Production configuration accepted publicSignupEnabled: true and started a
working Identity/API runtime, even though Ekklesia has no verified email,
invitation requirement, CAPTCHA, or durable shared/edge limiter — Doctor
merely reported "Public signup is explicitly ENABLED" as a pass.
validatePublicSignupEnabled now takes the same IdentityEnvironment the rest
of this config validates against and throws the stable
PUBLIC_SIGNUP_UNSUPPORTED_IN_PRODUCTION whenever the parsed value is true in
production. Parsing stays separate from the policy, so a malformed value
still reports PUBLIC_SIGNUP_ENABLED_INVALID everywhere. Because the
executable entry point validates configuration before startApi, such a
deployment fails before any pool, Better Auth instance, module runtime, or
listener exists, and Doctor reports NOT READY via its existing
IdentityConfigError path. Development and test composition still enable it
explicitly through the identical typed path.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
Add a single platform-owned request-body policy (hono/body-limit) with
small, named limits for Better Auth and Core's grant-mutation endpoint, and
a new required maxBodyBytes field on the executable module route contract so
every module route makes a conscious no-body-or-bounded-body choice, capped
at a platform ceiling. Every oversized request gets one sanitized 413
contract and never reaches business logic, authorization, or a handler.
Also configure finite Node header/request/keep-alive timeouts, including the
non-obvious connectionsCheckingInterval needed for them to take effect
promptly, so a slow-header or slow-body connection cannot hold a socket
indefinitely.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
Replace Better Auth's default trust of a caller-controlled X-Forwarded-For
with a platform-owned client-address resolution boundary: direct mode (the
safe default) trusts only the real socket peer, and an explicit trusted-proxy
mode requires a header name, a concrete trusted-proxy list, and only honors a
forwarded chain from an actual trusted peer. This closes a rate-limit bypass
where rotating a spoofed header let a caller choose a fresh bucket on every
request. Public sign-up is also disabled by default and requires an explicit
typed opt-in, using Better Auth's own disableSignUp gate so no email-existence
leak or second signup path is introduced.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
Add a real installed-module fixture (core/tests/fixtures/module-database-integration/db-facade)
with its own manifest, Drizzle schema, drizzle-kit-generated migration, and permissioned HTTP
routes, then exercise it end to end in a new apps/api PostgreSQL integration suite: explicit
migration application before the module runtime starts (never auto-created), start/stop/HTTP
handlers sharing one ModuleDatabase facade by reference, authorized read/mutation/transaction
commit and rollback against real PostgreSQL, denied/rejected-origin/OPTIONS/HEAD requests never
reaching the module or its table, and both a module-caught and an uncaught real database failure
sanitizing exactly as pass 1 established. Registered alongside the existing suites in
vitest.migrations.integration.config.ts; no production code, schema, or migration changed.
Introduce ModuleDatabase (a typed, restricted Drizzle query surface) and the frozen
ModuleRuntimeServices boundary in @ekklesia/contracts, and thread the same services object
through Core's module start/stop lifecycle hooks and apps/api's authorized module HTTP handler
context. apps/api builds the facade via a new core/src/modules/database.ts view (createModuleDatabaseView)
over the one existing shared PostgreSQL pool, alongside the identity and authorization views, and
wires it into startApi's fixed startup order ahead of Identity/Authorization construction.
Registration stays database-free; a module reaches its database only through an authorized start,
stop, or HTTP handler invocation.
Phase 5B, pass 3: adds ADR 0015 recording the durable module HTTP
routing and production runtime lifecycle architecture pass 1 and pass
2 implemented, extending ADR 0006 and ADR 0014 without superseding
either. Adds narrow cross-reference notes to both, and to the ADR
index, pointing at ADR 0015 for the work they deferred, while
preserving their historical text and accepted status.
Corrects stale forward-looking "pass 2"/future-tense language left
over from pass 1 in core/src/modules/runtime.ts and
packages/contracts/src/module-http.ts (comment-only; production
behavior unchanged), and a shutdown-lifecycle description in
docs/development/testing.md that predated the module-runtime-stop
step pass 2 added between draining the HTTP server and closing the
pool.
Full audit against origin/main...HEAD found the architecture,
contract, startup ordering, routing, authorization/origin
enforcement, and PostgreSQL integration coverage from passes 1-2
sound; the one concrete defect found (Vary-header merge producing an
invalid "*, Origin, Cookie" combination and case-sensitive duplicate
tokens) was already fixed with focused regression tests in a separate
commit (bf76f4e), not amending either checkpoint commit.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
Phase 5B, pass 1: framework-neutral module HTTP route contracts and runtime
registration. Adds @ekklesia/contracts' module-http.ts (methods, canonical
path grammar, route definition/context/handler types, and validation)
and Core's module runtime staging/publication of a module's declared
routes alongside its capabilities, gated on the module's own manifest
permissions. Routes are collected into StartedModuleRuntime as an
immutable snapshot but are not yet mounted into apps/api; that is pass 2.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
Adds ADR 0014 recording the durable architecture Phase 5A established
across both passes: the shared contracts-layer PermissionDeclaration,
manifest version 3 replacing version 2's bare permission strings, the
reserved core.* namespace and the structural guarantee that a
module-vs-Core collision always surfaces as
ModulePermissionCompositionError rather than the generic
PermissionRegistryError duplicate path, deterministic registry
composition, startup ordering, repository-root/package-version
resolution, registry injection into apps/api's enforcement and
explicit-grant HTTP API, the static-snapshot/historical-record
preservation guarantees, and Doctor/modules:validate integration.
