ADR 0033 gave Ekklesia a display host and ADR 0034 gave it a login page. Together, the only way to light a television in a foyer was to sign a human being into it and leave that session running on a screen anyone can walk up to: a person's credentials on a wall, a person's session as the thing signage depends on, and the display going dark when they are revoked or their session simply expires. A screen is not a person. Ekklesia now recognizes three principal classes — anonymous, authenticated human, and managed device — and a device is a first-class principal with its own credential and its own explicit permissions. It has no email, no password, and no row in the identity tables, and it satisfies the `authenticated` baseline never, so every route that settles for "somebody is signed in" stays closed to it. Device permissions live in their own table because ekklesia_core_grant.user_id is a non-null foreign key into the user table and making it polymorphic would rewrite the platform's central authorization record to serve one narrow case. That is a schema decision, not a second decision point: the evaluator gained one branch, so a device is allowed or denied by the same function, with the same deny-by-default, as anyone else — with no owner path it could reach and no baseline that stands in for a grant. The six-digit code is not the credential. It is printed across a screen in a public hallway, so it is treated as public: it identifies a request to an administrator and is worth nothing alone. Collecting the credential also requires a 256-bit claim secret held only in the requesting browser's HttpOnly cookie, and approving requires the restricted core.devices.manage permission. Without that split, reading a code off a wall would hand over the screen's identity. The permission a pairing asks for is read from the module's validated display declaration, never from the request, so a browser cannot ask to be granted core.devices.manage or another module's permission. Approval grants exactly that one permission. Credentials are stored only as SHA-256; the raw value exists in the Set-Cookie that issues it and the device's own cookie jar, and is never logged, returned in JSON, or placed in a URL. The cookie is HttpOnly, so the module display code running in that same page cannot read it. Revocation is a server-side column checked on every principal resolution, and re-pairing mints a new identity so an old credential can never come back. State transitions are conditional updates, so one code cannot be approved twice or claimed into two credentials under a race. /api/v1/principal still reports a device as anonymous: it is what the Dashboard uses to decide whether a person is signed in. Displays read their viewer from the descriptor instead, which already performed the authorization — so displays are descriptor-first while the Dashboard stays principal-first, and neither infers an identity by elimination. Proven end to end against real PostgreSQL and real HTTP: an unpaired screen shows a code, an owner approves it, the device opens the display descriptor and a realtime stream, and revocation closes both while the device still holds its cookie. An already-open SSE stream is bounded by realtime's existing five-minute reconnect rather than closed instantly, and that bound is documented rather than called immediate. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
553 lines
21 KiB
TypeScript
553 lines
21 KiB
TypeScript
import { createHash, randomBytes, randomInt } from "node:crypto";
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import type { EkklesiaDeviceId, EkklesiaUserId, PermissionId } from "@ekklesia/contracts";
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import { and, eq, gt, isNull, lt, or, sql } from "drizzle-orm";
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import type { DeviceDrizzleDatabase } from "./database.js";
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import {
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ekklesiaCoreDevice,
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ekklesiaCoreDevicePairingRequest,
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ekklesiaCoreDevicePermission,
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} from "./schema.js";
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export type DeviceStoreErrorCode =
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| "DEVICE_PAIRING_CODE_UNAVAILABLE"
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| "DEVICE_STORE_FAILED"
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| "DEVICE_NOT_FOUND";
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const deviceStoreMessages: Readonly<Record<DeviceStoreErrorCode, string>> = Object.freeze({
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DEVICE_NOT_FOUND: "The device does not exist.",
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DEVICE_PAIRING_CODE_UNAVAILABLE: "A pairing code could not be allocated. Try again.",
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DEVICE_STORE_FAILED: "The device operation could not be completed.",
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});
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/** Never carries a credential, a claim secret, SQL, a driver error, or a cause. */
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export class DeviceStoreError extends Error {
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readonly code: DeviceStoreErrorCode;
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constructor(code: DeviceStoreErrorCode) {
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super(deviceStoreMessages[code]);
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this.name = "DeviceStoreError";
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this.code = code;
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this.stack = `${this.name}: ${this.message}`;
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Object.freeze(this);
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}
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}
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/**
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* How long a pairing code is worth showing on a screen.
