Files
Ekklesia/core/tests/database-transport.test.ts
T
ekklesiaandClaude Opus 5 6b6b77c105 fix: enforce production transport policy
Every PostgreSQL connection this repository opened was plaintext, in every
environment: no connection site set `ssl` at all, so credentials, session
tokens, and row data crossed the network in the clear and nothing in
configuration, startup, or `pnpm doctor` said so. The public identity URL
boundary was also looser than it appeared.

`core/src/database/transport.ts` is now the one typed policy. It has exactly two
modes: `verify-full` (TLS required, certificate chain verified, and server
identity verified against the configured host — the production default) and
`disable` (the development/test default, refused outright in production). There
is deliberately no encryption-only `require` mode, no chain-only `verify-ca`,
and no `rejectUnauthorized: false` escape hatch anywhere in the configuration
surface; every loose or aliased spelling is rejected in both environments, so a
typo never quietly becomes a weaker mode. Production has no plaintext exception
at all, not even for a loopback database — a connection string cannot prove the
database is process-local.

Verification is certificate *and* hostname. The policy supplies an explicit
`checkServerIdentity` pinned to the host parsed from DATABASE_URL, because the
pinned driver sets TLS `servername` only for non-IP hosts and Node performs no
identity check when it is unset — so `rejectUnauthorized: true` alone accepts a
certificate from any host the trusted CA ever signed when connecting by IP.
Both halves are proven against a real TLS-enabled PostgreSQL, including that the
same connection without the pinned callback succeeds. Every CA, certificate, and
key is generated at test runtime and deleted afterwards.

A DATABASE_URL may no longer carry its own TLS parameters. The pinned driver
merges parsed connection-string values over explicitly passed options, so a
`?sslmode=disable` in the URL would silently replace the policy's verified `ssl`
object; that now fails with a stable code, reported by both `pnpm doctor` and
the migration CLIs rather than as "failed unexpectedly".

One shared environment reader keeps `process.env` out of Core's reusable
constructors, and every executable that opens a connection resolves the policy
identically: the API (validated before any pool, Better Auth instance, module
runtime, or listener exists), both migration commands, the bootstrap CLI, and
Doctor's own connection. Doctor reports it as a blocking failure, never a
warning, naming only the effective mode.

Separately, the identity base URL and every trusted origin must now be exactly
one canonical origin — the WHATWG origin serialization must equal the supplied
string — so a path, trailing slash, credentials, explicit default port, or
non-canonical case is rejected rather than normalized into something that no
longer matches what a browser sends. Production's loopback rejection now
classifies the address instead of comparing against three literals, covering
`.localhost`, all of 127.0.0.0/8, 0.0.0.0, `::`, expanded and IPv4-mapped
forms. This is a configuration-shape guarantee only: it does not resolve DNS or
prove reachability, and TLS protects the connection, not the exposure.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-07-26 17:03:52 -05:00

