Ekklesia/apps/api/src/device-routes.ts

import { safeParseEkklesiaDeviceId } from "@ekklesia/contracts";
import { CORE_DEVICES_MANAGE } from "@ekklesia/core/authorization";
import type { DeviceStore } from "@ekklesia/core/devices";
import { DEVICE_CREDENTIAL_TTL_MS } from "@ekklesia/core/devices";
import type { ModuleUiPublicationRegistry } from "@ekklesia/core/modules";
import type { Context, Hono } from "hono";
import { Hono as HonoApp } from "hono";
import { getCookie, setCookie } from "hono/cookie";
import {
  type AuthorizationMiddlewareOptions,
  getAuthorizedPrincipal,
  requirePermission,
  requireTrustedOrigin,
} from "./authorization-middleware.js";
import { CORE_MUTATION_MAX_BODY_BYTES, platformBodyLimit } from "./body-limits.js";

/**
 * Host-owned device identity transport: pairing a display, and managing what has been paired
 * (ADR 0036).
 *
 * Both prefixes are siblings of `/api/v1/modules/...` and cannot collide with any module route.
 * Nothing here is reachable by module code, and no module-facing contract mentions any of it — a
 * module receives a principal and its permissions, and never learns that pairing exists.
 */
export const DEVICE_PAIRING_PREFIX = "/api/v1/device-pairing";
export const DEVICES_PREFIX = "/api/v1/devices";

/**
 * The device's two cookies, deliberately named nothing like Better Auth's session cookie.
 *
 * Distinct names are what keep the two identity systems from being confused for one another: the
 * human resolver looks only for Better Auth's cookie and the device resolver looks only for these,
 * so neither can ever be satisfied by the other's credential no matter what a caller sends.
 */
export const DEVICE_PAIRING_COOKIE = "ekklesia_device_pairing";
export const DEVICE_SESSION_COOKIE = "ekklesia_device_session";

/** How often an unpaired screen should ask again. Slow enough that a waiting display is not a load
 * source, fast enough that someone standing at the screen sees it come alive. */
export const DEVICE_PAIRING_POLL_INTERVAL_MS = 3_000;

export interface DeviceRoutesOptions extends AuthorizationMiddlewareOptions {
  readonly devices: DeviceStore;
  /** The same eligible/running publication registry the display routes use. It is the only source
   * of the permission a pairing request may ask for. */
  readonly moduleUi: ModuleUiPublicationRegistry;
  readonly trustedOrigins: ReadonlySet<string>;
  /** True when the platform is reached over https, which is what `Secure` requires to be usable at
   * all. Derived from the validated identity base URL, never from a request. */
  readonly secureCookies: boolean;
  readonly now?: () => Date;
}

function noStore(c: Context): void {
  c.header("Cache-Control", "no-store");
}

function sanitizedFailure(c: Context, status: 400 | 403 | 404 | 503, code: string): Response {
  noStore(c);
  return c.json({ code }, status);
}

async function readJsonObject(c: Context): Promise<Record<string, unknown> | undefined> {
  try {
    const body: unknown = await c.req.json();
    return typeof body === "object" && body !== null && !Array.isArray(body)
      ? (body as Record<string, unknown>)
      : undefined;
  } catch {
    return undefined;
  }
}

function readString(body: Record<string, unknown>, key: string, max: number): string | undefined {
  const value = body[key];
  if (typeof value !== "string") {
    return undefined;
  }
  const trimmed = value.trim();
  return trimmed.length === 0 || trimmed.length > max ? undefined : trimmed;
}

/**
 * Writes one of the device cookies.
 *
 * `HttpOnly` so no script — least of all a module's display bundle, which runs in this very page —
 * can read the value; `SameSite=Strict` because a display only ever talks to the host that serves
 * it and nothing legitimate arrives cross-site; host-only (no `Domain`) so a sibling hostname
 * cannot claim it; `Path=/` because the credential is presented to the descriptor, the module API,
 * and realtime alike. `Secure` follows the deployment's own scheme — asserting it on a plaintext
 * development origin would make the cookie silently unusable rather than more secure.
 */
function writeDeviceCookie(
  c: Context,
  options: Pick<DeviceRoutesOptions, "secureCookies">,
  name: string,
  value: string,
  maxAgeSeconds: number,
): void {
  setCookie(c, name, value, {
    httpOnly: true,
    maxAge: maxAgeSeconds,
    path: "/",
    sameSite: "Strict",
    secure: options.secureCookies,
  });
}