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*
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* Long enough that someone can walk from the display to a computer and type six digits; short
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* enough that a code photographed off a wall is worthless by the time anyone acts on it. It is not
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* the only thing protecting pairing — approval requires an authenticated administrator holding
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* `core.devices.manage`, and the credential is issued only to the browser holding the claim secret
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* — so this bound is defence in depth rather than the defence.
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*/
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export const DEVICE_PAIRING_REQUEST_TTL_MS = 10 * 60_000;
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/**
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* How long a device credential is accepted before the device must pair again.
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*
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* A display runs unattended for months; forcing a signage player to be re-paired every fortnight
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* because human sessions expire that fast would mean someone climbing to a ceiling-mounted screen
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* on a schedule. What makes a long horizon safe is that it is not the security boundary: the server
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* decides on every single request whether the device is still revoked, so an administrator's revoke
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* takes effect immediately regardless of how long the credential would otherwise have lived. The
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* expiry exists so an abandoned, forgotten screen eventually stops being an identity at all.
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*/
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export const DEVICE_CREDENTIAL_TTL_MS = 180 * 24 * 60 * 60_000;
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/** How stale `lastSeenAt` may become before the resolver spends a write on it. A display polling
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* realtime and assets would otherwise turn an operational nicety into a continuous write load. */
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export const DEVICE_LAST_SEEN_THROTTLE_MS = 15 * 60_000;
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const PAIRING_CODE_ALLOCATION_ATTEMPTS = 8;
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/**
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* How many pairing requests may be waiting at once, across the whole installation.
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*
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* Starting a pairing needs no identity — an unpaired screen has none to offer — so without a ceiling
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* anyone who can reach the platform could fill this table. A building has a handful of screens and
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* pairs them one at a time, so this is far above any real use and still a hard bound. Expired rows
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* are swept on the way in, so the ceiling counts genuinely live requests rather than history.
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*/
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const MAX_LIVE_PAIRING_REQUESTS = 50;
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/** SHA-256, hex. Applied to 256-bit CSPRNG output, never to anything user-chosen. */
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export function hashDeviceSecret(secret: string): string {
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return createHash("sha256").update(secret, "utf8").digest("hex");
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}
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/** 256 bits, URL-safe. Used for both the pairing claim secret and the device credential — the two
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* values that must never be guessable. */
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function generateSecret(): string {
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return randomBytes(32).toString("base64url");
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}
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/** Six digits from a rejection-free CSPRNG range, zero padded so every code is exactly six
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* characters and none is easier to type than another. */
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function generatePairingCode(): string {
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return randomInt(0, 1_000_000).toString().padStart(6, "0");
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}
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export interface CreatePairingRequestInput {
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readonly moduleId: string;
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readonly permissionId: PermissionId;
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readonly now: Date;
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}
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export interface CreatedPairingRequest {
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readonly code: string;
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readonly expiresAt: Date;
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/** Returned exactly once, to be written into the device's HttpOnly cookie and never persisted or
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* logged in this form. */
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readonly claimSecret: string;
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}
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export type PairingRequestStatus = "pending" | "approved" | "expired" | "unknown";
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export interface PairingRequestView {
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readonly moduleId: string;
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readonly permissionId: string;
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readonly createdAt: Date;
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readonly expiresAt: Date;
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readonly status: "pending" | "approved";
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}
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export interface ConsumedPairing {
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readonly deviceId: EkklesiaDeviceId;
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/** Returned exactly once, to be written into the device's HttpOnly cookie. */
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readonly credential: string;
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readonly expiresAt: Date;
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}
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export interface DeviceSummary {
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readonly id: EkklesiaDeviceId;
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readonly name: string;
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readonly createdAt: Date;
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readonly lastSeenAt?: Date;
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readonly revokedAt?: Date;
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readonly permissions: readonly string[];
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}
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export interface ResolvedDevice {
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readonly deviceId: EkklesiaDeviceId;
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readonly lastSeenAt?: Date;
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}
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export interface DeviceStore {
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createPairingRequest(input: CreatePairingRequestInput): Promise<CreatedPairingRequest>;
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/** Looks a live request up by the code an administrator typed. Never used by the device itself. */
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findPendingByCode(code: string, now: Date): Promise<PairingRequestView | undefined>;
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approvePairingRequest(input: {
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readonly code: string;
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readonly deviceName: string;
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readonly approvedBy: EkklesiaUserId;
