Files
Ekklesia/core/src/diagnostics/doctor.ts
T
ekklesiaandClaude Opus 5.5 e36b70d8d4
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feat: one generic image, with installed modules in installation-owned storage (ADR 0048)
The production image now contains zero feature modules and is the same for every
installation. Installed modules live in module storage that one Core resolver
selects from EKKLESIA_MODULES_DIR: the checkout's modules/ when unset, an
absolute path that must exist when set (/var/lib/ekklesia/modules in the image).
A relative, blank, missing, or unreadable configured directory fails closed with
a sanitized error that never contains the value.

- Host configuration reads EKKLESIA_MODULES_DIR. The API, migration plan, apply
  and validate, module validation, module enablement, and Doctor all resolve it
  the same way; the test-only API override still takes precedence.
- Doctor receives Core's migrations directory explicitly instead of deriving it
  from the modules directory's parent.
- The migration runner retains and reports the applied history of a module that
  is not installed, and plans and applies Core's and present modules' migrations
  around it. Core's history and every installed module's history stay strict: a
  missing or changed applied migration, or a downgrade, still fails. No down
  migrations, no data deletion.
- deploy/Dockerfile copies no module and installs nothing for the module
  template; .dockerignore excludes modules/ and the build refuses a context that
  contains it; the runtime has an empty root-owned /var/lib/ekklesia/modules and
  sets EKKLESIA_MODULES_DIR.
- deploy/compose.yaml bind-mounts EKKLESIA_MODULES_HOST_DIR read-only into api
  and migrate, with create_host_path disabled.
- scripts/check-image.sh proves the image holds no modules and that a populated
  modules/ directory leaves its runtime file system identical; CI runs it.
- The split deploy smoke now uses the same generic image: it boots with no
  modules, installs a self-contained test module packaged from the template
  (test-only), migrates and restarts, removes it (Core runs, planning reports the
  retained history, data survives), and restores it with its data.

Docs: deploy README (module storage, install/update/remove/restore, the runtime
modules target), .env.example, API configuration, module development guide,
testing, workflow, security, and the architecture overview.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
2026-10-07 08:38:14 -05:00

1357 lines
57 KiB
TypeScript

import {
capabilityIdSchema,
EMPTY_MODULE_SECRET_SOURCE,
isVersionCompatible,
logicalBucketIdSchema,
type ModuleSecretSource,
moduleConfigurationKeySchema,
moduleIdSchema,
permissionIdSchema,
semanticVersionSchema,
} from "@ekklesia/contracts";
import { getTableName } from "drizzle-orm";
import { type PermissionRegistry, PermissionRegistryError } from "../authorization/index.js";
import type { PostgresPoolOptions } from "../database/pool.js";
import {
assertProductionDatabaseTransport,
createDatabaseTransportPolicy,
type DatabaseTransportEnvironment,
DatabaseTransportError,
type DatabaseTransportPolicyInput,
describeDatabaseTransport,
} from "../database/transport.js";
import {
ClientAddressConfigError,
type ClientAddressConfigInput,
createClientAddressConfig,
} from "../identity/client-address.js";
import {
type CreateIdentityConfigOptions,
createIdentityConfig,
IdentityConfigError,
} from "../identity/config.js";
import { TRUSTED_CLIENT_ADDRESS_HEADER } from "../identity/runtime.js";
import { identityAdapterSchema } from "../identity/schema.js";
import {
createMailProviderConfig,
createSmtpMailProvider,
describeMailProvider,
MailConfigError,
type MailProviderConfig,
type MailProviderConfigInput,
} from "../mail/index.js";
import {
createPostgresMigrationDatabase,
type DiscoverAllMigrationsOptions,
discoverAllMigrations,
type MigrationDatabase,
type MigrationPlanResult,
MigrationRunnerError,
PostgresMigrationDatabaseError,
type PostgresMigrationDatabaseOptions,
planModuleMigrations,
} from "../migrations/index.js";
import {
composePlatformPermissionRegistry,
createModuleConfigurationDatabase,
createModuleConfigurationStore,
createModuleLifecycleDatabase,
createModuleLifecycleStore,
createModuleUiPublicationRegistry,
type DiscoveredModule,
discoverModuleSchemas,
discoverModules,
isConfigurationBlockedDetail,
isStorageBlockedDetail,
type ModuleConfigurationSettings,
ModuleDiscoveryError,
type ModuleDiscoveryOptions,
type ModuleEligibility,
type ModuleLifecycleConfiguration,
type ModuleMigrationAggregate,
ModulePermissionCompositionError,
type ModuleSchemaAggregate,
resolveModuleEligibility,
} from "../modules/index.js";
import {
createS3StorageProvider,
createStorageProviderConfig,
describeStorageProvider,
physicalBucketName,
StorageConfigError,
type StorageProviderConfig,
type StorageProviderConfigInput,
} from "../storage/index.js";
export type DoctorCheckId =
| "database.transport"
| "platform.runtime"
| "modules.discovery"
| "modules.dependencies"
| "modules.permissions"
| "modules.lifecycle"
| "modules.configuration"
| "schemas.discovery"
| "migrations.discovery"
| "postgresql.connection"
| "postgresql.plan"
| "identity.configuration"
| "identity.client-address"
| "object-storage.integration"
| "object-storage.bindings"
| "outbound-email.configuration";
export type DoctorCheckStatus = "failure" | "pass" | "skipped" | "warning";
export type DoctorResult = "not-ready" | "ready" | "ready-with-warnings";
export interface DoctorCheck {
readonly details: readonly string[];
readonly id: DoctorCheckId;
readonly status: DoctorCheckStatus;
readonly summary: string;
}
export interface DoctorReport {
readonly checks: readonly DoctorCheck[];
readonly result: DoctorResult;
}
export interface DoctorIdentityConfigurationOptions {
readonly baseUrl?: string | undefined;
readonly dashboardOrigin?: string | undefined;
readonly environment?: CreateIdentityConfigOptions["environment"];
readonly publicSignupEnabled?: string | undefined;
readonly secret?: string | undefined;
readonly trustedOrigins?: readonly string[] | undefined;
}
export interface DoctorOptions {
readonly clientAddress?: ClientAddressConfigInput | undefined;
/** Core's own migrations, where the platform is installed. Never derived from the modules
* directory: installed modules live in installation-owned storage, anywhere at all (ADR 0048). */
readonly coreMigrationsDirectory: string;
/** The environment the executable resolved, used only for transport policy evaluation; identity
* configuration keeps its own `identityConfiguration.environment` for the same purpose. */
readonly databaseEnvironment?: DatabaseTransportEnvironment | undefined;
readonly databaseTransport?: DatabaseTransportPolicyInput | undefined;
readonly databaseUrl?: string | undefined;
readonly identityConfiguration?: DoctorIdentityConfigurationOptions | undefined;
readonly moduleDiscovery: ModuleDiscoveryOptions;
/** Where deployment-supplied module secrets come from, so Doctor's answer about a required secret
* matches what `startApi` would resolve. Omitted supplies nothing — Doctor then reports every
* required secret as missing, which is only the honest answer for a deployment that has actually
* set none, so an executable must pass the same source it would give the runtime. */
readonly moduleSecrets?: ModuleSecretSource;
/**
* The host's object-storage settings as the executable read them, validated here.
