ADR 0017 capped a module route at 1 MiB and said large media belonged to a
future storage design. That design arrived — ADR 0030 gave modules a bucket,
ADR 0031 took Ekklesia out of the read path — and it did not solve the write
path: signed write URLs were deliberately declined, so the only way bytes
reach a bucket is a module's own route, and a photograph is not 1 MiB.
Extend the route contract rather than adding a second HTTP system. A route
declares `bodyMode`: `buffered` (the default, and what every existing route
already meant) keeps the 1 MiB ceiling and materializes the body before the
handler runs; `streamed` raises the ceiling to 32 MiB and counts bytes as the
handler consumes them, holding nothing. The mode is explicit rather than
inferred from the size, because inferring it would mean an author who raised a
limit silently changed how their own handler receives its body and when a 413
can reach their own code.
32 MiB holds one 25 MiB image plus bounded overhead and is also the platform's
absolute ceiling: no route in any mode may declare more, and no unbounded
option exists in the contract. The unit is one file per request — twenty
images are twenty individually bounded requests, and nothing here can express
a 500 MiB aggregate whose failure would waste everything already sent.
Replace the buffering dependency with the platform's own limiter. A declared
Content-Length over the limit is refused synchronously, before authorization
and before a byte is read. Buffered mode now counts what actually arrives
rather than trusting the header, which closes a gap the previous
implementation had. Streamed mode wraps the body in a counting transform;
on overflow the stream errors, the source is cancelled, and the response is
replaced with the same sanitized 413 even if the handler swallowed the error —
a limit a handler can swallow is not a limit. An unread body is cancelled so
an abandoned upload releases its socket, and an abort stays an ordinary failed
request rather than becoming a 413.
Ordering is unchanged and now strictly better: in streamed mode no byte is
read until the handler reads it, and the handler runs only after authorization
succeeds, so an unauthorized caller cannot push an upload through at all.
The live suite uploads a real 25 MiB body over a real socket end to end.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
`manifest.storage.buckets` has existed since manifest version 1 and meant
nothing — discovery validated it and no code read it. This turns it into a
real capability, which is what stands between Announcements and the module
system: that product currently fetches a hardcoded LAN S3 endpoint, parses
ListObjectsV2 XML by hand, and hands the browser direct object URLs.
- A module declares a logical bucket and receives a scoped facade at
`context.storage` — list, head, get, put, delete. The contract names no
provider: no endpoint, region, credential, or physical bucket is reachable
from it, which is what lets the same module run under a future standalone
host over its own or a shared S3-compatible service.
- Core's first provider speaks S3 through the AWS SDK. SeaweedFS is the
deployment target (ADR 0004), never an API name. Probing the pinned image
found `CreateBucket` reporting `BucketAlreadyExists` rather than AWS's
`BucketAlreadyOwnedByYou`; treating only the AWS spelling as success would
have failed every second boot. A live test pins it.
- Logical → physical mapping is deterministic and collision-safe: an
installation prefix, the module and bucket ids joined by `--` (which cannot
occur inside either identifier, so `a-b`+`c` and `a`+`b-c` cannot collide),
and a digest over the full untruncated identity. Two modules declaring
`assets` always get separate namespaces; neither can see the physical name.
- Declaring a bucket is now a requirement: with no provider configured the
module is `blocked · storage_unavailable` through ADR 0028's existing
resolver, propagating to required dependents. An installation with no object
storage stays a complete deployment.
- Binding availability is not provider health. Eligibility asks whether
storage is configured, never whether it answered; bucket creation is lazy on
first use so a storage outage cannot stop the platform booting; a running
module whose store blinks stays running and retries. Nothing deletes a
bucket.
- Credentials are deployment-supplied, never persisted, never routed through
module configuration, and never visible to modules, module UI, diagnostics,
or API responses. Provider errors translate to a closed code set carrying no
endpoint, bucket, request id, or XML.
- Retires ADR 0029's transitional `bucket` configuration key. No manifest
version change. The template declares no bucket, so it still runs without S3.
See ADR 0030.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
Modules had no way to be told anything. Announcements — the first real
product Ekklesia will absorb — has zero environment variables and compiles
a LAN IP address into its source, so this is the contract standing between
it and the module system.
