Files
Ekklesia/core/src/database/pool.ts
T
ekklesiaandClaude Opus 5 6b6b77c105 fix: enforce production transport policy
Every PostgreSQL connection this repository opened was plaintext, in every
environment: no connection site set `ssl` at all, so credentials, session
tokens, and row data crossed the network in the clear and nothing in
configuration, startup, or `pnpm doctor` said so. The public identity URL
boundary was also looser than it appeared.

`core/src/database/transport.ts` is now the one typed policy. It has exactly two
modes: `verify-full` (TLS required, certificate chain verified, and server
identity verified against the configured host — the production default) and
`disable` (the development/test default, refused outright in production). There
is deliberately no encryption-only `require` mode, no chain-only `verify-ca`,
and no `rejectUnauthorized: false` escape hatch anywhere in the configuration
surface; every loose or aliased spelling is rejected in both environments, so a
typo never quietly becomes a weaker mode. Production has no plaintext exception
at all, not even for a loopback database — a connection string cannot prove the
database is process-local.

Verification is certificate *and* hostname. The policy supplies an explicit
`checkServerIdentity` pinned to the host parsed from DATABASE_URL, because the
pinned driver sets TLS `servername` only for non-IP hosts and Node performs no
identity check when it is unset — so `rejectUnauthorized: true` alone accepts a
certificate from any host the trusted CA ever signed when connecting by IP.
Both halves are proven against a real TLS-enabled PostgreSQL, including that the
same connection without the pinned callback succeeds. Every CA, certificate, and
key is generated at test runtime and deleted afterwards.

A DATABASE_URL may no longer carry its own TLS parameters. The pinned driver
merges parsed connection-string values over explicitly passed options, so a
`?sslmode=disable` in the URL would silently replace the policy's verified `ssl`
object; that now fails with a stable code, reported by both `pnpm doctor` and
the migration CLIs rather than as "failed unexpectedly".

One shared environment reader keeps `process.env` out of Core's reusable
constructors, and every executable that opens a connection resolves the policy
identically: the API (validated before any pool, Better Auth instance, module
runtime, or listener exists), both migration commands, the bootstrap CLI, and
Doctor's own connection. Doctor reports it as a blocking failure, never a
warning, naming only the effective mode.

Separately, the identity base URL and every trusted origin must now be exactly
one canonical origin — the WHATWG origin serialization must equal the supplied
string — so a path, trailing slash, credentials, explicit default port, or
non-canonical case is rejected rather than normalized into something that no
longer matches what a browser sends. Production's loopback rejection now
classifies the address instead of comparing against three literals, covering
`.localhost`, all of 127.0.0.0/8, 0.0.0.0, `::`, expanded and IPv4-mapped
forms. This is a configuration-shape guarantee only: it does not resolve DNS or
prove reachability, and TLS protects the connection, not the exposure.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-07-26 17:03:52 -05:00