*
* **Raw input**, for the same reason `mailConfiguration` below is raw: a half-configured provider
* is precisely the thing an operator runs Doctor to find, so Doctor has to be the one that
* validates it and reports the sanitized code. A pre-validated option meant a bad value threw
* before a report existed, and — because the executable then had to validate it itself — meant
* `pnpm doctor` simply never passed one at all, reporting configured storage as absent.
*/
readonly storageConfiguration?: StorageProviderConfigInput | undefined;
/**
* The host's outbound mail settings as the executable read them, validated here.
*
* Deliberately **raw input**, exactly like `identityConfiguration` and `storageConfiguration`: a
* malformed SMTP setting is precisely the thing an operator runs Doctor to find, so Doctor has to
* be the one that validates it and reports the sanitized code. A pre-validated option would mean
* a bad value crashed the command instead of appearing in its report.
*/
readonly mailConfiguration?: MailProviderConfigInput | undefined;
readonly runtimeRange: string;
readonly runtimeVersion: string;
}
export interface DoctorDependencies {
/** Synchronous, matching the real implementation: pure in-memory composition over an
* already-discovered module list, never re-discovering modules itself. */
readonly composePermissions: (modules: readonly DiscoveredModule[]) => PermissionRegistry;
readonly createMigrationDatabase: (
connectionString: string,
options: PostgresMigrationDatabaseOptions,
) => MigrationDatabase;
readonly discoverMigrations: (
options: DiscoverAllMigrationsOptions,
) => Promise<ModuleMigrationAggregate>;
readonly discoverModules: (
options: ModuleDiscoveryOptions,
) => Promise<readonly DiscoveredModule[]>;
readonly discoverSchemas: (options: ModuleDiscoveryOptions) => Promise<ModuleSchemaAggregate>;
/** Reads the stored module enablement configuration read-only. Separated behind the dependency
* boundary like every other I/O Doctor performs, so the whole report stays exercisable without a
* database. */
readonly readModuleLifecycle: (
connectionString: string,
options: PostgresPoolOptions,
) => Promise<ModuleLifecycleConfiguration>;
/** Reads the stored module configuration read-only, behind the same dependency boundary as every
* other I/O Doctor performs. */
readonly readModuleConfiguration: (
connectionString: string,
options: PostgresPoolOptions,
) => Promise<ModuleConfigurationSettings>;
readonly planMigrations: (options: {
readonly aggregate: ModuleMigrationAggregate;
readonly database: MigrationDatabase;
}) => Promise<MigrationPlanResult>;
readonly runtimeSatisfies: (version: string, range: string) => boolean;
/** Probes the configured storage provider for reachability. Behind the dependency boundary like
* every other I/O Doctor performs, so the whole report stays exercisable without a network. */
readonly probeStorage: (config: StorageProviderConfig) => Promise<void>;
/** Opens an SMTP connection, authenticates when credentials are configured, and closes —
* **sending nothing**. Behind the dependency boundary like every other I/O Doctor performs. */
readonly probeMail: (config: MailProviderConfig) => Promise<void>;
}
const doctorPostgresTimeoutMs = 10_000;
const checksumPattern = /^[a-f0-9]{64}$/u;
const migrationIdentityPattern =
/^[a-z][a-z0-9]*(?:-[a-z0-9]+)*:\d{4,}_[a-z][a-z0-9]*(?:_[a-z0-9]+)*$/u;
/** Opens its own short-lived connection, reads, and always closes it — Doctor never leaves a pool
* behind, and never shares one with the migration planner's, whose lifetime it does not control. */
async function readModuleLifecycleForRuntime(
connectionString: string,
options: PostgresPoolOptions,
): Promise<ModuleLifecycleConfiguration> {
const { close, db } = createModuleLifecycleDatabase(connectionString, options);
try {
return await createModuleLifecycleStore(db).readConfiguration();
} finally {
await close().catch(() => undefined);
}
}
/** Opens its own short-lived connection, reads, and always closes it — the same discipline
* `readModuleLifecycleForRuntime` follows. */
async function readModuleConfigurationForRuntime(
connectionString: string,
options: PostgresPoolOptions,
): Promise<ModuleConfigurationSettings> {
const { close, db } = createModuleConfigurationDatabase(connectionString, options);
try {
return await createModuleConfigurationStore(db).readSettings();
} finally {
await close().catch(() => undefined);
}
}
/** Opens a provider client, probes, and always closes it — Doctor never leaves a connection behind. */
async function probeStorageForRuntime(config: StorageProviderConfig): Promise<void> {
const provider = createS3StorageProvider(config);
try {
await provider.probe();
} finally {
await provider.close().catch(() => undefined);
}
}
/**
* Opens a transport, verifies, and always closes it — Doctor never leaves a connection behind.
*
* `verify()` performs the SMTP handshake and, where credentials are configured, an authentication
* exchange, then disconnects. It **never sends a message**: a diagnostic that emailed somebody every
* time an operator ran it would be its own incident.
*/
async function probeMailForRuntime(config: MailProviderConfig): Promise<void> {
const provider = createSmtpMailProvider(config);
try {
await provider.verify();
} finally {
await provider.close().catch(() => undefined);
}
}
const productionDependencies: DoctorDependencies = Object.freeze({
composePermissions: composePlatformPermissionRegistry,
createMigrationDatabase: createPostgresMigrationDatabase,
discoverMigrations: discoverAllMigrations,
discoverModules,
discoverSchemas: discoverModuleSchemas,
planMigrations: planModuleMigrations,
probeMail: probeMailForRuntime,
probeStorage: probeStorageForRuntime,
readModuleConfiguration: readModuleConfigurationForRuntime,
readModuleLifecycle: readModuleLifecycleForRuntime,
runtimeSatisfies: isVersionCompatible,
});
function plural(count: number, singular: string): string {
return count === 1 ? singular : `${singular}s`;
}
function freezeCheck(
id: DoctorCheckId,
status: DoctorCheckStatus,
summary: string,
details: readonly string[] = [],
): DoctorCheck {
return Object.freeze({
details: Object.freeze([...details]),
id,
status,
summary,
});
}
export function deriveDoctorResult(checks: readonly DoctorCheck[]): DoctorResult {
if (checks.some((check) => check.status === "failure")) {
return "not-ready";
}
if (checks.some((check) => check.status === "warning" || check.status === "skipped")) {
return "ready-with-warnings";
}
return "ready";
}
function publishReport(checks: readonly DoctorCheck[]): DoctorReport {
const frozenChecks = Object.freeze([...checks]);
return Object.freeze({ checks: frozenChecks, result: deriveDoctorResult(frozenChecks) });
}
/**
* One line per installed module, plus — for a module that declares browser contributions (ADR 0041)
* — how many of them have a compatible provider among the installed set.
