Merge pull request 'chore(release): prepare 0.1.2' (#62) from chore/release-0.1.2 into main

Reviewed-on: https://git.riverofglorymn.org/River_of_Glory_Church/Ekklesia/pulls/62
Reviewed-by: The_River <[email protected]>

.github/workflows/ci.yml

@@ -1,18 +1,13 @@
 name: CI
 
-# IMPORTANT — the currently inventoried server is Gitea 1.24.2, which *ignores* several keys used
+# The server runs Gitea 1.27.2 (docs/development/security.md, "What this server honours"):
-# below. Per https://docs.gitea.com/1.24/usage/actions/comparison, its unsupported workflow syntax
-# includes `permissions` / `jobs.<job_id>.permissions`, `concurrency`, and
-# `jobs.<job_id>.timeout-minutes`. They are declared here deliberately, so the workflow is already
-# correct on a supported release and on GitHub Actions, but on this server they are inert:
 #
-#   * `permissions:` does NOT restrict the in-job `GITEA_TOKEN`. Job-token permission controls,
+#   * `concurrency:` is honoured: a newer push to a pull request cancels the run it supersedes, so a
-#     repository/owner defaults, and server-side maximum-permission clamping arrive in the 1.26
+#     cancelled run's own cleanup is never guaranteed (see the CI stack sweep in each stack job).
-#     feature line (https://docs.gitea.com/1.26/usage/actions/token-permissions). Until the server
+#   * `permissions:` is supported by 1.27 with Gitea's own scopes, but what the job token can do on
-#     is upgraded and configured, the token's authority is whatever the server grants — not what
+#     this server is not yet proven, so nothing here relies on it being read-only.
-#     this file requests.
+#   * `timeout-minutes:` is no longer listed as unsupported, but is not verified here either;
-#   * `concurrency:` and `timeout-minutes:` are NOT bounded-execution guarantees here. Cancellation,
+#     teardown relies on the stack sweep and the runner's own reaper.
-#     timeout, and teardown must be enforced by the trusted runner provisioner/reaper.
 #
 # `persist-credentials: false` below is unaffected by any of this and is enforced by the action
 # itself. See docs/development/security.md.
@@ -63,6 +58,9 @@ jobs:
     needs: verify
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     timeout-minutes: 10
+    env:
+      # Names this job's stacks, so its final step removes exactly these (scripts/lib/ci-project.sh).
+      EKKLESIA_CI_JOB_KEY: infrastructure-smoke
     steps:
       - name: Check out repository
         uses: actions/checkout@de0fac2e4500dabe0009e67214ff5f5447ce83dd # v6.0.2
@@ -72,13 +70,29 @@ jobs:
           # in this workflow pushes, so the credential is never needed after checkout.
           persist-credentials: false
 
+      # A job the runner killed (cancelled, or past the runner's own time limit) never ran its
+      # cleanup. Anything a CI job left on this shared daemon more than three hours ago goes first.
+      - name: Sweep stale CI stacks from the runner
+        run: bash scripts/ci-sweep.sh --stale
+
+      - name: Prove the sweep removes exactly what it should, against real Docker resources
+        run: bash scripts/test-ci-sweep.sh
+
       - name: Exercise PostgreSQL and S3 infrastructure
         run: bash scripts/smoke-infrastructure.sh
 
+      # Whatever happened above, this job's own stacks do not outlive it.
+      - name: Remove this job's CI stacks
+        if: always()
+        run: bash scripts/ci-sweep.sh --job
+
   migration-smoke:
     needs: verify
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     timeout-minutes: 15
+    env:
+      # Names this job's stacks, so its final step removes exactly these (scripts/lib/ci-project.sh).
+      EKKLESIA_CI_JOB_KEY: migration-smoke
     steps:
       - name: Check out repository
         uses: actions/checkout@de0fac2e4500dabe0009e67214ff5f5447ce83dd # v6.0.2
@@ -88,6 +102,11 @@ jobs:
           # in this workflow pushes, so the credential is never needed after checkout.
           persist-credentials: false
 
+      # A job the runner killed (cancelled, or past the runner's own time limit) never ran its
+      # cleanup. Anything a CI job left on this shared daemon more than three hours ago goes first.
+      - name: Sweep stale CI stacks from the runner
+        run: bash scripts/ci-sweep.sh --stale
+
       - name: Set up Node.js
         uses: actions/setup-node@48b55a011bda9f5d6aeb4c2d9c7362e8dae4041e # v6.4.0
         with:
@@ -104,11 +123,18 @@ jobs:
       - name: Exercise transactional migrations against PostgreSQL
         run: pnpm test:migrations:integration
 
+      # Whatever happened above, this job's own stacks do not outlive it.
+      - name: Remove this job's CI stacks
+        if: always()
+        run: bash scripts/ci-sweep.sh --job
+
   image-build:
     needs: verify
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     timeout-minutes: 20
     env:
+      # Names this job's stacks, so its final step removes exactly these (scripts/lib/ci-project.sh).
+      EKKLESIA_CI_JOB_KEY: image-build
       # Cache mounts in deploy/Dockerfile need BuildKit; this selects it even where the Docker CLI
       # has no buildx plugin.
       DOCKER_BUILDKIT: "1"
@@ -121,22 +147,33 @@ jobs:
           # in this workflow pushes, so the credential is never needed after checkout.
           persist-credentials: false
 
+      # A job the runner killed (cancelled, or past the runner's own time limit) never ran its
+      # cleanup. Anything a CI job left on this shared daemon more than three hours ago goes first.
+      - name: Sweep stale CI stacks from the runner
+        run: bash scripts/ci-sweep.sh --stale
+
       # The platform-only image (ADR 0044): a checkout has no `modules/`, so this proves the image
       # builds, validates, and assembles with zero modules. Build only — no registry login, no
       # credentials, no push, no tag anywhere but this runner's local image store.
       # Tagged per run and attempt, not only per commit: a pull request and a push of the same commit
       # can build at once on one runner's Docker daemon, and neither may remove the other's image.
+      # Labeled like every CI stack, so this job's final step removes it even if the build is killed.
       - name: Build the production image without modules
-        run: >-
+        shell: bash
-          docker build
+        run: |
-          --file deploy/Dockerfile
+          source scripts/lib/ci-project.sh
-          --build-arg REVISION="$GITHUB_SHA"
+          docker build \
-          --tag ekklesia-ci:"$GITHUB_SHA-${GITHUB_RUN_ID:-0}-${GITHUB_RUN_ATTEMPT:-1}"
+            --file deploy/Dockerfile \
-          .
+            --build-arg REVISION="$GITHUB_SHA" \
+            --label "${EKKLESIA_CI_LABEL}=$(ci_project_name image)" \
+            --label "${EKKLESIA_CI_CREATED_LABEL}=$(date +%s)" \
+            --tag ekklesia-ci:"$GITHUB_SHA-${GITHUB_RUN_ID:-0}-${GITHUB_RUN_ATTEMPT:-1}" \
+            .
 
-      - name: Remove the image from the runner
+      # Whatever happened above, this job's own stacks do not outlive it.
+      - name: Remove this job's CI stacks
         if: always()
-        run: docker image rm --force ekklesia-ci:"$GITHUB_SHA-${GITHUB_RUN_ID:-0}-${GITHUB_RUN_ATTEMPT:-1}" || true
+        run: bash scripts/ci-sweep.sh --job
 
   deploy-smoke:
     needs: verify
@@ -151,6 +188,8 @@ jobs:
           - same-origin
           - split
     env:
+      # Names this job's stacks, so its final step removes exactly these (scripts/lib/ci-project.sh).
+      EKKLESIA_CI_JOB_KEY: deploy-smoke-${{ matrix.topology }}
       DOCKER_BUILDKIT: "1"
       EKKLESIA_SMOKE_TOPOLOGY: ${{ matrix.topology }}
     steps:
@@ -162,6 +201,11 @@ jobs:
           # in this workflow pushes, so the credential is never needed after checkout.
           persist-credentials: false
 
+      # A job the runner killed (cancelled, or past the runner's own time limit) never ran its
+      # cleanup. Anything a CI job left on this shared daemon more than three hours ago goes first.
+      - name: Sweep stale CI stacks from the runner
+        run: bash scripts/ci-sweep.sh --stale
+
       # The reference deployment end to end (ADR 0044): a platform-only image, base + proxy with
       # Caddy's internal CA (test-only), an explicit migration apply against this job's own fresh
       # PostgreSQL, then the API, Dashboard, storage delivery, client-address chain, and verify-full
@@ -169,3 +213,8 @@ jobs:
       # it; nothing is pushed, published, or logged in to.
       - name: Smoke-test the reference deployment (${{ matrix.topology }})
         run: bash scripts/smoke-deploy.sh
+
+      # Whatever happened above, this job's own stacks do not outlive it.
+      - name: Remove this job's CI stacks
+        if: always()
+        run: bash scripts/ci-sweep.sh --job