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readonly now: Date;
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}): Promise<PairingRequestView | undefined>;
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/** The device's own poll. Consumes an approved request atomically and issues the credential. */
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claimPairingRequest(input: {
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readonly claimSecret: string;
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readonly now: Date;
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}): Promise<{ readonly status: PairingRequestStatus; readonly paired?: ConsumedPairing }>;
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/** Resolves a presented credential to a live, unrevoked device. */
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resolveCredential(credential: string, now: Date): Promise<ResolvedDevice | undefined>;
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touchLastSeen(deviceId: EkklesiaDeviceId, now: Date): Promise<void>;
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hasActivePermission(deviceId: EkklesiaDeviceId, permission: PermissionId): Promise<boolean>;
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listDevices(): Promise<readonly DeviceSummary[]>;
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revokeDevice(input: {
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readonly deviceId: EkklesiaDeviceId;
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readonly revokedBy: EkklesiaUserId;
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readonly now: Date;
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}): Promise<void>;
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}
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function rethrowAsStoreError(error: unknown): never {
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if (error instanceof DeviceStoreError) {
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throw error;
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}
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throw new DeviceStoreError("DEVICE_STORE_FAILED");
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}
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export function createDeviceStore(db: DeviceDrizzleDatabase): DeviceStore {
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/** Deletes rows that can no longer do anything: expired-and-never-approved requests, and
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* consumed ones past their window. Run opportunistically on request creation rather than by a
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* scheduler — pairing is rare, so the only moment the table can grow is also a fine moment to
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* trim it, and nothing depends on it having run. */
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const sweepDeadRequests = async (now: Date): Promise<void> => {
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await db
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.delete(ekklesiaCoreDevicePairingRequest)
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.where(
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or(
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and(
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lt(ekklesiaCoreDevicePairingRequest.expiresAt, now),
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eq(ekklesiaCoreDevicePairingRequest.state, "pending"),
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),
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lt(ekklesiaCoreDevicePairingRequest.expiresAt, new Date(now.getTime() - 86_400_000)),
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),
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)
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.catch(() => undefined);
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};
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const store: DeviceStore = {
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async approvePairingRequest(input): Promise<PairingRequestView | undefined> {
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try {
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// Conditional on `pending` and unexpired, so approving twice, approving an expired request,
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// or approving one already consumed all affect zero rows rather than racing.
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const rows = await db
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.update(ekklesiaCoreDevicePairingRequest)
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.set({
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approvedAt: input.now,
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approvedByUserId: input.approvedBy,
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deviceName: input.deviceName,
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state: "approved",
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})
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.where(
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and(
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eq(ekklesiaCoreDevicePairingRequest.code, input.code),
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eq(ekklesiaCoreDevicePairingRequest.state, "pending"),
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gt(ekklesiaCoreDevicePairingRequest.expiresAt, input.now),
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),
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)
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.returning({
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createdAt: ekklesiaCoreDevicePairingRequest.createdAt,
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expiresAt: ekklesiaCoreDevicePairingRequest.expiresAt,
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moduleId: ekklesiaCoreDevicePairingRequest.moduleId,
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permissionId: ekklesiaCoreDevicePairingRequest.permissionId,
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});
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const row = rows[0];
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return row === undefined
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? undefined
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: Object.freeze({ ...row, status: "approved" as const });
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} catch (error) {
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rethrowAsStoreError(error);
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}
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},
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async claimPairingRequest(input): Promise<{
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readonly status: PairingRequestStatus;
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readonly paired?: ConsumedPairing;
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}> {
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const claimSecretHash = hashDeviceSecret(input.claimSecret);
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try {
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return await db.transaction(async (tx) => {
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const rows = await tx
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.select({
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deviceName: ekklesiaCoreDevicePairingRequest.deviceName,
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expiresAt: ekklesiaCoreDevicePairingRequest.expiresAt,
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id: ekklesiaCoreDevicePairingRequest.id,
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permissionId: ekklesiaCoreDevicePairingRequest.permissionId,
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state: ekklesiaCoreDevicePairingRequest.state,
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approvedByUserId: ekklesiaCoreDevicePairingRequest.approvedByUserId,
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})
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.from(ekklesiaCoreDevicePairingRequest)
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.where(eq(ekklesiaCoreDevicePairingRequest.claimSecretHash, claimSecretHash))
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.limit(1);
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const request = rows[0];
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if (!request) {
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return { status: "unknown" as const };
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}
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if (request.state === "consumed") {
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// A credential was already issued for this request. Replaying the claim never issues a
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// second one.