*
* Worth reporting because the failure it names is otherwise silent: a contribution whose target
* capability nobody provides, or whose provider moved outside its declared range, is simply not
* published, and an operator sees a screen that renders nothing with no error anywhere. The counts
* are derived from the same publication registry the API serves from, so this can never disagree
* with what the running platform would actually publish.
*
* Static only, like every other Doctor check: it reports what the *manifests* support and never
* claims a module is running. Enablement and dependency blocking are the lifecycle check's job.
*/
function safeModuleDetails(modules: readonly DiscoveredModule[]): readonly string[] {
const publication = createModuleUiPublicationRegistry(modules);
const compatible = new Set(
publication
.listContributions()
.map((contribution) => `${contribution.moduleId}\u0000${contribution.contributionId}`),
);
return modules.map((module) => {
const id = module.manifest.id;
const version = module.manifest.version;
if (
!moduleIdSchema.safeParse(id).success ||
!semanticVersionSchema.safeParse(version).success
) {
throw new TypeError("Unsafe module diagnostic value.");
}
const declared = module.contributions.length;
if (declared === 0) {
return `${id} ${version}`;
}
const resolved = module.contributions.filter((contribution) =>
compatible.has(`${id}\u0000${contribution.id}`),
).length;
return `${id} ${version} · ${declared} browser contribution${
declared === 1 ? "" : "s"
} (${resolved} with a compatible provider)`;
});
}
function safeMigrationReference(identity: string, checksum: string): string {
if (!migrationIdentityPattern.test(identity) || !checksumPattern.test(checksum)) {
throw new TypeError("Unsafe migration diagnostic value.");
}
return `${identity} · ${checksum.slice(0, 12)}`;
}
function safeModuleId(value: string): string {
if (!moduleIdSchema.safeParse(value).success) {
throw new TypeError("Unsafe module diagnostic value.");
}
return value;
}
function safePermissionId(value: string): string {
if (!permissionIdSchema.safeParse(value).success) {
throw new TypeError("Unsafe permission diagnostic value.");
}
return value;
}
/** Distinguishes the two composition-error families rather than describing a reserved `core.*`
* declaration as a generic duplicate. Never includes a module directory, manifest path, caught
* cause, or stack — only the module id and permission id the structured errors already carry,
* each re-validated before being interpolated (defense in depth against a future drift bug,
* matching `safeModuleDetails`/`safeMigrationReference` elsewhere in this file); if that
* re-validation itself fails, this falls back to a fixed generic detail rather than throwing. */
function permissionCompositionFailure(error: unknown): DoctorCheck {
if (error instanceof ModulePermissionCompositionError) {
try {
const moduleId = safeModuleId(error.moduleId);
const permissionId = safePermissionId(error.permissionId);
return freezeCheck("modules.permissions", "failure", "Permission composition failed", [
`Module "${moduleId}" declared permission "${permissionId}" in the reserved core.* namespace.`,
]);
} catch {
return freezeCheck("modules.permissions", "failure", "Permission composition failed", [
"A module declared a permission in the reserved core.* namespace.",
]);
}
}
if (error instanceof PermissionRegistryError) {
try {
const permissionId = safePermissionId(error.permissionId);
return freezeCheck("modules.permissions", "failure", "Permission composition failed", [
`Permission "${permissionId}" is declared more than once.`,
]);
} catch {
return freezeCheck("modules.permissions", "failure", "Permission composition failed", [
"A permission is declared more than once.",
]);
}
}
return freezeCheck("modules.permissions", "failure", "Permission composition failed", [
"The installed permission declarations could not be composed safely.",
]);
}
/**
* Renders one module's operational state in a form that is safe by construction: only a module id, a
* semantic version, a fixed state word, a fixed reason code from a closed set, and — for a
* capability edge — a capability id. Identity values are re-validated before interpolation, exactly
* like `safeModuleDetails` and `safeMigrationReference` do, so a future drift bug cannot turn this
* into a disclosure channel. No filesystem path, package name, manifest path, or caught error can
* reach this line, because none of them is on the record it reads.
*/
function safeLifecycleDetail(entry: ModuleEligibility): string {
if (
!moduleIdSchema.safeParse(entry.moduleId).success ||
!semanticVersionSchema.safeParse(entry.version).success
) {
throw new TypeError("Unsafe module lifecycle diagnostic value.");
}
const identity = `${entry.moduleId} ${entry.version}`;
if (!entry.configured.enabled) {
return `${identity} · disabled${entry.configured.explicit ? "" : " (default)"}`;
}
if (!entry.blocked) {
return `${identity} · enabled`;
}
if (isStorageBlockedDetail(entry.blocked)) {
// A storage block names the **logical** bucket the module declared — never an endpoint, a
// credential, or the physical bucket the host maps it to. Re-validated against the same grammar
// the manifest accepted it under, for the same defense-in-depth reason as every other
// interpolation here.
if (!logicalBucketIdSchema.safeParse(entry.blocked.storageBucketId).success) {
throw new TypeError("Unsafe module lifecycle diagnostic value.");
}
return `${identity} · blocked · ${entry.blocked.reason} · ${entry.blocked.storageBucketId}`;
}
if (isConfigurationBlockedDetail(entry.blocked)) {
// A configuration block names the offending **key** and never its value: a key is declared in a
// public manifest, while a value may be a credential or arbitrary operator-entered text. The key
// is re-validated against the same grammar the manifest accepted it under, for the same
// defense-in-depth reason every other interpolation here is.
if (!moduleConfigurationKeySchema.safeParse(entry.blocked.configurationKey).success) {
throw new TypeError("Unsafe module lifecycle diagnostic value.");
}
return `${identity} · blocked · ${entry.blocked.reason} · ${entry.blocked.configurationKey}`;
}
const dependency = entry.blocked.dependency;
if (!moduleIdSchema.safeParse(dependency.moduleId).success) {
throw new TypeError("Unsafe module lifecycle diagnostic value.");
}
const target =
dependency.kind === "capability" &&
dependency.capabilityId !== undefined &&
capabilityIdSchema.safeParse(dependency.capabilityId).success
? `${dependency.capabilityId} (${dependency.moduleId})`
: dependency.moduleId;
return `${identity} · blocked · ${entry.blocked.reason} · ${target}`;
}
/**
* Reports what an operator most wants to know before anything else: which installed modules this
* deployment would actually run, and why any of them would not.
