feat: support split Dashboard and API origins (ADR 0045)

An installation can now serve the Dashboard and the API on sibling
hostnames (dash./api.) beside the default same-origin topology, from one
image and with configuration alone.

- The Dashboard learns its API origin at run time: the built page carries
  one empty <meta name="ekklesia-api-origin">, which the API fills with its
  identity base URL's origin at startup, before computing the page's ETag.
  The shell accepts only a canonical http(s) origin and otherwise fails
  closed without making a request. The build-time EKKLESIA_API_BASE_URL is
  gone from the bundle; the development server injects the same element.
- The display host stays on the API's origin, so its device cookies,
  requests, and offline cache are unchanged.
- The API trusts its own origin (trusted origins plus the identity base
  URL), as Better Auth already does, so the display page's mutations pass
  the origin check without operators listing it.
- Doctor validates EKKLESIA_DASHBOARD_ORIGIN exactly as the API's startup
  does (it previously skipped it), reports the topology without printing
  hostnames, and warns when split hostnames are not siblings.
- The module UI contract states the CORS header limit (safelisted headers
  plus Content-Type, safelisted response headers only).
- Reference deployment: Caddyfile.split.example (Dashboard hostname serves
  / and its script; API hostname serves /api/*, /display/*, and the
  display script; each refuses the other's paths) and
  EKKLESIA_DASHBOARD_HOSTNAME in the proxy overlay and env examples.
- The deploy smoke test runs either topology (CI runs both). The split run
  installs the module template as a test-only module, checks per-hostname
  routing and exact CORS, then drives a digest-pinned headless Chromium
  over the DevTools protocol, with no added dependency: sign-in on the
  Dashboard hostname, the session cookie host-only on the API hostname,
  the module UI imported cross-origin and its credentialed request
  succeeding, the display and its service worker on the API hostname, and
  sign-out.

ADR 0045 is marked Accepted.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>

.dockerignore

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+# Build context for deploy/Dockerfile (ADR 0044). The image installs its own dependencies with
+# `pnpm install --frozen-lockfile` and builds its own outputs, so nothing installed or built on the
+# host may enter the context, and no secret or environment file may enter any layer.
+
+# Host-installed dependencies and build outputs: the image produces its own.
+**/node_modules
+**/dist
+**/.turbo
+**/coverage
+**/*.tsbuildinfo
+
+# Environment and secret material. Configuration reaches the container only through its runtime
+# environment; `.env.example` is excluded too, since nothing in the image reads it.
+**/.env
+**/.env.*
+
+# Repository and tooling metadata the image never reads.
+.git
+.github
+.gitea
+.forgejo
+.vscode
+.idea
+**/*.log
+**/.DS_Store

.github/workflows/ci.yml

@@ -103,3 +103,69 @@ jobs:
 
       - name: Exercise transactional migrations against PostgreSQL
         run: pnpm test:migrations:integration
+
+  image-build:
+    needs: verify
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    timeout-minutes: 20
+    env:
+      # Cache mounts in deploy/Dockerfile need BuildKit; this selects it even where the Docker CLI
+      # has no buildx plugin.
+      DOCKER_BUILDKIT: "1"
+    steps:
+      - name: Check out repository
+        uses: actions/checkout@de0fac2e4500dabe0009e67214ff5f5447ce83dd # v6.0.2
+        with:
+          # `actions/checkout` defaults to leaving the job token in `.git/config`, where any later
+          # step — including one a pull request added to this file — could read or reuse it. Nothing
+          # in this workflow pushes, so the credential is never needed after checkout.
+          persist-credentials: false
+
+      # The platform-only image (ADR 0044): a checkout has no `modules/`, so this proves the image
+      # builds, validates, and assembles with zero modules. Build only — no registry login, no
+      # credentials, no push, no tag anywhere but this runner's local image store.
+      # Tagged per run and attempt, not only per commit: a pull request and a push of the same commit
+      # can build at once on one runner's Docker daemon, and neither may remove the other's image.
+      - name: Build the production image without modules
+        run: >-
+          docker build
+          --file deploy/Dockerfile
+          --build-arg REVISION="$GITHUB_SHA"
+          --tag ekklesia-ci:"$GITHUB_SHA-${GITHUB_RUN_ID:-0}-${GITHUB_RUN_ATTEMPT:-1}"
+          .
+
+      - name: Remove the image from the runner
+        if: always()
+        run: docker image rm --force ekklesia-ci:"$GITHUB_SHA-${GITHUB_RUN_ID:-0}-${GITHUB_RUN_ATTEMPT:-1}" || true
+
+  deploy-smoke:
+    needs: verify
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    timeout-minutes: 30
+    # Both topologies (ADR 0045): same-origin, the default every installation gets, and split, which
+    # adds a test-only module and drives a real headless browser across the two origins.
+    strategy:
+      fail-fast: false
+      matrix:
+        topology:
+          - same-origin
+          - split
+    env:
+      DOCKER_BUILDKIT: "1"
+      EKKLESIA_SMOKE_TOPOLOGY: ${{ matrix.topology }}
+    steps:
+      - name: Check out repository
+        uses: actions/checkout@de0fac2e4500dabe0009e67214ff5f5447ce83dd # v6.0.2
+        with:
+          # `actions/checkout` defaults to leaving the job token in `.git/config`, where any later
+          # step — including one a pull request added to this file — could read or reuse it. Nothing
+          # in this workflow pushes, so the credential is never needed after checkout.
+          persist-credentials: false
+
+      # The reference deployment end to end (ADR 0044): a platform-only image, base + proxy with
+      # Caddy's internal CA (test-only), an explicit migration apply against this job's own fresh
+      # PostgreSQL, then the API, Dashboard, storage delivery, client-address chain, and verify-full
+      # database TLS through the proxy. Every secret is generated for this run and discarded with
+      # it; nothing is pushed, published, or logged in to.
+      - name: Smoke-test the reference deployment (${{ matrix.topology }})
+        run: bash scripts/smoke-deploy.sh

apps/api/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@ekklesia/api",
-  "version": "0.1.0",
+  "version": "0.1.1",
   "private": true,
   "type": "module",
   "files": [

apps/api/src/app.ts

@@ -27,10 +27,13 @@ import type { Context, MiddlewareHandler } from "hono";
 import { Hono } from "hono";
 import { cors } from "hono/cors";
 import { AUTH_REQUEST_MAX_BODY_BYTES, platformBodyLimit } from "./body-limits.js";
+import type { DashboardHostAssets } from "./dashboard-host-assets.js";
+import { createDashboardHostRoutes } from "./dashboard-host-routes.js";
 import { createDashboardRoutes } from "./dashboard-routes.js";
 import { createDeviceRoutes } from "./device-routes.js";
 import type { DisplayHostAssets } from "./display-host-assets.js";
 import { createGrantsRoutes } from "./grants-routes.js";
+import { type ApiHealthOptions, createHealthRoutes } from "./health-routes.js";
 import { createModuleConfigurationRoutes } from "./module-configuration-routes.js";
 import { mountModuleDisplayRoutes } from "./module-display-routes.js";
 import { canonicalizeVaryHeader, mountModuleHttpRoutes } from "./module-http-routes.js";
@@ -137,6 +140,20 @@ export interface CreateApiAppOptions {
    * presentation only — nothing reachable through this store influences discovery, dependency
    * ordering, module startup, or any authorization decision. */
   readonly dashboard: DashboardStore;
+  /**
+   * The built Dashboard's two files, read once by production startup (ADR 0044). Required rather
+   * than optional, unlike `displayHostAssets`: every installation has a Dashboard, and a missing
+   * shell build fails startup instead of leaving this origin answering `/` with a 404. See
+   * `./dashboard-host-routes.js`.
+   */
+  readonly dashboardHostAssets: DashboardHostAssets;
+  /**
+   * The readiness inputs behind the unauthenticated health routes (ADR 0044). Required rather than
+   * defaulted, like every other dependency here: a composition that cannot reach a database says so
+   * with a check that rejects, never falls through to an implicitly healthy one. `checkDatabase` is
+   * the bare query; the routes themselves bound and serialize it. See `./health-routes.js`.
+   */
+  readonly health: ApiHealthOptions;
   readonly runtime: EkklesiaIdentityRuntime;
   /** Exact allowed browser origins. Never a wildcard; combined with `credentials: true`, only an
    * exact, reflected match is ever returned in `Access-Control-Allow-Origin`. Also the trusted set
@@ -341,6 +358,16 @@ export function createApiApp(options: CreateApiAppOptions): Hono {
     }
   });
 
+  // Unauthenticated liveness/readiness under a platform-owned sibling prefix: like every route below,
+  // it is mounted before module routes and never inside `/api/v1/modules/`, which installed modules
+  // own entirely. See `./health-routes.js`.
+  app.route("/", createHealthRoutes(options.health));
+
+  // The Dashboard page and its one script, at exact literal paths outside `/api/` (ADR 0044). They
+  // grant no authority and resolve no principal; the page asks `/api/v1/principal` itself. See
+  // `./dashboard-host-routes.js`.
+  app.route("/", createDashboardHostRoutes(options.dashboardHostAssets));
+
   app.route(
     "/",
     createGrantsRoutes({

apps/api/src/conditional-request.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+/**
+ * RFC 9110 weak comparison for a GET/HEAD `If-None-Match` precondition, shared by the host-owned
+ * asset routes that answer `304` against a strong validator they computed from their own bytes.
+ */
+export function etagMatches(headerValue: string | undefined, etag: string): boolean {
+  if (headerValue === undefined) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  if (headerValue.trim() === "*") {
+    return true;
+  }
+  return headerValue.split(",").some((candidate) => {
+    const value = candidate.trim();
+    return (value.startsWith("W/") ? value.slice(2) : value) === etag;
+  });
+}

apps/api/src/config.ts

@@ -200,3 +200,19 @@ export function createApiRuntimeConfig(
     storage,
   });
 }
+
+/**
+ * The exact browser origins the API trusts: CORS on `/api/auth/*` and `/api/v1/*`, and every
+ * mutation route's origin check (ADR 0045).
+ *
+ * The configured trusted origins plus the identity base URL's own origin, which is where the API
+ * lives. Better Auth already trusts its base URL implicitly; this makes the API's own checks agree,
+ * so a page the API itself serves (the display host, and the Dashboard in the same-origin topology)
+ * passes without an operator listing the API's origin. Order is preserved and duplicates removed;
+ * every entry is already a canonical origin.
+ */
+export function apiTrustedOrigins(
+  identity: Pick<IdentityConfig, "baseUrl" | "trustedOrigins">,
+): readonly string[] {
+  return Object.freeze([...new Set([...identity.trustedOrigins, identity.baseUrl])]);
+}

apps/api/src/dashboard-host-assets.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+import { createHash } from "node:crypto";
+import { readFile } from "node:fs/promises";
+import { dashboardHostAssetUrls } from "@ekklesia/shell/dashboard-assets";
+
+/**
+ * The two immutable, platform-owned files that make up the built Ekklesia Dashboard (ADR 0044).
+ *
+ * Exactly the model `./display-host-assets.js` uses: read once, before the HTTP listener is bound,
+ * from the exact URLs the surface package exports. Request input is never involved in this read, the
+ * package is never exposed as a static directory, and the source map beside the script is never
+ * read. Text rather than a mutable `Buffer` keeps the frozen snapshot a genuinely immutable value
+ * every response can reuse.
+ */
+export interface DashboardHostAssets {
+  readonly html: string;
+  readonly htmlEtag: string;
+  readonly script: string;
+  readonly scriptEtag: string;
+}
+
+/** A startup failure with a fixed, non-secret shape. The originating filesystem exception, package
+ * location, and machine path are intentionally not retained or surfaced. */
+export class DashboardHostAssetError extends Error {
+  readonly code = "DASHBOARD_HOST_ASSET_UNAVAILABLE" as const;
+
+  constructor() {
+    super("The Dashboard host browser assets are unavailable.");
+    this.name = "DashboardHostAssetError";
+    this.stack = `${this.name}: ${this.message}`;
+    Object.freeze(this);
+  }
+}
+
+function strongEtag(text: string): string {
+  return `"${createHash("sha256").update(text).digest("base64url")}"`;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Captures one immutable, internally consistent Dashboard asset snapshot.
+ *
+ * Each strong validator is derived from the exact text in the same snapshot, so bytes from one build
+ * can never be paired with an ETag from another. Empty output is a failed shell build rather than a
+ * valid page that can never render anything.
+ */
+export function createDashboardHostAssets(html: string, script: string): DashboardHostAssets {
+  if (html.trim().length === 0 || script.trim().length === 0) {
+    throw new DashboardHostAssetError();
+  }
+  return Object.freeze({
+    html,
+    htmlEtag: strongEtag(html),
+    script,
+    scriptEtag: strongEtag(script),
+  });
+}
+
+/**
+ * The exact element the built Dashboard page carries for its API origin (ADR 0045), empty. The shell
+ * reads the filled-in value at run time; empty means the page's own origin.
+ */
+export const DASHBOARD_API_ORIGIN_PLACEHOLDER = '<meta content="" name="ekklesia-api-origin" />';
+
+function isCanonicalHttpOrigin(value: string): boolean {
+  try {
+    const url = new URL(value);
+    return (url.protocol === "https:" || url.protocol === "http:") && url.origin === value;
+  } catch {
+    return false;
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Writes the API's own origin into the Dashboard page, once, before the page's `ETag` is computed.
+ *
+ * The origin is the identity base URL's, which is where `/api` lives in either topology: the page's
+ * own origin when the Dashboard and the API share one, the API hostname when they are split. The
+ * built page must carry exactly one empty placeholder; anything else is a shell build this API does
+ * not understand, and startup fails rather than serving a page that might send credentials somewhere
+ * unintended. The value is escaped for an attribute even though a canonical origin cannot contain
+ * any character that needs it.
+ */
+export function renderDashboardPage(html: string, apiOrigin: string): string {
+  const parts = html.split(DASHBOARD_API_ORIGIN_PLACEHOLDER);
+  if (parts.length !== 2 || !isCanonicalHttpOrigin(apiOrigin)) {
+    throw new DashboardHostAssetError();
+  }
+  const escaped = apiOrigin
+    .replaceAll("&", "&amp;")
+    .replaceAll('"', "&quot;")
+    .replaceAll("<", "&lt;")
+    .replaceAll(">", "&gt;");
+  return parts.join(`<meta content="${escaped}" name="ekklesia-api-origin" />`);
+}
+
+/** Loads only the two surface-declared files, and renders the API origin into the page. A missing,
+ * unreadable, or incompatible build fails startup rather than leaving an API whose own origin answers
+ * `/` with a 404 or a page that cannot find its API. */
+export async function loadDashboardHostAssets(apiOrigin: string): Promise<DashboardHostAssets> {
+  try {
+    // Sequential deliberately, as for the display host: diagnostics stay deterministic and no
+    // rejected sibling read is left running after this function has already failed.
+    const html = await readFile(new URL(dashboardHostAssetUrls.html), "utf8");
+    const script = await readFile(new URL(dashboardHostAssetUrls.script), "utf8");
+    return createDashboardHostAssets(renderDashboardPage(html, apiOrigin), script);
+  } catch {
+    throw new DashboardHostAssetError();
+  }
+}

apps/api/src/dashboard-host-routes.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
+import { Hono } from "hono";
+import { etagMatches } from "./conditional-request.js";
+import { createDashboardHostAssets, type DashboardHostAssets } from "./dashboard-host-assets.js";
+
+/**
+ * The Dashboard's two host-owned routes (ADR 0044). Neither can collide with anything else the API
+ * serves: `/` is the only page the Dashboard has — it has no client router, and every emailed
+ * verification or reset link lands on `/` with a query (ADR 0038) — and the script lives beside, never
+ * inside, the display host's `/assets/ekklesia-display/` namespace. Module routes all live under
+ * `/api/v1/modules/<module-id>`.
+ */
+export const DASHBOARD_HOST_PAGE_PATH = "/";
+export const DASHBOARD_HOST_SCRIPT_PATH = "/assets/ekklesia-dashboard/app.js";
+
+/**
+ * Revalidate-always with a strong `ETag`, exactly the module UI and display-host script policy. The
+ * shell emits fixed, unhashed file names, so no response here may be cached as `immutable`: a
+ * rebuilt Dashboard must reach a browser on its next load, and an unchanged one costs a `304`.
+ */
+const DASHBOARD_HOST_CACHE_CONTROL = "no-cache";
+
+/**
+ * Headers the Dashboard page carries on every answer, including a `304`, so a revalidated cache
+ * entry never keeps an older set.
+ *
+ * The page holds the platform sign-in form, so it refuses to be framed by anyone — `X-Frame-Options`
+ * for older browsers, and CSP `frame-ancestors`, the one directive a policy here carries until the
+ * full Content-Security-Policy is decided separately. `no-referrer` keeps the page's URL, which can
+ * briefly hold an emailed reset token before the shell strips it, out of every request it makes.
+ */
+const DASHBOARD_PAGE_SECURITY_HEADERS = Object.freeze({
+  "Content-Security-Policy": "frame-ancestors 'none'",
+  "Referrer-Policy": "no-referrer",
+  "X-Content-Type-Options": "nosniff",
+  "X-Frame-Options": "DENY",
+});
+
+/** A composition error, detected before any Dashboard route is registered. Carries no file path,
+ * package location, or asset content. */
+export class DashboardHostConfigurationError extends Error {
+  constructor() {
+    super("The Dashboard host configuration is inconsistent.");
+    this.name = "DashboardHostConfigurationError";
+    this.stack = `${this.name}: ${this.message}`;
+    Object.freeze(this);
+  }
+}
+
+/** Copies and validates injected assets before registering any route, as the display host does, so
+ * a composition can never pair bytes with a validator computed from different bytes. */
+function snapshotAssets(input: DashboardHostAssets): DashboardHostAssets {
+  try {
+    const snapshot = createDashboardHostAssets(input.html, input.script);
+    if (snapshot.htmlEtag !== input.htmlEtag || snapshot.scriptEtag !== input.scriptEtag) {
+      throw new DashboardHostConfigurationError();
+    }
+    return snapshot;
+  } catch {
+    throw new DashboardHostConfigurationError();
+  }
+}
+
+function fixedAsset(
+  ifNoneMatch: string | undefined,
+  body: string,
+  etag: string,
+  contentType: string,
+  extraHeaders: Readonly<Record<string, string>>,
+): Response {
+  if (etagMatches(ifNoneMatch, etag)) {
+    return new Response(null, {
+      headers: { ...extraHeaders, "Cache-Control": DASHBOARD_HOST_CACHE_CONTROL, ETag: etag },
+      status: 304,
+    });
+  }
+  return new Response(body, {
+    headers: {
+      "X-Content-Type-Options": "nosniff",
+      ...extraHeaders,
+      "Cache-Control": DASHBOARD_HOST_CACHE_CONTROL,
+      "Content-Type": contentType,
+      ETag: etag,
+    },
+    status: 200,
+  });
+}
+
+/**
+ * Serves the built Dashboard from the same origin as `/api`, so the identity system keeps its
+ * default same-origin shape.
+ *
+ * Two exact literal routes over one frozen snapshot: never a static directory, never a path or file
+ * name taken from the request, and never the source map. Any other path — `/index.html`, `/app.js`,
+ * the `.map`, a traversal spelling — has no route and falls through to the application's ordinary
+ * sanitized `404`. Like the display host's code, these bytes grant no authority: the page renders
+ * the sign-in form until `/api/v1/principal` says otherwise.
+ */
+export function createDashboardHostRoutes(assets: DashboardHostAssets): Hono {
+  const snapshot = snapshotAssets(assets);
+  const routes = new Hono();
+
+  routes.get(DASHBOARD_HOST_PAGE_PATH, (c) =>
+    fixedAsset(
+      c.req.header("if-none-match"),
+      snapshot.html,
+      snapshot.htmlEtag,
+      "text/html; charset=utf-8",
+      DASHBOARD_PAGE_SECURITY_HEADERS,
+    ),
+  );
+
+  routes.get(DASHBOARD_HOST_SCRIPT_PATH, (c) =>
+    fixedAsset(
+      c.req.header("if-none-match"),
+      snapshot.script,
+      snapshot.scriptEtag,
+      "text/javascript; charset=utf-8",
+      {},
+    ),
+  );
+
+  return routes;
+}

apps/api/src/database.ts

@@ -26,11 +26,31 @@ export interface ApiDatabaseHandle {
   readonly module: ModuleDatabase;
   readonly moduleConfiguration: ModuleConfigurationDrizzleDatabase;
   readonly moduleLifecycle: ModuleLifecycleDrizzleDatabase;
+  /**
+   * One trivial round trip on the shared pool, for readiness (`./health-routes.js`). The `SELECT 1`
+   * runs in a read-only transaction carrying its own `SET LOCAL statement_timeout`, so PostgreSQL
+   * cancels a stalled statement itself rather than the caller merely abandoning it; the pool's
+   * session-wide `statement_timeout`/`query_timeout` remain the outer bound. The four statements
+   * travel as one simple-protocol message, so the check costs a single round trip. On any failure
+   * the pool discards that connection instead of returning it, so a transaction left open by a
+   * cancelled statement never reaches another caller. Rejects with whatever the driver raised; no
+   * caller may surface it.
+   */
+  readonly ping: (statementTimeoutMs: number) => Promise<void>;
   /** Closes the one shared pool exactly once, regardless of how many typed views were created
    * over it. Safe to call from both a startup-failure cleanup path and normal shutdown. */
   readonly close: () => Promise<void>;
 }
 
