Merge pull request 'chore(release): prepare 0.1.2' (#62) from chore/release-0.1.2 into main

Reviewed-on: https://git.riverofglorymn.org/River_of_Glory_Church/Ekklesia/pulls/62
Reviewed-by: The_River <[email protected]>

.github/workflows/ci.yml

@@ -1,18 +1,13 @@
 name: CI
 
-# IMPORTANT — the currently inventoried server is Gitea 1.24.2, which *ignores* several keys used
+# The server runs Gitea 1.27.2 (docs/development/security.md, "What this server honours"):
-# below. Per https://docs.gitea.com/1.24/usage/actions/comparison, its unsupported workflow syntax
-# includes `permissions` / `jobs.<job_id>.permissions`, `concurrency`, and
-# `jobs.<job_id>.timeout-minutes`. They are declared here deliberately, so the workflow is already
-# correct on a supported release and on GitHub Actions, but on this server they are inert:
 #
-#   * `permissions:` does NOT restrict the in-job `GITEA_TOKEN`. Job-token permission controls,
+#   * `concurrency:` is honoured: a newer push to a pull request cancels the run it supersedes, so a
-#     repository/owner defaults, and server-side maximum-permission clamping arrive in the 1.26
+#     cancelled run's own cleanup is never guaranteed (see the CI stack sweep in each stack job).
-#     feature line (https://docs.gitea.com/1.26/usage/actions/token-permissions). Until the server
+#   * `permissions:` is supported by 1.27 with Gitea's own scopes, but what the job token can do on
-#     is upgraded and configured, the token's authority is whatever the server grants — not what
+#     this server is not yet proven, so nothing here relies on it being read-only.
-#     this file requests.
+#   * `timeout-minutes:` is no longer listed as unsupported, but is not verified here either;
-#   * `concurrency:` and `timeout-minutes:` are NOT bounded-execution guarantees here. Cancellation,
+#     teardown relies on the stack sweep and the runner's own reaper.
-#     timeout, and teardown must be enforced by the trusted runner provisioner/reaper.
 #
 # `persist-credentials: false` below is unaffected by any of this and is enforced by the action
 # itself. See docs/development/security.md.
@@ -63,6 +58,9 @@ jobs:
     needs: verify
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     timeout-minutes: 10
+    env:
+      # Names this job's stacks, so its final step removes exactly these (scripts/lib/ci-project.sh).
+      EKKLESIA_CI_JOB_KEY: infrastructure-smoke
     steps:
       - name: Check out repository
         uses: actions/checkout@de0fac2e4500dabe0009e67214ff5f5447ce83dd # v6.0.2
@@ -72,13 +70,29 @@ jobs:
           # in this workflow pushes, so the credential is never needed after checkout.
           persist-credentials: false
 
+      # A job the runner killed (cancelled, or past the runner's own time limit) never ran its
+      # cleanup. Anything a CI job left on this shared daemon more than three hours ago goes first.
+      - name: Sweep stale CI stacks from the runner
+        run: bash scripts/ci-sweep.sh --stale
+
+      - name: Prove the sweep removes exactly what it should, against real Docker resources
+        run: bash scripts/test-ci-sweep.sh
+
       - name: Exercise PostgreSQL and S3 infrastructure
         run: bash scripts/smoke-infrastructure.sh
 
+      # Whatever happened above, this job's own stacks do not outlive it.
+      - name: Remove this job's CI stacks
+        if: always()
+        run: bash scripts/ci-sweep.sh --job
+
   migration-smoke:
     needs: verify
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     timeout-minutes: 15
+    env:
+      # Names this job's stacks, so its final step removes exactly these (scripts/lib/ci-project.sh).
+      EKKLESIA_CI_JOB_KEY: migration-smoke
     steps:
       - name: Check out repository
         uses: actions/checkout@de0fac2e4500dabe0009e67214ff5f5447ce83dd # v6.0.2
@@ -88,6 +102,11 @@ jobs:
           # in this workflow pushes, so the credential is never needed after checkout.
           persist-credentials: false
 
+      # A job the runner killed (cancelled, or past the runner's own time limit) never ran its
+      # cleanup. Anything a CI job left on this shared daemon more than three hours ago goes first.
+      - name: Sweep stale CI stacks from the runner
+        run: bash scripts/ci-sweep.sh --stale
+
       - name: Set up Node.js
         uses: actions/setup-node@48b55a011bda9f5d6aeb4c2d9c7362e8dae4041e # v6.4.0
         with:
@@ -104,11 +123,18 @@ jobs:
       - name: Exercise transactional migrations against PostgreSQL
         run: pnpm test:migrations:integration
 
+      # Whatever happened above, this job's own stacks do not outlive it.
+      - name: Remove this job's CI stacks
+        if: always()
+        run: bash scripts/ci-sweep.sh --job
+
   image-build:
     needs: verify
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     timeout-minutes: 20
     env:
+      # Names this job's stacks, so its final step removes exactly these (scripts/lib/ci-project.sh).
+      EKKLESIA_CI_JOB_KEY: image-build
       # Cache mounts in deploy/Dockerfile need BuildKit; this selects it even where the Docker CLI
       # has no buildx plugin.
       DOCKER_BUILDKIT: "1"
@@ -121,29 +147,51 @@ jobs:
           # in this workflow pushes, so the credential is never needed after checkout.
           persist-credentials: false
 
+      # A job the runner killed (cancelled, or past the runner's own time limit) never ran its
+      # cleanup. Anything a CI job left on this shared daemon more than three hours ago goes first.
+      - name: Sweep stale CI stacks from the runner
+        run: bash scripts/ci-sweep.sh --stale
+
       # The platform-only image (ADR 0044): a checkout has no `modules/`, so this proves the image
       # builds, validates, and assembles with zero modules. Build only — no registry login, no
       # credentials, no push, no tag anywhere but this runner's local image store.
       # Tagged per run and attempt, not only per commit: a pull request and a push of the same commit
       # can build at once on one runner's Docker daemon, and neither may remove the other's image.
+      # Labeled like every CI stack, so this job's final step removes it even if the build is killed.
       - name: Build the production image without modules
-        run: >-
+        shell: bash
-          docker build
+        run: |
-          --file deploy/Dockerfile
+          source scripts/lib/ci-project.sh
-          --build-arg REVISION="$GITHUB_SHA"
+          docker build \
-          --tag ekklesia-ci:"$GITHUB_SHA-${GITHUB_RUN_ID:-0}-${GITHUB_RUN_ATTEMPT:-1}"
+            --file deploy/Dockerfile \
+            --build-arg REVISION="$GITHUB_SHA" \
+            --label "${EKKLESIA_CI_LABEL}=$(ci_project_name image)" \
+            --label "${EKKLESIA_CI_CREATED_LABEL}=$(date +%s)" \
+            --tag ekklesia-ci:"$GITHUB_SHA-${GITHUB_RUN_ID:-0}-${GITHUB_RUN_ATTEMPT:-1}" \
             .
 
-      - name: Remove the image from the runner
+      # Whatever happened above, this job's own stacks do not outlive it.
+      - name: Remove this job's CI stacks
         if: always()
-        run: docker image rm --force ekklesia-ci:"$GITHUB_SHA-${GITHUB_RUN_ID:-0}-${GITHUB_RUN_ATTEMPT:-1}" || true
+        run: bash scripts/ci-sweep.sh --job
 
   deploy-smoke:
     needs: verify
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
-    timeout-minutes: 20
+    timeout-minutes: 30
+    # Both topologies (ADR 0045): same-origin, the default every installation gets, and split, which
+    # adds a test-only module and drives a real headless browser across the two origins.
+    strategy:
+      fail-fast: false
+      matrix:
+        topology:
+          - same-origin
+          - split
     env:
+      # Names this job's stacks, so its final step removes exactly these (scripts/lib/ci-project.sh).
+      EKKLESIA_CI_JOB_KEY: deploy-smoke-${{ matrix.topology }}
       DOCKER_BUILDKIT: "1"
+      EKKLESIA_SMOKE_TOPOLOGY: ${{ matrix.topology }}
     steps:
       - name: Check out repository
         uses: actions/checkout@de0fac2e4500dabe0009e67214ff5f5447ce83dd # v6.0.2
@@ -153,10 +201,20 @@ jobs:
           # in this workflow pushes, so the credential is never needed after checkout.
           persist-credentials: false
 
+      # A job the runner killed (cancelled, or past the runner's own time limit) never ran its
+      # cleanup. Anything a CI job left on this shared daemon more than three hours ago goes first.
+      - name: Sweep stale CI stacks from the runner
+        run: bash scripts/ci-sweep.sh --stale
+
       # The reference deployment end to end (ADR 0044): a platform-only image, base + proxy with
       # Caddy's internal CA (test-only), an explicit migration apply against this job's own fresh
       # PostgreSQL, then the API, Dashboard, storage delivery, client-address chain, and verify-full
       # database TLS through the proxy. Every secret is generated for this run and discarded with
       # it; nothing is pushed, published, or logged in to.
-      - name: Smoke-test the reference deployment
+      - name: Smoke-test the reference deployment (${{ matrix.topology }})
         run: bash scripts/smoke-deploy.sh
+
+      # Whatever happened above, this job's own stacks do not outlive it.
+      - name: Remove this job's CI stacks
+        if: always()
+        run: bash scripts/ci-sweep.sh --job

README.md

@@ -218,9 +218,10 @@ undeployed state, and the launch checklist in a single place. **CI is accepted a
 trusted-code-only boundary**: the self-hosted Gitea runner executes only code controlled and
 reviewed by trusted repository collaborators, and unknown or untrusted pull requests must not
 execute on it automatically. What remains is operational and cannot be proven from this repository —
-upgrading Gitea past 1.24.2 (which *ignores* the workflow's `permissions`, `concurrency`, and
+configuring and proving job-token authority server-side (the server now runs Gitea 1.27.2, which
-`timeout-minutes` declarations), clamping job-token authority server-side, enforcing timeout and
+honours `concurrency` and documents `permissions`, but neither token limits nor `timeout-minutes` are
-teardown in a trusted provisioner/reaper, and proving disposable runner isolation. Those are
+verified on it yet), enforcing timeout and teardown in a trusted provisioner/reaper, and proving
+disposable runner isolation. Those are
 prerequisites for **executing untrusted contributions**, alongside the deployment checklist that
 gates a **public launch**; moving future public contribution workflows to a service with isolated
 hosted runners is an acceptable alternative. **Neither set of requirements blocks Phase 6** — Surface

apps/api/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@ekklesia/api",
-  "version": "0.1.1",
+  "version": "0.1.2",
   "private": true,
   "type": "module",
   "files": [

apps/api/src/config.ts

@@ -200,3 +200,19 @@ export function createApiRuntimeConfig(
     storage,
   });
 }
+
+/**
+ * The exact browser origins the API trusts: CORS on `/api/auth/*` and `/api/v1/*`, and every
+ * mutation route's origin check (ADR 0045).
+ *
+ * The configured trusted origins plus the identity base URL's own origin, which is where the API
+ * lives. Better Auth already trusts its base URL implicitly; this makes the API's own checks agree,
+ * so a page the API itself serves (the display host, and the Dashboard in the same-origin topology)
+ * passes without an operator listing the API's origin. Order is preserved and duplicates removed;
+ * every entry is already a canonical origin.
+ */
+export function apiTrustedOrigins(
+  identity: Pick<IdentityConfig, "baseUrl" | "trustedOrigins">,
+): readonly string[] {
+  return Object.freeze([...new Set([...identity.trustedOrigins, identity.baseUrl])]);
+}

apps/api/src/dashboard-host-assets.ts

@@ -54,15 +54,54 @@ export function createDashboardHostAssets(html: string, script: string): Dashboa
   });
 }
 
-/** Loads only the two surface-declared files. A missing or unreadable build fails startup rather
+/**
- * than leaving an API whose own origin answers `/` with a 404. */
+ * The exact element the built Dashboard page carries for its API origin (ADR 0045), empty. The shell
-export async function loadDashboardHostAssets(): Promise<DashboardHostAssets> {
+ * reads the filled-in value at run time; empty means the page's own origin.
+ */
+export const DASHBOARD_API_ORIGIN_PLACEHOLDER = '<meta content="" name="ekklesia-api-origin" />';
+
+function isCanonicalHttpOrigin(value: string): boolean {
+  try {
+    const url = new URL(value);
+    return (url.protocol === "https:" || url.protocol === "http:") && url.origin === value;
+  } catch {
+    return false;
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Writes the API's own origin into the Dashboard page, once, before the page's `ETag` is computed.
+ *
+ * The origin is the identity base URL's, which is where `/api` lives in either topology: the page's
+ * own origin when the Dashboard and the API share one, the API hostname when they are split. The
+ * built page must carry exactly one empty placeholder; anything else is a shell build this API does
+ * not understand, and startup fails rather than serving a page that might send credentials somewhere
+ * unintended. The value is escaped for an attribute even though a canonical origin cannot contain
+ * any character that needs it.
+ */
+export function renderDashboardPage(html: string, apiOrigin: string): string {
+  const parts = html.split(DASHBOARD_API_ORIGIN_PLACEHOLDER);
+  if (parts.length !== 2 || !isCanonicalHttpOrigin(apiOrigin)) {
+    throw new DashboardHostAssetError();
+  }
+  const escaped = apiOrigin
+    .replaceAll("&", "&amp;")
+    .replaceAll('"', "&quot;")
+    .replaceAll("<", "&lt;")
+    .replaceAll(">", "&gt;");
+  return parts.join(`<meta content="${escaped}" name="ekklesia-api-origin" />`);
+}
+
+/** Loads only the two surface-declared files, and renders the API origin into the page. A missing,
+ * unreadable, or incompatible build fails startup rather than leaving an API whose own origin answers
+ * `/` with a 404 or a page that cannot find its API. */
+export async function loadDashboardHostAssets(apiOrigin: string): Promise<DashboardHostAssets> {
   try {
     // Sequential deliberately, as for the display host: diagnostics stay deterministic and no
     // rejected sibling read is left running after this function has already failed.
     const html = await readFile(new URL(dashboardHostAssetUrls.html), "utf8");
     const script = await readFile(new URL(dashboardHostAssetUrls.script), "utf8");
-    return createDashboardHostAssets(html, script);
+    return createDashboardHostAssets(renderDashboardPage(html, apiOrigin), script);
   } catch {
     throw new DashboardHostAssetError();
   }

apps/api/src/server.ts

@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ import {
   createClientAddressResolver,
   wrapFetchWithClientAddress,
 } from "./client-address.js";
-import { type ApiRuntimeConfig, createApiRuntimeConfig } from "./config.js";
+import { type ApiRuntimeConfig, apiTrustedOrigins, createApiRuntimeConfig } from "./config.js";
 import { loadDashboardHostAssets } from "./dashboard-host-assets.js";
 import { type ApiDatabaseHandle, createApiDatabase } from "./database.js";
 import { withDevicePrincipals } from "./device-principal.js";
@@ -550,7 +550,9 @@ export async function startApi(
       moduleUi.listDisplays().length === 0 ? undefined : await loadDisplayHostAssets();
     // Unconditional, unlike the display host: every installation serves its Dashboard (ADR 0044),
     // so a missing shell build fails here, before any module code is imported.
-    dashboardHostAssets = await loadDashboardHostAssets();
+    // The page learns its API origin from the API that serves it, so one build serves either
+    // topology (ADR 0045).
+    dashboardHostAssets = await loadDashboardHostAssets(config.identity.baseUrl);
   } catch (error) {
     await safeCloseStorage(storageProvider);
     await safeCloseMail(mailProvider);
@@ -648,7 +650,8 @@ export async function startApi(
       // Principal resolution, extended with managed devices. A human session still wins, and this
       // is the only place a device credential ever becomes a principal.
       runtime: withDevicePrincipals({ devices: deviceStore, runtime }),
-      trustedOrigins: config.identity.trustedOrigins,
+      // The configured origins plus the API's own (ADR 0045).
+      trustedOrigins: apiTrustedOrigins(config.identity),
     });
   } catch (error) {
     await safeStopModuleRuntime(moduleRuntime);

apps/api/tests/api-http.integration.ts

@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ import type { ClientAddressConfigInput } from "../src/client-address.js";
 import { dashboardHostAssetUrls } from "@ekklesia/shell/dashboard-assets";
 import { createApiRuntimeConfig } from "../src/config.js";
 import { createApiDatabase } from "../src/database.js";
+import { DASHBOARD_API_ORIGIN_PLACEHOLDER } from "../src/dashboard-host-assets.js";
 import {
   DASHBOARD_HOST_PAGE_PATH,
   DASHBOARD_HOST_SCRIPT_PATH,
@@ -2989,7 +2990,7 @@ describe.sequential("live API — published module UI artifact", () => {
 });
 
 describe.sequential("live API — the built Dashboard on the API's own origin", () => {
-  it("serves the built shell's exact index.html at / and its exact script, and nothing beside them", async () => {
+  it("serves the built shell's index.html at /, with only its API origin written in, and its exact script, and nothing beside them", async () => {
     const database = await createDisposableDatabase("dashboard_host");
     await applyCoreMigrations(database.url);
     const running = await startMigratedApi(database.url);
@@ -3006,7 +3007,15 @@ describe.sequential("live API — the built Dashboard on the API's own origin",
       expect(page.headers.get("x-frame-options")).toBe("DENY");
       expect(page.headers.get("content-security-policy")).toBe("frame-ancestors 'none'");
       expect(page.headers.get("referrer-policy")).toBe("no-referrer");
-      expect(html).toBe(builtHtml);
+      // The built page carries one empty API-origin element; the API fills in its own origin
+      // (the identity base URL) and changes nothing else (ADR 0045).
+      expect(builtHtml.split(DASHBOARD_API_ORIGIN_PLACEHOLDER)).toHaveLength(2);
+      expect(html).toBe(
+        builtHtml.replace(
+          DASHBOARD_API_ORIGIN_PLACEHOLDER,
+          `<meta content="${identityBaseUrl}" name="ekklesia-api-origin" />`,
+        ),
+      );
       expect(html).toContain('id="ekklesia-host"');
       expect(html).toContain(`<script src="${DASHBOARD_HOST_SCRIPT_PATH}" type="module"></script>`);
 

apps/api/tests/app.test.ts

@@ -3,11 +3,16 @@ import {
   createAuthenticatedPrincipal,
   type ModuleDatabase,
   type ModuleRuntimeServices,
+  moduleIdSchema,
+  parseEkklesiaUserId,
+  parsePermissionId,
 } from "@ekklesia/contracts";
 import {
   type AuthorizationEvaluator,
   type AuthorizationStore,
+  CORE_PERMISSION_DECLARATIONS,
   CORE_PERMISSION_REGISTRY,
+  createPermissionRegistry,
   type PermissionRegistry,
 } from "@ekklesia/core/authorization";
 import type { EkklesiaIdentityRuntime } from "@ekklesia/core/identity";
@@ -16,6 +21,7 @@ import {
   createModuleUiPublicationRegistry,
   EMPTY_MODULE_REALTIME_REGISTRY,
   type ModuleUiPublicationRegistry,
+  StagedModuleRealtimeRegistry,
 } from "@ekklesia/core/modules";
 import { describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest";
 import {
@@ -910,3 +916,101 @@ describe("Ekklesia API Hono application", () => {
     });
   });
 });
+
+describe("split Dashboard and API origins (ADR 0045)", () => {
+  const moduleId = moduleIdSchema.parse("announcements");
+  const permission = parsePermissionId("announcements.slideshow.view");
+  const endpoint = "/api/v1/module-realtime/announcements/state";
+
+  /** The full application with one live channel, a signed-in caller, and an evaluator that allows
+   * it: the same composition a Dashboard on another origin reaches. */
+  function realtimeApp() {
+    const staged = new StagedModuleRealtimeRegistry();
+    const registration = staged.createRegistrationStage(moduleId, new Set([permission]));
+    registration.realtime.channel({ channel: "state", permission });
+    registration.commit();
+    staged.publisherFor(moduleId).publish("state", { mode: "on" } as never);
+    const moduleRealtime = staged.publish();
+    const app = createApiAppWithModules({
+      moduleRoutes: Object.freeze([]),
+      moduleUi: emptyModuleUiPublication(),
+      moduleLifecycle: emptyModuleLifecycle(),
+      moduleConfiguration: emptyModuleConfiguration(),
+      moduleStorage: emptyModuleStorage(),
+      moduleRealtime,
+      dashboard: createInMemoryDashboardStore(),
+      dashboardHostAssets: testDashboardHostAssets(),
+      health: readyHealth(),
+      moduleServices: fakeModuleServices(),
+      authorization: fakeAuthorization({
+        evaluator: { authorize: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({ allowed: true }) },
+        registry: createPermissionRegistry([
+          ...CORE_PERMISSION_DECLARATIONS,
+          {
+            baseline: "restricted",
+            description: "View the announcement slideshow.",
+            id: permission,
+          },
+        ]),
+      }),
+      runtime: fakeRuntime({
+        resolvePrincipal: vi
+          .fn()
+          .mockResolvedValue(
+            createAuthenticatedPrincipal(
+              parseEkklesiaUserId("88888888-8888-4888-8888-888888888888"),
+            ),
+          ),
+      }),
+      trustedOrigins: [trustedOrigin],
+    });
+    return { app, moduleRealtime };
+  }
+
+  it("lets the Dashboard's origin open a credentialed realtime stream", async () => {
+    const { app, moduleRealtime } = realtimeApp();
+
+    const response = await app.request(endpoint, {
+      headers: { cookie: "session=1", origin: trustedOrigin },
+    });
+
+    expect(response.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(response.headers.get("content-type")).toBe("text/event-stream; charset=utf-8");
+    expect(response.headers.get("access-control-allow-origin")).toBe(trustedOrigin);
+    expect(response.headers.get("access-control-allow-credentials")).toBe("true");
+    expect(response.headers.get("vary")).toContain("Origin");
+    await response.body?.cancel();
+    moduleRealtime.closeSubscriptions();
+  });
+
+  it("gives an untrusted origin's realtime request no CORS permission to read the stream", async () => {
+    const { app, moduleRealtime } = realtimeApp();
+
+    const response = await app.request(endpoint, {
+      headers: { cookie: "session=1", origin: untrustedOrigin },
+    });
+
+    expect(response.headers.get("access-control-allow-origin")).toBeNull();
+    await response.body?.cancel();
+    moduleRealtime.closeSubscriptions();
+  });
+
+  it("allows only Content-Type beyond the CORS-safelisted request headers, and exposes none", async () => {
+    const app = createAuthWiringApp(fakeRuntime());
+
+    const response = await app.request("/api/v1/principal", {
+      headers: {
+        "access-control-request-headers": "content-type, x-module-custom",
+        "access-control-request-method": "PATCH",
+        origin: trustedOrigin,
+      },
+      method: "OPTIONS",
+    });
+
+    expect(response.headers.get("access-control-allow-origin")).toBe(trustedOrigin);
+    expect(response.headers.get("access-control-allow-headers")?.toLowerCase()).toBe(
+      "content-type",
+    );
+    expect(response.headers.get("access-control-expose-headers")).toBeNull();
+  });
+});

apps/api/tests/config.test.ts

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 import { describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
-import { ApiConfigError, createApiRuntimeConfig } from "../src/config.js";
+import { ApiConfigError, apiTrustedOrigins, createApiRuntimeConfig } from "../src/config.js";
 
 const validSecret = "correct-horse-battery-staple-0123456789";
 
@@ -337,3 +337,24 @@ describe("API runtime configuration", () => {
     expect(publicText).not.toContain("db.internal.example");
   });
 });
+
+describe("the API's trusted browser origins (ADR 0045)", () => {
+  it("adds the API's own origin to the configured ones, as Better Auth does", () => {
+    const origins = apiTrustedOrigins({
+      baseUrl: "https://api.example.test",
+      trustedOrigins: ["https://dash.example.test"],
+    });
+
+    expect(origins).toEqual(["https://dash.example.test", "https://api.example.test"]);
+    expect(Object.isFrozen(origins)).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it("does not duplicate an API origin already listed (the same-origin topology)", () => {
+    expect(
+      apiTrustedOrigins({
+        baseUrl: "https://ekklesia.example.test",
+        trustedOrigins: ["https://ekklesia.example.test"],
+      }),
+    ).toEqual(["https://ekklesia.example.test"]);
+  });
+});

apps/api/tests/dashboard-host-assets.test.ts

@@ -13,10 +13,14 @@ vi.mock("@ekklesia/shell/dashboard-assets", () => ({
 
 import {
   createDashboardHostAssets,
+  DASHBOARD_API_ORIGIN_PLACEHOLDER,
   DashboardHostAssetError,
   loadDashboardHostAssets,
+  renderDashboardPage,
 } from "../src/dashboard-host-assets.js";
 
+const API_ORIGIN = "https://api.example.test";
+
 function sha256Etag(text: string): string {
   return `"${createHash("sha256").update(text).digest("base64url")}"`;
 }
@@ -25,19 +29,20 @@ describe("Dashboard host asset loading", () => {
   beforeEach(() => readFileMock.mockReset());
 
   it("reads only the two declared file URLs in order and freezes one consistent snapshot", async () => {
-    const html = '<!doctype html><div id="ekklesia-host"></div>';
+    const html = `<!doctype html>${DASHBOARD_API_ORIGIN_PLACEHOLDER}<div id="ekklesia-host"></div>`;
     const script = "export const dashboardHost = true;\n";
     readFileMock.mockResolvedValueOnce(html).mockResolvedValueOnce(script);
 
-    const assets = await loadDashboardHostAssets();
+    const assets = await loadDashboardHostAssets(API_ORIGIN);
 
     expect(readFileMock.mock.calls).toEqual([
       [new URL("file:///surface/browser/index.html"), "utf8"],
       [new URL("file:///surface/browser/assets/ekklesia-dashboard/app.js"), "utf8"],
     ]);
+    const rendered = `<!doctype html><meta content="${API_ORIGIN}" name="ekklesia-api-origin" /><div id="ekklesia-host"></div>`;
     expect(assets).toEqual({
-      html,
+      html: rendered,
-      htmlEtag: sha256Etag(html),
+      htmlEtag: sha256Etag(rendered),
       script,
       scriptEtag: sha256Etag(script),
     });
@@ -49,7 +54,7 @@ describe("Dashboard host asset loading", () => {
       new Error("ENOENT /home/operator/private/surface-build secret-token"),
     );
 
-    const failure = await loadDashboardHostAssets().catch((error: unknown) => error);
+    const failure = await loadDashboardHostAssets(API_ORIGIN).catch((error: unknown) => error);
 
     expect(readFileMock).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
     expect(failure).toBeInstanceOf(DashboardHostAssetError);
@@ -69,10 +74,12 @@ describe("Dashboard host asset loading", () => {
 
   it("fails when the script is missing even though the page was read", async () => {
     readFileMock
-      .mockResolvedValueOnce("<!doctype html>")
+      .mockResolvedValueOnce(`<!doctype html>${DASHBOARD_API_ORIGIN_PLACEHOLDER}`)
       .mockRejectedValueOnce(new Error("ENOENT app.js"));
 
-    await expect(loadDashboardHostAssets()).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(DashboardHostAssetError);
+    await expect(loadDashboardHostAssets(API_ORIGIN)).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(
+      DashboardHostAssetError,
+    );
     expect(readFileMock).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2);
   });
 
@@ -84,4 +91,41 @@ describe("Dashboard host asset loading", () => {
       expect(() => createDashboardHostAssets(html, script)).toThrow(DashboardHostAssetError);
     }
   });
+
+  it("fails startup on a page without exactly one empty API-origin element (ADR 0045)", async () => {
+    for (const html of [
+      "<!doctype html>",
+      `<!doctype html>${DASHBOARD_API_ORIGIN_PLACEHOLDER}${DASHBOARD_API_ORIGIN_PLACEHOLDER}`,
+      '<!doctype html><meta content="https://elsewhere.test" name="ekklesia-api-origin" />',
+    ]) {
+      readFileMock.mockReset();
+      readFileMock.mockResolvedValueOnce(html).mockResolvedValueOnce("export {};\n");
+      await expect(loadDashboardHostAssets(API_ORIGIN)).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(
+        DashboardHostAssetError,
+      );
+    }
+  });
+});
+
+describe("Dashboard page API origin (ADR 0045)", () => {
+  const page = `<head>${DASHBOARD_API_ORIGIN_PLACEHOLDER}</head>`;
+
+  it("writes the API's origin into the one placeholder, in either topology", () => {
+    expect(renderDashboardPage(page, "https://api.example.test")).toBe(
+      '<head><meta content="https://api.example.test" name="ekklesia-api-origin" /></head>',
+    );
+    expect(renderDashboardPage(page, "http://127.0.0.1:3000")).toBe(
+      '<head><meta content="http://127.0.0.1:3000" name="ekklesia-api-origin" /></head>',
+    );
+  });
+
+  it.each([
+    "https://api.example.test/",
+    "https://api.example.test/api",
+    'https://api.example.test"><script>',
+    "javascript:alert(1)",
+    "",
+  ])("refuses a value that is not a canonical http(s) origin: %s", (origin) => {
+    expect(() => renderDashboardPage(page, origin)).toThrow(DashboardHostAssetError);
+  });
 });

core/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@ekklesia/core",
-  "version": "0.1.1",
+  "version": "0.1.2",
   "private": true,
   "type": "module",
   "files": [

core/src/diagnostics/doctor.ts

@@ -757,6 +757,35 @@ function identitySchemaSummary(): string {
   return `Core identity schema defines ${tableNames.length} ${plural(tableNames.length, "table")} (${tableNames.join(", ")}).`;
 }
 