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return { status: "unknown" as const };
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}
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if (request.expiresAt.getTime() <= input.now.getTime()) {
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return { status: "expired" as const };
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}
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if (request.state !== "approved") {
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return { status: "pending" as const };
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}
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// The single-use gate: only the transaction whose UPDATE actually matches the still
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// `approved` row proceeds to mint a credential. A concurrent second claim matches zero
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// rows and is told the request is gone.
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const consumed = await tx
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.update(ekklesiaCoreDevicePairingRequest)
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.set({ consumedAt: input.now, state: "consumed" })
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.where(
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and(
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eq(ekklesiaCoreDevicePairingRequest.id, request.id),
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eq(ekklesiaCoreDevicePairingRequest.state, "approved"),
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),
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)
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.returning({ id: ekklesiaCoreDevicePairingRequest.id });
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if (consumed.length === 0) {
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return { status: "unknown" as const };
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}
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const credential = generateSecret();
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const created = await tx
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.insert(ekklesiaCoreDevice)
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.values({
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createdByUserId: request.approvedByUserId,
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credentialHash: hashDeviceSecret(credential),
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name: request.deviceName ?? "Display device",
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})
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.returning({ id: ekklesiaCoreDevice.id });
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const deviceId = created[0]?.id;
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if (deviceId === undefined) {
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throw new DeviceStoreError("DEVICE_STORE_FAILED");
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}
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// Exactly the one permission the request was created for — never a bundle, never every
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// permission the module declares.
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await tx.insert(ekklesiaCoreDevicePermission).values({
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deviceId,
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grantedByUserId: request.approvedByUserId,
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permissionId: request.permissionId,
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});
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await tx
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.update(ekklesiaCoreDevicePairingRequest)
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.set({ deviceId })
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.where(eq(ekklesiaCoreDevicePairingRequest.id, request.id));
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return {
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paired: Object.freeze({
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credential,
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deviceId: deviceId as EkklesiaDeviceId,
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expiresAt: new Date(input.now.getTime() + DEVICE_CREDENTIAL_TTL_MS),
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}),
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status: "pending" as const,
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};
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});
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} catch (error) {
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rethrowAsStoreError(error);
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}
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},
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async createPairingRequest(input): Promise<CreatedPairingRequest> {
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await sweepDeadRequests(input.now);
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const live = await db
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.select({ id: ekklesiaCoreDevicePairingRequest.id })
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.from(ekklesiaCoreDevicePairingRequest)
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.where(
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and(
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gt(ekklesiaCoreDevicePairingRequest.expiresAt, input.now),
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eq(ekklesiaCoreDevicePairingRequest.state, "pending"),
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),
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)
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.limit(MAX_LIVE_PAIRING_REQUESTS);
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if (live.length >= MAX_LIVE_PAIRING_REQUESTS) {
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throw new DeviceStoreError("DEVICE_PAIRING_CODE_UNAVAILABLE");
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}
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const claimSecret = generateSecret();
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const expiresAt = new Date(input.now.getTime() + DEVICE_PAIRING_REQUEST_TTL_MS);
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// Collisions are resolved by the partial unique index, not by reading first and hoping: a
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// concurrent request that took the same code makes this insert fail and we simply draw again.