*
* Configuration lives in PostgreSQL, so this check is honestly skipped when `DATABASE_URL` is not
* configured rather than reporting a default that might not be what is stored. A **disabled** module
* is a `pass` with a detail line: it is a decision somebody made, not a problem. A **blocked** module
* is a `warning`: an enabled module that cannot run is an anomaly worth surfacing, and it is exactly
* the question "why is this module unavailable?" that would otherwise send an operator to the logs.
*/
function moduleLifecycleCheck(entries: readonly ModuleEligibility[]): DoctorCheck {
const disabled = entries.filter((entry) => !entry.configured.enabled).length;
const blocked = entries.filter((entry) => entry.blocked !== undefined).length;
const eligible = entries.filter((entry) => entry.eligible).length;
const details = [
`${eligible} eligible · ${disabled} disabled · ${blocked} blocked`,
...entries.map(safeLifecycleDetail),
];
if (blocked > 0) {
return freezeCheck(
"modules.lifecycle",
"warning",
blocked === 1 ? "1 enabled module cannot run" : `${blocked} enabled modules cannot run`,
details,
);
}
return freezeCheck("modules.lifecycle", "pass", "Module lifecycle resolved", details);
}
/**
* Reports whether each installed module's configuration would actually let it run — and
* deliberately reports **nothing about the values themselves**.
*
* Not one configuration value is printed, secret or otherwise. A value is operator-entered text that
* may be an endpoint, a bucket name, or a credential that ended up in the wrong field; a *key* is
* declared in a public manifest and is safe. So a healthy module renders as a count, and an unhealthy
* one names the reason and the offending key. That is everything an operator needs to act, and
* nothing that turns `pnpm doctor` output — which people paste into chat — into a disclosure channel.
*/
function safeConfigurationDetail(entry: ModuleEligibility, declaredCount: number): string {
if (
!moduleIdSchema.safeParse(entry.moduleId).success ||
!semanticVersionSchema.safeParse(entry.version).success
) {
throw new TypeError("Unsafe module configuration diagnostic value.");
}
const identity = `${entry.moduleId} ${entry.version}`;
if (declaredCount === 0) {
return `${identity} · no configuration declared`;
}
const declared = `${declaredCount} ${plural(declaredCount, "key")} declared`;
if (entry.blocked && isConfigurationBlockedDetail(entry.blocked)) {
if (!moduleConfigurationKeySchema.safeParse(entry.blocked.configurationKey).success) {
throw new TypeError("Unsafe module configuration diagnostic value.");
}
return `${identity} · ${declared} · ${entry.blocked.reason} · ${entry.blocked.configurationKey}`;
}
if (!entry.configured.enabled) {
// Not evaluated: a disabled module's configuration is not resolved at all, and claiming it is
// valid would be asserting something nothing checked.
return `${identity} · ${declared} · not evaluated (disabled)`;
}
return `${identity} · ${declared} · valid`;
}
/**
* The configuration counterpart to `modules.lifecycle`: which installed modules could not run
* because of their own configuration, and which key is at fault.
*
* A module whose configuration is fine, or which declares none, is a `pass` line. A module blocked
* by configuration is a `warning`, for the same reason a dependency-blocked module is: an enabled
* module that cannot run is an anomaly an operator should see without reading logs.
*/
function moduleConfigurationCheck(
entries: readonly ModuleEligibility[],
declaredCounts: ReadonlyMap<string, number>,
): DoctorCheck {
const blockedByConfiguration = entries.filter(
(entry) => entry.blocked !== undefined && !("dependency" in entry.blocked),
).length;
const declaringModules = entries.filter(
(entry) => (declaredCounts.get(entry.moduleId) ?? 0) > 0,
).length;
const details = [
`${declaringModules} ${plural(declaringModules, "module")} declaring configuration · ${blockedByConfiguration} blocked`,
...entries.map((entry) =>
safeConfigurationDetail(entry, declaredCounts.get(entry.moduleId) ?? 0),
),
];
if (blockedByConfiguration > 0) {
return freezeCheck(
"modules.configuration",
"warning",
blockedByConfiguration === 1
? "1 module cannot run with its current configuration"
: `${blockedByConfiguration} modules cannot run with their current configuration`,
details,
);
}
return freezeCheck("modules.configuration", "pass", "Module configuration valid", details);
}
/**
* Reports which installed modules require object storage, and where the host keeps each binding.
*
* Names the module, the **logical** bucket it declared, and the physical bucket the host maps it to
* — the last of which is safe and useful here precisely because Doctor is an operator tool: someone
* debugging a permissions problem needs to know which bucket to look at. It is still never reachable
* from module-facing code (ADR 0030). No endpoint, access key, or secret key appears in any form.
*/
function storageBindingsCheck(
modules: readonly DiscoveredModule[],
entries: readonly ModuleEligibility[],
config: StorageProviderConfig | undefined,
): DoctorCheck {
const requiring = modules.filter((module) => module.manifest.storage.buckets.length > 0);
if (requiring.length === 0) {
// An installation whose modules need no object storage is not unhealthy for lacking a provider.
return freezeCheck("object-storage.bindings", "pass", "No module requires object storage", [
"0 modules declare a logical storage bucket.",
]);
}
const blocked = entries.filter(
(entry) => entry.blocked !== undefined && isStorageBlockedDetail(entry.blocked),
);
const details = requiring.flatMap((module) => {
const moduleId = module.manifest.id;
if (!moduleIdSchema.safeParse(moduleId).success) {
throw new TypeError("Unsafe module storage diagnostic value.");
}
return module.manifest.storage.buckets.map((bucket) => {
if (!logicalBucketIdSchema.safeParse(bucket.id).success) {
throw new TypeError("Unsafe module storage diagnostic value.");
}
return config === undefined
? `${moduleId} · ${bucket.id} · unbound (no storage provider configured)`
: `${moduleId} · ${bucket.id} → ${physicalBucketName(config.bucketPrefix, moduleId, bucket.id)}`;
});
});
if (config === undefined) {
return freezeCheck(
"object-storage.bindings",
"failure",
blocked.length === 1
? "1 module requires object storage that is not configured"
: `${blocked.length} modules require object storage that is not configured`,
[
"Configure an S3-compatible Ekklesia storage provider (S3_ENDPOINT, S3_ACCESS_KEY, S3_SECRET_KEY).",
...details,
],
);
}
return freezeCheck(
"object-storage.bindings",
"pass",
`${details.length} ${plural(details.length, "storage binding")} resolved`,
details,
);
}
function moduleDiscoveryFailureDetail(error: unknown): string {
if (!(error instanceof ModuleDiscoveryError)) {
return "Static module discovery could not be completed.";
}
// The modules directory itself, rather than anything in it (ADR 0048). Fixed wording, never the
// configured value: a path is machine detail.