+function pingStatement(statementTimeoutMs: number): string {
+  // Interpolated rather than bound: neither SET nor a multi-statement simple query accepts
+  // parameters. Only a positive safe integer can ever reach the SQL text.
+  if (!Number.isSafeInteger(statementTimeoutMs) || statementTimeoutMs <= 0) {
+    throw new RangeError("The ping statement timeout must be a positive integer.");
+  }
+  return `BEGIN READ ONLY; SET LOCAL statement_timeout = ${statementTimeoutMs}; SELECT 1; COMMIT`;
+}
+
 /**
  * Composes the one physical PostgreSQL pool this process uses for Core's identity and
  * authorization schemas plus the module database facade: one validated, timeout-bounded
@@ -58,5 +78,8 @@ export function createApiDatabase(
     module: createModuleDatabaseView(pool),
     moduleConfiguration: createModuleConfigurationView(pool),
     moduleLifecycle: createModuleLifecycleView(pool),
+    ping: async (statementTimeoutMs: number) => {
+      await pool.query(pingStatement(statementTimeoutMs));
+    },
   });
 }

apps/api/src/health-routes.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
+import { Hono } from "hono";
+
+/**
+ * The longest a readiness probe waits on the database before answering `503` (ADR 0044). Short
+ * enough for a Compose health check or an external monitor to treat a stall as "not ready" rather
+ * than as a hung probe, and well inside the shared pool's own 10s connection and operation
+ * timeouts, which bound the underlying query independently.
+ */
+export const READINESS_DATABASE_TIMEOUT_MS = 2_000;
+
+export const HEALTH_LIVE_PATH = "/api/v1/health/live";
+export const HEALTH_READY_PATH = "/api/v1/health/ready";
+
+export interface ApiHealthOptions {
+  /**
+   * One trivial database round trip. Resolves when the database answered; rejects on any failure.
+   * The rejection is never read — not its message, code, or cause — so nothing a driver says can
+   * reach a response. The route bounds the wait and never overlaps two calls; this function only
+   * has to perform the query.
+   */
+  readonly checkDatabase: () => Promise<void>;
+  /** Whether module startup has completed. `false` again from the moment shutdown begins, so a
+   * draining instance stops reporting ready while it finishes in-flight requests. */
+  readonly isModuleStartupComplete: () => boolean;
+}
+
+const LIVE_BODY = Object.freeze({ status: "live" });
+const READY_BODY = Object.freeze({ status: "ready" });
+const NOT_READY_BODY = Object.freeze({ code: "NOT_READY" });
+
+/**
+ * Wraps `checkDatabase` so at most one call is ever unsettled, and no probe waits longer than
+ * `timeoutMs`.
+ *
+ * Every probe arriving while a check is unsettled shares that check's outcome, including after its
+ * deadline has passed: the deadline resolves the shared outcome to `false`, so those later probes
+ * answer immediately. A new check starts only once the previous call has actually settled. A timed-
+ * out query still occupies a pool connection until the database or the pool's own timeouts end it,
+ * so starting a fresh query on every probe would let a stalled database drain the pool one health
+ * check at a time.
+ */
+function createBoundedDatabaseCheck(
+  checkDatabase: () => Promise<void>,
+  timeoutMs: number,
+): () => Promise<boolean> {
+  let inFlight: Promise<boolean> | undefined;
+
+  return () => {
+    if (inFlight !== undefined) {
+      return inFlight;
+    }
+    let timer: ReturnType<typeof setTimeout> | undefined;
+    // The executor runs `checkDatabase` synchronously, so a synchronous throw is a rejection like
+    // any other rather than an exception escaping the route.
+    const settled = new Promise<void>((resolve) => resolve(checkDatabase())).then(
+      () => true,
+      () => false,
+    );
+    const outcome = Promise.race([
+      settled,
+      new Promise<false>((resolve) => {
+        timer = setTimeout(() => resolve(false), timeoutMs);
+      }),
+    ]);
+    inFlight = outcome;
+    void settled.then(() => {
+      clearTimeout(timer);
+      inFlight = undefined;
+    });
+    return outcome;
+  };
+}
+
+/** The same fixed refusal `./module-realtime-routes.js` uses: Hono lets a GET handler answer HEAD,
+ * and these routes accept GET alone. */
+function methodNotAllowed(): Response {
+  return new Response(null, {
+    headers: { Allow: "GET", "Cache-Control": "no-store" },
+    status: 405,
+  });
+}
+
+/**
+ * Unauthenticated liveness and readiness (ADR 0044), for Compose health checks and external
+ * monitoring. Neither route resolves a principal or reads a cookie, and both return fixed bodies
+ * that name no module, version, error, or connection detail; `pnpm doctor` remains the detailed
+ * operator report. They live under `/api/v1/health/`, a sibling of the `/api/v1/modules/` prefix that
+ * installed modules own entirely, so no module route can shadow them.
+ */
+export function createHealthRoutes(options: ApiHealthOptions): Hono {
+  const checkDatabase = createBoundedDatabaseCheck(
+    options.checkDatabase,
+    READINESS_DATABASE_TIMEOUT_MS,
+  );
+  const routes = new Hono();
+
+  routes.all(HEALTH_LIVE_PATH, (c) => {
+    if (c.req.method !== "GET") {
+      return methodNotAllowed();
+    }
+    c.header("Cache-Control", "no-store");
+    return c.json(LIVE_BODY, 200);
+  });
+
+  routes.all(HEALTH_READY_PATH, async (c) => {
+    if (c.req.method !== "GET") {
+      return methodNotAllowed();
+    }
+    c.header("Cache-Control", "no-store");
+    if (!options.isModuleStartupComplete()) {
+      return c.json(NOT_READY_BODY, 503);
+    }
+    const databaseReady = await checkDatabase();
+    // Checked again afterwards: shutdown may have begun while the query was in flight.
+    return databaseReady && options.isModuleStartupComplete()
+      ? c.json(READY_BODY, 200)
+      : c.json(NOT_READY_BODY, 503);
+  });
+
+  return routes;
+}

apps/api/src/module-display-routes.ts

@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ import {
   getAuthorizedPrincipal,
   requirePermission,
 } from "./authorization-middleware.js";
+import { etagMatches } from "./conditional-request.js";
 import { createDisplayHostAssets, type DisplayHostAssets } from "./display-host-assets.js";
 export {
   MODULE_DISPLAY_DESCRIPTOR_PREFIX,
@@ -100,20 +101,6 @@ function displayFailure(c: Context): Response {
   return c.json({ code: "AUTHORIZATION_EVALUATION_FAILED" }, 503);
 }
 
-/** RFC 9110 weak comparison for a GET/HEAD `If-None-Match` precondition. */
-function etagMatches(headerValue: string | undefined, etag: string): boolean {
-  if (headerValue === undefined) {
-    return false;
-  }
-  if (headerValue.trim() === "*") {
-    return true;
-  }
-  return headerValue.split(",").some((candidate) => {
-    const value = candidate.trim();
-    return (value.startsWith("W/") ? value.slice(2) : value) === etag;
-  });
-}
-
 /** Copies and validates injected assets before registering any route. Production's loader already
  * creates this exact shape, while this check keeps a test/composition caller from pairing mutable
  * bytes with a stale validator. */

apps/api/src/server.ts

@@ -44,10 +44,12 @@ import {
   createClientAddressResolver,
   wrapFetchWithClientAddress,
 } from "./client-address.js";
-import { type ApiRuntimeConfig, createApiRuntimeConfig } from "./config.js";
+import { type ApiRuntimeConfig, apiTrustedOrigins, createApiRuntimeConfig } from "./config.js";
+import { loadDashboardHostAssets } from "./dashboard-host-assets.js";
 import { type ApiDatabaseHandle, createApiDatabase } from "./database.js";
 import { withDevicePrincipals } from "./device-principal.js";
 import { loadDisplayHostAssets } from "./display-host-assets.js";
+import { READINESS_DATABASE_TIMEOUT_MS } from "./health-routes.js";
 import { prepareStartupModuleInventory } from "./platform-permissions.js";
 
 const connectionTimeoutMs = 10_000;
@@ -542,9 +544,15 @@ export async function startApi(
   // starts and application composition succeeds.
   const moduleUi = createModuleUiPublicationRegistry(eligibility.eligibleModules);
   let displayHostAssets: Awaited<ReturnType<typeof loadDisplayHostAssets>> | undefined;
+  let dashboardHostAssets: Awaited<ReturnType<typeof loadDashboardHostAssets>>;
   try {
     displayHostAssets =
       moduleUi.listDisplays().length === 0 ? undefined : await loadDisplayHostAssets();
+    // Unconditional, unlike the display host: every installation serves its Dashboard (ADR 0044),
+    // so a missing shell build fails here, before any module code is imported.
+    // The page learns its API origin from the API that serves it, so one build serves either
+    // topology (ADR 0045).
+    dashboardHostAssets = await loadDashboardHostAssets(config.identity.baseUrl);
   } catch (error) {
     await safeCloseStorage(storageProvider);
     await safeCloseMail(mailProvider);
@@ -576,6 +584,10 @@ export async function startApi(
     throw error;
   }
 
+  // Set by the first `shutdown()` call, before anything is drained or stopped, so readiness turns
+  // `503` while the instance still finishes in-flight requests.
+  let shuttingDown = false;
+
   let app: Hono;
   try {
     app = createApiApp({
@@ -620,6 +632,13 @@ export async function startApi(
       },
       // A typed view over the same single pool as identity, authorization, and the module facade.
       dashboard: createDashboardStore(databaseHandle.dashboard),
+      dashboardHostAssets,
+      // The app is only composed after `startDiscoveredModuleRuntime` resolved, so module startup
+      // has completed whenever it can answer; it stops counting as complete once shutdown begins.
+      health: {
+        checkDatabase: () => databaseHandle.ping(READINESS_DATABASE_TIMEOUT_MS),
+        isModuleStartupComplete: () => !shuttingDown,
+      },
       devices: {
         // `Secure` follows the deployment's own scheme, read from the already-validated identity
         // base URL rather than from any request. Production is https by configuration policy, so a
@@ -631,7 +650,8 @@ export async function startApi(
       // Principal resolution, extended with managed devices. A human session still wins, and this
       // is the only place a device credential ever becomes a principal.
       runtime: withDevicePrincipals({ devices: deviceStore, runtime }),
-      trustedOrigins: config.identity.trustedOrigins,
+      // The configured origins plus the API's own (ADR 0045).
+      trustedOrigins: apiTrustedOrigins(config.identity),
     });
   } catch (error) {
     await safeStopModuleRuntime(moduleRuntime);
@@ -677,6 +697,7 @@ export async function startApi(
   let shutdownPromise: Promise<void> | undefined;
   const shutdown = (): Promise<void> => {
     if (!shutdownPromise) {
+      shuttingDown = true;
       shutdownPromise = (async () => {
         // Close long-lived streams so HTTP can drain, but leave publishers active until the drain
         // completes: an in-flight module command may still commit and publish its resulting state.

apps/api/tests/api-http.integration.ts

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 import { randomBytes } from "node:crypto";
-import { mkdir, mkdtemp, rm, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises";
+import { mkdir, mkdtemp, readFile, rm, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises";
 import { request as httpRequest } from "node:http";
 import net from "node:net";
 import { tmpdir } from "node:os";
@@ -26,7 +26,19 @@ import {
 import { Client, type QueryResultRow } from "pg";
 import { afterAll, describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest";
 import type { ClientAddressConfigInput } from "../src/client-address.js";
+import { dashboardHostAssetUrls } from "@ekklesia/shell/dashboard-assets";
 import { createApiRuntimeConfig } from "../src/config.js";
+import { createApiDatabase } from "../src/database.js";
+import { DASHBOARD_API_ORIGIN_PLACEHOLDER } from "../src/dashboard-host-assets.js";
+import {
+  DASHBOARD_HOST_PAGE_PATH,
+  DASHBOARD_HOST_SCRIPT_PATH,
+} from "../src/dashboard-host-routes.js";
+import {
+  HEALTH_LIVE_PATH,
+  HEALTH_READY_PATH,
+  READINESS_DATABASE_TIMEOUT_MS,
+} from "../src/health-routes.js";
 import {
   MODULE_UI_CACHE_CONTROL,
   MODULE_UI_CONTENT_TYPE,
@@ -2977,6 +2989,106 @@ describe.sequential("live API — published module UI artifact", () => {
   });
 });
 
+describe.sequential("live API — the built Dashboard on the API's own origin", () => {
+  it("serves the built shell's index.html at /, with only its API origin written in, and its exact script, and nothing beside them", async () => {
+    const database = await createDisposableDatabase("dashboard_host");
+    await applyCoreMigrations(database.url);
+    const running = await startMigratedApi(database.url);
+    try {
+      const origin = apiOrigin(running);
+      const builtHtml = await readFile(new URL(dashboardHostAssetUrls.html), "utf8");
+      const builtScript = await readFile(new URL(dashboardHostAssetUrls.script), "utf8");
+
+      const page = await fetch(`${origin}${DASHBOARD_HOST_PAGE_PATH}`);
+      const html = await page.text();
+      expect(page.status).toBe(200);
+      expect(page.headers.get("content-type")).toBe("text/html; charset=utf-8");
+      expect(page.headers.get("cache-control")).toBe("no-cache");
+      expect(page.headers.get("x-frame-options")).toBe("DENY");
+      expect(page.headers.get("content-security-policy")).toBe("frame-ancestors 'none'");
+      expect(page.headers.get("referrer-policy")).toBe("no-referrer");
+      // The built page carries one empty API-origin element; the API fills in its own origin
+      // (the identity base URL) and changes nothing else (ADR 0045).
+      expect(builtHtml.split(DASHBOARD_API_ORIGIN_PLACEHOLDER)).toHaveLength(2);
+      expect(html).toBe(
+        builtHtml.replace(
+          DASHBOARD_API_ORIGIN_PLACEHOLDER,
+          `<meta content="${identityBaseUrl}" name="ekklesia-api-origin" />`,
+        ),
+      );
+      expect(html).toContain('id="ekklesia-host"');
+      expect(html).toContain(`<script src="${DASHBOARD_HOST_SCRIPT_PATH}" type="module"></script>`);
+
+      const revalidated = await fetch(`${origin}${DASHBOARD_HOST_PAGE_PATH}`, {
+        headers: { "if-none-match": page.headers.get("etag") ?? "" },
+      });
+      expect(revalidated.status).toBe(304);
+
+      const script = await fetch(`${origin}${DASHBOARD_HOST_SCRIPT_PATH}`);
+      expect(script.status).toBe(200);
+      expect(script.headers.get("content-type")).toBe("text/javascript; charset=utf-8");
+      expect(await script.text()).toBe(builtScript);
+
+      // The source map sits beside the script on disk and is never published.
+      const sourceMap = await fetch(`${origin}${DASHBOARD_HOST_SCRIPT_PATH}.map`);
+      expect(sourceMap.status).toBe(404);
+      expect(await sourceMap.json()).toEqual({ code: "NOT_FOUND" });
+    } finally {
+      await running.shutdown();
+    }
+  });
+});
+
+describe.sequential("live API — health", () => {
+  it("answers liveness and readiness with 200 against a migrated disposable PostgreSQL", async () => {
+    const database = await createDisposableDatabase("health");
+    await applyCoreMigrations(database.url);
+    const running = await startMigratedApi(database.url);
+    try {
+      const origin = apiOrigin(running);
+
+      const live = await fetch(`${origin}${HEALTH_LIVE_PATH}`);
+      expect(live.status).toBe(200);
+      expect(live.headers.get("cache-control")).toBe("no-store");
+      expect(await live.json()).toEqual({ status: "live" });
+
+      const ready = await fetch(`${origin}${HEALTH_READY_PATH}`);
+      expect(ready.status).toBe(200);
+      expect(ready.headers.get("cache-control")).toBe("no-store");
+      expect(await ready.json()).toEqual({ status: "ready" });
+    } finally {
+      await running.shutdown();
+    }
+  });
+
+  it("pings through the shared pool, and PostgreSQL itself cancels a statement that outlives the ping's transaction-local timeout", async () => {
+    const database = await createDisposableDatabase("health_ping");
+    const handle = createApiDatabase(database.url);
+    try {
+      await expect(handle.ping(READINESS_DATABASE_TIMEOUT_MS)).resolves.toBeUndefined();
+    } finally {
+      await handle.close();
+    }
+
+    // The ping's exact statement shape, with a statement that cannot finish inside its timeout: the
+    // server cancels it (query_canceled) long before the sleep would end, on a client that has no
+    // client-side timeout of its own.
+    const client = new Client({ connectionString: database.url });
+    await client.connect();
+    try {
+      const startedAt = Date.now();
+      await expect(
+        client.query(
+          "BEGIN READ ONLY; SET LOCAL statement_timeout = 50; SELECT pg_sleep(5); COMMIT",
+        ),
+      ).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: "57014" });
+      expect(Date.now() - startedAt).toBeLessThan(2_000);
+    } finally {
+      await client.end();
+    }
+  });
+});
+
 describe.sequential("live API — public signup is disabled by default", () => {
   it("rejects sign-up with a stable sanitized 400 when publicSignupEnabled is not set, creating no user row", async () => {
     const database = await createDisposableDatabase("signup_disabled");

