ADR 0033 gave Ekklesia a display host and ADR 0034 gave it a login page. Together, the only way to light a television in a foyer was to sign a human being into it and leave that session running on a screen anyone can walk up to: a person's credentials on a wall, a person's session as the thing signage depends on, and the display going dark when they are revoked or their session simply expires. A screen is not a person. Ekklesia now recognizes three principal classes — anonymous, authenticated human, and managed device — and a device is a first-class principal with its own credential and its own explicit permissions. It has no email, no password, and no row in the identity tables, and it satisfies the `authenticated` baseline never, so every route that settles for "somebody is signed in" stays closed to it. Device permissions live in their own table because ekklesia_core_grant.user_id is a non-null foreign key into the user table and making it polymorphic would rewrite the platform's central authorization record to serve one narrow case. That is a schema decision, not a second decision point: the evaluator gained one branch, so a device is allowed or denied by the same function, with the same deny-by-default, as anyone else — with no owner path it could reach and no baseline that stands in for a grant. The six-digit code is not the credential. It is printed across a screen in a public hallway, so it is treated as public: it identifies a request to an administrator and is worth nothing alone. Collecting the credential also requires a 256-bit claim secret held only in the requesting browser's HttpOnly cookie, and approving requires the restricted core.devices.manage permission. Without that split, reading a code off a wall would hand over the screen's identity. The permission a pairing asks for is read from the module's validated display declaration, never from the request, so a browser cannot ask to be granted core.devices.manage or another module's permission. Approval grants exactly that one permission. Credentials are stored only as SHA-256; the raw value exists in the Set-Cookie that issues it and the device's own cookie jar, and is never logged, returned in JSON, or placed in a URL. The cookie is HttpOnly, so the module display code running in that same page cannot read it. Revocation is a server-side column checked on every principal resolution, and re-pairing mints a new identity so an old credential can never come back. State transitions are conditional updates, so one code cannot be approved twice or claimed into two credentials under a race. /api/v1/principal still reports a device as anonymous: it is what the Dashboard uses to decide whether a person is signed in. Displays read their viewer from the descriptor instead, which already performed the authorization — so displays are descriptor-first while the Dashboard stays principal-first, and neither infers an identity by elimination. Proven end to end against real PostgreSQL and real HTTP: an unpaired screen shows a code, an owner approves it, the device opens the display descriptor and a realtime stream, and revocation closes both while the device still holds its cookie. An already-open SSE stream is bounded by realtime's existing five-minute reconnect rather than closed instantly, and that bound is documented rather than called immediate. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
Architecture decision records
ADRs capture durable choices that affect more than one package or phase.
- Filenames use a four-digit sequence followed by a short kebab-case title.
- Status is
Proposed,Accepted,Superseded, orRejected. - Accepted ADRs are immutable except for status and cross-reference corrections.
- A changed decision receives a new ADR that links to and supersedes the old one.
Index
- 0001: Four-layer platform boundary — Accepted
- 0002: pnpm workspace and strict TypeScript — Accepted
- 0003: Development infrastructure — Accepted
- 0004: Replace unmaintained MinIO baseline — Accepted
- 0005: Static module manifests and atomic discovery — Superseded
- 0006: Versioned capabilities and compiled module runtime — Accepted
- 0007: Module-owned Drizzle schemas and table isolation — Accepted
- 0008: Module-owned migration contracts and offline validation — Accepted
- 0009: Transactional module migration execution — Accepted
- 0010: Core identity architecture and Better Auth adoption — Accepted
- 0011: Identity HTTP transport and public enrollment policy — Accepted
- 0012: Production-equivalent identity origin/CSRF protection under test — Accepted
- 0013: Core authorization, permission registry, and platform-owner bootstrap — Accepted
- 0014: Module permission declarations and platform permission registry — Accepted
- 0015: Static module HTTP routing and production runtime lifecycle — Accepted
- 0016: Module database access — Accepted
- 0017: Public request perimeter hardening — client address, signup gating, body limits, timeouts — Accepted
- 0018: Identity session resolution, canonical public origins, and PostgreSQL transport policy — Accepted
- 0019: Durable authorization history and grant management — Accepted
- 0020: Module runtime and migration execution hardening — Accepted
- 0021: Modules as independently hostable products — Accepted
- 0022: Module UI authoring model and host contract — Accepted
- 0023: Module UI build pipeline — Accepted
- 0024: Browser-safe module UI SDK and the generic host loader — Accepted
- 0025: Trusted module UI asset publication — Accepted
- 0026: The minimal Ekklesia module UI host — Accepted
- 0027: Dashboard navigation is presentation configuration, and modules stay flat — Accepted
- 0028: Module operational lifecycle — enablement, eligibility, and what "running" means — Accepted
- 0029: Module configuration is manifest-declared, host-resolved, and secret-free at rest — Accepted
- 0030: Modules declare logical buckets; hosts provide object storage — Accepted
- 0031: Browsers fetch objects directly, through opaque temporary read URLs — Accepted
- 0032: Native module realtime is scoped snapshot state over SSE — Accepted
- 0033: Display UI is a separate, permission-gated module entrypoint — Accepted
- 0034: Dashboard browser authentication is host-owned and principal-first — Accepted
- 0035: The first platform owner is created by an operator command, never by a browser — Accepted
- 0036: A display device is its own principal, paired by an administrator — Accepted