ekklesiaandClaude Opus 5
6b6b77c105
Every PostgreSQL connection this repository opened was plaintext, in every environment: no connection site set `ssl` at all, so credentials, session tokens, and row data crossed the network in the clear and nothing in configuration, startup, or `pnpm doctor` said so. The public identity URL boundary was also looser than it appeared. `core/src/database/transport.ts` is now the one typed policy. It has exactly two modes: `verify-full` (TLS required, certificate chain verified, and server identity verified against the configured host — the production default) and `disable` (the development/test default, refused outright in production). There is deliberately no encryption-only `require` mode, no chain-only `verify-ca`, and no `rejectUnauthorized: false` escape hatch anywhere in the configuration surface; every loose or aliased spelling is rejected in both environments, so a typo never quietly becomes a weaker mode. Production has no plaintext exception at all, not even for a loopback database — a connection string cannot prove the database is process-local. Verification is certificate *and* hostname. The policy supplies an explicit `checkServerIdentity` pinned to the host parsed from DATABASE_URL, because the pinned driver sets TLS `servername` only for non-IP hosts and Node performs no identity check when it is unset — so `rejectUnauthorized: true` alone accepts a certificate from any host the trusted CA ever signed when connecting by IP. Both halves are proven against a real TLS-enabled PostgreSQL, including that the same connection without the pinned callback succeeds. Every CA, certificate, and key is generated at test runtime and deleted afterwards. A DATABASE_URL may no longer carry its own TLS parameters. The pinned driver merges parsed connection-string values over explicitly passed options, so a `?sslmode=disable` in the URL would silently replace the policy's verified `ssl` object; that now fails with a stable code, reported by both `pnpm doctor` and the migration CLIs rather than as "failed unexpectedly". One shared environment reader keeps `process.env` out of Core's reusable constructors, and every executable that opens a connection resolves the policy identically: the API (validated before any pool, Better Auth instance, module runtime, or listener exists), both migration commands, the bootstrap CLI, and Doctor's own connection. Doctor reports it as a blocking failure, never a warning, naming only the effective mode. Separately, the identity base URL and every trusted origin must now be exactly one canonical origin — the WHATWG origin serialization must equal the supplied string — so a path, trailing slash, credentials, explicit default port, or non-canonical case is rejected rather than normalized into something that no longer matches what a browser sends. Production's loopback rejection now classifies the address instead of comparing against three literals, covering `.localhost`, all of 127.0.0.0/8, 0.0.0.0, `::`, expanded and IPv4-mapped forms. This is a configuration-shape guarantee only: it does not resolve DNS or prove reachability, and TLS protects the connection, not the exposure. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
Architecture decision records
ADRs capture durable choices that affect more than one package or phase.
- Filenames use a four-digit sequence followed by a short kebab-case title.
- Status is
Proposed,Accepted,Superseded, orRejected. - Accepted ADRs are immutable except for status and cross-reference corrections.
- A changed decision receives a new ADR that links to and supersedes the old one.
Index
- 0001: Four-layer platform boundary — Accepted
- 0002: pnpm workspace and strict TypeScript — Accepted
- 0003: Development infrastructure — Accepted
- 0004: Replace unmaintained MinIO baseline — Accepted
- 0005: Static module manifests and atomic discovery — Superseded
- 0006: Versioned capabilities and compiled module runtime — Accepted
- 0007: Module-owned Drizzle schemas and table isolation — Accepted
- 0008: Module-owned migration contracts and offline validation — Accepted
- 0009: Transactional module migration execution — Accepted
- 0010: Core identity architecture and Better Auth adoption — Accepted
- 0011: Identity HTTP transport and public enrollment policy — Accepted
- 0012: Production-equivalent identity origin/CSRF protection under test — Accepted
- 0013: Core authorization, permission registry, and platform-owner bootstrap — Accepted
- 0014: Module permission declarations and platform permission registry — Accepted
- 0015: Static module HTTP routing and production runtime lifecycle — Accepted
- 0016: Module database access — Accepted
- 0017: Public request perimeter hardening — client address, signup gating, body limits, timeouts — Accepted
- 0018: Identity session resolution, canonical public origins, and PostgreSQL transport policy — Accepted