apps/api/tests/app.test.ts

@@ -3,11 +3,16 @@ import {
   createAuthenticatedPrincipal,
   type ModuleDatabase,
   type ModuleRuntimeServices,
+  moduleIdSchema,
+  parseEkklesiaUserId,
+  parsePermissionId,
 } from "@ekklesia/contracts";
 import {
   type AuthorizationEvaluator,
   type AuthorizationStore,
+  CORE_PERMISSION_DECLARATIONS,
   CORE_PERMISSION_REGISTRY,
+  createPermissionRegistry,
   type PermissionRegistry,
 } from "@ekklesia/core/authorization";
 import type { EkklesiaIdentityRuntime } from "@ekklesia/core/identity";
@@ -16,6 +21,7 @@ import {
   createModuleUiPublicationRegistry,
   EMPTY_MODULE_REALTIME_REGISTRY,
   type ModuleUiPublicationRegistry,
+  StagedModuleRealtimeRegistry,
 } from "@ekklesia/core/modules";
 import { describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest";
 import {
@@ -25,6 +31,8 @@ import {
 } from "../src/app.js";
 import { AUTH_REQUEST_MAX_BODY_BYTES } from "../src/body-limits.js";
 import { createInMemoryDashboardStore } from "./support/in-memory-dashboard-store.js";
+import { testDashboardHostAssets } from "./support/dashboard-host-assets.js";
+import { readyHealth } from "./support/ready-health.js";
 import { emptyModuleConfiguration } from "./support/in-memory-module-configuration.js";
 import { emptyModuleLifecycle } from "./support/in-memory-module-lifecycle.js";
 import { emptyModuleStorage } from "./support/in-memory-module-storage.js";
@@ -104,6 +112,8 @@ function createAuthWiringApp(runtime: EkklesiaIdentityRuntime) {
     moduleConfiguration: emptyModuleConfiguration(),
     moduleStorage: emptyModuleStorage(),
     dashboard: createInMemoryDashboardStore(),
+    dashboardHostAssets: testDashboardHostAssets(),
+    health: readyHealth(),
     moduleServices: fakeModuleServices(),
     authorization: fakeAuthorization({}),
     runtime,
@@ -121,6 +131,8 @@ describe("Ekklesia API Hono application", () => {
       moduleConfiguration: emptyModuleConfiguration(),
       moduleStorage: emptyModuleStorage(),
       dashboard: createInMemoryDashboardStore(),
+      dashboardHostAssets: testDashboardHostAssets(),
+      health: readyHealth(),
       moduleServices: fakeModuleServices(),
       authorization: fakeAuthorization({}),
       runtime,
@@ -355,6 +367,8 @@ describe("Ekklesia API Hono application", () => {
       moduleConfiguration: emptyModuleConfiguration(),
       moduleStorage: emptyModuleStorage(),
       dashboard: createInMemoryDashboardStore(),
+      dashboardHostAssets: testDashboardHostAssets(),
+      health: readyHealth(),
       moduleServices: fakeModuleServices(),
       authorization: fakeAuthorization({}),
       runtime,
@@ -378,6 +392,8 @@ describe("Ekklesia API Hono application", () => {
       moduleConfiguration: emptyModuleConfiguration(),
       moduleStorage: emptyModuleStorage(),
       dashboard: createInMemoryDashboardStore(),
+      dashboardHostAssets: testDashboardHostAssets(),
+      health: readyHealth(),
       moduleServices: fakeModuleServices(),
       authorization: fakeAuthorization({}),
       runtime,
@@ -403,6 +419,8 @@ describe("Ekklesia API Hono application", () => {
       moduleConfiguration: emptyModuleConfiguration(),
       moduleStorage: emptyModuleStorage(),
       dashboard: createInMemoryDashboardStore(),
+      dashboardHostAssets: testDashboardHostAssets(),
+      health: readyHealth(),
       moduleServices: fakeModuleServices(),
       authorization: fakeAuthorization({}),
       runtime,
@@ -430,6 +448,8 @@ describe("Ekklesia API Hono application", () => {
       moduleConfiguration: emptyModuleConfiguration(),
       moduleStorage: emptyModuleStorage(),
       dashboard: createInMemoryDashboardStore(),
+      dashboardHostAssets: testDashboardHostAssets(),
+      health: readyHealth(),
       moduleServices: fakeModuleServices(),
       authorization: fakeAuthorization({}),
       runtime,
@@ -457,6 +477,8 @@ describe("Ekklesia API Hono application", () => {
       moduleConfiguration: emptyModuleConfiguration(),
       moduleStorage: emptyModuleStorage(),
       dashboard: createInMemoryDashboardStore(),
+      dashboardHostAssets: testDashboardHostAssets(),
+      health: readyHealth(),
       moduleServices: fakeModuleServices(),
       authorization: fakeAuthorization({}),
       runtime,
@@ -481,6 +503,8 @@ describe("Ekklesia API Hono application", () => {
       moduleConfiguration: emptyModuleConfiguration(),
       moduleStorage: emptyModuleStorage(),
       dashboard: createInMemoryDashboardStore(),
+      dashboardHostAssets: testDashboardHostAssets(),
+      health: readyHealth(),
       moduleServices: fakeModuleServices(),
       authorization: fakeAuthorization({}),
       runtime,
@@ -507,6 +531,8 @@ describe("Ekklesia API Hono application", () => {
       moduleConfiguration: emptyModuleConfiguration(),
       moduleStorage: emptyModuleStorage(),
       dashboard: createInMemoryDashboardStore(),
+      dashboardHostAssets: testDashboardHostAssets(),
+      health: readyHealth(),
       moduleServices: fakeModuleServices(),
       authorization: fakeAuthorization({}),
       runtime,
@@ -530,6 +556,8 @@ describe("Ekklesia API Hono application", () => {
         moduleConfiguration: emptyModuleConfiguration(),
         moduleStorage: emptyModuleStorage(),
         dashboard: createInMemoryDashboardStore(),
+        dashboardHostAssets: testDashboardHostAssets(),
+        health: readyHealth(),
         moduleServices: fakeModuleServices(),
         authorization: fakeAuthorization({}),
         runtime,
@@ -555,6 +583,8 @@ describe("Ekklesia API Hono application", () => {
         moduleConfiguration: emptyModuleConfiguration(),
         moduleStorage: emptyModuleStorage(),
         dashboard: createInMemoryDashboardStore(),
+        dashboardHostAssets: testDashboardHostAssets(),
+        health: readyHealth(),
         moduleServices: fakeModuleServices(),
         authorization: fakeAuthorization({}),
         runtime,
@@ -587,6 +617,8 @@ describe("Ekklesia API Hono application", () => {
         moduleConfiguration: emptyModuleConfiguration(),
         moduleStorage: emptyModuleStorage(),
         dashboard: createInMemoryDashboardStore(),
+        dashboardHostAssets: testDashboardHostAssets(),
+        health: readyHealth(),
         moduleServices: fakeModuleServices(),
         authorization: fakeAuthorization({}),
         runtime,
@@ -620,6 +652,8 @@ describe("Ekklesia API Hono application", () => {
         moduleConfiguration: emptyModuleConfiguration(),
         moduleStorage: emptyModuleStorage(),
         dashboard: createInMemoryDashboardStore(),
+        dashboardHostAssets: testDashboardHostAssets(),
+        health: readyHealth(),
         moduleServices: fakeModuleServices(),
         authorization: fakeAuthorization({}),
         runtime,
@@ -658,6 +692,8 @@ describe("Ekklesia API Hono application", () => {
       moduleConfiguration: emptyModuleConfiguration(),
       moduleStorage: emptyModuleStorage(),
       dashboard: createInMemoryDashboardStore(),
+      dashboardHostAssets: testDashboardHostAssets(),
+      health: readyHealth(),
       moduleServices: fakeModuleServices(),
       authorization: fakeAuthorization({}),
       runtime: fakeRuntime(),
@@ -678,6 +714,8 @@ describe("Ekklesia API Hono application", () => {
       moduleConfiguration: emptyModuleConfiguration(),
       moduleStorage: emptyModuleStorage(),
       dashboard: createInMemoryDashboardStore(),
+      dashboardHostAssets: testDashboardHostAssets(),
+      health: readyHealth(),
       moduleServices: fakeModuleServices(),
       authorization: fakeAuthorization({}),
       runtime: fakeRuntime(),
@@ -700,6 +738,8 @@ describe("Ekklesia API Hono application", () => {
       moduleConfiguration: emptyModuleConfiguration(),
       moduleStorage: emptyModuleStorage(),
       dashboard: createInMemoryDashboardStore(),
+      dashboardHostAssets: testDashboardHostAssets(),
+      health: readyHealth(),
       moduleServices: fakeModuleServices(),
       authorization: fakeAuthorization({}),
       runtime: fakeRuntime(),
@@ -721,6 +761,8 @@ describe("Ekklesia API Hono application", () => {
       moduleConfiguration: emptyModuleConfiguration(),
       moduleStorage: emptyModuleStorage(),
       dashboard: createInMemoryDashboardStore(),
+      dashboardHostAssets: testDashboardHostAssets(),
+      health: readyHealth(),
       moduleServices: fakeModuleServices(),
       authorization: fakeAuthorization({}),
       runtime: fakeRuntime(),
@@ -740,6 +782,8 @@ describe("Ekklesia API Hono application", () => {
       moduleConfiguration: emptyModuleConfiguration(),
       moduleStorage: emptyModuleStorage(),
       dashboard: createInMemoryDashboardStore(),
+      dashboardHostAssets: testDashboardHostAssets(),
+      health: readyHealth(),
       moduleServices: fakeModuleServices(),
       authorization: fakeAuthorization({}),
       runtime: fakeRuntime(),
@@ -766,6 +810,8 @@ describe("Ekklesia API Hono application", () => {
       moduleConfiguration: emptyModuleConfiguration(),
       moduleStorage: emptyModuleStorage(),
       dashboard: createInMemoryDashboardStore(),
+      dashboardHostAssets: testDashboardHostAssets(),
+      health: readyHealth(),
       moduleServices: fakeModuleServices(),
       authorization: fakeAuthorization({}),
       runtime: fakeRuntime(),
@@ -795,6 +841,8 @@ describe("Ekklesia API Hono application", () => {
         moduleConfiguration: emptyModuleConfiguration(),
         moduleStorage: emptyModuleStorage(),
         dashboard: createInMemoryDashboardStore(),
+        dashboardHostAssets: testDashboardHostAssets(),
+        health: readyHealth(),
         moduleServices: fakeModuleServices(),
         authorization: fakeAuthorization({ evaluator: { authorize: evaluatorAuthorize } }),
         runtime: fakeRuntime(),
@@ -827,6 +875,8 @@ describe("Ekklesia API Hono application", () => {
         moduleConfiguration: emptyModuleConfiguration(),
         moduleStorage: emptyModuleStorage(),
         dashboard: createInMemoryDashboardStore(),
+        dashboardHostAssets: testDashboardHostAssets(),
+        health: readyHealth(),
         moduleServices: fakeModuleServices(),
         authorization: fakeAuthorization({
           evaluator: { authorize: evaluatorAuthorize },
@@ -850,6 +900,8 @@ describe("Ekklesia API Hono application", () => {
         moduleConfiguration: emptyModuleConfiguration(),
         moduleStorage: emptyModuleStorage(),
         dashboard: createInMemoryDashboardStore(),
+        dashboardHostAssets: testDashboardHostAssets(),
+        health: readyHealth(),
         moduleServices: fakeModuleServices(),
         authorization: fakeAuthorization({}),
         runtime: fakeRuntime(),
@@ -864,3 +916,101 @@ describe("Ekklesia API Hono application", () => {
     });
   });
 });
+
+describe("split Dashboard and API origins (ADR 0045)", () => {
+  const moduleId = moduleIdSchema.parse("announcements");
+  const permission = parsePermissionId("announcements.slideshow.view");
+  const endpoint = "/api/v1/module-realtime/announcements/state";
+
+  /** The full application with one live channel, a signed-in caller, and an evaluator that allows
+   * it: the same composition a Dashboard on another origin reaches. */
+  function realtimeApp() {
+    const staged = new StagedModuleRealtimeRegistry();
+    const registration = staged.createRegistrationStage(moduleId, new Set([permission]));
+    registration.realtime.channel({ channel: "state", permission });
+    registration.commit();
+    staged.publisherFor(moduleId).publish("state", { mode: "on" } as never);
+    const moduleRealtime = staged.publish();
+    const app = createApiAppWithModules({
+      moduleRoutes: Object.freeze([]),
+      moduleUi: emptyModuleUiPublication(),
+      moduleLifecycle: emptyModuleLifecycle(),
+      moduleConfiguration: emptyModuleConfiguration(),
+      moduleStorage: emptyModuleStorage(),
+      moduleRealtime,
+      dashboard: createInMemoryDashboardStore(),
+      dashboardHostAssets: testDashboardHostAssets(),
+      health: readyHealth(),
+      moduleServices: fakeModuleServices(),
+      authorization: fakeAuthorization({
+        evaluator: { authorize: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({ allowed: true }) },
+        registry: createPermissionRegistry([
+          ...CORE_PERMISSION_DECLARATIONS,
+          {
+            baseline: "restricted",
+            description: "View the announcement slideshow.",
+            id: permission,
+          },
+        ]),
+      }),
+      runtime: fakeRuntime({
+        resolvePrincipal: vi
+          .fn()
+          .mockResolvedValue(
+            createAuthenticatedPrincipal(
+              parseEkklesiaUserId("88888888-8888-4888-8888-888888888888"),
+            ),
+          ),
+      }),
+      trustedOrigins: [trustedOrigin],
+    });
+    return { app, moduleRealtime };
+  }
+
+  it("lets the Dashboard's origin open a credentialed realtime stream", async () => {
+    const { app, moduleRealtime } = realtimeApp();
+
+    const response = await app.request(endpoint, {
+      headers: { cookie: "session=1", origin: trustedOrigin },
+    });
+
+    expect(response.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(response.headers.get("content-type")).toBe("text/event-stream; charset=utf-8");
+    expect(response.headers.get("access-control-allow-origin")).toBe(trustedOrigin);
+    expect(response.headers.get("access-control-allow-credentials")).toBe("true");
+    expect(response.headers.get("vary")).toContain("Origin");
+    await response.body?.cancel();
+    moduleRealtime.closeSubscriptions();
+  });
+
+  it("gives an untrusted origin's realtime request no CORS permission to read the stream", async () => {
+    const { app, moduleRealtime } = realtimeApp();
+
+    const response = await app.request(endpoint, {
+      headers: { cookie: "session=1", origin: untrustedOrigin },
+    });
+
+    expect(response.headers.get("access-control-allow-origin")).toBeNull();
+    await response.body?.cancel();
+    moduleRealtime.closeSubscriptions();
+  });
+
+  it("allows only Content-Type beyond the CORS-safelisted request headers, and exposes none", async () => {
+    const app = createAuthWiringApp(fakeRuntime());
+
+    const response = await app.request("/api/v1/principal", {
+      headers: {
+        "access-control-request-headers": "content-type, x-module-custom",
+        "access-control-request-method": "PATCH",
+        origin: trustedOrigin,
+      },
+      method: "OPTIONS",
+    });
+
+    expect(response.headers.get("access-control-allow-origin")).toBe(trustedOrigin);
+    expect(response.headers.get("access-control-allow-headers")?.toLowerCase()).toBe(
+      "content-type",
+    );
+    expect(response.headers.get("access-control-expose-headers")).toBeNull();
+  });
+});

apps/api/tests/config.test.ts

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 import { describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
-import { ApiConfigError, createApiRuntimeConfig } from "../src/config.js";
+import { ApiConfigError, apiTrustedOrigins, createApiRuntimeConfig } from "../src/config.js";
 
 const validSecret = "correct-horse-battery-staple-0123456789";
 
@@ -337,3 +337,24 @@ describe("API runtime configuration", () => {
     expect(publicText).not.toContain("db.internal.example");
   });
 });
+
+describe("the API's trusted browser origins (ADR 0045)", () => {
+  it("adds the API's own origin to the configured ones, as Better Auth does", () => {
+    const origins = apiTrustedOrigins({
+      baseUrl: "https://api.example.test",
+      trustedOrigins: ["https://dash.example.test"],
+    });
+
+    expect(origins).toEqual(["https://dash.example.test", "https://api.example.test"]);
+    expect(Object.isFrozen(origins)).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it("does not duplicate an API origin already listed (the same-origin topology)", () => {
+    expect(
+      apiTrustedOrigins({
+        baseUrl: "https://ekklesia.example.test",
+        trustedOrigins: ["https://ekklesia.example.test"],
+      }),
+    ).toEqual(["https://ekklesia.example.test"]);
+  });
+});

apps/api/tests/dashboard-host-assets.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
+import { createHash } from "node:crypto";
+import { beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest";
+
+const readFileMock = vi.hoisted(() => vi.fn());
+
+vi.mock("node:fs/promises", () => ({ readFile: readFileMock }));
+vi.mock("@ekklesia/shell/dashboard-assets", () => ({
+  dashboardHostAssetUrls: Object.freeze({
+    html: "file:///surface/browser/index.html",
+    script: "file:///surface/browser/assets/ekklesia-dashboard/app.js",
+  }),
+}));
+
+import {
+  createDashboardHostAssets,
+  DASHBOARD_API_ORIGIN_PLACEHOLDER,
+  DashboardHostAssetError,
+  loadDashboardHostAssets,
+  renderDashboardPage,
+} from "../src/dashboard-host-assets.js";
+
+const API_ORIGIN = "https://api.example.test";
+
+function sha256Etag(text: string): string {
+  return `"${createHash("sha256").update(text).digest("base64url")}"`;
+}
+
+describe("Dashboard host asset loading", () => {
+  beforeEach(() => readFileMock.mockReset());
+
+  it("reads only the two declared file URLs in order and freezes one consistent snapshot", async () => {
+    const html = `<!doctype html>${DASHBOARD_API_ORIGIN_PLACEHOLDER}<div id="ekklesia-host"></div>`;
+    const script = "export const dashboardHost = true;\n";
+    readFileMock.mockResolvedValueOnce(html).mockResolvedValueOnce(script);
+
+    const assets = await loadDashboardHostAssets(API_ORIGIN);
+
+    expect(readFileMock.mock.calls).toEqual([
+      [new URL("file:///surface/browser/index.html"), "utf8"],
+      [new URL("file:///surface/browser/assets/ekklesia-dashboard/app.js"), "utf8"],
+    ]);
+    const rendered = `<!doctype html><meta content="${API_ORIGIN}" name="ekklesia-api-origin" /><div id="ekklesia-host"></div>`;
+    expect(assets).toEqual({
+      html: rendered,
+      htmlEtag: sha256Etag(rendered),
+      script,
+      scriptEtag: sha256Etag(script),
+    });
+    expect(Object.isFrozen(assets)).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it("fails deterministically without attempting a neighboring file or exposing the read error", async () => {
+    readFileMock.mockRejectedValueOnce(
+      new Error("ENOENT /home/operator/private/surface-build secret-token"),
+    );
+
+    const failure = await loadDashboardHostAssets(API_ORIGIN).catch((error: unknown) => error);
+
+    expect(readFileMock).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+    expect(failure).toBeInstanceOf(DashboardHostAssetError);
+    expect(failure).toMatchObject({
+      code: "DASHBOARD_HOST_ASSET_UNAVAILABLE",
+      message: "The Dashboard host browser assets are unavailable.",
+      name: "DashboardHostAssetError",
+    });
+    expect((failure as Error).stack).toBe(
+      "DashboardHostAssetError: The Dashboard host browser assets are unavailable.",
+    );
+    const publicText = `${String(failure)}\n${JSON.stringify(failure)}\n${(failure as Error).stack}`;
+    for (const secret of ["/home/", "operator", "ENOENT", "secret-token"]) {
+      expect(publicText).not.toContain(secret);
+    }
+  });
+
+  it("fails when the script is missing even though the page was read", async () => {
+    readFileMock
+      .mockResolvedValueOnce(`<!doctype html>${DASHBOARD_API_ORIGIN_PLACEHOLDER}`)
+      .mockRejectedValueOnce(new Error("ENOENT app.js"));
+
+    await expect(loadDashboardHostAssets(API_ORIGIN)).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(
+      DashboardHostAssetError,
+    );
+    expect(readFileMock).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2);
+  });
+
+  it("rejects an empty page or script as an unavailable shell build", () => {
+    for (const [html, script] of [
+      ["", "export {};"],
+      ["<html></html>", "   \n"],
+    ] as const) {
+      expect(() => createDashboardHostAssets(html, script)).toThrow(DashboardHostAssetError);
+    }
+  });
+
+  it("fails startup on a page without exactly one empty API-origin element (ADR 0045)", async () => {
+    for (const html of [
+      "<!doctype html>",
+      `<!doctype html>${DASHBOARD_API_ORIGIN_PLACEHOLDER}${DASHBOARD_API_ORIGIN_PLACEHOLDER}`,
+      '<!doctype html><meta content="https://elsewhere.test" name="ekklesia-api-origin" />',
+    ]) {
+      readFileMock.mockReset();
+      readFileMock.mockResolvedValueOnce(html).mockResolvedValueOnce("export {};\n");
+      await expect(loadDashboardHostAssets(API_ORIGIN)).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(
+        DashboardHostAssetError,
+      );
+    }
+  });
+});
+
+describe("Dashboard page API origin (ADR 0045)", () => {
+  const page = `<head>${DASHBOARD_API_ORIGIN_PLACEHOLDER}</head>`;
+
+  it("writes the API's origin into the one placeholder, in either topology", () => {
+    expect(renderDashboardPage(page, "https://api.example.test")).toBe(
+      '<head><meta content="https://api.example.test" name="ekklesia-api-origin" /></head>',
+    );
+    expect(renderDashboardPage(page, "http://127.0.0.1:3000")).toBe(
+      '<head><meta content="http://127.0.0.1:3000" name="ekklesia-api-origin" /></head>',
+    );
+  });
+
+  it.each([
+    "https://api.example.test/",
+    "https://api.example.test/api",
+    'https://api.example.test"><script>',
+    "javascript:alert(1)",
+    "",
+  ])("refuses a value that is not a canonical http(s) origin: %s", (origin) => {
+    expect(() => renderDashboardPage(page, origin)).toThrow(DashboardHostAssetError);
+  });
+});

