ADR 0033 gave Ekklesia a display host and ADR 0034 gave it a login page. Together, the only way to light a television in a foyer was to sign a human being into it and leave that session running on a screen anyone can walk up to: a person's credentials on a wall, a person's session as the thing signage depends on, and the display going dark when they are revoked or their session simply expires. A screen is not a person. Ekklesia now recognizes three principal classes — anonymous, authenticated human, and managed device — and a device is a first-class principal with its own credential and its own explicit permissions. It has no email, no password, and no row in the identity tables, and it satisfies the `authenticated` baseline never, so every route that settles for "somebody is signed in" stays closed to it. Device permissions live in their own table because ekklesia_core_grant.user_id is a non-null foreign key into the user table and making it polymorphic would rewrite the platform's central authorization record to serve one narrow case. That is a schema decision, not a second decision point: the evaluator gained one branch, so a device is allowed or denied by the same function, with the same deny-by-default, as anyone else — with no owner path it could reach and no baseline that stands in for a grant. The six-digit code is not the credential. It is printed across a screen in a public hallway, so it is treated as public: it identifies a request to an administrator and is worth nothing alone. Collecting the credential also requires a 256-bit claim secret held only in the requesting browser's HttpOnly cookie, and approving requires the restricted core.devices.manage permission. Without that split, reading a code off a wall would hand over the screen's identity. The permission a pairing asks for is read from the module's validated display declaration, never from the request, so a browser cannot ask to be granted core.devices.manage or another module's permission. Approval grants exactly that one permission. Credentials are stored only as SHA-256; the raw value exists in the Set-Cookie that issues it and the device's own cookie jar, and is never logged, returned in JSON, or placed in a URL. The cookie is HttpOnly, so the module display code running in that same page cannot read it. Revocation is a server-side column checked on every principal resolution, and re-pairing mints a new identity so an old credential can never come back. State transitions are conditional updates, so one code cannot be approved twice or claimed into two credentials under a race. /api/v1/principal still reports a device as anonymous: it is what the Dashboard uses to decide whether a person is signed in. Displays read their viewer from the descriptor instead, which already performed the authorization — so displays are descriptor-first while the Dashboard stays principal-first, and neither infers an identity by elimination. Proven end to end against real PostgreSQL and real HTTP: an unpaired screen shows a code, an owner approves it, the device opens the display descriptor and a realtime stream, and revocation closes both while the device still holds its cookie. An already-open SSE stream is bounded by realtime's existing five-minute reconnect rather than closed instantly, and that bound is documented rather than called immediate. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
119 lines
4.4 KiB
TypeScript
119 lines
4.4 KiB
TypeScript
import { z } from "zod";
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/**
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* Opaque at the type level via Zod's nominal `.brand()`: a plain `string` is not assignable to
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* `EkklesiaUserId` without passing through `parseEkklesiaUserId`/`safeParseEkklesiaUserId`. The
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* brand exists only in the type system — it adds no runtime tag, wrapper, or field, so a value
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* still serializes (JSON.stringify, string concatenation, equality) as a plain opaque string.
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* Ekklesia does not assume any particular format (in particular, not UUID): Phase 4A's identity
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* schema stores Better Auth's default application-generated id, an opaque base62-ish string, not
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* a database-generated UUID. Only the constraints Ekklesia itself owns are validated: non-empty
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* after trimming, and a generous upper bound against unreasonably large values.
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*/
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export const ekklesiaUserIdSchema = z.string().trim().min(1).max(128).brand<"EkklesiaUserId">();
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export type EkklesiaUserId = z.infer<typeof ekklesiaUserIdSchema>;
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export function parseEkklesiaUserId(input: unknown): EkklesiaUserId {
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return ekklesiaUserIdSchema.parse(input);
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}
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export function safeParseEkklesiaUserId(input: unknown): z.ZodSafeParseResult<EkklesiaUserId> {
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return ekklesiaUserIdSchema.safeParse(input);
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}
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/**
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* A managed display device: a TV, signage player, or confidence monitor that the platform paired
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* and can revoke.
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*
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* It is deliberately **not** a user. A device has no email, no password, no session that a person
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* signs into, and no row in the user table — representing one as a fake user would make every
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* "is this a person?" question in the platform unanswerable, and would quietly hand a screen in a
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* hallway whatever a signed-in human is allowed to do.
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*
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* A device principal carries only the permissions explicitly granted to that device. It satisfies
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* no `authenticated` baseline: "unattended screen in the foyer" is not "a person is signed in",
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* and every route gated only by "someone is logged in" would otherwise open to it (ADR 0036).
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*/
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export const ekklesiaDeviceIdSchema = z
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.string()
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.regex(/^[0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{12}$/u)
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.brand<"EkklesiaDeviceId">();
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export type EkklesiaDeviceId = z.infer<typeof ekklesiaDeviceIdSchema>;
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export function parseEkklesiaDeviceId(input: unknown): EkklesiaDeviceId {
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return ekklesiaDeviceIdSchema.parse(input);
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}
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export function safeParseEkklesiaDeviceId(input: unknown): z.ZodSafeParseResult<EkklesiaDeviceId> {
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return ekklesiaDeviceIdSchema.safeParse(input);
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}
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export interface EkklesiaAnonymousPrincipal {
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readonly kind: "anonymous";
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}
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export interface EkklesiaAuthenticatedPrincipal {
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readonly kind: "authenticated";
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readonly userId: EkklesiaUserId;
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}
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export interface EkklesiaDevicePrincipal {
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readonly kind: "device";
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readonly deviceId: EkklesiaDeviceId;
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}
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/**
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* The three principal classes Ekklesia recognizes. They are deliberately a closed union rather than
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* "authenticated or not": code that means *a person* must be able to say so, and code that merely
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* needs *some* caller must not accidentally accept a device.
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*/
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export type EkklesiaPrincipal =
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| EkklesiaAnonymousPrincipal
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| EkklesiaAuthenticatedPrincipal
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| EkklesiaDevicePrincipal;
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export const ANONYMOUS_PRINCIPAL: EkklesiaAnonymousPrincipal = Object.freeze({
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kind: "anonymous",
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});
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export function createAuthenticatedPrincipal(userId: unknown): EkklesiaAuthenticatedPrincipal {
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return Object.freeze({
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kind: "authenticated",
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userId: parseEkklesiaUserId(userId),
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});
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}
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export function createDevicePrincipal(deviceId: unknown): EkklesiaDevicePrincipal {
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return Object.freeze({
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deviceId: parseEkklesiaDeviceId(deviceId),
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kind: "device",
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});
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}
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export function isAnonymousPrincipal(
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principal: EkklesiaPrincipal,
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): principal is EkklesiaAnonymousPrincipal {
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return principal.kind === "anonymous";
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}
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/**
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* Whether this principal is a signed-in **person**.
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*
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* A device principal deliberately returns `false`. Every existing caller of this predicate means
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* "a human is authenticated here" — the Dashboard shell, the `authenticated` permission baseline,
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* the grants API — and each of them would be wrong about a screen on a wall.
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*/
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export function isAuthenticatedPrincipal(
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principal: EkklesiaPrincipal,
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): principal is EkklesiaAuthenticatedPrincipal {
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return principal.kind === "authenticated";
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}
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export function isDevicePrincipal(
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principal: EkklesiaPrincipal,
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): principal is EkklesiaDevicePrincipal {
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return principal.kind === "device";
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}
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