Every PostgreSQL connection this repository opened was plaintext, in every environment: no connection site set `ssl` at all, so credentials, session tokens, and row data crossed the network in the clear and nothing in configuration, startup, or `pnpm doctor` said so. The public identity URL boundary was also looser than it appeared. `core/src/database/transport.ts` is now the one typed policy. It has exactly two modes: `verify-full` (TLS required, certificate chain verified, and server identity verified against the configured host — the production default) and `disable` (the development/test default, refused outright in production). There is deliberately no encryption-only `require` mode, no chain-only `verify-ca`, and no `rejectUnauthorized: false` escape hatch anywhere in the configuration surface; every loose or aliased spelling is rejected in both environments, so a typo never quietly becomes a weaker mode. Production has no plaintext exception at all, not even for a loopback database — a connection string cannot prove the database is process-local. Verification is certificate *and* hostname. The policy supplies an explicit `checkServerIdentity` pinned to the host parsed from DATABASE_URL, because the pinned driver sets TLS `servername` only for non-IP hosts and Node performs no identity check when it is unset — so `rejectUnauthorized: true` alone accepts a certificate from any host the trusted CA ever signed when connecting by IP. Both halves are proven against a real TLS-enabled PostgreSQL, including that the same connection without the pinned callback succeeds. Every CA, certificate, and key is generated at test runtime and deleted afterwards. A DATABASE_URL may no longer carry its own TLS parameters. The pinned driver merges parsed connection-string values over explicitly passed options, so a `?sslmode=disable` in the URL would silently replace the policy's verified `ssl` object; that now fails with a stable code, reported by both `pnpm doctor` and the migration CLIs rather than as "failed unexpectedly". One shared environment reader keeps `process.env` out of Core's reusable constructors, and every executable that opens a connection resolves the policy identically: the API (validated before any pool, Better Auth instance, module runtime, or listener exists), both migration commands, the bootstrap CLI, and Doctor's own connection. Doctor reports it as a blocking failure, never a warning, naming only the effective mode. Separately, the identity base URL and every trusted origin must now be exactly one canonical origin — the WHATWG origin serialization must equal the supplied string — so a path, trailing slash, credentials, explicit default port, or non-canonical case is rejected rather than normalized into something that no longer matches what a browser sends. Production's loopback rejection now classifies the address instead of comparing against three literals, covering `.localhost`, all of 127.0.0.0/8, 0.0.0.0, `::`, expanded and IPv4-mapped forms. This is a configuration-shape guarantee only: it does not resolve DNS or prove reachability, and TLS protects the connection, not the exposure. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
187 lines
5.9 KiB
TypeScript
187 lines
5.9 KiB
TypeScript
import { afterEach, describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
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import {
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type DoctorDependencies,
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diagnoseEkklesia,
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formatDoctorReport,
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} from "../src/diagnostics/index.js";
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import type { MigrationDatabase } from "../src/migrations/index.js";
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import type { ModuleMigrationAggregate, ModuleSchemaAggregate } from "../src/modules/index.js";
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import { composePlatformPermissionRegistry } from "../src/modules/permissions.js";
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const originalNoColor = process.env.NO_COLOR;
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afterEach(() => {
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if (originalNoColor === undefined) {
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delete process.env.NO_COLOR;
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} else {
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process.env.NO_COLOR = originalNoColor;
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}
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});
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function zeroSchemaAggregate(): ModuleSchemaAggregate {
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return Object.freeze({
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discoveredModules: Object.freeze([]),
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drizzleSchema: Object.freeze({}),
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modules: Object.freeze([]),
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tables: Object.freeze([]),
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});
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}
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function zeroMigrationAggregate(): ModuleMigrationAggregate {
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return Object.freeze({
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discoveredModules: Object.freeze([]),
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migrations: Object.freeze([]),
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modules: Object.freeze([]),
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});
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}
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function noConfigurationDependencies(): DoctorDependencies {
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return {
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composePermissions: composePlatformPermissionRegistry,
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createMigrationDatabase: () => {
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throw new Error("database must not be constructed");
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},
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discoverMigrations: async () => zeroMigrationAggregate(),
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discoverModules: async () => Object.freeze([]),
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discoverSchemas: async () => zeroSchemaAggregate(),
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planMigrations: async () => {
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throw new Error("database must not be planned");
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},
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runtimeSatisfies: () => true,
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};
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}
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describe("Ekklesia Doctor terminal report", () => {
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it("renders the real zero-module and no-database shape exactly", async () => {
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const report = await diagnoseEkklesia(
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{
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moduleDiscovery: {
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moduleSdkVersion: "0.1.0",
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modulesDirectory: "/not-rendered/modules",
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platformVersion: "0.1.0",
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},
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runtimeRange: ">=24.11.0 <25",
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runtimeVersion: "24.15.0",
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},
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noConfigurationDependencies(),
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);
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expect(formatDoctorReport(report).join("\n")).toBe(`Ekklesia Doctor
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Platform
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✓ Runtime version supported
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Active Node.js satisfies the declared supported range.
