Files
Ekklesia/apps/api/src/module-display-routes.ts
T
ekklesiaandClaude Opus 5.5 650932a170
CI / verify (pull_request) Successful in 1m7s
CI / infrastructure-smoke (pull_request) Successful in 39s
CI / package-release (pull_request) Successful in 50s
CI / migration-smoke (pull_request) Successful in 2m22s
CI / image-build (pull_request) Successful in 1m1s
CI / deploy-smoke (same-origin) (pull_request) Successful in 44s
CI / package-publication (pull_request) Successful in 58s
CI / deploy-smoke (split) (pull_request) Successful in 2m34s
fix(devices): keep an in-use display paired, renewing its credential instead of expiring it
A device credential was accepted for a fixed 180 days from pairing, so every
working screen dropped to a pairing code on the anniversary of its pairing,
and screens paired together failed together. Measure the 180 days from when
the device was last seen instead, and have the display descriptor - which
every screen requests on start, on reconnect, and periodically - re-issue the
cookie that authenticated it with a fresh lifetime. The value is not rotated,
so a renewal lost in transit cannot strand a screen. Revoked, expired, and
unknown credentials are never renewed, a person never receives a device
cookie, and an abandoned screen still stops being an identity 180 days after
it was last seen. No migration: lastSeenAt already slides with use.

ADR 0056 supersedes the session-lifetime section of ADR 0036.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
2026-10-12 22:27:27 -05:00

297 lines
13 KiB
TypeScript

import type { EkklesiaPrincipal } from "@ekklesia/contracts";
import type { ModuleUiPublicationRegistry, PublishableModuleDisplay } from "@ekklesia/core/modules";
import type { Context, Hono } from "hono";
import {
type AuthorizationMiddlewareOptions,
getAuthorizedPrincipal,
requirePermission,
} from "./authorization-middleware.js";
import { etagMatches } from "./conditional-request.js";
import { createDisplayHostAssets, type DisplayHostAssets } from "./display-host-assets.js";
export {
MODULE_DISPLAY_DESCRIPTOR_PREFIX,
MODULE_DISPLAY_PAGE_PREFIX,
moduleDisplayDescriptorUrl,
moduleDisplayPageUrl,
} from "./module-display-path.js";
import { moduleDisplayDescriptorUrl, moduleDisplayPageUrl } from "./module-display-path.js";
import { moduleApiBaseUrl } from "./module-http-routes.js";
import { moduleRealtimeBaseUrl } from "./module-realtime-routes.js";
import {
describeModuleContributions,
grantedModulePermissionIds,
type HostModuleContributionDescriptor,
} from "./module-ui-inventory.js";
import { moduleDisplayUiArtifactUrl } from "./module-ui-routes.js";
/** Host-owned namespaces. Neither can collide with module HTTP routes, all of which live under
* `/api/v1/modules/<module-id>`, and neither string enters the module-facing UI ABI. */
export const DISPLAY_HOST_SCRIPT_PATH = "/assets/ekklesia-display/app.js";
/**
* Where the display's offline service worker is served (ADR 0043).
*
* The path is chosen for its **directory**: a service worker's default scope is the directory it was
* served from, so `/display/sw.js` controls display pages and nothing else. Serving it from
* `/assets/…` beside the host script would scope it to `/assets/`, where no page lives, and widening
* it with `Service-Worker-Allowed` would put the Dashboard under a worker it has no use for.
*
* `sw.js` cannot collide with a display page: a display page is registered at the exact literal
* `/display/<module-id>` for each display-capable module, and `sw.js` is not a valid module id.
*/
export const DISPLAY_SERVICE_WORKER_PATH = "/display/sw.js";
/** The portable facts a browser host needs to mount this module's one display artifact. It mirrors
* the primary UI descriptor while naming the role explicitly, so a host cannot accidentally load a
* management artifact into a signage route. No outer Ekklesia route or filesystem path crosses the
* boundary. */
export interface HostModuleDisplayDescriptor {
readonly id: string;
readonly version: string;
readonly display: { readonly url: string };
/** The public page a screen opens to mount this display. This is distinct from `display.url`,
* which is the compiled artifact imported by the platform host. */
readonly page: { readonly url: string };
readonly api: { readonly baseUrl: string };
readonly realtime: { readonly baseUrl: string };
readonly permissions: readonly string[];
/** Renderers other modules contributed to capabilities this module provides (ADR 0041) — the
* mechanism a signage-style display uses to show another module's content without importing it. */
readonly contributions: readonly HostModuleContributionDescriptor[];
}
/**
* Who the host resolved as the viewer of this display.