apps/api/tests/dashboard-host-routes.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,347 @@
+import { createHash } from "node:crypto";
+import {
+  ANONYMOUS_PRINCIPAL,
+  type ModuleDatabase,
+  type ModuleRouteHandler,
+  type ModuleRuntimeServices,
+  parsePermissionId,
+  type RegisteredModuleHttpRoute,
+} from "@ekklesia/contracts";
+import {
+  type AuthorizationEvaluator,
+  type AuthorizationStore,
+  createPermissionRegistry,
+} from "@ekklesia/core/authorization";
+import type { EkklesiaIdentityRuntime } from "@ekklesia/core/identity";
+import {
+  createModuleUiPublicationRegistry,
+  EMPTY_MODULE_REALTIME_REGISTRY,
+} from "@ekklesia/core/modules";
+import { describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest";
+
+// Every byte these routes serve must come from the injected startup snapshot. Any filesystem read
+// while answering a request — the hallmark of a static directory — fails these tests.
+const readFileMock = vi.hoisted(() => vi.fn());
+vi.mock("node:fs/promises", () => ({ readFile: readFileMock }));
+
+import { createApiApp } from "../src/app.js";
+import {
+  createDashboardHostAssets,
+  type DashboardHostAssets,
+} from "../src/dashboard-host-assets.js";
+import {
+  DASHBOARD_HOST_PAGE_PATH,
+  DASHBOARD_HOST_SCRIPT_PATH,
+  DashboardHostConfigurationError,
+} from "../src/dashboard-host-routes.js";
+import { DISPLAY_HOST_SCRIPT_PATH } from "../src/module-display-routes.js";
+import { createInMemoryDashboardStore } from "./support/in-memory-dashboard-store.js";
+import { emptyModuleConfiguration } from "./support/in-memory-module-configuration.js";
+import { emptyModuleLifecycle } from "./support/in-memory-module-lifecycle.js";
+import { emptyModuleStorage } from "./support/in-memory-module-storage.js";
+import { readyHealth } from "./support/ready-health.js";
+
+const trustedOrigin = "https://dashboard.example.test";
+const modulePermission = parsePermissionId("dashboard.page.read");
+
+const PAGE_HTML =
+  '<!doctype html><html lang="en"><body><div id="ekklesia-host"></div><script src="/assets/ekklesia-dashboard/app.js" type="module"></script></body></html>\n';
+const SCRIPT = "export const dashboard = 'built shell';\n";
+
+function sha256Etag(text: string): string {
+  return `"${createHash("sha256").update(text).digest("base64url")}"`;
+}
+
+const PAGE_ETAG = sha256Etag(PAGE_HTML);
+const SCRIPT_ETAG = sha256Etag(SCRIPT);
+
+function fakeRuntime(): EkklesiaIdentityRuntime {
+  return {
+    handleAuthRequest: vi.fn(),
+    resolvePrincipal: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(ANONYMOUS_PRINCIPAL),
+  };
+}
+
+function fakeStore(): AuthorizationStore {
+  return {
+    createGrant: vi.fn(),
+    grantPlatformOwner: vi.fn(),
+    hasActiveGrant: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(false),
+    isPlatformOwner: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(false),
+    listGrantsForUser: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({ grants: [] }),
+    revokeGrant: vi.fn(),
+    revokePlatformOwner: vi.fn(),
+  };
+}
+
+function fakeModuleServices(): ModuleRuntimeServices {
+  return Object.freeze({ database: Object.freeze({}) as unknown as ModuleDatabase });
+}
+
+function buildApp(
+  options: {
+    readonly assets?: DashboardHostAssets;
+    readonly moduleRoutes?: readonly RegisteredModuleHttpRoute[];
+  } = {},
+) {
+  const evaluator: AuthorizationEvaluator = {
+    authorize: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({ allowed: true }),
+  };
+  const runtime = fakeRuntime();
+  const app = createApiApp({
+    authorization: {
+      evaluator,
+      registry: createPermissionRegistry([
+        { baseline: "public", description: "Test permission.", id: modulePermission },
+      ]),
+      store: fakeStore(),
+    },
+    moduleRoutes: options.moduleRoutes ?? Object.freeze([]),
+    moduleRealtime: EMPTY_MODULE_REALTIME_REGISTRY,
+    moduleServices: fakeModuleServices(),
+    moduleUi: createModuleUiPublicationRegistry([]),
+    moduleLifecycle: emptyModuleLifecycle(),
+    moduleConfiguration: emptyModuleConfiguration(),
+    moduleStorage: emptyModuleStorage(),
+    dashboard: createInMemoryDashboardStore(),
+    dashboardHostAssets: options.assets ?? createDashboardHostAssets(PAGE_HTML, SCRIPT),
+    health: readyHealth(),
+    runtime,
+    trustedOrigins: [trustedOrigin],
+  });
+  return { app, evaluator, runtime };
+}
+
+function expectPageSecurityHeaders(response: Response): void {
+  expect(response.headers.get("x-frame-options")).toBe("DENY");
+  expect(response.headers.get("content-security-policy")).toBe("frame-ancestors 'none'");
+  expect(response.headers.get("referrer-policy")).toBe("no-referrer");
+  expect(response.headers.get("x-content-type-options")).toBe("nosniff");
+}
+
+async function expectSanitizedNotFound(response: Response, label: string): Promise<void> {
+  expect(response.status, label).toBe(404);
+  expect(response.headers.get("content-type"), label).toMatch(/^application\/json/u);
+  expect(await response.json(), label).toEqual({ code: "NOT_FOUND" });
+}
+
+describe("GET / (the Dashboard page)", () => {
+  it("serves the exact startup HTML bytes with revalidation, a strong ETag, and the page security headers", async () => {
+    const { app } = buildApp();
+
+    const response = await app.request(DASHBOARD_HOST_PAGE_PATH);
+
+    expect(response.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(await response.text()).toBe(PAGE_HTML);
+    expect(response.headers.get("content-type")).toBe("text/html; charset=utf-8");
+    expect(response.headers.get("cache-control")).toBe("no-cache");
+    expect(response.headers.get("etag")).toBe(PAGE_ETAG);
+    expectPageSecurityHeaders(response);
+    // The one CSP directive is the only one: the full policy is a separate decision.
+    expect(response.headers.get("content-security-policy")).not.toContain(";");
+  });
+
+  it("serves the same page for an emailed-link landing, since the query never selects a file", async () => {
+    const { app } = buildApp();
+
+    const response = await app.request("/?ekklesia_auth=reset-password&token=abc123");
+
+    expect(response.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(await response.text()).toBe(PAGE_HTML);
+    expect(response.headers.get("etag")).toBe(PAGE_ETAG);
+  });
+
+  it("answers a matching If-None-Match with an empty 304 that keeps the validator and every page security header", async () => {
+    const { app } = buildApp();
+
+    for (const ifNoneMatch of [PAGE_ETAG, `W/${PAGE_ETAG}`, `"other", ${PAGE_ETAG}`, "*"]) {
+      const response = await app.request(DASHBOARD_HOST_PAGE_PATH, {
+        headers: { "If-None-Match": ifNoneMatch },
+      });
+
+      expect(response.status, ifNoneMatch).toBe(304);
+      expect(await response.text(), ifNoneMatch).toBe("");
+      expect(response.headers.get("etag")).toBe(PAGE_ETAG);
+      expect(response.headers.get("cache-control")).toBe("no-cache");
+      expectPageSecurityHeaders(response);
+    }
+  });
+
+  it("serves the full page again when the browser holds a different build's validator", async () => {
+    const { app } = buildApp();
+
+    const response = await app.request(DASHBOARD_HOST_PAGE_PATH, {
+      headers: { "If-None-Match": sha256Etag("an older build") },
+    });
+
+    expect(response.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(await response.text()).toBe(PAGE_HTML);
+  });
+
+  it("is unauthenticated and outside the API's CORS policy: it resolves no principal and reflects no origin", async () => {
+    const { app, evaluator, runtime } = buildApp();
+
+    const response = await app.request(DASHBOARD_HOST_PAGE_PATH, {
+      headers: { Cookie: "better-auth.session_token=anything", Origin: trustedOrigin },
+    });
+
+    expect(response.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(runtime.resolvePrincipal).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    expect(evaluator.authorize).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    expect(response.headers.get("access-control-allow-origin")).toBeNull();
+    expect(response.headers.get("set-cookie")).toBeNull();
+  });
+});
+
+describe("GET /assets/ekklesia-dashboard/app.js (the Dashboard script)", () => {
+  it("serves the exact startup script bytes as JavaScript with revalidation and a strong ETag", async () => {
+    const { app } = buildApp();
+
+    const response = await app.request(DASHBOARD_HOST_SCRIPT_PATH);
+
+    expect(response.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(await response.text()).toBe(SCRIPT);
+    expect(response.headers.get("content-type")).toBe("text/javascript; charset=utf-8");
+    expect(response.headers.get("cache-control")).toBe("no-cache");
+    expect(response.headers.get("etag")).toBe(SCRIPT_ETAG);
+    expect(response.headers.get("x-content-type-options")).toBe("nosniff");
+  });
+
+  it("answers a matching If-None-Match with an empty 304 carrying the script's own validator", async () => {
+    const { app } = buildApp();
+
+    const response = await app.request(DASHBOARD_HOST_SCRIPT_PATH, {
+      headers: { "If-None-Match": SCRIPT_ETAG },
+    });
+
+    expect(response.status).toBe(304);
+    expect(await response.text()).toBe("");
+    expect(response.headers.get("etag")).toBe(SCRIPT_ETAG);
+    expect(response.headers.get("cache-control")).toBe("no-cache");
+  });
+
+  it("does not accept the page's validator as the script's", async () => {
+    const { app } = buildApp();
+
+    const response = await app.request(DASHBOARD_HOST_SCRIPT_PATH, {
+      headers: { "If-None-Match": PAGE_ETAG },
+    });
+
+    expect(response.status).toBe(200);
+  });
+});
+
+describe("Dashboard host boundaries", () => {
+  it("serves nothing but its two exact paths, answering every other spelling with the sanitized 404", async () => {
+    const { app } = buildApp();
+
+    for (const path of [
+      "/index.html",
+      "/app.js",
+      "/app.js.map",
+      "/assets/ekklesia-dashboard/app.js.map",
+      "/assets/ekklesia-dashboard/",
+      "/assets/ekklesia-dashboard",
+      "/assets/ekklesia-dashboard/app.js/",
+      "/assets/ekklesia-dashboard/index.html",
+      "/assets/",
+      "/assets/ekklesia-dashboard/APP.JS",
+      "/dashboard",
+      "/login",
+    ]) {
+      await expectSanitizedNotFound(await app.request(path), path);
+    }
+  });
+
+  it("cannot be walked out of: encoded traversal, separators, and double slashes reach no file", async () => {
+    const { app } = buildApp();
+
+    for (const path of [
+      "/assets/ekklesia-dashboard/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/package.json",
+      "/assets/ekklesia-dashboard/..%2fapp.js.map",
+      "/assets/ekklesia-dashboard/%2e%2e%2fapp.js.map",
+      "/assets/ekklesia-dashboard/app.js%2f..%2f..%2fpackage.json",
+      "/assets/ekklesia-dashboard/..%5c..%5cpackage.json",
+      "/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/etc/passwd",
+      "/../../etc/passwd",
+      "//assets/ekklesia-dashboard/app.js",
+      "/assets//ekklesia-dashboard/app.js",
+      "/assets/ekklesia-dashboard/app.js%00.map",
+    ]) {
+      const response = await app.request(path);
+      expect(await response.text(), path).not.toContain(SCRIPT);
+      expect(response.status, path).toBe(404);
+    }
+    expect(readFileMock).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  it("never touches the filesystem while answering, even across every served path", async () => {
+    const { app } = buildApp();
+
+    await app.request(DASHBOARD_HOST_PAGE_PATH);
+    await app.request(DASHBOARD_HOST_SCRIPT_PATH);
+    await app.request("/assets/ekklesia-dashboard/app.js.map");
+
+    expect(readFileMock).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  it("serves GET (and Hono's implicit HEAD) only; every other method is the ordinary 404", async () => {
+    const { app } = buildApp();
+
+    const head = await app.request(DASHBOARD_HOST_PAGE_PATH, { method: "HEAD" });
+    expect(head.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(head.headers.get("etag")).toBe(PAGE_ETAG);
+    expect(await head.text()).toBe("");
+
+    for (const path of [DASHBOARD_HOST_PAGE_PATH, DASHBOARD_HOST_SCRIPT_PATH]) {
+      for (const method of ["POST", "PUT", "PATCH", "DELETE"]) {
+        await expectSanitizedNotFound(await app.request(path, { method }), `${method} ${path}`);
+      }
+    }
+  });
+
+  it("leaves the API, the display host's namespace, and module routes exactly where they were", async () => {
+    const moduleHandler = vi.fn<ModuleRouteHandler>(
+      async () => new Response("module", { status: 200 }),
+    );
+    const { app } = buildApp({
+      moduleRoutes: [
+        Object.freeze({
+          bodyMode: "buffered",
+          handler: moduleHandler,
+          maxBodyBytes: 1024,
+          method: "GET",
+          moduleId: "dashboard",
+          path: "/",
+          permission: modulePermission,
+        }) as RegisteredModuleHttpRoute,
+      ],
+    });
+
+    expect(await (await app.request("/api/v1/principal")).json()).toEqual({ kind: "anonymous" });
+    expect(await (await app.request("/api/v1/health/live")).json()).toEqual({ status: "live" });
+    expect(await (await app.request("/api/v1/modules/dashboard")).text()).toBe("module");
+    await expectSanitizedNotFound(await app.request("/api/v1/unknown"), "/api/v1/unknown");
+    // No display is published here, so the display host's script is absent rather than answered
+    // by the Dashboard's.
+    await expectSanitizedNotFound(
+      await app.request(DISPLAY_HOST_SCRIPT_PATH),
+      DISPLAY_HOST_SCRIPT_PATH,
+    );
+    expect(DASHBOARD_HOST_SCRIPT_PATH.startsWith("/assets/ekklesia-display/")).toBe(false);
+    expect(await (await app.request(DASHBOARD_HOST_PAGE_PATH)).text()).toBe(PAGE_HTML);
+    expect(moduleHandler).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+  });
+
+  it("refuses at composition a snapshot whose validator does not match its bytes, or empty bytes", () => {
+    const consistent = createDashboardHostAssets(PAGE_HTML, SCRIPT);
+
+    for (const assets of [
+      { ...consistent, html: `${PAGE_HTML}<!-- tampered -->` },
+      { ...consistent, scriptEtag: PAGE_ETAG },
+      { html: "", htmlEtag: sha256Etag(""), script: SCRIPT, scriptEtag: SCRIPT_ETAG },
+    ]) {
+      expect(() => buildApp({ assets })).toThrow(DashboardHostConfigurationError);
+    }
+  });
+});

apps/api/tests/dashboard-routes.test.ts

@@ -27,6 +27,8 @@ import { createApiApp } from "../src/app.js";
 import { DASHBOARD_NAVIGATION_PATH } from "../src/dashboard-routes.js";
 import { MODULE_UI_INVENTORY_PATH } from "../src/module-ui-inventory.js";
 import { createInMemoryDashboardStore } from "./support/in-memory-dashboard-store.js";
+import { testDashboardHostAssets } from "./support/dashboard-host-assets.js";
+import { readyHealth } from "./support/ready-health.js";
 import {
   createInMemoryModuleLifecycleStore,
   moduleLifecycleSnapshotFor,
@@ -139,6 +141,8 @@ async function install(options: InstallOptions = {}): Promise<{ app: Hono }> {
   const app = createApiApp({
     authorization: { evaluator, registry: composePlatformPermissionRegistry(modules), store },
     dashboard: createInMemoryDashboardStore(options.configuration ?? {}),
+    dashboardHostAssets: testDashboardHostAssets(),
+    health: readyHealth(),
     moduleRoutes: Object.freeze([]),
     moduleRealtime: EMPTY_MODULE_REALTIME_REGISTRY,
     moduleServices: Object.freeze({

apps/api/tests/health-routes.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,373 @@
+import {
+  ANONYMOUS_PRINCIPAL,
+  type ModuleDatabase,
+  type ModuleRouteHandler,
+  type ModuleRuntimeServices,
+  parsePermissionId,
+  type RegisteredModuleHttpRoute,
+} from "@ekklesia/contracts";
+import {
+  type AuthorizationEvaluator,
+  type AuthorizationStore,
+  createPermissionRegistry,
+} from "@ekklesia/core/authorization";
+import type { EkklesiaIdentityRuntime } from "@ekklesia/core/identity";
+import {
+  createModuleUiPublicationRegistry,
+  EMPTY_MODULE_REALTIME_REGISTRY,
+} from "@ekklesia/core/modules";
+import { afterEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest";
+import { createApiApp } from "../src/app.js";
+import {
+  type ApiHealthOptions,
+  HEALTH_LIVE_PATH,
+  HEALTH_READY_PATH,
+  READINESS_DATABASE_TIMEOUT_MS,
+} from "../src/health-routes.js";
+import { createInMemoryDashboardStore } from "./support/in-memory-dashboard-store.js";
+import { testDashboardHostAssets } from "./support/dashboard-host-assets.js";
+import { emptyModuleConfiguration } from "./support/in-memory-module-configuration.js";
+import { emptyModuleLifecycle } from "./support/in-memory-module-lifecycle.js";
+import { emptyModuleStorage } from "./support/in-memory-module-storage.js";
+
+const trustedOrigin = "https://dashboard.example.test";
+const modulePermission = parsePermissionId("health.status.read");
+
+/** What a real driver failure can carry, and what must therefore never reach a response. */
+const DRIVER_FAILURE_DETAIL =
+  "connect ECONNREFUSED postgresql://ekklesia:[email protected]:5432/ekklesia SELECT 1";
+
+function fakeRuntime(): EkklesiaIdentityRuntime {
+  return {
+    handleAuthRequest: vi.fn(),
+    resolvePrincipal: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(ANONYMOUS_PRINCIPAL),
+  };
+}
+
+function fakeStore(): AuthorizationStore {
+  return {
+    createGrant: vi.fn(),
+    grantPlatformOwner: vi.fn(),
+    hasActiveGrant: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(false),
+    isPlatformOwner: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(false),
+    listGrantsForUser: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({ grants: [] }),
+    revokeGrant: vi.fn(),
+    revokePlatformOwner: vi.fn(),
+  };
+}
+
+function fakeModuleServices(): ModuleRuntimeServices {
+  return Object.freeze({ database: Object.freeze({}) as unknown as ModuleDatabase });
+}
+
+function healthOptions(overrides: Partial<ApiHealthOptions> = {}) {
+  return {
+    checkDatabase: vi.fn<() => Promise<void>>().mockResolvedValue(undefined),
+    isModuleStartupComplete: vi.fn<() => boolean>().mockReturnValue(true),
+    ...overrides,
+  };
+}
+
+function buildApp(
+  health: ApiHealthOptions,
+  moduleRoutes: readonly RegisteredModuleHttpRoute[] = Object.freeze([]),
+) {
+  const evaluator: AuthorizationEvaluator = {
+    authorize: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({ allowed: true }),
+  };
+  const runtime = fakeRuntime();
+  const app = createApiApp({
+    authorization: {
+      evaluator,
+      registry: createPermissionRegistry([
+        { baseline: "public", description: "Test permission.", id: modulePermission },
+      ]),
+      store: fakeStore(),
+    },
+    moduleRoutes,
+    moduleRealtime: EMPTY_MODULE_REALTIME_REGISTRY,
+    moduleServices: fakeModuleServices(),
+    moduleUi: createModuleUiPublicationRegistry([]),
+    moduleLifecycle: emptyModuleLifecycle(),
+    moduleConfiguration: emptyModuleConfiguration(),
+    moduleStorage: emptyModuleStorage(),
+    dashboard: createInMemoryDashboardStore(),
+    dashboardHostAssets: testDashboardHostAssets(),
+    health,
+    runtime,
+    trustedOrigins: [trustedOrigin],
+  });
+  return { app, evaluator, runtime };
+}
+
+/** Resolves once every already-queued microtask has run, using the real `setImmediate` — the only
+ * timer functions these tests fake are `setTimeout` and `clearTimeout`. */
+function drainMicrotasks(): Promise<void> {
+  return new Promise((resolve) => setImmediate(resolve));
+}
+
+/** Whether `promise` settled with no fake time advanced at all: "promptly", made exact. */
+async function settlesWithoutWaiting(promise: Response | Promise<Response>): Promise<boolean> {
+  let settled = false;
+  void Promise.resolve(promise).then(
+    () => {
+      settled = true;
+    },
+    () => {
+      settled = true;
+    },
+  );
+  await drainMicrotasks();
+  return settled;
+}
+
+async function expectNotReady(response: Response): Promise<void> {
+  expect(response.status).toBe(503);
+  expect(response.headers.get("cache-control")).toBe("no-store");
+  expect(await response.json()).toEqual({ code: "NOT_READY" });
+}
+
+afterEach(() => {
+  vi.useRealTimers();
+});
+
+describe("GET /api/v1/health/live", () => {
+  it("returns 200 with a fixed body and Cache-Control: no-store", async () => {
+    const health = healthOptions();
+    const { app } = buildApp(health);
+
+    const response = await app.request(HEALTH_LIVE_PATH);
+
+    expect(response.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(response.headers.get("cache-control")).toBe("no-store");
+    expect(response.headers.get("content-type")).toMatch(/^application\/json/u);
+    expect(await response.json()).toEqual({ status: "live" });
+  });
+
+  it("does not consult the database or module startup, so it stays 200 while readiness is 503", async () => {
+    const health = healthOptions({
+      checkDatabase: vi.fn().mockRejectedValue(new Error(DRIVER_FAILURE_DETAIL)),
+      isModuleStartupComplete: vi.fn().mockReturnValue(false),
+    });
+    const { app } = buildApp(health);
+
+    const response = await app.request(HEALTH_LIVE_PATH);
+
+    expect(response.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(health.checkDatabase).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    expect(health.isModuleStartupComplete).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+});
+
+describe("GET /api/v1/health/ready", () => {
+  it("returns 200 with a fixed body when the database answers and module startup completed", async () => {
+    const health = healthOptions();
+    const { app } = buildApp(health);
+
+    const response = await app.request(HEALTH_READY_PATH);
+
+    expect(response.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(response.headers.get("cache-control")).toBe("no-store");
+    expect(await response.json()).toEqual({ status: "ready" });
+    expect(health.checkDatabase).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+  });
+
+  it("returns a fixed 503 when the database query fails, carrying nothing from the failure", async () => {
+    const health = healthOptions({
+      checkDatabase: vi.fn().mockRejectedValue(new Error(DRIVER_FAILURE_DETAIL)),
+    });
+    const { app } = buildApp(health);
+
+    const response = await app.request(HEALTH_READY_PATH);
+    const text = await response.clone().text();
+
+    await expectNotReady(response);
+    for (const fragment of ["ECONNREFUSED", "hunter2", "db.internal", "SELECT", "Error"]) {
+      expect(text).not.toContain(fragment);
+    }
+  });
+
+  it("treats a check that throws synchronously exactly like one that rejects", async () => {
+    const health = healthOptions({
+      checkDatabase: vi.fn(() => {
+        throw new Error(DRIVER_FAILURE_DETAIL);
+      }),
+    });
+    const { app } = buildApp(health);
+
+    await expectNotReady(await app.request(HEALTH_READY_PATH));
+  });
+
+  it("returns 503 without touching the database before module startup completed", async () => {
+    const health = healthOptions({ isModuleStartupComplete: vi.fn().mockReturnValue(false) });
+    const { app } = buildApp(health);
+
+    await expectNotReady(await app.request(HEALTH_READY_PATH));
+    expect(health.checkDatabase).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  it("returns 503 when shutdown began while the database query was in flight", async () => {
+    let startupComplete = true;
+    const health = healthOptions({
+      checkDatabase: vi.fn(async () => {
+        startupComplete = false;
+      }),
+      isModuleStartupComplete: () => startupComplete,
+    });
+    const { app } = buildApp(health);
+
+    await expectNotReady(await app.request(HEALTH_READY_PATH));
+  });
+
+  it("starts a fresh check for each sequential probe rather than caching a success", async () => {
+    const health = healthOptions();
+    const { app } = buildApp(health);
+
+    await app.request(HEALTH_READY_PATH);
+    await app.request(HEALTH_READY_PATH);
+
+    expect(health.checkDatabase).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2);
+  });
+
+  it("reports ready for a slow query that still answers inside the bound", async () => {
+    vi.useFakeTimers({ toFake: ["setTimeout", "clearTimeout"] });
+    let answer: () => void = () => undefined;
+    const health = healthOptions({
+      checkDatabase: vi.fn(
+        () =>
+          new Promise<void>((resolve) => {
+            answer = resolve;
+          }),
+      ),
+    });
+    const { app } = buildApp(health);
+
+    const pending = app.request(HEALTH_READY_PATH);
+    await vi.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(READINESS_DATABASE_TIMEOUT_MS - 1);
+    answer();
+
+    expect((await pending).status).toBe(200);
+  });
+});
+
+describe("readiness never piles up database checks", () => {
+  it("keeps exactly one check in flight for a query that never settles, while every probe answers 503 promptly", async () => {
+    vi.useFakeTimers({ toFake: ["setTimeout", "clearTimeout"] });
+    const health = healthOptions({
+      checkDatabase: vi.fn(() => new Promise<void>(() => undefined)),
+    });
+    const { app } = buildApp(health);
+
+    // Probes arriving inside the first check's window share it and its single deadline.
+    const first = app.request(HEALTH_READY_PATH);
+    const concurrent = app.request(HEALTH_READY_PATH);
+    await drainMicrotasks();
+    expect(health.checkDatabase).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+
+    await vi.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(READINESS_DATABASE_TIMEOUT_MS);
+    await expectNotReady(await first);
+    await expectNotReady(await concurrent);
+
+    // After the deadline the query is still unsettled: no new check starts, and each probe answers
+    // without waiting out another bound.
+    for (let probe = 0; probe < 20; probe += 1) {
+      const pending = app.request(HEALTH_READY_PATH);
+      expect(await settlesWithoutWaiting(pending)).toBe(true);
+      await expectNotReady(await pending);
+    }
+    expect(health.checkDatabase).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+  });
+
+  it("starts a new check only once the timed-out query has actually settled", async () => {
+    vi.useFakeTimers({ toFake: ["setTimeout", "clearTimeout"] });
+    let settleHungQuery: (error: Error) => void = () => undefined;
+    const checkDatabase = vi
+      .fn<() => Promise<void>>()
+      .mockImplementationOnce(
+        () =>
+          new Promise<void>((_resolve, reject) => {
+            settleHungQuery = reject;
+          }),
+      )
+      .mockResolvedValue(undefined);
+    const { app } = buildApp(healthOptions({ checkDatabase }));
+
+    const first = app.request(HEALTH_READY_PATH);
+    await vi.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(READINESS_DATABASE_TIMEOUT_MS);
+    await expectNotReady(await first);
+    await expectNotReady(await app.request(HEALTH_READY_PATH));
+    expect(checkDatabase).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+
+    // The database cancels the abandoned statement; the next probe may finally ask again.
+    settleHungQuery(new Error(DRIVER_FAILURE_DETAIL));
+    await drainMicrotasks();
+
+    const recovered = await app.request(HEALTH_READY_PATH);
+    expect(recovered.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(checkDatabase).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2);
+  });
+});
+
+describe("health route boundaries", () => {
+  it.each([
+    HEALTH_LIVE_PATH,
+    HEALTH_READY_PATH,
+  ])("%s accepts GET only, answering every other method with a fixed 405 and never checking readiness", async (path) => {
+    const health = healthOptions();
+    const { app } = buildApp(health);
+
+    for (const method of ["HEAD", "POST", "PUT", "PATCH", "DELETE"]) {
+      const response = await app.request(path, { method });
+      expect(response.status, method).toBe(405);
+      expect(response.headers.get("allow")).toBe("GET");
+      expect(response.headers.get("cache-control")).toBe("no-store");
+      expect(await response.text()).toBe("");
+    }
+    expect(health.checkDatabase).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    expect(health.isModuleStartupComplete).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  it.each([
+    HEALTH_LIVE_PATH,
+    HEALTH_READY_PATH,
+  ])("%s is unauthenticated: it never resolves a principal or evaluates authorization, even with a cookie", async (path) => {
+    const { app, evaluator, runtime } = buildApp(healthOptions());
+
+    const response = await app.request(path, {
+      headers: { Cookie: "better-auth.session_token=anything", Origin: trustedOrigin },
+    });
+
+    expect(response.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(runtime.resolvePrincipal).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    expect(runtime.handleAuthRequest).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    expect(evaluator.authorize).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  it('cannot be shadowed by a module, even one whose id is "health"', async () => {
+    const moduleHandler = vi.fn<ModuleRouteHandler>(
+      async () => new Response("module", { status: 200 }),
+    );
+    const moduleRoutes = ["/live", "/ready"].map(
+      (path) =>
+        Object.freeze({
+          bodyMode: "buffered",
+          handler: moduleHandler,
+          maxBodyBytes: 1024,
+          method: "GET",
+          moduleId: "health",
+          path,
+          permission: modulePermission,
+        }) as RegisteredModuleHttpRoute,
+    );
+    const { app } = buildApp(healthOptions(), moduleRoutes);
+
+    expect(await (await app.request(HEALTH_LIVE_PATH)).json()).toEqual({ status: "live" });
+    expect(await (await app.request(HEALTH_READY_PATH)).json()).toEqual({ status: "ready" });
+    expect(moduleHandler).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+
+    // The module's own routes still live where every module route lives, and only there.
+    const moduleResponse = await app.request("/api/v1/modules/health/ready");
+    expect(await moduleResponse.text()).toBe("module");
+    expect(moduleHandler).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+  });
+});

apps/api/tests/lifecycle.test.ts

@@ -9,11 +9,21 @@ const drizzleAdapterMock = vi.hoisted(() => vi.fn());
 const serveMock = vi.hoisted(() => vi.fn());
 const processOnSpy = vi.hoisted(() => vi.fn());
 const loadDisplayHostAssetsMock = vi.hoisted(() => vi.fn());
+const loadDashboardHostAssetsMock = vi.hoisted(() => vi.fn());
 
 vi.mock("pg", () => ({ Pool: poolConstructor }));
 vi.mock("better-auth", () => ({ betterAuth: betterAuthMock }));
 vi.mock("better-auth/adapters/drizzle", () => ({ drizzleAdapter: drizzleAdapterMock }));
 vi.mock("@hono/node-server", () => ({ serve: serveMock }));
+// Every startup reads the built Dashboard (ADR 0044), and this file never depends on a built shell,
+// so the loader answers a small consistent snapshot unless a test makes it fail.
+vi.mock("../src/dashboard-host-assets.js", async (importOriginal) => {
+  const actual = await importOriginal<typeof import("../src/dashboard-host-assets.js")>();
+  loadDashboardHostAssetsMock.mockImplementation(async () =>
+    actual.createDashboardHostAssets("<!doctype html>", "export {};\n"),
+  );
+  return { ...actual, loadDashboardHostAssets: loadDashboardHostAssetsMock };
+});
 vi.mock("../src/display-host-assets.js", async (importOriginal) => {
   const actual = await importOriginal<typeof import("../src/display-host-assets.js")>();
   return { ...actual, loadDisplayHostAssets: loadDisplayHostAssetsMock };
@@ -35,7 +45,13 @@ import {
 import { PermissionRegistryError } from "@ekklesia/core/authorization";
 import { createApiApp } from "../src/app.js";
 import { createApiRuntimeConfig } from "../src/config.js";
+import { DashboardHostAssetError } from "../src/dashboard-host-assets.js";
 import { DisplayHostAssetError } from "../src/display-host-assets.js";
+import {
+  HEALTH_LIVE_PATH,
+  HEALTH_READY_PATH,
+  READINESS_DATABASE_TIMEOUT_MS,
+} from "../src/health-routes.js";
 import { installShutdownSignalHandlers, startApi } from "../src/server.js";
 
 function validConfig() {
@@ -447,6 +463,36 @@ describe("Ekklesia API shutdown lifecycle", () => {
     expect(poolEnd).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
   });
 
