c737ebb472f2e72f254f6015935397e6c30e2643
2
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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 ekklesiaandClaude Opus 5
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ea28f8aa2e |
feat: verify email addresses and recover forgotten passwords
Ekklesia could authenticate a person and, since Pass 1, send a transactional email — but it had no way to establish that an address belonged to whoever claimed it, and no way back in for someone who forgot their password. A verified address is now a precondition for holding a session. Better Auth enforces that after the password check and before any session exists, so an unverified sign-in returns 403 with no cookie. That is why no "unverified principal" was needed: a correct password on an unverified address carries exactly the authority of no password, and /api/v1/principal is unchanged. Better Auth keeps every token. Ekklesia adds no token table, no hashing, and no expiry clock. It supplies a recipient, a subject, and two bodies, and the mail provider supplies everything about SMTP. Verification and reset links are rebuilt from a validated Dashboard origin, taking only the token — never the URL Better Auth prebuilds from a caller-supplied callbackURL — so no request can steer where a recipient lands. Following a verification link mints no session, because mail infrastructure dereferences links. Reset revokes that person's other sessions and leaves managed devices alone. Recovery answers identically for an address with an account, without one, already verified, or undeliverable — including when SMTP is broken, which is why the delivery adapter never throws. The initial platform owner is the one exception: created already verified by an operator command with no mail prerequisite, so a fresh server can be signed in to before a relay exists. Migration 0007 extends that to owners of installations that already exist. Public signup stays disabled; verification is not a licence to self-register. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]> |
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ekklesiaandClaude Opus 5
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c8fa13dd6a |
feat: create the initial platform owner from an operator command
A fresh production installation deadlocked. ADR 0034 gave Ekklesia a login
page and ADR 0019 gave it a single-use platform-owner bootstrap, but that
bootstrap grants ownership to a user id that already exists and has no way
to bring one into being. Public signup is disabled by default and
production cannot enable it at all, so a newly deployed instance had a
login page, no account, and no supported way to create one — only hand-
written SQL or briefly opening public registration.
pnpm identity:create-initial-owner -- --email [email protected]
creates the identity and grants it ownership, in the same shape as the
other operator commands: trusted local tooling, reachable only by someone
who already holds the database credentials, serving no HTTP route. No
/signup, /register, or /setup route is added, no bootstrap endpoint, and
no setup token; public signup stays disabled in every environment and a
test asserts a freshly bootstrapped deployment still refuses
/api/auth/sign-up/email.
The identity is created through Better Auth's own sign-up path, so
hashing, salting, normalization and the 8-128 bound are the identity
system's rather than a second implementation that could drift. Because the
server's instance refuses account creation, the command builds its own
in-process instance; nothing in apps/api imports it and the running
server's posture is untouched.
The sign-up result is verified rather than trusted. Better Auth returns a
fabricated success for an already-registered address — a user object whose
id was never persisted, database unchanged. That is correct enumeration
defence on a public endpoint and a trap here, so the identity is always
read back from the database and that read, not the response, is what the
grant uses.
An existing usable identity is adopted: ownership is granted and its
password left alone, reported as an adoption rather than a creation. This
is the recovery path for the one partial failure possible, since sign-up
commits on Better Auth's connection and the grant is a separate
transaction. A credential-less row is refused instead — making it an owner
would consume the single use on an identity nobody can authenticate as. A
password is never reset and an account is never taken over.
Whole invocations are serialized by an advisory lock on their own key, so
a race cannot leave a stray signable-in account behind; the grant's own
locked single-use transaction is unchanged. There is no --force or reset.
The password is prompted for invisibly or read from stdin, never from
argv (--password is refused with an explanation) and never from an
environment variable, so nothing about it becomes permanent deployment
configuration. The command needs DATABASE_URL and nothing else — verified
that sign-up needs no secret, base URL, or trusted origins, and that the
resulting account signs in through a separately configured server — so the
first owner can be created before TLS or DNS exist. It never migrates.
Proven end to end rather than at the database: a fresh installation is
bootstrapped, signed in through the real browser login transport with
signup disabled, its principal read, and used to open an owner-protected
resource that stays closed to anonymous callers.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
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