- A module declares what it needs in its manifest, using six bounded types
(string, integer, boolean, enum, url, secret) with no nesting and no
regular expressions. Static declaration is what lets the platform validate
configuration *before* deciding whether a module may start: an enabled
module missing a required value is reported `blocked ·
configuration_missing · <key>` rather than taking startup down from inside
its own `start` hook, and Doctor reports the same while still importing no
module code. That forces `manifestVersion: 5`, a hard cutover.
- Ordinary values persist in one Core table (migration 0005), one row per
(module_id, key), stored as text until validated against the declaring
module's current manifest. Nothing is coerced; an invalid stored value
blocks the module rather than falling back to the default. A key the
manifest no longer declares is retained and ignored.
- Secrets are never persisted. There is no encryption at rest in this
repository, so a `secret` key is deployment-supplied and mapped in by the
host under a name the module never sees. A secret declaration has no
`default` field, the write API refuses secret material, and the HTTP view
has no `value` field for one — absent by construction, not filtered.
- Modules receive a frozen `context.config` on the registration, runtime,
and HTTP handler contexts: the same object identity, per module, beside
`services` rather than inside it (services is deliberately one shared
instance). No environment access, no database reference, no way to reach
another module's values.
- Configuration decides eligibility through ADR 0028's existing resolver:
three new blocked reasons, each with a distinct operator fix, propagating
to required dependents through the same mechanism as a disabled module.
- Changes take effect at the next restart; both resources report
restartRequired. New restricted permission
`core.modules.configuration.manage`, separate from lifecycle, at the
sibling prefix `/api/v1/module-configuration`.
- Migration participation stays independent of configuration validity.
Endpoints and credentials for shared infrastructure stay platform
concerns; a module declares which bucket it needs, not an S3 endpoint.
See ADR 0029.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
Nothing bounded shutdown, and a module that failed to start was never cleaned up.
`startModules` appended to its rollback set only after `start()` resolved, so a
hook that acquired a connection, registered a listener, or recorded partial
initialization and then threw had its own `stop()` skipped, while every
previously completed module was rolled back correctly. A module now joins the
rollback set the moment its start hook is invoked: its own stop hook runs first,
then earlier modules in reverse order. The original start issue stays first in
the reported issues, and a failure stopping the failing module is appended
without preventing the rest of the rollback. The consequence for module authors
is explicit and documented — `stop()` may run after a partially completed
`start()` and must be safe and idempotent about resources it may or may not
hold.
Neither stage of shutdown had a deadline. `shutdown()` awaited `server.close()`
with no bound, so one open connection could hold it forever, and each stop or
rollback hook was awaited without a bound, so a hook that never settled kept the
pool open indefinitely. Both now have fixed, non-configurable defaults: 10
seconds per module hook and 30 seconds for the graceful HTTP drain. A hook that
reaches its deadline records MODULE_STOP_TIMEOUT or MODULE_ROLLBACK_TIMEOUT and
the sequence continues with the next module, so the whole stop sequence is
finite in the started module count rather than one global ten-second bound.
Timers that lose the race are cleared, the losing promise gets a permanent
rejection handler so a late throw cannot become an unhandled rejection, and a
timed-out hook is never awaited again.
At the drain deadline the platform closes idle and then active connections
through Node's own public closeIdleConnections/closeAllConnections, after
server.close(), touching no private field, and stops waiting for the close
callback. It then runs the bounded module stop sequence and closes the pool, so
a drain timeout or a stop failure never skips later cleanup. Both are reported
together as an ApiShutdownError carrying only fixed booleans and the already
sanitized module error; a forced drain is a shutdown failure, not a success.
Stated honestly rather than overstated: a deadline bounds how long the platform
waits, not how long module code runs. An in-process promise cannot be canceled,
and closing a socket does not prove a handler promise ended. What is guaranteed
is that shutdown stops waiting and the pool closes afterwards, so late database
work fails.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
A module can register both `GET /events/:id` and `GET /events/new`. Driven
through the pinned router, `/events/new` reached the parameter handler under
`demo.events.read` when the parameter route registered first, and the static
handler under `demo.events.create` when it registered second. Nothing rejected
the pair, so declaration order decided which permission guarded the path. That
is a permission policy, not a routing preference, and it must not be inferred
from array position.
