Phase 6D pass 1. The shell's navigation was a flat list of module ids, which
is not a usable experience — and the obvious fix carries an obvious trap.
Letting a module declare its folder, or modelling "Media" as something
Livestream and Video belong to, turns a rendering preference into
architecture: a folder becomes an owner, membership starts to look like a
dependency, and the flat module graph acquires a hierarchy nobody decided on.
So the rule comes first: a Dashboard group is a label on a rendering bucket.
No manifest, no version, no artifact, no API, no lifecycle; nothing depends on
it. Livestream depends on Video because it calls Video's functionality, and
that orders startup. Livestream is shown under Media, and that orders nothing.
No parent module, child module, owning module, or group-derived dependency
appears anywhere in the contracts.
No manifest change and no version 5. `manifest.name` has been required since
version 1 and already is the module's product identity, so the shell renders
"Livestream" instead of `livestream` with nothing added. `suggestedGroup` is
deliberately deferred rather than shipped: it would force a hard
manifest-version cutover for a hint, and its only correct semantics needs
initialization logic that risks a suggestion overwriting an administrator's
decision. Defaulting and ownership are different things.
Two Core tables (migration 0003) hold groups and placements — server-side,
because a church configures its Dashboard rather than one browser;
platform-global, because no organization model exists to scope them to.
`group_id` is `on delete set null`, so deleting a group ungroups its modules
and a dangling reference is impossible. `module_id` carries no foreign key,
because modules are packages rather than rows, so a placement for an
uninstalled module is retained and restores its position on reinstall.
`resolveDashboardNavigation` is a pure function of configuration plus the
mountable set: an unplaced module is ungrouped and visible with no
initialization write, an absent module renders nothing, empty groups are kept,
and ordering is total with the module id as final tie-break.
`GET /api/v1/dashboard/navigation` returns the resolved view, layered on top of
the host-neutral module UI inventory rather than merged into it — each generic
descriptor is embedded untouched, so a standalone host never inherits Dashboard
semantics. Reading needs the permission the inventory already needs; organizing
needs the new platform permission `core.dashboard.navigation.manage` through a
narrow, idempotent, closed-validation mutation contract. No editor UI.
The flatness rule is executable: a test discovers real fixtures with a genuine
dependency, arranges them four ways including both in one folder and the
dependency inverted in presentation, and asserts discovery order, dependency
declarations, and the module set stay byte-identical. The end-to-end test
organizes a real installation through the real API, mounts a module from inside
a group, moves it, and asserts the navigation entry is byte-identical across the
move and still mounts the same artifact.
The shell's client for the generic inventory became dead code and was removed
rather than kept speculatively; the endpoint itself is unchanged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
Phase 6C pass 1. ADR 0024 named the one thing missing between the module UI
build pipeline and the generic host loader: Core resolves entrypoints.ui to an
absolute server filesystem path, and a browser needs a URL. This adds that
publication layer.
Core owns the policy. createModuleUiPublicationRegistry builds, from the
discovered and started module inventory, the answer to "may this be published,
and which exact file is it?" — publishable means the module survived discovery
and declares entrypoints.ui, with no new lifecycle state and no installer.
apps/api owns the transport: GET /api/v1/module-ui/<module-id>/<version>. Both
segments are lookup keys, not path components. An exact match yields the
canonical artifact path discovery already validated; no request value is ever
composed into a filesystem path, and the route declares no wildcard segment, so
traversal, encoded separators, sibling chunks, package-root files, and source
maps are unreachable by construction. An installed module directory never
becomes a static file root.
The prefix is a sibling of /api/v1/modules/, not a child: `ui` is a legal module
route segment, so a module registering GET /ui/:version would otherwise compete
with the platform for one URL with routing order deciding the winner.
The route requires no authentication, deliberately. Fetching the bundle confers
no authority, and a cookie-gated route would break cross-origin import(), which
sends none. The cost is stated rather than hidden: a caller who knows a module
id and its exact version can download that bundle. The three failure modes
return one identical 404 so the route is not an enumeration oracle.
Caching is no-cache with a strong SHA-256 ETag and RFC 9110 If-None-Match
handling, not immutable: without an installer nothing stops a version being
rebuilt with different bytes. The server reads bytes and writes bytes — never
imports, evaluates, or transforms the artifact.
Nothing mounts a module UI. A host could now obtain a URL, which was previously
impossible; there is still no Dashboard shell, navigation, or metadata endpoint.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
Nothing bounded shutdown, and a module that failed to start was never cleaned up.
`startModules` appended to its rollback set only after `start()` resolved, so a
hook that acquired a connection, registered a listener, or recorded partial
initialization and then threw had its own `stop()` skipped, while every
previously completed module was rolled back correctly. A module now joins the
rollback set the moment its start hook is invoked: its own stop hook runs first,
then earlier modules in reverse order. The original start issue stays first in
the reported issues, and a failure stopping the failing module is appended
without preventing the rest of the rollback. The consequence for module authors
is explicit and documented — `stop()` may run after a partially completed
`start()` and must be safe and idempotent about resources it may or may not
hold.