+/**
+ * A heuristic for "same site" between two canonical origins, for a warning only (ADR 0045).
+ *
+ * The same hostname on another port is the same site. Otherwise the two hostnames must be siblings:
+ * identical after their first label, with that parent itself holding at least one dot
+ * (`dash.example.org` and `api.example.org`). Without the Public Suffix List this can be wrong in
+ * both directions for unusual names, which is why its result is a warning and never a failure.
+ */
+function plausiblySameSite(dashboardOrigin: string, apiOrigin: string): boolean {
+  const dashboard = new URL(dashboardOrigin).hostname;
+  const api = new URL(apiOrigin).hostname;
+  if (dashboard === api) {
+    return true;
+  }
+  // An IP address is a site of its own; two different ones never share one.
+  const isIpAddress = (hostname: string): boolean =>
+    hostname.startsWith("[") || /^[0-9]+(\.[0-9]+){3}$/u.test(hostname);
+  if (isIpAddress(dashboard) || isIpAddress(api)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  const parent = (hostname: string): string => hostname.slice(hostname.indexOf(".") + 1);
+  return (
+    dashboard.includes(".") &&
+    api.includes(".") &&
+    parent(dashboard) === parent(api) &&
+    parent(dashboard).includes(".")
+  );
+}
+
 /**
  * Pure configuration validation only: never constructs Better Auth, never opens a database
  * connection, and never prints the configured secret, base URL, or trusted origins. Missing
@@ -769,6 +798,7 @@ function identityConfigurationCheck(
   const hasAnyValue =
     input?.secret !== undefined ||
     input?.baseUrl !== undefined ||
+    (input?.dashboardOrigin ?? "") !== "" ||
     input?.publicSignupEnabled !== undefined ||
     (input?.trustedOrigins?.length ?? 0) > 0;
 
@@ -783,17 +813,43 @@ function identityConfigurationCheck(
     const config = createIdentityConfig(
       {
         baseUrl: input?.baseUrl,
+        // Validated exactly as the API validates it at startup, so a Dashboard origin the API would
+        // refuse (untrusted, insecure, malformed) fails here first.
+        dashboardOrigin: input?.dashboardOrigin,
         publicSignupEnabled: input?.publicSignupEnabled,
         secret: input?.secret,
         trustedOrigins: input?.trustedOrigins,
       },
       { environment: input?.environment ?? "production" },
     );
+    const signupDetail = config.publicSignupEnabled
+      ? "Public signup is explicitly ENABLED."
+      : "Public signup is disabled (safe default).";
+    if (config.dashboardOrigin === config.baseUrl) {
       return freezeCheck("identity.configuration", "pass", "Identity configuration valid", [
         schemaDetail,
-      config.publicSignupEnabled
+        signupDetail,
-        ? "Public signup is explicitly ENABLED."
+        "Topology: same-origin (the Dashboard is served from the API's origin).",
-        : "Public signup is disabled (safe default).",
+      ]);
+    }
+    const topologyDetail = "Topology: split (the Dashboard and the API are on separate origins).";
+    if (!plausiblySameSite(config.dashboardOrigin, config.baseUrl)) {
+      return freezeCheck(
+        "identity.configuration",
+        "warning",
+        "Identity configuration valid; split origins may not share a site",
+        [
+          schemaDetail,
+          signupDetail,
+          topologyDetail,
+          "The Dashboard and API hostnames are not siblings under one parent domain. Browsers send the session cookie across split origins only within one registrable domain (ADR 0045); Doctor cannot check the Public Suffix List, so confirm it.",
+        ],
+      );
+    }
+    return freezeCheck("identity.configuration", "pass", "Identity configuration valid", [
+      schemaDetail,
+      signupDetail,
+      topologyDetail,
     ]);
   } catch (error) {
     const code =
@@ -849,17 +905,25 @@ function databaseTransportCheck(
   }
 }
 
+/** Doctor reads only its own process's environment, so it says so: run as the reference
+ * deployment's `migrate`, it is given the API's values by the proxy overlay, but run any other way
+ * it may be checking a configuration the API is not running. */
+const CLIENT_ADDRESS_SCOPE =
+  "Checked: the environment Doctor runs with. In the reference deployment `migrate` is given the API's client-address values; a running API's own value is shown by `docker compose exec api printenv EKKLESIA_CLIENT_ADDRESS_MODE`.";
+
 function clientAddressCheck(input: ClientAddressConfigInput | undefined): DoctorCheck {
   try {
     const config = createClientAddressConfig(input, TRUSTED_CLIENT_ADDRESS_HEADER);
     if (config.mode === "direct") {
       return freezeCheck("identity.client-address", "pass", "Direct client-address mode", [
         "Trusts only the actual immediate socket peer for rate limiting; no forwarded header is trusted.",
+        CLIENT_ADDRESS_SCOPE,
       ]);
     }
     return freezeCheck("identity.client-address", "pass", "Trusted-proxy client-address mode", [
       `Trusts header "${config.header}" only from a request whose immediate socket peer matches one of ${config.trustedProxies.length} configured trusted ${plural(config.trustedProxies.length, "proxy")}.`,
       "The reverse proxy must overwrite (never append to) this header, and the origin must not be reachable except through it.",
+      CLIENT_ADDRESS_SCOPE,
     ]);
   } catch (error) {
     const code =
@@ -870,7 +934,7 @@ function clientAddressCheck(input: ClientAddressConfigInput | undefined): Doctor
       "identity.client-address",
       "failure",
       "Client-address configuration invalid",
-      [`[${code}] Configured client-address values failed validation.`],
+      [`[${code}] Configured client-address values failed validation.`, CLIENT_ADDRESS_SCOPE],
     );
   }
 }

core/tests/doctor-report.test.ts

@@ -117,6 +117,7 @@ Identity
     Identity runtime configuration (signing key, base URL, trusted origins) is not set.
   ✓ Direct client-address mode
     Trusts only the actual immediate socket peer for rate limiting; no forwarded header is trusted.
+    Checked: the environment Doctor runs with. In the reference deployment \`migrate\` is given the API's client-address values; a running API's own value is shown by \`docker compose exec api printenv EKKLESIA_CLIENT_ADDRESS_MODE\`.
 
 Object storage
   ○ Object storage not configured

core/tests/doctor.test.ts

@@ -705,6 +705,88 @@ describe("Ekklesia Doctor diagnostics", () => {
     expect(report.result).toBe("ready-with-warnings"); // PostgreSQL is still skipped in this fixture
   });
 
+  describe("Dashboard and API topology (ADR 0045)", () => {
+    const secret = "correct-horse-battery-staple-0123456789";
+    async function identityCheck(identity: {
+      readonly baseUrl: string;
+      readonly dashboardOrigin?: string;
+      readonly environment?: "development" | "production";
+      readonly trustedOrigins: readonly string[];
+    }) {
+      const report = await diagnoseEkklesia(
+        {
+          ...options(),
+          identityConfiguration: { environment: "production", secret, ...identity },
+        },
+        dependencies(),
+      );
+      return { check: check(report, "identity.configuration"), report };
+    }
+
+    it("reports the same-origin topology when no Dashboard origin is set", async () => {
+      const { check: identity } = await identityCheck({
+        baseUrl: "https://ekklesia.example.test",
+        trustedOrigins: ["https://ekklesia.example.test"],
+      });
+      expect(identity.status).toBe("pass");
+      expect(identity.details).toContain(
+        "Topology: same-origin (the Dashboard is served from the API's origin).",
+      );
+    });
+
+    it("reports the split topology for sibling hostnames without printing either", async () => {
+      const { check: identity, report } = await identityCheck({
+        baseUrl: "https://api.example.test",
+        dashboardOrigin: "https://dash.example.test",
+        trustedOrigins: ["https://dash.example.test"],
+      });
+      expect(identity.status).toBe("pass");
+      expect(identity.details).toContain(
+        "Topology: split (the Dashboard and the API are on separate origins).",
+      );
+      expect(JSON.stringify(report)).not.toContain("dash.example.test");
+      expect(JSON.stringify(report)).not.toContain("api.example.test");
+    });
+
+    it.each([
+      ["different registrable domains", "https://dash.example.test", "https://api.example.org"],
+      ["two IP addresses", "https://10.0.0.2", "https://10.0.0.1"],
+      ["a parent that is only a top-level domain", "https://dash.test", "https://api.test"],
+    ])("warns, without failing, when split hostnames may not share a site: %s", async (_case, dashboardOrigin, baseUrl) => {
+      const { check: identity, report } = await identityCheck({
+        baseUrl,
+        dashboardOrigin,
+        trustedOrigins: [dashboardOrigin],
+      });
+      expect(identity.status).toBe("warning");
+      expect(identity.details.join("\n")).toContain("not siblings under one parent domain");
+      expect(doctorExitCode(report)).toBe(0);
+    });
+
+    it("treats another port on the same host as the same site (split development)", async () => {
+      const { check: identity } = await identityCheck({
+        baseUrl: "http://localhost:3000",
+        dashboardOrigin: "http://localhost:5173",
+        environment: "development",
+        trustedOrigins: ["http://localhost:5173"],
+      });
+      expect(identity.status).toBe("pass");
+    });
+
+    it("fails, as the API's startup would, for a Dashboard origin the API does not trust", async () => {
+      const { check: identity, report } = await identityCheck({
+        baseUrl: "https://api.example.test",
+        dashboardOrigin: "https://dash.example.test",
+        trustedOrigins: ["https://other.example.test"],
+      });
+      expect(identity.status).toBe("failure");
+      expect(identity.details.some((detail) => detail.includes("DASHBOARD_ORIGIN_UNTRUSTED"))).toBe(
+        true,
+      );
+      expect(doctorExitCode(report)).toBe(1);
+    });
+  });
+
   it("fails identity configuration for an invalid secret without leaking it", async () => {
     const hostileSecret = "s3cr3t-do-not-log";
     const report = await diagnoseEkklesia(
@@ -876,6 +958,21 @@ describe("Ekklesia Doctor diagnostics", () => {
     expect(report.result).toBe("ready-with-warnings");
   });
 
+  it("says whose client-address configuration it checked: this process's, not a running API's", async () => {
+    for (const clientAddress of [
+      undefined,
+      { header: "x-forwarded-for", mode: "trusted-proxy" as const, trustedProxies: ["10.0.0.1"] },
+      { header: "x-forwarded-for", mode: "trusted-proxy" as const, trustedProxies: ["bad"] },
+    ]) {
+      const report = await diagnoseEkklesia(
+        { ...options(), ...(clientAddress ? { clientAddress } : {}) },
+        dependencies(),
+      );
+      const details = check(report, "identity.client-address").details;
+      expect(details.some((detail) => detail.includes("environment Doctor runs with"))).toBe(true);
+    }
+  });
+
   it("passes client-address configuration with an explicitly configured trusted-proxy mode", async () => {
     const report = await diagnoseEkklesia(
       {

deploy/Caddyfile.example

@@ -70,18 +70,57 @@
 
 # Browsers fetch signed object URLs here (S3_DELIVERY_ENDPOINT, ADR 0031).
 {$EKKLESIA_STORAGE_HOSTNAME} {
+	# Delivery-layer CORS belongs to the deployment, not to the object store: this block decides it,
+	# so it stays the same with any S3 backend behind it. Only the origins whose pages read objects
+	# with fetch() get CORS: the Ekklesia origin, which serves the Dashboard and the displays. An <img> needs none. Every object
+	# URL is still a signed, expiring capability; CORS only decides which pages may read the bytes.
+	@cors_origin header Origin https://{$EKKLESIA_HOSTNAME}
+
+	# A preflight is answered here and never reaches storage. Only GET and HEAD are ever allowed, and
+	# no request header beyond the CORS-safelisted ones.
+	@preflight method OPTIONS
+	handle @preflight {
+		header @cors_origin {
+			Access-Control-Allow-Origin {http.request.header.Origin}
+			Access-Control-Allow-Methods "GET, HEAD"
+			Access-Control-Max-Age 600
+		}
+		header Vary Origin
+		respond 204
+	}
+
+	handle {
+		# Set when the response is written, after the upstream's own CORS headers were removed below.
+		header @cors_origin >Access-Control-Allow-Origin {http.request.header.Origin}
+		header >Vary Origin
+
 		reverse_proxy https://object-storage:8443 {
-		# An S3 signature covers the Host header: pass the original through unchanged, or every signed
+			# An S3 signature covers the Host header: pass the original through unchanged, or every
-		# URL fails verification.
+			# signed URL fails verification.
 			header_up Host {host}
 			header_up -CF-Connecting-IP
 			header_up -X-Real-IP
 			header_up -Forwarded
 			header_up -True-Client-IP
+			# The object store's own CORS answer (SeaweedFS reflects any origin, with every method)
+			# is not the deployment's policy.
+			header_down -Access-Control-Allow-Origin
+			header_down -Access-Control-Allow-Methods
+			header_down -Access-Control-Allow-Headers
+			header_down -Access-Control-Expose-Headers
+			header_down -Access-Control-Allow-Credentials
+			header_down -Access-Control-Max-Age
+			header_down -Vary
 			transport http {
 				# object-storage presents a certificate from the installation-private CA.
 				tls_trust_pool file /etc/caddy/ekklesia-ca.crt
 				tls_server_name object-storage
+				# HTTP/1.1 only. Over HTTP/2, SeaweedFS answers a conditional request with a 304 that
+				# declares a Content-Length it never sends; Caddy then aborts the browser's stream,
+				# which a browser reports as ERR_HTTP2_PROTOCOL_ERROR on every revalidation. Its
+				# HTTP/1.1 304 is clean. Browsers still reach this proxy over HTTP/2 and HTTP/3.
+				versions 1.1
+			}
 		}
 	}
 }

deploy/Caddyfile.split.example

@@ -0,0 +1,152 @@
+# Ekklesia reference proxy configuration for the split topology (ADR 0045): the Dashboard and the API
+# on separate hostnames of one site, for example dash.example.org and api.example.org. For the
+# default same-origin topology use Caddyfile.example instead. Copy this file to deploy/Caddyfile.
+#
+# Hostnames, the ACME contact, and the tunnel connector's address come from the proxy service's
+# environment (deploy/.env): EKKLESIA_DASHBOARD_HOSTNAME is the Dashboard's, EKKLESIA_HOSTNAME the
+# API's (which also serves the display host), EKKLESIA_STORAGE_HOSTNAME the storage origin's. Only
+# the two site blocks below differ from Caddyfile.example.
+{
+	# ACME account contact. Certificates use the HTTP-01 challenge on port 80 by default, which needs
+	# all three hostnames to resolve publicly to this host with 80 and 443 reachable.
+	email {$EKKLESIA_ACME_EMAIL}
+
+	# DNS-01, for an installation that keeps Ekklesia off the public Internet, serves only a LAN
+	# (split-horizon DNS), or is reachable only through Cloudflare Tunnel. Cloudflare terminates TLS at
+	# its edge, so HTTP-01 cannot reach this proxy through a tunnel.
+	#
+	# DNS-01 needs a DNS provider module that the stock Caddy image does not contain. Build an image
+	# with it (for example `xcaddy build --with github.com/caddy-dns/cloudflare`), pin that image by
+	# digest in your own overlay, give it CLOUDFLARE_API_TOKEN through a root-owned env file, then
+	# enable:
+	#
+	# acme_dns cloudflare {env.CLOUDFLARE_API_TOKEN}
+
+	servers {
+		# A client-address header is honored only from the tunnel connector's fixed address
+		# (compose.tunnel.yaml). From every other peer, the client address is the TCP peer itself and
+		# any such header is ignored. Without a tunnel, nothing has this address.
+		trusted_proxies static {$EKKLESIA_TUNNEL_ADDRESS}/32
+		client_ip_headers CF-Connecting-IP
+		trusted_proxies_strict
+	}
+
+	# Access logs are off unless enabled. If you enable them, keep request headers out: they carry
+	# cookies and forwarding chains (docs/development/security.md, launch checklist item 7).
+}
+
+# What every request to the API carries upstream: exactly one forwarding header, overwritten with
+# the client address Caddy resolved, and none of the headers a caller could use to choose its own.
+(ekklesia_forwarding) {
+	header_up X-Forwarded-For {client_ip}
+	header_up -CF-Connecting-IP
+	header_up -X-Real-IP
+	header_up -Forwarded
+	header_up -True-Client-IP
+}
+
+# The Dashboard: its page and its one script, nothing else. Emailed verification and reset links land
+# on `/` with a query. `/api/*` is refused here on purpose, so the session cookie has exactly one
+# home, the API hostname, and the Dashboard can never fall back to a same-origin API.
+{$EKKLESIA_DASHBOARD_HOSTNAME} {
+	@dashboard path / /assets/ekklesia-dashboard/*
+
+	handle @dashboard {
+		reverse_proxy api:3000 {
+			import ekklesia_forwarding
+		}
+	}
+
+	handle {
+		respond 404
+	}
+}
+
+# The API, and the display host on the API's own origin: a screen's pages, service worker, device
+# cookies, and requests are all same-origin (ADR 0045). Nothing is served at `/`.
+{$EKKLESIA_HOSTNAME} {
+	@api path /api/* /display/* /assets/ekklesia-display/*
+
+	# Module realtime is Server-Sent Events: flush every event immediately.
+	@realtime path /api/v1/module-realtime/*
+
+	handle @realtime {
+		reverse_proxy api:3000 {
+			import ekklesia_forwarding
+			flush_interval -1
+		}
+	}
+
+	handle @api {
+		# Request bodies stream through unbuffered and unlimited here; the API enforces the platform's
+		# ceilings itself (8 KiB for authentication, up to 32 MiB for a streamed module route).
+		reverse_proxy api:3000 {
+			import ekklesia_forwarding
+		}
+	}
+
+	handle {
+		respond 404
+	}
+}
+
+# Browsers fetch signed object URLs here (S3_DELIVERY_ENDPOINT, ADR 0031).
+{$EKKLESIA_STORAGE_HOSTNAME} {
+	# Delivery-layer CORS belongs to the deployment, not to the object store: this block decides it,
+	# so it stays the same with any S3 backend behind it. Only the origins whose pages read objects
+	# with fetch() get CORS: the API origin, where displays run, and the Dashboard origin,
+	# where a module's preview may cache images too. An <img> needs none. Every object
+	# URL is still a signed, expiring capability; CORS only decides which pages may read the bytes.
+	@cors_origin {
+		header Origin https://{$EKKLESIA_HOSTNAME}
+		header Origin https://{$EKKLESIA_DASHBOARD_HOSTNAME}
+	}
+
+	# A preflight is answered here and never reaches storage. Only GET and HEAD are ever allowed, and
+	# no request header beyond the CORS-safelisted ones.
+	@preflight method OPTIONS
+	handle @preflight {
+		header @cors_origin {
+			Access-Control-Allow-Origin {http.request.header.Origin}
+			Access-Control-Allow-Methods "GET, HEAD"
+			Access-Control-Max-Age 600
+		}
+		header Vary Origin
+		respond 204
+	}
+
+	handle {
+		# Set when the response is written, after the upstream's own CORS headers were removed below.
+		header @cors_origin >Access-Control-Allow-Origin {http.request.header.Origin}
+		header >Vary Origin
+
+		reverse_proxy https://object-storage:8443 {
+			# An S3 signature covers the Host header: pass the original through unchanged, or every
+			# signed URL fails verification.
+			header_up Host {host}
+			header_up -CF-Connecting-IP
+			header_up -X-Real-IP
+			header_up -Forwarded
+			header_up -True-Client-IP
+			# The object store's own CORS answer (SeaweedFS reflects any origin, with every method)
+			# is not the deployment's policy.
+			header_down -Access-Control-Allow-Origin
+			header_down -Access-Control-Allow-Methods
+			header_down -Access-Control-Allow-Headers
+			header_down -Access-Control-Expose-Headers
+			header_down -Access-Control-Allow-Credentials
+			header_down -Access-Control-Max-Age
+			header_down -Vary
+			transport http {
+				# object-storage presents a certificate from the installation-private CA.
+				tls_trust_pool file /etc/caddy/ekklesia-ca.crt
+				tls_server_name object-storage
+				# HTTP/1.1 only. Over HTTP/2, SeaweedFS answers a conditional request with a 304 that
+				# declares a Content-Length it never sends; Caddy then aborts the browser's stream,
+				# which a browser reports as ERR_HTTP2_PROTOCOL_ERROR on every revalidation. Its
+				# HTTP/1.1 304 is clean. Browsers still reach this proxy over HTTP/2 and HTTP/3.
+				versions 1.1
+			}
+		}
+	}
+}

deploy/README.md

@@ -10,7 +10,8 @@ specific to one organization.
 | [`compose.yaml`](compose.yaml) | The base: `api`, `postgres`, `object-storage`, and the operator-only `migrate`. Publishes no port. |
 | [`compose.proxy.yaml`](compose.proxy.yaml) | Overlay: Caddy as the TLS proxy, the only service with published ports. |
 | [`compose.tunnel.yaml`](compose.tunnel.yaml) | Overlay on top of the proxy: a Cloudflare Tunnel connector. |
-| [`Caddyfile.example`](Caddyfile.example) | The proxy's configuration; copy to `Caddyfile`. |
+| [`Caddyfile.example`](Caddyfile.example) | The proxy's configuration for the default same-origin topology; copy to `Caddyfile`. |
+| [`Caddyfile.split.example`](Caddyfile.split.example) | The proxy's configuration when the Dashboard and the API have separate hostnames ([Split Dashboard and API origins](#split-dashboard-and-api-origins)); copy to `Caddyfile` instead. |
 | [`postgres/pg_hba.conf`](postgres/pg_hba.conf) | PostgreSQL client authentication: TLS only, SCRAM passwords. |
 | [`env/`](env/) | Commented examples of every env file. No values. |
 | [`scripts/init-tls.sh`](scripts/init-tls.sh) | Creates the installation-private CA and the `postgres` and `object-storage` server certificates. |
@@ -142,6 +143,64 @@ image, because it was not built for the newer schema.
 Slice 6 adds the scheduled backup job and the restore procedure (ADR 0044, Backups). Until then,
 take a `pg_dump` and a copy of every bucket before each upgrade by hand.
 
+### Split Dashboard and API origins
+
+By default one hostname serves the Dashboard (`/`), the API (`/api/*`), and displays (`/display/*`).
+An installation may instead give the Dashboard its own hostname, for example `dash.example.org`
+beside `api.example.org` ([ADR 0045](../docs/architecture/decisions/0045-split-dashboard-and-api-origins.md)).
+The same image serves both; only configuration differs.
+
+| Hostname | Serves | Refuses (`404`) |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| Dashboard (`EKKLESIA_DASHBOARD_HOSTNAME`) | `/` and `/assets/ekklesia-dashboard/*` | everything else, including `/api/*` |
+| API (`EKKLESIA_HOSTNAME`) | `/api/*`, `/display/*`, `/assets/ekklesia-display/*` | everything else, including `/` |
+| Storage (`EKKLESIA_STORAGE_HOSTNAME`) | signed object URLs, unchanged | |
+
+Displays live on the API's hostname (`https://api.example.org/display/<module>`), because their
+device cookies are bound to it and their offline cache keeps only same-origin responses. That
+hostname is what every screen and paired device depends on: choose it once.
+
+To run split:
+
+1. Copy `Caddyfile.split.example` to `Caddyfile` instead of `Caddyfile.example`.
+2. In `deploy/.env`, set `EKKLESIA_HOSTNAME` to the API's hostname and `EKKLESIA_DASHBOARD_HOSTNAME`
+   to the Dashboard's.
+3. In `ekklesia.env`, set `EKKLESIA_IDENTITY_BASE_URL` to `https://` and the API's hostname,
+   `EKKLESIA_DASHBOARD_ORIGIN` to `https://` and the Dashboard's, and
+   `EKKLESIA_IDENTITY_TRUSTED_ORIGINS` to the Dashboard's origin. The API always trusts its own
+   origin, so it need not be listed.
+
+**Both hostnames must belong to one registrable domain** (`dash.example.org` and `api.example.org`,
+not `dash.example.org` and `api.example.net`). The session cookie stays host-only on the API's
+hostname; browsers send it from the Dashboard only between origins of the same site. Doctor reports
+the topology and warns when the two hostnames are not siblings.
+
+The Dashboard learns the API's origin at run time: the API writes its identity base URL into the page
+it serves (`<meta name="ekklesia-api-origin">`). Nothing about the topology is built into the image.
+
+### Storage delivery: CORS is the deployment's
+
+Browsers fetch objects directly from the storage hostname through signed, expiring URLs (ADR 0031).
+**Which pages may read those bytes with `fetch()` is decided by the delivery layer, the proxy, and
+never by the object store.** That policy therefore stays the same with SeaweedFS, R2, or any other
+S3 backend behind it, and an installation that changes backends changes nothing about CORS.
+
+The reference proxy's storage block:
+
+- grants CORS only to the origins whose pages read objects with `fetch()`: the Ekklesia origin in the
+  same-origin topology; the API origin (displays) and the Dashboard origin (a module's preview) in
+  the split topology. An `<img>` needs no CORS and is unaffected;
+- allows `GET` and `HEAD` only, and no request header beyond the CORS-safelisted ones, always with
+  `Vary: Origin`;
+- answers preflight `OPTIONS` requests itself, so they never reach storage;
+- removes the object store's own CORS headers. SeaweedFS's default reflects any origin and
+  advertises `PUT`, `POST`, and `DELETE`.
+
+The proxy reaches storage over **HTTP/1.1 only**. Over HTTP/2, SeaweedFS answers a conditional
+request with a `304` that declares a `Content-Length` it never sends. The proxy then resets the
+browser's stream, and every reload of a cached image fails with `ERR_HTTP2_PROTOCOL_ERROR`.
+Browsers still reach the proxy itself over HTTP/2 and HTTP/3.
+
 ### Behind an existing reverse proxy
 
 Run the base alone and attach `api` and `object-storage` to your proxy's network with an overlay of
@@ -177,6 +236,8 @@ Then make your proxy do what `Caddyfile.example` does:
 - forward the storage hostname to `https://object-storage:8443`, verifying it against
   `/etc/ekklesia/tls/ca.crt` with server name `object-storage`, and **pass the original `Host`
   through unchanged**, or every signed URL fails (ADR 0031).
+- reach `object-storage` over **HTTP/1.1** only, and own the storage hostname's CORS as described in
+  [Storage delivery](#storage-delivery-cors-is-the-deployments).
 
 The proxy's address must be fixed and must never be handed to anything else. With Docker, give its
 network an explicit subnet, limit `ip_range` to part of it, and fix the proxy's address outside that
@@ -203,8 +264,9 @@ dashboard. No Cloudflare API is called from here.
    the Ekklesia hostname. Service type **HTTPS**, URL `proxy:443`.
 3. Under that hostname's **TLS** settings, set **Origin Server Name** to the same Ekklesia hostname,
    and leave **No TLS Verify** off. The connector then verifies the proxy's certificate for that name.
-4. Add a second public hostname for the storage hostname, the same way, with its own origin server
+4. Add a public hostname for the storage hostname, the same way, with its own origin server name.
-   name.
+   In the [split topology](#split-dashboard-and-api-origins), add one for the Dashboard's hostname
+   too: three in all, each with its own origin server name.
 5. Start with all three files. The proxy honors `CF-Connecting-IP` only from the connector's fixed
    address. From any other peer it is stripped.
 
@@ -232,7 +294,7 @@ deployment:
 
 | # | Item | Where it is met |
 | --- | --- | --- |
-| 1 | The proxy forwards the Dashboard and `/api` on the intended origin | `Caddyfile.example` routes `/`, `/api/*`, `/display/*`, `/assets/*` on one hostname to `api`; the API serves the Dashboard itself. |
+| 1 | The proxy forwards the Dashboard and `/api` on the intended origin | `Caddyfile.example` routes `/`, `/api/*`, `/display/*`, `/assets/*` on one hostname to `api`; the API serves the Dashboard itself. In the split topology, `Caddyfile.split.example` gives each hostname exactly its own paths and the exact trusted-origin CORS of ADR 0045 covers the rest. |
 | 2 | The origin port is unreachable from the Internet | The base publishes no port; only `proxy` publishes 80 and 443. |
 | 3 | The origin port is unreachable from untrusted networks | `api` is reachable only on Docker networks; `EKKLESIA_PUBLISH_ADDRESS` limits the proxy to one interface. Firewall the host itself. |
 | 4 | The proxy overwrites the trusted client-IP header | `header_up X-Forwarded-For {client_ip}` in `Caddyfile.example`. |
@@ -251,14 +313,25 @@ deployment:
   platform-only image and a disposable PostgreSQL and SeaweedFS that exist only for that run. It
   follows the first boot above and checks the following through the proxy:
   - readiness and the Dashboard;
-  - a signed object URL fetched through the storage hostname;
+  - a signed object URL fetched through the storage hostname, and the same image loaded twice over
+    HTTP/2, the second time as a conditional request that must be a clean `304`;
+  - storage CORS: exactly the allowed origins, `GET` and `HEAD` only, preflights answered by the
+    proxy, and none of the object store's own CORS headers;
   - the client-address chain, both from an ordinary peer and from the tunnel connector's address;
   - initial-owner sign-in and sign-out;
   - that the API's database connection is TLS 1.3, and that it is refused by a foreign CA and by a
     wrong host name;
   - Doctor.
 