125 lines
5.2 KiB
TypeScript

import { Pool, type PoolConfig } from "pg";
import { type DatabaseTransportPolicy, databaseTlsConnectionOptions } from "./transport.js";
export type PostgresPoolErrorCode = "POSTGRES_POOL_CONFIGURATION_INVALID";
/** Never carries the offending connection string, host, or underlying driver error. */
export class PostgresPoolError extends Error {
readonly code: PostgresPoolErrorCode;
constructor(code: PostgresPoolErrorCode) {
super("PostgreSQL pool configuration is invalid.");
this.name = "PostgresPoolError";
this.code = code;
this.stack = `${this.name}: ${this.message}`;
Object.freeze(this);
}
}
const maximumPostgresTimeoutMs = 2_147_483_647;
export interface PostgresPoolOptions {
readonly connectionTimeoutMs?: number;
/** Bounds both `query_timeout` and `statement_timeout`: `connectionTimeoutMs` alone only bounds
* establishing a connection, not a hung query already running on one. */
readonly operationTimeoutMs?: number;
/** The validated transport policy (`./transport.js`). Omitted only by isolated unit-test and
* single-domain factories that connect to a disposable loopback database; every production
* executable passes one explicitly. When omitted, no `ssl` option is set and the connection is
* plaintext — exactly the pre-existing development behavior. */
readonly transport?: DatabaseTransportPolicy;
}
export interface PostgresPoolHandle {
readonly close: () => Promise<void>;
readonly pool: Pool;
}
function validateConnectionString(connectionString: string): string {
if (connectionString.trim().length === 0) {
throw new PostgresPoolError("POSTGRES_POOL_CONFIGURATION_INVALID");
}
let protocol: string;
try {
protocol = new URL(connectionString).protocol;
} catch {
throw new PostgresPoolError("POSTGRES_POOL_CONFIGURATION_INVALID");
}
if (protocol !== "postgres:" && protocol !== "postgresql:") {
throw new PostgresPoolError("POSTGRES_POOL_CONFIGURATION_INVALID");
}
return connectionString;
}
/** Mirrors the validation already used by `core/src/identity/database.ts`,
* `core/src/authorization/database.ts`, and `core/src/migrations/postgres-database.ts`: an
* explicit timeout must be a positive safe integer no larger than PostgreSQL's own maximum, or it
* is rejected as invalid configuration rather than silently passed through to `pg`. */
function validateTimeout(value: unknown): number | undefined {
if (value === undefined) {
return undefined;
}
if (
typeof value !== "number" ||
!Number.isSafeInteger(value) ||
value <= 0 ||
value > maximumPostgresTimeoutMs
) {
throw new PostgresPoolError("POSTGRES_POOL_CONFIGURATION_INVALID");
}
return value;
}
/**
* Ekklesia's one shared, validated `pg.Pool` constructor for a single physical database
* connection meant to back more than one typed Drizzle view (for example Core's identity and
* authorization schemas sharing one pool in `apps/api`) — one pool, one mandatory error listener,
* one `close()`. Building the pool performs no network I/O until a query is issued, and this
* function is only ever invoked by explicit caller code — never during module import.
*
* This does not replace `createIdentityDrizzleDatabase` or `createAuthorizationDrizzleDatabase`:
* those remain independent, self-contained factories (each owns a private pool and its own
* `close()`) for callers — tests included — that only need one domain. Use this function, plus
* `createIdentityDrizzleView`/`createAuthorizationDrizzleView`, specifically when more than one
* domain must share one physical connection pool.
*/
export function createValidatedPostgresPool(
connectionString: string,
options: PostgresPoolOptions = {},
): PostgresPoolHandle {
const validatedConnectionString = validateConnectionString(connectionString);
const validatedConnectionTimeoutMs = validateTimeout(options.connectionTimeoutMs);
const validatedOperationTimeoutMs = validateTimeout(options.operationTimeoutMs);
// `databaseTlsConnectionOptions` also rejects a URL carrying its own TLS parameters, so the
// pinned driver's `Object.assign({}, config, parse(connectionString))` precedence can never
// silently replace the policy's `ssl` object with a weaker one.
const ssl =
options.transport === undefined
? undefined
: databaseTlsConnectionOptions(validatedConnectionString, options.transport);
const poolConfig: PoolConfig = {
connectionString: validatedConnectionString,
...(ssl === undefined ? {} : { ssl }),
...(validatedConnectionTimeoutMs === undefined
? {}
: { connectionTimeoutMillis: validatedConnectionTimeoutMs }),
...(validatedOperationTimeoutMs === undefined
? {}
: {
query_timeout: validatedOperationTimeoutMs,
statement_timeout: validatedOperationTimeoutMs,
}),
};
const pool = new Pool(poolConfig);
// Same rationale as core/src/identity/database.ts: pg's own documentation requires an error
// listener on the pool, or a server-initiated termination of an idle client becomes an
// unhandled Node.js error and can crash the process.
pool.on("error", () => undefined);
return Object.freeze({
close: () => pool.end(),
pool,
});
}