README.md

@@ -218,9 +218,10 @@ undeployed state, and the launch checklist in a single place. **CI is accepted a
 trusted-code-only boundary**: the self-hosted Gitea runner executes only code controlled and
 reviewed by trusted repository collaborators, and unknown or untrusted pull requests must not
 execute on it automatically. What remains is operational and cannot be proven from this repository —
-upgrading Gitea past 1.24.2 (which *ignores* the workflow's `permissions`, `concurrency`, and
+configuring and proving job-token authority server-side (the server now runs Gitea 1.27.2, which
-`timeout-minutes` declarations), clamping job-token authority server-side, enforcing timeout and
+honours `concurrency` and documents `permissions`, but neither token limits nor `timeout-minutes` are
-teardown in a trusted provisioner/reaper, and proving disposable runner isolation. Those are
+verified on it yet), enforcing timeout and teardown in a trusted provisioner/reaper, and proving
+disposable runner isolation. Those are
 prerequisites for **executing untrusted contributions**, alongside the deployment checklist that
 gates a **public launch**; moving future public contribution workflows to a service with isolated
 hosted runners is an acceptable alternative. **Neither set of requirements blocks Phase 6** — Surface

apps/api/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@ekklesia/api",
-  "version": "0.1.1",
+  "version": "0.1.2",
   "private": true,
   "type": "module",
   "files": [

core/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@ekklesia/core",
-  "version": "0.1.1",
+  "version": "0.1.2",
   "private": true,
   "type": "module",
   "files": [

deploy/Caddyfile.example

@@ -70,18 +70,57 @@
 
 # Browsers fetch signed object URLs here (S3_DELIVERY_ENDPOINT, ADR 0031).
 {$EKKLESIA_STORAGE_HOSTNAME} {
-	reverse_proxy https://object-storage:8443 {
+	# Delivery-layer CORS belongs to the deployment, not to the object store: this block decides it,
-		# An S3 signature covers the Host header: pass the original through unchanged, or every signed
+	# so it stays the same with any S3 backend behind it. Only the origins whose pages read objects
-		# URL fails verification.
+	# with fetch() get CORS: the Ekklesia origin, which serves the Dashboard and the displays. An <img> needs none. Every object
-		header_up Host {host}
+	# URL is still a signed, expiring capability; CORS only decides which pages may read the bytes.
-		header_up -CF-Connecting-IP
+	@cors_origin header Origin https://{$EKKLESIA_HOSTNAME}
-		header_up -X-Real-IP
+
-		header_up -Forwarded
+	# A preflight is answered here and never reaches storage. Only GET and HEAD are ever allowed, and
-		header_up -True-Client-IP
+	# no request header beyond the CORS-safelisted ones.
-		transport http {
+	@preflight method OPTIONS
-			# object-storage presents a certificate from the installation-private CA.
+	handle @preflight {
-			tls_trust_pool file /etc/caddy/ekklesia-ca.crt
+		header @cors_origin {
-			tls_server_name object-storage
+			Access-Control-Allow-Origin {http.request.header.Origin}
+			Access-Control-Allow-Methods "GET, HEAD"
+			Access-Control-Max-Age 600
+		}
+		header Vary Origin
+		respond 204
+	}
+
+	handle {
+		# Set when the response is written, after the upstream's own CORS headers were removed below.
+		header @cors_origin >Access-Control-Allow-Origin {http.request.header.Origin}
+		header >Vary Origin
+
+		reverse_proxy https://object-storage:8443 {
+			# An S3 signature covers the Host header: pass the original through unchanged, or every
+			# signed URL fails verification.
+			header_up Host {host}
+			header_up -CF-Connecting-IP
+			header_up -X-Real-IP
+			header_up -Forwarded
+			header_up -True-Client-IP
+			# The object store's own CORS answer (SeaweedFS reflects any origin, with every method)
+			# is not the deployment's policy.
+			header_down -Access-Control-Allow-Origin
+			header_down -Access-Control-Allow-Methods
+			header_down -Access-Control-Allow-Headers
+			header_down -Access-Control-Expose-Headers
+			header_down -Access-Control-Allow-Credentials
+			header_down -Access-Control-Max-Age
+			header_down -Vary
+			transport http {
+				# object-storage presents a certificate from the installation-private CA.
+				tls_trust_pool file /etc/caddy/ekklesia-ca.crt
+				tls_server_name object-storage
+				# HTTP/1.1 only. Over HTTP/2, SeaweedFS answers a conditional request with a 304 that
+				# declares a Content-Length it never sends; Caddy then aborts the browser's stream,
+				# which a browser reports as ERR_HTTP2_PROTOCOL_ERROR on every revalidation. Its
+				# HTTP/1.1 304 is clean. Browsers still reach this proxy over HTTP/2 and HTTP/3.
+				versions 1.1
+			}
 		}
 	}
 }

deploy/Caddyfile.split.example

@@ -92,18 +92,61 @@
 
 # Browsers fetch signed object URLs here (S3_DELIVERY_ENDPOINT, ADR 0031).
 {$EKKLESIA_STORAGE_HOSTNAME} {
-	reverse_proxy https://object-storage:8443 {
+	# Delivery-layer CORS belongs to the deployment, not to the object store: this block decides it,
-		# An S3 signature covers the Host header: pass the original through unchanged, or every signed
+	# so it stays the same with any S3 backend behind it. Only the origins whose pages read objects
-		# URL fails verification.
+	# with fetch() get CORS: the API origin, where displays run, and the Dashboard origin,
-		header_up Host {host}
+	# where a module's preview may cache images too. An <img> needs none. Every object
-		header_up -CF-Connecting-IP
+	# URL is still a signed, expiring capability; CORS only decides which pages may read the bytes.
-		header_up -X-Real-IP
+	@cors_origin {
-		header_up -Forwarded
+		header Origin https://{$EKKLESIA_HOSTNAME}
-		header_up -True-Client-IP
+		header Origin https://{$EKKLESIA_DASHBOARD_HOSTNAME}
-		transport http {
+	}
-			# object-storage presents a certificate from the installation-private CA.
+
-			tls_trust_pool file /etc/caddy/ekklesia-ca.crt
+	# A preflight is answered here and never reaches storage. Only GET and HEAD are ever allowed, and
-			tls_server_name object-storage
+	# no request header beyond the CORS-safelisted ones.
+	@preflight method OPTIONS
+	handle @preflight {
+		header @cors_origin {
+			Access-Control-Allow-Origin {http.request.header.Origin}
+			Access-Control-Allow-Methods "GET, HEAD"
+			Access-Control-Max-Age 600
+		}
+		header Vary Origin
+		respond 204
+	}
+
+	handle {
+		# Set when the response is written, after the upstream's own CORS headers were removed below.
+		header @cors_origin >Access-Control-Allow-Origin {http.request.header.Origin}
+		header >Vary Origin
+
+		reverse_proxy https://object-storage:8443 {
+			# An S3 signature covers the Host header: pass the original through unchanged, or every
+			# signed URL fails verification.
+			header_up Host {host}
+			header_up -CF-Connecting-IP
+			header_up -X-Real-IP
+			header_up -Forwarded
+			header_up -True-Client-IP
+			# The object store's own CORS answer (SeaweedFS reflects any origin, with every method)
+			# is not the deployment's policy.
+			header_down -Access-Control-Allow-Origin
+			header_down -Access-Control-Allow-Methods
+			header_down -Access-Control-Allow-Headers
+			header_down -Access-Control-Expose-Headers
+			header_down -Access-Control-Allow-Credentials
+			header_down -Access-Control-Max-Age
+			header_down -Vary
+			transport http {
+				# object-storage presents a certificate from the installation-private CA.
+				tls_trust_pool file /etc/caddy/ekklesia-ca.crt
+				tls_server_name object-storage
+				# HTTP/1.1 only. Over HTTP/2, SeaweedFS answers a conditional request with a 304 that
+				# declares a Content-Length it never sends; Caddy then aborts the browser's stream,
+				# which a browser reports as ERR_HTTP2_PROTOCOL_ERROR on every revalidation. Its
+				# HTTP/1.1 304 is clean. Browsers still reach this proxy over HTTP/2 and HTTP/3.
+				versions 1.1
+			}
 		}
 	}
 }

deploy/README.md

@@ -178,6 +178,29 @@ the topology and warns when the two hostnames are not siblings.
 The Dashboard learns the API's origin at run time: the API writes its identity base URL into the page
 it serves (`<meta name="ekklesia-api-origin">`). Nothing about the topology is built into the image.
 
+### Storage delivery: CORS is the deployment's
+
+Browsers fetch objects directly from the storage hostname through signed, expiring URLs (ADR 0031).
+**Which pages may read those bytes with `fetch()` is decided by the delivery layer, the proxy, and
+never by the object store.** That policy therefore stays the same with SeaweedFS, R2, or any other
+S3 backend behind it, and an installation that changes backends changes nothing about CORS.
+
+The reference proxy's storage block:
+
+- grants CORS only to the origins whose pages read objects with `fetch()`: the Ekklesia origin in the
+  same-origin topology; the API origin (displays) and the Dashboard origin (a module's preview) in
+  the split topology. An `<img>` needs no CORS and is unaffected;
+- allows `GET` and `HEAD` only, and no request header beyond the CORS-safelisted ones, always with
+  `Vary: Origin`;
+- answers preflight `OPTIONS` requests itself, so they never reach storage;
+- removes the object store's own CORS headers. SeaweedFS's default reflects any origin and
+  advertises `PUT`, `POST`, and `DELETE`.
+
+The proxy reaches storage over **HTTP/1.1 only**. Over HTTP/2, SeaweedFS answers a conditional
+request with a `304` that declares a `Content-Length` it never sends. The proxy then resets the
+browser's stream, and every reload of a cached image fails with `ERR_HTTP2_PROTOCOL_ERROR`.
+Browsers still reach the proxy itself over HTTP/2 and HTTP/3.
+
 ### Behind an existing reverse proxy
 
 Run the base alone and attach `api` and `object-storage` to your proxy's network with an overlay of
@@ -213,6 +236,8 @@ Then make your proxy do what `Caddyfile.example` does:
 - forward the storage hostname to `https://object-storage:8443`, verifying it against
   `/etc/ekklesia/tls/ca.crt` with server name `object-storage`, and **pass the original `Host`
   through unchanged**, or every signed URL fails (ADR 0031).
+- reach `object-storage` over **HTTP/1.1** only, and own the storage hostname's CORS as described in
+  [Storage delivery](#storage-delivery-cors-is-the-deployments).
 