-  CI runs it on every change.
+  `EKKLESIA_SMOKE_TOPOLOGY=split` runs the [split topology](#split-dashboard-and-api-origins)
+  instead: an image with the repository's module template installed as a test-only module, every
+  hostname's served and refused paths, exact CORS for the Dashboard's origin and none for others,
+  and then a real headless Chromium (pinned by digest, driven over the DevTools protocol) that signs
+  in on the Dashboard's hostname, checks the session cookie lives only on the API's, mounts the
+  module's UI from the API's origin and sees its own credentialed requests succeed, mounts its display
+  on the API's hostname with its service worker, and signs out.
+
+  CI runs both topologies on every change.
 - **Test-only:** the smoke test runs Caddy with its internal CA (`local_certs`), because a test run
   has no public hostname. Never use it in an installation; `Caddyfile.example` does not contain it.
 
@@ -311,10 +384,10 @@ finds its files:
 ```sh
 docker build \
   --file deploy/Dockerfile \
-  --build-arg VERSION=0.1.1 \
+  --build-arg VERSION=0.1.2 \
   --build-arg REVISION="$(git rev-parse HEAD)" \
   --build-arg SOURCE=https://git.example.org/your-org/ekklesia \
-  --tag ekklesia:0.1.1 \
+  --tag ekklesia:0.1.2 \
   .
 ```
 
@@ -395,6 +468,14 @@ for a development checkout, not for the image.
 `migrate` has `profiles: ["ops"]`, so `up` never starts it. It never restarts, has no health check,
 and its default command is the read-only plan. **Nothing applies migrations automatically.**
 
+Run operator commands with the same Compose files as the stack. `COMPOSE_FILE` in `deploy/.env`
+(set in [`env/compose.env.example`](env/compose.env.example)) does that for every plain
+`docker compose` command below. It matters for Doctor in particular: Doctor checks the
+client-address configuration of the process it runs in. The proxy overlay gives `migrate` the
+API's trusted-proxy settings, so Doctor reports what the API runs. Without the overlay, Doctor
+reports direct mode for an API that trusts its proxy. The running API's own value is shown by
+`docker compose exec api printenv EKKLESIA_CLIENT_ADDRESS_MODE`.
+
 | Task | Command (from `deploy/`) |
 | --- | --- |
 | Plan migrations (read-only) | `docker compose run --rm migrate` |

deploy/compose.proxy.yaml

@@ -13,6 +13,13 @@
 # its lower half; the proxy (and the tunnel connector, if used) take addresses from the upper half,
 # which Docker never hands to another container.
 
+# Exactly one trusted peer: this proxy. Set from the same variable that fixes the proxy's address,
+# so the two cannot drift apart. These override any value in ekklesia.env.
+x-ekklesia-client-address: &ekklesia-client-address
+  EKKLESIA_CLIENT_ADDRESS_MODE: trusted-proxy
+  EKKLESIA_CLIENT_ADDRESS_HEADER: x-forwarded-for
+  EKKLESIA_CLIENT_ADDRESS_TRUSTED_PROXIES: ${EKKLESIA_PROXY_ADDRESS:-10.249.250.254}/32
+
 services:
   proxy:
     image: caddy:2.11.4-alpine@sha256:6aeddd44c3078b0f9a35206472a11420648a79c184603ef95957d0a20044cb2b
@@ -35,6 +42,10 @@ services:
     environment:
       EKKLESIA_HOSTNAME: ${EKKLESIA_HOSTNAME:?EKKLESIA_HOSTNAME is required, for example ekklesia.example.org}
       EKKLESIA_STORAGE_HOSTNAME: ${EKKLESIA_STORAGE_HOSTNAME:?EKKLESIA_STORAGE_HOSTNAME is required, for example storage.ekklesia.example.org}
+      # The split topology only (ADR 0045, Caddyfile.split.example), where EKKLESIA_HOSTNAME is the
+      # API's hostname and this is the Dashboard's. Caddyfile.example ignores it; the split
+      # configuration refuses to start without it.
+      EKKLESIA_DASHBOARD_HOSTNAME: ${EKKLESIA_DASHBOARD_HOSTNAME:-}
       EKKLESIA_ACME_EMAIL: ${EKKLESIA_ACME_EMAIL:?EKKLESIA_ACME_EMAIL is required for ACME account notices}
       EKKLESIA_TUNNEL_ADDRESS: ${EKKLESIA_TUNNEL_ADDRESS:-10.249.250.253}
     volumes:
@@ -55,12 +66,12 @@ services:
   api:
     networks:
       edge: {}
-    environment:
+    environment: *ekklesia-client-address
-      # Exactly one trusted peer: this proxy. Set here from the same variable that fixes the proxy's
+
-      # address, so the two cannot drift apart. These override any value in ekklesia.env.
+  # Operator commands (migrations, Doctor) run as `migrate`. It gets the API's client-address
-      EKKLESIA_CLIENT_ADDRESS_MODE: trusted-proxy
+  # configuration too, so that Doctor checks what the API actually runs rather than an empty one.
-      EKKLESIA_CLIENT_ADDRESS_HEADER: x-forwarded-for
+  migrate:
-      EKKLESIA_CLIENT_ADDRESS_TRUSTED_PROXIES: ${EKKLESIA_PROXY_ADDRESS:-10.249.250.254}/32
+    environment: *ekklesia-client-address
 
   object-storage:
     networks:

deploy/env/compose.env.example

@@ -2,6 +2,12 @@
 # Compose reads automatically from this directory. Nothing here is a secret; secrets live in the
 # per-service files under EKKLESIA_ENV_DIR.
 
+# Which Compose files make up this installation, so that every plain `docker compose …` command
+# run from this directory, operator commands through `migrate` included, sees the same services and
+# settings as the running stack. Add compose.tunnel.yaml if you use the tunnel connector. Without
+# the proxy overlay here, Doctor checks a `migrate` that lacks the API's client-address settings.
+COMPOSE_FILE=compose.yaml:compose.proxy.yaml
+
 # The image to run, by registry, name, and tag (or digest). Required.
 EKKLESIA_IMAGE=
 
@@ -10,9 +16,14 @@ EKKLESIA_ENV_DIR=/etc/ekklesia
 EKKLESIA_TLS_DIR=/etc/ekklesia/tls
 
 # --- compose.proxy.yaml ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-# The Ekklesia hostname (Dashboard, API, displays) and the storage hostname (signed object URLs).
+# The Ekklesia hostname and the storage hostname (signed object URLs). In the default same-origin
+# topology (Caddyfile.example) EKKLESIA_HOSTNAME serves the Dashboard, the API, and displays.
 EKKLESIA_HOSTNAME=
 EKKLESIA_STORAGE_HOSTNAME=
+# The split topology only (ADR 0045, Caddyfile.split.example): the Dashboard's own hostname, while
+# EKKLESIA_HOSTNAME is the API's and the displays'. Both must share one registrable domain, for
+# example dash.example.org and api.example.org. Leave empty for the same-origin topology.
+EKKLESIA_DASHBOARD_HOSTNAME=
 # Contact address for the ACME account (certificate expiry notices).
 EKKLESIA_ACME_EMAIL=
 # EKKLESIA_CADDYFILE=./Caddyfile

deploy/env/ekklesia.env.example

@@ -23,15 +23,19 @@ EKKLESIA_DATABASE_TLS_MODE=verify-full
 # scripts/init-tls.sh prints this exact line. It is the only CA the database connection trusts.
 EKKLESIA_DATABASE_CA=
 
-# --- Identity (ADR 0011, ADR 0018, ADR 0034) ----------------------------------------------------
+# --- Identity (ADR 0011, ADR 0018, ADR 0034, ADR 0045) -----------------------------------------
-# The public https origin of the Ekklesia hostname, with no path. Production rejects http and
+# The public https origin of the API, with no path: the Ekklesia hostname in the same-origin
-# loopback origins.
+# topology, the API's hostname in the split one. Production rejects http and loopback origins.
 EKKLESIA_IDENTITY_BASE_URL=
-# Comma-separated exact origins allowed to make credentialed requests. Normally just the base URL.
+# Comma-separated exact origins allowed to make credentialed requests. The API's own origin is
+# always trusted and need not be listed. Same-origin topology: the base URL. Split topology: the
+# Dashboard's origin.
 EKKLESIA_IDENTITY_TRUSTED_ORIGINS=
 # At least 32 random characters. Rotating it signs every user out.
 EKKLESIA_IDENTITY_SECRET=
-# Leave unset: the Dashboard is served from the base URL (ADR 0044).
+# Same-origin topology: leave unset; the Dashboard is served from the base URL (ADR 0044).
+# Split topology: the Dashboard's https origin, which must also be in the trusted origins. Emailed
+# verification and reset links land here (ADR 0045).
 # EKKLESIA_DASHBOARD_ORIGIN=
 # Production refuses public sign-up. Leave unset.
 # EKKLESIA_PUBLIC_SIGNUP_ENABLED=

docs/architecture/decisions/0045-split-dashboard-and-api-origins.md

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 # 0045: The Dashboard and the API may live on separate origins
 
-- Status: Proposed
+- Status: Accepted
 - Date: 2026-10-03
 - Amends: [0034](0034-host-owned-browser-authentication.md)
 - Extends: [0044](0044-self-hosted-reference-deployment.md)

docs/architecture/decisions/0046-installation-owned-branding.md

@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
+# 0046: Ekklesia's branding is never forced on an installation
+
+- Status: Proposed
+- Date: 2026-10-03
+- Related: [ADR 0021](0021-modules-as-hostable-products.md),
+  [ADR 0034](0034-host-owned-browser-authentication.md),
+  [ADR 0037](0037-host-provided-outbound-email.md),
+  [ADR 0038](0038-email-verification-and-password-recovery.md),
+  [ADR 0039](0039-shared-design-tokens-and-elements.md),
+  [ADR 0043](0043-display-offline-code-fallback.md),
+  [ADR 0045](0045-split-dashboard-and-api-origins.md)
+
+## Context
+
+Ekklesia is software a church runs for its own people. The people who use an installation (members,
+visitors, volunteers running a screen) know the church, not the software behind it, and the church
+decides how it presents itself to them. Today the platform names itself in places those people see:
+the sign-in screen asks them to "Sign in to Ekklesia", the Dashboard's heading and page title read
+"Ekklesia", emails ask them to verify "your Ekklesia email address", and an offline screen in the
+sanctuary says it is "waiting for Ekklesia".
+
+None of those were decided; they accumulated. This records the rule they should have followed, so
+every later screen, message, and module is held to it.
+
+## Decision
+
+### The principle
+
+**Ekklesia's branding is never forced on an installation.** Anything a member, visitor, or volunteer
+can see is configurable by the installation and removable entirely. That includes, and is not
+limited to:
+
+- page titles, headings, and the name of the application in a browser tab, an installed web app, or
+  a bookmark;
+- sign-in, verification, recovery, and every other authentication screen;
+- emails: the sender's display name, the subject, and the body;
+- display screens, pairing screens, and offline and failure screens on a display;
+- error pages and error messages a person reads;
+- application names and icons, and any "powered by" or attribution text.
+
+"Removable entirely" means an installation can show its own name, or no product name at all, and in
+either case no screen or message a person sees names Ekklesia.
+
+### What is exempt
+
+Internal identifiers are not branding and stay as they are: package names, module ids, URL paths
+(`/api/v1/…`, `/assets/ekklesia-dashboard/…`), HTTP header names, environment variable names, cookie
+names, CSS custom property names, element ids and `data-` attributes, storage, cache, and database
+names, and log field names. A person can find them only by opening developer tools or reading
+configuration, and renaming them would break installations for no one's benefit.
+
+Tooling an operator runs to administer the installation (the command-line tools, Doctor, server logs,
+and startup messages) names the software being operated, as a package name does, and is exempt too.
+So are messages written only for developers: thrown errors that reach a console and never a page, and
+build-time diagnostics for module authors.
+
+### How installations configure it
+
+The platform takes the installation's name from configuration, once, and uses it everywhere a
+person-facing string would otherwise have said "Ekklesia". When no name is configured, the wording is
+neutral ("Sign in", "Verify your email address", "Waiting for the server") rather than falling back to
+"Ekklesia". The default installation therefore names nothing, which is what makes the principle
+checkable: a test can render every person-facing screen and message with no name configured and fail
+on any occurrence of "Ekklesia".
+
+Browser pages receive the name the way they receive the API origin (ADR 0045): the API renders it
+into the page it serves at startup, so the image stays generic and nothing is decided at build time.
+An email's sender display name is the existing `EKKLESIA_SMTP_FROM_NAME` (ADR 0037); its subject and
+body use the same installation name.
+
+Visual identity follows the same rule. The platform ships no logo, favicon, or icon today; any it
+ships later must be replaceable by the installation and removable entirely, and must not appear by
+default. Colours and type are the installation's theme (ADR 0039), not a mark.
+
+### It applies to modules
+
+A module's user-visible text follows the same principle. A module that names its host ("Open the
+Ekklesia Dashboard") also ties itself to one host, which ADR 0021 already asks modules not to do.
+Modules refer to the host generically ("the Dashboard") or not at all.
+
+## Consequences
+
+- Every person-facing string that names the platform today becomes either the configured name or
+  neutral wording. An implementation slice makes that change and adds the test that keeps it true.
+- New screens, emails, and modules are reviewed against this rule; "Ekklesia" in a person-facing
+  string is a defect.
+- Internal identifiers, operator tooling, and developer diagnostics keep the name, so nothing
+  operational is renamed.
+- An installation that wants to credit Ekklesia can do so in its own words; the platform never
+  inserts that credit.
+
+## Alternatives
+
+- **Keep "Ekklesia" as the default and let installations override it.** Rejected: an installation
+  that never thought to configure it would show the software's name to its people, which is forcing
+  it by default, and "no occurrence of Ekklesia" could not be tested in the default state.
+- **Rename internal identifiers too.** Rejected: invisible to the people this protects, and costly
+  to every installation and module.
+- **A configurable "powered by" line, on by default.** Rejected for the same reason as the first
+  alternative.
+- **Per-string customization of every message.** Not needed for this principle: one installation
+  name and neutral wording remove the product's name everywhere. Richer copy customization, if
+  wanted, is separate work.
+
+## Deferred
+
+- The implementation: the setting, its delivery to pages and emails, the rewording, and the
+  regression test.
+- Installation-supplied logos, icons, and favicons, and a web app manifest.
+- Translation and per-string copy customization.

docs/architecture/decisions/0047-module-ci-harness.md

@@ -0,0 +1,256 @@
+# 0047: Every module proves itself inside Ekklesia, with one harness the platform publishes
+
+- Status: Proposed
+- Date: 2026-10-05
+- Supersedes: none
+- Related: [ADR 0016](0016-module-database-access.md),
+  [ADR 0021](0021-modules-as-hostable-products.md),
+  [ADR 0028](0028-module-operational-lifecycle.md),
+  [ADR 0030](0030-host-provided-module-object-storage.md),
+  [ADR 0033](0033-display-kiosk-host-contract.md),
+  [ADR 0036](0036-managed-device-identity-and-pairing.md),
+  [ADR 0041](0041-module-browser-contributions.md),
+  [ADR 0043](0043-display-offline-code-fallback.md),
+  [ADR 0044](0044-self-hosted-reference-deployment.md),
+  [ADR 0045](0045-split-dashboard-and-api-origins.md)
+
+## Context
+
+Modules are independently versioned products (ADR 0021). They live in their own repositories, and
+none of them can be built, run, or rendered without Ekklesia. The first production module, Signage,
+reached a church with three defects that only show when it runs **inside** Ekklesia, in a real
+browser:
+
+- every heartbeat its display sent was refused with a 400, because the display and the server
+  disagreed about `null`;
+- a display that failed one request at start-up never recovered without a reload;
+- its media cache leaked one blob per slide per refresh, until the browser refused the display's own
+  requests.
+
+Signage had unit tests, browser tests against a stubbed host, and no CI. Every test passed, because
+each half was tested against its own idea of the other, and nothing ever ran the module in the
+platform it ships into.
+
+The platform's own deployment smoke (ADR 0044, ADR 0045) does run a module in a real browser, but
+only the repository's template, and only far enough to mount it. The instance repository runs the
+smoke against its real modules, but only at release time, after a module has already been tagged.
+Each module repository that wants more than that has to assemble the platform, build an image,
+start a deployment, and drive a browser itself. Signage is about to do exactly that by hand. The
+second module, Classroom, would copy it, and the copies would drift from the platform they test.
+
+## Decision
+
+### The platform publishes a versioned module harness
+
+Each platform release publishes one OCI image, `ekklesia-module-harness:<platform version>`. It is
+built from the platform at that release tag by the platform's own release CI, and pushed to the
+organization's registry. A version is never overwritten. Modules reference it **by digest**.
+
+The harness contains the platform source at that version: its `deploy/` directory, its Dockerfile,
+its lockfile, and its smoke scripts. It also contains the pinned Node.js and pnpm, the browser
+driver, and the pinned headless Chromium image reference. Given a module checkout, it:
+
+1. **assembles** the module into the platform at `modules/<id>`, exactly as an instance does (ADR
+   0044), and installs with `--frozen-lockfile`;
+2. runs the platform's own gates against that set: `pnpm boundaries`, `modules:validate`,
+   `migrations:validate`, and the build;
+3. **builds** the deployment image from the assembled workspace with the platform's Dockerfile;
+4. starts the **reference deployment** in the split topology (ADR 0045), with a disposable
+   PostgreSQL and object store, Caddy's internal CA, and freshly generated secrets;
+5. plans, then **explicitly applies**, migrations against that fresh database. This is the only
+   database the harness ever migrates;
+6. creates the initial owner, grants the module's declared permissions to a test person, and
+   **mounts every UI surface the manifest declares**, in headless Chromium. That covers:
+   - the primary UI in the Dashboard;
+   - the display, paired as a device with no human session (ADR 0036);
+   - each browser contribution, whenever the module that hosts it is present (ADR 0041);
+7. runs a short **display soak**, and the **no-dead-ends** injections below;
+8. tears everything down: containers, networks, volumes, and the work directory.
+
+It **fails** on any of the following:
+
+- a `console.error` or uncaught exception on any page;
+- an unhandled promise rejection;
+- any 4xx or 5xx response that the harness did not itself expect. Expected ones are listed in the
+  harness, for example a display's descriptor before it is paired;
+- a page that never mounts;
+- a failed or refused request (CORS, blocked, network error);
+- a soak leak.
+
+Each failure line names the surface, the request path (never its query), and the step.
+
+### The display soak and the no-dead-ends checks are generic
+
+These checks come from what Signage got wrong, and they apply to any module with a display.
+
+- **Soak**, two minutes by default. The display stays mounted with no remount and no offline
+  indicator. Its realtime streams stay healthy. Live object URLs stay bounded. JavaScript heap
+  growth, measured over DevTools, stays within a fixed ratio.
+- **No dead ends.** One at a time, the harness refuses the first request to each module route the
+  display calls at start-up, and the first realtime connection. Within a bounded time and with no
+  reload, the display must make that request again and succeed. A display has nobody to press
+  Retry.
+
+Module-specific behaviour, such as Signage's heartbeat being recorded, is not guessed by the
+harness. A module declares it (below).
+
+### A module is tested against both ends of its compatibility range
+
+A module's CI runs the harness twice: against the **lowest** and the **newest** published platform
+version within its manifest's `compatibility.platform` range. Testing every version in between adds
+cost and finds little. Testing only the newest misses the floor the manifest promises to work on.
+
+The two versions, and their harness digests, are pinned in the module's repository. The harness
+refuses to run if:
+
+- a pinned version lies outside the module's range;
+- the lowest pinned version is not the range's floor.
+
+Moving to a newer platform is a deliberate, reviewed pin change, as an instance's is (ADR 0044). It
+is never a moving tag.
+
+A frozen install of the module assembled into each of those two platforms needs a lockfile per
+pinned version. The module keeps them (`ci/lock/<platform version>.yaml`), and the harness provides
+the one command that regenerates them inside its own pinned Node.js. A stale lockfile fails the
+frozen install, which is the signal to regenerate it in a reviewed change.
+
+### Modules declare extra smoke steps, beside their manifest rather than in it
+
+A module may add steps of its own in `ekklesia.harness.json`, next to `ekklesia.module.json`. Steps
+are declarative first:
+
+- open a surface;
+- wait for a test id;
+- call one of the module's routes as a named role, expecting a status;
+- soak for N minutes;
+- inject a failure into a named route;
+- check a value in the module's own table, through its own route.
+
+For what a declaration cannot express, a step may name a driver script in the module's repository.
+The harness runs that script with the same DevTools client and the same failure rules.
+
+**This is deliberately not a manifest field.** Manifest versions are strict, hard cutovers that every
+host validates (ADR 0033). A test step is not a runtime contract, and a host must never read one.
+Putting steps in the manifest would force a manifest version bump on every module for something
+that has no meaning outside CI.
+
+### Later: the harness checks what a module actually touches against what it declares
+
+In a later phase, the harness records what the module does while it runs:
+
+- the tables and schemas it reads and writes;
+- the buckets it uses;
+- its outbound network connections, with the egress network blocked and every attempt logged.
+
+It compares them with what the manifest declares (ADR 0016, ADR 0030). A module that touches what it
+did not declare fails. This is the module-trust check. The egress half needs a manifest declaration
+of outbound destinations that does not exist yet, and is a separate decision. This ADR fixes only
+the harness's shape, so that the recording phases can be added without changing how modules call
+it.
+
+### The template's workflow stays short, and calls the harness by digest
+
+`templates/module` ships a workflow that:
+
+- checks out the module with `persist-credentials: false` and pinned actions;
+- runs the module's own unit tests, typecheck, and lint;
+- sweeps stale CI stacks from the runner, then runs the harness, once per pinned platform version,
+  with one `docker run` of the harness image **by digest**, and finally, always, removes this job's
+  own stacks. The module directory is mounted read-only, and the runner's Docker is used exactly
+  as the platform's smoke uses it.
+
+It references no secret, needs no registry credential (the harness image is public within the
+organization), and uses no `pull_request_target`. The trusted-code-only rule for self-hosted runners
+applies to module repositories exactly as it does to the platform (see `docs/development/security.md`).
+
+**Why `docker run`, and not a reusable workflow or a composite action.** The server runs Gitea
+1.27.2. (This proposal first assumed 1.24.2; the reasons below hold on the actual version.)
+
+- Its runner can call a reusable workflow from another repository by cloning that repository, and
+  since 1.26 that includes private repositories (go-gitea/gitea#32562). That support is still thinly
+  documented, and has known problems in practice.
+- A reusable workflow would make the harness's behaviour depend on how this server and runner
+  version expand it. An image runs the same everywhere it runs.
+- Composite actions from another repository work through absolute `uses:` URLs. That would still
+  wrap the same `docker run`, adding a second pinned reference and nothing else.
+
+An image digest is the one reference that is equally immutable, equally reviewable, and works
+unchanged on any Gitea release and on GitHub Actions. A composite action can be added later as a
+convenience over the same image, without changing what a module pins.
+
+### Nothing the harness starts outlives the job that started it
+
+The harness starts Docker stacks on a shared runner, and a runner can kill a job outright: a
+cancelled or superseded job (`concurrency` cancels superseded runs on this server), or the runner's
+own time limit. A script's own cleanup trap does not run then. The platform's CI leaked a whole
+migration stack that way, and it ran until someone removed it by hand. So the harness follows the
+platform's rule (`scripts/ci-sweep.sh`, `docs/development/security.md`):
+
+- everything it starts is named and labeled as a CI stack of its run, attempt, and job key;
+- it removes its own stacks in a trap;
+- the template workflow runs the harness's **stale sweep** before the harness starts, and its
+  **job sweep** in a final `if: always()` step, so a killed run's stacks are removed by that run's
+  last step, or failing that by the next job on the runner.
+
+The sweep ships inside the harness image, so a module never copies it.
+
+### Publishing follows the instance's release pattern
+
+The harness image is pushed only by a `publish` job that runs on `v*` tags, after the platform's CI
+has built and tested that exact image (checked by image ID). That job:
+
+- uses a write-only package token, the only secret in the platform's workflow;
+- refuses to overwrite an existing version;
+- prints the digest.
+
+Pull requests and branch builds build the harness and run it against the template, but never push.
+The registry is reached exactly as the instance's publish job reaches it.
+
+### Adoption
+
+- **Signage** uses an interim CI job until the first harness is published. That job assembles
+  Signage into a pinned platform commit and runs the platform's display-device smoke scenarios.
+  Signage switches to the harness as soon as one is published.
+- **Classroom** follows.
+- **The template** carries the workflow from the first harness release on, so every new module has
+  it from its first commit.
+
+## Consequences
+
+- A module cannot reach a release without having run inside Ekklesia, in a real browser, at both
+  ends of the platform range it claims.
+- The defects that reached the first production Signage deployment fail a module's CI instead:
+  refused requests, dead ends, leaks, and console errors.
+- The platform owns one harness, versioned with itself. Modules do not copy deployment scripts that
+  then drift.
+- Every module's CI needs Docker on its runner, and takes minutes rather than seconds. The harness
+  runs as separate jobs from the unit tests, so a quick failure still reports quickly.
+- The platform's release process gains one published artifact, one credential, and one more failure
+  mode at release time.
+- A module now carries a lockfile for each pinned platform version. The harness makes regenerating
+  them one command, and a stale one fails visibly.
+
+## Alternatives
+
+- **Each module keeps its own copy of the smoke scripts.** Rejected. That is today's situation in
+  embryo, and it drifts.
+- **A reusable workflow in the platform repository.** Rejected for now, for the reasons above: thin
+  support in practice, and a harness whose behaviour depends on whichever runner and server version
+  happens to expand it.
+- **Publish the harness as an npm package.** Rejected. The harness needs Docker, a browser, and the
+  platform's deployment files anyway, so a package would ship a fraction of it and assume the rest.
+- **Test only the newest platform version.** Rejected. A module's range floor would go untested
+  until an installation that has not upgraded meets it.
+- **Put smoke steps in the manifest.** Rejected. Manifest versions are hard cutovers with runtime
+  meaning, and test steps have neither.
+- **Run the harness in the platform's CI against every known module.** Rejected. The platform would
+  need every module's source and would fail on modules it does not own. The direction is module
+  tests platform, not the reverse.
+
+## Deferred
+
+- The data-access and egress recording phases, and the manifest declaration egress needs.
+- A composite action over the harness image.
+- Running the harness against a module's declared dependencies at their own pinned versions, for
+  contributions hosted by another module.
+- Visual regression of mounted surfaces.

docs/architecture/decisions/README.md

@@ -53,4 +53,6 @@ ADRs capture durable choices that affect more than one package or phase.
 - [0042: Explicit, bounded streaming request bodies](0042-bounded-streaming-request-bodies.md) — Accepted
 - [0043: The display caches its shell and declared code, and nothing else](0043-display-offline-code-fallback.md) — Accepted
 - [0044: Ekklesia ships one self-hosted reference deployment, composed from pinned sources](0044-self-hosted-reference-deployment.md) — Accepted
-- [0045: The Dashboard and the API may live on separate origins](0045-split-dashboard-and-api-origins.md) — Proposed
+- [0045: The Dashboard and the API may live on separate origins](0045-split-dashboard-and-api-origins.md) — Accepted
+- [0046: Ekklesia's branding is never forced on an installation](0046-installation-owned-branding.md) — Proposed
+- [0047: Every module proves itself inside Ekklesia, with one harness the platform publishes](0047-module-ci-harness.md) — Proposed

docs/development/api.md

@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ No real values are shown here — configure per environment and never commit the
 | `EKKLESIA_API_PORT` | Optional. Listen port, `0`–`65535` (`0` requests an OS-assigned port). Defaults to `3000`. |
 | `EKKLESIA_IDENTITY_SECRET` | At least 32 characters, high entropy (for example `openssl rand -base64 32`). Same requirement as Phase 4A. |
 | `EKKLESIA_IDENTITY_BASE_URL` | Exactly one canonical `http`/`https` origin — scheme, host, and non-default port only, with no path, trailing slash, query, fragment, credentials, or explicit default port. `https` is required in production; loopback and unspecified hosts are rejected in production. |
-| `EKKLESIA_IDENTITY_TRUSTED_ORIGINS` | Comma-separated list of canonical origins, validated identically to the base URL (no wildcards). Used for both Better Auth's own CSRF/origin checks and the API's CORS policy — there is only one trusted-origin list. |
+| `EKKLESIA_IDENTITY_TRUSTED_ORIGINS` | Comma-separated list of canonical origins, validated identically to the base URL (no wildcards). Used for both Better Auth's own CSRF/origin checks and the API's CORS policy — there is only one trusted-origin list. The base URL's own origin is always trusted as well and need not be listed ([ADR 0045](../architecture/decisions/0045-split-dashboard-and-api-origins.md)). |
 | `EKKLESIA_PUBLIC_SIGNUP_ENABLED` | Optional, **development/test only**. Exactly `"true"` enables public sign-up when `NODE_ENV=development`; defaults to disabled, and a production configuration rejects `"true"` outright. Omitted, misspelled, or any other value never enables it. See [Public registration policy](#public-registration-policy). |
 | `EKKLESIA_CLIENT_ADDRESS_MODE` | Optional. `"direct"` (default when unset) or `"trusted-proxy"`. See [Client-address resolution](#client-address-resolution). |
 | `EKKLESIA_CLIENT_ADDRESS_HEADER` | Required only when `EKKLESIA_CLIENT_ADDRESS_MODE=trusted-proxy`. The one forwarded-header name the reverse proxy is trusted to set (for example `x-forwarded-for`). |
@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ No real values are shown here — configure per environment and never commit the
 | `/api/auth/{get-session,list-sessions,update-session,change-password}` | Deliberately unavailable | Token-bearing native session inspection/mutation endpoints are denied at the Ekklesia HTTP boundary with sanitized `404 {"code":"NOT_FOUND"}`. Use `/api/v1/principal`; no browser session-list/update or password-management contract exists. |
 | `POST\|GET /api/auth/*` | Better Auth (mounted directly) | Supported Better Auth routes retain their native shapes except for the successful email sign-in normalization above. The four denied paths above never reach Better Auth. See [Better Auth's email/password docs](https://www.better-auth.com/docs/authentication/email-password) for supported endpoints such as `/sign-up/email` and `/sign-out`. |
 | `GET /api/v1/principal` | Ekklesia | Returns the minimal `EkklesiaPrincipal` contract as JSON. `Cache-Control: no-store`. |
-| `GET /` | Ekklesia | The built Dashboard page (`surfaces/shell`'s `index.html`), served from the same origin as `/api`. `no-cache` with a strong `ETag`; framing refused. See [Dashboard host](#dashboard-host). |
+| `GET /` | Ekklesia | The built Dashboard page (`surfaces/shell`'s `index.html`), with the API's origin written into it. Served from the API's origin, or from the Dashboard's own hostname through the proxy in the split topology. `no-cache` with a strong `ETag`; framing refused. See [Dashboard host](#dashboard-host). |
 | `GET /assets/ekklesia-dashboard/app.js` | Ekklesia | The Dashboard's one script. `no-cache` with a strong `ETag`; its source map is never served. See [Dashboard host](#dashboard-host). |
 | `GET /api/v1/health/live` | Ekklesia | Unauthenticated liveness: fixed `200 {"status":"live"}` whenever the process is serving HTTP. `Cache-Control: no-store`; GET only. See [Health](#health). |
 | `GET /api/v1/health/ready` | Ekklesia | Unauthenticated readiness: fixed `200 {"status":"ready"}` only when a bounded database ping succeeds and module startup completed, otherwise `503 {"code":"NOT_READY"}`. `Cache-Control: no-store`; GET only. See [Health](#health). |
@@ -140,19 +140,29 @@ role, permission, membership, or volunteer data.
 
