Files
Ekklesia/core/src/cli/bootstrap-platform-owner.ts
T
ekklesiaandClaude Opus 5 6b6b77c105 fix: enforce production transport policy
Every PostgreSQL connection this repository opened was plaintext, in every
environment: no connection site set `ssl` at all, so credentials, session
tokens, and row data crossed the network in the clear and nothing in
configuration, startup, or `pnpm doctor` said so. The public identity URL
boundary was also looser than it appeared.

`core/src/database/transport.ts` is now the one typed policy. It has exactly two
modes: `verify-full` (TLS required, certificate chain verified, and server
identity verified against the configured host — the production default) and
`disable` (the development/test default, refused outright in production). There
is deliberately no encryption-only `require` mode, no chain-only `verify-ca`,
and no `rejectUnauthorized: false` escape hatch anywhere in the configuration
surface; every loose or aliased spelling is rejected in both environments, so a
typo never quietly becomes a weaker mode. Production has no plaintext exception
at all, not even for a loopback database — a connection string cannot prove the
database is process-local.

Verification is certificate *and* hostname. The policy supplies an explicit
`checkServerIdentity` pinned to the host parsed from DATABASE_URL, because the
pinned driver sets TLS `servername` only for non-IP hosts and Node performs no
identity check when it is unset — so `rejectUnauthorized: true` alone accepts a
certificate from any host the trusted CA ever signed when connecting by IP.
Both halves are proven against a real TLS-enabled PostgreSQL, including that the
same connection without the pinned callback succeeds. Every CA, certificate, and
key is generated at test runtime and deleted afterwards.

A DATABASE_URL may no longer carry its own TLS parameters. The pinned driver
merges parsed connection-string values over explicitly passed options, so a
`?sslmode=disable` in the URL would silently replace the policy's verified `ssl`
object; that now fails with a stable code, reported by both `pnpm doctor` and
the migration CLIs rather than as "failed unexpectedly".

One shared environment reader keeps `process.env` out of Core's reusable
constructors, and every executable that opens a connection resolves the policy
identically: the API (validated before any pool, Better Auth instance, module
runtime, or listener exists), both migration commands, the bootstrap CLI, and
Doctor's own connection. Doctor reports it as a blocking failure, never a
warning, naming only the effective mode.

Separately, the identity base URL and every trusted origin must now be exactly
one canonical origin — the WHATWG origin serialization must equal the supplied
string — so a path, trailing slash, credentials, explicit default port, or
non-canonical case is rejected rather than normalized into something that no
longer matches what a browser sends. Production's loopback rejection now
classifies the address instead of comparing against three literals, covering
`.localhost`, all of 127.0.0.0/8, 0.0.0.0, `::`, expanded and IPv4-mapped
forms. This is a configuration-shape guarantee only: it does not resolve DNS or
prove reachability, and TLS protects the connection, not the exposure.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-07-26 17:03:52 -05:00

112 lines
3.6 KiB
TypeScript

import path from "node:path";
import { pathToFileURL } from "node:url";
import { safeParseEkklesiaUserId } from "@ekklesia/contracts";
import {
bootstrapPlatformOwner,
createAuthorizationDrizzleDatabase,
PlatformOwnerBootstrapError,
} from "../authorization/index.js";
import { resolveExecutableDatabaseTransport } from "./database-transport-environment.js";
class BootstrapCliError extends Error {
constructor(message: string) {
super(message);
this.name = "BootstrapCliError";
}
}
const usage =
"Usage: pnpm authorization:bootstrap-owner -- --user-id <id> --confirm-user-id <same-id>";
interface ParsedArgs {
readonly confirmUserId: string;
readonly userId: string;
}
/** A minimal, hand-rolled flag parser — this command takes exactly two required, named flags, so
* a general-purpose argument-parsing dependency is not warranted. */
function parseArgs(argv: readonly string[]): ParsedArgs {
let userId: string | undefined;
let confirmUserId: string | undefined;
for (let index = 0; index < argv.length; index += 1) {
const flag = argv[index];
if (flag === "--user-id") {
userId = argv[index + 1];
index += 1;
} else if (flag === "--confirm-user-id") {
confirmUserId = argv[index + 1];
index += 1;
}
}
if (userId === undefined || confirmUserId === undefined) {
throw new BootstrapCliError(usage);
}
return { confirmUserId, userId };
}
async function main(): Promise<void> {
const { confirmUserId, userId: rawUserId } = parseArgs(process.argv.slice(2));
// Deliberately not "infer the first user" or "select by signup order" — the operator must name
// the exact, opaque Ekklesia user id twice, and both must match exactly, before anything else
// is even attempted.
if (rawUserId !== confirmUserId) {
throw new BootstrapCliError(
"--user-id and --confirm-user-id must match exactly. No changes were made.",
);
}
const parsedUserId = safeParseEkklesiaUserId(rawUserId);
if (!parsedUserId.success) {
throw new BootstrapCliError("The provided user id is not a valid Ekklesia user id.");
}
// Read only when this command actually executes — never merely by importing this module (see
// isDirectExecution() below) or any module it imports.
const databaseUrl = process.env.DATABASE_URL;
if (typeof databaseUrl !== "string" || databaseUrl.trim().length === 0) {
throw new BootstrapCliError("DATABASE_URL is required.");
}
// Asserted before the connection is constructed, so an unsafe production transport never opens
// a client at all.
const transport = resolveExecutableDatabaseTransport(databaseUrl);
const { close, db } = createAuthorizationDrizzleDatabase(databaseUrl, {
connectionTimeoutMs: 10_000,
operationTimeoutMs: 10_000,
transport,
});
try {
await bootstrapPlatformOwner(db, { userId: parsedUserId.data });
console.log(`Platform-owner bootstrap complete for user "${parsedUserId.data}".`);
} finally {
await close().catch(() => undefined);
}
}
function reportBootstrapCliError(error: unknown): void {
if (error instanceof BootstrapCliError) {
console.error(error.message);
return;
}
if (error instanceof PlatformOwnerBootstrapError) {
console.error(`[${error.code}] ${error.message}`);
return;
}
console.error("Platform-owner bootstrap failed unexpectedly.");
}
function isDirectExecution(): boolean {
const entrypoint = process.argv[1];
return (
entrypoint !== undefined && import.meta.url === pathToFileURL(path.resolve(entrypoint)).href
);
}
if (isDirectExecution()) {
main().catch((error: unknown) => {
reportBootstrapCliError(error);
process.exitCode = 1;
});
}