/**
 * Re-issues the device cookie a request just authenticated with, with a fresh lifetime (ADR 0056).
 *
 * The value is unchanged — no rotation — so a renewal lost in transit costs nothing: the screen still
 * holds a working credential. Only the browser's own expiry is pushed forward, matching the
 * server's sliding window. Called only after the request resolved to a live, unrevoked device.
 */
export function renewDeviceSessionCookie(c: Context, secureCookies: boolean): void {
  const credential = getCookie(c, DEVICE_SESSION_COOKIE);
  if (credential === undefined || credential.length === 0) {
    return;
  }
  writeDeviceCookie(
    c,
    { secureCookies },
    DEVICE_SESSION_COOKIE,
    credential,
    Math.floor(DEVICE_CREDENTIAL_TTL_MS / 1000),
  );
}

export function createDeviceRoutes(options: DeviceRoutesOptions): Hono {
  const routes = new HonoApp();
  const now = options.now ?? ((): Date => new Date());
  const requireManage = requirePermission(options, CORE_DEVICES_MANAGE);
  const requireOrigin = requireTrustedOrigin(options.trustedOrigins);
  const mutationBodyLimit = platformBodyLimit(CORE_MUTATION_MAX_BODY_BYTES);

  /**
   * An unpaired display asks to be paired.
   *
   * The **only** thing the caller supplies is which module's display it is sitting on, and even
   * that is not taken at its word: the module is looked up in the publication registry and the
   * permission is read from that module's validated display declaration. A browser therefore cannot
   * ask to be granted `core.devices.manage`, another module's permission, or anything else — the
   * request records the permission the host derived, and approval grants exactly that.
   */
  routes.post(
    `${DEVICE_PAIRING_PREFIX}/requests`,
    requireOrigin,
    mutationBodyLimit,
    async (c: Context) => {
      const body = await readJsonObject(c);
      const moduleId = body === undefined ? undefined : readString(body, "moduleId", 128);
      if (moduleId === undefined) {
        return sanitizedFailure(c, 400, "INVALID_REQUEST");
      }
      const display = options.moduleUi
        .listDisplays()
        .find((candidate) => candidate.moduleId === moduleId);
      if (!display) {
        // Unknown, dashboard-only, disabled, or dependency-blocked all answer the same way, so
        // pairing never becomes a way to enumerate what is installed.
        return sanitizedFailure(c, 404, "NOT_FOUND");
      }

      try {
        const at = now();
        const created = await options.devices.createPairingRequest({
          moduleId: display.moduleId,
          now: at,
          permissionId: display.displayPermission,
        });
        writeDeviceCookie(
          c,
          options,
          DEVICE_PAIRING_COOKIE,
          created.claimSecret,
          Math.max(1, Math.ceil((created.expiresAt.getTime() - at.getTime()) / 1000)),
        );
        noStore(c);
        // The code is returned because it has to be shown on the screen. The claim secret is not:
        // it goes only into the HttpOnly cookie above, so reading the code off a television tells
        // an onlooker nothing they could use.
        return c.json(
          {
            code: created.code,
            expiresAt: created.expiresAt.toISOString(),
            pollIntervalMs: DEVICE_PAIRING_POLL_INTERVAL_MS,
          },
          201,
        );
      } catch {
        return sanitizedFailure(c, 503, "DEVICE_PAIRING_UNAVAILABLE");
      }
    },
  );

  /**
   * The display asks whether it has been approved yet, and collects its credential when it has.
   *
   * Authority here is the claim cookie and nothing else. The pairing code is not accepted — it is
   * public, printed across a screen, and a flow that issued a credential to whoever presented it
   * would hand the device's identity to anyone who walked past. Consumption is single-use inside
   * the store, so a replayed or concurrent claim never yields a second credential.
   */
  routes.post(
    `${DEVICE_PAIRING_PREFIX}/claims`,
    requireOrigin,
    mutationBodyLimit,
    async (c: Context) => {
      const claimSecret = getCookie(c, DEVICE_PAIRING_COOKIE);
      if (claimSecret === undefined || claimSecret.length === 0) {
        return sanitizedFailure(c, 400, "DEVICE_PAIRING_UNKNOWN");
      }
      try {
        const at = now();
        const result = await options.devices.claimPairingRequest({ claimSecret, now: at });
        noStore(c);
        if (result.paired) {
          writeDeviceCookie(
            c,
            options,
            DEVICE_SESSION_COOKIE,
            result.paired.credential,
            Math.floor(DEVICE_CREDENTIAL_TTL_MS / 1000),
          );
          // The pairing cookie has done its job; leaving it would keep a spent secret on the device.
          writeDeviceCookie(c, options, DEVICE_PAIRING_COOKIE, "", 0);
          // Deliberately no credential, device id, or permission in the body: the browser needs to
          // know only that it may now load the display, and everything it needs travels in the
          // Set-Cookie header where script cannot reach it.
          return c.json({ status: "paired" as const }, 200);
        }
        return c.json({ status: result.status }, 200);
      } catch {
        return sanitizedFailure(c, 503, "DEVICE_PAIRING_UNAVAILABLE");
      }
    },
  );