 The proxy's address must be fixed and must never be handed to anything else. With Docker, give its
 network an explicit subnet, limit `ip_range` to part of it, and fix the proxy's address outside that
@@ -288,7 +313,10 @@ deployment:
   platform-only image and a disposable PostgreSQL and SeaweedFS that exist only for that run. It
   follows the first boot above and checks the following through the proxy:
   - readiness and the Dashboard;
-  - a signed object URL fetched through the storage hostname;
+  - a signed object URL fetched through the storage hostname, and the same image loaded twice over
+    HTTP/2, the second time as a conditional request that must be a clean `304`;
+  - storage CORS: exactly the allowed origins, `GET` and `HEAD` only, preflights answered by the
+    proxy, and none of the object store's own CORS headers;
   - the client-address chain, both from an ordinary peer and from the tunnel connector's address;
   - initial-owner sign-in and sign-out;
   - that the API's database connection is TLS 1.3, and that it is refused by a foreign CA and by a
@@ -356,10 +384,10 @@ finds its files:
 ```sh
 docker build \
   --file deploy/Dockerfile \
-  --build-arg VERSION=0.1.1 \
+  --build-arg VERSION=0.1.2 \
   --build-arg REVISION="$(git rev-parse HEAD)" \
   --build-arg SOURCE=https://git.example.org/your-org/ekklesia \
-  --tag ekklesia:0.1.1 \
+  --tag ekklesia:0.1.2 \
   .
 ```
 

docs/architecture/decisions/0047-module-ci-harness.md

@@ -0,0 +1,256 @@
+# 0047: Every module proves itself inside Ekklesia, with one harness the platform publishes
+
+- Status: Proposed
+- Date: 2026-10-05
+- Supersedes: none
+- Related: [ADR 0016](0016-module-database-access.md),
+  [ADR 0021](0021-modules-as-hostable-products.md),
+  [ADR 0028](0028-module-operational-lifecycle.md),
+  [ADR 0030](0030-host-provided-module-object-storage.md),
+  [ADR 0033](0033-display-kiosk-host-contract.md),
+  [ADR 0036](0036-managed-device-identity-and-pairing.md),
+  [ADR 0041](0041-module-browser-contributions.md),
+  [ADR 0043](0043-display-offline-code-fallback.md),
+  [ADR 0044](0044-self-hosted-reference-deployment.md),
+  [ADR 0045](0045-split-dashboard-and-api-origins.md)
+
+## Context
+
+Modules are independently versioned products (ADR 0021). They live in their own repositories, and
+none of them can be built, run, or rendered without Ekklesia. The first production module, Signage,
+reached a church with three defects that only show when it runs **inside** Ekklesia, in a real
+browser:
+
+- every heartbeat its display sent was refused with a 400, because the display and the server
+  disagreed about `null`;
+- a display that failed one request at start-up never recovered without a reload;
+- its media cache leaked one blob per slide per refresh, until the browser refused the display's own
+  requests.
+
+Signage had unit tests, browser tests against a stubbed host, and no CI. Every test passed, because
+each half was tested against its own idea of the other, and nothing ever ran the module in the
+platform it ships into.
+
+The platform's own deployment smoke (ADR 0044, ADR 0045) does run a module in a real browser, but
+only the repository's template, and only far enough to mount it. The instance repository runs the
+smoke against its real modules, but only at release time, after a module has already been tagged.
+Each module repository that wants more than that has to assemble the platform, build an image,
+start a deployment, and drive a browser itself. Signage is about to do exactly that by hand. The
+second module, Classroom, would copy it, and the copies would drift from the platform they test.
+
+## Decision
+
+### The platform publishes a versioned module harness
+
+Each platform release publishes one OCI image, `ekklesia-module-harness:<platform version>`. It is
+built from the platform at that release tag by the platform's own release CI, and pushed to the
+organization's registry. A version is never overwritten. Modules reference it **by digest**.
+
+The harness contains the platform source at that version: its `deploy/` directory, its Dockerfile,
+its lockfile, and its smoke scripts. It also contains the pinned Node.js and pnpm, the browser
+driver, and the pinned headless Chromium image reference. Given a module checkout, it:
+
+1. **assembles** the module into the platform at `modules/<id>`, exactly as an instance does (ADR
+   0044), and installs with `--frozen-lockfile`;
+2. runs the platform's own gates against that set: `pnpm boundaries`, `modules:validate`,
+   `migrations:validate`, and the build;
+3. **builds** the deployment image from the assembled workspace with the platform's Dockerfile;
+4. starts the **reference deployment** in the split topology (ADR 0045), with a disposable
+   PostgreSQL and object store, Caddy's internal CA, and freshly generated secrets;
+5. plans, then **explicitly applies**, migrations against that fresh database. This is the only
+   database the harness ever migrates;
+6. creates the initial owner, grants the module's declared permissions to a test person, and
+   **mounts every UI surface the manifest declares**, in headless Chromium. That covers:
+   - the primary UI in the Dashboard;
+   - the display, paired as a device with no human session (ADR 0036);
+   - each browser contribution, whenever the module that hosts it is present (ADR 0041);
+7. runs a short **display soak**, and the **no-dead-ends** injections below;
+8. tears everything down: containers, networks, volumes, and the work directory.
+
+It **fails** on any of the following:
+
+- a `console.error` or uncaught exception on any page;
+- an unhandled promise rejection;
+- any 4xx or 5xx response that the harness did not itself expect. Expected ones are listed in the
+  harness, for example a display's descriptor before it is paired;
+- a page that never mounts;
+- a failed or refused request (CORS, blocked, network error);
+- a soak leak.
+
+Each failure line names the surface, the request path (never its query), and the step.
+
+### The display soak and the no-dead-ends checks are generic
+
+These checks come from what Signage got wrong, and they apply to any module with a display.
+
+- **Soak**, two minutes by default. The display stays mounted with no remount and no offline
+  indicator. Its realtime streams stay healthy. Live object URLs stay bounded. JavaScript heap
+  growth, measured over DevTools, stays within a fixed ratio.
+- **No dead ends.** One at a time, the harness refuses the first request to each module route the
+  display calls at start-up, and the first realtime connection. Within a bounded time and with no
+  reload, the display must make that request again and succeed. A display has nobody to press
+  Retry.
+
+Module-specific behaviour, such as Signage's heartbeat being recorded, is not guessed by the
+harness. A module declares it (below).
+
+### A module is tested against both ends of its compatibility range
+
+A module's CI runs the harness twice: against the **lowest** and the **newest** published platform
+version within its manifest's `compatibility.platform` range. Testing every version in between adds
+cost and finds little. Testing only the newest misses the floor the manifest promises to work on.
+
+The two versions, and their harness digests, are pinned in the module's repository. The harness
+refuses to run if:
+
+- a pinned version lies outside the module's range;
+- the lowest pinned version is not the range's floor.
+
+Moving to a newer platform is a deliberate, reviewed pin change, as an instance's is (ADR 0044). It
+is never a moving tag.
+
+A frozen install of the module assembled into each of those two platforms needs a lockfile per
+pinned version. The module keeps them (`ci/lock/<platform version>.yaml`), and the harness provides
+the one command that regenerates them inside its own pinned Node.js. A stale lockfile fails the
+frozen install, which is the signal to regenerate it in a reviewed change.
+
+### Modules declare extra smoke steps, beside their manifest rather than in it
+
+A module may add steps of its own in `ekklesia.harness.json`, next to `ekklesia.module.json`. Steps
+are declarative first:
+
+- open a surface;
+- wait for a test id;
+- call one of the module's routes as a named role, expecting a status;
+- soak for N minutes;
+- inject a failure into a named route;
+- check a value in the module's own table, through its own route.
+
+For what a declaration cannot express, a step may name a driver script in the module's repository.
+The harness runs that script with the same DevTools client and the same failure rules.
+
+**This is deliberately not a manifest field.** Manifest versions are strict, hard cutovers that every
+host validates (ADR 0033). A test step is not a runtime contract, and a host must never read one.
+Putting steps in the manifest would force a manifest version bump on every module for something
+that has no meaning outside CI.
+
+### Later: the harness checks what a module actually touches against what it declares
+
+In a later phase, the harness records what the module does while it runs:
+
+- the tables and schemas it reads and writes;
+- the buckets it uses;
+- its outbound network connections, with the egress network blocked and every attempt logged.
+
+It compares them with what the manifest declares (ADR 0016, ADR 0030). A module that touches what it
+did not declare fails. This is the module-trust check. The egress half needs a manifest declaration
+of outbound destinations that does not exist yet, and is a separate decision. This ADR fixes only
+the harness's shape, so that the recording phases can be added without changing how modules call
+it.
+
+### The template's workflow stays short, and calls the harness by digest
+
+`templates/module` ships a workflow that:
+
+- checks out the module with `persist-credentials: false` and pinned actions;
+- runs the module's own unit tests, typecheck, and lint;
+- sweeps stale CI stacks from the runner, then runs the harness, once per pinned platform version,
+  with one `docker run` of the harness image **by digest**, and finally, always, removes this job's
+  own stacks. The module directory is mounted read-only, and the runner's Docker is used exactly
+  as the platform's smoke uses it.
+
+It references no secret, needs no registry credential (the harness image is public within the
+organization), and uses no `pull_request_target`. The trusted-code-only rule for self-hosted runners
+applies to module repositories exactly as it does to the platform (see `docs/development/security.md`).
+
+**Why `docker run`, and not a reusable workflow or a composite action.** The server runs Gitea
+1.27.2. (This proposal first assumed 1.24.2; the reasons below hold on the actual version.)
+
+- Its runner can call a reusable workflow from another repository by cloning that repository, and
+  since 1.26 that includes private repositories (go-gitea/gitea#32562). That support is still thinly
+  documented, and has known problems in practice.
+- A reusable workflow would make the harness's behaviour depend on how this server and runner
+  version expand it. An image runs the same everywhere it runs.
+- Composite actions from another repository work through absolute `uses:` URLs. That would still
+  wrap the same `docker run`, adding a second pinned reference and nothing else.
+
+An image digest is the one reference that is equally immutable, equally reviewable, and works
+unchanged on any Gitea release and on GitHub Actions. A composite action can be added later as a
+convenience over the same image, without changing what a module pins.
+
+### Nothing the harness starts outlives the job that started it
+
+The harness starts Docker stacks on a shared runner, and a runner can kill a job outright: a
+cancelled or superseded job (`concurrency` cancels superseded runs on this server), or the runner's
+own time limit. A script's own cleanup trap does not run then. The platform's CI leaked a whole
+migration stack that way, and it ran until someone removed it by hand. So the harness follows the
+platform's rule (`scripts/ci-sweep.sh`, `docs/development/security.md`):
+
+- everything it starts is named and labeled as a CI stack of its run, attempt, and job key;
+- it removes its own stacks in a trap;
+- the template workflow runs the harness's **stale sweep** before the harness starts, and its
+  **job sweep** in a final `if: always()` step, so a killed run's stacks are removed by that run's
+  last step, or failing that by the next job on the runner.
+
+The sweep ships inside the harness image, so a module never copies it.
+
+### Publishing follows the instance's release pattern
+
+The harness image is pushed only by a `publish` job that runs on `v*` tags, after the platform's CI
+has built and tested that exact image (checked by image ID). That job:
+
+- uses a write-only package token, the only secret in the platform's workflow;
+- refuses to overwrite an existing version;
+- prints the digest.
+
+Pull requests and branch builds build the harness and run it against the template, but never push.
+The registry is reached exactly as the instance's publish job reaches it.
+
+### Adoption
+
+- **Signage** uses an interim CI job until the first harness is published. That job assembles
+  Signage into a pinned platform commit and runs the platform's display-device smoke scenarios.
+  Signage switches to the harness as soon as one is published.
+- **Classroom** follows.
+- **The template** carries the workflow from the first harness release on, so every new module has
+  it from its first commit.
+
+## Consequences
+
+- A module cannot reach a release without having run inside Ekklesia, in a real browser, at both
+  ends of the platform range it claims.
+- The defects that reached the first production Signage deployment fail a module's CI instead:
+  refused requests, dead ends, leaks, and console errors.
+- The platform owns one harness, versioned with itself. Modules do not copy deployment scripts that
+  then drift.
+- Every module's CI needs Docker on its runner, and takes minutes rather than seconds. The harness
+  runs as separate jobs from the unit tests, so a quick failure still reports quickly.
+- The platform's release process gains one published artifact, one credential, and one more failure
+  mode at release time.
+- A module now carries a lockfile for each pinned platform version. The harness makes regenerating
+  them one command, and a stale one fails visibly.
+
+## Alternatives
+
+- **Each module keeps its own copy of the smoke scripts.** Rejected. That is today's situation in
+  embryo, and it drifts.
+- **A reusable workflow in the platform repository.** Rejected for now, for the reasons above: thin
+  support in practice, and a harness whose behaviour depends on whichever runner and server version
+  happens to expand it.
+- **Publish the harness as an npm package.** Rejected. The harness needs Docker, a browser, and the
+  platform's deployment files anyway, so a package would ship a fraction of it and assume the rest.
+- **Test only the newest platform version.** Rejected. A module's range floor would go untested
+  until an installation that has not upgraded meets it.
+- **Put smoke steps in the manifest.** Rejected. Manifest versions are hard cutovers with runtime
+  meaning, and test steps have neither.
+- **Run the harness in the platform's CI against every known module.** Rejected. The platform would
+  need every module's source and would fail on modules it does not own. The direction is module
+  tests platform, not the reverse.
+
+## Deferred
+
+- The data-access and egress recording phases, and the manifest declaration egress needs.
+- A composite action over the harness image.
+- Running the harness against a module's declared dependencies at their own pinned versions, for
+  contributions hosted by another module.
+- Visual regression of mounted surfaces.