*
* The descriptor reports it because the display host must not ask `/api/v1/principal` — that
* endpoint answers a question about *people*, and a paired device is deliberately anonymous to it
* (ADR 0036). Reading the viewer from the response that already performed the authorization means
* the display never has to infer "no human session, so presumably a device", and the two identity
* classes never have to be told apart by elimination.
*/
export type HostDisplayViewer =
| { readonly kind: "authenticated"; readonly userId: string }
| { readonly kind: "device"; readonly deviceId: string };
export interface HostModuleDisplayResource {
readonly module: HostModuleDisplayDescriptor;
readonly viewer: HostDisplayViewer;
}
export interface ModuleDisplayRoutesOptions extends AuthorizationMiddlewareOptions {
/** The same immutable, eligible/running publication registry used for artifact bytes. */
readonly moduleUi: ModuleUiPublicationRegistry;
/** Omitted only when the registry contains no display entrypoints. Production reads the exact
* surface-owned files before binding and supplies their frozen contents here. */
readonly assets?: DisplayHostAssets;
/** Re-issues a paired device's cookie with a fresh lifetime (ADR 0056). Composed only when the
* deployment has device support; called only for a request that resolved to a device. */
readonly renewDeviceCredential?: (c: Context) => void;
}
/** A composition error, detected before any display route is registered. Carries no module id,
* permission id, path, or package location. */
export class ModuleDisplayConfigurationError extends Error {
constructor() {
super("The module display host configuration is inconsistent.");
this.name = "ModuleDisplayConfigurationError";
this.stack = `${this.name}: ${this.message}`;
Object.freeze(this);
}
}
function displayFailure(c: Context): Response {
c.header("Cache-Control", "no-store");
return c.json({ code: "AUTHORIZATION_EVALUATION_FAILED" }, 503);
}
/** Copies and validates injected assets before registering any route. Production's loader already
* creates this exact shape, while this check keeps a test/composition caller from pairing mutable
* bytes with a stale validator. */
function snapshotAssets(input: DisplayHostAssets): DisplayHostAssets {
try {
const snapshot = createDisplayHostAssets(input.html, input.script, input.serviceWorker);
if (
snapshot.scriptEtag !== input.scriptEtag ||
snapshot.serviceWorkerEtag !== input.serviceWorkerEtag
) {
throw new ModuleDisplayConfigurationError();
}
return snapshot;
} catch {
throw new ModuleDisplayConfigurationError();
}
}
function describeViewer(principal: EkklesiaPrincipal): HostDisplayViewer | undefined {
if (principal.kind === "authenticated") {
return { kind: "authenticated", userId: principal.userId };
}
if (principal.kind === "device") {
return { deviceId: principal.deviceId, kind: "device" };
}
// Unreachable behind the permission gate: the display permission is `restricted`, which no
// anonymous principal satisfies. Stated rather than assumed.
return undefined;
}
async function describeDisplay(
options: ModuleDisplayRoutesOptions,
principal: EkklesiaPrincipal,
display: PublishableModuleDisplay,
viewer: HostDisplayViewer,
): Promise<HostModuleDisplayResource> {
return {
viewer,
module: {
api: { baseUrl: moduleApiBaseUrl(display.moduleId) },
contributions: describeModuleContributions(options.moduleUi, display.moduleId),
display: { url: moduleDisplayUiArtifactUrl(display) },
id: display.moduleId,
page: { url: moduleDisplayPageUrl(display.moduleId) },
permissions: await grantedModulePermissionIds(
options.evaluator,
principal,
display.permissions,
),
realtime: { baseUrl: moduleRealtimeBaseUrl(display.moduleId) },
version: display.version,
},
};
}
function mountDisplay(
app: Hono,
options: ModuleDisplayRoutesOptions & { readonly assets: DisplayHostAssets },
display: PublishableModuleDisplay,
): void {
// The permission comes from an already-validated manifest/publication record. A request selects
// neither the permission nor the artifact; it can only hit this exact pre-composed route.
const requireDisplayPermission = requirePermission(options, display.displayPermission);
/**
* The page itself is **not** permission-gated, and the descriptor below still is.