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for (let attempt = 0; attempt < PAIRING_CODE_ALLOCATION_ATTEMPTS; attempt += 1) {
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const code = generatePairingCode();
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try {
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await db.insert(ekklesiaCoreDevicePairingRequest).values({
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claimSecretHash: hashDeviceSecret(claimSecret),
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code,
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expiresAt,
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moduleId: input.moduleId,
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permissionId: input.permissionId,
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});
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return Object.freeze({ claimSecret, code, expiresAt });
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} catch {
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// Fall through and draw a different code.
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}
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}
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throw new DeviceStoreError("DEVICE_PAIRING_CODE_UNAVAILABLE");
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},
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async findPendingByCode(code, now): Promise<PairingRequestView | undefined> {
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try {
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const rows = await db
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.select({
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createdAt: ekklesiaCoreDevicePairingRequest.createdAt,
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expiresAt: ekklesiaCoreDevicePairingRequest.expiresAt,
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moduleId: ekklesiaCoreDevicePairingRequest.moduleId,
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permissionId: ekklesiaCoreDevicePairingRequest.permissionId,
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state: ekklesiaCoreDevicePairingRequest.state,
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})
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.from(ekklesiaCoreDevicePairingRequest)
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.where(
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and(
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eq(ekklesiaCoreDevicePairingRequest.code, code),
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eq(ekklesiaCoreDevicePairingRequest.state, "pending"),
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gt(ekklesiaCoreDevicePairingRequest.expiresAt, now),
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),
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)
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.limit(1);
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const row = rows[0];
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return row === undefined
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? undefined
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: Object.freeze({
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createdAt: row.createdAt,
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expiresAt: row.expiresAt,
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moduleId: row.moduleId,
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permissionId: row.permissionId,
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status: "pending" as const,
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});
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} catch (error) {
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rethrowAsStoreError(error);
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}
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},
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async hasActivePermission(deviceId, permission): Promise<boolean> {
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try {
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// Joined against the device row so a revoked device has no permissions at all, without
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// every permission row needing to be revoked separately.
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const rows = await db
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.select({ id: ekklesiaCoreDevicePermission.id })
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.from(ekklesiaCoreDevicePermission)
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.innerJoin(
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ekklesiaCoreDevice,
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eq(ekklesiaCoreDevice.id, ekklesiaCoreDevicePermission.deviceId),
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)
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.where(
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and(
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eq(ekklesiaCoreDevicePermission.deviceId, deviceId),
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eq(ekklesiaCoreDevicePermission.permissionId, permission),
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isNull(ekklesiaCoreDevicePermission.revokedAt),
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isNull(ekklesiaCoreDevice.revokedAt),
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),
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)
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.limit(1);
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return rows.length > 0;
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} catch (error) {
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rethrowAsStoreError(error);
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}
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},
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async listDevices(): Promise<readonly DeviceSummary[]> {
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try {
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const devices = await db
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.select({
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createdAt: ekklesiaCoreDevice.createdAt,
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id: ekklesiaCoreDevice.id,
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lastSeenAt: ekklesiaCoreDevice.lastSeenAt,
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name: ekklesiaCoreDevice.name,
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revokedAt: ekklesiaCoreDevice.revokedAt,
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})
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.from(ekklesiaCoreDevice)
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.orderBy(ekklesiaCoreDevice.createdAt);
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const permissions = await db
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.select({
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deviceId: ekklesiaCoreDevicePermission.deviceId,
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permissionId: ekklesiaCoreDevicePermission.permissionId,
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})
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.from(ekklesiaCoreDevicePermission)
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.where(isNull(ekklesiaCoreDevicePermission.revokedAt));
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return Object.freeze(
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devices.map((device) =>
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|
Object.freeze({
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createdAt: device.createdAt,
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id: device.id as EkklesiaDeviceId,
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name: device.name,
|
|
permissions: Object.freeze(
|
|
permissions
|
|
.filter((permission) => permission.deviceId === device.id)
|
|
.map((permission) => permission.permissionId)
|
|
.sort(),
|
|
),
|
|
...(device.lastSeenAt === null ? {} : { lastSeenAt: device.lastSeenAt }),
|
|
...(device.revokedAt === null ? {} : { revokedAt: device.revokedAt }),
|
|
}),
|
|
),
|
|
);
|
|
} catch (error) {
|
|
rethrowAsStoreError(error);
|
|
}
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
async resolveCredential(credential, now): Promise<ResolvedDevice | undefined> {
|
|
try {
|
|
const rows = await db
|
|
.select({
|
|
createdAt: ekklesiaCoreDevice.createdAt,
|
|
id: ekklesiaCoreDevice.id,
|
|
lastSeenAt: ekklesiaCoreDevice.lastSeenAt,
|
|
})
|
|
.from(ekklesiaCoreDevice)
|
|
.where(
|
|
and(
|
|
eq(ekklesiaCoreDevice.credentialHash, hashDeviceSecret(credential)),
|
|
isNull(ekklesiaCoreDevice.revokedAt),
|
|
),
|
|
)
|
|
.limit(1);
|
|
const row = rows[0];
|
|
if (!row) {
|
|
return undefined;
|
|
}
|
|
// The credential's own horizon, measured from when the device was paired. Revocation is
|
|
// checked above and is what makes a long horizon acceptable.