+  it("answers readiness with one bounded ping on the shared pool, and turns it 503 the moment shutdown begins", async () => {
+    const query = emptyQuery();
+    poolConstructor.mockImplementation(function fakePool() {
+      return { end: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined), on: vi.fn(), query };
+    });
+    betterAuthMock.mockReturnValue({ api: { getSession: vi.fn() }, handler: vi.fn() });
+    mockSuccessfulServe();
+
+    const running = await startApi(validConfig());
+    query.mockClear();
+
+    const ready = await running.app.request(HEALTH_READY_PATH);
+    expect(ready.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(query).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+    // The statement timeout is server-side and scoped to this one transaction, so PostgreSQL itself
+    // cancels a stalled ping rather than the route merely abandoning it.
+    expect(query).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+      `BEGIN READ ONLY; SET LOCAL statement_timeout = ${READINESS_DATABASE_TIMEOUT_MS}; SELECT 1; COMMIT`,
+    );
+
+    const shutdown = running.shutdown();
+    const draining = await running.app.request(HEALTH_READY_PATH);
+    expect(draining.status).toBe(503);
+    expect(await draining.json()).toEqual({ code: "NOT_READY" });
+    // Draining is not dead: liveness still answers while in-flight requests finish.
+    expect((await running.app.request(HEALTH_LIVE_PATH)).status).toBe(200);
+    expect(query).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+    await shutdown;
+  });
+
   it("keeps shutdown idempotent for calls made after the first has already resolved", async () => {
     const poolEnd = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined);
     poolConstructor.mockImplementation(function fakePool() {
@@ -1022,6 +1068,30 @@ describe("Ekklesia API module runtime startup and shutdown", () => {
     expect(serveMock).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
   });
 
+  it("fails on missing Dashboard assets before importing module code and still closes startup resources", async () => {
+    const modulesDirectory = await createTemporaryModulesDirectory();
+    const recorder = createEventRecorder();
+    await createWorkingFixtureModule(modulesDirectory, "calendar", recorder);
+    const { poolEnd } = mockPoolAndAuth();
+    loadDashboardHostAssetsMock.mockRejectedValueOnce(new DashboardHostAssetError());
+
+    const failure = await startApi(validConfig(), {
+      modulesDirectoryOverride: modulesDirectory,
+    }).catch((error: unknown) => error);
+
+    expect(failure).toMatchObject({
+      code: "DASHBOARD_HOST_ASSET_UNAVAILABLE",
+      message: "The Dashboard host browser assets are unavailable.",
+      name: "DashboardHostAssetError",
+    });
+    expect((failure as Error).stack).toBe(
+      "DashboardHostAssetError: The Dashboard host browser assets are unavailable.",
+    );
+    expect(recorder.events).toEqual([]);
+    expect(poolEnd).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+    expect(serveMock).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
   it("does not read display-host assets when the eligible set declares no display", async () => {
     const modulesDirectory = await createTemporaryModulesDirectory();
     const recorder = createEventRecorder();

apps/api/tests/module-configuration-routes.test.ts

@@ -35,6 +35,8 @@ import { CORE_MUTATION_MAX_BODY_BYTES } from "../src/body-limits.js";
 import { MODULE_CONFIGURATION_PATH } from "../src/module-configuration-routes.js";
 import { MODULE_LIFECYCLE_PATH } from "../src/module-lifecycle-routes.js";
 import { createInMemoryDashboardStore } from "./support/in-memory-dashboard-store.js";
+import { testDashboardHostAssets } from "./support/dashboard-host-assets.js";
+import { readyHealth } from "./support/ready-health.js";
 import {
   createFakeModuleSecretSource,
   createInMemoryModuleConfigurationStore,
@@ -189,6 +191,8 @@ async function install(options: InstallOptions = {}): Promise<Installation> {
       store: authorizationStore,
     },
     dashboard: createInMemoryDashboardStore(),
+    dashboardHostAssets: testDashboardHostAssets(),
+    health: readyHealth(),
     moduleConfiguration: {
       bootSettings,
       discoveredModules: modules,

apps/api/tests/module-display-routes.test.ts

@@ -38,6 +38,8 @@ import { moduleRealtimeBaseUrl } from "../src/module-realtime-routes.js";
 import { MODULE_UI_INVENTORY_PATH } from "../src/module-ui-inventory.js";
 import { moduleDisplayUiArtifactUrl } from "../src/module-ui-routes.js";
 import { createInMemoryDashboardStore } from "./support/in-memory-dashboard-store.js";
+import { testDashboardHostAssets } from "./support/dashboard-host-assets.js";
+import { readyHealth } from "./support/ready-health.js";
 import { moduleConfigurationOptionFor } from "./support/in-memory-module-configuration.js";
 import {
   createInMemoryModuleLifecycleStore,
@@ -198,6 +200,8 @@ async function install(options: InstallOptions): Promise<Installation> {
       store: fakeAuthorizationStore(),
     },
     dashboard: createInMemoryDashboardStore(),
+    dashboardHostAssets: testDashboardHostAssets(),
+    health: readyHealth(),
     ...(moduleUi.listDisplays().length > 0 && options.withAssets !== false
       ? { displayHostAssets: options.assets ?? displayHostAssets }
       : {}),

apps/api/tests/module-http-routes.test.ts

@@ -23,6 +23,8 @@ import {
 } from "@ekklesia/core/modules";
 import { describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest";
 import { createInMemoryDashboardStore } from "./support/in-memory-dashboard-store.js";
+import { testDashboardHostAssets } from "./support/dashboard-host-assets.js";
+import { readyHealth } from "./support/ready-health.js";
 import { createApiApp } from "../src/app.js";
 import {
   canonicalizeVaryHeader,
@@ -123,6 +125,8 @@ function buildModuleApp(options: {
     moduleConfiguration: emptyModuleConfiguration(),
     moduleStorage: emptyModuleStorage(),
     dashboard: createInMemoryDashboardStore(),
+    dashboardHostAssets: testDashboardHostAssets(),
+    health: readyHealth(),
     runtime,
     trustedOrigins: options.trustedOrigins ?? [trustedOrigin],
   });

apps/api/tests/module-lifecycle-routes.test.ts

@@ -33,6 +33,8 @@ import { CORE_MUTATION_MAX_BODY_BYTES } from "../src/body-limits.js";
 import { MODULE_LIFECYCLE_PATH } from "../src/module-lifecycle-routes.js";
 import { MODULE_UI_INVENTORY_PATH } from "../src/module-ui-inventory.js";
 import { createInMemoryDashboardStore } from "./support/in-memory-dashboard-store.js";
+import { testDashboardHostAssets } from "./support/dashboard-host-assets.js";
+import { readyHealth } from "./support/ready-health.js";
 import { createInMemoryModuleLifecycleStore } from "./support/in-memory-module-lifecycle.js";
 import { moduleConfigurationOptionFor } from "./support/in-memory-module-configuration.js";
 import { moduleStorageOptionFor } from "./support/in-memory-module-storage.js";
@@ -171,6 +173,8 @@ async function install(options: InstallOptions = {}): Promise<Installation> {
       store: authorizationStore,
     },
     dashboard: createInMemoryDashboardStore(),
+    dashboardHostAssets: testDashboardHostAssets(),
+    health: readyHealth(),
     moduleConfiguration: moduleConfigurationOptionFor(modules),
     moduleStorage: moduleStorageOptionFor(modules),
     moduleLifecycle: {

apps/api/tests/module-ui-host-e2e.test.ts

@@ -36,6 +36,8 @@ import {
 } from "@ekklesia/shell";
 import { afterEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest";
 import { createInMemoryDashboardStore } from "./support/in-memory-dashboard-store.js";
+import { testDashboardHostAssets } from "./support/dashboard-host-assets.js";
+import { readyHealth } from "./support/ready-health.js";
 import { createApiApp } from "../src/app.js";
 import { createDisplayHostAssets } from "../src/display-host-assets.js";
 import {
@@ -288,6 +290,8 @@ async function startHarness(options: HarnessOptions = {}): Promise<Harness> {
     moduleConfiguration: moduleConfigurationOptionFor(modules),
     moduleStorage: moduleStorageOptionFor(modules),
     dashboard: createInMemoryDashboardStore(),
+    dashboardHostAssets: testDashboardHostAssets(),
+    health: readyHealth(),
     runtime,
     trustedOrigins: ["https://dashboard.example.test"],
   });

apps/api/tests/module-ui-inventory.test.ts

@@ -25,6 +25,8 @@ import {
 import type { Hono } from "hono";
 import { afterEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest";
 import { createInMemoryDashboardStore } from "./support/in-memory-dashboard-store.js";
+import { testDashboardHostAssets } from "./support/dashboard-host-assets.js";
+import { readyHealth } from "./support/ready-health.js";
 import { createApiApp } from "../src/app.js";
 import { moduleApiBaseUrl } from "../src/module-http-routes.js";
 import { moduleRealtimeBaseUrl } from "../src/module-realtime-routes.js";
@@ -208,6 +210,8 @@ async function install(options: InstallOptions): Promise<Installation> {
     moduleConfiguration: moduleConfigurationOptionFor(modules),
     moduleStorage: moduleStorageOptionFor(modules),
     dashboard: createInMemoryDashboardStore(),
+    dashboardHostAssets: testDashboardHostAssets(),
+    health: readyHealth(),
     runtime,
     trustedOrigins: [trustedOrigin],
   });

apps/api/tests/module-ui-routes.test.ts

@@ -21,6 +21,8 @@ import { Window } from "happy-dom";
 import type { Hono } from "hono";
 import { afterEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest";
 import { createInMemoryDashboardStore } from "./support/in-memory-dashboard-store.js";
+import { testDashboardHostAssets } from "./support/dashboard-host-assets.js";
+import { readyHealth } from "./support/ready-health.js";
 import { createApiApp } from "../src/app.js";
 import { createDisplayHostAssets } from "../src/display-host-assets.js";
 import {
@@ -255,6 +257,8 @@ async function install(
     moduleConfiguration: moduleConfigurationOptionFor(modules),
     moduleStorage: moduleStorageOptionFor(modules),
     dashboard: createInMemoryDashboardStore(),
+    dashboardHostAssets: testDashboardHostAssets(),
+    health: readyHealth(),
     runtime,
     trustedOrigins: [trustedOrigin],
   });

apps/api/tests/support/dashboard-host-assets.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+import {
+  createDashboardHostAssets,
+  type DashboardHostAssets,
+} from "../../src/dashboard-host-assets.js";
+
+/** A small, internally consistent Dashboard snapshot for compositions whose tests do not exercise
+ * the Dashboard host. Its own behavior is tested in `../dashboard-host-routes.test.ts`. */
+export function testDashboardHostAssets(): DashboardHostAssets {
+  return createDashboardHostAssets(
+    '<!doctype html><div id="ekklesia-host"></div><script src="/assets/ekklesia-dashboard/app.js" type="module"></script>',
+    "export const dashboardHost = true;\n",
+  );
+}

apps/api/tests/support/ready-health.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+import type { ApiHealthOptions } from "../../src/health-routes.js";
+
+/** Readiness inputs for a composition whose tests do not exercise health: the database answers and
+ * module startup has completed. Health behavior itself is tested in `../health-routes.test.ts`. */
+export function readyHealth(): ApiHealthOptions {
+  return {
+    checkDatabase: async () => undefined,
+    isModuleStartupComplete: () => true,
+  };
+}

core/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@ekklesia/core",
-  "version": "0.1.0",
+  "version": "0.1.1",
   "private": true,
   "type": "module",
   "files": [

core/src/diagnostics/doctor.ts

@@ -757,6 +757,35 @@ function identitySchemaSummary(): string {
   return `Core identity schema defines ${tableNames.length} ${plural(tableNames.length, "table")} (${tableNames.join(", ")}).`;
 }
 
+/**
+ * A heuristic for "same site" between two canonical origins, for a warning only (ADR 0045).
+ *
+ * The same hostname on another port is the same site. Otherwise the two hostnames must be siblings:
+ * identical after their first label, with that parent itself holding at least one dot
+ * (`dash.example.org` and `api.example.org`). Without the Public Suffix List this can be wrong in
+ * both directions for unusual names, which is why its result is a warning and never a failure.
+ */
+function plausiblySameSite(dashboardOrigin: string, apiOrigin: string): boolean {
+  const dashboard = new URL(dashboardOrigin).hostname;
+  const api = new URL(apiOrigin).hostname;
+  if (dashboard === api) {
+    return true;
+  }
+  // An IP address is a site of its own; two different ones never share one.
+  const isIpAddress = (hostname: string): boolean =>
+    hostname.startsWith("[") || /^[0-9]+(\.[0-9]+){3}$/u.test(hostname);
+  if (isIpAddress(dashboard) || isIpAddress(api)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  const parent = (hostname: string): string => hostname.slice(hostname.indexOf(".") + 1);
+  return (
+    dashboard.includes(".") &&
+    api.includes(".") &&
+    parent(dashboard) === parent(api) &&
+    parent(dashboard).includes(".")
+  );
+}
+
 /**
  * Pure configuration validation only: never constructs Better Auth, never opens a database
  * connection, and never prints the configured secret, base URL, or trusted origins. Missing
@@ -769,6 +798,7 @@ function identityConfigurationCheck(
   const hasAnyValue =
     input?.secret !== undefined ||
     input?.baseUrl !== undefined ||
+    (input?.dashboardOrigin ?? "") !== "" ||
     input?.publicSignupEnabled !== undefined ||
     (input?.trustedOrigins?.length ?? 0) > 0;
 
@@ -783,17 +813,43 @@ function identityConfigurationCheck(
     const config = createIdentityConfig(
       {
         baseUrl: input?.baseUrl,
+        // Validated exactly as the API validates it at startup, so a Dashboard origin the API would
+        // refuse (untrusted, insecure, malformed) fails here first.
+        dashboardOrigin: input?.dashboardOrigin,
         publicSignupEnabled: input?.publicSignupEnabled,
         secret: input?.secret,
         trustedOrigins: input?.trustedOrigins,
       },
       { environment: input?.environment ?? "production" },
     );
+    const signupDetail = config.publicSignupEnabled
+      ? "Public signup is explicitly ENABLED."
+      : "Public signup is disabled (safe default).";
+    if (config.dashboardOrigin === config.baseUrl) {
+      return freezeCheck("identity.configuration", "pass", "Identity configuration valid", [
+        schemaDetail,
+        signupDetail,
+        "Topology: same-origin (the Dashboard is served from the API's origin).",
+      ]);
+    }
+    const topologyDetail = "Topology: split (the Dashboard and the API are on separate origins).";
+    if (!plausiblySameSite(config.dashboardOrigin, config.baseUrl)) {
+      return freezeCheck(
+        "identity.configuration",
+        "warning",
+        "Identity configuration valid; split origins may not share a site",
+        [
+          schemaDetail,
+          signupDetail,
+          topologyDetail,
+          "The Dashboard and API hostnames are not siblings under one parent domain. Browsers send the session cookie across split origins only within one registrable domain (ADR 0045); Doctor cannot check the Public Suffix List, so confirm it.",
+        ],
+      );
+    }
     return freezeCheck("identity.configuration", "pass", "Identity configuration valid", [
       schemaDetail,
-      config.publicSignupEnabled
-        ? "Public signup is explicitly ENABLED."
-        : "Public signup is disabled (safe default).",
+      signupDetail,
+      topologyDetail,
     ]);
   } catch (error) {
     const code =

core/tests/doctor.test.ts

@@ -705,6 +705,88 @@ describe("Ekklesia Doctor diagnostics", () => {
     expect(report.result).toBe("ready-with-warnings"); // PostgreSQL is still skipped in this fixture
   });
 
+  describe("Dashboard and API topology (ADR 0045)", () => {
+    const secret = "correct-horse-battery-staple-0123456789";
+    async function identityCheck(identity: {
+      readonly baseUrl: string;
+      readonly dashboardOrigin?: string;
+      readonly environment?: "development" | "production";
+      readonly trustedOrigins: readonly string[];
+    }) {
+      const report = await diagnoseEkklesia(
+        {
+          ...options(),
+          identityConfiguration: { environment: "production", secret, ...identity },
+        },
+        dependencies(),
+      );
+      return { check: check(report, "identity.configuration"), report };
+    }
+
+    it("reports the same-origin topology when no Dashboard origin is set", async () => {
+      const { check: identity } = await identityCheck({
+        baseUrl: "https://ekklesia.example.test",
+        trustedOrigins: ["https://ekklesia.example.test"],
+      });
+      expect(identity.status).toBe("pass");
+      expect(identity.details).toContain(
+        "Topology: same-origin (the Dashboard is served from the API's origin).",
+      );
+    });
+
+    it("reports the split topology for sibling hostnames without printing either", async () => {
+      const { check: identity, report } = await identityCheck({
+        baseUrl: "https://api.example.test",
+        dashboardOrigin: "https://dash.example.test",
+        trustedOrigins: ["https://dash.example.test"],
+      });
+      expect(identity.status).toBe("pass");
+      expect(identity.details).toContain(
+        "Topology: split (the Dashboard and the API are on separate origins).",
+      );
+      expect(JSON.stringify(report)).not.toContain("dash.example.test");
+      expect(JSON.stringify(report)).not.toContain("api.example.test");
+    });
+
+    it.each([
+      ["different registrable domains", "https://dash.example.test", "https://api.example.org"],
+      ["two IP addresses", "https://10.0.0.2", "https://10.0.0.1"],
+      ["a parent that is only a top-level domain", "https://dash.test", "https://api.test"],
+    ])("warns, without failing, when split hostnames may not share a site: %s", async (_case, dashboardOrigin, baseUrl) => {
+      const { check: identity, report } = await identityCheck({
+        baseUrl,
+        dashboardOrigin,
+        trustedOrigins: [dashboardOrigin],
+      });
+      expect(identity.status).toBe("warning");
+      expect(identity.details.join("\n")).toContain("not siblings under one parent domain");
+      expect(doctorExitCode(report)).toBe(0);
+    });
+
+    it("treats another port on the same host as the same site (split development)", async () => {
+      const { check: identity } = await identityCheck({
+        baseUrl: "http://localhost:3000",
+        dashboardOrigin: "http://localhost:5173",
+        environment: "development",
+        trustedOrigins: ["http://localhost:5173"],
+      });
+      expect(identity.status).toBe("pass");
+    });
+
+    it("fails, as the API's startup would, for a Dashboard origin the API does not trust", async () => {
+      const { check: identity, report } = await identityCheck({
+        baseUrl: "https://api.example.test",
+        dashboardOrigin: "https://dash.example.test",
+        trustedOrigins: ["https://other.example.test"],
+      });
+      expect(identity.status).toBe("failure");
+      expect(identity.details.some((detail) => detail.includes("DASHBOARD_ORIGIN_UNTRUSTED"))).toBe(
+        true,
+      );
+      expect(doctorExitCode(report)).toBe(1);
+    });
+  });
+
   it("fails identity configuration for an invalid secret without leaking it", async () => {
     const hostileSecret = "s3cr3t-do-not-log";
     const report = await diagnoseEkklesia(