304 lines
11 KiB
TypeScript

import tls from "node:tls";
import { describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest";
import { reportMigrationCommandError } from "../src/cli/migration-command-errors.js";
import {
assertNoConnectionStringTlsParameters,
assertProductionDatabaseTransport,
createDatabaseTransportPolicy,
databaseHostFromUrl,
DatabaseTransportError,
databaseTlsConnectionOptions,
describeDatabaseTransport,
} from "../src/database/transport.js";
const productionUrl = "postgresql://ekklesia:[email protected]:5432/ekklesia";
describe("createDatabaseTransportPolicy", () => {
it("defaults to certificate-verified TLS in production and plaintext in development", () => {
expect(createDatabaseTransportPolicy()).toEqual({ mode: "verify-full" });
expect(createDatabaseTransportPolicy({}, { environment: "production" })).toEqual({
mode: "verify-full",
});
expect(createDatabaseTransportPolicy({}, { environment: "development" })).toEqual({
mode: "disable",
});
});
it("refuses plaintext in production", () => {
let captured: unknown;
try {
createDatabaseTransportPolicy({ mode: "disable" }, { environment: "production" });
} catch (error) {
captured = error;
}
expect(captured).toBeInstanceOf(DatabaseTransportError);
expect(captured).toMatchObject({ code: "DATABASE_TLS_REQUIRED_IN_PRODUCTION" });
});
it("rejects every loose, aliased, or coercible mode spelling in both environments", () => {
for (const mode of [
"VERIFY-FULL",
"Verify-Full",
" verify-full",
"verify-full ",
"require", // encryption-only: deliberately unsupported
"verify-ca", // no hostname verification: deliberately unsupported
"prefer",
"no-verify",
"allow",
"true",
true,
false,
1,
0,
"",
null,
]) {
for (const environment of ["production", "development"] as const) {
let captured: unknown;
try {
createDatabaseTransportPolicy({ mode }, { environment });
} catch (error) {
captured = error;
}
expect(captured, `expected ${JSON.stringify(mode)} to be rejected`).toMatchObject({
code: "DATABASE_TLS_MODE_INVALID",
});
}
}
});
it("accepts an optional private CA and rejects an empty one", () => {
expect(
createDatabaseTransportPolicy({ certificateAuthority: "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----" })
.certificateAuthority,
).toBe("-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----");
for (const certificateAuthority of ["", " ", 42]) {
let captured: unknown;
try {
createDatabaseTransportPolicy({ certificateAuthority });
} catch (error) {
captured = error;
}
expect(captured).toBeInstanceOf(DatabaseTransportError);
}
});
it("never carries the offending mode or CA material in the thrown error", () => {
let captured: unknown;
try {
createDatabaseTransportPolicy({ certificateAuthority: "SUPER-SECRET-CA", mode: "sslmode=x" });
} catch (error) {
captured = error;
}
const publicText = `${String(captured)}\n${
captured instanceof Error ? (captured.stack ?? "") : ""
}\n${JSON.stringify(captured)}`;
expect(publicText).not.toContain("SUPER-SECRET-CA");
expect(publicText).not.toContain("sslmode=x");
});
});
describe("assertNoConnectionStringTlsParameters", () => {
it("rejects every TLS parameter the pinned connection-string parser recognizes", () => {
for (const parameter of [
"ssl=true",
"sslmode=disable",
"sslmode=require",
"sslmode=verify-full",
"sslcert=/tmp/c.crt",
"sslkey=/tmp/c.key",
"sslrootcert=/tmp/ca.crt",
"sslpassword=x",
"sslnegotiation=direct",
"uselibpqcompat=true",
"SSLMODE=disable", // case-insensitive
]) {
let captured: unknown;
try {
assertNoConnectionStringTlsParameters(`${productionUrl}?${parameter}`);
} catch (error) {
captured = error;
}
expect(captured, `expected ${parameter} to be rejected`).toMatchObject({
code: "DATABASE_TLS_CONNECTION_STRING_CONFLICT",
});
}
});
it("allows an unrelated parameter", () => {
expect(() =>
assertNoConnectionStringTlsParameters(`${productionUrl}?application_name=ekklesia`),
).not.toThrow();
});
it("rejects a non-PostgreSQL or malformed URL", () => {
for (const url of ["", "not-a-url", "mysql://db.example.test/x", "http://db.example.test"]) {
let captured: unknown;
try {
assertNoConnectionStringTlsParameters(url);
} catch (error) {
captured = error;
}
expect(captured).toMatchObject({ code: "DATABASE_URL_INVALID" });
}
});
});
describe("databaseTlsConnectionOptions", () => {
it("produces no TLS options at all when the policy disables TLS", () => {
expect(
databaseTlsConnectionOptions("postgresql://127.0.0.1:5432/ekklesia", { mode: "disable" }),
).toBe(false);
});
it("enables chain verification and pins hostname verification to the configured host", () => {
const options = databaseTlsConnectionOptions(productionUrl, { mode: "verify-full" });
expect(options).not.toBe(false);
if (options === false) {
throw new Error("expected TLS options");
}
// There is no configuration path that produces `rejectUnauthorized: false`.
expect(options.rejectUnauthorized).toBe(true);
