cd0287537e0968f6d9c8b505230938ccf6a90e40
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Commits
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cd0287537e |
Add the account area and account-synced Appearance preferences
CI / verify (pull_request) Successful in 1m10s
CI / infrastructure-smoke (pull_request) Successful in 34s
CI / package-release (pull_request) Successful in 50s
CI / migration-smoke (pull_request) Successful in 2m26s
CI / image-build (pull_request) Successful in 1m12s
CI / deploy-smoke (same-origin) (pull_request) Successful in 42s
CI / package-publication (pull_request) Successful in 54s
CI / deploy-smoke (split) (pull_request) Successful in 3m17s
Stage 1 PR 6 (ADR 0062). /account shows who is signed in; /account/appearance chooses System, Light, or Dark and reduced motion (System, Reduce, Allow). - Core: ekklesia_core_user_preference, one typed, CHECK-constrained, nullable column per preference (null = never chosen), migration 0008_user_preferences (additive), @ekklesia/core/account store, and the authenticated-baseline permission core.account.self.manage. - API: GET /api/v1/account (name, email, preferences) and partial PATCH /api/v1/account/preferences, self-only by construction: no user id is accepted anywhere; trusted Origin and body limit on the mutation. - Shell: the account control shows name, email, and initials (never the unvetted image URL) and offers Account, Appearance, Sign out; native radio groups apply a choice at once through the ADR 0060 controller and save it; the server's answer wins and a failed save reverts. - First paint: a classic, same-origin, render-blocking appearance.js in <head> applies a two-word localStorage cache before paint (no inline script, CSP unchanged). The account replaces the cache on every load, sign-out clears it, and other tabs follow via the storage event. - Deploy smoke: real-Chromium checks for light/dark, OS emulation, overrides, reload persistence, pre-paint, Shadow DOM modules, reduced motion, the display staying light, and phone width; the browser container gets a 512 MiB /dev/shm so a long session no longer fails requests with ERR_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]> |
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cf2f847c8c |
test(core): pin the shell's one use of browser storage, not ban it
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CI / infrastructure-smoke (pull_request) Successful in 42s
CI / package-release (pull_request) Successful in 48s
CI / migration-smoke (pull_request) Successful in 2m26s
CI / image-build (pull_request) Successful in 1m8s
CI / deploy-smoke (same-origin) (pull_request) Successful in 49s
CI / package-publication (pull_request) Successful in 57s
CI / deploy-smoke (split) (pull_request) Successful in 2m41s
CI failed in `identity-verification-boundaries.test.ts`: its guard that a
reset token never reaches browser storage was a blanket ban on the word
`localStorage` anywhere in the shell. The sidebar preference (ADR 0058)
legitimately reads it in the entry point.
The guarantee is unchanged: the reset token stays in React state for
the life of one form. The guard is now precise:
- `localStorage` appears only in `main.tsx`, only to hand it to the
sidebar preference;
- the shell's only storage write is the sidebar's own key and a
validated mode;
- the files that ever hold the token (`auth-protocol.ts`,
`ResetPasswordForm.tsx`, `HostApp.tsx`) touch no storage API at all;
- `sessionStorage` and `document.cookie` stay banned everywhere.
A planted `localStorage.setItem("t", token)` in `auth-protocol.ts` fails
it. The runtime reset-token test in `auth-recovery.test.tsx` now runs
with the production localStorage-backed preference and asserts storage
holds nothing but the sidebar key.
It passed locally only because Turbo restored `@ekklesia/core:test` from
cache: that test reads shell source that Core's task hash does not
include.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
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ea28f8aa2e |
feat: verify email addresses and recover forgotten passwords
Ekklesia could authenticate a person and, since Pass 1, send a transactional email — but it had no way to establish that an address belonged to whoever claimed it, and no way back in for someone who forgot their password. A verified address is now a precondition for holding a session. Better Auth enforces that after the password check and before any session exists, so an unverified sign-in returns 403 with no cookie. That is why no "unverified principal" was needed: a correct password on an unverified address carries exactly the authority of no password, and /api/v1/principal is unchanged. Better Auth keeps every token. Ekklesia adds no token table, no hashing, and no expiry clock. It supplies a recipient, a subject, and two bodies, and the mail provider supplies everything about SMTP. Verification and reset links are rebuilt from a validated Dashboard origin, taking only the token — never the URL Better Auth prebuilds from a caller-supplied callbackURL — so no request can steer where a recipient lands. Following a verification link mints no session, because mail infrastructure dereferences links. Reset revokes that person's other sessions and leaves managed devices alone. Recovery answers identically for an address with an account, without one, already verified, or undeliverable — including when SMTP is broken, which is why the delivery adapter never throws. The initial platform owner is the one exception: created already verified by an operator command with no mail prerequisite, so a fresh server can be signed in to before a relay exists. Migration 0007 extends that to owners of installations that already exist. Public signup stays disabled; verification is not a licence to self-register. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]> |