deploy/Caddyfile.example

@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+# Ekklesia reference proxy configuration (ADR 0044). Copy to deploy/Caddyfile, which the proxy
+# overlay mounts read-only. Hostnames, the ACME contact, and the tunnel connector's address come from
+# the proxy service's environment (deploy/.env), so this file normally needs no edits.
+{
+	# ACME account contact. Certificates use the HTTP-01 challenge on port 80 by default, which needs
+	# the Ekklesia and storage hostnames to resolve publicly to this host with 80 and 443 reachable.
+	email {$EKKLESIA_ACME_EMAIL}
+
+	# DNS-01, for an installation that keeps Ekklesia off the public Internet, serves only a LAN
+	# (split-horizon DNS), or is reachable only through Cloudflare Tunnel. Cloudflare terminates TLS at
+	# its edge, so HTTP-01 cannot reach this proxy through a tunnel.
+	#
+	# DNS-01 needs a DNS provider module that the stock Caddy image does not contain. Build an image
+	# with it (for example `xcaddy build --with github.com/caddy-dns/cloudflare`), pin that image by
+	# digest in your own overlay, give it CLOUDFLARE_API_TOKEN through a root-owned env file, then
+	# enable:
+	#
+	# acme_dns cloudflare {env.CLOUDFLARE_API_TOKEN}
+
+	servers {
+		# A client-address header is honored only from the tunnel connector's fixed address
+		# (compose.tunnel.yaml). From every other peer, the client address is the TCP peer itself and
+		# any such header is ignored. Without a tunnel, nothing has this address.
+		trusted_proxies static {$EKKLESIA_TUNNEL_ADDRESS}/32
+		client_ip_headers CF-Connecting-IP
+		trusted_proxies_strict
+	}
+
+	# Access logs are off unless enabled. If you enable them, keep request headers out: they carry
+	# cookies and forwarding chains (docs/development/security.md, launch checklist item 7).
+}
+
+# What every request to the API carries upstream: exactly one forwarding header, overwritten with
+# the client address Caddy resolved, and none of the headers a caller could use to choose its own.
+(ekklesia_forwarding) {
+	header_up X-Forwarded-For {client_ip}
+	header_up -CF-Connecting-IP
+	header_up -X-Real-IP
+	header_up -Forwarded
+	header_up -True-Client-IP
+}
+
+{$EKKLESIA_HOSTNAME} {
+	# Everything the API serves: the Dashboard at /, the API, display pages and their service
+	# worker, and the Dashboard and display host scripts. Any other path is refused here.
+	@ekklesia path / /api/* /display/* /assets/*
+
+	# Module realtime is Server-Sent Events: flush every event immediately.
+	@realtime path /api/v1/module-realtime/*
+
+	handle @realtime {
+		reverse_proxy api:3000 {
+			import ekklesia_forwarding
+			flush_interval -1
+		}
+	}
+
+	handle @ekklesia {
+		# Request bodies stream through unbuffered and unlimited here; the API enforces the platform's
+		# ceilings itself (8 KiB for authentication, up to 32 MiB for a streamed module route).
+		reverse_proxy api:3000 {
+			import ekklesia_forwarding
+		}
+	}
+
+	handle {
+		respond 404
+	}
+}
+
+# Browsers fetch signed object URLs here (S3_DELIVERY_ENDPOINT, ADR 0031).
+{$EKKLESIA_STORAGE_HOSTNAME} {
+	reverse_proxy https://object-storage:8443 {
+		# An S3 signature covers the Host header: pass the original through unchanged, or every signed
+		# URL fails verification.
+		header_up Host {host}
+		header_up -CF-Connecting-IP
+		header_up -X-Real-IP
+		header_up -Forwarded
+		header_up -True-Client-IP
+		transport http {
+			# object-storage presents a certificate from the installation-private CA.
+			tls_trust_pool file /etc/caddy/ekklesia-ca.crt
+			tls_server_name object-storage
+		}
+	}
+}

deploy/Caddyfile.split.example

@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
+# Ekklesia reference proxy configuration for the split topology (ADR 0045): the Dashboard and the API
+# on separate hostnames of one site, for example dash.example.org and api.example.org. For the
+# default same-origin topology use Caddyfile.example instead. Copy this file to deploy/Caddyfile.
+#
+# Hostnames, the ACME contact, and the tunnel connector's address come from the proxy service's
+# environment (deploy/.env): EKKLESIA_DASHBOARD_HOSTNAME is the Dashboard's, EKKLESIA_HOSTNAME the
+# API's (which also serves the display host), EKKLESIA_STORAGE_HOSTNAME the storage origin's. Only
+# the two site blocks below differ from Caddyfile.example.
+{
+	# ACME account contact. Certificates use the HTTP-01 challenge on port 80 by default, which needs
+	# all three hostnames to resolve publicly to this host with 80 and 443 reachable.
+	email {$EKKLESIA_ACME_EMAIL}
+
+	# DNS-01, for an installation that keeps Ekklesia off the public Internet, serves only a LAN
+	# (split-horizon DNS), or is reachable only through Cloudflare Tunnel. Cloudflare terminates TLS at
+	# its edge, so HTTP-01 cannot reach this proxy through a tunnel.
+	#
+	# DNS-01 needs a DNS provider module that the stock Caddy image does not contain. Build an image
+	# with it (for example `xcaddy build --with github.com/caddy-dns/cloudflare`), pin that image by
+	# digest in your own overlay, give it CLOUDFLARE_API_TOKEN through a root-owned env file, then
+	# enable:
+	#
+	# acme_dns cloudflare {env.CLOUDFLARE_API_TOKEN}
+
+	servers {
+		# A client-address header is honored only from the tunnel connector's fixed address
+		# (compose.tunnel.yaml). From every other peer, the client address is the TCP peer itself and
+		# any such header is ignored. Without a tunnel, nothing has this address.
+		trusted_proxies static {$EKKLESIA_TUNNEL_ADDRESS}/32
+		client_ip_headers CF-Connecting-IP
+		trusted_proxies_strict
+	}
+
+	# Access logs are off unless enabled. If you enable them, keep request headers out: they carry
+	# cookies and forwarding chains (docs/development/security.md, launch checklist item 7).
+}
+
+# What every request to the API carries upstream: exactly one forwarding header, overwritten with
+# the client address Caddy resolved, and none of the headers a caller could use to choose its own.
+(ekklesia_forwarding) {
+	header_up X-Forwarded-For {client_ip}
+	header_up -CF-Connecting-IP
+	header_up -X-Real-IP
+	header_up -Forwarded
+	header_up -True-Client-IP
+}
+
+# The Dashboard: its page and its one script, nothing else. Emailed verification and reset links land
+# on `/` with a query. `/api/*` is refused here on purpose, so the session cookie has exactly one
+# home, the API hostname, and the Dashboard can never fall back to a same-origin API.
+{$EKKLESIA_DASHBOARD_HOSTNAME} {
+	@dashboard path / /assets/ekklesia-dashboard/*
+
+	handle @dashboard {
+		reverse_proxy api:3000 {
+			import ekklesia_forwarding
+		}
+	}
+
+	handle {
+		respond 404
+	}
+}
+
+# The API, and the display host on the API's own origin: a screen's pages, service worker, device
+# cookies, and requests are all same-origin (ADR 0045). Nothing is served at `/`.
+{$EKKLESIA_HOSTNAME} {
+	@api path /api/* /display/* /assets/ekklesia-display/*
+
+	# Module realtime is Server-Sent Events: flush every event immediately.
+	@realtime path /api/v1/module-realtime/*
+
+	handle @realtime {
+		reverse_proxy api:3000 {
+			import ekklesia_forwarding
+			flush_interval -1
+		}
+	}
+
+	handle @api {
+		# Request bodies stream through unbuffered and unlimited here; the API enforces the platform's
+		# ceilings itself (8 KiB for authentication, up to 32 MiB for a streamed module route).
+		reverse_proxy api:3000 {
+			import ekklesia_forwarding
+		}
+	}
+
+	handle {
+		respond 404
+	}
+}
+
+# Browsers fetch signed object URLs here (S3_DELIVERY_ENDPOINT, ADR 0031).
+{$EKKLESIA_STORAGE_HOSTNAME} {
+	reverse_proxy https://object-storage:8443 {
+		# An S3 signature covers the Host header: pass the original through unchanged, or every signed
+		# URL fails verification.
+		header_up Host {host}
+		header_up -CF-Connecting-IP
+		header_up -X-Real-IP
+		header_up -Forwarded
+		header_up -True-Client-IP
+		transport http {
+			# object-storage presents a certificate from the installation-private CA.
+			tls_trust_pool file /etc/caddy/ekklesia-ca.crt
+			tls_server_name object-storage
+		}
+	}
+}

deploy/Dockerfile

@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
+# Ekklesia's one production image (ADR 0044): the `api` service and every operator-run CLI, from one
+# build. See deploy/README.md for how to build and run it.
+#
+# The build context is an already-assembled workspace: the platform, zero or more module packages in
+# `modules/<id>`, and the `pnpm-lock.yaml` that describes exactly that set. This file clones nothing
+# and chooses no modules. With an empty or absent `modules/`, it builds the platform alone.
+#
+# No `# syntax=` directive, deliberately: it would make BuildKit pull an unpinned frontend image.
+# The built-in frontend supports everything below, including cache mounts.
+
+# Node.js 24.18.0 (matching `.node-version`) on Debian 13 slim, pinned by its multi-architecture
+# index digest. glibc rather than musl, because module dependencies such as sharp ship glibc
+# prebuilt binaries. Every stage starts from this exact image.
+FROM node:24.18.0-trixie-slim@sha256:ae91dcc111a68c9d2d81ff2a17bda61be126426176fde6fe7d08ab13b7f50573 AS base
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# toolchain: pnpm through Corepack, at exactly the root `packageManager` version.
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+FROM base AS toolchain
+ENV COREPACK_ENABLE_DOWNLOAD_PROMPT=0 \
+    PNPM_HOME=/pnpm \
+    TURBO_TELEMETRY_DISABLED=1 \
+    DO_NOT_TRACK=1
+WORKDIR /opt/ekklesia
+COPY package.json ./
+# Corepack reads `packageManager` (pnpm@<exact version>) from the root manifest, so the version is
+# declared once, in the repository, and never restated here.
+RUN corepack enable && corepack install
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# manifests: the lockfile, workspace configuration, and every workspace package.json, at their
+# repository paths. Dependency installation keys on these alone, so a source-only change reuses the
+# installed layers.
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+FROM base AS manifests
+WORKDIR /context
+COPY . .
+RUN set -eu; \
+    mkdir /manifests; \
+    cp package.json pnpm-lock.yaml pnpm-workspace.yaml .npmrc /manifests/; \
+    for manifest in apps/*/package.json builders/*/package.json core/package.json \
+                    modules/*/package.json packages/*/package.json surfaces/*/package.json \
+                    templates/*/package.json; do \
+      if [ -f "$manifest" ]; then install -D -m 0644 "$manifest" "/manifests/$manifest"; fi; \
+    done
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# build: full install, validation, build, then the exact runtime file set.
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+FROM toolchain AS build
+# Sources first, then one install: workspace packages publish `bin` commands from source files (the
+# module UI builder's, which every module build invokes), and pnpm links a bin only when its target
+# already exists. The store cache mount keeps a rebuild off the network all the same.
+COPY . .
+RUN --mount=type=cache,id=ekklesia-pnpm-store,target=/pnpm/store \
+    pnpm install --frozen-lockfile --store-dir /pnpm/store
+# The same gates `pnpm verify` runs for boundaries, modules, and migrations, against exactly the
+# module set in this context. `pnpm boundaries` comes first and reads only sources: among its rules,
+# a module that imports something at run time without declaring it a production dependency fails
+# here, because the production-only install below would leave it unresolvable at API startup. Each
+# validate script builds first; the final build is a Turbo cache hit that keeps the intent explicit.
+RUN pnpm boundaries && pnpm modules:validate && pnpm migrations:validate && pnpm build
+# What the runtime resolves at startup, at the paths it resolves them from:
+#   - every workspace package's `dist/` (every package exports only from `dist/`), which includes
+#     the Dashboard and display host assets under `surfaces/shell/dist/browser/`;
+#   - Core's migrations, `core/drizzle/` with its `meta/` journal;
+#   - each module directory whole, minus `node_modules`, because each manifest names its own
+#     entrypoints, UI artifacts, and migrations directory.
+# `node_modules` comes from the production-only install below, never from this stage.
+RUN set -eu; \
+    mkdir -p /runtime/core /runtime/modules; \
+    for package in apps/* core packages/* surfaces/*; do \
+      if [ -d "$package/dist" ]; then \
+        mkdir -p "/runtime/$package"; \
+        cp -a "$package/dist" "/runtime/$package/dist"; \
+      fi; \
+    done; \
+    cp -a core/drizzle /runtime/core/drizzle; \
+    if [ -d modules ]; then \
+      tar -C modules --exclude='node_modules' -cf - . | tar -C /runtime/modules -xf -; \
+    fi
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# prod-deps: the same lockfile, production dependencies only. No compiler, bundler, or test runner
+# reaches the runtime image.
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+FROM toolchain AS prod-deps
+COPY --from=manifests /manifests/ ./
+RUN --mount=type=cache,id=ekklesia-pnpm-store,target=/pnpm/store \
+    pnpm install --frozen-lockfile --prod --store-dir /pnpm/store
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# runtime
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+FROM base AS runtime
+
+ARG VERSION=""
+ARG REVISION=""
+ARG SOURCE=""
+LABEL org.opencontainers.image.title="Ekklesia" \
+      org.opencontainers.image.description="Ekklesia API, Dashboard, display host, and operator CLIs" \
+      org.opencontainers.image.version="${VERSION}" \
+      org.opencontainers.image.revision="${REVISION}" \
+      org.opencontainers.image.source="${SOURCE}" \
+      org.opencontainers.image.base.name="docker.io/library/node:24.18.0-trixie-slim" \
+      org.opencontainers.image.base.digest="sha256:ae91dcc111a68c9d2d81ff2a17bda61be126426176fde6fe7d08ab13b7f50573"
+
+# Only the container's own listen address differs from the platform default: outside a container
+# the API still binds 127.0.0.1. `production` is stated rather than relied on as the default.
+ENV NODE_ENV=production \
+    EKKLESIA_API_HOST=0.0.0.0 \
+    EKKLESIA_API_PORT=3000
+
+# The repository layout, preserved: the API finds the repository root three directories above
+# `apps/api/dist/`, and every CLI uses its working directory as the root.
+WORKDIR /opt/ekklesia
+COPY --from=prod-deps /opt/ekklesia/ ./
+COPY --from=build /runtime/ ./
+
+# Files stay root-owned: the unprivileged runtime user can read the installation, never modify it.
+USER node
+EXPOSE 3000
+
+# Readiness, not liveness: an instance whose database is unreachable or that is shutting down is
+# unhealthy. Node's own fetch, so the image needs no curl.
+HEALTHCHECK --interval=30s --timeout=5s --start-period=30s --retries=3 \
+  CMD ["node", "-e", "fetch('http://127.0.0.1:' + (process.env.EKKLESIA_API_PORT || '3000') + '/api/v1/health/ready', { signal: AbortSignal.timeout(4000) }).then((response) => process.exit(response.status === 200 ? 0 : 1), () => process.exit(1))"]
+
+# `pnpm api:start` without its build step and without `--env-file`: configuration comes only from
+# the container environment. The same image runs every CLI: `node core/dist/cli/<command>.js`.
+CMD ["node", "apps/api/dist/server.js"]