Two routes of one module now overlap when they share a method and a segment
count and, at every position, either both segments are the same static literal
or at least one is a parameter. Under this grammar — static literals or `:name`
parameters, no wildcard, regex, optional, or catch-all — that is exactly "some
concrete request path matches both". `moduleRoutesOverlap` implements it in the
contracts package, where path semantics already live and Hono cannot reach.
Core checks it during staged registration, after the existing duplicate check,
so identical shapes (including paths differing only in parameter name) keep
returning MODULE_ROUTE_DUPLICATE and a genuine intersection returns the new
MODULE_ROUTE_OVERLAP. The rejected module publishes none of its staged routes or
capabilities, no start hook runs, and no listener binds. Rejection rather than a
specificity rule: ranking static above parameter would still silently pick which
permission applies. Disjoint routes keep their order; different methods,
different segment counts, and the same local path in two different modules
(each has its own platform-owned mount prefix) all remain legal.
The same requests also pinned down what handlers actually receive. Route
declarations are validated; route *parameters* are not, and the two are
unrelated. A single encoded segment arrives decoded as `/../admin`, `a\b`, an
embedded NUL, CR/LF, `1; drop`, or non-ASCII text — none of which any declared
path could contain. The contract now says so explicitly: decoded values are
untrusted, module-owned input that a handler must validate against its own exact
domain grammar before any database, filesystem, command, or identifier use, and
re-encoding is not a substitute. No generic validator, path-normalization layer,
or route field was added, because module parameters are module-owned domain
types and one platform-wide pattern would either reject legitimate values or
approve meaningless ones.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
Add a single platform-owned request-body policy (hono/body-limit) with
small, named limits for Better Auth and Core's grant-mutation endpoint, and
a new required maxBodyBytes field on the executable module route contract so
every module route makes a conscious no-body-or-bounded-body choice, capped
at a platform ceiling. Every oversized request gets one sanitized 413
contract and never reaches business logic, authorization, or a handler.
Also configure finite Node header/request/keep-alive timeouts, including the
non-obvious connectionsCheckingInterval needed for them to take effect
promptly, so a slow-header or slow-body connection cannot hold a socket
indefinitely.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
Introduce ModuleDatabase (a typed, restricted Drizzle query surface) and the frozen
ModuleRuntimeServices boundary in @ekklesia/contracts, and thread the same services object
through Core's module start/stop lifecycle hooks and apps/api's authorized module HTTP handler
context. apps/api builds the facade via a new core/src/modules/database.ts view (createModuleDatabaseView)
over the one existing shared PostgreSQL pool, alongside the identity and authorization views, and
wires it into startApi's fixed startup order ahead of Identity/Authorization construction.
Registration stays database-free; a module reaches its database only through an authorized start,
stop, or HTTP handler invocation.
Phase 5B, pass 3: adds ADR 0015 recording the durable module HTTP
routing and production runtime lifecycle architecture pass 1 and pass
2 implemented, extending ADR 0006 and ADR 0014 without superseding
either. Adds narrow cross-reference notes to both, and to the ADR
index, pointing at ADR 0015 for the work they deferred, while
preserving their historical text and accepted status.
Corrects stale forward-looking "pass 2"/future-tense language left
over from pass 1 in core/src/modules/runtime.ts and
packages/contracts/src/module-http.ts (comment-only; production
behavior unchanged), and a shutdown-lifecycle description in
docs/development/testing.md that predated the module-runtime-stop
step pass 2 added between draining the HTTP server and closing the
pool.
Full audit against origin/main...HEAD found the architecture,
contract, startup ordering, routing, authorization/origin
enforcement, and PostgreSQL integration coverage from passes 1-2
sound; the one concrete defect found (Vary-header merge producing an
invalid "*, Origin, Cookie" combination and case-sensitive duplicate
tokens) was already fixed with focused regression tests in a separate
commit (bf76f4e), not amending either checkpoint commit.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
Phase 5B, pass 1: framework-neutral module HTTP route contracts and runtime
registration. Adds @ekklesia/contracts' module-http.ts (methods, canonical
path grammar, route definition/context/handler types, and validation)
and Core's module runtime staging/publication of a module's declared
routes alongside its capabilities, gated on the module's own manifest
permissions. Routes are collected into StartedModuleRuntime as an
immutable snapshot but are not yet mounted into apps/api; that is pass 2.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