  /**
   * An administrator types the code from the screen and sees what it is asking for, before deciding.
   *
   * The code travels in a request body rather than a path or query so it does not land in access
   * logs, browser history, or a `Referer`. Reaching this at all requires `core.devices.manage`, so
   * it is not an enumeration oracle for anyone who is not already trusted to approve pairings.
   */
  routes.post(
    `${DEVICE_PAIRING_PREFIX}/lookups`,
    requireOrigin,
    mutationBodyLimit,
    requireManage,
    async (c: Context) => {
      const body = await readJsonObject(c);
      const code = body === undefined ? undefined : readString(body, "code", 16);
      if (code === undefined || !/^[0-9]{6}$/u.test(code)) {
        return sanitizedFailure(c, 400, "INVALID_REQUEST");
      }
      try {
        const found = await options.devices.findPendingByCode(code, now());
        if (!found) {
          return sanitizedFailure(c, 404, "DEVICE_PAIRING_UNKNOWN");
        }
        noStore(c);
        return c.json(
          {
            expiresAt: found.expiresAt.toISOString(),
            moduleId: found.moduleId,
            permissionId: found.permissionId,
            requestedAt: found.createdAt.toISOString(),
          },
          200,
        );
      } catch {
        return sanitizedFailure(c, 503, "DEVICE_PAIRING_UNAVAILABLE");
      }
    },
  );

  /** Approval. The administrator names the device; the unpaired screen never names itself. */
  routes.post(
    `${DEVICE_PAIRING_PREFIX}/approvals`,
    requireOrigin,
    mutationBodyLimit,
    requireManage,
    async (c: Context) => {
      const body = await readJsonObject(c);
      const code = body === undefined ? undefined : readString(body, "code", 16);
      const deviceName = body === undefined ? undefined : readString(body, "deviceName", 128);
      if (code === undefined || !/^[0-9]{6}$/u.test(code) || deviceName === undefined) {
        return sanitizedFailure(c, 400, "INVALID_REQUEST");
      }
      const principal = getAuthorizedPrincipal(c);
      if (principal.kind !== "authenticated") {
        // Unreachable through `requireManage`, which only ever admits a person. Stated rather than
        // assumed, so a device could never be recorded as having approved its own pairing.
        return sanitizedFailure(c, 403, "AUTHORIZATION_DENIED");
      }
      try {
        const approved = await options.devices.approvePairingRequest({
          approvedBy: principal.userId,
          code,
          deviceName,
          now: now(),
        });
        if (!approved) {
          // Expired, already approved, already consumed, or never existed. One answer for all of
          // them: which one it was is not information this endpoint owes anybody.
          return sanitizedFailure(c, 404, "DEVICE_PAIRING_UNKNOWN");
        }
        noStore(c);
        return c.json({ moduleId: approved.moduleId, permissionId: approved.permissionId }, 200);
      } catch {
        return sanitizedFailure(c, 503, "DEVICE_PAIRING_UNAVAILABLE");
      }
    },
  );

  routes.get(DEVICES_PREFIX, requireManage, async (c: Context) => {
    try {
      const devices = await options.devices.listDevices();
      noStore(c);
      return c.json(
        {
          devices: devices.map((device) => ({
            createdAt: device.createdAt.toISOString(),
            id: device.id,
            name: device.name,
            permissions: device.permissions,
            revoked: device.revokedAt !== undefined,
            ...(device.lastSeenAt === undefined
              ? {}
              : { lastSeenAt: device.lastSeenAt.toISOString() }),
            ...(device.revokedAt === undefined
              ? {}
              : { revokedAt: device.revokedAt.toISOString() }),
          })),
        },
        200,
      );
    } catch {
      return sanitizedFailure(c, 503, "DEVICE_LOOKUP_UNAVAILABLE");
    }
  });

  /**
   * Revocation, which is a server-side fact rather than a request that the remote browser discard
   * anything. The device's own copy of its credential keeps existing and stops working.
   */
  routes.post(
    `${DEVICES_PREFIX}/:deviceId/revoke`,
    requireOrigin,
    mutationBodyLimit,
    requireManage,
    async (c: Context) => {
      const parsed = safeParseEkklesiaDeviceId(c.req.param("deviceId"));
      if (!parsed.success) {
        return sanitizedFailure(c, 400, "INVALID_REQUEST");
      }
      const principal = getAuthorizedPrincipal(c);
      if (principal.kind !== "authenticated") {
        return sanitizedFailure(c, 403, "AUTHORIZATION_DENIED");
      }
      try {
        await options.devices.revokeDevice({
          deviceId: parsed.data,
          now: now(),
          revokedBy: principal.userId,
        });
      } catch {
        return sanitizedFailure(c, 404, "NOT_FOUND");
      }
      noStore(c);
      return c.body(null, 204);
    },
  );

  return routes;
}