deploy/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,467 @@
+# Deployment
+
+This directory holds Ekklesia's reference self-hosted deployment
+([ADR 0044](../docs/architecture/decisions/0044-self-hosted-reference-deployment.md)): one Linux
+host, one Docker Compose project, and the production container image it runs. Nothing here is
+specific to one organization.
+
+| File | What it is |
+| --- | --- |
+| [`compose.yaml`](compose.yaml) | The base: `api`, `postgres`, `object-storage`, and the operator-only `migrate`. Publishes no port. |
+| [`compose.proxy.yaml`](compose.proxy.yaml) | Overlay: Caddy as the TLS proxy, the only service with published ports. |
+| [`compose.tunnel.yaml`](compose.tunnel.yaml) | Overlay on top of the proxy: a Cloudflare Tunnel connector. |
+| [`Caddyfile.example`](Caddyfile.example) | The proxy's configuration for the default same-origin topology; copy to `Caddyfile`. |
+| [`Caddyfile.split.example`](Caddyfile.split.example) | The proxy's configuration when the Dashboard and the API have separate hostnames ([Split Dashboard and API origins](#split-dashboard-and-api-origins)); copy to `Caddyfile` instead. |
+| [`postgres/pg_hba.conf`](postgres/pg_hba.conf) | PostgreSQL client authentication: TLS only, SCRAM passwords. |
+| [`env/`](env/) | Commented examples of every env file. No values. |
+| [`scripts/init-tls.sh`](scripts/init-tls.sh) | Creates the installation-private CA and the `postgres` and `object-storage` server certificates. |
+| [`scripts/gen-secrets.sh`](scripts/gen-secrets.sh) | Prints freshly generated secrets to paste into the env files. Writes nothing. |
+| [`Dockerfile`](Dockerfile) | The one production image, for the API and every operator command ([The production image](#the-production-image)). |
+
+## The reference deployment
+
+### Shape
+
+```sh
+cd deploy
+# Base and proxy: the reference.
+docker compose -f compose.yaml -f compose.proxy.yaml up -d
+# Base, proxy, and Cloudflare Tunnel.
+docker compose -f compose.yaml -f compose.proxy.yaml -f compose.tunnel.yaml up -d
+# Base only, behind a reverse proxy the installation already runs.
+docker compose -f compose.yaml -f compose.myproxy.yaml up -d
+```
+
+Pass the same `-f` files to every later `up`, `down`, `ps`, and `logs`. `migrate` commands need only
+the base: `docker compose run --rm migrate …` from this directory uses `compose.yaml` by default.
+
+| Network | Kind | Members |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| `data` | internal | `postgres`, `api`, `migrate` |
+| `storage` | internal | `object-storage`, `api`, `migrate` |
+| `egress` | bridge | `api`, `migrate` (outbound only, for example an SMTP relay) |
+| `edge` | bridge, fixed subnet (proxy overlay) | `proxy` (fixed address), `api`, `object-storage`, `tunnel` (fixed address) |
+
+PostgreSQL is only ever on `data`, so no proxy and no tunnel can reach it. `internal` networks have
+no route off the host. Object storage joins `edge` only when the proxy overlay attaches it.
+
+TLS is everywhere, without any exception in Core:
+
+- **Browsers to the proxy:** publicly trusted ACME certificates.
+- **API to PostgreSQL:** `verify-full` against the installation-private CA, passed as PEM text in
+  `EKKLESIA_DATABASE_CA`. PostgreSQL accepts only TLS 1.3 network connections.
+- **API (and proxy) to object storage:** HTTPS on port 8443 with a certificate from the same CA.
+  Production storage must be https (ADR 0030). Core's S3 client uses Node's default trust store, so
+  Compose adds the CA with `NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS`.
+
+### Where configuration and secrets live
+
+| File (on the host) | Holds | Read by |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| `deploy/.env` (from [`env/compose.env.example`](env/compose.env.example)) | Non-secret settings: the image, hostnames, paths, the edge subnet | Compose itself |
+| `/etc/ekklesia/ekklesia.env` | Everything the API needs, including `DATABASE_URL` and the S3 keys | `api`, `migrate` |
+| `/etc/ekklesia/postgres.env` | `POSTGRES_USER`, `POSTGRES_PASSWORD`, `POSTGRES_DB` | `postgres` |
+| `/etc/ekklesia/object-storage.env` | The S3 key pair | `object-storage` |
+| `/etc/ekklesia/tunnel.env` | `TUNNEL_TOKEN` | `tunnel` |
+| `/etc/ekklesia/tls/` | The CA and server certificates and keys | mounted file by file |
+
+The secret files are owned by root with mode 600, one per service, so no container receives another
+service's credentials. None is committed, and `deploy/.env` is ignored by Git. `EKKLESIA_ENV_DIR`
+and `EKKLESIA_TLS_DIR` in `deploy/.env` move the directories.
+
+### First boot
+
+1. **Get the image.** Build it ([Building](#building)) or pull it, and set `EKKLESIA_IMAGE` in
+   `deploy/.env`.
+2. **Create the TLS material**, as root:
+
+   ```sh
+   sudo sh deploy/scripts/init-tls.sh /etc/ekklesia/tls
+   ```
+
+   It creates the CA once and a certificate for each of `postgres` and `object-storage`, gives each
+   key to its server's uid (PostgreSQL 70, SeaweedFS 1000) with mode 600, and prints the exact
+   `EKKLESIA_DATABASE_CA="…"` line. It never overwrites an existing key or certificate and never
+   prints a private key. `ca.key` is needed only to issue certificates: keep a copy offline.
+3. **Generate secrets** with `sh deploy/scripts/gen-secrets.sh`, and paste each line into the file
+   named above it.
+4. **Write the env files** from [`env/`](env/), then install each one owned by root with mode 600:
+
+   ```sh
+   sudo install -d -m 755 /etc/ekklesia
+   sudo install -o root -g root -m 600 ekklesia.env /etc/ekklesia/ekklesia.env
+   ```
+
+   `EKKLESIA_IDENTITY_BASE_URL` and `EKKLESIA_IDENTITY_TRUSTED_ORIGINS` are `https://` and your
+   Ekklesia hostname. `S3_DELIVERY_ENDPOINT` is `https://` and your storage hostname.
+5. **Configure the proxy:** copy `Caddyfile.example` to `Caddyfile`, and set `EKKLESIA_HOSTNAME`,
+   `EKKLESIA_STORAGE_HOSTNAME`, and `EKKLESIA_ACME_EMAIL` in `deploy/.env`. Both hostnames must
+   resolve to this host with ports 80 and 443 reachable for HTTP-01, or see [DNS-01](#dns-01).
+6. **Start the data services, then migrate explicitly:**
+
+   ```sh
+   docker compose -f compose.yaml -f compose.proxy.yaml up -d --wait postgres object-storage
+   docker compose run --rm migrate                                   # plan: read-only
+   docker compose run --rm migrate node core/dist/cli/apply-migrations.js
+   ```
+
+   Nothing ever applies migrations automatically: the API never does, and `migrate` runs only when
+   you run it.
+7. **Start everything:** `docker compose -f compose.yaml -f compose.proxy.yaml up -d --wait`.
+8. **Check it:** `curl https://<hostname>/api/v1/health/ready` answers `{"status":"ready"}`, and
+   `docker compose run --rm migrate node core/dist/cli/doctor.js` reports `READY` (with warnings
+   for anything optional you left unconfigured, such as email).
+
+### The initial owner
+
+```sh
+docker compose run --rm -it migrate node core/dist/cli/create-initial-owner.js --email owner@example.org
+```
+
+It prompts for the password with hidden input and never accepts it on the command line. The owner
+is created already verified, so they can sign in before any email relay exists
+([ADR 0035](../docs/architecture/decisions/0035-initial-platform-owner-bootstrap.md)). To supply the
+password from a secret manager instead, pipe it on standard input and use `-T` instead of `-it`.
+
+### Upgrading
+
+1. **Pull or build the new image**, and change `EKKLESIA_IMAGE` in `deploy/.env`. Keep the old tag.
+2. **Back up** ([Backups](#backups)).
+3. **Plan, review, then apply:** `docker compose run --rm migrate` with the new image, then
+   `docker compose run --rm migrate node core/dist/cli/apply-migrations.js`.
+4. **Restart on the new image:** `docker compose -f compose.yaml -f compose.proxy.yaml up -d --wait`.
+
+### Rolling back
+
+Set `EKKLESIA_IMAGE` back to the previous tag and run `up -d --wait` again. That is enough only when
+the upgrade applied no migrations (the plan in step 3 showed none pending). Migrations are
+forward-only. If any were applied, restore the backup taken in step 2 before starting the previous
+image, because it was not built for the newer schema.
+
+### Backups
+
+Slice 6 adds the scheduled backup job and the restore procedure (ADR 0044, Backups). Until then,
+take a `pg_dump` and a copy of every bucket before each upgrade by hand.
+
+### Split Dashboard and API origins
+
+By default one hostname serves the Dashboard (`/`), the API (`/api/*`), and displays (`/display/*`).
+An installation may instead give the Dashboard its own hostname, for example `dash.example.org`
+beside `api.example.org` ([ADR 0045](../docs/architecture/decisions/0045-split-dashboard-and-api-origins.md)).
+The same image serves both; only configuration differs.
+
+| Hostname | Serves | Refuses (`404`) |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| Dashboard (`EKKLESIA_DASHBOARD_HOSTNAME`) | `/` and `/assets/ekklesia-dashboard/*` | everything else, including `/api/*` |
+| API (`EKKLESIA_HOSTNAME`) | `/api/*`, `/display/*`, `/assets/ekklesia-display/*` | everything else, including `/` |
+| Storage (`EKKLESIA_STORAGE_HOSTNAME`) | signed object URLs, unchanged | |
+
+Displays live on the API's hostname (`https://api.example.org/display/<module>`), because their
+device cookies are bound to it and their offline cache keeps only same-origin responses. That
+hostname is what every screen and paired device depends on: choose it once.
+
+To run split:
+
+1. Copy `Caddyfile.split.example` to `Caddyfile` instead of `Caddyfile.example`.
+2. In `deploy/.env`, set `EKKLESIA_HOSTNAME` to the API's hostname and `EKKLESIA_DASHBOARD_HOSTNAME`
+   to the Dashboard's.
+3. In `ekklesia.env`, set `EKKLESIA_IDENTITY_BASE_URL` to `https://` and the API's hostname,
+   `EKKLESIA_DASHBOARD_ORIGIN` to `https://` and the Dashboard's, and
+   `EKKLESIA_IDENTITY_TRUSTED_ORIGINS` to the Dashboard's origin. The API always trusts its own
+   origin, so it need not be listed.
+
+**Both hostnames must belong to one registrable domain** (`dash.example.org` and `api.example.org`,
+not `dash.example.org` and `api.example.net`). The session cookie stays host-only on the API's
+hostname; browsers send it from the Dashboard only between origins of the same site. Doctor reports
+the topology and warns when the two hostnames are not siblings.
+
+The Dashboard learns the API's origin at run time: the API writes its identity base URL into the page
+it serves (`<meta name="ekklesia-api-origin">`). Nothing about the topology is built into the image.
+
+### Behind an existing reverse proxy
+
+Run the base alone and attach `api` and `object-storage` to your proxy's network with an overlay of
+your own, for example `compose.myproxy.yaml`:
+
+```yaml
+services:
+  api:
+    networks:
+      proxy: {}
+    environment:
+      # Exactly one trusted peer: your proxy, at an address that cannot change.
+      EKKLESIA_CLIENT_ADDRESS_MODE: trusted-proxy
+      EKKLESIA_CLIENT_ADDRESS_HEADER: x-forwarded-for
+      EKKLESIA_CLIENT_ADDRESS_TRUSTED_PROXIES: 10.0.100.254/32
+  object-storage:
+    networks:
+      proxy: {}
+
+networks:
+  proxy:
+    external: true
+    name: your-proxy-network
+```
+
+Then make your proxy do what `Caddyfile.example` does:
+
+- forward `/`, `/api/*`, `/display/*`, and `/assets/*` on the Ekklesia hostname to `api:3000`;
+- **overwrite** `X-Forwarded-For` with the one client address it resolved, and strip
+  `CF-Connecting-IP`, `X-Real-IP`, `Forwarded`, and `True-Client-IP`;
+- stream responses on `/api/v1/module-realtime/*` without buffering (Server-Sent Events);
+- set no request-body limit below 32 MiB; the API enforces its own ceilings;
+- forward the storage hostname to `https://object-storage:8443`, verifying it against
+  `/etc/ekklesia/tls/ca.crt` with server name `object-storage`, and **pass the original `Host`
+  through unchanged**, or every signed URL fails (ADR 0031).
+
+The proxy's address must be fixed and must never be handed to anything else. With Docker, give its
+network an explicit subnet, limit `ip_range` to part of it, and fix the proxy's address outside that
+range, as `compose.proxy.yaml` does.
+
+### Fixed addresses on `edge`
+
+`compose.proxy.yaml` gives `edge` the subnet `10.249.250.0/24` and lets Docker assign dynamic
+addresses only from its lower half (`10.249.250.0/25`). The proxy (`.254`) and the tunnel connector
+(`.253`) take fixed addresses from the top of the upper half, which Docker never assigns to anything
+else. That is what makes "only the proxy" and "only the connector" expressible as `/32` trust
+entries. If the subnet collides with one on your host, change `EKKLESIA_EDGE_SUBNET`,
+`EKKLESIA_EDGE_DYNAMIC_RANGE`, `EKKLESIA_PROXY_ADDRESS`, and `EKKLESIA_TUNNEL_ADDRESS` together,
+keeping the fixed addresses at the top and outside the dynamic range.
+
+### Cloudflare Tunnel
+
+`compose.tunnel.yaml` runs `cloudflared` with a token, so the tunnel is managed in the Cloudflare
+dashboard. No Cloudflare API is called from here.
+
+1. In Cloudflare Zero Trust, under **Networks → Tunnels**, create a Cloudflared tunnel. Copy its
+   token into `/etc/ekklesia/tunnel.env` as `TUNNEL_TOKEN`.
+2. Add a **public hostname** (shown as a *published application route* in newer dashboards) for
+   the Ekklesia hostname. Service type **HTTPS**, URL `proxy:443`.
+3. Under that hostname's **TLS** settings, set **Origin Server Name** to the same Ekklesia hostname,
+   and leave **No TLS Verify** off. The connector then verifies the proxy's certificate for that name.
+4. Add a public hostname for the storage hostname, the same way, with its own origin server name.
+   In the [split topology](#split-dashboard-and-api-origins), add one for the Dashboard's hostname
+   too: three in all, each with its own origin server name.
+5. Start with all three files. The proxy honors `CF-Connecting-IP` only from the connector's fixed
+   address. From any other peer it is stripped.
+
+The proxy's certificate must still be publicly trusted, and an HTTP-01 challenge cannot reach the
+proxy through a tunnel, because Cloudflare terminates TLS at its edge. A tunnel-only installation
+therefore uses [DNS-01](#dns-01). An installation that also serves local displays should give the
+same hostnames a LAN path to the proxy (split-horizon DNS), so displays do not depend on the
+Internet link.
+
+### DNS-01
+
+For an installation off the public Internet, LAN-only, or tunnel-only. DNS-01 needs a DNS provider
+module, which the stock Caddy image does not contain:
+
+1. Build a Caddy image with the module (for example
+   `xcaddy build --with github.com/caddy-dns/cloudflare`) and pin it by digest.
+2. Override the proxy's `image:` in an overlay of your own. Give it `CLOUDFLARE_API_TOKEN` (a token
+   scoped to DNS edits for the zone) through a root-owned env file.
+3. Enable the commented `acme_dns` line in your `Caddyfile`.
+
+### Launch checklist
+
+The ten items in [Security § launch checklist](../docs/development/security.md) mapped to this
+deployment:
+
+| # | Item | Where it is met |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| 1 | The proxy forwards the Dashboard and `/api` on the intended origin | `Caddyfile.example` routes `/`, `/api/*`, `/display/*`, `/assets/*` on one hostname to `api`; the API serves the Dashboard itself. In the split topology, `Caddyfile.split.example` gives each hostname exactly its own paths and the exact trusted-origin CORS of ADR 0045 covers the rest. |
+| 2 | The origin port is unreachable from the Internet | The base publishes no port; only `proxy` publishes 80 and 443. |
+| 3 | The origin port is unreachable from untrusted networks | `api` is reachable only on Docker networks; `EKKLESIA_PUBLISH_ADDRESS` limits the proxy to one interface. Firewall the host itself. |
+| 4 | The proxy overwrites the trusted client-IP header | `header_up X-Forwarded-For {client_ip}` in `Caddyfile.example`. |
+| 5 | Rotating forwarding headers cannot rotate the rate-limit bucket | The same, plus stripping `CF-Connecting-IP`, `X-Real-IP`, `Forwarded`, and `True-Client-IP`; the API overwrites its internal header. Proven by the smoke test. |
+| 6 | The proxy peer is the only trusted proxy | `compose.proxy.yaml` sets `EKKLESIA_CLIENT_ADDRESS_TRUSTED_PROXIES` to the proxy's fixed `/32`. |
+| 7 | Proxy logs record no cookies, credentials, bodies, or forwarding chains | Caddy access logs are off in `Caddyfile.example`. If you enable them, exclude request headers. |
+| 8 | PostgreSQL only from the API, over verified TLS | `postgres` is only on internal `data`; `pg_hba.conf` rejects non-TLS; `verify-full` with `EKKLESIA_DATABASE_CA`. Proven by the smoke test. |
+| 9 | The deployed login and logout flow keeps its contract | Unchanged by the proxy; the smoke test signs in and out through it. |
+| 10 | A supported way to create the first production identity | `create-initial-owner.js` through `migrate` ([The initial owner](#the-initial-owner)). Exercised by the smoke test. |
+
+### Testing this deployment
+
+- `pnpm deploy:config` validates the base, base + proxy, and base + proxy + tunnel with the example
+  env files. CI runs it in `pnpm ci:verify`.
+- `pnpm deploy:smoke` (`scripts/smoke-deploy.sh`) runs the whole deployment end to end, against a
+  platform-only image and a disposable PostgreSQL and SeaweedFS that exist only for that run. It
+  follows the first boot above and checks the following through the proxy:
+  - readiness and the Dashboard;
+  - a signed object URL fetched through the storage hostname;
+  - the client-address chain, both from an ordinary peer and from the tunnel connector's address;
+  - initial-owner sign-in and sign-out;
+  - that the API's database connection is TLS 1.3, and that it is refused by a foreign CA and by a
+    wrong host name;
+  - Doctor.
+
+  `EKKLESIA_SMOKE_TOPOLOGY=split` runs the [split topology](#split-dashboard-and-api-origins)
+  instead: an image with the repository's module template installed as a test-only module, every
+  hostname's served and refused paths, exact CORS for the Dashboard's origin and none for others,
+  and then a real headless Chromium (pinned by digest, driven over the DevTools protocol) that signs
+  in on the Dashboard's hostname, checks the session cookie lives only on the API's, mounts the
+  module's UI from the API's origin and sees its own credentialed requests succeed, mounts its display
+  on the API's hostname with its service worker, and signs out.
+
+  CI runs both topologies on every change.
+- **Test-only:** the smoke test runs Caddy with its internal CA (`local_certs`), because a test run
+  has no public hostname. Never use it in an installation; `Caddyfile.example` does not contain it.
+
+The smoke test uses no module, so it does not exercise realtime streams or large uploads. Through
+this same proxy configuration, a scratch module confirmed both:
+
+- a Server-Sent Event crossed the proxy in milliseconds;
+- a 32 MiB streamed upload passed with and without `Content-Length`;
+- one byte more was refused by the API's own `413 REQUEST_BODY_TOO_LARGE`.
+
+## The production image
+
+[`Dockerfile`](Dockerfile) builds **one image** for two jobs: the long-running `api` service, and
+every operator-run command (migrations, Doctor, initial-owner creation, module enablement). There
+is no second image and no second build.
+
+### What it builds
+
+The build context is an **already-assembled workspace**: this repository, plus zero or more module
+packages already present in `modules/<id>`, plus a `pnpm-lock.yaml` describing exactly that set.
+The Dockerfile clones nothing and chooses no modules. It builds what it is given. With no
+`modules/` directory, it builds the platform alone; CI builds that case on every change.
+
+Assembling the context (checking out the platform at a release tag, each module at a pinned tag or
+commit, and the instance's own lockfile) belongs to the installation's instance composition, not to
+this file.
+
+| Stage | Does |
+| --- | --- |
+| `base` | `node:24.18.0-trixie-slim`, pinned by its multi-architecture index digest. Debian, so glibc, because module dependencies such as sharp ship glibc prebuilt binaries. Every stage starts here. |
+| `toolchain` | Enables pnpm through Corepack, at exactly the root `packageManager` version. |
+| `manifests` | Collects the lockfile, workspace configuration, `.npmrc`, and every workspace `package.json` at its repository path. |
+| `build` | `pnpm install --frozen-lockfile`, then `pnpm boundaries`, `pnpm modules:validate`, `pnpm migrations:validate`, and `pnpm build`, against exactly the modules in the context. Never uses host `node_modules`: `.dockerignore` excludes them. |
+| `prod-deps` | The same lockfile with `--prod`: production dependencies only. |
+| `runtime` | Production dependencies plus built outputs, owned by root and run as the unprivileged `node` user (uid 1000). No pnpm, no compiler, no curl. |
+
+The runtime keeps the repository layout at `/opt/ekklesia`, because that layout is how the platform
+finds its files:
+
+- the API takes the repository root as three directories above `apps/api/dist/`, and reads
+  `package.json`, `packages/module-sdk/package.json`, and `modules/` beneath it;
+- every CLI takes its **working directory** as the root and also reads Core's migrations in
+  `core/drizzle/`, so commands must run from `/opt/ekklesia`, the image's `WORKDIR`;
+- the Dashboard and display host files are read from `surfaces/shell/dist/browser/`;
+- each module directory is copied whole, minus `node_modules`, because each manifest names its
+  own entrypoints, UI artifacts, and migrations directory.
+
+### Building
+
+```sh
+docker build \
+  --file deploy/Dockerfile \
+  --build-arg VERSION=0.1.1 \
+  --build-arg REVISION="$(git rev-parse HEAD)" \
+  --build-arg SOURCE=https://git.example.org/your-org/ekklesia \
+  --tag ekklesia:0.1.1 \
+  .
+```
+
+The three build arguments become the OCI labels `org.opencontainers.image.version`, `.revision`,
+and `.source`. They have no defaults: the repository cannot know an installation's Git host. The
+image also records its base image name and digest. BuildKit is required (Docker's default builder);
+set `DOCKER_BUILDKIT=1` if your Docker CLI has no buildx plugin.
+
+No secret is a build argument, and none enters any layer. `.env` files are excluded from the build
+context entirely, and no registry credentials are needed.
+
+**A module missing a production dependency fails the build, not the API.** The runtime receives
+production dependencies only, so a module that imports a package at run time but declares it only
+as a development or peer dependency would build and then fail at startup. `pnpm boundaries` runs
+in the build stage and rejects that module first
+(`runtime-imports-are-production-dependencies`, see
+[Repository boundaries](../docs/architecture/repository-boundaries.md)). The same applies to every
+other boundary rule: a module the platform's own CI would reject cannot be built into an image.
+
+**A platform-only image does not exercise native module dependencies.** With no modules in the
+context, nothing like sharp is installed, so the CI image build proves nothing about them. An
+instance build that includes such a module must smoke-test the built image itself: start it,
+confirm `/api/v1/health/ready` answers `200`, and exercise the module's native code path (for
+example, process one image).
+
+### Configuration
+
+Configuration comes **only from the container environment**, never from a file inside the image.
+The image sets exactly three variables itself:
+
+| Variable | Image value | Why |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| `NODE_ENV` | `production` | Stated rather than relied on. Anything other than `development` already validates as production. |
+| `EKKLESIA_API_HOST` | `0.0.0.0` | Reachable from other containers. Outside a container the platform default stays `127.0.0.1`. |
+| `EKKLESIA_API_PORT` | `3000` | The platform default, made explicit; `EXPOSE 3000`. |
+
+Everything else is the ordinary host configuration in
+[API § Required configuration](../docs/development/api.md#required-configuration), supplied by the
+reference deployment's `ekklesia.env`. `EKKLESIA_DATABASE_CA` is the CA's PEM text itself, on one
+double-quoted line with `\n` escapes. Compose expands those escapes; plain `docker run --env-file`
+does not, which is why every command here goes through Compose.
+
+Never publish the API's port to the host or the Internet. Only the proxy publishes ports.
+
+### Process, signals, and the read-only posture
+
+`compose.yaml` runs `api` and `migrate` with `init: true`, `read_only: true`, `tmpfs: /tmp`,
+`cap_drop: [ALL]`, and `no-new-privileges`. That is the supported production posture:
+
+- **`init: true`** runs a minimal init as PID 1 that forwards signals and reaps children, so
+  `docker stop` reaches the API's own SIGTERM handler promptly. The API then drains in-flight
+  requests, stops modules in reverse order, and closes its pool.
+- **Read-only:** the image was verified under exactly these flags. The API reached `healthy`, and
+  the migration and Doctor commands ran. Nothing wrote to `/tmp`, which stays mounted as headroom
+  for module code that needs scratch space. The installation, `/home/node` included, is not
+  writable, so anything that needs a writable path other than `/tmp` is a defect to report, not to
+  work around.
+
+### Health
+
+The image's `HEALTHCHECK` calls `GET /api/v1/health/ready` on `127.0.0.1` with Node's built-in
+`fetch`, every 30 seconds after a 30-second start period, with three retries. Readiness means the
+database answered within 2 seconds and the instance is not shutting down; see
+[API § Health](../docs/development/api.md#health). Because it probes `127.0.0.1`, keep
+`EKKLESIA_API_HOST` at `0.0.0.0` (or any address that includes loopback) inside the container. The
+API trusts only the proxy's address for client-address headers, so the loopback probe is an
+ordinary direct peer.
+
+An external monitor can use the same endpoint through the proxy. Use `/api/v1/health/live` to ask
+only whether the process is serving.
+
+### Operator commands
+
+The same image runs every CLI, directly with `node core/dist/cli/<command>.js`, through the
+`migrate` service. The `pnpm` scripts of the same names rebuild first and read `.env`, so they are
+for a development checkout, not for the image.
+
+`migrate` has `profiles: ["ops"]`, so `up` never starts it. It never restarts, has no health check,
+and its default command is the read-only plan. **Nothing applies migrations automatically.**
+
+| Task | Command (from `deploy/`) |
+| --- | --- |
+| Plan migrations (read-only) | `docker compose run --rm migrate` |
+| Apply migrations | `docker compose run --rm migrate node core/dist/cli/apply-migrations.js` |
+| Doctor (read-only report) | `docker compose run --rm migrate node core/dist/cli/doctor.js` |
+| Create the initial owner (interactive) | `docker compose run --rm -it migrate node core/dist/cli/create-initial-owner.js --email [email protected]` |
+| Enable or disable a module | `docker compose run --rm migrate node core/dist/cli/set-module-enabled.js --enable --module <id>` (or `--disable`) |
+
+The plan, apply, Doctor, and initial-owner commands are exercised by the smoke test; module
+enablement is not.
+
+### Size
+
+The platform-only image is about 378 MB: the Debian slim Node base (about 230 MB), production
+dependencies (about 141 MB), and built outputs (about 6 MB). A rebuild that reuses a warm pnpm store
+cache can come out about 21 MB larger. When esbuild's install script runs, it hard-links its
+`bin/esbuild` to the native binary it ships beside it; when pnpm restores esbuild from the store's
+cached post-install state instead, that file is a second full copy. Both are esbuild, one of the
+unused tools below.
+
+About 57 MB of the production dependencies are development tools that no runtime code imports:
+`vitest`, `vite`, `drizzle-kit`, `tsx`, `esbuild`, and their native bindings. They arrive as
+optional peer dependencies of Better Auth (and `esbuild` through the module UI builder), which pnpm
+resolves because the workspace already has them. Excluding them means changing dependency
+resolution and the lockfile, which is separate work.