docs/architecture/decisions/README.md

@@ -55,3 +55,4 @@ ADRs capture durable choices that affect more than one package or phase.
 - [0044: Ekklesia ships one self-hosted reference deployment, composed from pinned sources](0044-self-hosted-reference-deployment.md) — Accepted
 - [0045: The Dashboard and the API may live on separate origins](0045-split-dashboard-and-api-origins.md) — Accepted
 - [0046: Ekklesia's branding is never forced on an installation](0046-installation-owned-branding.md) — Proposed
+- [0047: Every module proves itself inside Ekklesia, with one harness the platform publishes](0047-module-ci-harness.md) — Proposed

docs/development/security.md

@@ -693,8 +693,10 @@ public Dashboard login must be assessed with the actual edge/proxy controls befo
 
 ## Continuous integration boundary
 
-CI runs on self-hosted Gitea Actions runners. The inventoried server is **Gitea 1.24.2**, and that
+CI runs on self-hosted Gitea Actions runners. The server reports **Gitea 1.27.2** (`GET
-version determines which parts of the workflow are real guarantees and which are not.
+/api/v1/version`, checked 2026-10-06; this document previously said 1.24.2, which was stale). The
+server's actual version, not the documentation of an earlier one, determines which parts of the
+workflow are real guarantees and which are not.
 
 ### The current operating rule: trusted code only
 
@@ -727,24 +729,53 @@ so a later step in the same job cannot read or reuse it from there.
 It does **not** remove the short-lived `GITEA_TOKEN` from the job environment, and it does **not**
 reduce that token's server-side authority. A step that wants the token can still read it.
 
-### What Gitea 1.24 ignores — so the branch cannot claim it
+### What this server honours, and what is not yet verified
 
-Per the official comparison for this version
+Each item separates what Gitea documents for 1.27
-(<https://docs.gitea.com/1.24/usage/actions/comparison>), Gitea 1.24's unsupported workflow syntax
+(<https://docs.gitea.com/1.27/usage/actions/comparison>) from what has been observed on this server:
-includes `permissions` and `jobs.<job_id>.permissions`, `concurrency`, and
-`jobs.<job_id>.timeout-minutes`. On this server those declarations are inert. Therefore:
 
-- **The workflow's `permissions: contents: read` does not restrict the job token.** This branch
+- **`concurrency` is honoured.** Gitea supports it since 1.26 (go-gitea/gitea#32751), and on this
-  cannot claim the `GITEA_TOKEN` is read-only, because nothing in workflow YAML makes it so on
+  server a newer push to a pull request cancels the run it supersedes. Observed: Ekklesia run 133 was
-  1.24. Job-token permission controls, repository/owner defaults, and server-side
+  cancelled when run 134 started for the same pull request, and run 135 when run 137 did. A
-  maximum-permission clamping arrive in the 1.26 feature line
+  superseded run's own cleanup is therefore never guaranteed to run, which is one reason for the
-  (<https://docs.gitea.com/1.26/usage/actions/token-permissions>).
+  stack sweep below.
-- **`concurrency` and `timeout-minutes` are not bounded-execution guarantees here.** Cancellation,
+- **`permissions` is supported by 1.27, with Gitea's own scopes, but is not verified here.** The
-  timeout, and teardown must be enforced by a trusted provisioner and reaper outside the workflow.
+  server-side token-permission settings are not visible through the API, and nothing has yet proven
+  what the job token can and cannot do on this server. Until that proof exists (requirement 3
+  below), this repository still does not claim the `GITEA_TOKEN` is read-only.
+- **`timeout-minutes` is no longer listed as unsupported for 1.27, but is not verified here.**
+  Teardown does not rely on it: the stack sweep and a trusted reaper do.
+- **Still ignored:** `jobs.<job_id>.environment`, and any `runs-on` other than a single label.
 
-The declarations are kept deliberately: they are already correct for a supported Gitea release and
+The declarations stay in the workflow either way: they state the intent, and are correct on GitHub
-for GitHub Actions, and keeping them means the upgrade does not require re-deriving the intent. They
+Actions as well.
-are documented as ignored, not removed.
+
+### Disposable stacks never outlive their job
+
+Every CI script removes its own Compose stack in an `EXIT` trap, but a trap never runs when the runner
+kills the job container: a cancelled job, or the runner's own time limit. One such stack ran on the
+shared runner for two days. So stack cleanup has three layers:
+
+- **The script's own trap**, for every ordinary failure.
+- **A final `if: always()` step** in every job that starts stacks: `scripts/ci-sweep.sh --job` removes
+  everything that job started, at any age, even after a failed step.
+- **A sweep before every such job starts**: `scripts/ci-sweep.sh --stale` removes anything a CI job
+  left more than three hours ago, which catches whatever a killed job could not clean up itself.
+
+A stack is found by name and label, never by guesswork (`scripts/lib/ci-project.sh`):
+
+- every CI Compose project is named `ekklesia-ci-<run>-<attempt>-<job key>-…`, and Compose labels
+  its containers, networks, and volumes with that name;
+- anything a script starts outside Compose carries `org.riverofglorymn.ekklesia.ci.project`;
+- images also carry the time CI built them, because an image's own creation time can be its base's.
+
+The job key is per matrix leg, so one leg's cleanup cannot match another's running stack. Nothing
+outside the `ekklesia-ci-` prefix is ever removed. A job container attached to a stack's network is
+disconnected, never removed.
+
+**This is not a substitute for a runner-side reaper.** A stack killed with its job is removed only
+when another job that sweeps runs on the same runner. Bounded execution and teardown are still the
+runner host's to enforce, as above.
 
 ### Runner topology is not verified
 
@@ -766,16 +797,17 @@ they are not conditions on merging trusted, reviewed work.
 None of them can be satisfied by editing this repository; each requires access to the Gitea server
 and runner hosts, and each must be proven there.
 
-1. Upgrade Gitea to a reviewed supported release with job-token permission controls — at least the
+1. ~~Upgrade Gitea to a reviewed supported release with job-token permission controls — at least
-   1.26 feature line. Select the actual release during infrastructure work, after backup and
+   the 1.26 feature line.~~ **Done:** the server runs 1.27.2. Items 2 and 3 now configure and prove
-   compatibility review; do not pin a version from this document.
+   what it makes possible.
 2. Configure repository and owner defaults, and the server-side maximum permission, so workflow
    code cannot request more than read-only repository access.
 3. Prove against the real server that the job's `GITEA_TOKEN` cannot push code, create or update
    releases, packages, issues, or pull requests, change Actions configuration, or reach another
    private repository.
-4. Enforce job timeout, cancellation, concurrency, and teardown in the trusted
+4. Enforce job timeout and teardown in the trusted provisioner/reaper. `concurrency` is honoured
-   provisioner/reaper rather than relying on the ignored workflow keys above.
+   by the server; `timeout-minutes` is not yet verified, and the in-workflow stack sweep only
+   complements a reaper.
 5. Complete a disposable-guest runner isolation proof: one throwaway guest per job, torn down by a
    trusted reaper outside workflow YAML, holding no deployment credential, registration token, or
    reusable key.

docs/development/testing.md

@@ -159,6 +159,12 @@ also receives a safely named disposable database. Direct host runs use a Docker-
 port bound only to `127.0.0.1`; a containerized Gitea job joins the isolated Compose network and
 uses the PostgreSQL service name.
 