if (error.issues.some((issue) => issue.code === "MODULES_DIRECTORY_INVALID")) {
return "The configured modules directory is not usable.";
}
if (error.issues.some((issue) => issue.code === "MODULES_DIRECTORY_UNREADABLE")) {
return "The configured modules directory could not be read.";
}
return "The installed module inventory is invalid.";
}
function moduleDiscoveryFailure(error: unknown): DoctorCheck {
const details = [moduleDiscoveryFailureDetail(error)];
return freezeCheck("modules.discovery", "failure", "Module discovery failed", details);
}
function schemaDiscoveryFailure(): DoctorCheck {
return freezeCheck("schemas.discovery", "failure", "Schema validation failed", [
"Installed module schemas could not be validated.",
]);
}
function migrationDiscoveryFailure(): DoctorCheck {
return freezeCheck("migrations.discovery", "failure", "Migration validation failed", [
"Installed module migrations could not be validated.",
]);
}
function configuredDatabaseFailure(error: unknown): readonly [DoctorCheck, DoctorCheck] {
if (error instanceof MigrationRunnerError) {
if (error.code === "MIGRATION_CONNECTION_FAILED") {
return [
freezeCheck("postgresql.connection", "failure", "Connection failed", [
"The configured PostgreSQL database could not be reached.",
]),
freezeCheck("postgresql.plan", "skipped", "Migration plan skipped", [
"A successful PostgreSQL connection is required.",
]),
];
}
return [
freezeCheck("postgresql.connection", "pass", "Connection established"),
freezeCheck("postgresql.plan", "failure", "Migration history validation failed", [
migrationPlanFailureDetail(error.code),
]),
];
}
if (error instanceof PostgresMigrationDatabaseError) {
return [
freezeCheck("postgresql.connection", "failure", "PostgreSQL configuration invalid", [
"The configured database connection could not be prepared safely.",
]),
freezeCheck("postgresql.plan", "skipped", "Migration plan skipped", [
"A valid PostgreSQL configuration is required.",
]),
];
}
return [
freezeCheck("postgresql.connection", "failure", "PostgreSQL diagnostic failed", [
"The configured database could not be inspected safely.",
]),
freezeCheck("postgresql.plan", "skipped", "Migration plan skipped", [
"PostgreSQL connectivity could not be confirmed.",
]),
];
}
function migrationPlanFailureDetail(code: MigrationRunnerError["code"]): string {
switch (code) {
case "MIGRATION_CHECKSUM_MISMATCH":
return "An applied migration checksum disagrees with packaged inventory.";
case "MIGRATION_HISTORY_INVALID":
return "Applied migration history is invalid.";
case "MIGRATION_HISTORY_READ_FAILED":
return "Applied migration history could not be read safely.";
case "MIGRATION_UNKNOWN_APPLIED":
return "Applied migration history contains an unknown identity.";
case "MIGRATION_CLEANUP_FAILED":
return "The read-only PostgreSQL session did not close cleanly.";
default:
return "The read-only migration plan could not be completed safely.";
}
}
function migrationPlanCheck(plan: MigrationPlanResult): DoctorCheck {
const pendingCount = plan.entries.filter((entry) => entry.status === "pending").length;
const blockedCount = plan.entries.filter((entry) => entry.status === "approval-blocked").length;
const appliedCount = plan.entries.filter((entry) => entry.status === "applied").length;
if (
appliedCount !== plan.appliedCount ||
pendingCount + blockedCount !== plan.pendingCount ||
blockedCount !== plan.approvalRequiredCount
) {
throw new TypeError("Inconsistent migration plan diagnostic value.");
}
const details = [
`${appliedCount} applied · ${pendingCount} pending · ${blockedCount} approval-blocked`,
...plan.entries.map((entry) => {
if (!(["applied", "approval-blocked", "pending"] as const).includes(entry.status)) {
throw new TypeError("Unsafe migration plan diagnostic value.");
}
return `${entry.status} · ${safeMigrationReference(entry.identity, entry.checksum)}`;
}),
// An absent module's applied history (ADR 0048) is information, never attention: removing a
// module's code keeps its data, and nothing here is pending.
...plan.retained.map((module) => {
if (!/^[a-z][a-z0-9]*(?:-[a-z0-9]+)*$/u.test(module.moduleId)) {
throw new TypeError("Unsafe migration plan diagnostic value.");
}
return `retained · ${module.moduleId} · ${module.appliedCount} applied ${plural(module.appliedCount, "migration")} kept; the module is not installed`;
}),
];
if (pendingCount + blockedCount === 0) {
return freezeCheck("postgresql.plan", "pass", "Migration history current", details);
}
const attentionCount = pendingCount + blockedCount;
return freezeCheck(
"postgresql.plan",
"warning",
attentionCount === 1
? "1 migration requires attention"
: `${attentionCount} migrations require attention`,
details,
);
}
function identitySchemaSummary(): string {
const tableNames = Object.values(identityAdapterSchema)
.map((table) => getTableName(table))
.sort();
return `Core identity schema defines ${tableNames.length} ${plural(tableNames.length, "table")} (${tableNames.join(", ")}).`;
}
/**
* A heuristic for "same site" between two canonical origins, for a warning only (ADR 0045).
*
* The same hostname on another port is the same site. Otherwise the two hostnames must be siblings:
* identical after their first label, with that parent itself holding at least one dot
* (`dash.example.org` and `api.example.org`). Without the Public Suffix List this can be wrong in
* both directions for unusual names, which is why its result is a warning and never a failure.
*/
function plausiblySameSite(dashboardOrigin: string, apiOrigin: string): boolean {
const dashboard = new URL(dashboardOrigin).hostname;
const api = new URL(apiOrigin).hostname;
if (dashboard === api) {
return true;
}
// An IP address is a site of its own; two different ones never share one.
const isIpAddress = (hostname: string): boolean =>
hostname.startsWith("[") || /^[0-9]+(\.[0-9]+){3}$/u.test(hostname);
if (isIpAddress(dashboard) || isIpAddress(api)) {
return false;
}
const parent = (hostname: string): string => hostname.slice(hostname.indexOf(".") + 1);
return (
dashboard.includes(".") &&
api.includes(".") &&
parent(dashboard) === parent(api) &&
parent(dashboard).includes(".")
);
}
/**
* Pure configuration validation only: never constructs Better Auth, never opens a database
* connection, and never prints the configured secret, base URL, or trusted origins. Missing
* configuration is a skip, not a failure — Doctor does not require identity to be configured yet.
*/
function identityConfigurationCheck(
input: DoctorIdentityConfigurationOptions | undefined,
): DoctorCheck {
const schemaDetail = identitySchemaSummary();
const hasAnyValue =
input?.secret !== undefined ||
input?.baseUrl !== undefined ||
(input?.dashboardOrigin ?? "") !== "" ||
input?.publicSignupEnabled !== undefined ||
(input?.trustedOrigins?.length ?? 0) > 0;
if (!hasAnyValue) {
return freezeCheck("identity.configuration", "skipped", "Identity configuration skipped", [
schemaDetail,
"Identity runtime configuration (signing key, base URL, trusted origins) is not set.",
]);
}
try {
const config = createIdentityConfig(
{
baseUrl: input?.baseUrl,
// Validated exactly as the API validates it at startup, so a Dashboard origin the API would
// refuse (untrusted, insecure, malformed) fails here first.
dashboardOrigin: input?.dashboardOrigin,
publicSignupEnabled: input?.publicSignupEnabled,
secret: input?.secret,
trustedOrigins: input?.trustedOrigins,
},
{ environment: input?.environment ?? "production" },
);
const signupDetail = config.publicSignupEnabled
? "Public signup is explicitly ENABLED."