 ## Dashboard host
 
-`apps/api` serves the built Dashboard itself, from the same origin as `/api`
+`apps/api` serves the built Dashboard itself
-([ADR 0044](../architecture/decisions/0044-self-hosted-reference-deployment.md)). That keeps the
+([ADR 0044](../architecture/decisions/0044-self-hosted-reference-deployment.md)). In the default
-identity system's default same-origin shape: `EKKLESIA_DASHBOARD_ORIGIN` stays unset, the session
+same-origin topology it does so from the same origin as `/api`: `EKKLESIA_DASHBOARD_ORIGIN` stays
-cookie stays host-only, and no second static server or proxy file root is needed. It works exactly
+unset, the session cookie stays host-only, and no second static server or proxy file root is
-like the display host:
+needed. In the split topology
+([ADR 0045](../architecture/decisions/0045-split-dashboard-and-api-origins.md)) the proxy forwards
+the Dashboard's own hostname to the same two routes; the API does not inspect `Host`. It works
+exactly like the display host:
 
 - **A closed set of files, read once at startup.** `@ekklesia/shell/dashboard-assets` exports the
   exact URLs of two built files, `dist/browser/index.html` and
   `dist/browser/assets/ekklesia-dashboard/app.js`. `startApi()` reads both before importing any
   module code or binding the listener, and keeps one frozen snapshot of their text with a SHA-256
   strong `ETag` for each.
-- **A missing build fails startup.** An absent, unreadable, or empty file stops `startApi()` with a
+- **The API's origin is written in at startup.** The built page carries one empty
-  fixed `DashboardHostAssetError` (`DASHBOARD_HOST_ASSET_UNAVAILABLE`), after closing the resources
+  `<meta content="" name="ekklesia-api-origin" />`. Before computing the page's `ETag`, `startApi()`
+  fills it with the identity base URL's origin, which is where `/api` lives in either topology. The
+  shell reads it before rendering, uses the page's own origin when it is empty, and fails closed,
+  making no request, when it is anything but a canonical `http(s)` origin. Nothing about the topology
+  is built into the bundle.
+- **A missing or incompatible build fails startup.** An absent, unreadable, or empty file, or a page
+  without exactly one empty API-origin element, stops `startApi()` with a fixed
+  `DashboardHostAssetError` (`DASHBOARD_HOST_ASSET_UNAVAILABLE`), after closing the resources
   already opened. It never carries a path or the filesystem error. Build the shell first;
   `pnpm api:start` already runs the full build.
 - **Two exact routes, never a directory.** `GET /` answers the page and
@@ -195,7 +205,9 @@ strips that token from the address bar before it renders anything.
 
 **Development.** `pnpm --filter @ekklesia/shell dev` serves `dist/browser` at the same absolute
 paths, because the build emits the script at `assets/ekklesia-dashboard/app.js`. `index.html` names
-that path absolutely, so the page never depends on the URL that served it.
+that path absolutely, so the page never depends on the URL that served it. For a split-origin
+development API, set `EKKLESIA_API_BASE_URL` for the development server: it writes that origin into
+its copy of the page exactly as the API does in production. A production build ignores it.
 
 ## Dashboard browser authentication
 
@@ -340,7 +352,10 @@ real server: 7 characters rejected, 8 accepted, 128 accepted, 129 rejected.
 ## Origin, CORS, and cookies
 
 The API reuses the same `EKKLESIA_IDENTITY_TRUSTED_ORIGINS` list for both CORS and Better Auth's
-own origin/CSRF checks — there is no second, competing configuration. CORS reflects a request's
+own origin/CSRF checks — there is no second, competing configuration. Like Better Auth, the API also
+trusts the identity base URL's own origin without it being listed, so a page the API itself serves
+(the display host, or the Dashboard in the same-origin topology) passes the API's origin checks
+([ADR 0045](../architecture/decisions/0045-split-dashboard-and-api-origins.md)). CORS reflects a request's
 `Origin` header back only when it exactly matches a configured trusted origin (never a wildcard,
 since `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` cannot be combined with `Access-Control-Allow-Credentials:
 true`); a disallowed origin never receives the header at all, though the request itself may still
@@ -374,10 +389,18 @@ Cookies keep Better Auth's defaults: `HttpOnly` always, `SameSite=Lax` always, `
 configured base URL is `https://`. Cross-subdomain cookies are not enabled and no cookie `Domain`
 attribute is set, so every cookie is host-only. See [Client-address resolution](#client-address-resolution)
 for how (and whether) a reverse proxy's forwarded headers are trusted — a separate concern from
-CORS/CSRF above. The Dashboard does not broaden this policy: same-origin `/api` proxying is the
+CORS/CSRF above. The Dashboard does not broaden this policy. In the split topology
-simplest production topology, while a deliberately split browser/API origin must use the exact
+([ADR 0045](../architecture/decisions/0045-split-dashboard-and-api-origins.md)) the cookie stays
-trusted-origin allowlist and credentialed CORS. Sibling subdomains do not implicitly share the
+host-only on the API's hostname, and the Dashboard on a sibling hostname reaches the API with
-cookie. No production Dashboard hostname or proxy deployment exists in this repository.
+credentialed CORS; browsers send the cookie because the two hostnames are origins of one site, which
+is therefore a requirement of that topology. The reference deployment provides both topologies
+([`deploy/README.md`](../../deploy/README.md#split-dashboard-and-api-origins)).
+
+**CORS request and response headers are deliberately narrow, and part of the module UI contract.**
+Beyond the CORS-safelisted request headers, only `Content-Type` is allowed, and no response header is
+exposed beyond the safelisted ones. A module UI's `api.request` inherits this policy, so portable
+module UI code sends only safelisted headers plus `Content-Type` and reads only safelisted response
+headers. That keeps one module artifact working in either topology.
 
 ## Logging
 
@@ -1613,7 +1636,7 @@ Cookie: better-auth.session_token=<redacted, now revoked>
 See the repository root [README](../../README.md#current-status) and
 [platform architecture](../architecture/platform-architecture.md#current-implementation-status)
 for what has landed across every phase and what remains. Surface work is underway; the API now
-serves the built Dashboard ([Dashboard host](#dashboard-host)), while its production proxy, TLS,
+serves the built Dashboard ([Dashboard host](#dashboard-host)) in either topology, while the full
-full Content-Security-Policy, enrollment/recovery, display device identity, and public Website
+Content-Security-Policy, enrollment/recovery, display device identity, and public Website
 routing remain separate work. This document tracks `apps/api`'s own HTTP, module-runtime, and
 database-composition contracts as they evolve.

docs/development/security.md

@@ -153,7 +153,8 @@ enforced by `requirePermission` regardless; the test suite proves it by having a
 "denied" call its API anyway and still receive `403`.
 
 **The host executes trusted module code in its own page and does not pretend otherwise.** The loader
-performs a same-origin dynamic `import()` — no `eval`, no `new Function`, no `blob:` URL — and the
+performs a dynamic `import()` from the API's origin (the page's own in the same-origin topology, the
+API hostname in the split one, ADR 0045) — no `eval`, no `new Function`, no `blob:` URL — and the
 shell owns the container, the loading state, and every error, so a failing module costs its own panel
 rather than the shell. None of that is containment: once imported, a module UI is ordinary same-realm
 JavaScript, exactly as described above.
@@ -493,7 +494,9 @@ outstanding.
    split origin is covered by the exact trusted-origin/CORS configuration. `apps/api` serves the
    built Dashboard itself at `/` ([API § Dashboard host](api.md#dashboard-host)), and the
    reference deployment's proxy routes it ([deploy/README.md](../../deploy/README.md#launch-checklist)
-   maps every item here to its configuration).
+   maps every item here to its configuration). A split installation (ADR 0045) puts its Dashboard
+   and API hostnames on one registrable domain and uses `Caddyfile.split.example`, which refuses
+   `/api/*` on the Dashboard's hostname so the session cookie has exactly one home.
 2. The origin port is unreachable from the public Internet.
 3. The origin port is also unreachable from any untrusted network/VLAN — only the intended private
    proxy path connects. Security must not depend on an unpublished DNS name or origin IP.
@@ -690,8 +693,10 @@ public Dashboard login must be assessed with the actual edge/proxy controls befo
 
 ## Continuous integration boundary
 
-CI runs on self-hosted Gitea Actions runners. The inventoried server is **Gitea 1.24.2**, and that
+CI runs on self-hosted Gitea Actions runners. The server reports **Gitea 1.27.2** (`GET
-version determines which parts of the workflow are real guarantees and which are not.
+/api/v1/version`, checked 2026-10-06; this document previously said 1.24.2, which was stale). The
+server's actual version, not the documentation of an earlier one, determines which parts of the
+workflow are real guarantees and which are not.
 
 ### The current operating rule: trusted code only
 
@@ -724,24 +729,53 @@ so a later step in the same job cannot read or reuse it from there.
 It does **not** remove the short-lived `GITEA_TOKEN` from the job environment, and it does **not**
 reduce that token's server-side authority. A step that wants the token can still read it.
 
-### What Gitea 1.24 ignores — so the branch cannot claim it
+### What this server honours, and what is not yet verified
 
-Per the official comparison for this version
+Each item separates what Gitea documents for 1.27
-(<https://docs.gitea.com/1.24/usage/actions/comparison>), Gitea 1.24's unsupported workflow syntax
+(<https://docs.gitea.com/1.27/usage/actions/comparison>) from what has been observed on this server:
-includes `permissions` and `jobs.<job_id>.permissions`, `concurrency`, and
-`jobs.<job_id>.timeout-minutes`. On this server those declarations are inert. Therefore:
 
-- **The workflow's `permissions: contents: read` does not restrict the job token.** This branch
+- **`concurrency` is honoured.** Gitea supports it since 1.26 (go-gitea/gitea#32751), and on this
-  cannot claim the `GITEA_TOKEN` is read-only, because nothing in workflow YAML makes it so on
+  server a newer push to a pull request cancels the run it supersedes. Observed: Ekklesia run 133 was
-  1.24. Job-token permission controls, repository/owner defaults, and server-side
+  cancelled when run 134 started for the same pull request, and run 135 when run 137 did. A
-  maximum-permission clamping arrive in the 1.26 feature line
+  superseded run's own cleanup is therefore never guaranteed to run, which is one reason for the
-  (<https://docs.gitea.com/1.26/usage/actions/token-permissions>).
+  stack sweep below.
-- **`concurrency` and `timeout-minutes` are not bounded-execution guarantees here.** Cancellation,
+- **`permissions` is supported by 1.27, with Gitea's own scopes, but is not verified here.** The
-  timeout, and teardown must be enforced by a trusted provisioner and reaper outside the workflow.
+  server-side token-permission settings are not visible through the API, and nothing has yet proven
+  what the job token can and cannot do on this server. Until that proof exists (requirement 3
+  below), this repository still does not claim the `GITEA_TOKEN` is read-only.
+- **`timeout-minutes` is no longer listed as unsupported for 1.27, but is not verified here.**
+  Teardown does not rely on it: the stack sweep and a trusted reaper do.
+- **Still ignored:** `jobs.<job_id>.environment`, and any `runs-on` other than a single label.
 
-The declarations are kept deliberately: they are already correct for a supported Gitea release and
+The declarations stay in the workflow either way: they state the intent, and are correct on GitHub
-for GitHub Actions, and keeping them means the upgrade does not require re-deriving the intent. They
+Actions as well.
-are documented as ignored, not removed.
+
+### Disposable stacks never outlive their job
+
+Every CI script removes its own Compose stack in an `EXIT` trap, but a trap never runs when the runner
+kills the job container: a cancelled job, or the runner's own time limit. One such stack ran on the
+shared runner for two days. So stack cleanup has three layers:
+
+- **The script's own trap**, for every ordinary failure.
+- **A final `if: always()` step** in every job that starts stacks: `scripts/ci-sweep.sh --job` removes
+  everything that job started, at any age, even after a failed step.
+- **A sweep before every such job starts**: `scripts/ci-sweep.sh --stale` removes anything a CI job
+  left more than three hours ago, which catches whatever a killed job could not clean up itself.
+
+A stack is found by name and label, never by guesswork (`scripts/lib/ci-project.sh`):
+
+- every CI Compose project is named `ekklesia-ci-<run>-<attempt>-<job key>-…`, and Compose labels
+  its containers, networks, and volumes with that name;
+- anything a script starts outside Compose carries `org.riverofglorymn.ekklesia.ci.project`;
+- images also carry the time CI built them, because an image's own creation time can be its base's.
+
+The job key is per matrix leg, so one leg's cleanup cannot match another's running stack. Nothing
+outside the `ekklesia-ci-` prefix is ever removed. A job container attached to a stack's network is
+disconnected, never removed.
+
+**This is not a substitute for a runner-side reaper.** A stack killed with its job is removed only
+when another job that sweeps runs on the same runner. Bounded execution and teardown are still the
+runner host's to enforce, as above.
 
 ### Runner topology is not verified
 
@@ -763,16 +797,17 @@ they are not conditions on merging trusted, reviewed work.
 None of them can be satisfied by editing this repository; each requires access to the Gitea server
 and runner hosts, and each must be proven there.
 
-1. Upgrade Gitea to a reviewed supported release with job-token permission controls — at least the
+1. ~~Upgrade Gitea to a reviewed supported release with job-token permission controls — at least
-   1.26 feature line. Select the actual release during infrastructure work, after backup and
+   the 1.26 feature line.~~ **Done:** the server runs 1.27.2. Items 2 and 3 now configure and prove
-   compatibility review; do not pin a version from this document.
+   what it makes possible.
 2. Configure repository and owner defaults, and the server-side maximum permission, so workflow
    code cannot request more than read-only repository access.
 3. Prove against the real server that the job's `GITEA_TOKEN` cannot push code, create or update
    releases, packages, issues, or pull requests, change Actions configuration, or reach another
    private repository.
-4. Enforce job timeout, cancellation, concurrency, and teardown in the trusted
+4. Enforce job timeout and teardown in the trusted provisioner/reaper. `concurrency` is honoured
-   provisioner/reaper rather than relying on the ignored workflow keys above.
+   by the server; `timeout-minutes` is not yet verified, and the in-workflow stack sweep only
+   complements a reaper.
 5. Complete a disposable-guest runner isolation proof: one throwaway guest per job, torn down by a
    trusted reaper outside workflow YAML, holding no deployment credential, registration token, or
    reusable key.

docs/development/testing.md

@@ -159,6 +159,12 @@ also receives a safely named disposable database. Direct host runs use a Docker-
 port bound only to `127.0.0.1`; a containerized Gitea job joins the isolated Compose network and
 uses the PostgreSQL service name.
 
+In CI, a stack whose job was killed before its own cleanup ran is still removed: by that job's final
+`if: always()` step, or by the stale sweep before a later job starts (`scripts/ci-sweep.sh`, see
+[Disposable stacks never outlive their job](security.md#disposable-stacks-never-outlive-their-job)).
+`bash scripts/test-ci-sweep.sh` proves what the sweep removes and what it leaves alone, against real
+Docker resources.
+
 The live suite proves fresh read-only planning, initial and incremental application, genuine
 no-op behavior, exact applied checksums and history, edited or corrupt history rejection,
 whole-batch DDL rollback, Drizzle breakpoint execution, real advisory-lock concurrency and

package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "ekklesia",
-  "version": "0.1.1",
+  "version": "0.1.2",
   "private": true,
   "type": "module",
   "description": "Open, modular church technology platform",

packages/contracts/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@ekklesia/contracts",
-  "version": "0.1.1",
+  "version": "0.1.2",
   "type": "module",
   "files": [
     "dist"

packages/design-tokens/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@ekklesia/design-tokens",
-  "version": "0.1.1",
+  "version": "0.1.2",
   "type": "module",
   "files": [
     "dist"

packages/module-sdk/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@ekklesia/module-sdk",
-  "version": "0.1.1",
+  "version": "0.1.2",
   "type": "module",
   "files": [
     "dist"

packages/module-ui-build/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@ekklesia/module-ui-build",
-  "version": "0.1.1",
+  "version": "0.1.2",
   "type": "module",
   "files": [
     "bin",

packages/module-ui-host/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@ekklesia/module-ui-host",
-  "version": "0.1.1",
+  "version": "0.1.2",
   "type": "module",
   "files": [
     "dist"

packages/module-ui-sdk/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@ekklesia/module-ui-sdk",
-  "version": "0.1.1",
+  "version": "0.1.2",
   "type": "module",
   "files": [
     "dist"

packages/module-ui-sdk/src/host-context.ts

@@ -125,6 +125,11 @@ export interface ModuleUiDisplayLocation {
  *
  * A host is responsible for credentials, base URL, and any platform headers. A module UI neither
  * supplies nor sees a session token.
+ *
+ * The module's API may be on another origin than the page (Ekklesia's split topology, ADR 0045), so
+ * a portable module UI keeps to what cross-origin requests always allow: CORS-safelisted request
+ * headers plus `Content-Type`, and only CORS-safelisted response headers read back. Anything more
+ * works under one host topology and fails under another.
  */
 export interface ModuleUiApiClient {
   /**

packages/typescript-config/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@ekklesia/typescript-config",
-  "version": "0.1.1",
+  "version": "0.1.2",
   "private": true,
   "files": [
     "base.json",

packages/ui/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@ekklesia/ui",
-  "version": "0.1.1",
+  "version": "0.1.2",
   "type": "module",
   "files": [
     "dist"

scripts/ci-sweep.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,206 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# Removes disposable CI stacks from the Docker daemon: containers, networks, volumes, images, and
+# staging directories on the Docker host.
+#
+#   bash scripts/ci-sweep.sh --stale [--max-age-seconds N]   any CI stack older than N (default 3 h)
+#   bash scripts/ci-sweep.sh --job                           this job's own stacks, at any age
+#
+# Every CI script already removes its own stack in an EXIT trap, but a trap never runs when the runner
+# kills the job container: a cancelled or superseded job (the server honours `concurrency`), or
+# the runner's own time limit. So each workflow job that starts stacks ends with `--job` in an
+# `if: always()` step, and begins with `--stale`, which catches whatever a killed job left before
+# it could clean up.
+#
+# What a stack is, and how it is found, is defined in scripts/lib/ci-project.sh: a Compose project
+# named with the `ekklesia-ci-` prefix (Compose labels everything it creates with that name), plus
+# anything labeled EKKLESIA_CI_LABEL. Nothing outside that prefix is ever touched, at any age.
+#
+# --stale's threshold is far above any job's run time, so a stack another job on this daemon is using
+# right now is never young enough to match. --job refuses to run outside CI: locally, its prefix would
+# match a developer's own stacks.
+#
+# Best effort by design: a resource that cannot be removed is reported, and the sweep goes on. Output
+# names resources only; nothing a stack holds is printed.
+
+set -Eeuo pipefail
+
+repository_root="$(cd -- "$(dirname -- "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")/.." && pwd)"
+# shellcheck source=scripts/lib/ci-project.sh
+source "$repository_root/scripts/lib/ci-project.sh"
+
+compose_label="com.docker.compose.project"
+mode=""
+max_age_seconds="${EKKLESIA_CI_SWEEP_MAX_AGE_SECONDS:-10800}"
+
+usage() {
+  echo "usage: ci-sweep.sh --stale [--max-age-seconds N] | --job" >&2
+  exit 2
+}
+
+while (($# > 0)); do
+  case "$1" in
+  --stale | --job)
+    [[ -z "$mode" ]] || usage
+    mode="${1#--}"
+    ;;
+  --max-age-seconds)
+    [[ "${2:-}" =~ ^[0-9]+$ ]] || usage
+    max_age_seconds="$2"
+    shift
+    ;;
+  *) usage ;;
+  esac
+  shift
+done
+[[ -n "$mode" ]] || usage
+
+if [[ "$mode" == job ]]; then
+  [[ -n "${GITHUB_RUN_ID:-}" ]] || {
+    echo "ci-sweep: --job runs only in CI (GITHUB_RUN_ID is unset); locally it would match your own stacks." >&2
+    exit 2
+  }
+  prefix="$(ci_job_prefix)"
+  cutoff=""
+else
+  prefix="$EKKLESIA_CI_PREFIX"
+  cutoff="$(($(date +%s) - max_age_seconds))"
+fi
+
+if ! docker info >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+  echo "ci-sweep: no Docker daemon reachable; nothing to sweep."
+  exit 0
+fi
+
+removed=0
+warn() {
+  echo "ci-sweep: warning: $*" >&2
+}
+
+# selected <project> <created>: whether a resource belongs to the sweep.
+selected() {
+  local project="$1" created="$2" seconds
+  [[ -n "$project" && "$project" == "$prefix"* ]] || return 1
+  [[ -z "$cutoff" ]] && return 0
+  seconds="$(date -d "$created" +%s 2>/dev/null)" || return 1
+  ((seconds <= cutoff))
+}
+
+# --- Containers: Compose's own, and those a script started itself --------------------------------
+mapfile -t containers < <(
+  {
+    docker ps --all --quiet --no-trunc --filter "label=${compose_label}"
+    docker ps --all --quiet --no-trunc --filter "label=${EKKLESIA_CI_LABEL}"
+  } | sort -u
+)
+for id in "${containers[@]}"; do
+  [[ -n "$id" ]] || continue
+  record="$(docker inspect --format \
+    "{{index .Config.Labels \"${compose_label}\"}}|{{index .Config.Labels \"${EKKLESIA_CI_LABEL}\"}}|{{.Created}}|{{.Name}}" \
+    "$id" 2>/dev/null)" || continue
+  IFS='|' read -r compose_project ci_project created name <<<"$record"
+  project="${compose_project:-$ci_project}"
+  selected "$project" "$created" || continue
+  if docker rm --force --volumes "$id" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+    echo "ci-sweep: removed container ${name#/} (${project})"
+    removed=$((removed + 1))
+  else
+    warn "could not remove container ${name#/}"
+  fi
+done
+
+# --- Networks: anything still attached (a job container) is disconnected, never removed ---------
+mapfile -t networks < <(docker network ls --quiet --no-trunc --filter "label=${compose_label}")
+for id in "${networks[@]}"; do
+  [[ -n "$id" ]] || continue
+  # A network's creation time is a time value, not a string: ask for RFC 3339, which `date` reads.
+  record="$(docker network inspect --format \
+    "{{index .Labels \"${compose_label}\"}}|{{.Created.Format \"2006-01-02T15:04:05Z07:00\"}}|{{.Name}}" \
+    "$id" 2>/dev/null)" || continue
+  IFS='|' read -r project created name <<<"$record"
+  selected "$project" "$created" || continue
+  for endpoint in $(docker network inspect --format '{{range $id, $_ := .Containers}}{{$id}} {{end}}' "$id" 2>/dev/null); do
+    docker network disconnect --force "$id" "$endpoint" >/dev/null 2>&1 ||
+      warn "could not disconnect a container from network ${name}"
+  done
+  if docker network rm "$id" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+    echo "ci-sweep: removed network ${name} (${project})"
+    removed=$((removed + 1))
+  else
+    warn "could not remove network ${name}"
+  fi
+done
+
+# --- Volumes ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+mapfile -t volumes < <(
+  {
+    docker volume ls --quiet --filter "label=${compose_label}"
+    docker volume ls --quiet --filter "label=${EKKLESIA_CI_LABEL}"
+  } | sort -u
+)
+for name in "${volumes[@]}"; do
+  [[ -n "$name" ]] || continue
+  record="$(docker volume inspect --format \
+    "{{index .Labels \"${compose_label}\"}}|{{index .Labels \"${EKKLESIA_CI_LABEL}\"}}|{{.CreatedAt}}" \
+    "$name" 2>/dev/null)" || continue
+  IFS='|' read -r compose_project ci_project created <<<"$record"
+  project="${compose_project:-$ci_project}"
+  selected "$project" "$created" || continue
+  if docker volume rm --force "$name" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+    echo "ci-sweep: removed volume ${name} (${project})"
+    removed=$((removed + 1))
+  else
+    warn "could not remove volume ${name}"
+  fi
+done
+
+# --- Images built for a stack ------------------------------------------------------------------------
+mapfile -t images < <(docker image ls --quiet --no-trunc --filter "label=${EKKLESIA_CI_LABEL}" | sort -u)
+for id in "${images[@]}"; do
+  [[ -n "$id" ]] || continue
+  # Judged by when CI built it (EKKLESIA_CI_CREATED_LABEL), never by the image's own creation time,
+  # which BuildKit may have taken from its base. An image without that label is never swept by age.
+  record="$(docker image inspect --format \
+    "{{index .Config.Labels \"${EKKLESIA_CI_LABEL}\"}}|{{index .Config.Labels \"${EKKLESIA_CI_CREATED_LABEL}\"}}" \
+    "$id" 2>/dev/null)" || continue
+  IFS='|' read -r project built <<<"$record"
+  if [[ -n "$cutoff" ]]; then
+    [[ "$built" =~ ^[0-9]+$ ]] || continue
+    selected "$project" "@${built}" || continue
+  else
+    selected "$project" "" || continue
+  fi
+  if docker image rm --force "$id" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+    echo "ci-sweep: removed image ${id#sha256:} (${project})"
+    removed=$((removed + 1))
+  else
+    warn "could not remove image ${id#sha256:}"
+  fi
+done
+
+# --- Staging directories on the Docker host ------------------------------------------------------
+# A deploy smoke run inside a job container stages its mounted files under the Docker host's /tmp,
+# named for its project, as root-owned files; they hold that run's disposable secrets and keys. They
+# are removed with the same pinned image that created them. If that image is not on this daemon, no
+# smoke has staged anything here.
+image="$(sed -n 's/^[[:space:]]*image: \(postgres:[^[:space:]]*\)$/\1/p' "$repository_root/deploy/compose.yaml" | head -1)"
+if [[ -n "$image" ]] && docker image inspect "$image" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+  age=()
+  # `find -mmin +0` does not match something younger than a minute, so a threshold under a minute
+  # sweeps without an age filter, like the rest of this script.
+  if [[ -n "$cutoff" ]] && ((max_age_seconds >= 60)); then
+    age=(-mmin "+$((max_age_seconds / 60))")
+  fi
+  if staged="$(docker run --rm --entrypoint find -v /tmp:/host-tmp "$image" \
+    /host-tmp -mindepth 1 -maxdepth 1 -type d -name "${prefix}*" "${age[@]}" \
+    -print -exec rm -rf {} + 2>/dev/null)"; then
+    while IFS= read -r directory; do
+      [[ -n "$directory" ]] || continue
+      echo "ci-sweep: removed staging directory /tmp/${directory#/host-tmp/}"
+      removed=$((removed + 1))
+    done <<<"$staged"
+  else
+    warn "could not sweep staging directories on the Docker host"
+  fi
+fi
+
+echo "ci-sweep: ${mode} sweep removed ${removed} resource(s)."