+In CI, a stack whose job was killed before its own cleanup ran is still removed: by that job's final
+`if: always()` step, or by the stale sweep before a later job starts (`scripts/ci-sweep.sh`, see
+[Disposable stacks never outlive their job](security.md#disposable-stacks-never-outlive-their-job)).
+`bash scripts/test-ci-sweep.sh` proves what the sweep removes and what it leaves alone, against real
+Docker resources.
+
 The live suite proves fresh read-only planning, initial and incremental application, genuine
 no-op behavior, exact applied checksums and history, edited or corrupt history rejection,
 whole-batch DDL rollback, Drizzle breakpoint execution, real advisory-lock concurrency and

package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "ekklesia",
-  "version": "0.1.1",
+  "version": "0.1.2",
   "private": true,
   "type": "module",
   "description": "Open, modular church technology platform",

packages/contracts/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@ekklesia/contracts",
-  "version": "0.1.1",
+  "version": "0.1.2",
   "type": "module",
   "files": [
     "dist"

packages/design-tokens/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@ekklesia/design-tokens",
-  "version": "0.1.1",
+  "version": "0.1.2",
   "type": "module",
   "files": [
     "dist"

packages/module-sdk/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@ekklesia/module-sdk",
-  "version": "0.1.1",
+  "version": "0.1.2",
   "type": "module",
   "files": [
     "dist"

packages/module-ui-build/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@ekklesia/module-ui-build",
-  "version": "0.1.1",
+  "version": "0.1.2",
   "type": "module",
   "files": [
     "bin",

packages/module-ui-host/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@ekklesia/module-ui-host",
-  "version": "0.1.1",
+  "version": "0.1.2",
   "type": "module",
   "files": [
     "dist"

packages/module-ui-sdk/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@ekklesia/module-ui-sdk",
-  "version": "0.1.1",
+  "version": "0.1.2",
   "type": "module",
   "files": [
     "dist"

packages/typescript-config/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@ekklesia/typescript-config",
-  "version": "0.1.1",
+  "version": "0.1.2",
   "private": true,
   "files": [
     "base.json",

packages/ui/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@ekklesia/ui",
-  "version": "0.1.1",
+  "version": "0.1.2",
   "type": "module",
   "files": [
     "dist"

scripts/ci-sweep.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,206 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# Removes disposable CI stacks from the Docker daemon: containers, networks, volumes, images, and
+# staging directories on the Docker host.
+#
+#   bash scripts/ci-sweep.sh --stale [--max-age-seconds N]   any CI stack older than N (default 3 h)
+#   bash scripts/ci-sweep.sh --job                           this job's own stacks, at any age
+#
+# Every CI script already removes its own stack in an EXIT trap, but a trap never runs when the runner
+# kills the job container: a cancelled or superseded job (the server honours `concurrency`), or
+# the runner's own time limit. So each workflow job that starts stacks ends with `--job` in an
+# `if: always()` step, and begins with `--stale`, which catches whatever a killed job left before
+# it could clean up.
+#
+# What a stack is, and how it is found, is defined in scripts/lib/ci-project.sh: a Compose project
+# named with the `ekklesia-ci-` prefix (Compose labels everything it creates with that name), plus
+# anything labeled EKKLESIA_CI_LABEL. Nothing outside that prefix is ever touched, at any age.
+#
+# --stale's threshold is far above any job's run time, so a stack another job on this daemon is using
+# right now is never young enough to match. --job refuses to run outside CI: locally, its prefix would
+# match a developer's own stacks.
+#
+# Best effort by design: a resource that cannot be removed is reported, and the sweep goes on. Output
+# names resources only; nothing a stack holds is printed.
+
+set -Eeuo pipefail
+
+repository_root="$(cd -- "$(dirname -- "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")/.." && pwd)"
+# shellcheck source=scripts/lib/ci-project.sh
+source "$repository_root/scripts/lib/ci-project.sh"
+
+compose_label="com.docker.compose.project"
+mode=""
+max_age_seconds="${EKKLESIA_CI_SWEEP_MAX_AGE_SECONDS:-10800}"
+
+usage() {
+  echo "usage: ci-sweep.sh --stale [--max-age-seconds N] | --job" >&2
+  exit 2
+}
+
+while (($# > 0)); do
+  case "$1" in
+  --stale | --job)
+    [[ -z "$mode" ]] || usage
+    mode="${1#--}"
+    ;;
+  --max-age-seconds)
+    [[ "${2:-}" =~ ^[0-9]+$ ]] || usage
+    max_age_seconds="$2"
+    shift
+    ;;
+  *) usage ;;
+  esac
+  shift
+done
+[[ -n "$mode" ]] || usage
+
+if [[ "$mode" == job ]]; then
+  [[ -n "${GITHUB_RUN_ID:-}" ]] || {
+    echo "ci-sweep: --job runs only in CI (GITHUB_RUN_ID is unset); locally it would match your own stacks." >&2
+    exit 2
+  }
+  prefix="$(ci_job_prefix)"
+  cutoff=""
+else
+  prefix="$EKKLESIA_CI_PREFIX"
+  cutoff="$(($(date +%s) - max_age_seconds))"
+fi
+
+if ! docker info >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+  echo "ci-sweep: no Docker daemon reachable; nothing to sweep."
+  exit 0
+fi
+
+removed=0
+warn() {
+  echo "ci-sweep: warning: $*" >&2
+}
+
+# selected <project> <created>: whether a resource belongs to the sweep.
+selected() {
+  local project="$1" created="$2" seconds
+  [[ -n "$project" && "$project" == "$prefix"* ]] || return 1
+  [[ -z "$cutoff" ]] && return 0
+  seconds="$(date -d "$created" +%s 2>/dev/null)" || return 1
+  ((seconds <= cutoff))
+}
+
+# --- Containers: Compose's own, and those a script started itself --------------------------------
+mapfile -t containers < <(
+  {
+    docker ps --all --quiet --no-trunc --filter "label=${compose_label}"
+    docker ps --all --quiet --no-trunc --filter "label=${EKKLESIA_CI_LABEL}"
+  } | sort -u
+)
+for id in "${containers[@]}"; do
+  [[ -n "$id" ]] || continue
+  record="$(docker inspect --format \
+    "{{index .Config.Labels \"${compose_label}\"}}|{{index .Config.Labels \"${EKKLESIA_CI_LABEL}\"}}|{{.Created}}|{{.Name}}" \
+    "$id" 2>/dev/null)" || continue
+  IFS='|' read -r compose_project ci_project created name <<<"$record"
+  project="${compose_project:-$ci_project}"
+  selected "$project" "$created" || continue
+  if docker rm --force --volumes "$id" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+    echo "ci-sweep: removed container ${name#/} (${project})"
+    removed=$((removed + 1))
+  else
+    warn "could not remove container ${name#/}"
+  fi
+done
+
+# --- Networks: anything still attached (a job container) is disconnected, never removed ---------
+mapfile -t networks < <(docker network ls --quiet --no-trunc --filter "label=${compose_label}")
+for id in "${networks[@]}"; do
+  [[ -n "$id" ]] || continue
+  # A network's creation time is a time value, not a string: ask for RFC 3339, which `date` reads.
+  record="$(docker network inspect --format \
+    "{{index .Labels \"${compose_label}\"}}|{{.Created.Format \"2006-01-02T15:04:05Z07:00\"}}|{{.Name}}" \
+    "$id" 2>/dev/null)" || continue
+  IFS='|' read -r project created name <<<"$record"
+  selected "$project" "$created" || continue
+  for endpoint in $(docker network inspect --format '{{range $id, $_ := .Containers}}{{$id}} {{end}}' "$id" 2>/dev/null); do
+    docker network disconnect --force "$id" "$endpoint" >/dev/null 2>&1 ||
+      warn "could not disconnect a container from network ${name}"
+  done
+  if docker network rm "$id" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+    echo "ci-sweep: removed network ${name} (${project})"
+    removed=$((removed + 1))
+  else
+    warn "could not remove network ${name}"
+  fi
+done
+
+# --- Volumes ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+mapfile -t volumes < <(
+  {
+    docker volume ls --quiet --filter "label=${compose_label}"
+    docker volume ls --quiet --filter "label=${EKKLESIA_CI_LABEL}"
+  } | sort -u
+)
+for name in "${volumes[@]}"; do
+  [[ -n "$name" ]] || continue
+  record="$(docker volume inspect --format \
+    "{{index .Labels \"${compose_label}\"}}|{{index .Labels \"${EKKLESIA_CI_LABEL}\"}}|{{.CreatedAt}}" \
+    "$name" 2>/dev/null)" || continue
+  IFS='|' read -r compose_project ci_project created <<<"$record"
+  project="${compose_project:-$ci_project}"
+  selected "$project" "$created" || continue
+  if docker volume rm --force "$name" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+    echo "ci-sweep: removed volume ${name} (${project})"
+    removed=$((removed + 1))
+  else
+    warn "could not remove volume ${name}"
+  fi
+done
+
+# --- Images built for a stack ------------------------------------------------------------------------
+mapfile -t images < <(docker image ls --quiet --no-trunc --filter "label=${EKKLESIA_CI_LABEL}" | sort -u)
+for id in "${images[@]}"; do
+  [[ -n "$id" ]] || continue
+  # Judged by when CI built it (EKKLESIA_CI_CREATED_LABEL), never by the image's own creation time,
+  # which BuildKit may have taken from its base. An image without that label is never swept by age.
+  record="$(docker image inspect --format \
+    "{{index .Config.Labels \"${EKKLESIA_CI_LABEL}\"}}|{{index .Config.Labels \"${EKKLESIA_CI_CREATED_LABEL}\"}}" \
+    "$id" 2>/dev/null)" || continue
+  IFS='|' read -r project built <<<"$record"
+  if [[ -n "$cutoff" ]]; then
+    [[ "$built" =~ ^[0-9]+$ ]] || continue
+    selected "$project" "@${built}" || continue
+  else
+    selected "$project" "" || continue
+  fi
+  if docker image rm --force "$id" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+    echo "ci-sweep: removed image ${id#sha256:} (${project})"
+    removed=$((removed + 1))
+  else
+    warn "could not remove image ${id#sha256:}"
+  fi
+done
+
+# --- Staging directories on the Docker host ------------------------------------------------------
+# A deploy smoke run inside a job container stages its mounted files under the Docker host's /tmp,
+# named for its project, as root-owned files; they hold that run's disposable secrets and keys. They
+# are removed with the same pinned image that created them. If that image is not on this daemon, no
+# smoke has staged anything here.
+image="$(sed -n 's/^[[:space:]]*image: \(postgres:[^[:space:]]*\)$/\1/p' "$repository_root/deploy/compose.yaml" | head -1)"
+if [[ -n "$image" ]] && docker image inspect "$image" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+  age=()
+  # `find -mmin +0` does not match something younger than a minute, so a threshold under a minute
+  # sweeps without an age filter, like the rest of this script.
+  if [[ -n "$cutoff" ]] && ((max_age_seconds >= 60)); then
+    age=(-mmin "+$((max_age_seconds / 60))")
+  fi
+  if staged="$(docker run --rm --entrypoint find -v /tmp:/host-tmp "$image" \
+    /host-tmp -mindepth 1 -maxdepth 1 -type d -name "${prefix}*" "${age[@]}" \
+    -print -exec rm -rf {} + 2>/dev/null)"; then
+    while IFS= read -r directory; do
+      [[ -n "$directory" ]] || continue
+      echo "ci-sweep: removed staging directory /tmp/${directory#/host-tmp/}"
+      removed=$((removed + 1))
+    done <<<"$staged"
+  else
+    warn "could not sweep staging directories on the Docker host"
+  fi
+fi
+
+echo "ci-sweep: ${mode} sweep removed ${removed} resource(s)."