: "Public signup is disabled (safe default).";
if (config.dashboardOrigin === config.baseUrl) {
return freezeCheck("identity.configuration", "pass", "Identity configuration valid", [
schemaDetail,
signupDetail,
"Topology: same-origin (the Dashboard is served from the API's origin).",
]);
}
const topologyDetail = "Topology: split (the Dashboard and the API are on separate origins).";
if (!plausiblySameSite(config.dashboardOrigin, config.baseUrl)) {
return freezeCheck(
"identity.configuration",
"warning",
"Identity configuration valid; split origins may not share a site",
[
schemaDetail,
signupDetail,
topologyDetail,
"The Dashboard and API hostnames are not siblings under one parent domain. Browsers send the session cookie across split origins only within one registrable domain (ADR 0045); Doctor cannot check the Public Suffix List, so confirm it.",
],
);
}
return freezeCheck("identity.configuration", "pass", "Identity configuration valid", [
schemaDetail,
signupDetail,
topologyDetail,
]);
} catch (error) {
const code =
error instanceof IdentityConfigError ? error.code : "IDENTITY_CONFIGURATION_INVALID";
return freezeCheck("identity.configuration", "failure", "Identity configuration invalid", [
schemaDetail,
`[${code}] Configured identity values failed validation.`,
]);
}
}
/**
* Pure configuration validation only, mirroring `identityConfigurationCheck`: never resolves a real
* peer address or reads a real request. Omitted configuration is a `pass`, not a skip — direct mode
* (trusting only the actual immediate socket peer) is itself a complete, safe default, unlike
* identity configuration, which has no meaningful default at all. An explicitly configured
* trusted-proxy mode reports its header name and trusted-proxy count; an invalid or contradictory
* combination is a `failure`, distinguishing the three states this pass's audit specifically calls
* for: safe direct mode, explicitly configured proxy mode, and an invalid configuration.
*/
/**
* Pure configuration validation only: never opens a connection, and never prints the database URL,
* host, port, database name, credentials, certificate, or CA material. An unsafe production
* transport is a blocking `failure`, not a warning — a production deployment that would reach
* PostgreSQL without certificate-verified TLS is not "ready with warnings".
*/
function databaseTransportCheck(
input: DatabaseTransportPolicyInput | undefined,
databaseUrl: string | undefined,
environment: DatabaseTransportEnvironment | undefined,
): DoctorCheck {
const effectiveEnvironment = environment ?? "production";
try {
const policy = createDatabaseTransportPolicy(input, { environment: effectiveEnvironment });
if (typeof databaseUrl === "string" && databaseUrl.trim() !== "") {
// Also rejects a URL carrying TLS parameters that could override the policy.
assertProductionDatabaseTransport(databaseUrl, policy, effectiveEnvironment);
}
return freezeCheck(
"database.transport",
"pass",
policy.mode === "verify-full"
? "Database TLS verified"
: "Database TLS disabled (development)",
[describeDatabaseTransport(policy)],
);
} catch (error) {
const code =
error instanceof DatabaseTransportError ? error.code : "DATABASE_TRANSPORT_INVALID";
return freezeCheck("database.transport", "failure", "Database transport unsafe", [
`[${code}] The configured database transport is not permitted.`,
]);
}
}
/** Doctor reads only its own process's environment, so it says so: run as the reference
* deployment's `migrate`, it is given the API's values by the proxy overlay, but run any other way
* it may be checking a configuration the API is not running. */
const CLIENT_ADDRESS_SCOPE =
"Checked: the environment Doctor runs with. In the reference deployment `migrate` is given the API's client-address values; a running API's own value is shown by `docker compose exec api printenv EKKLESIA_CLIENT_ADDRESS_MODE`.";
function clientAddressCheck(input: ClientAddressConfigInput | undefined): DoctorCheck {
try {
const config = createClientAddressConfig(input, TRUSTED_CLIENT_ADDRESS_HEADER);
if (config.mode === "direct") {
return freezeCheck("identity.client-address", "pass", "Direct client-address mode", [
"Trusts only the actual immediate socket peer for rate limiting; no forwarded header is trusted.",
CLIENT_ADDRESS_SCOPE,
]);
}
return freezeCheck("identity.client-address", "pass", "Trusted-proxy client-address mode", [
`Trusts header "${config.header}" only from a request whose immediate socket peer matches one of ${config.trustedProxies.length} configured trusted ${plural(config.trustedProxies.length, "proxy")}.`,
"The reverse proxy must overwrite (never append to) this header, and the origin must not be reachable except through it.",
CLIENT_ADDRESS_SCOPE,
]);
} catch (error) {
const code =
error instanceof ClientAddressConfigError
? error.code
: "CLIENT_ADDRESS_CONFIGURATION_INVALID";
return freezeCheck(
"identity.client-address",
"failure",
"Client-address configuration invalid",
[`[${code}] Configured client-address values failed validation.`, CLIENT_ADDRESS_SCOPE],
);
}
}
function skippedPostgresChecks(detail: string): readonly [DoctorCheck, DoctorCheck] {
return [
freezeCheck("postgresql.connection", "skipped", "Connection check skipped", [detail]),
freezeCheck("postgresql.plan", "skipped", "Migration plan skipped", [
"A validated migration inventory and configured PostgreSQL connection are required.",
]),
];
}
export function doctorExitCode(report: DoctorReport): 0 | 1 {
return report.result === "not-ready" ? 1 : 0;
}
export async function diagnoseEkklesia(
options: DoctorOptions,
dependencies: DoctorDependencies = productionDependencies,
): Promise<DoctorReport> {
// Resolved first, before module eligibility is decided: whether a provider is configured is an
// input to whether a module that declares a bucket can run, so validating it later would mean
// deciding eligibility against a question that had not been answered yet.
const hostEnvironment =
options.databaseEnvironment === "development" ? "development" : "production";
let storageConfig: StorageProviderConfig | undefined;
let storageConfigurationError: string | undefined;
try {
storageConfig = createStorageProviderConfig(options.storageConfiguration, {
environment: hostEnvironment,
});
} catch (error) {
// The sanitized code only — never the endpoint, the access key, or the secret key.