scripts/lib/ci-project.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+# shellcheck shell=bash
+# How CI names, labels, and later finds the disposable stacks it starts.
+#
+# Every Compose project a CI script starts is named
+#
+#   ekklesia-ci-<run id>-<run attempt>-<job key>-<kind>-<pid><random>
+#
+# and Compose labels every container, network, and volume it creates with that name. What a script
+# creates outside Compose (a browser container, a volume, an image) gets EKKLESIA_CI_LABEL with the
+# same name. scripts/ci-sweep.sh finds stacks by those labels: this job's own, by the prefix up to
+# the job key (in a final `if: always()` step), and any CI stack by age (before a job starts).
+#
+# The job key is EKKLESIA_CI_JOB_KEY, which the workflow sets per job, and per matrix leg where a job
+# has one, so that one leg's cleanup cannot match another leg's running stack. Outside CI the
+# identifiers are "local".
+
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034 # read by the scripts that source this
+EKKLESIA_CI_LABEL="org.riverofglorymn.ekklesia.ci.project"
+# On images, when they were built, in Unix seconds. An image's own creation time is not that: BuildKit
+# gives an image that only adds metadata its base's time, and a reproducible build a fixed one. A
+# stale sweep that trusted it could remove an image another job is using right now.
+EKKLESIA_CI_CREATED_LABEL="org.riverofglorymn.ekklesia.ci.created"
+EKKLESIA_CI_PREFIX="ekklesia-ci-"
+
+# ci_name_safe <text>: lower case, and only what a Compose project name may contain.
+ci_name_safe() {
+  local text="${1//[^a-zA-Z0-9_-]/-}"
+  printf '%s' "${text,,}"
+}
+
+# ci_job_prefix: every project this job starts begins with exactly this.
+ci_job_prefix() {
+  ci_name_safe "ekklesia-ci-${GITHUB_RUN_ID:-local}-${GITHUB_RUN_ATTEMPT:-0}-${EKKLESIA_CI_JOB_KEY:-${GITHUB_JOB:-local}}-"
+}
+
+# ci_project_name <kind>: a project name unique to this invocation. Not only per run: several runs,
+# and several jobs of one run, share a runner's Docker daemon, and job containers often share a PID.
+ci_project_name() {
+  ci_name_safe "ekklesia-ci-${GITHUB_RUN_ID:-local}-${GITHUB_RUN_ATTEMPT:-0}-${EKKLESIA_CI_JOB_KEY:-${GITHUB_JOB:-local}}-${1:?ci_project_name needs a kind}-$$-${RANDOM}${RANDOM}"
+}

scripts/lib/deploy-smoke-browser.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,287 @@
+// Real-browser assertions for scripts/smoke-deploy.sh in the split topology (ADR 0045). Runs inside a
+// disposable container on the deployment's `edge` network and drives a headless Chromium, itself a
+// disposable container on the same network, over the Chrome DevTools Protocol, with Node.js's own
+// fetch and WebSocket and no other dependency.
+//
+//   node deploy-smoke-browser.mjs
+//
+// What only a browser can prove: that a person signing in on the Dashboard's hostname gets a session
+// cookie on the API's hostname alone, that the Dashboard then imports a module's UI from the API's
+// origin and the module's credentialed requests succeed under CORS, that the module's display page
+// mounts on the API's origin with that same session, and that sign-out ends it. Output is one line
+// per check; nothing printed carries a credential, cookie value, or response body.
+
+function required(name) {
+  const value = process.env[name];
+  if (!value) {
+    throw new Error(`${name} is required.`);
+  }
+  return value;
+}
+
+const apiOrigin = `https://${required("SMOKE_HOSTNAME")}`;
+const dashboardOrigin = `https://${required("SMOKE_DASHBOARD_HOSTNAME")}`;
+const apiHostname = new URL(apiOrigin).hostname;
+const devtools = required("SMOKE_CDP_ADDRESS");
+const timeoutMs = 30_000;
+
+let failures = 0;
+function check(condition, description) {
+  console.log(`${condition ? "ok  " : "FAIL"} ${description}`);
+  if (!condition) {
+    failures += 1;
+  }
+}
+
+/** The smallest Chrome DevTools Protocol client: numbered commands, flat sessions, and events. */
+async function connect() {
+  // The browser container was started moments ago; give it time to listen.
+  // One overall deadline, with every attempt bounded, so a browser that never comes up fails the
+  // run in seconds rather than waiting out TCP timeouts.
+  const deadline = Date.now() + 30_000;
+  let version;
+  while (version === undefined) {
+    try {
+      const response = await fetch(`http://${devtools}/json/version`, {
+        signal: AbortSignal.timeout(2_000),
+      });
+      version = await response.json();
+    } catch {
+      if (Date.now() > deadline) {
+        throw new Error("The headless browser never answered.");
+      }
+      await new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, 500));
+    }
+  }
+  // Chromium names its WebSocket after the Host it was asked on; ask on the same address.
+  const socketUrl = version.webSocketDebuggerUrl.replace(/^ws:\/\/[^/]+/u, `ws://${devtools}`);
+  const socket = new WebSocket(socketUrl);
+  await new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
+    socket.addEventListener("open", resolve, { once: true });
+    socket.addEventListener("error", () => reject(new Error("DevTools connection failed.")), {
+      once: true,
+    });
+  });
+  let nextId = 1;
+  const pending = new Map();
+  const listeners = [];
+  socket.addEventListener("message", (event) => {
+    const message = JSON.parse(String(event.data));
+    if (message.id !== undefined) {
+      const waiter = pending.get(message.id);
+      pending.delete(message.id);
+      if (message.error) {
+        waiter?.reject(new Error(`DevTools ${waiter.method} failed.`));
+      } else {
+        waiter?.resolve(message.result);
+      }
+      return;
+    }
+    for (const listener of listeners) {
+      listener(message);
+    }
+  });
+  return {
+    close: () => socket.close(),
+    on: (listener) => listeners.push(listener),
+    send(method, params = {}, sessionId = undefined) {
+      const id = nextId;
+      nextId += 1;
+      socket.send(JSON.stringify({ id, method, params, ...(sessionId ? { sessionId } : {}) }));
+      return new Promise((resolve, reject) => pending.set(id, { method, reject, resolve }));
+    },
+  };
+}
+
+const cdp = await connect();
+const { targetId } = await cdp.send("Target.createTarget", { url: "about:blank" });
+const { sessionId } = await cdp.send("Target.attachToTarget", { flatten: true, targetId });
+const send = (method, params) => cdp.send(method, params, sessionId);
+
+/** Every response and failure the page sees, for the API's origin. A CORS refusal is a
+ * `loadingFailed` here, never a response. */
+const responses = [];
+const failed = [];
+cdp.on((message) => {
+  if (message.sessionId !== sessionId) {
+    return;
+  }
+  if (message.method === "Network.responseReceived") {
+    const { response, type } = message.params;
+    responses.push({ status: response.status, type, url: response.url });
+  } else if (message.method === "Network.loadingFailed") {
+    failed.push(message.params);
+  }
+});
+await send("Network.enable");
+await send("Page.enable");
+await send("Runtime.enable");
+// A desktop-sized window: a module may reasonably decline to render its management UI on a small one.
+await send("Emulation.setDeviceMetricsOverride", {
+  deviceScaleFactor: 1,
+  height: 1080,
+  mobile: false,
+  width: 1920,
+});
+
+async function evaluate(expression) {
+  const result = await send("Runtime.evaluate", {
+    awaitPromise: true,
+    expression,
+    returnByValue: true,
+  });
+  if (result.exceptionDetails) {
+    throw new Error("A page expression threw.");
+  }
+  return result.result.value;
+}
+
+async function waitFor(expression, description) {
+  const deadline = Date.now() + timeoutMs;
+  while (Date.now() < deadline) {
+    if (await evaluate(`Boolean(${expression})`).catch(() => false)) {
+      return true;
+    }
+    await new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, 250));
+  }
+  console.log(`FAIL timed out waiting for ${description}`);
+  failures += 1;
+  return false;
+}
+
+async function navigate(url) {
+  await send("Page.navigate", { url });
+}
+
+const selector = (testId) => `document.querySelector('[data-testid="${testId}"]')`;
+
+async function cookiesFor(origin) {
+  const { cookies } = await send("Network.getCookies", { urls: [`${origin}/`] });
+  return cookies;
+}
+
+// --- Sign in on the Dashboard's hostname -------------------------------------------------------
+await navigate(`${dashboardOrigin}/`);
+await waitFor(selector("login-email"), "the sign-in form on the Dashboard hostname");
+await evaluate(`(() => {
+  // React tracks input values through the native setter; assigning .value alone is invisible to it.
+  const setValue = (element, value) => {
+    Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor(HTMLInputElement.prototype, "value").set.call(element, value);
+    element.dispatchEvent(new Event("input", { bubbles: true }));
+  };
+  setValue(${selector("login-email")}, ${JSON.stringify(required("SMOKE_OWNER_EMAIL"))});
+  setValue(${selector("login-password")}, ${JSON.stringify(required("SMOKE_OWNER_PASSWORD"))});
+  ${selector("login-email")}.form.requestSubmit();
+})()`);
+check(
+  await waitFor(selector("host-shell"), "the signed-in Dashboard"),
+  "a person signs in through the real form on the Dashboard hostname",
+);
+
+const apiCookies = await cookiesFor(apiOrigin);
+const dashboardCookies = await cookiesFor(dashboardOrigin);
+check(
+  apiCookies.some((cookie) => cookie.httpOnly && cookie.secure && cookie.domain === apiHostname) &&
+    dashboardCookies.length === 0,
+  "the session cookie is host-only on the API hostname, and the Dashboard hostname holds none",
+);
+
+// --- A module UI, imported from the API's origin -------------------------------------------------
+const moduleButton = "document.querySelector('[data-testid^=\"select-\"]')";
+const hasModule = await waitFor(moduleButton, "a module in the Dashboard navigation");
+if (hasModule) {
+  const moduleId = await evaluate(`${moduleButton}.dataset.testid.slice("select-".length)`);
+  await evaluate(`${moduleButton}.click()`);
+  const mounted = await waitFor(
+    `${selector("module-container")}?.childElementCount > 0 && !${selector("module-loading")} && !${selector("module-error")}`,
+    "the module UI to mount",
+  );
+  check(
+    mounted && !(await evaluate(`Boolean(${selector("module-error")})`)),
+    `the ${moduleId} module UI mounts`,
+  );
+  // Give the module's first requests a moment to settle before judging them.
+  await new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, 1_000));
+  check(
+    responses.some(
+      (response) =>
+        response.url.startsWith(`${apiOrigin}/api/v1/module-ui/${moduleId}/`) &&
+        response.status === 200,
+    ),
+    "its UI artifact was imported from the API's origin",
+  );
+  check(
+    responses.some(
+      (response) =>
+        response.url.startsWith(`${apiOrigin}/api/v1/modules/${moduleId}`) &&
+        response.status >= 200 &&
+        response.status < 300,
+    ),
+    "its own credentialed API request to the API's origin succeeded under CORS",
+  );
+  const streams = responses.filter((response) => response.type === "EventSource");
+  check(
+    streams.every((response) => response.status === 200),
+    `every realtime stream it opened was accepted (${streams.length} opened)`,
+  );
+}
+// A CORS refusal or a blocked request is always a failure. A request the page itself cancelled (a
+// module unmounting, a navigation) is not.
+const refused = failed.filter(
+  (failure) =>
+    failure.corsErrorStatus !== undefined ||
+    failure.blockedReason !== undefined ||
+    !(failure.canceled || failure.errorText === "net::ERR_ABORTED"),
+);
+check(
+  refused.length === 0,
+  `no request from the Dashboard failed or was refused by CORS (${refused.length} refused)`,
+);
+
+// --- The display host, on the API's origin, with the same session --------------------------------
+const displayPath =
+  await evaluate(`fetch(${JSON.stringify(`${apiOrigin}/api/v1/dashboard/navigation`)}, {
+  credentials: "include",
+}).then((response) => response.json()).then((navigation) => {
+  const entries = [...navigation.ungrouped, ...navigation.groups.flatMap((group) => group.modules)];
+  return entries.find((entry) => entry.module.display !== null)?.module.display.url ?? null;
+})`);
+if (displayPath === null) {
+  console.log("skip no installed module publishes a display");
+} else {
+  await navigate(`${apiOrigin}${displayPath}`);
+  check(
+    await waitFor(
+      `${selector("display-module-container")}?.childElementCount > 0 && !${selector("display-error")}`,
+      "the display to mount",
+    ),
+    "the module's display page mounts on the API hostname with the same session",
+  );
+  check(
+    await waitFor(
+      "navigator.serviceWorker.getRegistrations().then((registrations) => registrations.length > 0)",
+      "the display's service worker",
+    ),
+    "the display's offline service worker registers on the API's origin",
+  );
+}
+
+// --- Sign out on the Dashboard -------------------------------------------------------------------
+await navigate(`${dashboardOrigin}/`);
+await waitFor(selector("host-logout"), "the sign-out control");
+await evaluate(`${selector("host-logout")}.click()`);
+check(
+  await waitFor(selector("login-email"), "the sign-in form after sign-out"),
+  "sign-out returns the Dashboard to the sign-in form",
+);
+const principal = await evaluate(`fetch(${JSON.stringify(`${apiOrigin}/api/v1/principal`)}, {
+  credentials: "include",
+}).then((response) => response.json()).then((body) => body.kind)`);
+check(principal === "anonymous", "after sign-out, the API answers anonymous to the same browser");
+
+await cdp.send("Target.closeTarget", { targetId });
+cdp.close();
+if (failures > 0) {
+  console.error(`${failures} check(s) failed`);
+  process.exit(1);
+}

scripts/lib/deploy-smoke-client.mjs

@@ -7,12 +7,22 @@
 //   node deploy-smoke-client.mjs tunnel   the Cloudflare Tunnel connector's fixed address
 //   node deploy-smoke-client.mjs session  the initial owner signing in and out through the proxy
 //
+// Either topology (ADR 0045): SMOKE_HOSTNAME is the API's hostname, and SMOKE_DASHBOARD_HOSTNAME,
+// when set, the Dashboard's. Unset means the same-origin topology, where both are one hostname. Every
+// request goes to the API's origin and carries the Dashboard's origin as `Origin`, as a browser would.
+//
 // Output is one line per check; any failed check exits non-zero. Nothing printed carries a
 // credential, cookie, signed URL, or response body beyond the fixed shapes asserted here.
 
+import { connect as connectHttp2 } from "node:http2";
+
 const mode = process.argv[2];
-const hostname = required("SMOKE_HOSTNAME");
+const apiOrigin = `https://${required("SMOKE_HOSTNAME")}`;
-const origin = `https://${hostname}`;
+const dashboardOrigin = process.env.SMOKE_DASHBOARD_HOSTNAME
+  ? `https://${process.env.SMOKE_DASHBOARD_HOSTNAME}`
+  : apiOrigin;
+const split = dashboardOrigin !== apiOrigin;
+const untrustedOrigin = "https://untrusted.smoke.test";
 
 function required(name) {
   const value = process.env[name];
@@ -34,9 +44,9 @@ function check(condition, description) {
 /** A sign-in attempt that can only fail authentication; what matters is whether the API's
  * per-client limiter (3 attempts per 10 seconds) counts it against the expected client. */
 async function signInAttempt(headers = {}) {
-  const response = await fetch(`${origin}/api/auth/sign-in/email`, {
+  const response = await fetch(`${apiOrigin}/api/auth/sign-in/email`, {
     body: JSON.stringify({ email: "[email protected]", password: "definitely-not-the-password" }),
-    headers: { "content-type": "application/json", origin, ...headers },
+    headers: { "content-type": "application/json", origin: dashboardOrigin, ...headers },
     method: "POST",
   });
   await response.arrayBuffer();
@@ -44,13 +54,13 @@ async function signInAttempt(headers = {}) {
 }
 
 async function edgeChecks() {
-  const ready = await fetch(`${origin}/api/v1/health/ready`);
+  const ready = await fetch(`${apiOrigin}/api/v1/health/ready`);
   check(
     ready.status === 200 && (await ready.text()) === '{"status":"ready"}',
     "GET /api/v1/health/ready through the proxy is 200 ready",
   );
 
-  const page = await fetch(`${origin}/`);
+  const page = await fetch(`${dashboardOrigin}/`);
   const html = await page.text();
   check(page.status === 200, "GET / through the proxy is 200");
   check(
@@ -66,22 +76,32 @@ async function edgeChecks() {
     "the Dashboard page keeps its security headers through the proxy",
   );
 
-  const script = await fetch(`${origin}/assets/ekklesia-dashboard/app.js`);
+  check(
+    html.includes(`<meta content="${apiOrigin}" name="ekklesia-api-origin" />`),
+    "the Dashboard page names the API's origin, rendered at run time (ADR 0045)",
+  );
+
+  const script = await fetch(`${dashboardOrigin}/assets/ekklesia-dashboard/app.js`);
   await script.arrayBuffer();
   check(script.status === 200, "GET /assets/ekklesia-dashboard/app.js is 200");
 
-  const outside = await fetch(`${origin}/favicon.ico`);
+  const outside = await fetch(`${dashboardOrigin}/favicon.ico`);
   check(
     outside.status === 404 && !(outside.headers.get("content-type") ?? "").includes("json"),
     "a path the API does not serve is refused by the proxy, never forwarded",
   );
 
-  const unknownApi = await fetch(`${origin}/api/v1/does-not-exist`);
+  const unknownApi = await fetch(`${apiOrigin}/api/v1/does-not-exist`);
   check(
     unknownApi.status === 404 && (await unknownApi.text()) === '{"code":"NOT_FOUND"}',
     "an unknown /api/* path reaches the API and gets its sanitized 404",
   );
 
+  if (split) {
+    await splitRoutingChecks();
+    await splitCorsChecks();
+  }
+
   await storageDeliveryCheck();
 
   // Every caller-supplied forwarding header rotates on every attempt. If any of them reached the
@@ -106,6 +126,114 @@ async function edgeChecks() {
   );
 }
 
+/** A proxy refusal: Caddy's own empty `404`, never the API's JSON one, so the request was not
+ * forwarded at all. */
+async function refusedByProxy(url) {
+  const response = await fetch(url);
+  const body = await response.text();
+  return response.status === 404 && body === "";
+}
+
+/** Each hostname serves exactly its own paths (ADR 0045, "Routing per hostname"). */
+async function splitRoutingChecks() {
+  check(
+    await refusedByProxy(`${dashboardOrigin}/api/v1/health/ready`),
+    "the Dashboard hostname refuses /api/*, so the session cookie has one home",
+  );
+  check(
+    await refusedByProxy(`${dashboardOrigin}/display/example`),
+    "the Dashboard hostname refuses /display/*",
+  );
+  check(await refusedByProxy(`${apiOrigin}/`), "the API hostname serves nothing at /");
+  check(
+    await refusedByProxy(`${apiOrigin}/assets/ekklesia-dashboard/app.js`),
+    "the API hostname refuses the Dashboard's script",
+  );
+  const display = await fetch(`${apiOrigin}/display/does-not-exist`);
+  check(
+    display.status === 404 && (await display.text()) === '{"code":"NOT_FOUND"}',
+    "the API hostname forwards /display/* to the API (the display host's origin)",
+  );
+}
+
+/** Credentialed CORS for exactly the Dashboard's origin, and for nothing else. */
+async function splitCorsChecks() {
+  const preflight = await fetch(`${apiOrigin}/api/auth/sign-in/email`, {
+    headers: {
+      "access-control-request-headers": "content-type",
+      "access-control-request-method": "POST",
+      origin: dashboardOrigin,
+    },
+    method: "OPTIONS",
+  });
+  await preflight.arrayBuffer();
+  check(
+    preflight.status === 204 &&
+      preflight.headers.get("access-control-allow-origin") === dashboardOrigin &&
+      preflight.headers.get("access-control-allow-credentials") === "true",
+    "a preflight from the Dashboard's origin is allowed, with credentials",
+  );
+  const foreignPreflight = await fetch(`${apiOrigin}/api/auth/sign-in/email`, {
+    headers: { "access-control-request-method": "POST", origin: untrustedOrigin },
+    method: "OPTIONS",
+  });
+  await foreignPreflight.arrayBuffer();
+  check(
+    foreignPreflight.headers.get("access-control-allow-origin") === null,
+    "a preflight from any other origin gets no CORS permission",
+  );
+  const principal = await fetch(`${apiOrigin}/api/v1/principal`, {
+    headers: { origin: dashboardOrigin },
+  });
+  await principal.arrayBuffer();
+  check(
+    principal.headers.get("access-control-allow-origin") === dashboardOrigin &&
+      principal.headers.get("access-control-allow-credentials") === "true" &&
+      (principal.headers.get("vary") ?? "").includes("Origin"),
+    "an API response to the Dashboard's origin reflects exactly that origin, with credentials",
+  );
+}
+
+/**
+ * One GET over a real HTTP/2 connection. Node's fetch speaks HTTP/1.1, and the failure this guards
+ * against exists only on HTTP/2: a reset stream, which a browser reports as ERR_HTTP2_PROTOCOL_ERROR.
+ */
+function http2Get(url, headers = {}) {
+  return new Promise((resolve) => {
+    const session = connectHttp2(url.origin);
+    const finish = (result) => {
+      clearTimeout(timer);
+      session.close();
+      resolve(result);
+    };
+    const timer = setTimeout(() => finish({ error: "timeout" }), 10_000);
+    session.on("error", () => finish({ error: "session" }));
+    const stream = session.request({
+      ":method": "GET",
+      ":path": `${url.pathname}${url.search}`,
+      ...headers,
+    });
+    let status;
+    let responseHeaders = {};
+    let bytes = 0;
+    stream.on("response", (received) => {
+      status = received[":status"];
+      responseHeaders = received;
+    });
+    stream.on("data", (chunk) => {
+      bytes += chunk.length;
+    });
+    stream.on("error", (error) => finish({ error: error.code ?? "stream" }));
+    stream.on("end", () => finish({ bytes, headers: responseHeaders, status }));
+    stream.end();
+  });
+}
+
+/** The CORS headers of a response, by name: what a browser would act on. */
+function corsOf(response) {
+  return [...response.headers.keys()].filter((name) => name.startsWith("access-control-"));
+}
+
 async function storageDeliveryCheck() {
   // Core's own provider, from the image, exactly as the API composes it: it reaches object-storage
   // over HTTPS on the private network and signs read URLs for the storage hostname.
@@ -152,6 +280,79 @@ async function storageDeliveryCheck() {
       "a delivered object is Cache-Control: private",
     );
     await provider.delete(bucket, "smoke/object.txt");
+
+    // The same image, twice, over HTTP/2: a browser's second load of a signed URL it has cached is a
+    // conditional request, and must come back as a clean 304, not a reset stream.
+    const png = Buffer.from(
+      "iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAAAEAAAABCAYAAAAfFcSJAAAADUlEQVR42mP8z8BQDwAEhQGAhKmMIQAAAABJRU5ErkJggg==",
+      "base64",
+    );
+    await provider.put(bucket, "smoke/image.png", png, {
+      contentLength: png.byteLength,
+      contentType: "image/png",
+    });
+    const image = new URL(
+      (await provider.createReadUrl(bucket, "smoke/image.png", { expiresInSeconds: 300 })).url,
+    );
+    const first = await http2Get(image);
+    check(
+      first.status === 200 && first.bytes === png.byteLength && Boolean(first.headers?.etag),
+      "an image loads over HTTP/2 through the proxy, with a validator (200, ETag)",
+    );
+    const revalidated = await http2Get(image, { "if-none-match": first.headers?.etag ?? "" });
+    check(
+      revalidated.status === 304 && revalidated.error === undefined,
+      `the same image loaded again over HTTP/2 revalidates cleanly (${revalidated.status ?? revalidated.error})`,
+    );
+    const sinceModified = await http2Get(image, {
+      "if-modified-since": first.headers?.["last-modified"] ?? "",
+    });
+    check(
+      sinceModified.status === 304 && sinceModified.error === undefined,
+      `a revalidation by date over HTTP/2 is a clean 304 too (${sinceModified.status ?? sinceModified.error})`,
+    );
+
+    // Delivery-layer CORS is the deployment's own, set by the proxy: exactly the origins whose pages
+    // read objects with fetch(), GET and HEAD only, and nothing of the object store's own answer.
+    const fromApi = await fetch(image, { headers: { origin: apiOrigin } });
+    check(
+      fromApi.headers.get("access-control-allow-origin") === apiOrigin &&
+        (fromApi.headers.get("vary") ?? "").toLowerCase().includes("origin") &&
+        corsOf(fromApi).length === 1,
+      "a read from the API origin is allowed for exactly that origin, with Vary: Origin and nothing else",
+    );
+    if (split) {
+      const fromDashboard = await fetch(image, { headers: { origin: dashboardOrigin } });
+      check(
+        fromDashboard.headers.get("access-control-allow-origin") === dashboardOrigin,
+        "a read from the Dashboard origin is allowed for exactly that origin",
+      );
+    }
+    const fromElsewhere = await fetch(image, { headers: { origin: untrustedOrigin } });
+    check(
+      fromElsewhere.status === 200 && corsOf(fromElsewhere).length === 0,
+      "a read from any other origin gets no CORS header at all",
+    );
+    const preflight = await fetch(image, {
+      headers: { "access-control-request-method": "GET", origin: apiOrigin },
+      method: "OPTIONS",
+    });
+    check(
+      preflight.status === 204 &&
+        preflight.headers.get("access-control-allow-origin") === apiOrigin &&
+        preflight.headers.get("access-control-allow-methods") === "GET, HEAD" &&
+        preflight.headers.get("x-amz-request-id") === null,
+      "the proxy answers a preflight itself (204, GET and HEAD only), never the object store",
+    );
+    const foreignPreflight = await fetch(image, {
+      headers: { "access-control-request-method": "GET", origin: untrustedOrigin },
+      method: "OPTIONS",
+    });
+    check(
+      foreignPreflight.status === 204 && corsOf(foreignPreflight).length === 0,
+      "a preflight from any other origin is answered without permission",
+    );
+    await provider.delete(bucket, "smoke/image.png");
   } finally {
     await provider.close();
   }
@@ -184,9 +385,9 @@ async function sessionChecks() {
     "/api/auth/update-session",
     "/api/auth/change-password",
   ]) {
-    const response = await fetch(`${origin}${path}`, {
+    const response = await fetch(`${apiOrigin}${path}`, {
       method: path.endsWith("get-session") || path.endsWith("list-sessions") ? "GET" : "POST",
-      headers: { origin },
+      headers: { origin: dashboardOrigin },
     });
     check(
       response.status === 404 && (await response.text()) === '{"code":"NOT_FOUND"}',
@@ -194,12 +395,12 @@ async function sessionChecks() {
     );
   }
 
-  const signIn = await fetch(`${origin}/api/auth/sign-in/email`, {
+  const signIn = await fetch(`${apiOrigin}/api/auth/sign-in/email`, {
     body: JSON.stringify({
       email: required("SMOKE_OWNER_EMAIL"),
       password: required("SMOKE_OWNER_PASSWORD"),
     }),
-    headers: { "content-type": "application/json", origin },
+    headers: { "content-type": "application/json", origin: dashboardOrigin },
     method: "POST",
   });
   const signInBody = await signIn.text();
@@ -218,20 +419,24 @@ async function sessionChecks() {
   );
   const cookie = setCookie.split(";")[0] ?? "";
 
-  const principal = await fetch(`${origin}/api/v1/principal`, { headers: { cookie, origin } });
+  const principal = await fetch(`${apiOrigin}/api/v1/principal`, {
+    headers: { cookie, origin: dashboardOrigin },
+  });
   const principalBody = await principal.json();
   check(
     principal.status === 200 && principalBody.kind === "authenticated",
     "the session resolves an authenticated principal through the proxy",
   );
 