scripts/lib/ci-project.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+# shellcheck shell=bash
+# How CI names, labels, and later finds the disposable stacks it starts.
+#
+# Every Compose project a CI script starts is named
+#
+#   ekklesia-ci-<run id>-<run attempt>-<job key>-<kind>-<pid><random>
+#
+# and Compose labels every container, network, and volume it creates with that name. What a script
+# creates outside Compose (a browser container, a volume, an image) gets EKKLESIA_CI_LABEL with the
+# same name. scripts/ci-sweep.sh finds stacks by those labels: this job's own, by the prefix up to
+# the job key (in a final `if: always()` step), and any CI stack by age (before a job starts).
+#
+# The job key is EKKLESIA_CI_JOB_KEY, which the workflow sets per job, and per matrix leg where a job
+# has one, so that one leg's cleanup cannot match another leg's running stack. Outside CI the
+# identifiers are "local".
+
+# shellcheck disable=SC2034 # read by the scripts that source this
+EKKLESIA_CI_LABEL="org.riverofglorymn.ekklesia.ci.project"
+# On images, when they were built, in Unix seconds. An image's own creation time is not that: BuildKit
+# gives an image that only adds metadata its base's time, and a reproducible build a fixed one. A
+# stale sweep that trusted it could remove an image another job is using right now.
+EKKLESIA_CI_CREATED_LABEL="org.riverofglorymn.ekklesia.ci.created"
+EKKLESIA_CI_PREFIX="ekklesia-ci-"
+
+# ci_name_safe <text>: lower case, and only what a Compose project name may contain.
+ci_name_safe() {
+  local text="${1//[^a-zA-Z0-9_-]/-}"
+  printf '%s' "${text,,}"
+}
+
+# ci_job_prefix: every project this job starts begins with exactly this.
+ci_job_prefix() {
+  ci_name_safe "ekklesia-ci-${GITHUB_RUN_ID:-local}-${GITHUB_RUN_ATTEMPT:-0}-${EKKLESIA_CI_JOB_KEY:-${GITHUB_JOB:-local}}-"
+}
+
+# ci_project_name <kind>: a project name unique to this invocation. Not only per run: several runs,
+# and several jobs of one run, share a runner's Docker daemon, and job containers often share a PID.
+ci_project_name() {
+  ci_name_safe "ekklesia-ci-${GITHUB_RUN_ID:-local}-${GITHUB_RUN_ATTEMPT:-0}-${EKKLESIA_CI_JOB_KEY:-${GITHUB_JOB:-local}}-${1:?ci_project_name needs a kind}-$$-${RANDOM}${RANDOM}"
+}

scripts/lib/deploy-smoke-client.mjs

@@ -14,6 +14,8 @@
 // Output is one line per check; any failed check exits non-zero. Nothing printed carries a
 // credential, cookie, signed URL, or response body beyond the fixed shapes asserted here.
 
+import { connect as connectHttp2 } from "node:http2";
+
 const mode = process.argv[2];
 const apiOrigin = `https://${required("SMOKE_HOSTNAME")}`;
 const dashboardOrigin = process.env.SMOKE_DASHBOARD_HOSTNAME
@@ -192,6 +194,46 @@ async function splitCorsChecks() {
   );
 }
 
+/**
+ * One GET over a real HTTP/2 connection. Node's fetch speaks HTTP/1.1, and the failure this guards
+ * against exists only on HTTP/2: a reset stream, which a browser reports as ERR_HTTP2_PROTOCOL_ERROR.
+ */
+function http2Get(url, headers = {}) {
+  return new Promise((resolve) => {
+    const session = connectHttp2(url.origin);
+    const finish = (result) => {
+      clearTimeout(timer);
+      session.close();
+      resolve(result);
+    };
+    const timer = setTimeout(() => finish({ error: "timeout" }), 10_000);
+    session.on("error", () => finish({ error: "session" }));
+    const stream = session.request({
+      ":method": "GET",
+      ":path": `${url.pathname}${url.search}`,
+      ...headers,
+    });
+    let status;
+    let responseHeaders = {};
+    let bytes = 0;
+    stream.on("response", (received) => {
+      status = received[":status"];
+      responseHeaders = received;
+    });
+    stream.on("data", (chunk) => {
+      bytes += chunk.length;
+    });
+    stream.on("error", (error) => finish({ error: error.code ?? "stream" }));
+    stream.on("end", () => finish({ bytes, headers: responseHeaders, status }));
+    stream.end();
+  });
+}
+
+/** The CORS headers of a response, by name: what a browser would act on. */
+function corsOf(response) {
+  return [...response.headers.keys()].filter((name) => name.startsWith("access-control-"));
+}
+
 async function storageDeliveryCheck() {
   // Core's own provider, from the image, exactly as the API composes it: it reaches object-storage
   // over HTTPS on the private network and signs read URLs for the storage hostname.
@@ -238,6 +280,79 @@ async function storageDeliveryCheck() {
       "a delivered object is Cache-Control: private",
     );
     await provider.delete(bucket, "smoke/object.txt");
+
+    // The same image, twice, over HTTP/2: a browser's second load of a signed URL it has cached is a
+    // conditional request, and must come back as a clean 304, not a reset stream.
+    const png = Buffer.from(
+      "iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAAAEAAAABCAYAAAAfFcSJAAAADUlEQVR42mP8z8BQDwAEhQGAhKmMIQAAAABJRU5ErkJggg==",
+      "base64",
+    );
+    await provider.put(bucket, "smoke/image.png", png, {
+      contentLength: png.byteLength,
+      contentType: "image/png",
+    });
+    const image = new URL(
+      (await provider.createReadUrl(bucket, "smoke/image.png", { expiresInSeconds: 300 })).url,
+    );
+    const first = await http2Get(image);
+    check(
+      first.status === 200 && first.bytes === png.byteLength && Boolean(first.headers?.etag),
+      "an image loads over HTTP/2 through the proxy, with a validator (200, ETag)",
+    );
+    const revalidated = await http2Get(image, { "if-none-match": first.headers?.etag ?? "" });
+    check(
+      revalidated.status === 304 && revalidated.error === undefined,
+      `the same image loaded again over HTTP/2 revalidates cleanly (${revalidated.status ?? revalidated.error})`,
+    );
+    const sinceModified = await http2Get(image, {
+      "if-modified-since": first.headers?.["last-modified"] ?? "",
+    });
+    check(
+      sinceModified.status === 304 && sinceModified.error === undefined,
+      `a revalidation by date over HTTP/2 is a clean 304 too (${sinceModified.status ?? sinceModified.error})`,
+    );
+
+    // Delivery-layer CORS is the deployment's own, set by the proxy: exactly the origins whose pages
+    // read objects with fetch(), GET and HEAD only, and nothing of the object store's own answer.
+    const fromApi = await fetch(image, { headers: { origin: apiOrigin } });
+    check(
+      fromApi.headers.get("access-control-allow-origin") === apiOrigin &&
+        (fromApi.headers.get("vary") ?? "").toLowerCase().includes("origin") &&
+        corsOf(fromApi).length === 1,
+      "a read from the API origin is allowed for exactly that origin, with Vary: Origin and nothing else",
+    );
+    if (split) {
+      const fromDashboard = await fetch(image, { headers: { origin: dashboardOrigin } });
+      check(
+        fromDashboard.headers.get("access-control-allow-origin") === dashboardOrigin,
+        "a read from the Dashboard origin is allowed for exactly that origin",
+      );
+    }
+    const fromElsewhere = await fetch(image, { headers: { origin: untrustedOrigin } });
+    check(
+      fromElsewhere.status === 200 && corsOf(fromElsewhere).length === 0,
+      "a read from any other origin gets no CORS header at all",
+    );
+    const preflight = await fetch(image, {
+      headers: { "access-control-request-method": "GET", origin: apiOrigin },
+      method: "OPTIONS",
+    });
+    check(
+      preflight.status === 204 &&
+        preflight.headers.get("access-control-allow-origin") === apiOrigin &&
+        preflight.headers.get("access-control-allow-methods") === "GET, HEAD" &&
+        preflight.headers.get("x-amz-request-id") === null,
+      "the proxy answers a preflight itself (204, GET and HEAD only), never the object store",
+    );
+    const foreignPreflight = await fetch(image, {
+      headers: { "access-control-request-method": "GET", origin: untrustedOrigin },
+      method: "OPTIONS",
+    });
+    check(
+      foreignPreflight.status === 204 && corsOf(foreignPreflight).length === 0,
+      "a preflight from any other origin is answered without permission",
+    );
+    await provider.delete(bucket, "smoke/image.png");
   } finally {
     await provider.close();
   }

scripts/smoke-deploy.sh

@@ -39,6 +39,8 @@ cd "$repository_root"
 