storageConfigurationError =
error instanceof StorageConfigError ? error.code : "STORAGE_CONFIGURATION_INVALID";
}
let runtimeCheck: DoctorCheck;
try {
runtimeCheck = dependencies.runtimeSatisfies(options.runtimeVersion, options.runtimeRange)
? freezeCheck("platform.runtime", "pass", "Runtime version supported", [
"Active Node.js satisfies the declared supported range.",
])
: freezeCheck("platform.runtime", "failure", "Runtime version unsupported", [
"Install a Node.js version supported by this repository.",
]);
} catch {
runtimeCheck = freezeCheck("platform.runtime", "failure", "Runtime validation failed", [
"The active Node.js runtime could not be validated safely.",
]);
}
let discoveredModules: readonly DiscoveredModule[] | undefined;
let moduleCheck: DoctorCheck;
let dependencyCheck: DoctorCheck;
try {
discoveredModules = await dependencies.discoverModules(options.moduleDiscovery);
const moduleDetails = safeModuleDetails(discoveredModules);
moduleCheck = freezeCheck(
"modules.discovery",
"pass",
"Module discovery complete",
discoveredModules.length === 0 ? ["0 modules installed"] : moduleDetails,
);
dependencyCheck = freezeCheck("modules.dependencies", "pass", "Dependency graph valid", [
discoveredModules.length === 0
? "Dependency order is empty."
: `Order: ${discoveredModules.map((module) => module.manifest.id).join(" → ")}`,
]);
} catch (error) {
moduleCheck = moduleDiscoveryFailure(error);
dependencyCheck = freezeCheck("modules.dependencies", "skipped", "Dependency check skipped", [
"Complete module discovery is required.",
]);
}
// Reuses the already-discovered module list above — never re-discovers modules solely for
// permission composition. Independent of the schema/migration checks below: a permission
// composition failure here (a reserved-namespace or duplicate declaration) does not skip those,
// since neither depends on the permission registry, only on discovery having succeeded.
let permissionsCheck: DoctorCheck;
if (!discoveredModules) {
permissionsCheck = freezeCheck(
"modules.permissions",
"skipped",
"Permission composition skipped",
["Complete module discovery is required."],
);
} else {
try {
const registry = dependencies.composePermissions(discoveredModules);
const count = registry.declarations.length;
permissionsCheck = freezeCheck(
"modules.permissions",
"pass",
"Permission registry composed",
[`${count} ${plural(count, "permission")} registered`],
);
} catch (error) {
permissionsCheck = permissionCompositionFailure(error);
}
}
// Deliberately independent of permission composition, schema, and migration discovery: an
// operator asking "is this module running?" must still get an answer when an unrelated check
// failed. It needs only a successful discovery and a configured database.
let lifecycleCheck: DoctorCheck;
let configurationCheck: DoctorCheck;
// Hoisted so the storage-bindings check below reports the same eligibility this pass resolved,
// rather than resolving a second time and risking a different answer.
let eligibilityEntries: readonly ModuleEligibility[] = [];
const skippedConfiguration = (detail: string): DoctorCheck =>
freezeCheck("modules.configuration", "skipped", "Module configuration skipped", [detail]);
if (!discoveredModules) {
lifecycleCheck = freezeCheck("modules.lifecycle", "skipped", "Module lifecycle skipped", [
"Complete module discovery is required.",
]);
configurationCheck = skippedConfiguration("Complete module discovery is required.");
} else if (typeof options.databaseUrl !== "string" || options.databaseUrl.trim() === "") {
lifecycleCheck = freezeCheck("modules.lifecycle", "skipped", "Module lifecycle skipped", [
"DATABASE_URL is not configured.",
]);
configurationCheck = skippedConfiguration("DATABASE_URL is not configured.");
} else {
try {
const lifecycleTransport = createDatabaseTransportPolicy(options.databaseTransport, {
environment: options.databaseEnvironment ?? "production",
});
const poolOptions = {
connectionTimeoutMs: doctorPostgresTimeoutMs,
operationTimeoutMs: doctorPostgresTimeoutMs,
transport: lifecycleTransport,
};
// Both axes read and resolved in the one pass the platform itself uses, so Doctor can never
// report a module as runnable that startup would block, or the reverse.
// Sequential for the same reason `startApi` reads them sequentially: a deterministic failure
// beats two tiny queries racing.
const configuration = await dependencies.readModuleLifecycle(
options.databaseUrl,
poolOptions,
);
const settings = await dependencies.readModuleConfiguration(options.databaseUrl, poolOptions);
const resolution = resolveModuleEligibility(
discoveredModules,
configuration,
{ secrets: options.moduleSecrets ?? EMPTY_MODULE_SECRET_SOURCE, settings },
{ providerConfigured: storageConfig !== undefined },
);
eligibilityEntries = resolution.entries;
lifecycleCheck = moduleLifecycleCheck(resolution.entries);
configurationCheck = moduleConfigurationCheck(
resolution.entries,
new Map(
discoveredModules.map(
(module) => [module.manifest.id, module.manifest.configuration.length] as const,
),
),
);
} catch {
lifecycleCheck = freezeCheck("modules.lifecycle", "failure", "Module lifecycle unavailable", [
"The stored module enablement configuration could not be read safely.",
]);
configurationCheck = freezeCheck(
"modules.configuration",
"failure",
"Module configuration unavailable",
["The stored module configuration could not be read safely."],
);
}
}
let schemaCheck: DoctorCheck;
let migrationCheck: DoctorCheck;
let migrations: ModuleMigrationAggregate | undefined;
if (!discoveredModules) {
schemaCheck = freezeCheck("schemas.discovery", "skipped", "Schema validation skipped", [
"Complete module discovery is required.",
]);
migrationCheck = freezeCheck(
"migrations.discovery",
"skipped",
"Migration validation skipped",
["Complete module discovery is required."],
);
} else {
try {
const schemas = await dependencies.discoverSchemas(options.moduleDiscovery);
schemaCheck = freezeCheck("schemas.discovery", "pass", "Schemas validated", [
`${schemas.discoveredModules.length} ${plural(schemas.discoveredModules.length, "module")} · ${schemas.tables.length} ${plural(schemas.tables.length, "table")}`,
]);
} catch {
schemaCheck = schemaDiscoveryFailure();
}
try {
migrations = await dependencies.discoverMigrations({
coreMigrationsDirectory: options.coreMigrationsDirectory,
moduleDiscovery: options.moduleDiscovery,
});
const inventory = migrations.migrations.map((migration) =>
safeMigrationReference(migration.identity, migration.checksum),
);
migrationCheck = freezeCheck("migrations.discovery", "pass", "Migrations validated", [
`${migrations.migrations.length} ${plural(migrations.migrations.length, "migration")} · checksums valid`,
...inventory,
]);
} catch {
migrations = undefined;
migrationCheck = migrationDiscoveryFailure();
}
}
let postgresConnectionCheck: DoctorCheck;
let postgresPlanCheck: DoctorCheck;
const databaseUrl = options.databaseUrl;
const databaseConfigured = typeof databaseUrl === "string" && databaseUrl.trim() !== "";
if (!migrations) {
[postgresConnectionCheck, postgresPlanCheck] = skippedPostgresChecks(
"Complete migration discovery is required.",
);
} else if (!databaseConfigured) {
[postgresConnectionCheck, postgresPlanCheck] = skippedPostgresChecks(
"DATABASE_URL is not configured.",
);
} else {
try {
// Doctor's own read-only connection uses the exact same validated transport policy every
// other executable does, so a Doctor "connection established" can never mean something
// weaker than what `pnpm api:start` or `pnpm migrations:apply` would use.
