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Ekklesia/core/tests/doctor-report.test.ts
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ekklesiaandClaude Opus 5 80189c8ae2
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feat: give display devices their own paired identity
ADR 0033 gave Ekklesia a display host and ADR 0034 gave it a login page.
Together, the only way to light a television in a foyer was to sign a
human being into it and leave that session running on a screen anyone can
walk up to: a person's credentials on a wall, a person's session as the
thing signage depends on, and the display going dark when they are
revoked or their session simply expires.

A screen is not a person. Ekklesia now recognizes three principal classes
— anonymous, authenticated human, and managed device — and a device is a
first-class principal with its own credential and its own explicit
permissions. It has no email, no password, and no row in the identity
tables, and it satisfies the `authenticated` baseline never, so every
route that settles for "somebody is signed in" stays closed to it.

Device permissions live in their own table because
ekklesia_core_grant.user_id is a non-null foreign key into the user table
and making it polymorphic would rewrite the platform's central
authorization record to serve one narrow case. That is a schema decision,
not a second decision point: the evaluator gained one branch, so a device
is allowed or denied by the same function, with the same deny-by-default,
as anyone else — with no owner path it could reach and no baseline that
stands in for a grant.

The six-digit code is not the credential. It is printed across a screen in
a public hallway, so it is treated as public: it identifies a request to
an administrator and is worth nothing alone. Collecting the credential
also requires a 256-bit claim secret held only in the requesting browser's
HttpOnly cookie, and approving requires the restricted core.devices.manage
permission. Without that split, reading a code off a wall would hand over
the screen's identity.

The permission a pairing asks for is read from the module's validated
display declaration, never from the request, so a browser cannot ask to be
granted core.devices.manage or another module's permission. Approval
grants exactly that one permission.

Credentials are stored only as SHA-256; the raw value exists in the
Set-Cookie that issues it and the device's own cookie jar, and is never
logged, returned in JSON, or placed in a URL. The cookie is HttpOnly, so
the module display code running in that same page cannot read it.
Revocation is a server-side column checked on every principal resolution,
and re-pairing mints a new identity so an old credential can never come
back. State transitions are conditional updates, so one code cannot be
approved twice or claimed into two credentials under a race.

/api/v1/principal still reports a device as anonymous: it is what the
Dashboard uses to decide whether a person is signed in. Displays read
their viewer from the descriptor instead, which already performed the
authorization — so displays are descriptor-first while the Dashboard stays
principal-first, and neither infers an identity by elimination.

Proven end to end against real PostgreSQL and real HTTP: an unpaired
screen shows a code, an owner approves it, the device opens the display
descriptor and a realtime stream, and revocation closes both while the
device still holds its cookie. An already-open SSE stream is bounded by
realtime's existing five-minute reconnect rather than closed instantly,
and that bound is documented rather than called immediate.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-23 23:41:03 -05:00