*
* An unattended screen has no identity until someone pairs it, so a gate here would mean a new
* television could only ever be told 403 — there would be nowhere for it to display a pairing
* code, and the only way to adopt one would be to sign a human into it, which is exactly the
* model this pass exists to remove (ADR 0036).
*
* Serving it costs nothing, because it carries nothing: these are the same inert, module-agnostic
* bytes for every display, with no module id, no data, and one absolute script URL that was
* already public. Authorization lives entirely in the descriptor — the page can render, and then
* learns it may show only a pairing code. What this does reveal is that a module with a display
* exists at that path, which any pairing flow must reveal to the device it is pairing.
*/
app.get(moduleDisplayPageUrl(display.moduleId), () => {
return new Response(options.assets.html, {
headers: {
"Cache-Control": "no-store",
"Content-Type": "text/html; charset=utf-8",
"X-Content-Type-Options": "nosniff",
},
status: 200,
});
});
app.get(moduleDisplayDescriptorUrl(display.moduleId), requireDisplayPermission, async (c) => {
c.header("Cache-Control", "no-store");
c.header("Vary", "Origin, Cookie");
try {
const principal = getAuthorizedPrincipal(c);
const viewer = describeViewer(principal);
if (!viewer) {
return displayFailure(c);
}
// Every screen asks for this on start, on reconnect, and periodically while running, so it
// is where an in-use credential's browser expiry is pushed forward.
if (principal.kind === "device") {
options.renewDeviceCredential?.(c);
}
return c.json(await describeDisplay(options, principal, display, viewer), 200);
} catch {
return displayFailure(c);
}
});
}
/**
* Mounts one stable page and one descriptor route per eligible, running display declaration.
*
* There is deliberately no display inventory in this pass. A management UI may need one later,
* but a bookmarked TV needs only its version-independent page URL. Unknown, dashboard-only,
* disabled, and dependency-blocked modules have no registered route and collapse into the
* application's ordinary sanitized 404.
*
* The page is an inert, module-agnostic shell: its bytes contain no module id and its one absolute
* script URL cannot be rebased by a deep `/display/<id>` path. The browser reads the validated id
* from its outer URL, requests the permission-gated descriptor, and only then imports the exact
* versioned display artifact that the server supplied.
*/
export function mountModuleDisplayRoutes(app: Hono, options: ModuleDisplayRoutesOptions): void {
const displays = options.moduleUi.listDisplays();
if (displays.length === 0) {
return;
}
if (!options.assets) {
throw new ModuleDisplayConfigurationError();
}
const assets = snapshotAssets(options.assets);
for (const display of displays) {
if (!options.registry.has(display.displayPermission)) {
throw new ModuleDisplayConfigurationError();
}
}
// One fixed host bundle, never a directory and never a request-selected package file. Like module
// artifact bytes, fetching this platform code grants no authority; the page and descriptor are
// where identity and the module-owned display permission are enforced.
app.get(DISPLAY_HOST_SCRIPT_PATH, (c) => {
if (etagMatches(c.req.header("if-none-match"), assets.scriptEtag)) {
return new Response(null, {
headers: { "Cache-Control": "no-cache", ETag: assets.scriptEtag },
status: 304,
});
}
return new Response(assets.script, {
headers: {
"Cache-Control": "no-cache",
"Content-Type": "text/javascript; charset=utf-8",
ETag: assets.scriptEtag,
"X-Content-Type-Options": "nosniff",
},
status: 200,
});
});
/**
* The worker itself is `no-cache` with a strong validator, exactly like the host script: a browser
* re-checks it on its own schedule, and the worker deliberately never caches *itself*, which is
* how a screen avoids being trapped on an obsolete worker.
*
* Like the host script and module artifact bytes, fetching this code grants no authority. It
* caches only public code and never a permission decision, so serving it anonymously withholds
* nothing the platform was protecting.
*/
app.get(DISPLAY_SERVICE_WORKER_PATH, (c) => {
if (etagMatches(c.req.header("if-none-match"), assets.serviceWorkerEtag)) {
return new Response(null, {
headers: { "Cache-Control": "no-cache", ETag: assets.serviceWorkerEtag },
status: 304,
});
}
return new Response(assets.serviceWorker, {
headers: {
"Cache-Control": "no-cache",
"Content-Type": "text/javascript; charset=utf-8",
ETag: assets.serviceWorkerEtag,
"X-Content-Type-Options": "nosniff",
},
status: 200,
});
});
for (const display of displays) {
mountDisplay(app, { ...options, assets }, display);
}
}