Neither stage of shutdown had a deadline. `shutdown()` awaited `server.close()`
with no bound, so one open connection could hold it forever, and each stop or
rollback hook was awaited without a bound, so a hook that never settled kept the
pool open indefinitely. Both now have fixed, non-configurable defaults: 10
seconds per module hook and 30 seconds for the graceful HTTP drain. A hook that
reaches its deadline records MODULE_STOP_TIMEOUT or MODULE_ROLLBACK_TIMEOUT and
the sequence continues with the next module, so the whole stop sequence is
finite in the started module count rather than one global ten-second bound.
Timers that lose the race are cleared, the losing promise gets a permanent
rejection handler so a late throw cannot become an unhandled rejection, and a
timed-out hook is never awaited again.
At the drain deadline the platform closes idle and then active connections
through Node's own public closeIdleConnections/closeAllConnections, after
server.close(), touching no private field, and stops waiting for the close
callback. It then runs the bounded module stop sequence and closes the pool, so
a drain timeout or a stop failure never skips later cleanup. Both are reported
together as an ApiShutdownError carrying only fixed booleans and the already
sanitized module error; a forced drain is a shutdown failure, not a success.
Stated honestly rather than overstated: a deadline bounds how long the platform
waits, not how long module code runs. An in-process promise cannot be canceled,
and closing a socket does not prove a handler promise ended. What is guaranteed
is that shutdown stops waiting and the pool closes afterwards, so late database
work fails.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
Every PostgreSQL connection this repository opened was plaintext, in every
environment: no connection site set `ssl` at all, so credentials, session
tokens, and row data crossed the network in the clear and nothing in
configuration, startup, or `pnpm doctor` said so. The public identity URL
boundary was also looser than it appeared.
`core/src/database/transport.ts` is now the one typed policy. It has exactly two
modes: `verify-full` (TLS required, certificate chain verified, and server
identity verified against the configured host — the production default) and
`disable` (the development/test default, refused outright in production). There
is deliberately no encryption-only `require` mode, no chain-only `verify-ca`,
and no `rejectUnauthorized: false` escape hatch anywhere in the configuration
surface; every loose or aliased spelling is rejected in both environments, so a
typo never quietly becomes a weaker mode. Production has no plaintext exception
at all, not even for a loopback database — a connection string cannot prove the
database is process-local.
Verification is certificate *and* hostname. The policy supplies an explicit
`checkServerIdentity` pinned to the host parsed from DATABASE_URL, because the
pinned driver sets TLS `servername` only for non-IP hosts and Node performs no
identity check when it is unset — so `rejectUnauthorized: true` alone accepts a
certificate from any host the trusted CA ever signed when connecting by IP.
Both halves are proven against a real TLS-enabled PostgreSQL, including that the
same connection without the pinned callback succeeds. Every CA, certificate, and
key is generated at test runtime and deleted afterwards.
A DATABASE_URL may no longer carry its own TLS parameters. The pinned driver
merges parsed connection-string values over explicitly passed options, so a
`?sslmode=disable` in the URL would silently replace the policy's verified `ssl`
object; that now fails with a stable code, reported by both `pnpm doctor` and
the migration CLIs rather than as "failed unexpectedly".
One shared environment reader keeps `process.env` out of Core's reusable
constructors, and every executable that opens a connection resolves the policy
identically: the API (validated before any pool, Better Auth instance, module
runtime, or listener exists), both migration commands, the bootstrap CLI, and
Doctor's own connection. Doctor reports it as a blocking failure, never a
warning, naming only the effective mode.
Separately, the identity base URL and every trusted origin must now be exactly
one canonical origin — the WHATWG origin serialization must equal the supplied
string — so a path, trailing slash, credentials, explicit default port, or
non-canonical case is rejected rather than normalized into something that no
longer matches what a browser sends. Production's loopback rejection now
classifies the address instead of comparing against three literals, covering
`.localhost`, all of 127.0.0.0/8, 0.0.0.0, `::`, expanded and IPv4-mapped
forms. This is a configuration-shape guarantee only: it does not resolve DNS or
prove reachability, and TLS protects the connection, not the exposure.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
The sanitized operational line promised for a header/request timeout was
never actually emitted. Driving a real slow-header and slow-body connection
through a real socket against the pinned Node 24 runtime shows the general
server 'timeout' event never fires for headersTimeout/requestTimeout — that
event belongs to server.setTimeout()'s idle-socket timer, which this server
never arms. Both surface as 'clientError' carrying
err.code === "ERR_HTTP_REQUEST_TIMEOUT".
bindServer now observes 'clientError'. Because registering any such listener
suppresses Node's own default response entirely, the handler reproduces that
default byte-for-byte — 408 for a timeout, 431 for a header overflow, 400
otherwise — writing it only when the socket is still writable and no response
has already begun, then destroying the socket exactly as Node would. Exactly
one fixed sanitized line is logged per event, never the caught error's own
message, which for a parse failure derives from attacker-controlled input.