const doctorTransport = createDatabaseTransportPolicy(options.databaseTransport, {
environment: options.databaseEnvironment ?? "production",
});
const database = dependencies.createMigrationDatabase(databaseUrl, {
connectionTimeoutMs: doctorPostgresTimeoutMs,
operationTimeoutMs: doctorPostgresTimeoutMs,
transport: doctorTransport,
});
const plan = await dependencies.planMigrations({ aggregate: migrations, database });
postgresConnectionCheck = freezeCheck(
"postgresql.connection",
"pass",
"Connection established",
);
postgresPlanCheck = migrationPlanCheck(plan);
} catch (error) {
[postgresConnectionCheck, postgresPlanCheck] = configuredDatabaseFailure(error);
}
}
const identityCheck = identityConfigurationCheck(options.identityConfiguration);
const clientAddressDoctorCheck = clientAddressCheck(options.clientAddress);
const transportCheck = databaseTransportCheck(
options.databaseTransport,
options.databaseUrl,
options.databaseEnvironment,
);
// Two separate questions, deliberately. "Is a provider configured and reachable?" is
// infrastructure diagnostics; "can every module's declared bucket be bound?" is what decides
// whether modules run. Conflating them would let a momentary network blip read as a module
// problem (ADR 0030).
let storageCheck: DoctorCheck;
if (storageConfigurationError !== undefined) {
// A failure, unlike an unreachable provider: this is not a network condition an operator can
// wait out. `startApi` refuses to start on exactly this input, so a deployment carrying it is
// genuinely not ready, and saying so is what stops the operator from discovering it at boot.
storageCheck = freezeCheck(
"object-storage.integration",
"failure",
"Object storage configuration invalid",
[
`The object-storage settings were rejected: ${storageConfigurationError}.`,
"Nothing was connected to and no credential is shown. Correct the S3_* values and run Doctor again.",
],
);
} else if (!storageConfig) {
storageCheck = freezeCheck(
"object-storage.integration",
"skipped",
"Object storage not configured",
["No S3_ENDPOINT is set. This is a complete deployment unless a module requires storage."],
);
} else {
try {
await dependencies.probeStorage(storageConfig);
storageCheck = freezeCheck("object-storage.integration", "pass", "Object storage reachable", [
describeStorageProvider(storageConfig),
// Said plainly rather than implied: this probe used the endpoint Core talks to, and a
// separate browser-facing origin is by definition something a browser reaches and this
// process may not. Reporting "reachable" without that caveat would let an operator conclude
// direct delivery works when only half of it was tested.
...(storageConfig.deliveryEndpoint === storageConfig.endpoint
? []
: [
"The browser delivery origin is configured separately and was not probed; verify it from a browser. Any reverse proxy in front of it must pass the original Host header through unchanged, or signed read URLs will be rejected.",
]),
]);
} catch {
// A warning, never a failure: the provider is configured, and a module that is already
// running keeps running through a transient outage. Reporting this as `not-ready` would make
// the platform look broken because a network hiccup happened while Doctor ran.
storageCheck = freezeCheck(
"object-storage.integration",
"warning",
"Object storage unreachable",
[
describeStorageProvider(storageConfig),
"The configured storage service did not respond. Modules already running are unaffected.",
],
);
}
}
const storageBindings = discoveredModules
? storageBindingsCheck(discoveredModules, eligibilityEntries, storageConfig)
: freezeCheck("object-storage.bindings", "skipped", "Storage bindings skipped", [
"Complete module discovery is required.",
]);
// Outbound email, reported the same way storage is: configured-and-reachable, configured-but-not
// answering, or simply absent. Absent is deliberately `skipped` rather than a warning — nothing in
// the platform sends email yet, so an installation without SMTP is complete rather than degraded
// (ADR 0037).
let mailCheck: DoctorCheck;
let mailConfig: MailProviderConfig | undefined;
let mailConfigurationError: string | undefined;
try {
mailConfig = createMailProviderConfig(options.mailConfiguration, {
environment: hostEnvironment,
});
} catch (error) {
// The sanitized code only — never the host, the username, or the password.
mailConfigurationError =
error instanceof MailConfigError ? error.code : "MAIL_CONFIGURATION_INVALID";
}
if (mailConfigurationError !== undefined) {
mailCheck = freezeCheck(
"outbound-email.configuration",
"failure",
"Outbound email configuration invalid",
[
`The SMTP settings were rejected: ${mailConfigurationError}.`,
"Nothing was connected to and no credential is shown. Correct the EKKLESIA_SMTP_* values and run Doctor again.",
],
);
} else if (!mailConfig) {
mailCheck = freezeCheck(
"outbound-email.configuration",
"skipped",
"Outbound email not configured",
[
"No EKKLESIA_SMTP_HOST is set. The platform runs and the bootstrap owner can sign in, but email verification and account recovery cannot deliver.",
],
);
} else {
try {
await dependencies.probeMail(mailConfig);
mailCheck = freezeCheck("outbound-email.configuration", "pass", "Outbound email reachable", [
describeMailProvider(mailConfig),
// Said plainly: this connected and, where credentials are set, authenticated. It did not
// send anything, so it proves the relay accepts this deployment — not that a message would
// reach an inbox, which depends on SPF, DKIM, DMARC, and the relay's own authorization
// policy and cannot be established from here.
"Connected without sending a message. Deliverability still depends on the relay's authorization policy and this domain's SPF/DKIM/DMARC records.",
]);
} catch {
// A warning, never a failure, exactly as for storage: the configuration is valid and nothing
// in the platform depends on mail yet, so a relay that is briefly unreachable — or one that
// declines a bare connectivity check — must not make the deployment read as broken.
mailCheck = freezeCheck(
"outbound-email.configuration",
"warning",
"Outbound email unreachable",
[
describeMailProvider(mailConfig),
"The configured SMTP service did not accept a connection. Some relays also refuse a connection that sends no message, so verify with a real send before treating this as an outage.",
],
);
}
}
return publishReport([
runtimeCheck,
moduleCheck,
dependencyCheck,
permissionsCheck,
lifecycleCheck,
configurationCheck,
schemaCheck,
migrationCheck,
transportCheck,
postgresConnectionCheck,
postgresPlanCheck,
identityCheck,
clientAddressDoctorCheck,
storageCheck,
storageBindings,
mailCheck,
]);
}