Indexes it in the ADR README, cross-references it from ADR 0006 (only
its manifestVersion 2 / permission-string decision is superseded; the
rest of ADR 0006 remains accepted, and its historical text is left
untouched) and ADR 0013 (module permission registration, deferred
there, is what ADR 0014 implements), and links it from the relevant
development documentation.
Corrects two comments discovered during a direct source audit that
overstated where a module-vs-Core permission collision is actually
caught (core/src/modules/permissions.ts,
apps/api/src/platform-permissions.ts) — comment-only, no behavior
change, already covered by existing tests. Also corrects a
documentation claim in docs/development/authorization.md that
incorrectly implied removing a module blocks explicit revocation of
its historical grants; grants-routes.ts's revoke handler never
consults the permission registry, so revocation remains unaffected.
Wires composePlatformPermissionRegistry into apps/api's production
startup: startApi() discovers every installed module, composes the one
immutable platform permission registry (Core's own declarations plus
every module's), and only then constructs the shared PostgreSQL pool,
Better Auth, and the HTTP server. A discovery or composition failure —
an invalid manifest, a reserved core.* namespace claim, or a duplicate
declaration — propagates before anything exists to close; there is no
Core-only registry fallback. apps/api/src/platform-permissions.ts
resolves the repository root from its own file location, never
process.cwd(), so package-scoped test runs discover the right modules/
directory.
createApiApp/createGrantsRoutes now require the composed registry as
an injected authorization option, replacing the previous hard-coded
CORE_PERMISSION_REGISTRY; requirePermission continues to work
identically for Core-owned and module-owned permissions, since it has
no concept of the distinction.
Extends pnpm doctor with a modules.permissions check (reusing the
already-discovered module list, distinguishing reserved-namespace from
generic-duplicate failures, never re-discovering modules) and pnpm
modules:validate to compose the same registry before a module is
considered installable.
Adds focused coverage: startup-ordering and failure-isolation tests in
apps/api/tests/lifecycle.test.ts, module-owned-declaration enforcement
tests in apps/api/tests/authorization-middleware.test.ts, Doctor
composition tests in core/tests/doctor.test.ts, and a live PostgreSQL
end-to-end scenario proving a real installed module's permission is
discoverable, grantable, and deniable once the module is absent again
after a restart, without ever executing its server entrypoint.
Establishes the one canonical PermissionDeclaration contract
(packages/contracts/src/authorization.ts) — id/baseline/description,
strict, unknown-property-rejecting — consumed by both Core's
authorization registry and module manifests, replacing Core's
previously separate interface.
Bumps the canonical module manifest to manifestVersion 3: permissions
become complete declarations instead of bare identifier strings, with
manifest-owned namespace and duplicate-id enforcement. Version 2 and
bare string-array permissions are rejected outright; there is no
compatibility adapter.
Adds composePlatformPermissionRegistry (core/src/modules/permissions.ts),
a pure, synchronous composer that builds one platform permission
registry from Core's own declarations plus every already-discovered
module's, in deterministic order, reusing createPermissionRegistry
and rejecting any module-contributed permission in the reserved
core.* namespace. core/src/authorization remains independent of
core/src/modules; only the module integration layer depends on
authorization.
Updates the module template, module-development docs, authorization
docs, and existing manifest fixtures for manifestVersion 3. Does not
wire the combined registry into apps/api — that is pass 2.
Two related fail-closed gaps let a well-formed but never-declared
permission id slip through:
- POST /api/v1/grants created explicit grants for any well-formed
PermissionId without checking the injected permission registry,
allowing dormant grants for invented identifiers that could become
effective the moment those identifiers were registered later.
- createAuthorizationEvaluator validated the permission id only inside
the restricted-baseline branch, so a malformed permission combined
with the public or authenticated baseline could still return allowed.
Both now fail closed: the grants route checks the target permission
against the trusted registry before calling store.createGrant (sanitized
403, no store or audit write), and the evaluator validates permission
shape before any baseline is allowed to return an allowed decision,
without adding a registry dependency to the evaluator itself.
The live integration lifecycle test switched from an unregistered
calendar.events.read to the registered core.authorization.grants.manage
permission, since module permission registration does not exist yet.
Wires Core's identity and authorization domains into apps/api over one
shared, validated PostgreSQL pool; adds an explicit, single-use,
concurrency-safe platform-owner bootstrap CLI; adds a smallest-possible
immutable permission registry with one Core-owned restricted permission
(core.authorization.grants.manage); and adds reusable Hono authorization
enforcement plus a narrowly scoped /api/v1/grants HTTP API for managing
explicit grants only, gated by an exact trusted Origin on every mutation.
Adds Core-owned identity contracts, a Core-owned Better Auth database schema
(ekklesia_core_user/session/account/verification), a first-class Core-owned
migration source that coexists with module-owned migrations under the exact
existing migration system, and an explicit Better Auth construction boundary.
No authentication endpoint or sign-in UI is exposed yet (ADR 0010).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