-  const signOut = await fetch(`${origin}/api/auth/sign-out`, {
+  const signOut = await fetch(`${apiOrigin}/api/auth/sign-out`, {
     body: "{}",
-    headers: { "content-type": "application/json", cookie, origin },
+    headers: { "content-type": "application/json", cookie, origin: dashboardOrigin },
     method: "POST",
   });
   await signOut.arrayBuffer();
-  const after = await fetch(`${origin}/api/v1/principal`, { headers: { cookie, origin } });
+  const after = await fetch(`${apiOrigin}/api/v1/principal`, {
+    headers: { cookie, origin: dashboardOrigin },
+  });
   check(
     signOut.status === 200 && (await after.json()).kind === "anonymous",
     "sign-out ends the session",

scripts/lib/deploy-smoke-display.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,979 @@
+// Real-browser display-device scenarios for scripts/smoke-deploy.sh in the split topology (ADR 0036,
+// ADR 0045). Runs inside a disposable container on the deployment's `edge` network and drives two
+// headless Chromiums over the Chrome DevTools Protocol, with Node.js's own fetch and WebSocket and no
+// other dependency: the smoke run's browser, where the owner signs in, and a "kiosk" browser whose
+// profile directory is a Docker volume that outlives the kiosk container.
+//
+//   node deploy-smoke-display.mjs <step>
+//
+//   pair               seed content, pair the kiosk, then close its browser cleanly
+//   restart            same profile, new browser process: still paired and live?
+//   two-pages          two pages, one device credential: does either flap?
+//   connectivity-blip  the browser reports offline then online: is a live display remounted?
+//   session-blip       Signage's first viewer-session request fails once: does the display recover?
+//   stream-failure     the first realtime connection is refused: is realtime re-established?
+//   caching-probe      can a display on the API origin store storage-origin images in Cache Storage?
+//   stream-recycle     one page past the five-minute realtime recycle, with a timestamped timeline
+//   revoke             revoke the paired kiosk while its display is open
+//
+// Every DevTools command and every page-side request has its own deadline, and a step has an overall
+// budget. A call that never answers fails the step with a line naming that exact call, because a call
+// that can hang the driver may be a request that can hang a real display.
+//
+// Output is one line per check or observation; nothing printed carries a credential, cookie value,
+// signed URL, query string, or response body.
+
+function required(name) {
+  const value = process.env[name];
+  if (!value) {
+    throw new Error(`${name} is required.`);
+  }
+  return value;
+}
+
+/** A positive whole number of milliseconds from the environment, or the default. */
+function milliseconds(name, fallback) {
+  const raw = process.env[name];
+  const value = raw === undefined || raw === "" ? fallback : Number(raw);
+  if (!Number.isSafeInteger(value) || value <= 0) {
+    throw new Error(`${name} must be a positive whole number of milliseconds.`);
+  }
+  return value;
+}
+
+const mode = process.argv[2];
+const apiOrigin = `https://${required("SMOKE_HOSTNAME")}`;
+const dashboardOrigin = `https://${required("SMOKE_DASHBOARD_HOSTNAME")}`;
+const ownerAddress = required("SMOKE_CDP_ADDRESS");
+const kioskAddress = required("SMOKE_KIOSK_CDP_ADDRESS");
+const watchMs = milliseconds("SMOKE_WATCH_MS", 120_000);
+const recycleWatchMs = milliseconds("SMOKE_RECYCLE_WATCH_MS", 330_000);
+const stepBudgetMs = milliseconds("SMOKE_STEP_BUDGET_MS", 180_000);
+/** How long one DevTools command may go unanswered. */
+const callTimeoutMs = milliseconds("SMOKE_CALL_TIMEOUT_MS", 10_000);
+/** How long one page-side HTTP request may go unanswered; shorter than the call deadline, so a hung
+ * request is reported as the request rather than as the evaluation that awaited it. */
+const requestTimeoutMs = Math.max(1_000, callTimeoutMs - 2_000);
+const waitTimeoutMs = 30_000;
+const deviceCookie = "ekklesia_device_session";
+/** Far above what three cached slides need, which is one object URL each. */
+const MAX_LIVE_OBJECT_URLS = 50;
+const stepStartedAt = Date.now();
+
+let failures = 0;
+function check(condition, description) {
+  console.log(`${condition ? "ok  " : "FAIL"} ${description}`);
+  if (!condition) {
+    failures += 1;
+  }
+}
+function note(description) {
+  console.log(`     ${description}`);
+}
+const clock = (ms = Date.now()) => new Date(ms).toISOString().slice(11, 19);
+const since = (from) => `+${Math.round((Date.now() - from) / 1000)}s`;
+function progress(description) {
+  console.log(`···· ${clock()} ${since(stepStartedAt)} ${description}`);
+}
+const sleep = (ms) => new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, ms));
+/** A URL's path only: a signed delivery URL's query is a credential. */
+const pathOf = (url) => {
+  try {
+    return new URL(url).pathname;
+  } catch {
+    return "(unparseable)";
+  }
+};
+
+// --- Hang guards ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+class HangError extends Error {
+  constructor(label, ms) {
+    super(`HANG ${label}: no answer within ${ms / 1000}s`);
+    this.name = "HangError";
+  }
+}
+
+/** Everything awaited right now, by name, so a step that overruns its budget says what it was
+ * waiting for. */
+const inFlight = new Map();
+let nextOperation = 1;
+
+function guard(label, promise, ms = callTimeoutMs) {
+  const id = nextOperation;
+  nextOperation += 1;
+  inFlight.set(id, { at: Date.now(), label });
+  let timer;
+  return Promise.race([
+    promise,
+    new Promise((_, reject) => {
+      timer = setTimeout(() => reject(new HangError(label, ms)), ms);
+    }),
+  ]).finally(() => {
+    clearTimeout(timer);
+    inFlight.delete(id);
+  });
+}
+
+function describeInFlight() {
+  const pending = [...inFlight.values()].map(
+    (operation) => `${operation.label} (${Math.round((Date.now() - operation.at) / 1000)}s)`,
+  );
+  return pending.length === 0 ? "nothing — the step itself overran" : pending.join("; ");
+}
+
+setTimeout(() => {
+  console.log(
+    `FAIL ${mode}: step budget of ${stepBudgetMs / 1000}s exceeded; in flight: ${describeInFlight()}`,
+  );
+  process.exit(2);
+}, stepBudgetMs).unref();
+
+// --- DevTools ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+/** The same minimal DevTools client as deploy-smoke-browser.mjs, with a deadline on every command. */
+async function connect(devtools, name) {
+  const deadline = Date.now() + 30_000;
+  let version;
+  while (version === undefined) {
+    try {
+      const response = await fetch(`http://${devtools}/json/version`, {
+        signal: AbortSignal.timeout(2_000),
+      });
+      version = await response.json();
+    } catch {
+      if (Date.now() > deadline) {
+        throw new HangError(`the ${name} browser's DevTools endpoint`, 30_000);
+      }
+      await sleep(500);
+    }
+  }
+  const socketUrl = version.webSocketDebuggerUrl.replace(/^ws:\/\/[^/]+/u, `ws://${devtools}`);
+  const socket = new WebSocket(socketUrl);
+  await guard(
+    `the ${name} browser's DevTools socket`,
+    new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
+      socket.addEventListener("open", resolve, { once: true });
+      socket.addEventListener("error", () => reject(new Error("DevTools connection failed.")), {
+        once: true,
+      });
+    }),
+  );
+  let nextId = 1;
+  const pending = new Map();
+  const listeners = [];
+  socket.addEventListener("message", (event) => {
+    const message = JSON.parse(String(event.data));
+    if (message.id !== undefined) {
+      const waiter = pending.get(message.id);
+      pending.delete(message.id);
+      if (message.error) {
+        waiter?.reject(new Error(`DevTools ${waiter.method} failed.`));
+      } else {
+        waiter?.resolve(message.result);
+      }
+      return;
+    }
+    for (const listener of listeners) {
+      listener(message);
+    }
+  });
+  return {
+    close: () => socket.close(),
+    on: (listener) => listeners.push(listener),
+    send(method, params = {}, sessionId = undefined, where = name) {
+      const id = nextId;
+      nextId += 1;
+      socket.send(JSON.stringify({ id, method, params, ...(sessionId ? { sessionId } : {}) }));
+      return guard(
+        `DevTools ${method} on ${where}`,
+        new Promise((resolve, reject) => pending.set(id, { method, reject, resolve })),
+      );
+    },
+  };
+}
+
+/** Finds a test id anywhere in the document, including inside module artifacts' open shadow roots
+ * (ADR 0040). */
+const deepFind = `((testId) => {
+  const walk = (root) => {
+    const found = root.querySelector('[data-testid="' + testId + '"]');
+    if (found) return found;
+    for (const element of root.querySelectorAll("*")) {
+      if (element.shadowRoot) {
+        const inner = walk(element.shadowRoot);
+        if (inner) return inner;
+      }
+    }
+    return null;
+  };
+  return walk(document);
+})`;
+const find = (testId) => `${deepFind}(${JSON.stringify(testId)})`;
+
+/** Installed before any page script: the browser's own connectivity events and the display service
+ * worker's fallback reports, which are what the display host remounts on (ADR 0043). */
+const instrumentation = `(() => {
+  const events = [];
+  // Object URLs created and revoked in this document. Each live one pins its blob in the browser's
+  // blob storage until it is revoked or the document goes away.
+  const blobs = { created: 0, revoked: 0 };
+  Object.defineProperty(window, "__displayRepro", { value: { blobs, events } });
+  const create = URL.createObjectURL.bind(URL);
+  const revoke = URL.revokeObjectURL.bind(URL);
+  URL.createObjectURL = (object) => { blobs.created += 1; return create(object); };
+  URL.revokeObjectURL = (url) => { blobs.revoked += 1; return revoke(url); };
+  const record = (kind) => events.push({ at: Date.now(), kind });
+  addEventListener("online", () => record("online"));
+  addEventListener("offline", () => record("offline"));
+  navigator.serviceWorker?.addEventListener("message", (event) => {
+    const status = event.data && event.data.ekklesiaDisplayOffline;
+    if (status) record(status.usingFallback ? "sw-fallback:" + (status.kind || "") : "sw-network");
+  });
+})()`;
+
+/** One page target with its own flat session, and what it does on the network. */
+async function openPage(cdp, url, label) {
+  const { targetId } = await cdp.send("Target.createTarget", { url: "about:blank" });
+  const { sessionId } = await cdp.send("Target.attachToTarget", { flatten: true, targetId });
+  const send = (method, params) => cdp.send(method, params, sessionId, `page "${label}"`);
+  const requests = new Map();
+  const page = {
+    label,
+    /** Every realtime connection: when it opened, its status, and when and how it ended. */
+    streams: [],
+    /** Signage viewer-session requests: one per module mount. */
+    sessionRequests: [],
+    /** Heartbeat statuses, by status code. */
+    heartbeats: new Map(),
+    /** Channel-state fetches and how they went. */
+    stateFetches: [],
+    /** Non-2xx responses and failed requests, by path only. */
+    problems: [],
+  };
+  cdp.on((message) => {
+    if (message.sessionId !== sessionId) {
+      return;
+    }
+    const params = message.params ?? {};
+    if (message.method === "Network.requestWillBeSent") {
+      const path = pathOf(params.request.url);
+      const entry = { at: Date.now(), path, type: params.type };
+      requests.set(params.requestId, entry);
+      if (params.type === "EventSource") {
+        entry.stream = {
+          openedAt: Date.now(),
+          path,
+          status: undefined,
+          endedAt: undefined,
+          how: undefined,
+        };
+        page.streams.push(entry.stream);
+      } else if (path.endsWith("/viewers/session")) {
+        page.sessionRequests.push(Date.now());
+      } else if (path.endsWith("/display-state") && !path.includes("module-realtime")) {
+        entry.state = { at: Date.now(), outcome: "pending" };
+        page.stateFetches.push(entry.state);
+      }
+    } else if (message.method === "Network.responseReceived") {
+      const entry = requests.get(params.requestId);
+      const { status } = params.response;
+      if (entry?.stream) {
+        entry.stream.status = status;
+      }
+      if (entry?.state) {
+        entry.state.outcome = String(status);
+      }
+      if (entry?.path.endsWith("/heartbeat")) {
+        page.heartbeats.set(status, (page.heartbeats.get(status) ?? 0) + 1);
+      }
+      if (status >= 400 || status === 0) {
+        page.problems.push(`${clock()} ${status} ${pathOf(params.response.url)}`);
+      }
+    } else if (message.method === "Network.loadingFinished") {
+      const entry = requests.get(params.requestId);
+      if (entry?.stream) {
+        entry.stream.endedAt = Date.now();
+        entry.stream.how = "finished";
+      }
+    } else if (message.method === "Network.loadingFailed") {
+      const entry = requests.get(params.requestId);
+      if (entry?.stream) {
+        entry.stream.endedAt = Date.now();
+        entry.stream.how = params.canceled ? "canceled" : `failed ${params.errorText}`;
+      }
+      if (entry?.state) {
+        entry.state.outcome = params.canceled ? "canceled" : `failed ${params.errorText}`;
+      }
+      if (entry && !params.canceled) {
+        page.problems.push(`${clock()} failed ${params.errorText} ${entry.path}`);
+      }
+    }
+  });
+  await send("Network.enable");
+  await send("Page.enable");
+  await send("Runtime.enable");
+  await send("Page.addScriptToEvaluateOnNewDocument", { source: instrumentation });
+  await send("Emulation.setDeviceMetricsOverride", {
+    deviceScaleFactor: 1,
+    height: 1080,
+    mobile: false,
+    width: 1920,
+  });
+  page.send = send;
+  /** Runs an expression in the page. `what` names it if it never comes back. */
+  page.evaluate = async (expression, what = "an evaluation") => {
+    const result = await guard(
+      `page "${label}": ${what}`,
+      send("Runtime.evaluate", { awaitPromise: true, expression, returnByValue: true }),
+    );
+    if (result.exceptionDetails) {
+      throw new Error(`A page expression threw (${what}).`);
+    }
+    return result.result.value;
+  };
+  page.waitFor = async (expression, description, ms = waitTimeoutMs) => {
+    const deadline = Date.now() + ms;
+    while (Date.now() < deadline) {
+      if (
+        await page
+          .evaluate(`Boolean(${expression})`, `waiting for ${description}`)
+          .catch((error) => {
+            if (error instanceof HangError) throw error;
+            return false;
+          })
+      ) {
+        return true;
+      }
+      await sleep(250);
+    }
+    note(`timed out waiting for ${description}`);
+    return false;
+  };
+  /** A credentialed request from this page, bounded in the page itself, so a request that never
+   * answers is reported as that request. */
+  page.request = async (method, url, body) => {
+    const result = await page.evaluate(
+      `fetch(${JSON.stringify(url)}, {
+        credentials: "include",
+        method: ${JSON.stringify(method)},
+        signal: AbortSignal.timeout(${requestTimeoutMs}),
+        ${body === undefined ? "" : `headers: { "content-type": "application/json" }, body: ${JSON.stringify(JSON.stringify(body))},`}
+      }).then(
+        async (response) => ({ status: response.status, body: await response.json().catch(() => null) }),
+        (error) => ({ status: error && error.name === "TimeoutError" ? "timeout" : "network-error" }),
+      )`,
+      `${method} ${pathOf(url)}`,
+    );
+    if (result.status === "timeout") {
+      throw new HangError(`HTTP ${method} ${pathOf(url)} from page "${label}"`, requestTimeoutMs);
+    }
+    return result;
+  };
+  page.close = () => cdp.send("Target.closeTarget", { targetId });
+  page.navigate = (to) => send("Page.navigate", { url: to });
+  if (url) {
+    await page.navigate(url);
+  }
+  return page;
+}
+
+/** The owner, signed in on the Dashboard hostname of the smoke run's own browser. */
+async function ownerPage() {
+  const cdp = await connect(ownerAddress, "owner");
+  const page = await openPage(cdp, `${dashboardOrigin}/`, "owner");
+  await page.waitFor(`${find("login-email")} || ${find("host-shell")}`, "the Dashboard");
+  if (!(await page.evaluate(`Boolean(${find("host-shell")})`, "checking the session"))) {
+    await page.evaluate(
+      `(() => {
+        const setValue = (element, value) => {
+          Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor(HTMLInputElement.prototype, "value").set.call(element, value);
+          element.dispatchEvent(new Event("input", { bubbles: true }));
+        };
+        setValue(${find("login-email")}, ${JSON.stringify(required("SMOKE_OWNER_EMAIL"))});
+        setValue(${find("login-password")}, ${JSON.stringify(required("SMOKE_OWNER_PASSWORD"))});
+        ${find("login-email")}.form.requestSubmit();
+      })()`,
+      "submitting the sign-in form",
+    );
+    check(await page.waitFor(find("host-shell"), "the signed-in Dashboard"), "the owner signs in");
+  }
+  page.api = (method, path, body) => page.request(method, `${apiOrigin}${path}`, body);
+  return { cdp, page };
+}
+
+/** Closes the owner's tab as well as the connection: the owner browser is shared by every step, and a
+ * tab left behind by each one accumulates until the Dashboard no longer renders in time. */
+async function finishOwner(owner) {
+  await owner.page.close().catch(() => undefined);
+  owner.cdp.close();
+}
+
+async function displayModuleId(owner) {
+  const navigation = await owner.api("GET", "/api/v1/dashboard/navigation");
+  const entries = [
+    ...navigation.body.ungrouped,
+    ...navigation.body.groups.flatMap((group) => group.modules),
+  ];
+  const withDisplay = entries.filter((entry) => entry.module.display !== null);
+  const signage = withDisplay.find((entry) => entry.module.id === "signage");
+  return (signage ?? withDisplay[0])?.module.id;
+}
+
+/** Three slides of plain colour, on a five-second rotation, so a display has real content to persist
+ * and continue from, as the production screen did. Signage only. */
+async function seedSignage(owner) {
+  const base = "/api/v1/modules/signage";
+  const images = [];
+  for (const [index, colour] of ["#b03030", "#3060b0", "#30a050"].entries()) {
+    const uploaded = await owner.evaluate(
+      `(async () => {
+        const canvas = document.createElement("canvas");
+        canvas.width = 640;
+        canvas.height = 360;
+        const context = canvas.getContext("2d");
+        context.fillStyle = ${JSON.stringify(colour)};
+        context.fillRect(0, 0, 640, 360);
+        const blob = await new Promise((resolve) => canvas.toBlob(resolve, "image/png"));
+        const response = await fetch(${JSON.stringify(`${apiOrigin}${base}/images?filename=slide-${index}.png&displayName=Slide%20${index}`)}, {
+          body: blob, credentials: "include", headers: { "content-type": "image/png" }, method: "POST",
+          signal: AbortSignal.timeout(${requestTimeoutMs}),
+        });
+        return { status: response.status, body: await response.json().catch(() => null) };
+      })()`,
+      `uploading slide ${index}`,
+    );
+    images.push(uploaded.body?.image?.id);
+  }
+  check(
+    images.every((id) => typeof id === "string"),
+    "three slides are uploaded to Signage",
+  );
+  const timeline = await owner.api("POST", `${base}/timelines`, { name: "Display repro" });
+  const timelineId = timeline.body?.timeline?.id ?? timeline.body?.id;
+  for (const itemId of images) {
+    await owner.api("POST", `${base}/timelines/${timelineId}/slots`, {
+      durationOverrideMs: 5_000,
+      itemId,
+      providerId: "signage.native-images",
+    });
+  }
+  const groups = await owner.api("GET", `${base}/channel-groups`);
+  const groupId = groups.body?.groups?.[0]?.id;
+  const activated = await owner.api("POST", `${base}/playback/${groupId}/activate`, {
+    timelineId,
+  });
+  check(activated.status === 200, "a three-slide timeline is playing on the default channel group");
+}
+
+async function signageViewers(owner) {
+  const listed = await owner.api("GET", "/api/v1/modules/signage/viewers");
+  return listed.body?.viewers ?? [];
+}
+
+async function coreDevices(owner) {
+  const listed = await owner.api("GET", "/api/v1/devices");
+  return listed.body?.devices ?? [];
+}
+
+/** The display's own view of itself: which host state is showing, and Signage's offline flag. */
+function displayState(page) {
+  return page.evaluate(
+    `(() => {
+      const stage = ${find("signage-stage")};
+      return {
+        pairing: Boolean(${find("display-pairing")}),
+        hostLoading: Boolean(${find("display-host-loading")}) || Boolean(${find("display-loading")}),
+        hostError: Boolean(${find("display-host-error")}) || Boolean(${find("display-error")}),
+        hostOffline: Boolean(${find("display-offline")}),
+        mounted: (${find("display-module-container")}?.childElementCount ?? 0) > 0,
+        signageOffline: stage ? stage.dataset.offline === "true" : null,
+      };
+    })()`,
+    "reading the display state",
+  );
+}
+
+async function blobCounts(page) {
+  return page.evaluate(
+    "window.__displayRepro ? window.__displayRepro.blobs : { created: 0, revoked: 0 }",
+    "reading object-URL counts",
+  );
+}
+
+async function connectivityEvents(page) {
+  return page.evaluate(
+    "window.__displayRepro ? window.__displayRepro.events : []",
+    "reading connectivity events",
+  );
+}
+
+async function describeDeviceCookie(cdp) {
+  const { cookies } = await cdp.send("Storage.getCookies");
+  const cookie = cookies.find((candidate) => candidate.name === deviceCookie);
+  if (!cookie) {
+    note(`${deviceCookie}: absent from the profile`);
+    return undefined;
+  }
+  const days = cookie.session
+    ? "session"
+    : `${((cookie.expires * 1000 - Date.now()) / 86_400_000).toFixed(1)} days`;
+  note(
+    `${deviceCookie}: domain=${cookie.domain} session=${cookie.session} lifetime=${days} httpOnly=${cookie.httpOnly} secure=${cookie.secure} sameSite=${cookie.sameSite}`,
+  );
+  return cookie;
+}
+
+const liveExpression = `(() => {
+  const stage = ${find("signage-stage")};
+  const mounted = (${find("display-module-container")}?.childElementCount ?? 0) > 0;
+  return mounted && !${find("display-pairing")} && (stage === null || stage.dataset.offline === "false");
+})()`;
+
+function waitLive(page, description, ms = 45_000) {
+  return page.waitFor(liveExpression, description, ms);
+}
+
+/** A page's network story, one line each, by path only. */
+function summarize(page, from) {
+  const at = (ms) => (ms === undefined ? "-" : `${clock(ms)} (${Math.round((ms - from) / 1000)}s)`);
+  note(`${page.label}: viewer sessions opened ${page.sessionRequests.length} (= module mounts)`);
+  note(
+    `${page.label}: heartbeats ${[...page.heartbeats].map(([status, count]) => `${status}×${count}`).join(" ") || "none"}`,
+  );
+  const states = page.stateFetches.reduce((tally, fetch) => {
+    tally[fetch.outcome] = (tally[fetch.outcome] ?? 0) + 1;
+    return tally;
+  }, {});
+  note(`${page.label}: channel-state fetches ${JSON.stringify(states)}`);
+  for (const stream of page.streams) {
+    const lived =
+      stream.endedAt === undefined
+        ? "open"
+        : `${Math.round((stream.endedAt - stream.openedAt) / 1000)}s`;
+    note(
+      `${page.label}: stream opened ${at(stream.openedAt)} status ${stream.status ?? "-"} ended ${at(stream.endedAt)} ${stream.how ?? ""} lived ${lived}`,
+    );
+  }
+  note(`${page.label}: problems ${page.problems.slice(-12).join(" | ") || "none"}`);
+}
+
+/** Samples display state on an interval for a fixed time, printing progress, and returns a tally. */
+async function watch(pages, ms, { onSample, viewerOwner } = {}) {
+  const from = Date.now();
+  const tally = new Map(
+    pages.map((page) => [
+      page.label,
+      { loading: 0, offline: 0, pairing: 0, samples: 0, transitions: [] },
+    ]),
+  );
+  const last = new Map();
+  let nextProgress = from + 15_000;
+  const roster = [];
+  while (Date.now() - from < ms) {
+    for (const page of pages) {
+      const state = await displayState(page);
+      const t = tally.get(page.label);
+      t.samples += 1;
+      if (state.signageOffline || state.hostOffline) t.offline += 1;
+      if (state.pairing) t.pairing += 1;
+      if (state.hostLoading) t.loading += 1;
+      const key = JSON.stringify(state);
+      if (last.get(page.label) !== key) {
+        last.set(page.label, key);
+        t.transitions.push(`${clock()} ${since(from)} ${key}`);
+      }
+      if (onSample && (await onSample(page, state))) {
+        return { from, roster, stopped: true, tally };
+      }
+    }
+    if (Date.now() >= nextProgress) {
+      nextProgress = Date.now() + 15_000;
+      if (viewerOwner) {
+        const viewers = await signageViewers(viewerOwner);
+        roster.push(
+          `${since(from)} ${viewers.map((v) => `${v.name}:${v.online ? "Online" : "Offline"}`).join(",")}`,
+        );
+      }
+      const lines = [];
+      for (const page of pages) {
+        const t = tally.get(page.label);
+        const blobs = await blobCounts(page);
+        lines.push(
+          `${page.label}: ${t.samples} samples, offline ${t.offline}, mounts ${page.sessionRequests.length}, streams ${page.streams.length}, live object URLs ${blobs.created - blobs.revoked}`,
+        );
+      }
+      progress(lines.join(" · "));
+    }
+    await sleep(2_000);
+  }
+  return { from, roster, stopped: false, tally };
+}
+
+function printTally(result) {
+  for (const [label, t] of result.tally) {
+    note(
+      `${label}: ${t.samples} samples, offline in ${t.offline}, pairing in ${t.pairing}, loading in ${t.loading}`,
+    );
+    for (const transition of t.transitions.slice(0, 30)) {
+      note(`  ${label} ${transition}`);
+    }
+  }
+  if (result.roster.length > 0) {
+    note(`roster over time: ${result.roster.join(" ; ")}`);
+  }
+}
+
+// --- Steps ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+async function run() {
+  if (mode === "pair") {
+    const owner = await ownerPage();
+    const moduleId = await displayModuleId(owner.page);
+    check(moduleId !== undefined, `a module publishes a display (${moduleId})`);
+    if (moduleId === "signage") {
+      await seedSignage(owner.page);
+    }
+    const kiosk = await connect(kioskAddress, "kiosk");
+    const display = await openPage(kiosk, `${apiOrigin}/display/${moduleId}`, "kiosk");
+    check(
+      await display.waitFor(find("display-pairing-code"), "a pairing code"),
+      "an unpaired kiosk shows a pairing code",
+    );
+    const code = (
+      await display.evaluate(`${find("display-pairing-code")}.textContent`, "reading the code")
+    ).replace(/\D/gu, "");
+    const approved = await owner.page.api("POST", "/api/v1/device-pairing/approvals", {
+      code,
+      deviceName: "Repro kiosk",
+    });
+    check(approved.status === 200, "the owner approves the code");
+    check(
+      await waitLive(display, "the paired display to go live"),
+      "the paired kiosk mounts the display and is live",
+    );
+    await describeDeviceCookie(kiosk);
+    progress("letting heartbeats, a persisted snapshot, and media prefetch happen (20s)");
+    await sleep(20_000);
+    for (const viewer of await signageViewers(owner.page)) {
+      note(
+        `signage viewer "${viewer.name}" online=${viewer.online} offlineReady=${viewer.offlineReady} cachedAssets=${viewer.cachedAssetCount} error=${viewer.lastError?.code ?? "none"}`,
+      );
+    }
+    summarize(display, stepStartedAt);
+    // A clean exit: the browser shuts down normally, exactly as a systemd stop of a well-behaved kiosk.
+    await kiosk.send("Browser.close").catch(() => undefined);
+    kiosk.close();
+    await finishOwner(owner);
+  } else if (mode === "restart") {
+    const owner = await ownerPage();
+    const moduleId = await displayModuleId(owner.page);
+    const kiosk = await connect(kioskAddress, "kiosk");
+    const cookie = await describeDeviceCookie(kiosk);
+    check(cookie !== undefined, "the device credential survived a clean browser exit");
+    const display = await openPage(kiosk, `${apiOrigin}/display/${moduleId}`, "kiosk");
+    const live = await waitLive(display, "the restarted display to go live");
+    const state = await displayState(display);
+    check(
+      live && !state.pairing,
+      `after a clean restart the kiosk is still paired and live (${JSON.stringify(state)})`,
+    );
+    summarize(display, stepStartedAt);
+    await display.close();
+    kiosk.close();
+    await finishOwner(owner);
+  } else if (mode === "two-pages") {
+    const owner = await ownerPage();
+    const moduleId = await displayModuleId(owner.page);
+    const kiosk = await connect(kioskAddress, "kiosk");
+    const url = `${apiOrigin}/display/${moduleId}`;
+    const first = await openPage(kiosk, url, "first");
+    check(await waitLive(first, "the first page"), "the first page is live");
+    const second = await openPage(kiosk, url, "second");
+    check(await waitLive(second, "the second page"), "the second page is live");
+    const result = await watch([first, second], watchMs, { viewerOwner: owner.page });
+    printTally(result);
+    for (const page of [first, second]) {
+      summarize(page, result.from);
+      note(`${page.label}: connectivity events ${JSON.stringify(await connectivityEvents(page))}`);
+    }
+    check(
+      [...result.tally.values()].every((t) => t.offline === 0),
+      `neither page showed an offline state while both were open (${watchMs / 1000}s)`,
+    );
+    check(
+      [first, second].every((page) => page.sessionRequests.length === 1),
+      "neither page was remounted while both were open",
+    );
+    await first.close();
+    await second.close();
+    kiosk.close();
+    await finishOwner(owner);
+  } else if (mode === "connectivity-blip") {
+    // The browser's own offline/online events, as a Wi-Fi reassociation or a link flap produces. The
+    // display host re-resolves its descriptor on "online" (ADR 0043); this measures what that costs.
+    const owner = await ownerPage();
+    const moduleId = await displayModuleId(owner.page);
+    const kiosk = await connect(kioskAddress, "kiosk");
+    const page = await openPage(kiosk, `${apiOrigin}/display/${moduleId}`, "blip");
+    check(await waitLive(page, "the display"), "the display is live");
+    const mountsBefore = page.sessionRequests.length;
+    await page.evaluate(
+      `dispatchEvent(new Event("offline")); setTimeout(() => dispatchEvent(new Event("online")), 1000)`,
+      "dispatching offline then online",
+    );
+    let firstOfflineAt;
+    let lastOfflineAt;
+    const result = await watch([page], 30_000, {
+      onSample: (_page, state) => {
+        if (state.signageOffline || state.hostOffline || state.hostLoading || !state.mounted) {
+          firstOfflineAt ??= Date.now();
+          lastOfflineAt = Date.now();
+        }
+        return false;
+      },
+    });
+    printTally(result);
+    const remounts = page.sessionRequests.length - mountsBefore;
+    note(`remounts caused by one offline/online pair: ${remounts}`);
+    note(
+      firstOfflineAt === undefined
+        ? "nothing visible changed"
+        : `visible disruption from ${clock(firstOfflineAt)} to ${clock(lastOfflineAt)} (sampled every 2s)`,
+    );
+    summarize(page, result.from);
+    check(remounts === 0, "a connectivity blip does not remount a live display");
+    check(
+      firstOfflineAt === undefined,
+      "a connectivity blip does not show an offline state on a live display",
+    );
+    await page.close();
+    kiosk.close();
+    await finishOwner(owner);
+  } else if (mode === "session-blip") {
+    // One transient failure of Signage's viewer-session request at start-up, as a kiosk booting
+    // before its network settles, or an API restart, would produce. Everything else reaches the
+    // server.
+    const owner = await ownerPage();
+    const moduleId = await displayModuleId(owner.page);
+    const kiosk = await connect(kioskAddress, "kiosk");
+    const page = await openPage(kiosk, undefined, "session-blip");
+    let blocked = 0;
+    kiosk.on((message) => {
+      if (message.method === "Fetch.requestPaused") {
+        const { requestId, request } = message.params;
+        if (blocked === 0 && pathOf(request.url).endsWith("/viewers/session")) {
+          blocked += 1;
+          page
+            .send("Fetch.failRequest", { errorReason: "ConnectionRefused", requestId })
+            .catch((error) => note(`interception reply failed: ${error.message}`));
+        } else {
+          page
+            .send("Fetch.continueRequest", { requestId })
+            .catch((error) => note(`interception reply failed: ${error.message}`));
+        }
+      }
+    });
+    await page.send("Fetch.enable", { patterns: [{ urlPattern: "*/api/v1/modules/*" }] });
+    await page.navigate(`${apiOrigin}/display/${moduleId}`);
+    await page.waitFor(
+      `(${find("display-module-container")}?.childElementCount ?? 0) > 0`,
+      "the module to mount",
+    );
+    note(`viewer-session requests failed on purpose: ${blocked}`);
+    const recovered = await page.waitFor(
+      `${find("signage-stage")}?.dataset.offline === "false"`,
+      "recovery from one failed viewer-session request",
+      90_000,
+    );
+    summarize(page, stepStartedAt);
+    check(
+      recovered,
+      `one failed viewer-session request does not leave the display offline (${JSON.stringify(await displayState(page))})`,
+    );
+    await page.close();
+    kiosk.close();
+    await finishOwner(owner);
+  } else if (mode === "stream-failure") {
+    // The first realtime connection is refused with a 503, as an API mid-restart or a proxy with no
+    // upstream answers. A non-200 ends an EventSource for good; the question is whether anything
+    // re-establishes realtime without a reload.
+    const owner = await ownerPage();
+    const moduleId = await displayModuleId(owner.page);
+    const kiosk = await connect(kioskAddress, "kiosk");
+    const page = await openPage(kiosk, undefined, "stream-failure");
+    let refused = 0;
+    kiosk.on((message) => {
+      if (message.method === "Fetch.requestPaused") {
+        const { requestId } = message.params;
+        if (refused === 0) {
+          refused += 1;
+          page
+            .send("Fetch.fulfillRequest", {
+              body: Buffer.from('{"code":"REALTIME_UNAVAILABLE"}').toString("base64"),
+              requestId,
+              responseCode: 503,
+              responseHeaders: [
+                { name: "content-type", value: "application/json" },
+                { name: "cache-control", value: "no-store" },
+              ],
+            })
+            .catch((error) => note(`interception reply failed: ${error.message}`));
+        } else {
+          page
+            .send("Fetch.continueRequest", { requestId })
+            .catch((error) => note(`interception reply failed: ${error.message}`));
+        }
+      }
+    });
+    await page.send("Fetch.enable", { patterns: [{ urlPattern: "*/api/v1/module-realtime/*" }] });
+    await page.navigate(`${apiOrigin}/display/${moduleId}`);
+    await page.waitFor(
+      `(${find("display-module-container")}?.childElementCount ?? 0) > 0`,
+      "the module to mount",
+    );
+    note(`realtime connections refused on purpose: ${refused}`);
+    const result = await watch([page], 90_000, {
+      onSample: () => page.streams.some((stream) => stream.status === 200),
+    });
+    printTally(result);
+    summarize(page, result.from);
+    check(
+      page.streams.some((stream) => stream.status === 200),
+      "after one refused realtime connection, realtime is re-established without a reload",
+    );
+    await page.close();
+    kiosk.close();
+    await finishOwner(owner);
+  } else if (mode === "caching-probe") {
+    // Whether a display on the API origin can store an image from the storage origin in Cache
+    // Storage, which is what Signage's offline media relies on. Reports only statuses, response
+    // types, and whether CORS headers were present — never a URL.
+    const owner = await ownerPage();
+    const moduleId = await displayModuleId(owner.page);
+    const groups = await owner.page.api("GET", "/api/v1/modules/signage/channel-groups");
+    const channelId = groups.body?.groups?.[0]?.channels?.[0]?.id;
+    const kiosk = await connect(kioskAddress, "kiosk");
+    const page = await openPage(kiosk, `${apiOrigin}/display/${moduleId}`, "probe");
+    check(await waitLive(page, "the display"), "the display is live");
+    progress("letting the display prefetch its slides (15s)");
+    await sleep(15_000);
+    const probe = await page.evaluate(
+      `(async () => {
+        const result = {};
+        const state = await fetch(${JSON.stringify(`${apiOrigin}/api/v1/modules/signage/channels/${channelId}/display-state`)}, { credentials: "include", signal: AbortSignal.timeout(${requestTimeoutMs}) }).then((r) => r.json());
+        const url = (state.selections || []).map((s) => s.media && s.media.display && s.media.display.url).find(Boolean);
+        result.selections = (state.selections || []).length;
+        result.haveUrl = Boolean(url);
+        if (!url) return result;
+        result.sameOrigin = new URL(url).origin === location.origin;
+        try {
+          const response = await fetch(url, { signal: AbortSignal.timeout(${requestTimeoutMs}) });
+          result.cors = { status: response.status, type: response.type, allowOrigin: response.headers.get("access-control-allow-origin") === null ? "absent" : (response.headers.get("access-control-allow-origin") === location.origin || response.headers.get("access-control-allow-origin") === "*" ? "matches" : "other") };
+          try {
+            const cache = await caches.open("display-repro-probe");
+            await cache.put("/display-repro-probe/cors", response.clone());
+            result.cors.cachePut = "stored";
+          } catch (error) { result.cors.cachePut = "refused: " + error.name; }
+        } catch (error) { result.cors = { error: error.name }; }
+        try {
+          const response = await fetch(url, { mode: "no-cors", signal: AbortSignal.timeout(${requestTimeoutMs}) });
+          result.noCors = { status: response.status, type: response.type, ok: response.ok };
+          try {
+            const cache = await caches.open("display-repro-probe");
+            await cache.put("/display-repro-probe/opaque", response.clone());
+            result.noCors.cachePut = "stored";
+          } catch (error) { result.noCors.cachePut = "refused: " + error.name; }
+        } catch (error) { result.noCors = { error: error.name }; }
+        result.imgPlain = await new Promise((resolve) => { const i = new Image(); i.onload = () => resolve("loaded"); i.onerror = () => resolve("error"); i.src = url; });
+        result.imgCors = await new Promise((resolve) => { const i = new Image(); i.crossOrigin = "anonymous"; i.onload = () => resolve("loaded"); i.onerror = () => resolve("error"); i.src = url + (url.includes("?") ? "&" : "?") + "cors-probe=1"; });
+        await caches.delete("display-repro-probe");
+        result.signageCachedEntries = await caches.open("ekklesia-signage-media-v1").then((c) => c.keys()).then((k) => k.length).catch(() => "unavailable");
+        return result;
+      })()`,
+      "probing cross-origin image caching",
+    );
+    note(`caching probe: ${JSON.stringify(probe)}`);
+    summarize(page, stepStartedAt);
+    check(probe.signageCachedEntries > 0, "Signage has stored slide images in Cache Storage");
+    await page.close();
+    kiosk.close();
+    await finishOwner(owner);
+  } else if (mode === "stream-recycle") {
+    // One page, past the five-minute realtime connection age, with every stream's open and end
+    // time in UTC so they can be laid against the proxy's own log.
+    const owner = await ownerPage();
+    const moduleId = await displayModuleId(owner.page);
+    const kiosk = await connect(kioskAddress, "kiosk");
+    const page = await openPage(kiosk, `${apiOrigin}/display/${moduleId}`, "recycle");
+    check(await waitLive(page, "the display"), "the display is live");
+    const result = await watch([page], recycleWatchMs, { viewerOwner: owner.page });
+    printTally(result);
+    summarize(page, result.from);
+    note(`connectivity events ${JSON.stringify(await connectivityEvents(page))}`);
+    const blobs = await blobCounts(page);
+    const exhausted = page.stateFetches.filter((fetch) =>
+      fetch.outcome.includes("INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES"),
+    );
+    note(
+      `object URLs: created ${blobs.created}, revoked ${blobs.revoked}, live ${blobs.created - blobs.revoked}; channel-state fetches refused for insufficient resources: ${exhausted.length}`,
+    );
+    check(
+      blobs.created - blobs.revoked <= MAX_LIVE_OBJECT_URLS,
+      `live object URLs stay bounded (at most ${MAX_LIVE_OBJECT_URLS}; ${blobs.created - blobs.revoked} live)`,
+    );
+    check(
+      result.tally.get("recycle").offline === 0,
+      `the display stayed live for the whole ${recycleWatchMs / 1000}s watch${recycleWatchMs > 300_000 ? ", across a realtime recycle" : ""}`,
+    );
+    check(page.sessionRequests.length === 1, "the display was never remounted during the watch");
+    await page.close();
+    kiosk.close();
+    await finishOwner(owner);
+  } else if (mode === "revoke") {
+    const owner = await ownerPage();
+    const moduleId = await displayModuleId(owner.page);
+    const kiosk = await connect(kioskAddress, "kiosk");
+    const page = await openPage(kiosk, `${apiOrigin}/display/${moduleId}`, "revoked");
+    check(
+      await waitLive(page, "the display before revocation"),
+      "the display is live before revocation",
+    );
+    const devices = (await coreDevices(owner.page)).filter((device) => !device.revoked);
+    for (const device of devices) {
+      await owner.page.api("POST", `/api/v1/devices/${device.id}/revoke`);
+    }
+    note(`revoked ${devices.length} device(s) at ${clock()}; watching the open page`);
+    const result = await watch([page], watchMs, { onSample: (_page, state) => state.pairing });
+    printTally(result);
+    summarize(page, result.from);
+    check(
+      result.stopped,
+      `a revoked display returns to the pairing screen without a reload (within ${watchMs / 1000}s)`,
+    );
+    await page.close();
+    kiosk.close();
+    await finishOwner(owner);
+  } else {
+    throw new Error(
+      "usage: deploy-smoke-display.mjs pair|restart|two-pages|connectivity-blip|session-blip|stream-failure|caching-probe|stream-recycle|revoke",
+    );
+  }
+}
+
+try {
+  await run();
+} catch (error) {
+  if (error instanceof HangError) {
+    console.log(`FAIL ${mode}: ${error.message}; also in flight: ${describeInFlight()}`);
+  } else {
+    console.log(`FAIL ${mode}: ${error instanceof Error ? error.message : "an unexpected error"}`);
+  }
+  process.exit(2);
+}
+
+if (failures > 0) {
+  console.error(`${failures} check(s) failed`);
+  process.exit(1);
+}
+process.exit(0);

