery resolves a contribution artifact through the *identical* loop every other compiled entrypoint uses, inheriting the path, containment, symlink, extension, and file-kind checks rather than getting a weaker copy of them. The registry publishes one only when another eligible module provides the target capability within the declared range; otherwise it is absent rather than mounted and broken. `apps/api` serves it as a sibling of the artifact and display routes, with the same policy: three lookup keys, one exact match, one already-validated path, and one indistinguishable 404 for unknown, undeclared, stale, and incompatible alike. A consumer discovers through the host, never through a URL. Its descriptor carries identity, version, and capability; the URL stays server-side and is resolved exactly as `api.request("records")` is. A module can only ever see contributions aimed at a capability it itself provides, and cannot name its way to anything else — a mount for a withheld id fails without fetching. The consumer owns the domain contract entirely. Input is opaque JSON, checked structurally so a Date, a function, a cycle, or `undefined` fails at the boundary rather than vanishing somewhere far from the mistake, and checked for nothing else. A contributed renderer receives its own id and that input: no API client, realtime, principal, configuration, database, storage, or credential. Loading one grants its module nothing. The contribution ABI is versioned separately from the module UI ABI, because the two have different shapes and lifecycles and coupling them would force every module to rebuild whenever either moved. It supports asynchronous readiness, update-without-remount (a screen that remounted per tick would restart animations and reload media), deterministic cleanup in a `finally`, and sanitized failure that never carries the consumer's domain data. Each renderer mounts in its own isolated root with its own stylesheet. The template now declares a contribution, so `pnpm build` exercises the whole authoring path, and the shell suite drives the full relationship — one module discovering, mounting, updating, and unmounting another's React renderer with neither importing the other. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>	2026-08-27 07:47:10 -05:00
ekklesiaandClaude Opus 5	e03d38fcab	feat: give every Ekklesia screen one set of design tokens and elements ... Modules have owned their own UI since ADR 0021, but the platform has never said what that UI should look like. Every screen here — the Dashboard shell, the display host, the module template — invented its own hex colours, font stack, spacing, and radii, and they already disagreed. A module author had no vocabulary for "the ordinary panel background", so the only available answer was to invent one, and two modules would invent two. Add `@ekklesia/design-tokens`: one validated, enumerable registry of semantic tokens. A token declares a name, label, description, and default value; its category and `--ekklesia-*` identifier are derived from the name, so it can never claim one category while being named for another. Construction rejects duplicates, malformed names, unknown categories, empty or overlong text, and any value that is not a bounded literal — no declaration terminator, rule block, comment, at-rule, `url(`, `!important`, escape, control character, or markup. A registry that constructs can therefore be emitted as CSS without escaping, because nothing needing escaping can be in it. That validation is also what makes a future theme editor implementable rather than aspirational. Add `@ekklesia/ui`: button, icon button, text input, select, checkbox, field wrapper, panel, dialog, tabs, table and list primitives, badge, toast, and empty/error/loading states — every value a token reference, with real `:focus-visible` treatment and status that never depends on colour alone. Deliberately small: an element earns its place when two consumers need it. The stylesheet is a string rather than a `.css` file so the identical bytes install into a document or an isolated artifact root, and so hover, disabled, and focus-visible are real CSS rather than JavaScript approximations of them. `pnpm boundaries` opens exactly two shared roles to modules, by name — every other role stays rejected — and pins both design packages to the bottom of the presentation stack. Both are browser-safe by construction, proven by a real compile of module-shaped source in which `process.env` must fail to typecheck. The shell installs the defaults at its document root for the Dashboard and the display; custom properties inherit into module artifacts, so a module reads `var(--ekklesia-…)` with nothing to import at run time and nothing for a host to forget to pass. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>	2026-08-27 06:59:44 -05:00
ekklesiaandClaude Opus 5	80189c8ae2	feat: give display devices their own paired identity ... ADR 0033 gave Ekklesia a display host and ADR 0034 gave it a login page. Together, the only way to light a television in a foyer was to sign a human being into it and leave that session running on a screen anyone can walk up to: a person's credentials on a wall, a person's session as the thing signage depends on, and the display going dark when they are revoked or their session simply expires. A screen is not a person. Ekklesia now recognizes three principal classes — anonymous, authenticated human, and managed device — and a device is a first-class principal with its own credential and its own explicit permissions. It has no email, no password, and no row in the identity tables, and it satisfies the `authenticated` baseline never, so every route that settles for "somebody is signed in" stays closed to it. Device permissions live in their own table because ekklesia_core_grant.user_id is a non-null foreign key into the user table and making it polymorphic would rewrite the platform's central authorization record to serve one narrow case. That is a schema decision, not a second decision point: the evaluator gained one branch, so a device is allowed or denied by the same function, with the same deny-by-default, as anyone else — with no owner path it could reach and no baseline that stands in for a grant. The six-digit code is not the credential. It is printed across a screen in a public hallway, so it is treated as public: it identifies a request to an administrator and is worth nothing alone. Collecting the credential also requires a 256-bit claim secret held only in the requesting browser's HttpOnly cookie, and approving requires the restricted core.devices.manage permission. Without that split, reading a code off a wall would hand over the screen's identity. The permission a pairing asks for is read from the module's validated display declaration, never from the request, so a browser cannot ask to be granted core.devices.manage or another module's permission. Approval grants exactly that one permission. Credentials are stored only as SHA-256; the raw value exists in the Set-Cookie that issues it and the device's own cookie jar, and is never logged, returned in JSON, or placed in a URL. The cookie is HttpOnly, so the module display code running in that same page cannot read it. Revocation is a server-side column checked on every principal resolution, and re-pairing mints a new identity so an old credential can never come back. State transitions are conditional updates, so one code cannot be approved twice or claimed into two credentials under a race. /api/v1/principal still reports a device as anonymous: it is what the Dashboard uses to decide whether a person is signed in. Displays read their viewer from the descriptor instead, which already performed the authorization — so displays are descriptor-first while the Dashboard stays principal-first, and neither infers an identity by elimination. Proven end to end against real PostgreSQL and real HTTP: an unpaired screen shows a code, an owner approves it, the device opens the display descriptor and a realtime stream, and revocation closes both while the device still holds its cookie. An already-open SSE stream is bounded by realtime's existing five-minute reconnect rather than closed instantly, and that bound is documented rather than called immediate. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>	2026-08-23 23:41:03 -05:00
ekklesia	2e0fe059c3	feat: add display kiosk host	2026-08-23 20:50:56 -05:00