Proof moves to the real transport boundary: raw-socket scenarios assert the
exact response bytes, exactly one status line, socket closure, handler
non-invocation, and exactly one sanitized log for a slow-header connection, a
slow-body connection, a malformed request line, and an oversized header block.
The prior unit test, which manually emitted 'timeout', is removed as
misleading.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
Add a single platform-owned request-body policy (hono/body-limit) with
small, named limits for Better Auth and Core's grant-mutation endpoint, and
a new required maxBodyBytes field on the executable module route contract so
every module route makes a conscious no-body-or-bounded-body choice, capped
at a platform ceiling. Every oversized request gets one sanitized 413
contract and never reaches business logic, authorization, or a handler.
Also configure finite Node header/request/keep-alive timeouts, including the
non-obvious connectionsCheckingInterval needed for them to take effect
promptly, so a slow-header or slow-body connection cannot hold a socket
indefinitely.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
Replace Better Auth's default trust of a caller-controlled X-Forwarded-For
with a platform-owned client-address resolution boundary: direct mode (the
safe default) trusts only the real socket peer, and an explicit trusted-proxy
mode requires a header name, a concrete trusted-proxy list, and only honors a
forwarded chain from an actual trusted peer. This closes a rate-limit bypass
where rotating a spoofed header let a caller choose a fresh bucket on every
request. Public sign-up is also disabled by default and requires an explicit
typed opt-in, using Better Auth's own disableSignUp gate so no email-existence
leak or second signup path is introduced.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
Introduce ModuleDatabase (a typed, restricted Drizzle query surface) and the frozen
ModuleRuntimeServices boundary in @ekklesia/contracts, and thread the same services object
through Core's module start/stop lifecycle hooks and apps/api's authorized module HTTP handler
context. apps/api builds the facade via a new core/src/modules/database.ts view (createModuleDatabaseView)
over the one existing shared PostgreSQL pool, alongside the identity and authorization views, and
wires it into startApi's fixed startup order ahead of Identity/Authorization construction.
Registration stays database-free; a module reaches its database only through an authorized start,
stop, or HTTP handler invocation.
Phase 5B, pass 2: production API mounting, authorization enforcement,
and module-runtime lifecycle integration.
apps/api now discovers the installed module inventory exactly once
(prepareStartupModuleInventory), composes the platform permission
registry from it, starts the module runtime from that same discovered
list (startDiscoveredModuleRuntime, never rediscovering), and mounts
StartedModuleRuntime's published routes under
/api/v1/modules/<module-id> via a new apps/api-owned Hono adapter
(module-http-routes.ts). Every module route is protected by the
existing requirePermission middleware against the composed registry,
state-changing methods additionally require a trusted Origin, OPTIONS
remains entirely platform-owned, and a handler that throws, rejects,
or returns a non-Response becomes a fixed, sanitized
500 MODULE_HANDLER_FAILED. Module-supplied CORS headers are stripped
and every module response is forced to Cache-Control: no-store with
Vary: Origin, Cookie. RunningApi shutdown now stops the module runtime
between draining the HTTP server and closing the shared pool, and
every startup failure path stops the runtime and/or closes the pool
before propagating, without masking the original failure.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
Wires composePlatformPermissionRegistry into apps/api's production
startup: startApi() discovers every installed module, composes the one
immutable platform permission registry (Core's own declarations plus
every module's), and only then constructs the shared PostgreSQL pool,
Better Auth, and the HTTP server. A discovery or composition failure —
an invalid manifest, a reserved core.* namespace claim, or a duplicate
declaration — propagates before anything exists to close; there is no
Core-only registry fallback. apps/api/src/platform-permissions.ts
resolves the repository root from its own file location, never
process.cwd(), so package-scoped test runs discover the right modules/
directory.
createApiApp/createGrantsRoutes now require the composed registry as
an injected authorization option, replacing the previous hard-coded
CORE_PERMISSION_REGISTRY; requirePermission continues to work
identically for Core-owned and module-owned permissions, since it has
no concept of the distinction.
Extends pnpm doctor with a modules.permissions check (reusing the
already-discovered module list, distinguishing reserved-namespace from
generic-duplicate failures, never re-discovering modules) and pnpm
modules:validate to compose the same registry before a module is
considered installable.
Adds focused coverage: startup-ordering and failure-isolation tests in
apps/api/tests/lifecycle.test.ts, module-owned-declaration enforcement
tests in apps/api/tests/authorization-middleware.test.ts, Doctor
composition tests in core/tests/doctor.test.ts, and a live PostgreSQL
end-to-end scenario proving a real installed module's permission is
discoverable, grantable, and deniable once the module is absent again
after a restart, without ever executing its server entrypoint.
Wires Core's identity and authorization domains into apps/api over one
shared, validated PostgreSQL pool; adds an explicit, single-use,
concurrency-safe platform-owner bootstrap CLI; adds a smallest-possible
immutable permission registry with one Core-owned restricted permission
(core.authorization.grants.manage); and adds reusable Hono authorization
enforcement plus a narrowly scoped /api/v1/grants HTTP API for managing
explicit grants only, gated by an exact trusted Origin on every mutation.