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Modules
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✓ Module discovery complete
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0 modules installed
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✓ Dependency graph valid
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Dependency order is empty.
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✓ Permission registry composed
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1 permission registered
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Data definitions
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✓ Schemas validated
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0 modules · 0 tables
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✓ Migrations validated
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0 migrations · checksums valid
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PostgreSQL
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✓ Database TLS verified
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TLS required with certificate and hostname verification.
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○ Connection check skipped
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DATABASE_URL is not configured.
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○ Migration plan skipped
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A validated migration inventory and configured PostgreSQL connection are required.
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Identity
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○ Identity configuration skipped
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Core identity schema defines 4 tables (ekklesia_core_account, ekklesia_core_session, ekklesia_core_user, ekklesia_core_verification).
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Identity runtime configuration (signing key, base URL, trusted origins) is not set.
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✓ Direct client-address mode
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Trusts only the actual immediate socket peer for rate limiting; no forwarded header is trusted.
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Object storage
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○ Check unavailable
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Core storage integration has not been implemented yet.
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Result: READY WITH WARNINGS`);
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});
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it("does not depend on NO_COLOR or terminal interactivity", async () => {
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const report = await diagnoseEkklesia(
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{
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moduleDiscovery: {
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moduleSdkVersion: "0.1.0",
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modulesDirectory: "/not-rendered/modules",
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platformVersion: "0.1.0",
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},
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runtimeRange: ">=24.11.0 <25",
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runtimeVersion: "24.15.0",
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},
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noConfigurationDependencies(),
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);
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const baseline = formatDoctorReport(report);
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const originalIsTtyDescriptor = Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor(process.stdout, "isTTY");
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try {
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process.env.NO_COLOR = "1";
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Object.defineProperty(process.stdout, "isTTY", { configurable: true, value: true });
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const interactiveWithoutColor = formatDoctorReport(report);
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process.env.NO_COLOR = "";
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Object.defineProperty(process.stdout, "isTTY", { configurable: true, value: false });
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const nonInteractive = formatDoctorReport(report);
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expect(interactiveWithoutColor).toEqual(baseline);
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expect(nonInteractive).toEqual(baseline);
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expect(interactiveWithoutColor.some((line) => line.includes("\u001B"))).toBe(false);
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expect(Object.isFrozen(interactiveWithoutColor)).toBe(true);
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} finally {
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if (originalIsTtyDescriptor) {
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Object.defineProperty(process.stdout, "isTTY", originalIsTtyDescriptor);
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} else {
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delete (process.stdout as { isTTY?: boolean }).isTTY;
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}
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}
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});
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it("never renders secrets from a hostile database exception", async () => {
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const hostile =
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"postgresql://admin:[email protected]/db SELECT password FROM users /home/me/.env";
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const database = Object.freeze({}) as MigrationDatabase;
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const dependencies: DoctorDependencies = {
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...noConfigurationDependencies(),
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createMigrationDatabase: () => database,
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planMigrations: async () => {
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throw new Error(hostile);
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},
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};
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const report = await diagnoseEkklesia(
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{
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databaseUrl: "postgresql://another:[email protected]/db",
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moduleDiscovery: {
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moduleSdkVersion: "0.1.0",
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modulesDirectory: "/not-rendered/modules",
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platformVersion: "0.1.0",
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},
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runtimeRange: ">=24.11.0 <25",
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runtimeVersion: "24.15.0",
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},
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dependencies,
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);
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const output = formatDoctorReport(report).join("\n");
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for (const forbidden of [
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"admin",
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"secret",
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"host.invalid",
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"SELECT",
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"password",
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"/home/me",
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"postgresql://",
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]) {
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expect(output).not.toContain(forbidden);
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}
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});
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});
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