expect(typeof options.checkServerIdentity).toBe("function");
expect(options.ca).toBeUndefined();
});
it("checks the certificate against the configured host, not against whatever SNI the driver set", () => {
// The pinned driver sets `servername` only for non-IP hosts, and Node skips identity checking
// entirely when it is unset — so the policy must pin the host itself. This asserts the
// supplied callback ignores the passed servername and uses the configured host.
const options = databaseTlsConnectionOptions(productionUrl, { mode: "verify-full" });
if (options === false || !options.checkServerIdentity) {
throw new Error("expected a checkServerIdentity callback");
}
const spy = vi.spyOn(tls, "checkServerIdentity").mockReturnValue(undefined);
try {
options.checkServerIdentity("attacker-supplied.example", {} as tls.PeerCertificate);
expect(spy).toHaveBeenCalledWith("db.example.test", expect.anything());
} finally {
spy.mockRestore();
}
});
it("uses the bare address for an IPv6 host so identity checking sees a usable value", () => {
expect(databaseHostFromUrl("postgresql://[2001:db8::1]:5432/ekklesia")).toBe("2001:db8::1");
expect(databaseHostFromUrl("postgresql://db.example.test:5432/ekklesia")).toBe(
"db.example.test",
);
});
it("passes an explicit private CA through unchanged", () => {
const certificateAuthority =
"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\nprivate-ca\n-----END CERTIFICATE-----";
const options = databaseTlsConnectionOptions(productionUrl, {
certificateAuthority,
mode: "verify-full",
});
if (options === false) {
throw new Error("expected TLS options");
}
expect(options.ca).toBe(certificateAuthority);
});
it("refuses to build options for a URL carrying its own TLS parameters", () => {
let captured: unknown;
try {
databaseTlsConnectionOptions(`${productionUrl}?sslmode=disable`, { mode: "verify-full" });
} catch (error) {
captured = error;
}
expect(captured).toMatchObject({ code: "DATABASE_TLS_CONNECTION_STRING_CONFLICT" });
});
});
describe("assertProductionDatabaseTransport", () => {
it("permits verified TLS in production and any validated policy in development", () => {
expect(() =>
assertProductionDatabaseTransport(productionUrl, { mode: "verify-full" }, "production"),
).not.toThrow();
expect(() =>
assertProductionDatabaseTransport(
"postgresql://127.0.0.1:5432/ekklesia",
{ mode: "disable" },
"development",
),
).not.toThrow();
});
it("refuses production plaintext, including for a loopback database — there is no production exception", () => {
for (const url of [
productionUrl,
"postgresql://127.0.0.1:5432/ekklesia",
"postgresql://localhost:5432/ekklesia",
"postgresql://[::1]:5432/ekklesia",
]) {
let captured: unknown;
try {
assertProductionDatabaseTransport(url, { mode: "disable" }, "production");
} catch (error) {
captured = error;
}
expect(captured, `expected production plaintext to ${url} to be refused`).toMatchObject({
code: "DATABASE_TLS_REQUIRED_IN_PRODUCTION",
});
}
});
});
describe("migration CLI transport reporting", () => {
it("reports the stable transport code instead of a generic 'failed unexpectedly', and leaks nothing", () => {
const captured: string[] = [];
const errorSpy = vi.spyOn(console, "error").mockImplementation((...args: unknown[]) => {
captured.push(args.map(String).join(" "));
});
try {
for (const url of [
`${productionUrl}?sslmode=disable`,
"postgresql://ekklesia:[email protected]:5432/ekklesia?ssl=true",
]) {
try {
databaseTlsConnectionOptions(url, { mode: "verify-full" });
} catch (error) {
reportMigrationCommandError(error);
}
}
try {
createDatabaseTransportPolicy({ mode: "disable" }, { environment: "production" });
} catch (error) {
reportMigrationCommandError(error);
}
} finally {
errorSpy.mockRestore();
}
const output = captured.join("\n");
expect(output).toContain("[DATABASE_TLS_CONNECTION_STRING_CONFLICT]");
expect(output).toContain("[DATABASE_TLS_REQUIRED_IN_PRODUCTION]");
expect(output).not.toContain("failed unexpectedly");
// The connection string, its credentials, and its host never reach operator output.
for (const secret of ["hunter2", "db.example.test", "secret", "sslmode=disable"]) {
expect(output).not.toContain(secret);
}
});
});
describe("describeDatabaseTransport", () => {
it("describes the effective mode without revealing any connection detail", () => {
expect(describeDatabaseTransport({ mode: "verify-full" })).toBe(
"TLS required with certificate and hostname verification.",
);
expect(
describeDatabaseTransport({ certificateAuthority: "SECRET-CA", mode: "verify-full" }),
).toBe(
"TLS required with certificate and hostname verification (explicit private CA supplied).",
);
expect(
describeDatabaseTransport({ certificateAuthority: "SECRET-CA", mode: "verify-full" }),
).not.toContain("SECRET-CA");
expect(describeDatabaseTransport({ mode: "disable" })).toBe(
"TLS disabled (development/test plaintext).",
);
});
});