|
|
if (row.createdAt.getTime() + DEVICE_CREDENTIAL_TTL_MS <= now.getTime()) {
|
|
return undefined;
|
|
}
|
|
return Object.freeze({
|
|
deviceId: row.id as EkklesiaDeviceId,
|
|
...(row.lastSeenAt === null ? {} : { lastSeenAt: row.lastSeenAt }),
|
|
});
|
|
} catch (error) {
|
|
rethrowAsStoreError(error);
|
|
}
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
async revokeDevice(input): Promise<void> {
|
|
try {
|
|
const rows = await db
|
|
.update(ekklesiaCoreDevice)
|
|
.set({ revokedAt: input.now, revokedByUserId: input.revokedBy })
|
|
.where(
|
|
and(eq(ekklesiaCoreDevice.id, input.deviceId), isNull(ekklesiaCoreDevice.revokedAt)),
|
|
)
|
|
.returning({ id: ekklesiaCoreDevice.id });
|
|
if (rows.length === 0) {
|
|
// Either no such device or already revoked. Both are "not an active device", and telling
|
|
// the two apart would only serve enumeration.
|
|
const existing = await db
|
|
.select({ id: ekklesiaCoreDevice.id })
|
|
.from(ekklesiaCoreDevice)
|
|
.where(eq(ekklesiaCoreDevice.id, input.deviceId))
|
|
.limit(1);
|
|
if (existing.length === 0) {
|
|
throw new DeviceStoreError("DEVICE_NOT_FOUND");
|
|
}
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
await db
|
|
.update(ekklesiaCoreDevicePermission)
|
|
.set({ revokedAt: input.now })
|
|
.where(
|
|
and(
|
|
eq(ekklesiaCoreDevicePermission.deviceId, input.deviceId),
|
|
isNull(ekklesiaCoreDevicePermission.revokedAt),
|
|
),
|
|
);
|
|
} catch (error) {
|
|
rethrowAsStoreError(error);
|
|
}
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
async touchLastSeen(deviceId, now): Promise<void> {
|
|
// Throttled in SQL so concurrent requests from one display cannot each decide to write.
|
|
await db
|
|
.update(ekklesiaCoreDevice)
|
|
.set({ lastSeenAt: now })
|
|
.where(
|
|
and(
|
|
eq(ekklesiaCoreDevice.id, deviceId),
|
|
or(
|
|
isNull(ekklesiaCoreDevice.lastSeenAt),
|
|
lt(
|
|
ekklesiaCoreDevice.lastSeenAt,
|
|
new Date(now.getTime() - DEVICE_LAST_SEEN_THROTTLE_MS),
|
|
),
|
|
),
|
|
),
|
|
)
|
|
.catch(() => undefined);
|
|
},
|
|
};
|
|
return Object.freeze(store);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Exported for the schema-drift check and tests; never used to build a query string by hand. */
|
|
export const DEVICE_PAIRING_CODE_PATTERN = /^[0-9]{6}$/u;
|
|
|
|
export { sql as deviceStoreSql };
|