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Ekklesia/core/tests/authorization-permissions.test.ts
ekklesiaandClaude Opus 5 80189c8ae2
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feat: give display devices their own paired identity
ADR 0033 gave Ekklesia a display host and ADR 0034 gave it a login page.
Together, the only way to light a television in a foyer was to sign a
human being into it and leave that session running on a screen anyone can
walk up to: a person's credentials on a wall, a person's session as the
thing signage depends on, and the display going dark when they are
revoked or their session simply expires.

A screen is not a person. Ekklesia now recognizes three principal classes
— anonymous, authenticated human, and managed device — and a device is a
first-class principal with its own credential and its own explicit
permissions. It has no email, no password, and no row in the identity
tables, and it satisfies the `authenticated` baseline never, so every
route that settles for "somebody is signed in" stays closed to it.

Device permissions live in their own table because
ekklesia_core_grant.user_id is a non-null foreign key into the user table
and making it polymorphic would rewrite the platform's central
authorization record to serve one narrow case. That is a schema decision,
not a second decision point: the evaluator gained one branch, so a device
is allowed or denied by the same function, with the same deny-by-default,
as anyone else — with no owner path it could reach and no baseline that
stands in for a grant.

The six-digit code is not the credential. It is printed across a screen in
a public hallway, so it is treated as public: it identifies a request to
an administrator and is worth nothing alone. Collecting the credential
also requires a 256-bit claim secret held only in the requesting browser's
HttpOnly cookie, and approving requires the restricted core.devices.manage
permission. Without that split, reading a code off a wall would hand over
the screen's identity.

The permission a pairing asks for is read from the module's validated
display declaration, never from the request, so a browser cannot ask to be
granted core.devices.manage or another module's permission. Approval
grants exactly that one permission.

Credentials are stored only as SHA-256; the raw value exists in the
Set-Cookie that issues it and the device's own cookie jar, and is never
logged, returned in JSON, or placed in a URL. The cookie is HttpOnly, so
the module display code running in that same page cannot read it.
Revocation is a server-side column checked on every principal resolution,
and re-pairing mints a new identity so an old credential can never come
back. State transitions are conditional updates, so one code cannot be
approved twice or claimed into two credentials under a race.

/api/v1/principal still reports a device as anonymous: it is what the
Dashboard uses to decide whether a person is signed in. Displays read
their viewer from the descriptor instead, which already performed the
authorization — so displays are descriptor-first while the Dashboard stays
principal-first, and neither infers an identity by elimination.

Proven end to end against real PostgreSQL and real HTTP: an unpaired
screen shows a code, an owner approves it, the device opens the display
descriptor and a realtime stream, and revocation closes both while the
device still holds its cookie. An already-open SSE stream is bounded by
realtime's existing five-minute reconnect rather than closed instantly,
and that bound is documented rather than called immediate.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-23 23:41:03 -05:00