 # shellcheck source=scripts/lib/compose-diagnostics.sh
 source "$repository_root/scripts/lib/compose-diagnostics.sh"
+# shellcheck source=scripts/lib/ci-project.sh
+source "$repository_root/scripts/lib/ci-project.sh"
 
 for command in docker openssl awk; do
   command -v "$command" >/dev/null || {
@@ -67,7 +69,10 @@ same-origin | split) ;;
 esac
 
 run_id="$(openssl rand -hex 4)"
-project="ekklesia-deploy-smoke-${run_id}"
+# Unique per invocation, and findable by run and job if this script is killed before its trap runs
+# (scripts/lib/ci-project.sh, scripts/ci-sweep.sh). Everything started outside Compose below carries
+# the same name in EKKLESIA_CI_LABEL.
+project="$(ci_project_name "deploy-${topology}")"
 work="$(mktemp -d)"
 image="${EKKLESIA_SMOKE_IMAGE:-}"
 built_image=""
@@ -186,7 +191,9 @@ fail() {
 if [[ -z "$image" && "$topology" == same-origin ]]; then
   step "Building the platform-only image"
   built_image="ekklesia-deploy-smoke:${run_id}"
-  DOCKER_BUILDKIT=1 docker build --quiet --file deploy/Dockerfile --tag "$built_image" . >/dev/null
+  DOCKER_BUILDKIT=1 docker build --quiet --file deploy/Dockerfile --tag "$built_image" \
+    --label "${EKKLESIA_CI_LABEL}=${project}" --label "${EKKLESIA_CI_CREATED_LABEL}=$(date +%s)" \
+    . >/dev/null
   image="$built_image"
 elif [[ -z "$image" ]]; then
   # TEST-ONLY: the repository's module template, installed as the module `example`, in a copy of the
@@ -206,6 +213,7 @@ elif [[ -z "$image" ]]; then
   sed -i 's|^  templates/module:$|  modules/example:|' "$context/pnpm-lock.yaml"
   built_image="ekklesia-deploy-smoke:${run_id}"
   DOCKER_BUILDKIT=1 docker build --quiet --file "$context/deploy/Dockerfile" --tag "$built_image" \
+    --label "${EKKLESIA_CI_LABEL}=${project}" --label "${EKKLESIA_CI_CREATED_LABEL}=$(date +%s)" \
     "$context" >/dev/null || fail "the test-module image did not build."
   rm -rf "$context"
   image="$built_image"
@@ -362,6 +370,7 @@ client() {
   local mode="$1"
   shift
   docker run --rm --read-only --cap-drop ALL --security-opt no-new-privileges \
+    --label "${EKKLESIA_CI_LABEL}=${project}" \
     --network "$edge_network" "$@" "${host_mappings[@]}" \
     -e NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS=/smoke/client-ca.pem -e SMOKE_HOSTNAME="$hostname" \
     -e SMOKE_DASHBOARD_HOSTNAME="$dashboard_hostname" \
@@ -401,7 +410,7 @@ if [[ "$topology" == split ]]; then
   browser_container="${project}-browser"
   # The image's entry script passes its arguments on unquoted, so none may contain a space: the
   # hostnames reach Chromium through /etc/hosts, which it reads, rather than a resolver rule.
-  docker run --detach --rm --name "$browser_container" \
+  docker run --detach --rm --name "$browser_container" --label "${EKKLESIA_CI_LABEL}=${project}" \
     --cap-drop ALL --security-opt no-new-privileges --tmpfs /tmp \
     --network "$edge_network" --ip "$browser_address" "${host_mappings[@]}" \
     "$browser_image" \
@@ -410,6 +419,7 @@ if [[ "$topology" == split ]]; then
   cp scripts/lib/deploy-smoke-browser.mjs "$work/browser.mjs"
   stage browser.mjs
   docker run --rm --read-only --cap-drop ALL --security-opt no-new-privileges \
+    --label "${EKKLESIA_CI_LABEL}=${project}" \
     --network "$edge_network" \
     -e SMOKE_CDP_ADDRESS="${browser_address}:9222" \
     -e SMOKE_HOSTNAME="$hostname" -e SMOKE_DASHBOARD_HOSTNAME="$dashboard_hostname" \
@@ -423,9 +433,9 @@ if [[ "$topology" == split ]]; then
     kiosk_container="${project}-kiosk"
     kiosk_volume="${project}-kiosk-profile"
     kiosk_address="10.249.${octet}.250"
-    docker volume create "$kiosk_volume" >/dev/null
+    docker volume create --label "${EKKLESIA_CI_LABEL}=${project}" "$kiosk_volume" >/dev/null
     start_kiosk() {
-      docker run --detach --rm --name "$kiosk_container" \
+      docker run --detach --rm --name "$kiosk_container" --label "${EKKLESIA_CI_LABEL}=${project}" \
         --cap-drop ALL --security-opt no-new-privileges --tmpfs /tmp \
         --network "$edge_network" --ip "$kiosk_address" "${host_mappings[@]}" \
         -v "${kiosk_volume}:/profile" \

scripts/smoke-infrastructure.sh

@@ -9,6 +9,8 @@ cd "$repository_root"
 source "$repository_root/scripts/lib/compose-job-network.sh"
 # shellcheck source=scripts/lib/compose-diagnostics.sh
 source "$repository_root/scripts/lib/compose-diagnostics.sh"
+# shellcheck source=scripts/lib/ci-project.sh
+source "$repository_root/scripts/lib/ci-project.sh"
 
 command -v docker >/dev/null || {
   echo "Docker is required for the infrastructure smoke test." >&2
@@ -30,11 +32,9 @@ if [[ "$curl_help" != *"--aws-sigv4"* ]]; then
   exit 1
 fi
 
-# Unique per invocation, not only per run: several runs can share a runner's Docker daemon at once,
+# Unique per invocation, and findable by run and job if this script is killed before its trap runs
-# and the shell's PID is often identical across job containers.
+# (scripts/lib/ci-project.sh, scripts/ci-sweep.sh).
-raw_project="ekklesia-smoke-${GITHUB_RUN_ID:-local}-${GITHUB_RUN_ATTEMPT:-0}-$$-${RANDOM}${RANDOM}"
+project="$(ci_project_name infrastructure)"
-project="${raw_project//[^a-zA-Z0-9_-]/-}"
-project="${project,,}"
 temporary_directory="$(mktemp -d)"
 payload_file="$temporary_directory/payload.txt"
 download_file="$temporary_directory/download.txt"

