Phase 6C pass 2. Every link in the module UI chain existed except the one
that closes it: a module could be authored, built, validated, published at a
browser URL, and loaded by a generic loader — and nothing in Ekklesia did any
of it. There was no browser application at all.
Two pieces were missing. A browser could not discover what to mount, and it
must not work that out for itself.
GET /api/v1/module-ui is the inventory: per publishable module, its id and
version, the server-produced artifact URL, the server-produced root of the
module's own API, and the subset of that module's declared permissions the
caller holds. Five fields, each because building a ModuleUiHostContext needs
it — no filesystem paths, and no name/icon/folder/order, because navigation
metadata is a design that does not exist yet. Its module set is the ADR 0025
publication registry rather than a rescan, so the inventory and the artifact
route cannot disagree. It requires a new Core permission, core.modules.ui.read
(baseline authenticated), because it is precisely the enumeration the anonymous
artifact route deliberately withholds.
Both URLs are server-produced. moduleUiArtifactUrl already existed;
moduleApiBaseUrl is now exported and moduleRoutePath builds on it, so each URL
shape has exactly one author. Without it the shell would hardcode
/api/v1/modules/<id> — the prefix ADR 0022 forbids a module UI from spelling,
reappearing in the host instead.
surfaces/shell (@ekklesia/shell) is the repository's first surface: a small
React application built to static files by its own esbuild script. It resolves
the principal, fetches the inventory, builds the host context entirely from
server-derived data, and hands the artifact URL to @ekklesia/module-ui-host.
One frame per selection — keyed by module identity — defeats the stale-load
race; the host owns the container, the loading state, and every failure, so a
broken module costs its own panel rather than the shell.
The shell statically imports no module, and both levels are checked: no source
import may name a module, and the emitted bundle must contain exactly one
dynamic import (the loader's) with no module id, no /api/v1/modules, no eval,
and no blob URL. Permission hints come from Core's own evaluator and stay
presentation-only — the end-to-end test has a UI holding no grant call its API
anyway and still receive 403.
Surfaces may now depend only on browser-safe shared roles; @ekklesia/contracts
is deliberately excluded, since its barrel pulls Drizzle's types and Node's
globals into the browser — the hole ADR 0024 closed one layer down.
Not the Dashboard: no navigation, grouping, icons, ordering, design system, or
routing. The selector is a list of module ids.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
Every PostgreSQL connection this repository opened was plaintext, in every
environment: no connection site set `ssl` at all, so credentials, session
tokens, and row data crossed the network in the clear and nothing in
configuration, startup, or `pnpm doctor` said so. The public identity URL
boundary was also looser than it appeared.
`core/src/database/transport.ts` is now the one typed policy. It has exactly two
modes: `verify-full` (TLS required, certificate chain verified, and server
identity verified against the configured host — the production default) and
`disable` (the development/test default, refused outright in production). There
is deliberately no encryption-only `require` mode, no chain-only `verify-ca`,
and no `rejectUnauthorized: false` escape hatch anywhere in the configuration
surface; every loose or aliased spelling is rejected in both environments, so a
typo never quietly becomes a weaker mode. Production has no plaintext exception
at all, not even for a loopback database — a connection string cannot prove the
database is process-local.
Verification is certificate *and* hostname. The policy supplies an explicit
`checkServerIdentity` pinned to the host parsed from DATABASE_URL, because the
pinned driver sets TLS `servername` only for non-IP hosts and Node performs no
identity check when it is unset — so `rejectUnauthorized: true` alone accepts a
certificate from any host the trusted CA ever signed when connecting by IP.
Both halves are proven against a real TLS-enabled PostgreSQL, including that the
same connection without the pinned callback succeeds. Every CA, certificate, and
key is generated at test runtime and deleted afterwards.
A DATABASE_URL may no longer carry its own TLS parameters. The pinned driver
merges parsed connection-string values over explicitly passed options, so a
`?sslmode=disable` in the URL would silently replace the policy's verified `ssl`
object; that now fails with a stable code, reported by both `pnpm doctor` and
the migration CLIs rather than as "failed unexpectedly".
One shared environment reader keeps `process.env` out of Core's reusable
constructors, and every executable that opens a connection resolves the policy
identically: the API (validated before any pool, Better Auth instance, module
runtime, or listener exists), both migration commands, the bootstrap CLI, and
Doctor's own connection. Doctor reports it as a blocking failure, never a
warning, naming only the effective mode.
Separately, the identity base URL and every trusted origin must now be exactly
one canonical origin — the WHATWG origin serialization must equal the supplied
string — so a path, trailing slash, credentials, explicit default port, or
non-canonical case is rejected rather than normalized into something that no
longer matches what a browser sends. Production's loopback rejection now
classifies the address instead of comparing against three literals, covering
`.localhost`, all of 127.0.0.0/8, 0.0.0.0, `::`, expanded and IPv4-mapped
forms. This is a configuration-shape guarantee only: it does not resolve DNS or
prove reachability, and TLS protects the connection, not the exposure.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
Replace Better Auth's default trust of a caller-controlled X-Forwarded-For
with a platform-owned client-address resolution boundary: direct mode (the
safe default) trusts only the real socket peer, and an explicit trusted-proxy
mode requires a header name, a concrete trusted-proxy list, and only honors a
forwarded chain from an actual trusted peer. This closes a rate-limit bypass
where rotating a spoofed header let a caller choose a fresh bucket on every
request. Public sign-up is also disabled by default and requires an explicit
typed opt-in, using Better Auth's own disableSignUp gate so no email-existence
leak or second signup path is introduced.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
Wires composePlatformPermissionRegistry into apps/api's production
startup: startApi() discovers every installed module, composes the one
immutable platform permission registry (Core's own declarations plus
every module's), and only then constructs the shared PostgreSQL pool,
Better Auth, and the HTTP server. A discovery or composition failure —
an invalid manifest, a reserved core.* namespace claim, or a duplicate
declaration — propagates before anything exists to close; there is no
Core-only registry fallback. apps/api/src/platform-permissions.ts
resolves the repository root from its own file location, never
process.cwd(), so package-scoped test runs discover the right modules/
directory.
createApiApp/createGrantsRoutes now require the composed registry as
an injected authorization option, replacing the previous hard-coded
CORE_PERMISSION_REGISTRY; requirePermission continues to work
identically for Core-owned and module-owned permissions, since it has
no concept of the distinction.
Extends pnpm doctor with a modules.permissions check (reusing the
already-discovered module list, distinguishing reserved-namespace from
generic-duplicate failures, never re-discovering modules) and pnpm
modules:validate to compose the same registry before a module is
considered installable.
Adds focused coverage: startup-ordering and failure-isolation tests in
apps/api/tests/lifecycle.test.ts, module-owned-declaration enforcement
tests in apps/api/tests/authorization-middleware.test.ts, Doctor
composition tests in core/tests/doctor.test.ts, and a live PostgreSQL
end-to-end scenario proving a real installed module's permission is
discoverable, grantable, and deniable once the module is absent again
after a restart, without ever executing its server entrypoint.
Adds Core-owned identity contracts, a Core-owned Better Auth database schema
(ekklesia_core_user/session/account/verification), a first-class Core-owned
migration source that coexists with module-owned migrations under the exact
existing migration system, and an explicit Better Auth construction boundary.
No authentication endpoint or sign-in UI is exposed yet (ADR 0010).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