scripts/smoke-deploy.sh

@@ -5,6 +5,21 @@
 #
 #   bash scripts/smoke-deploy.sh                 builds the image first
 #   EKKLESIA_SMOKE_IMAGE=<image> bash scripts/smoke-deploy.sh
+#   EKKLESIA_SMOKE_TOPOLOGY=split bash scripts/smoke-deploy.sh
+#
+# Either topology (ADR 0045). `same-origin` (the default) serves the Dashboard, the API, and displays
+# from one hostname with Caddyfile.example and a platform-only image. `split` serves the Dashboard on
+# its own hostname with Caddyfile.split.example, builds an image with the repository's module
+# template installed as a test-only module (so a module UI, its API routes, and a display exist), and
+# then drives a real headless Chromium through the Dashboard, the module, the display, and sign-out.
+# With EKKLESIA_SMOKE_IMAGE, the given image is used as is in either topology; a split run then
+# exercises whichever of its modules publishes UI and a display.
+#
+# Opt-in, split topology only: EKKLESIA_SMOKE_DISPLAY_DEVICE=1 adds the display-device scenarios in
+# scripts/lib/deploy-smoke-display.mjs (pairing a kiosk browser with a persistent profile, a clean
+# restart, two pages, injected network failures, revocation), each with its own time budget.
+# EKKLESIA_SMOKE_DISPLAY_SCENARIOS selects a subset; EKKLESIA_SMOKE_WATCH_MS and
+# EKKLESIA_SMOKE_RECYCLE_WATCH_MS change how long they watch. Several scenarios expect Signage.
 #
 # TEST-ONLY: the proxy runs with Caddy's internal CA (`local_certs`) instead of ACME, because a test
 # run has no public hostname. Never use that option in an installation.
@@ -24,6 +39,8 @@ cd "$repository_root"
 
 # shellcheck source=scripts/lib/compose-diagnostics.sh
 source "$repository_root/scripts/lib/compose-diagnostics.sh"
+# shellcheck source=scripts/lib/ci-project.sh
+source "$repository_root/scripts/lib/ci-project.sh"
 
 for command in docker openssl awk; do
   command -v "$command" >/dev/null || {
@@ -39,14 +56,39 @@ docker compose version >/dev/null 2>&1 || {
 # The pinned PostgreSQL image doubles as a root shell for file ownership, so the run needs neither
 # root nor sudo on the host.
 postgres_image="postgres:18.4-alpine3.24@sha256:9a8afca54e7861fd90fab5fdf4c42477a6b1cb7d293595148e674e0a3181de15"
+# The split topology's real browser: headless Chromium, pinned by its multi-architecture index digest.
+browser_image="chromedp/headless-shell:151.0.7922.109@sha256:2d349b544a1ea6b5b5fd7c0fe99215ff662339c57407ee2e8c0a11af93516b04"
+
+topology="${EKKLESIA_SMOKE_TOPOLOGY:-same-origin}"
+case "$topology" in
+same-origin | split) ;;
+*)
+  echo "smoke-deploy: EKKLESIA_SMOKE_TOPOLOGY must be same-origin or split." >&2
+  exit 1
+  ;;
+esac
 
 run_id="$(openssl rand -hex 4)"
-project="ekklesia-deploy-smoke-${run_id}"
+# Unique per invocation, and findable by run and job if this script is killed before its trap runs
+# (scripts/lib/ci-project.sh, scripts/ci-sweep.sh). Everything started outside Compose below carries
+# the same name in EKKLESIA_CI_LABEL.
+project="$(ci_project_name "deploy-${topology}")"
 work="$(mktemp -d)"
 image="${EKKLESIA_SMOKE_IMAGE:-}"
 built_image=""
+# `hostname` is always the API's (and the display host's); the Dashboard has its own only when split.
+if [[ "$topology" == split ]]; then
+  hostname="api.smoke.test"
+  dashboard_hostname="dash.smoke.test"
+  caddyfile_example="deploy/Caddyfile.split.example"
+else
   hostname="ekklesia.smoke.test"
+  dashboard_hostname=""
+  caddyfile_example="deploy/Caddyfile.example"
+fi
+dashboard_origin="https://${dashboard_hostname:-$hostname}"
 storage_hostname="storage.smoke.test"
+browser_container=""
 
 # choose_edge_network: a per-run edge subnet that no network on this Docker daemon already uses, so
 # concurrent runs sharing a runner's daemon do not collide. Two runs can still pick the same free
@@ -69,6 +111,8 @@ choose_edge_network() {
       tunnel_address="10.249.${octet}.253"
       # A test-only client address, also outside the dynamic range, so its limiter bucket is its own.
       session_client_address="10.249.${octet}.252"
+      # The headless browser's fixed address, likewise (split topology only).
+      browser_address="10.249.${octet}.251"
       return 0
     fi
   done
@@ -105,6 +149,15 @@ compose=(
 cleanup() {
   local status=$?
   trap - EXIT INT TERM
+  if [[ -n "$browser_container" ]]; then
+    docker rm --force "$browser_container" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
+  fi
+  if [[ -n "${kiosk_container:-}" ]]; then
+    docker ps --all --quiet --filter "name=${project}-display-" | xargs -r docker rm --force \
+      >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
+    docker rm --force "$kiosk_container" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
+    docker volume rm --force "$kiosk_volume" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
+  fi
   if [[ -f "$work/compose.env" ]]; then
     "${compose[@]}" --profile ops down --volumes --remove-orphans --timeout 10 >/dev/null 2>&1 || status=1
   fi
@@ -135,10 +188,34 @@ fail() {
   exit 1
 }
 
-if [[ -z "$image" ]]; then
+if [[ -z "$image" && "$topology" == same-origin ]]; then
   step "Building the platform-only image"
   built_image="ekklesia-deploy-smoke:${run_id}"
-  DOCKER_BUILDKIT=1 docker build --quiet --file deploy/Dockerfile --tag "$built_image" . >/dev/null
+  DOCKER_BUILDKIT=1 docker build --quiet --file deploy/Dockerfile --tag "$built_image" \
+    --label "${EKKLESIA_CI_LABEL}=${project}" --label "${EKKLESIA_CI_CREATED_LABEL}=$(date +%s)" \
+    . >/dev/null
+  image="$built_image"
+elif [[ -z "$image" ]]; then
+  # TEST-ONLY: the repository's module template, installed as the module `example`, in a copy of the
+  # working tree. Its lockfile importer moves with it; the depth is the same, so every relative link
+  # in that importer stays correct and the install stays frozen.
+  step "Building an image with the module template installed as a test-only module"
+  command -v git >/dev/null || fail "git is required to build the split topology's test image."
+  context="$work/build-context"
+  mkdir -p "$context"
+  git ls-files -z --cached --others --exclude-standard |
+    tar --null --files-from=- --create --file=- |
+    tar -C "$context" -xf -
+  mkdir -p "$context/modules"
+  mv "$context/templates/module" "$context/modules/example"
+  [[ "$(grep -c '^  templates/module:$' "$context/pnpm-lock.yaml")" == 1 ]] ||
+    fail "the lockfile has no single templates/module importer to move."
+  sed -i 's|^  templates/module:$|  modules/example:|' "$context/pnpm-lock.yaml"
+  built_image="ekklesia-deploy-smoke:${run_id}"
+  DOCKER_BUILDKIT=1 docker build --quiet --file "$context/deploy/Dockerfile" --tag "$built_image" \
+    --label "${EKKLESIA_CI_LABEL}=${project}" --label "${EKKLESIA_CI_CREATED_LABEL}=$(date +%s)" \
+    "$context" >/dev/null || fail "the test-module image did not build."
+  rm -rf "$context"
   image="$built_image"
 fi
 
@@ -197,7 +274,10 @@ ekklesia_env="$work/env/ekklesia.env"
 set_env "$ekklesia_env" DATABASE_URL "postgresql://ekklesia:${postgres_password}@postgres:5432/ekklesia"
 set_env "$ekklesia_env" EKKLESIA_DATABASE_CA "${database_ca_line#EKKLESIA_DATABASE_CA=}"
 set_env "$ekklesia_env" EKKLESIA_IDENTITY_BASE_URL "https://${hostname}"
-set_env "$ekklesia_env" EKKLESIA_IDENTITY_TRUSTED_ORIGINS "https://${hostname}"
+set_env "$ekklesia_env" EKKLESIA_IDENTITY_TRUSTED_ORIGINS "$dashboard_origin"
+if [[ "$topology" == split ]]; then
+  set_env "$ekklesia_env" EKKLESIA_DASHBOARD_ORIGIN "$dashboard_origin"
+fi
 set_env "$ekklesia_env" EKKLESIA_IDENTITY_SECRET "$identity_secret"
 set_env "$ekklesia_env" S3_DELIVERY_ENDPOINT "https://${storage_hostname}"
 set_env "$ekklesia_env" S3_ACCESS_KEY "$s3_access_key"
@@ -209,7 +289,7 @@ chmod 600 "$work"/env/*.env
 
 # TEST-ONLY: Caddy's internal CA instead of ACME. Inserted as the first global option.
 awk '!done && $0 == "{" { print; print "\tlocal_certs"; done = 1; next } { print }' \
-  deploy/Caddyfile.example >"$work/Caddyfile"
+  "$caddyfile_example" >"$work/Caddyfile"
 grep -q $'^\tlocal_certs$' "$work/Caddyfile" || fail "could not enable local_certs for the test proxy."
 stage Caddyfile
 
@@ -218,6 +298,7 @@ EKKLESIA_IMAGE=${image}
 EKKLESIA_ENV_DIR=${work}/env
 EKKLESIA_TLS_DIR=${daemon_work}/tls
 EKKLESIA_HOSTNAME=${hostname}
+EKKLESIA_DASHBOARD_HOSTNAME=${dashboard_hostname}
 EKKLESIA_STORAGE_HOSTNAME=${storage_hostname}
 EKKLESIA_ACME_EMAIL=[email protected]
 EKKLESIA_CADDYFILE=${daemon_work}/Caddyfile
@@ -281,13 +362,18 @@ stage client-ca.pem
 stage client.mjs
 
 edge_network="${project}_edge"
+host_mappings=(--add-host "${hostname}:${proxy_address}" --add-host "${storage_hostname}:${proxy_address}")
+if [[ -n "$dashboard_hostname" ]]; then
+  host_mappings+=(--add-host "${dashboard_hostname}:${proxy_address}")
+fi
 client() {
   local mode="$1"
   shift
   docker run --rm --read-only --cap-drop ALL --security-opt no-new-privileges \
-    --network "$edge_network" "$@" \
+    --label "${EKKLESIA_CI_LABEL}=${project}" \
-    --add-host "${hostname}:${proxy_address}" --add-host "${storage_hostname}:${proxy_address}" \
+    --network "$edge_network" "$@" "${host_mappings[@]}" \
     -e NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS=/smoke/client-ca.pem -e SMOKE_HOSTNAME="$hostname" \
+    -e SMOKE_DASHBOARD_HOSTNAME="$dashboard_hostname" \
     -e SMOKE_STORAGE_HOSTNAME="$storage_hostname" \
     -e S3_ACCESS_KEY="$s3_access_key" -e S3_SECRET_KEY="$s3_secret_key" \
     -v "$daemon_work/client.mjs:/smoke/client.mjs:ro" \
@@ -312,6 +398,111 @@ client session --ip "$session_client_address" \
   -e SMOKE_OWNER_EMAIL="$owner_email" -e SMOKE_OWNER_PASSWORD="$owner_password" ||
   fail "session checks failed."
 
+if [[ "$topology" == split ]]; then
+  step "Driving a real browser through the split Dashboard, a module, its display, and sign-out"
+  # Chromium trusts this run's proxy through the public-key hash of Caddy's internal intermediate CA,
+  # which signs every certificate the test proxy serves: no CA is installed anywhere, and nothing but
+  # this run's certificates is accepted.
+  "${compose[@]}" exec -T proxy cat /data/caddy/pki/authorities/local/intermediate.crt \
+    >"$work/caddy-intermediate.crt" || fail "the test proxy's intermediate CA is unavailable."
+  spki="$(openssl x509 -in "$work/caddy-intermediate.crt" -pubkey -noout |
+    openssl pkey -pubin -outform der | openssl dgst -sha256 -binary | openssl base64 -A)"
+  browser_container="${project}-browser"
+  # The image's entry script passes its arguments on unquoted, so none may contain a space: the
+  # hostnames reach Chromium through /etc/hosts, which it reads, rather than a resolver rule.
+  docker run --detach --rm --name "$browser_container" --label "${EKKLESIA_CI_LABEL}=${project}" \
+    --cap-drop ALL --security-opt no-new-privileges --tmpfs /tmp \
+    --network "$edge_network" --ip "$browser_address" "${host_mappings[@]}" \
+    "$browser_image" \
+    "--ignore-certificate-errors-spki-list=${spki}" \
+    --user-data-dir=/tmp/profile >/dev/null || fail "the headless browser did not start."
+  cp scripts/lib/deploy-smoke-browser.mjs "$work/browser.mjs"
+  stage browser.mjs
+  docker run --rm --read-only --cap-drop ALL --security-opt no-new-privileges \
+    --label "${EKKLESIA_CI_LABEL}=${project}" \
+    --network "$edge_network" \
+    -e SMOKE_CDP_ADDRESS="${browser_address}:9222" \
+    -e SMOKE_HOSTNAME="$hostname" -e SMOKE_DASHBOARD_HOSTNAME="$dashboard_hostname" \
+    -e SMOKE_OWNER_EMAIL="$owner_email" -e SMOKE_OWNER_PASSWORD="$owner_password" \
+    -v "$daemon_work/browser.mjs:/smoke/browser.mjs:ro" \
+    --entrypoint node "$image" /smoke/browser.mjs || fail "browser checks failed."
+
+  if [[ -n "${EKKLESIA_SMOKE_DISPLAY_DEVICE:-}" ]]; then
+    # A kiosk: a second browser whose profile directory is a volume, so it outlives the container
+    # exactly as a kiosk's --user-data-dir outlives a browser restart.
+    kiosk_container="${project}-kiosk"
+    kiosk_volume="${project}-kiosk-profile"
+    kiosk_address="10.249.${octet}.250"
+    docker volume create --label "${EKKLESIA_CI_LABEL}=${project}" "$kiosk_volume" >/dev/null
+    start_kiosk() {
+      docker run --detach --rm --name "$kiosk_container" --label "${EKKLESIA_CI_LABEL}=${project}" \
+        --cap-drop ALL --security-opt no-new-privileges --tmpfs /tmp \
+        --network "$edge_network" --ip "$kiosk_address" "${host_mappings[@]}" \
+        -v "${kiosk_volume}:/profile" \
+        "$browser_image" \
+        "--ignore-certificate-errors-spki-list=${spki}" \
+        --user-data-dir=/profile >/dev/null || fail "the kiosk browser did not start."
+    }
+    wait_kiosk_exit() {
+      for _ in $(seq 1 60); do
+        docker inspect "$kiosk_container" >/dev/null 2>&1 || return 0
+        sleep 0.5
+      done
+      fail "the kiosk browser did not exit after a clean close."
+    }
+    cp scripts/lib/deploy-smoke-display.mjs "$work/display.mjs"
+    stage display.mjs
+    # display_driver <budget seconds> <step>: one scenario with a hard budget. The driver enforces it
+    # itself and names whatever call was still waiting; `timeout` is the backstop if it cannot.
+    display_driver() {
+      local budget="$1" step_name="$2" driver="${project}-display-${2}"
+      timeout --signal=TERM "$((budget + 30))" \
+        docker run --rm --name "$driver" --read-only --cap-drop ALL --security-opt no-new-privileges \
+        --network "$edge_network" \
+        -e SMOKE_CDP_ADDRESS="${browser_address}:9222" \
+        -e SMOKE_KIOSK_CDP_ADDRESS="${kiosk_address}:9222" \
+        -e SMOKE_STEP_BUDGET_MS="$((budget * 1000))" \
+        -e SMOKE_WATCH_MS="${EKKLESIA_SMOKE_WATCH_MS:-120000}" \
+        -e SMOKE_RECYCLE_WATCH_MS="${EKKLESIA_SMOKE_RECYCLE_WATCH_MS:-330000}" \
+        -e SMOKE_HOSTNAME="$hostname" -e SMOKE_DASHBOARD_HOSTNAME="$dashboard_hostname" \
+        -e SMOKE_OWNER_EMAIL="$owner_email" -e SMOKE_OWNER_PASSWORD="$owner_password" \
+        -v "$daemon_work/display.mjs:/smoke/display.mjs:ro" \
+        --entrypoint node "$image" /smoke/display.mjs "$step_name"
+      local status=$?
+      if ((status == 124)); then
+        echo "FAIL ${step_name}: the driver did not stop within its budget plus 30s; removed it"
+        docker rm --force "$driver" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
+      fi
+      return "$status"
+    }
+    display_status=0
+    step "Pairing a kiosk display, then closing its browser cleanly"
+    start_kiosk
+    display_driver 180 pair || display_status=1
+    wait_kiosk_exit
+    step "Restarting the kiosk browser on the same profile"
+    start_kiosk
+    display_driver 120 restart || display_status=1
+    for scenario in ${EKKLESIA_SMOKE_DISPLAY_SCENARIOS:-two-pages connectivity-blip session-blip stream-failure caching-probe stream-recycle revoke}; do
+      case "$scenario" in
+      two-pages) budget=240 ;;
+      stream-recycle) budget=420 ;;
+      revoke) budget=210 ;;
+      *) budget=150 ;;
+      esac
+      step "Display scenario: ${scenario} (budget ${budget}s)"
+      display_driver "$budget" "$scenario" || display_status=1
+    done
+    step "Proxy: streams aborted with an incomplete response (UTC time, path only)"
+    # Captured, never printed: only each line's time and path (no query, so no signature) leave it.
+    proxy_logs="$("${compose[@]}" logs --no-color proxy 2>/dev/null)" || proxy_logs=""
+    grep -o '{.*"aborting with incomplete response".*}' <<<"$proxy_logs" |
+      sed -E 's/.*"ts":([0-9]+)[^,]*,.*"uri":"([^"?]*)[^"]*".*/\1 \2/' |
+      while read -r ts uri; do echo "     $(date -u -d "@${ts}" +%T) ${uri}"; done || true
+    ((display_status == 0)) || fail "display-device checks failed."
+  fi
+fi
+
 step "Proving the API's database connection is certificate-verified TLS"
 api_container="$("${compose[@]}" ps -q api)"
 api_data_address="$(
@@ -374,12 +565,16 @@ grep -q 'TLS required with certificate and hostname verification (explicit priva
   <<<"$doctor_output" || fail "Doctor did not report verify-full with the private CA."
 grep -q '✓ Object storage reachable' <<<"$doctor_output" ||
   fail "Doctor could not reach object storage over HTTPS."
+# Doctor runs as `migrate`; it must check the client-address configuration the API runs with, which
+# behind the proxy is trusted-proxy mode, not the direct mode an unconfigured process reports.
+grep -q 'Trusted-proxy client-address mode' <<<"$doctor_output" ||
+  fail "Doctor did not check the API's trusted-proxy client-address configuration."
 for value in "$postgres_password" "$s3_secret_key" "$identity_secret"; do
   if grep -qF -- "$value" <<<"$doctor_output"; then
     fail "Doctor output contains a secret."
   fi
 done
-echo "ok   Doctor: READY, verify-full with the private CA, storage reachable, no secret printed"
+echo "ok   Doctor: READY, verify-full with the private CA, storage reachable, the API's client-address mode, no secret printed"
 
 api_logs="$("${compose[@]}" logs --no-color api 2>&1)"
 for value in "$postgres_password" "$s3_secret_key" "$identity_secret" "$owner_password"; do

scripts/smoke-infrastructure.sh

@@ -9,6 +9,8 @@ cd "$repository_root"
 source "$repository_root/scripts/lib/compose-job-network.sh"
 # shellcheck source=scripts/lib/compose-diagnostics.sh
 source "$repository_root/scripts/lib/compose-diagnostics.sh"
+# shellcheck source=scripts/lib/ci-project.sh
+source "$repository_root/scripts/lib/ci-project.sh"
 
 command -v docker >/dev/null || {
   echo "Docker is required for the infrastructure smoke test." >&2
@@ -30,11 +32,9 @@ if [[ "$curl_help" != *"--aws-sigv4"* ]]; then
   exit 1
 fi
 