202 lines
6.4 KiB
TypeScript

import { afterEach, describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
import {
type DoctorDependencies,
diagnoseEkklesia,
formatDoctorReport,
} from "../src/diagnostics/index.js";
import type { MigrationDatabase } from "../src/migrations/index.js";
import type { ModuleMigrationAggregate, ModuleSchemaAggregate } from "../src/modules/index.js";
import { composePlatformPermissionRegistry } from "../src/modules/permissions.js";
const originalNoColor = process.env.NO_COLOR;
afterEach(() => {
if (originalNoColor === undefined) {
delete process.env.NO_COLOR;
} else {
process.env.NO_COLOR = originalNoColor;
}
});
function zeroSchemaAggregate(): ModuleSchemaAggregate {
return Object.freeze({
discoveredModules: Object.freeze([]),
drizzleSchema: Object.freeze({}),
modules: Object.freeze([]),
tables: Object.freeze([]),
});
}
function zeroMigrationAggregate(): ModuleMigrationAggregate {
return Object.freeze({
discoveredModules: Object.freeze([]),
migrations: Object.freeze([]),
modules: Object.freeze([]),
});
}
function noConfigurationDependencies(): DoctorDependencies {
return {
composePermissions: composePlatformPermissionRegistry,
createMigrationDatabase: () => {
throw new Error("database must not be constructed");
},
discoverMigrations: async () => zeroMigrationAggregate(),
discoverModules: async () => Object.freeze([]),
discoverSchemas: async () => zeroSchemaAggregate(),
planMigrations: async () => {
throw new Error("database must not be planned");
},
probeStorage: async () => {
throw new Error("storage must not be probed");
},
readModuleConfiguration: async () => {
throw new Error("module configuration must not be read");
},
readModuleLifecycle: async () => {
throw new Error("module lifecycle configuration must not be read");
},
runtimeSatisfies: () => true,
};
}
describe("Ekklesia Doctor terminal report", () => {
it("renders the real zero-module and no-database shape exactly", async () => {
const report = await diagnoseEkklesia(
{
moduleDiscovery: {
moduleSdkVersion: "0.1.0",
modulesDirectory: "/not-rendered/modules",
platformVersion: "0.1.0",
},
runtimeRange: ">=24.11.0 <25",
runtimeVersion: "24.15.0",
},
noConfigurationDependencies(),
);
expect(formatDoctorReport(report).join("\n")).toBe(`Ekklesia Doctor
Platform
✓ Runtime version supported
Active Node.js satisfies the declared supported range.
Modules
✓ Module discovery complete
0 modules installed
✓ Dependency graph valid
Dependency order is empty.
✓ Permission registry composed
6 permissions registered
○ Module lifecycle skipped
DATABASE_URL is not configured.
○ Module configuration skipped
DATABASE_URL is not configured.
Data definitions
✓ Schemas validated
0 modules · 0 tables
✓ Migrations validated
0 migrations · checksums valid
PostgreSQL
✓ Database TLS verified
TLS required with certificate and hostname verification.
○ Connection check skipped
DATABASE_URL is not configured.
○ Migration plan skipped
A validated migration inventory and configured PostgreSQL connection are required.
Identity
○ Identity configuration skipped
Core identity schema defines 4 tables (ekklesia_core_account, ekklesia_core_session, ekklesia_core_user, ekklesia_core_verification).
Identity runtime configuration (signing key, base URL, trusted origins) is not set.
✓ Direct client-address mode
Trusts only the actual immediate socket peer for rate limiting; no forwarded header is trusted.
Object storage
○ Object storage not configured
No S3_ENDPOINT is set. This is a complete deployment unless a module requires storage.
✓ No module requires object storage
0 modules declare a logical storage bucket.
Result: READY WITH WARNINGS`);
});
it("does not depend on NO_COLOR or terminal interactivity", async () => {
const report = await diagnoseEkklesia(
{
moduleDiscovery: {
moduleSdkVersion: "0.1.0",
modulesDirectory: "/not-rendered/modules",
platformVersion: "0.1.0",
},
runtimeRange: ">=24.11.0 <25",
runtimeVersion: "24.15.0",
},
noConfigurationDependencies(),
);
const baseline = formatDoctorReport(report);
const originalIsTtyDescriptor = Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor(process.stdout, "isTTY");
try {
process.env.NO_COLOR = "1";
Object.defineProperty(process.stdout, "isTTY", { configurable: true, value: true });
const interactiveWithoutColor = formatDoctorReport(report);
process.env.NO_COLOR = "";
Object.defineProperty(process.stdout, "isTTY", { configurable: true, value: false });
const nonInteractive = formatDoctorReport(report);
expect(interactiveWithoutColor).toEqual(baseline);
expect(nonInteractive).toEqual(baseline);
expect(interactiveWithoutColor.some((line) => line.includes("\u001B"))).toBe(false);
expect(Object.isFrozen(interactiveWithoutColor)).toBe(true);
} finally {
if (originalIsTtyDescriptor) {
Object.defineProperty(process.stdout, "isTTY", originalIsTtyDescriptor);
} else {
delete (process.stdout as { isTTY?: boolean }).isTTY;
}
}
});
it("never renders secrets from a hostile database exception", async () => {
const hostile =
"postgresql://admin:[email protected]/db SELECT password FROM users /home/me/.env";
const database = Object.freeze({}) as MigrationDatabase;
const dependencies: DoctorDependencies = {
...noConfigurationDependencies(),
createMigrationDatabase: () => database,
planMigrations: async () => {
throw new Error(hostile);
},
};
const report = await diagnoseEkklesia(
{
databaseUrl: "postgresql://another:[email protected]/db",
moduleDiscovery: {
moduleSdkVersion: "0.1.0",
modulesDirectory: "/not-rendered/modules",
platformVersion: "0.1.0",
},
runtimeRange: ">=24.11.0 <25",
runtimeVersion: "24.15.0",
},
dependencies,
);
const output = formatDoctorReport(report).join("\n");
for (const forbidden of [
"admin",
"secret",
"host.invalid",
"SELECT",
"password",
"/home/me",
"postgresql://",
]) {
expect(output).not.toContain(forbidden);
}
});
});