scripts/test-ci-sweep.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,129 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# Proves scripts/ci-sweep.sh against real Docker resources: what it removes, and above all what it
+# leaves alone. CI runs it before trusting the sweep with a shared runner's daemon.
+#
+#   bash scripts/test-ci-sweep.sh
+#
+# Every resource it creates is named and labeled for this run alone, under fake run identifiers, so
+# it can never touch a real stack; and it removes all of them on exit, whatever happens.
+
+set -Eeuo pipefail
+
+repository_root="$(cd -- "$(dirname -- "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")/.." && pwd)"
+cd "$repository_root"
+
+image="$(sed -n 's/^[[:space:]]*image: \(postgres:[^[:space:]]*\)$/\1/p' deploy/compose.yaml | head -1)"
+[[ -n "$image" ]] || {
+  echo "test-ci-sweep: no pinned PostgreSQL image in deploy/compose.yaml." >&2
+  exit 1
+}
+docker image inspect "$image" >/dev/null 2>&1 || docker pull --quiet "$image" >/dev/null
+
+nonce="$(openssl rand -hex 4)"
+compose_label="com.docker.compose.project"
+ci_label="org.riverofglorymn.ekklesia.ci.project"
+failures=0
+created=()
+
+check() {
+  if eval "$1"; then
+    echo "ok   $2"
+  else
+    echo "FAIL $2"
+    failures=$((failures + 1))
+  fi
+}
+
+# project_exists <project>: any container, network, volume, or image still carries its label.
+project_exists() {
+  local project="$1"
+  [[ -n "$(
+    docker ps --all --quiet --filter "label=${compose_label}=${project}"
+    docker ps --all --quiet --filter "label=${ci_label}=${project}"
+    docker network ls --quiet --filter "label=${compose_label}=${project}"
+    docker volume ls --quiet --filter "label=${compose_label}=${project}"
+    docker image ls --quiet --filter "label=${ci_label}=${project}"
+  )" ]]
+}
+
+staging_exists() {
+  docker run --rm --entrypoint test -v /tmp:/host-tmp "$image" -d "/host-tmp/$1"
+}
+
+# make_stack <project>: what a CI script leaves behind when it is killed: a Compose-labeled network,
+# volume, and running container; a CI-labeled container and image; and a staging directory on the
+# Docker host.
+make_stack() {
+  local project="$1"
+  created+=("$project")
+  docker network create --label "${compose_label}=${project}" "${project}_default" >/dev/null
+  docker volume create --label "${compose_label}=${project}" "${project}_data" >/dev/null
+  docker run --detach --name "${project}-db" --label "${compose_label}=${project}" \
+    --network "${project}_default" -v "${project}_data:/data" --entrypoint sleep "$image" 600 >/dev/null
+  docker run --detach --name "${project}-browser" --label "${ci_label}=${project}" \
+    --entrypoint sleep "$image" 600 >/dev/null
+  printf 'FROM %s\nLABEL %s=%s %s=%s\n' "$image" "$ci_label" "$project" \
+    "org.riverofglorymn.ekklesia.ci.created" "$(date +%s)" |
+    docker build --quiet --tag "${project}-image:test" - >/dev/null
+  docker run --rm --entrypoint mkdir -v /tmp:/host-tmp "$image" -p "/host-tmp/${project}"
+}
+
+job_container="test-ci-sweep-job-${nonce}"
+cleanup() {
+  local status=$?
+  trap - EXIT INT TERM
+  docker rm --force "$job_container" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
+  for project in "${created[@]}"; do
+    docker ps --all --quiet --filter "label=${compose_label}=${project}" | xargs -r docker rm --force >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
+    docker ps --all --quiet --filter "label=${ci_label}=${project}" | xargs -r docker rm --force >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
+    docker network rm "${project}_default" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
+    docker volume rm --force "${project}_data" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
+    docker image rm --force "${project}-image:test" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
+    docker run --rm --entrypoint rm -v /tmp:/host-tmp "$image" -rf "/host-tmp/${project}" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
+  done
+  exit "$status"
+}
+trap cleanup EXIT INT TERM
+
+# shellcheck source=scripts/lib/ci-project.sh
+source "$repository_root/scripts/lib/ci-project.sh"
+
+# Fake run identifiers: nothing here can match a real run's stacks.
+export GITHUB_RUN_ID="sweeptest${nonce}"
+export GITHUB_RUN_ATTEMPT="1"
+mine="$(EKKLESIA_CI_JOB_KEY=alpha ci_project_name mine)"
+sibling="$(EKKLESIA_CI_JOB_KEY=beta ci_project_name sibling)"
+foreign="ekklesia-sweep-control-${nonce}"
+for project in "$mine" "$sibling" "$foreign"; do
+  make_stack "$project"
+done
+# A job container connected to this job's stack network, exactly as compose-job-network.sh does.
+docker run --detach --name "$job_container" --entrypoint sleep "$image" 600 >/dev/null
+docker network connect "${mine}_default" "$job_container"
+
+echo "--- --job removes this job's stacks, at any age, and nothing else"
+EKKLESIA_CI_JOB_KEY=alpha bash scripts/ci-sweep.sh --job
+check '! project_exists "$mine"' "this job's containers, network, volume, and image are gone"
+check '! staging_exists "$mine"' "this job's staging directory on the Docker host is gone"
+check 'project_exists "$sibling"' "another job's stack in the same run is left alone"
+check 'project_exists "$foreign"' "a stack outside the CI prefix is left alone"
+check 'docker inspect "$job_container" >/dev/null 2>&1' \
+  "a job container connected to the stack's network is disconnected, never removed"
+
+echo "--- --job refuses to run outside CI, where it could remove a developer's own stacks"
+check '! env -u GITHUB_RUN_ID bash scripts/ci-sweep.sh --job >/dev/null 2>&1' \
+  "--job without GITHUB_RUN_ID fails"
+
+echo "--- --stale removes only CI stacks older than its threshold"
+bash scripts/ci-sweep.sh --stale
+check 'project_exists "$sibling"' "a young CI stack survives the default threshold"
+bash scripts/ci-sweep.sh --stale --max-age-seconds 0
+check '! project_exists "$sibling"' "a CI stack older than the threshold is removed"
+check '! staging_exists "$sibling"' "its staging directory too"
+check 'project_exists "$foreign"' "a stack outside the CI prefix is never removed, at any age"
+
+if ((failures > 0)); then
+  echo "test-ci-sweep: ${failures} check(s) failed." >&2
+  exit 1
+fi
+echo "CI sweep checks passed."

scripts/test-migrations-integration.sh

@@ -9,6 +9,8 @@ cd "$repository_root"
 source "$repository_root/scripts/lib/compose-job-network.sh"
 # shellcheck source=scripts/lib/compose-diagnostics.sh
 source "$repository_root/scripts/lib/compose-diagnostics.sh"
+# shellcheck source=scripts/lib/ci-project.sh
+source "$repository_root/scripts/lib/ci-project.sh"
 
 command -v docker >/dev/null || {
   echo "Docker is required for the PostgreSQL migration integration suite." >&2
@@ -27,11 +29,9 @@ if ! compose_job_network_initialize; then
   exit 1
 fi
 
-# Unique per invocation, not only per run: several runs (and several jobs of one run) can share a
+# Unique per invocation, and findable by run and job if this script is killed before its trap runs
-# runner's Docker daemon at once, and the shell's PID is often identical across job containers.
+# (scripts/lib/ci-project.sh, scripts/ci-sweep.sh).
-raw_project="ekklesia-migration-${GITHUB_RUN_ID:-local}-${GITHUB_RUN_ATTEMPT:-0}-${GITHUB_JOB:-job}-$$-${RANDOM}${RANDOM}"
+project="$(ci_project_name migration)"
-project="${raw_project//[^a-zA-Z0-9_-]/-}"
-project="${project,,}"
 
 export POSTGRES_DB="ekklesia_migration_test"
 export POSTGRES_USER="ekklesia_migration_test"

surfaces/shell/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@ekklesia/shell",
-  "version": "0.1.1",
+  "version": "0.1.2",
   "private": true,
   "type": "module",
   "files": [

tests/ci-scripts.test.ts

@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ import path from "node:path";
 import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
 import { promisify } from "node:util";
 import { describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
+import { parse } from "yaml";
 
 /**
  * The scripts CI runs against a shared Docker daemon. Several runs, and several jobs of one run, can
@@ -59,21 +60,68 @@ describe("CI scripts on a shared Docker daemon", () => {
     }
   });
 
-  it("give every Compose project a name unique to the invocation, not only the run", async () => {
+  it("name every stack through one helper: the reserved CI prefix, the job's key, and a unique suffix", async () => {
-    expect(await source("scripts/test-migrations-integration.sh")).toMatch(
+    const helper = await source("scripts/lib/ci-project.sh");
-      /raw_project="ekklesia-migration-[^"\n]*\$\$-\$\{RANDOM\}\$\{RANDOM\}"/u,
+    // Run, attempt, job key, kind, then a per-invocation suffix: unique even when job containers
+    // share a PID, and findable later by run and job alone (scripts/ci-sweep.sh --job).
+    expect(helper).toContain(
+      "ekklesia-ci-${GITHUB_RUN_ID:-local}-${GITHUB_RUN_ATTEMPT:-0}-${EKKLESIA_CI_JOB_KEY:-${GITHUB_JOB:-local}}-",
     );
-    expect(await source("scripts/smoke-infrastructure.sh")).toMatch(
+    expect(helper).toContain("$$-${RANDOM}${RANDOM}");
-      /raw_project="ekklesia-smoke-[^"\n]*\$\$-\$\{RANDOM\}\$\{RANDOM\}"/u,
-    );
-    const deploy = await source("scripts/smoke-deploy.sh");
-    expect(deploy).toContain('run_id="$(openssl rand -hex 4)"');
-    expect(deploy).toContain('project="ekklesia-deploy-smoke-${run_id}"');
     for (const relativePath of ciScripts) {
-      expect(await source(relativePath), relativePath).toContain('--project-name "$project"');
+      const text = await source(relativePath);
+      expect(text, relativePath).toContain('source "$repository_root/scripts/lib/ci-project.sh"');
+      expect(text, relativePath).toMatch(/^project="\$\(ci_project_name [a-z"${}_-]+\)"$/mu);
+      expect(text, relativePath).not.toContain("raw_project=");
+      expect(text, relativePath).toContain('--project-name "$project"');
     }
   });
 
+  it("label everything the deploy smoke creates outside Compose, so a sweep can find it", async () => {
+    // Continuation lines joined, so each command is checked whole.
+    const deploy = (await source("scripts/smoke-deploy.sh")).replace(/\\\n\s*/gu, " ");
+    const creating = deploy
+      .split("\n")
+      .filter((line) => /\bdocker (?:run --detach|volume create|build)\b/u.test(line));
+    expect(creating.length).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(4);
+    for (const line of creating) {
+      expect(line).toContain('--label "${EKKLESIA_CI_LABEL}=${project}"');
+    }
+  });
+
+  it("sweep stale stacks before, and this job's own stacks after, every job that starts any", async () => {
+    const workflow = parse(await source(".github/workflows/ci.yml")) as {
+      jobs: Record<
+        string,
+        { env?: Record<string, string>; steps: { if?: string; run?: string; name?: string }[] }
+      >;
+    };
+    const startsStacks =
+      /smoke-infrastructure\.sh|test:migrations:integration|smoke-deploy\.sh|docker build/u;
+    const jobs = Object.entries(workflow.jobs).filter(([, job]) =>
+      job.steps.some((step) => startsStacks.test(step.run ?? "")),
+    );
+    expect(jobs.map(([id]) => id).sort()).toEqual(
+      ["deploy-smoke", "image-build", "infrastructure-smoke", "migration-smoke"].sort(),
+    );
+    for (const [id, job] of jobs) {
+      expect(job.env?.EKKLESIA_CI_JOB_KEY, id).toBeTruthy();
+      const runs = job.steps.map((step) => step.run ?? "");
+      const firstStack = runs.findIndex((run) => startsStacks.test(run));
+      const stale = runs.findIndex((run) => run.includes("bash scripts/ci-sweep.sh --stale"));
+      const own = job.steps.findIndex(
+        (step) =>
+          step.if === "always()" && (step.run ?? "").includes("bash scripts/ci-sweep.sh --job"),
+      );
+      expect(stale, `${id}: stale sweep`).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(0);
+      expect(stale, `${id}: stale sweep runs first`).toBeLessThan(firstStack);
+      expect(own, `${id}: its own cleanup, always`).toBeGreaterThan(firstStack);
+      expect(own, `${id}: cleanup is the last step`).toBe(job.steps.length - 1);
+    }
+    // One matrix leg's cleanup must never remove the other leg's running stack.
+    expect(workflow.jobs["deploy-smoke"]?.env?.EKKLESIA_CI_JOB_KEY).toContain("matrix.topology");
+  });
+
   it("choose the deploy smoke's edge subnet from those not in use, and choose again on a race", async () => {
     const deploy = await source("scripts/smoke-deploy.sh");
     expect(deploy).not.toMatch(/^octet=\$\(\(RANDOM/mu);