-# Unique per invocation, not only per run: several runs can share a runner's Docker daemon at once,
+# Unique per invocation, and findable by run and job if this script is killed before its trap runs
-# and the shell's PID is often identical across job containers.
+# (scripts/lib/ci-project.sh, scripts/ci-sweep.sh).
-raw_project="ekklesia-smoke-${GITHUB_RUN_ID:-local}-${GITHUB_RUN_ATTEMPT:-0}-$$-${RANDOM}${RANDOM}"
+project="$(ci_project_name infrastructure)"
-project="${raw_project//[^a-zA-Z0-9_-]/-}"
-project="${project,,}"
 temporary_directory="$(mktemp -d)"
 payload_file="$temporary_directory/payload.txt"
 download_file="$temporary_directory/download.txt"

scripts/test-ci-sweep.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,129 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# Proves scripts/ci-sweep.sh against real Docker resources: what it removes, and above all what it
+# leaves alone. CI runs it before trusting the sweep with a shared runner's daemon.
+#
+#   bash scripts/test-ci-sweep.sh
+#
+# Every resource it creates is named and labeled for this run alone, under fake run identifiers, so
+# it can never touch a real stack; and it removes all of them on exit, whatever happens.
+
+set -Eeuo pipefail
+
+repository_root="$(cd -- "$(dirname -- "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")/.." && pwd)"
+cd "$repository_root"
+
+image="$(sed -n 's/^[[:space:]]*image: \(postgres:[^[:space:]]*\)$/\1/p' deploy/compose.yaml | head -1)"
+[[ -n "$image" ]] || {
+  echo "test-ci-sweep: no pinned PostgreSQL image in deploy/compose.yaml." >&2
+  exit 1
+}
+docker image inspect "$image" >/dev/null 2>&1 || docker pull --quiet "$image" >/dev/null
+
+nonce="$(openssl rand -hex 4)"
+compose_label="com.docker.compose.project"
+ci_label="org.riverofglorymn.ekklesia.ci.project"
+failures=0
+created=()
+
+check() {
+  if eval "$1"; then
+    echo "ok   $2"
+  else
+    echo "FAIL $2"
+    failures=$((failures + 1))
+  fi
+}
+
+# project_exists <project>: any container, network, volume, or image still carries its label.
+project_exists() {
+  local project="$1"
+  [[ -n "$(
+    docker ps --all --quiet --filter "label=${compose_label}=${project}"
+    docker ps --all --quiet --filter "label=${ci_label}=${project}"
+    docker network ls --quiet --filter "label=${compose_label}=${project}"
+    docker volume ls --quiet --filter "label=${compose_label}=${project}"
+    docker image ls --quiet --filter "label=${ci_label}=${project}"
+  )" ]]
+}
+
+staging_exists() {
+  docker run --rm --entrypoint test -v /tmp:/host-tmp "$image" -d "/host-tmp/$1"
+}
+
+# make_stack <project>: what a CI script leaves behind when it is killed: a Compose-labeled network,
+# volume, and running container; a CI-labeled container and image; and a staging directory on the
+# Docker host.
+make_stack() {
+  local project="$1"
+  created+=("$project")
+  docker network create --label "${compose_label}=${project}" "${project}_default" >/dev/null
+  docker volume create --label "${compose_label}=${project}" "${project}_data" >/dev/null
+  docker run --detach --name "${project}-db" --label "${compose_label}=${project}" \
+    --network "${project}_default" -v "${project}_data:/data" --entrypoint sleep "$image" 600 >/dev/null
+  docker run --detach --name "${project}-browser" --label "${ci_label}=${project}" \
+    --entrypoint sleep "$image" 600 >/dev/null
+  printf 'FROM %s\nLABEL %s=%s %s=%s\n' "$image" "$ci_label" "$project" \
+    "org.riverofglorymn.ekklesia.ci.created" "$(date +%s)" |
+    docker build --quiet --tag "${project}-image:test" - >/dev/null
+  docker run --rm --entrypoint mkdir -v /tmp:/host-tmp "$image" -p "/host-tmp/${project}"
+}
+
+job_container="test-ci-sweep-job-${nonce}"
+cleanup() {
+  local status=$?
+  trap - EXIT INT TERM
+  docker rm --force "$job_container" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
+  for project in "${created[@]}"; do
+    docker ps --all --quiet --filter "label=${compose_label}=${project}" | xargs -r docker rm --force >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
+    docker ps --all --quiet --filter "label=${ci_label}=${project}" | xargs -r docker rm --force >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
+    docker network rm "${project}_default" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
+    docker volume rm --force "${project}_data" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
+    docker image rm --force "${project}-image:test" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
+    docker run --rm --entrypoint rm -v /tmp:/host-tmp "$image" -rf "/host-tmp/${project}" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
+  done
+  exit "$status"
+}
+trap cleanup EXIT INT TERM
+
+# shellcheck source=scripts/lib/ci-project.sh
+source "$repository_root/scripts/lib/ci-project.sh"
+
+# Fake run identifiers: nothing here can match a real run's stacks.
+export GITHUB_RUN_ID="sweeptest${nonce}"
+export GITHUB_RUN_ATTEMPT="1"
+mine="$(EKKLESIA_CI_JOB_KEY=alpha ci_project_name mine)"
+sibling="$(EKKLESIA_CI_JOB_KEY=beta ci_project_name sibling)"
+foreign="ekklesia-sweep-control-${nonce}"
+for project in "$mine" "$sibling" "$foreign"; do
+  make_stack "$project"
+done
+# A job container connected to this job's stack network, exactly as compose-job-network.sh does.
+docker run --detach --name "$job_container" --entrypoint sleep "$image" 600 >/dev/null
+docker network connect "${mine}_default" "$job_container"
+
+echo "--- --job removes this job's stacks, at any age, and nothing else"
+EKKLESIA_CI_JOB_KEY=alpha bash scripts/ci-sweep.sh --job
+check '! project_exists "$mine"' "this job's containers, network, volume, and image are gone"
+check '! staging_exists "$mine"' "this job's staging directory on the Docker host is gone"
+check 'project_exists "$sibling"' "another job's stack in the same run is left alone"
+check 'project_exists "$foreign"' "a stack outside the CI prefix is left alone"
+check 'docker inspect "$job_container" >/dev/null 2>&1' \
+  "a job container connected to the stack's network is disconnected, never removed"
+
+echo "--- --job refuses to run outside CI, where it could remove a developer's own stacks"
+check '! env -u GITHUB_RUN_ID bash scripts/ci-sweep.sh --job >/dev/null 2>&1' \
+  "--job without GITHUB_RUN_ID fails"
+
+echo "--- --stale removes only CI stacks older than its threshold"
+bash scripts/ci-sweep.sh --stale
+check 'project_exists "$sibling"' "a young CI stack survives the default threshold"
+bash scripts/ci-sweep.sh --stale --max-age-seconds 0
+check '! project_exists "$sibling"' "a CI stack older than the threshold is removed"
+check '! staging_exists "$sibling"' "its staging directory too"
+check 'project_exists "$foreign"' "a stack outside the CI prefix is never removed, at any age"
+
+if ((failures > 0)); then
+  echo "test-ci-sweep: ${failures} check(s) failed." >&2
+  exit 1
+fi
+echo "CI sweep checks passed."

scripts/test-migrations-integration.sh

@@ -9,6 +9,8 @@ cd "$repository_root"
 source "$repository_root/scripts/lib/compose-job-network.sh"
 # shellcheck source=scripts/lib/compose-diagnostics.sh
 source "$repository_root/scripts/lib/compose-diagnostics.sh"
+# shellcheck source=scripts/lib/ci-project.sh
+source "$repository_root/scripts/lib/ci-project.sh"
 
 command -v docker >/dev/null || {
   echo "Docker is required for the PostgreSQL migration integration suite." >&2
@@ -27,11 +29,9 @@ if ! compose_job_network_initialize; then
   exit 1
 fi
 
-# Unique per invocation, not only per run: several runs (and several jobs of one run) can share a
+# Unique per invocation, and findable by run and job if this script is killed before its trap runs
-# runner's Docker daemon at once, and the shell's PID is often identical across job containers.
+# (scripts/lib/ci-project.sh, scripts/ci-sweep.sh).
-raw_project="ekklesia-migration-${GITHUB_RUN_ID:-local}-${GITHUB_RUN_ATTEMPT:-0}-${GITHUB_JOB:-job}-$$-${RANDOM}${RANDOM}"
+project="$(ci_project_name migration)"
-project="${raw_project//[^a-zA-Z0-9_-]/-}"
-project="${project,,}"
 
 export POSTGRES_DB="ekklesia_migration_test"
 export POSTGRES_USER="ekklesia_migration_test"

surfaces/shell/index.html

@@ -3,6 +3,10 @@
   <head>
     <meta charset="utf-8" />
     <meta content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1" name="viewport" />
+    <!-- The API's origin (ADR 0045). The API serving this page fills it in at startup; empty means
+         this page's own origin, the same-origin topology. Never an inline script, so a strict
+         script-src needs no exception for it. -->
+    <meta content="" name="ekklesia-api-origin" />
     <title>Ekklesia</title>
   </head>
   <body style="margin: 0; min-width: 0">

surfaces/shell/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@ekklesia/shell",
-  "version": "0.1.1",
+  "version": "0.1.2",
   "private": true,
   "type": "module",
   "files": [

surfaces/shell/scripts/build-browser.mjs

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-import { copyFile, mkdir, rm } from "node:fs/promises";
+import { copyFile, mkdir, readFile, rm, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises";
 import path from "node:path";
 import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
 import esbuild from "esbuild";
@@ -23,12 +23,16 @@ const outputDirectory = path.join(packageDirectory, "dist", "browser");
 const serve = process.argv.includes("--serve");
 
 /**
- * Empty means "the API is on this page's own origin" — the expected production shape. Set it to an
+ * Development only: the API origin the development server writes into its copy of the Dashboard page,
- * absolute origin for split-origin development (`EKKLESIA_API_BASE_URL=http://127.0.0.1:3000`), and
+ * exactly as `apps/api` does at startup in production (ADR 0045). Empty means "the API is on this
- * add this page's own origin to `EKKLESIA_IDENTITY_TRUSTED_ORIGINS` so the API reflects it for CORS
+ * page's own origin". Set it to an absolute origin for split-origin development
- * and the session cookie travels.
+ * (`EKKLESIA_API_BASE_URL=http://127.0.0.1:3000`), and add this page's own origin to
+ * `EKKLESIA_IDENTITY_TRUSTED_ORIGINS` so the API reflects it for CORS and the session cookie travels.
+ * A production build never reads it: the built page always carries an empty value, and the bundle
+ * carries no origin at all.
  */
-const apiBaseUrl = process.env.EKKLESIA_API_BASE_URL ?? "";
+const apiBaseUrl = serve ? (process.env.EKKLESIA_API_BASE_URL ?? "") : "";
+const API_ORIGIN_PLACEHOLDER = '<meta content="" name="ekklesia-api-origin" />';
 
 /** @type {import("esbuild").BuildOptions} */
 const buildOptions = {
@@ -37,7 +41,6 @@ const buildOptions = {
   // artifacts it is told about, which are real URLs rather than bare specifiers.
   bundle: true,
   define: {
-    __EKKLESIA_API_BASE_URL__: JSON.stringify(apiBaseUrl),
     // React reads this at module scope and a browser has no `process`.
     "process.env.NODE_ENV": JSON.stringify(serve ? "development" : "production"),
   },
@@ -67,7 +70,17 @@ const buildOptions = {
 await rm(outputDirectory, { force: true, recursive: true });
 await mkdir(outputDirectory, { recursive: true });
 await mkdir(path.join(outputDirectory, "display"), { recursive: true });
-await copyFile(path.join(packageDirectory, "index.html"), path.join(outputDirectory, "index.html"));
+const dashboardPage = await readFile(path.join(packageDirectory, "index.html"), "utf8");
+if (dashboardPage.split(API_ORIGIN_PLACEHOLDER).length !== 2) {
+  throw new Error("index.html must contain exactly one empty ekklesia-api-origin meta element.");
+}
+await writeFile(
+  path.join(outputDirectory, "index.html"),
+  dashboardPage.replace(
+    API_ORIGIN_PLACEHOLDER,
+    `<meta content="${apiBaseUrl.replaceAll("&", "&amp;").replaceAll('"', "&quot;")}" name="ekklesia-api-origin" />`,
+  ),
+);
 await copyFile(
   path.join(packageDirectory, "display.html"),
   path.join(outputDirectory, "display", "index.html"),

surfaces/shell/src/browser/main.tsx

@@ -2,29 +2,22 @@ import { installEkklesiaDesignTokens } from "@ekklesia/design-tokens";
 import { EkklesiaUiStyles } from "@ekklesia/ui";
 import { createRoot } from "react-dom/client";
 import { consumeAuthLanding } from "../auth-protocol.js";
-import type { EkklesiaHostConfig } from "../host-protocol.js";
+import { type EkklesiaHostConfig, resolveApiOrigin } from "../host-protocol.js";
 import { HostApp } from "./HostApp.js";
 
-/**
- * Replaced at build time by `scripts/build-browser.mjs` with a JSON string literal: the API origin
- * when `EKKLESIA_API_BASE_URL` was set for the build, and `""` otherwise. Declared rather than read
- * from `process.env`, because a browser has no `process` and the substitution must be visible here
- * instead of hidden in bundler configuration.
- */
-declare const __EKKLESIA_API_BASE_URL__: string;
-
 /**
  * The one place the shell touches a browser global.
  *
- * An empty build-time value means the API is served from the same origin as this page, which is the
+ * The API that served this page wrote its own origin into `<meta name="ekklesia-api-origin">`
- * expected production shape; a non-empty one is the split-origin development shape the platform's
+ * (ADR 0045): empty in the same-origin topology, the API's hostname when the Dashboard and the API
- * trusted-origin configuration already supports (`EKKLESIA_IDENTITY_TRUSTED_ORIGINS` must list this
+ * live on separate origins. Read at run time, so one built shell serves either topology. Everything
- * page's origin for the session cookie to travel). Everything downstream receives the resolved
+ * downstream receives the resolved origin as a plain argument, so no other file in this package
- * origin as a plain argument, so no other file in this package reads `window`.
+ * reads `window`.
  */
-const config: EkklesiaHostConfig = {
+const apiBaseUrl = resolveApiOrigin(
-  apiBaseUrl: __EKKLESIA_API_BASE_URL__ || window.location.origin,
+  document.querySelector<HTMLMetaElement>('meta[name="ekklesia-api-origin"]')?.content,
-};
+  window.location.origin,
+);
 
 /** Read once, before anything renders, and stripped from the address bar in the same step. See
  * `consumeAuthLanding` for why the token must not stay in the URL. */
@@ -46,13 +39,29 @@ if (!container) {
  */
 installEkklesiaDesignTokens(document);
 
-createRoot(container).render(
+/**
-  <>
+ * A page whose API origin is not a canonical origin fails closed: it makes no request at all, because
-    <EkklesiaUiStyles />
+ * every request it would make carries credentials to an address it cannot vouch for. The message is
-    {authLanding ? (
+ * fixed and names no address.
+ */
+function renderHost(config: EkklesiaHostConfig | undefined) {
+  if (!config) {
+    return (
+      <main data-testid="host-configuration-invalid" role="alert">
+        This page cannot start: the server address it was given is not valid.
+      </main>
+    );
+  }
+  return authLanding ? (
     <HostApp authLanding={authLanding} config={config} />
   ) : (
     <HostApp config={config} />
-    )}
+  );
+}
+
+createRoot(container).render(
+  <>
+    <EkklesiaUiStyles />
+    {renderHost(apiBaseUrl === undefined ? undefined : { apiBaseUrl })}
   </>,
 );

surfaces/shell/src/display/main.tsx

@@ -6,10 +6,13 @@ import { parseDisplayRoute } from "../host-protocol.js";
 import { DisplayApp } from "./DisplayApp.js";
 import { type DisplayConnectivitySource, registerDisplayServiceWorker } from "./offline-status.js";
 
-declare const __EKKLESIA_API_BASE_URL__: string;
+/**
-
+ * The display host is always served from the API's own origin, in either topology (ADR 0045): its
+ * device cookies, pairing, descriptors, module requests, and realtime are all same-origin, and its
+ * offline cache stores only same-origin responses (ADR 0043).
+ */
 const config: EkklesiaHostConfig = {
-  apiBaseUrl: __EKKLESIA_API_BASE_URL__ || window.location.origin,
+  apiBaseUrl: window.location.origin,
 };
 
 const container = document.getElementById("ekklesia-display");

surfaces/shell/src/host-protocol.ts

@@ -4,10 +4,11 @@ import type { ModuleUiPrincipal } from "@ekklesia/module-ui-sdk";
  * How this shell reaches the Ekklesia API.
  *
  * `apiBaseUrl` is an absolute **origin** (`https://ekklesia.example.test`, `http://127.0.0.1:3000`)
- * rather than something read from a global. The browser entry point supplies it — from a build-time
+ * rather than something read from a global. The browser entry point supplies it — from the API
- * value when the shell and the API are served from different origins in development, and from
+ * origin the serving API wrote into the Dashboard page (ADR 0045, {@link resolveApiOrigin}), and from
- * `window.location.origin` otherwise — so every function below is a pure function of its arguments
+ * `window.location.origin` for the display host, which is always served from the API's own origin —
- * and can be exercised without a DOM, a `window`, or a page. Nothing here reads a global.
+ * so every function below is a pure function of its arguments and can be exercised without a DOM, a
+ * `window`, or a page. Nothing here reads a global.
  */
 export interface EkklesiaHostConfig {
   readonly apiBaseUrl: string;
@@ -702,6 +703,34 @@ export function parseHostPrincipal(payload: unknown): ModuleUiPrincipal {
   throw new HostProtocolError("HOST_RESPONSE_INVALID");
 }
 
+/**
+ * The API origin a Dashboard page was served with (ADR 0045).
+ *
+ * `declared` is the `content` of the page's `<meta name="ekklesia-api-origin">`, which the serving API
+ * fills in at startup. Absent or empty means the API shares this page's origin, the same-origin
+ * topology. Anything else must be exactly a canonical `http(s)` origin — no path, no trailing slash,
+ * no credentials, no query — or the result is `undefined` and the page must fail closed rather than
+ * send credentialed requests to an address it cannot vouch for.
+ */
+export function resolveApiOrigin(
+  declared: string | null | undefined,
+  pageOrigin: string,
+): string | undefined {
+  if (declared === null || declared === undefined || declared === "") {
+    return pageOrigin;
+  }
+  let url: URL;
+  try {
+    url = new URL(declared);
+  } catch {
+    return undefined;
+  }
+  if ((url.protocol !== "https:" && url.protocol !== "http:") || url.origin !== declared) {
+    return undefined;
+  }
+  return url.origin;
+}
+
 /** Resolves a root-relative platform path against the configured API origin. The one place the
  * shell turns a server-produced path into an absolute URL. */
 export function resolveApiUrl(config: EkklesiaHostConfig, rootRelativePath: string): string {

surfaces/shell/src/index.ts

@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ export {
   parseDisplayRoute,
   parseHostModuleDisplay,
   parseHostPrincipal,
+  resolveApiOrigin,
   resolveApiUrl,
 } from "./host-protocol.js";
 export {

surfaces/shell/tests/dashboard-assets.test.ts

@@ -44,6 +44,22 @@ describe("Dashboard host asset locator", () => {
     );
   });
 
+  it("carries exactly one empty API-origin meta element for the serving API to fill (ADR 0045)", async () => {
+    const html = await readFile(path.join(packageDirectory, "index.html"), "utf8");
+
+    expect(html.match(/name="ekklesia-api-origin"/gu)).toHaveLength(1);
+    expect(html).toContain('<meta content="" name="ekklesia-api-origin" />');
+  });
+
+  it("bakes no API origin into the bundle: the build defines nothing but NODE_ENV", async () => {
+    const buildScript = await readFile(
+      path.join(packageDirectory, "scripts/build-browser.mjs"),
+      "utf8",
+    );
+
+    expect(buildScript).not.toContain("__EKKLESIA_API_BASE_URL__");
+  });
+
   it("builds the Dashboard entry at the exact path the locator names", async () => {
     const buildScript = await readFile(
       path.join(packageDirectory, "scripts/build-browser.mjs"),

surfaces/shell/tests/host-protocol.test.ts

@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ import {
   loadHostPrincipal,
   parseDashboardNavigation,
   parseHostPrincipal,
+  resolveApiOrigin,
 } from "../src/host-protocol.js";
 import { createModuleUiContext, moduleUiSourceUrl } from "../src/module-context.js";
 
@@ -101,6 +102,39 @@ function navigationWithModule(module: unknown): unknown {
   return { groups: [], ungrouped: [{ module, name: "Example Module" }] };
 }
 
+describe("host protocol — API origin (ADR 0045)", () => {
+  const pageOrigin = "https://dash.example.test";
+
+  it("uses the page's own origin when the page declares none (same-origin topology)", () => {
+    expect(resolveApiOrigin(undefined, pageOrigin)).toBe(pageOrigin);
+    expect(resolveApiOrigin(null, pageOrigin)).toBe(pageOrigin);
+    expect(resolveApiOrigin("", pageOrigin)).toBe(pageOrigin);
+  });
+
+  it("uses a declared canonical origin (split topology)", () => {
+    expect(resolveApiOrigin("https://api.example.test", pageOrigin)).toBe(
+      "https://api.example.test",
+    );
+    expect(resolveApiOrigin("http://127.0.0.1:3000", pageOrigin)).toBe("http://127.0.0.1:3000");
+  });
+
+  it.each([
+    ["a trailing slash", "https://api.example.test/"],
+    ["a path", "https://api.example.test/api"],
+    ["a query", "https://api.example.test?x=1"],
+    ["credentials", "https://user:[email protected]"],
+    ["a non-canonical spelling", "HTTPS://API.example.test"],
+    ["a default port spelled out", "https://api.example.test:443"],
+    ["another scheme", "javascript:alert(1)"],
+    ["a protocol-relative value", "//api.example.test"],
+    ["a relative value", "/api"],
+    ["surrounding whitespace", " https://api.example.test"],
+    ["something that is not a URL", "api.example.test"],
+  ])("refuses %s, so the page fails closed", (_case, declared) => {
+    expect(resolveApiOrigin(declared, pageOrigin)).toBeUndefined();
+  });
+});
+
 describe("host protocol — descriptor validation", () => {
   it("parses a well-formed descriptor out of the navigation view", () => {
     const navigation = parseDashboardNavigation(navigationWithModule(inventoryPayload.modules[0]));

surfaces/shell/tests/modularity.test.ts

@@ -120,7 +120,6 @@ describe("the shell builds no module knowledge into its bundle", () => {
       absWorkingDir: packageDirectory,
       bundle: true,
       define: {
-        __EKKLESIA_API_BASE_URL__: '""',
         "process.env.NODE_ENV": '"production"',
       },
       entryPoints: [path.join(sourceDirectory, "browser", "main.tsx")],
@@ -200,7 +199,6 @@ describe("the display host is a separate generic browser bundle", () => {
       absWorkingDir: packageDirectory,
       bundle: true,
       define: {
-        __EKKLESIA_API_BASE_URL__: '""',
         "process.env.NODE_ENV": '"production"',
       },
       entryPoints: [path.join(sourceDirectory, "display", "main.tsx")],

tests/ci-scripts.test.ts

@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ import path from "node:path";
 import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
 import { promisify } from "node:util";
 import { describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
+import { parse } from "yaml";
 
 /**
  * The scripts CI runs against a shared Docker daemon. Several runs, and several jobs of one run, can
@@ -59,21 +60,68 @@ describe("CI scripts on a shared Docker daemon", () => {
     }
   });
 
-  it("give every Compose project a name unique to the invocation, not only the run", async () => {
+  it("name every stack through one helper: the reserved CI prefix, the job's key, and a unique suffix", async () => {
-    expect(await source("scripts/test-migrations-integration.sh")).toMatch(
+    const helper = await source("scripts/lib/ci-project.sh");
-      /raw_project="ekklesia-migration-[^"\n]*\$\$-\$\{RANDOM\}\$\{RANDOM\}"/u,
+    // Run, attempt, job key, kind, then a per-invocation suffix: unique even when job containers
+    // share a PID, and findable later by run and job alone (scripts/ci-sweep.sh --job).
+    expect(helper).toContain(
+      "ekklesia-ci-${GITHUB_RUN_ID:-local}-${GITHUB_RUN_ATTEMPT:-0}-${EKKLESIA_CI_JOB_KEY:-${GITHUB_JOB:-local}}-",
     );
-    expect(await source("scripts/smoke-infrastructure.sh")).toMatch(
+    expect(helper).toContain("$$-${RANDOM}${RANDOM}");
-      /raw_project="ekklesia-smoke-[^"\n]*\$\$-\$\{RANDOM\}\$\{RANDOM\}"/u,
-    );
-    const deploy = await source("scripts/smoke-deploy.sh");
-    expect(deploy).toContain('run_id="$(openssl rand -hex 4)"');
-    expect(deploy).toContain('project="ekklesia-deploy-smoke-${run_id}"');
     for (const relativePath of ciScripts) {
-      expect(await source(relativePath), relativePath).toContain('--project-name "$project"');
+      const text = await source(relativePath);
+      expect(text, relativePath).toContain('source "$repository_root/scripts/lib/ci-project.sh"');
+      expect(text, relativePath).toMatch(/^project="\$\(ci_project_name [a-z"${}_-]+\)"$/mu);
+      expect(text, relativePath).not.toContain("raw_project=");
+      expect(text, relativePath).toContain('--project-name "$project"');
     }
   });
 
+  it("label everything the deploy smoke creates outside Compose, so a sweep can find it", async () => {
+    // Continuation lines joined, so each command is checked whole.
+    const deploy = (await source("scripts/smoke-deploy.sh")).replace(/\\\n\s*/gu, " ");
+    const creating = deploy
+      .split("\n")
+      .filter((line) => /\bdocker (?:run --detach|volume create|build)\b/u.test(line));
+    expect(creating.length).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(4);
+    for (const line of creating) {
+      expect(line).toContain('--label "${EKKLESIA_CI_LABEL}=${project}"');
+    }
+  });
+
+  it("sweep stale stacks before, and this job's own stacks after, every job that starts any", async () => {
+    const workflow = parse(await source(".github/workflows/ci.yml")) as {
+      jobs: Record<
+        string,
+        { env?: Record<string, string>; steps: { if?: string; run?: string; name?: string }[] }
+      >;
+    };
+    const startsStacks =
+      /smoke-infrastructure\.sh|test:migrations:integration|smoke-deploy\.sh|docker build/u;
+    const jobs = Object.entries(workflow.jobs).filter(([, job]) =>
+      job.steps.some((step) => startsStacks.test(step.run ?? "")),
+    );
+    expect(jobs.map(([id]) => id).sort()).toEqual(
+      ["deploy-smoke", "image-build", "infrastructure-smoke", "migration-smoke"].sort(),
+    );
+    for (const [id, job] of jobs) {
+      expect(job.env?.EKKLESIA_CI_JOB_KEY, id).toBeTruthy();
+      const runs = job.steps.map((step) => step.run ?? "");
+      const firstStack = runs.findIndex((run) => startsStacks.test(run));
+      const stale = runs.findIndex((run) => run.includes("bash scripts/ci-sweep.sh --stale"));
+      const own = job.steps.findIndex(
+        (step) =>
+          step.if === "always()" && (step.run ?? "").includes("bash scripts/ci-sweep.sh --job"),
+      );
+      expect(stale, `${id}: stale sweep`).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(0);
+      expect(stale, `${id}: stale sweep runs first`).toBeLessThan(firstStack);
+      expect(own, `${id}: its own cleanup, always`).toBeGreaterThan(firstStack);
+      expect(own, `${id}: cleanup is the last step`).toBe(job.steps.length - 1);
+    }
+    // One matrix leg's cleanup must never remove the other leg's running stack.
+    expect(workflow.jobs["deploy-smoke"]?.env?.EKKLESIA_CI_JOB_KEY).toContain("matrix.topology");
+  });
+
   it("choose the deploy smoke's edge subnet from those not in use, and choose again on a race", async () => {
     const deploy = await source("scripts/smoke-deploy.sh");
     expect(deploy).not.toMatch(/^octet=\$\(\(RANDOM/mu);

tests/deploy.test.ts

@@ -153,6 +153,11 @@ describe("reference deployment compose files", () => {
       EKKLESIA_CLIENT_ADDRESS_MODE: "trusted-proxy",
       EKKLESIA_CLIENT_ADDRESS_TRUSTED_PROXIES: `${proxyAddress}/32`,
     });
+    // Doctor runs as `migrate`. Given anything else, it validates a configuration the API is not
+    // running, and reports "Direct" for an installation that trusts its proxy.
+    expect(proxyOverlay.services?.migrate?.environment).toEqual(
+      proxyOverlay.services?.api?.environment,
+    );
     expect(proxyOverlay.networks?.edge?.ipam?.config).toEqual([
       {
         ip_range: "${EKKLESIA_EDGE_DYNAMIC_RANGE:-10.249.250.0/25}",