192 lines
7.9 KiB
TypeScript

import { parsePermissionId } from "@ekklesia/contracts";
import { describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
import {
CORE_AUTHORIZATION_GRANTS_MANAGE,
CORE_DASHBOARD_NAVIGATION_MANAGE,
CORE_DEVICES_MANAGE,
CORE_MODULES_CONFIGURATION_MANAGE,
CORE_MODULES_LIFECYCLE_MANAGE,
CORE_MODULES_UI_READ,
CORE_PERMISSION_DECLARATIONS,
CORE_PERMISSION_REGISTRY,
createPermissionRegistry,
PermissionRegistryError,
} from "../src/authorization/index.js";
describe("createPermissionRegistry", () => {
it("builds an immutable registry from a fixed declaration list", () => {
const id = parsePermissionId("test.example.read");
const registry = createPermissionRegistry([
{ baseline: "public", description: "An example permission.", id },
]);
expect(registry.has(id)).toBe(true);
expect(registry.get(id)).toEqual({
baseline: "public",
description: "An example permission.",
id,
});
expect(Object.isFrozen(registry)).toBe(true);
expect(Object.isFrozen(registry.declarations)).toBe(true);
expect(Object.isFrozen(registry.get(id))).toBe(true);
});
it("rejects a duplicate permission id at composition time, not per request", () => {
const id = parsePermissionId("test.example.read");
expect(() =>
createPermissionRegistry([
{ baseline: "public", description: "First.", id },
{ baseline: "restricted", description: "Second.", id },
]),
).toThrow(PermissionRegistryError);
});
it("carries the offending permission id on the duplicate-declaration error (a composition-time, developer-facing detail, not a runtime response)", () => {
const id = parsePermissionId("test.example.read");
let captured: unknown;
try {
createPermissionRegistry([
{ baseline: "public", description: "First.", id },
{ baseline: "restricted", description: "Second.", id },
]);
} catch (error) {
captured = error;
}
expect(captured).toBeInstanceOf(PermissionRegistryError);
expect(captured).toMatchObject({
code: "PERMISSION_REGISTRY_DUPLICATE_DECLARATION",
permissionId: id,
});
});
it("treats an unregistered permission the same as a malformed one: get/has both fail closed", () => {
const registered = parsePermissionId("test.example.read");
const unregistered = parsePermissionId("test.example.unregistered");
const registry = createPermissionRegistry([
{ baseline: "public", description: "Registered.", id: registered },
]);
expect(registry.has(unregistered)).toBe(false);
expect(registry.get(unregistered)).toBeUndefined();
});
it("fails closed for a malformed permission id passed to get/has, without throwing", () => {
const registry = createPermissionRegistry([]);
expect(registry.has("not a valid permission")).toBe(false);
expect(registry.get(null)).toBeUndefined();
expect(registry.get(undefined)).toBeUndefined();
expect(registry.get(42)).toBeUndefined();
expect(registry.get("media.*")).toBeUndefined();
});
it("builds an empty registry from an empty list without error", () => {
const registry = createPermissionRegistry([]);
expect(registry.declarations).toEqual([]);
});
});
describe("CORE_PERMISSION_REGISTRY", () => {
it("registers exactly core.authorization.grants.manage as restricted", () => {
const declaration = CORE_PERMISSION_REGISTRY.get(CORE_AUTHORIZATION_GRANTS_MANAGE);
expect(declaration).toBeDefined();
expect(declaration?.baseline).toBe("restricted");
expect(declaration?.id).toBe("core.authorization.grants.manage");
});
it("registers core.modules.ui.read as authenticated, not restricted", () => {
const declaration = CORE_PERMISSION_REGISTRY.get(CORE_MODULES_UI_READ);
expect(declaration).toBeDefined();
// Any signed-in user may learn which module UIs the browser host can mount; a shell that
// rendered nothing until an operator granted each user a permission would be unusable, and the
// module UIs gate their own content on their own permissions regardless (ADR 0026).
expect(declaration?.baseline).toBe("authenticated");
expect(declaration?.id).toBe("core.modules.ui.read");
});
it("registers core.dashboard.navigation.manage as restricted", () => {
const declaration = CORE_PERMISSION_REGISTRY.get(CORE_DASHBOARD_NAVIGATION_MANAGE);
expect(declaration).toBeDefined();
// Reorganizing the Dashboard is administrative, not something every signed-in user may do —
// unlike merely reading which module UIs exist (ADR 0027).
expect(declaration?.baseline).toBe("restricted");
expect(declaration?.id).toBe("core.dashboard.navigation.manage");
});
it("registers core.modules.lifecycle.manage as restricted", () => {
const declaration = CORE_PERMISSION_REGISTRY.get(CORE_MODULES_LIFECYCLE_MANAGE);
expect(declaration).toBeDefined();
// Deciding which installed modules run is administrative, and so is *reading* that: the
// lifecycle view is the only place a disabled or blocked module is visible at all, unlike the
// merely-authenticated mountable inventory (ADR 0028).
expect(declaration?.baseline).toBe("restricted");
expect(declaration?.id).toBe("core.modules.lifecycle.manage");
});
it("registers core.modules.configuration.manage as restricted, separately from lifecycle", () => {
const declaration = CORE_PERMISSION_REGISTRY.get(CORE_MODULES_CONFIGURATION_MANAGE);
expect(declaration).toBeDefined();
expect(declaration?.baseline).toBe("restricted");
expect(declaration?.id).toBe("core.modules.configuration.manage");
// Deliberately a different permission from lifecycle management: tuning how a module behaves
// and deciding whether it runs at all are different authorities (ADR 0029).
expect(CORE_MODULES_CONFIGURATION_MANAGE).not.toBe(CORE_MODULES_LIFECYCLE_MANAGE);
});
it("contains exactly these six permissions and no others", () => {
expect(CORE_PERMISSION_REGISTRY.declarations.map((declaration) => declaration.id)).toEqual([
CORE_AUTHORIZATION_GRANTS_MANAGE,
CORE_MODULES_UI_READ,
CORE_DASHBOARD_NAVIGATION_MANAGE,
CORE_MODULES_LIFECYCLE_MANAGE,
CORE_MODULES_CONFIGURATION_MANAGE,
CORE_DEVICES_MANAGE,
]);
});
});
describe("CORE_PERMISSION_DECLARATIONS", () => {
it("is Core's own declaration list, exported separately from the registry in deeply immutable form", () => {
expect(CORE_PERMISSION_DECLARATIONS).toEqual([
{
baseline: "restricted",
description: "Create, list, and revoke another user's explicit authorization grants.",
id: CORE_AUTHORIZATION_GRANTS_MANAGE,
},
{
baseline: "authenticated",
description: "List the installed module UIs a browser host may mount.",
id: CORE_MODULES_UI_READ,
},
{
baseline: "restricted",
description: "Organize the Dashboard: create, rename, order, and delete navigation groups.",
id: CORE_DASHBOARD_NAVIGATION_MANAGE,
},
{
baseline: "restricted",
description: "Read and change which installed modules are enabled.",
id: CORE_MODULES_LIFECYCLE_MANAGE,
},
{
baseline: "restricted",
description: "Read and change an installed module's own configuration values.",
id: CORE_MODULES_CONFIGURATION_MANAGE,
},
{
baseline: "restricted",
description: "Approve display device pairing, list paired devices, and revoke a device.",
id: CORE_DEVICES_MANAGE,
},
]);
expect(Object.isFrozen(CORE_PERMISSION_DECLARATIONS)).toBe(true);
for (const declaration of CORE_PERMISSION_DECLARATIONS) {
expect(Object.isFrozen(declaration)).toBe(true);
}
});
it("matches exactly what CORE_PERMISSION_REGISTRY exposes as its own declarations, so a composer building on top of it never diverges from what Core itself registers", () => {
expect(CORE_PERMISSION_DECLARATIONS).toEqual(CORE_PERMISSION_REGISTRY.declarations);
});
});