deploy/compose.proxy.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+# The reference TLS proxy overlay (ADR 0044's `proxy` service). Use it on top of the base:
+#
+#   docker compose -f compose.yaml -f compose.proxy.yaml up -d
+#
+# Caddy terminates TLS with publicly trusted ACME certificates and publishes the deployment's only
+# ports. It reaches `api` and `object-storage` on the `edge` network, which this overlay creates and
+# attaches them to; `postgres` is never on it.
+#
+# Client addresses. Caddy is the only peer the API trusts to say who the client is: this overlay
+# puts the API in trusted-proxy mode for exactly the proxy's fixed address, and the Caddyfile
+# overwrites X-Forwarded-For with the one address Caddy resolved. Because the address must be
+# fixed for "only the proxy" to be expressible, `edge` has an explicit subnet whose dynamic range is
+# its lower half; the proxy (and the tunnel connector, if used) take addresses from the upper half,
+# which Docker never hands to another container.
+
+services:
+  proxy:
+    image: caddy:2.11.4-alpine@sha256:6aeddd44c3078b0f9a35206472a11420648a79c184603ef95957d0a20044cb2b
+    restart: unless-stopped
+    read_only: true
+    tmpfs:
+      - /tmp
+    cap_drop:
+      - ALL
+    cap_add:
+      - NET_BIND_SERVICE
+    security_opt:
+      - no-new-privileges:true
+    ports:
+      # 80 answers ACME HTTP-01 challenges and redirects everything else to HTTPS. Set
+      # EKKLESIA_PUBLISH_ADDRESS to bind one host interface instead of all of them.
+      - "${EKKLESIA_PUBLISH_ADDRESS:-0.0.0.0}:${EKKLESIA_HTTP_PORT:-80}:80"
+      - "${EKKLESIA_PUBLISH_ADDRESS:-0.0.0.0}:${EKKLESIA_HTTPS_PORT:-443}:443"
+      - "${EKKLESIA_PUBLISH_ADDRESS:-0.0.0.0}:${EKKLESIA_HTTPS_PORT:-443}:443/udp"
+    environment:
+      EKKLESIA_HOSTNAME: ${EKKLESIA_HOSTNAME:?EKKLESIA_HOSTNAME is required, for example ekklesia.example.org}
+      EKKLESIA_STORAGE_HOSTNAME: ${EKKLESIA_STORAGE_HOSTNAME:?EKKLESIA_STORAGE_HOSTNAME is required, for example storage.ekklesia.example.org}
+      # The split topology only (ADR 0045, Caddyfile.split.example), where EKKLESIA_HOSTNAME is the
+      # API's hostname and this is the Dashboard's. Caddyfile.example ignores it; the split
+      # configuration refuses to start without it.
+      EKKLESIA_DASHBOARD_HOSTNAME: ${EKKLESIA_DASHBOARD_HOSTNAME:-}
+      EKKLESIA_ACME_EMAIL: ${EKKLESIA_ACME_EMAIL:?EKKLESIA_ACME_EMAIL is required for ACME account notices}
+      EKKLESIA_TUNNEL_ADDRESS: ${EKKLESIA_TUNNEL_ADDRESS:-10.249.250.253}
+    volumes:
+      - ${EKKLESIA_CADDYFILE:-./Caddyfile}:/etc/caddy/Caddyfile:ro
+      # The installation-private CA, so Caddy can verify object-storage's certificate.
+      - ${EKKLESIA_TLS_DIR:-/etc/ekklesia/tls}/ca.crt:/etc/caddy/ekklesia-ca.crt:ro
+      - proxy-data:/data
+      - proxy-config:/config
+    networks:
+      edge:
+        ipv4_address: ${EKKLESIA_PROXY_ADDRESS:-10.249.250.254}
+    depends_on:
+      api:
+        condition: service_healthy
+      object-storage:
+        condition: service_healthy
+
+  api:
+    networks:
+      edge: {}
+    environment:
+      # Exactly one trusted peer: this proxy. Set here from the same variable that fixes the proxy's
+      # address, so the two cannot drift apart. These override any value in ekklesia.env.
+      EKKLESIA_CLIENT_ADDRESS_MODE: trusted-proxy
+      EKKLESIA_CLIENT_ADDRESS_HEADER: x-forwarded-for
+      EKKLESIA_CLIENT_ADDRESS_TRUSTED_PROXIES: ${EKKLESIA_PROXY_ADDRESS:-10.249.250.254}/32
+
+  object-storage:
+    networks:
+      edge: {}
+
+networks:
+  edge:
+    ipam:
+      config:
+        - subnet: ${EKKLESIA_EDGE_SUBNET:-10.249.250.0/24}
+          # Docker assigns dynamic addresses only from this range. Keep the fixed proxy and tunnel
+          # addresses outside it.
+          ip_range: ${EKKLESIA_EDGE_DYNAMIC_RANGE:-10.249.250.0/25}
+
+volumes:
+  proxy-data:
+  proxy-config:

deploy/compose.tunnel.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+# The Cloudflare Tunnel overlay (ADR 0044, optional ingress). Use it on top of base and proxy:
+#
+#   docker compose -f compose.yaml -f compose.proxy.yaml -f compose.tunnel.yaml up -d
+#
+# `cloudflared` makes an outbound connection to Cloudflare and forwards visitors to the proxy over
+# HTTPS. The tunnel is token-managed, so its public hostnames and origin settings live in the
+# Cloudflare dashboard: each hostname's service is `https://proxy:443` with the matching origin
+# server name and TLS verification left on (deploy/README.md, "Cloudflare Tunnel").
+#
+# The connector has a fixed address on `edge`. The Caddyfile trusts a client-address header
+# (CF-Connecting-IP) only from that address, so no other peer can choose its own client address.
+
+services:
+  tunnel:
+    image: cloudflare/cloudflared:2026.9.3@sha256:072c067d25ccbe61d46e18f0d0723255f2bb5304f7317caa95b27031520ff92c
+    restart: unless-stopped
+    read_only: true
+    cap_drop:
+      - ALL
+    security_opt:
+      - no-new-privileges:true
+    # The image's entrypoint is `cloudflared --no-autoupdate`; the token comes from TUNNEL_TOKEN.
+    command: ["tunnel", "run"]
+    env_file:
+      - ${EKKLESIA_ENV_DIR:-/etc/ekklesia}/tunnel.env
+    networks:
+      edge:
+        ipv4_address: ${EKKLESIA_TUNNEL_ADDRESS:-10.249.250.253}
+    depends_on:
+      - proxy

deploy/compose.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,153 @@
+# Ekklesia's reference self-hosted deployment: the base project (ADR 0044).
+#
+# `api`, `postgres`, and `object-storage`, plus the operator-only `migrate` service. Nothing here
+# publishes a port. Add `compose.proxy.yaml` for the reference TLS proxy, and `compose.tunnel.yaml`
+# on top of that for a Cloudflare Tunnel connector; or attach `api` and `object-storage` to an
+# existing proxy's network yourself (deploy/README.md).
+#
+# Non-secret settings come from `deploy/.env` (copy `env/compose.env.example`). Secrets live in
+# root-owned, mode-600 files under EKKLESIA_ENV_DIR, one per service, so no container receives
+# another service's credentials. TLS material comes from `scripts/init-tls.sh`.
+
+name: ekklesia
+
+x-ekklesia-hardening: &ekklesia-hardening
+  init: true
+  read_only: true
+  tmpfs:
+    - /tmp
+  cap_drop:
+    - ALL
+  security_opt:
+    - no-new-privileges:true
+
+x-ekklesia-app: &ekklesia-app
+  <<: *ekklesia-hardening
+  image: ${EKKLESIA_IMAGE:?EKKLESIA_IMAGE is required, for example registry.example.org/ekklesia:0.1.0}
+  env_file:
+    - ${EKKLESIA_ENV_DIR:-/etc/ekklesia}/ekklesia.env
+  environment:
+    # Core's object-storage client trusts Node's default CA set. Adding the installation-private CA
+    # to it, from the file below, is what lets the API verify `object-storage`'s certificate
+    # without any storage TLS exception. The database CA travels separately, as PEM text in
+    # EKKLESIA_DATABASE_CA, and is the only CA the database connection trusts.
+    NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS: /run/ekklesia/tls/ca.crt
+  volumes:
+    - ${EKKLESIA_TLS_DIR:-/etc/ekklesia/tls}/ca.crt:/run/ekklesia/tls/ca.crt:ro
+  networks:
+    data: {}
+    storage: {}
+    egress: {}
+
+services:
+  api:
+    <<: *ekklesia-app
+    restart: unless-stopped
+    # The image's own HEALTHCHECK (GET /api/v1/health/ready) applies unchanged.
+    depends_on:
+      postgres:
+        condition: service_healthy
+      object-storage:
+        condition: service_healthy
+
+  # Operator commands only. `profiles` keeps `docker compose up` from ever starting it; it runs only
+  # through `docker compose run --rm migrate …`. The default command is the read-only plan.
+  migrate:
+    <<: *ekklesia-app
+    profiles:
+      - ops
+    restart: "no"
+    healthcheck:
+      disable: true
+    command: ["node", "core/dist/cli/plan-migrations.js"]
+    depends_on:
+      postgres:
+        condition: service_healthy
+      object-storage:
+        condition: service_healthy
+
+  postgres:
+    image: postgres:18.4-alpine3.24@sha256:9a8afca54e7861fd90fab5fdf4c42477a6b1cb7d293595148e674e0a3181de15
+    restart: unless-stopped
+    security_opt:
+      - no-new-privileges:true
+    env_file:
+      - ${EKKLESIA_ENV_DIR:-/etc/ekklesia}/postgres.env
+    environment:
+      POSTGRES_INITDB_ARGS: --data-checksums --auth-host=scram-sha-256 --auth-local=trust
+      TZ: UTC
+    # TLS with the installation-private CA's server certificate for the name `postgres`, TLS 1.3
+    # only, and a host-based authentication file that rejects every non-TLS network connection.
+    # The API connects with verify-full; there is no plaintext path to fall back to.
+    command:
+      - postgres
+      - -c
+      - ssl=on
+      - -c
+      - ssl_cert_file=/run/ekklesia/tls/postgres.crt
+      - -c
+      - ssl_key_file=/run/ekklesia/tls/postgres.key
+      - -c
+      - ssl_min_protocol_version=TLSv1.3
+      - -c
+      - hba_file=/etc/ekklesia/pg_hba.conf
+    volumes:
+      - postgres-data:/var/lib/postgresql
+      - ${EKKLESIA_TLS_DIR:-/etc/ekklesia/tls}/postgres.crt:/run/ekklesia/tls/postgres.crt:ro
+      - ${EKKLESIA_TLS_DIR:-/etc/ekklesia/tls}/postgres.key:/run/ekklesia/tls/postgres.key:ro
+      - ./postgres/pg_hba.conf:/etc/ekklesia/pg_hba.conf:ro
+    # Only `data`: never a proxy-facing network, and no route out of the host.
+    networks:
+      data: {}
+    healthcheck:
+      test: ["CMD-SHELL", "pg_isready -U \"$${POSTGRES_USER}\" -d \"$${POSTGRES_DB}\""]
+      interval: 5s
+      timeout: 5s
+      retries: 12
+      start_period: 20s
+
+  object-storage:
+    image: chrislusf/seaweedfs:4.28@sha256:d071979843142451d41566bc09f6adaa36902c112683d900a417247c82e9c3c1
+    restart: unless-stopped
+    security_opt:
+      - no-new-privileges:true
+    env_file:
+      - ${EKKLESIA_ENV_DIR:-/etc/ekklesia}/object-storage.env
+    environment:
+      TZ: UTC
+    # The S3 API over HTTPS on 8443, with the installation-private CA's certificate for the name
+    # `object-storage`: production storage must be https (ADR 0030), for the API and for the proxy.
+    command:
+      - mini
+      - -dir=/data
+      - -s3.port.https=8443
+      - -s3.cert.file=/run/ekklesia/tls/object-storage.crt
+      - -s3.key.file=/run/ekklesia/tls/object-storage.key
+    volumes:
+      - object-storage-data:/data
+      - ${EKKLESIA_TLS_DIR:-/etc/ekklesia/tls}/object-storage.crt:/run/ekklesia/tls/object-storage.crt:ro
+      - ${EKKLESIA_TLS_DIR:-/etc/ekklesia/tls}/object-storage.key:/run/ekklesia/tls/object-storage.key:ro
+    networks:
+      storage: {}
+    healthcheck:
+      test: ["CMD-SHELL", "wget -q -O /dev/null http://127.0.0.1:9333/cluster/status"]
+      interval: 5s
+      timeout: 5s
+      retries: 18
+      start_period: 15s
+
+networks:
+  # The database network: postgres, api, and migrate. Internal, so nothing on it reaches beyond the
+  # host and no proxy is ever attached to it.
+  data:
+    internal: true
+  # The storage network: object-storage, api, and migrate. Internal for the same reason; browsers
+  # reach storage only through a proxy that joins it on `edge`.
+  storage:
+    internal: true
+  # Outbound access for api and migrate (an SMTP relay, for example). Nothing listens on it.
+  egress: {}
+
+volumes:
+  postgres-data:
+  object-storage-data:

deploy/env/compose.env.example

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+# Non-secret settings for the reference deployment's Compose project. Copy to deploy/.env, which
+# Compose reads automatically from this directory. Nothing here is a secret; secrets live in the
+# per-service files under EKKLESIA_ENV_DIR.
+
+# The image to run, by registry, name, and tag (or digest). Required.
+EKKLESIA_IMAGE=
+
+# Where the root-owned, mode-600 env files and the TLS directory live on the host.
+EKKLESIA_ENV_DIR=/etc/ekklesia
+EKKLESIA_TLS_DIR=/etc/ekklesia/tls
+
+# --- compose.proxy.yaml ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# The Ekklesia hostname and the storage hostname (signed object URLs). In the default same-origin
+# topology (Caddyfile.example) EKKLESIA_HOSTNAME serves the Dashboard, the API, and displays.
+EKKLESIA_HOSTNAME=
+EKKLESIA_STORAGE_HOSTNAME=
+# The split topology only (ADR 0045, Caddyfile.split.example): the Dashboard's own hostname, while
+# EKKLESIA_HOSTNAME is the API's and the displays'. Both must share one registrable domain, for
+# example dash.example.org and api.example.org. Leave empty for the same-origin topology.
+EKKLESIA_DASHBOARD_HOSTNAME=
+# Contact address for the ACME account (certificate expiry notices).
+EKKLESIA_ACME_EMAIL=
+# EKKLESIA_CADDYFILE=./Caddyfile
+# EKKLESIA_PUBLISH_ADDRESS=0.0.0.0
+# EKKLESIA_HTTP_PORT=80
+# EKKLESIA_HTTPS_PORT=443
+
+# The edge network. Change the subnet only if it collides with one already on the host. Docker
+# assigns dynamic addresses only from EKKLESIA_EDGE_DYNAMIC_RANGE (the lower half); the proxy and
+# the tunnel connector take fixed addresses from the upper half, so nothing else can ever hold them.
+# EKKLESIA_EDGE_SUBNET=10.249.250.0/24
+# EKKLESIA_EDGE_DYNAMIC_RANGE=10.249.250.0/25
+# EKKLESIA_PROXY_ADDRESS=10.249.250.254
+# EKKLESIA_TUNNEL_ADDRESS=10.249.250.253

deploy/env/ekklesia.env.example

@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+# Ekklesia API and operator commands (`api` and `migrate`). Reference deployment, ADR 0044.
+#
+# Install as EKKLESIA_ENV_DIR/ekklesia.env (default /etc/ekklesia/ekklesia.env), owned by root with
+# mode 600:
+#   install -o root -g root -m 600 env/ekklesia.env.example /etc/ekklesia/ekklesia.env
+# Never commit the filled-in file. Generate secrets with scripts/gen-secrets.sh, and the database CA
+# line with scripts/init-tls.sh.
+#
+# The image already sets NODE_ENV=production, EKKLESIA_API_HOST=0.0.0.0, and EKKLESIA_API_PORT=3000.
+# Compose sets NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS. The proxy overlay sets the three EKKLESIA_CLIENT_ADDRESS_*
+# variables. None of those belong here.
+#
+# Values that are part of the reference topology are filled in; everything installation-specific is
+# blank. Full reference: docs/development/api.md#required-configuration.
+
+# --- Database (ADR 0018) ------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# The host must be exactly `postgres`: the server certificate is issued for that name and
+# verify-full checks it. User, password, and database must match postgres.env. Percent-encode any
+# reserved character in the password. Never add sslmode or another TLS parameter to this URL.
+DATABASE_URL=postgresql://<user>:<password>@postgres:5432/<database>
+EKKLESIA_DATABASE_TLS_MODE=verify-full
+# The installation-private CA as PEM text (not a path), on one double-quoted line with \n escapes.
+# scripts/init-tls.sh prints this exact line. It is the only CA the database connection trusts.
+EKKLESIA_DATABASE_CA=
+
+# --- Identity (ADR 0011, ADR 0018, ADR 0034, ADR 0045) -----------------------------------------
+# The public https origin of the API, with no path: the Ekklesia hostname in the same-origin
+# topology, the API's hostname in the split one. Production rejects http and loopback origins.
+EKKLESIA_IDENTITY_BASE_URL=
+# Comma-separated exact origins allowed to make credentialed requests. The API's own origin is
+# always trusted and need not be listed. Same-origin topology: the base URL. Split topology: the
+# Dashboard's origin.
+EKKLESIA_IDENTITY_TRUSTED_ORIGINS=
+# At least 32 random characters. Rotating it signs every user out.
+EKKLESIA_IDENTITY_SECRET=
+# Same-origin topology: leave unset; the Dashboard is served from the base URL (ADR 0044).
+# Split topology: the Dashboard's https origin, which must also be in the trusted origins. Emailed
+# verification and reset links land here (ADR 0045).
+# EKKLESIA_DASHBOARD_ORIGIN=
+# Production refuses public sign-up. Leave unset.
+# EKKLESIA_PUBLIC_SIGNUP_ENABLED=
+
+# --- Client address (ADR 0017) ------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Set by compose.proxy.yaml. Only a base-only deployment behind its own proxy sets these here, with
+# that proxy's fixed address as the only trusted entry (deploy/README.md):
+# EKKLESIA_CLIENT_ADDRESS_MODE=trusted-proxy
+# EKKLESIA_CLIENT_ADDRESS_HEADER=x-forwarded-for
+# EKKLESIA_CLIENT_ADDRESS_TRUSTED_PROXIES=<proxy address>/32
+
+# --- Object storage (ADR 0030, ADR 0031) --------------------------------------------------------
+# The API reaches SeaweedFS over HTTPS on the private network; production storage must be https.
+S3_ENDPOINT=https://object-storage:8443
+# The https origin browsers fetch signed object URLs from: the storage hostname on the proxy.
+S3_DELIVERY_ENDPOINT=
+# Must match object-storage.env.
+S3_ACCESS_KEY=
+S3_SECRET_KEY=
+S3_REGION=us-east-1
+S3_FORCE_PATH_STYLE=true
+S3_BUCKET_PREFIX=ekklesia
+
+# --- Outbound email (ADR 0037), optional --------------------------------------------------------
+# Without a relay, email verification and password recovery cannot deliver. See
+# docs/development/email.md.
+# EKKLESIA_SMTP_HOST=
+# EKKLESIA_SMTP_PORT=587
+# EKKLESIA_SMTP_SECURITY=starttls
+# EKKLESIA_SMTP_USERNAME=
+# EKKLESIA_SMTP_PASSWORD=
+# EKKLESIA_SMTP_FROM_ADDRESS=
+# EKKLESIA_SMTP_FROM_NAME=Ekklesia
+# EKKLESIA_SMTP_HELO_NAME=
+
+# --- Module secrets (ADR 0029), as installed modules declare them --------------------------------
+# EKKLESIA_MODULE_SECRET__<MODULE_ID>__<KEY>=

deploy/env/object-storage.env.example

@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+# SeaweedFS S3 credentials (`object-storage` only). Install as EKKLESIA_ENV_DIR/object-storage.env,
+# owned by root with mode 600. Must match S3_ACCESS_KEY and S3_SECRET_KEY in ekklesia.env.
+AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID=
+AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=

deploy/env/postgres.env.example

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+# PostgreSQL superuser for the reference deployment (`postgres` only). Install as
+# EKKLESIA_ENV_DIR/postgres.env, owned by root with mode 600. Read only on the database's first
+# start; changing it later does not change the stored password.
+#
+# Must match the user, password, and database in ekklesia.env's DATABASE_URL.
+POSTGRES_USER=ekklesia
+POSTGRES_DB=ekklesia
+POSTGRES_PASSWORD=

deploy/env/tunnel.env.example

@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+# Cloudflare Tunnel connector token (`tunnel` only, compose.tunnel.yaml). Install as
+# EKKLESIA_ENV_DIR/tunnel.env, owned by root with mode 600. Copy the token from the tunnel's page in
+# the Cloudflare dashboard; it is the tunnel's credential.
+TUNNEL_TOKEN=

deploy/postgres/pg_hba.conf

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+# Host-based authentication for the reference deployment's PostgreSQL (ADR 0018, ADR 0044).
+#
+# Mounted read-only and selected with `-c hba_file=...` (deploy/compose.yaml), so it replaces the
+# image's generated file entirely. Rules are matched top to bottom; the first match decides.
+
+# TYPE      DATABASE  USER  ADDRESS  METHOD
+
+# The container's own Unix socket: the image's first-start initialization and the health check.
+# Nothing outside the container can reach it.
+local       all       all            trust
+
+# Every network connection must be TLS (the server enforces TLS 1.3) and authenticate with SCRAM.
+hostssl     all       all   all      scram-sha-256
+
+# A network connection without TLS is refused outright, before authentication.
+hostnossl   all       all   all      reject

deploy/scripts/gen-secrets.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+# Prints freshly generated secrets for the reference deployment's env files (ADR 0044). Writes
+# nothing: paste each line into the file named above it, then install that file root-owned with
+# mode 600.
+#
+#   sh deploy/scripts/gen-secrets.sh
+#
+# Every value is URL-safe (hexadecimal), so the database password needs no percent-encoding in
+# DATABASE_URL.
+
+set -eu
+
+command -v openssl >/dev/null 2>&1 || {
+	echo "gen-secrets: openssl is required." >&2
+	exit 69
+}
+
+hex() {
+	openssl rand -hex "$1"
+}
+
+postgres_password=$(hex 24)
+s3_access_key=$(hex 10)
+s3_secret_key=$(hex 32)
+
+cat <<EOF
+# ekklesia.env
+EKKLESIA_IDENTITY_SECRET=$(hex 32)
+DATABASE_URL=postgresql://ekklesia:$postgres_password@postgres:5432/ekklesia
+S3_ACCESS_KEY=$s3_access_key
+S3_SECRET_KEY=$s3_secret_key
+
+# postgres.env
+POSTGRES_PASSWORD=$postgres_password
+
+# object-storage.env
+AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID=$s3_access_key
+AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=$s3_secret_key
+EOF

deploy/scripts/init-tls.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+# Creates the installation-private CA (once) and the two server certificates the reference
+# deployment needs (ADR 0044): `postgres` for the database and `object-storage` for SeaweedFS.
+#
+#   sudo sh deploy/scripts/init-tls.sh /etc/ekklesia/tls
+#
+# Idempotent. An existing key or certificate is never overwritten: delete a file deliberately to
+# reissue it. Ownership and modes are re-applied on every run, which needs root; a non-root run
+# creates what is missing and then stops before that step, saying so. No private key is ever
+# printed.
+#
+# Output (in the directory given):
+#   ca.key              the CA's private key. Root only. Needed only to issue certificates; keep a
+#                       copy offline and consider removing it from the server afterwards.
+#   ca.crt              the CA certificate. Public. Mounted into api, migrate, and proxy.
+#   postgres.crt/.key   for the name `postgres`; the key is owned by PostgreSQL's uid (70).
+#   object-storage.crt/.key  for the name `object-storage`; the key is owned by SeaweedFS's uid (1000).
+
+set -eu
+
+umask 077
+
+usage() {
+	echo "Usage: sh init-tls.sh <output directory>" >&2
+	exit 64
+}
+
+[ "$#" -eq 1 ] || usage
+out=$1
+case "$out" in
+-*) usage ;;
+esac
+
+# The uids the two images run their servers as: postgres:18.4-alpine3.24 (postgres) and
+# chrislusf/seaweedfs:4.28 (seaweed). Each server refuses or fails to read a key it cannot own.
+POSTGRES_UID=${EKKLESIA_POSTGRES_UID:-70}
+SEAWEED_UID=${EKKLESIA_SEAWEED_UID:-1000}
+
+CA_DAYS=3650
+SERVER_DAYS=825
+
+mkdir -p "$out"
+chmod 700 "$out"
+
+created=""
+
+# Only generating needs openssl. A later root-only pass that applies ownership to files that already
+# exist runs without it, in any image that has a POSIX shell.
+require_openssl() {
+	command -v openssl >/dev/null 2>&1 || {
+		echo "init-tls: openssl is required to create keys and certificates." >&2
+		exit 69
+	}
+}
+
+note_created() {
+	created="$created $1"
+}
+
+# A file this script would create already exists: keep it, and say so.
+exists() {
+	if [ -e "$out/$1" ]; then
+		echo "init-tls: keeping existing $out/$1"
+		return 0
+	fi
+	return 1
+}
+
+if ! exists ca.key; then
+	require_openssl
+	openssl ecparam -name prime256v1 -genkey -noout -out "$out/ca.key"
+	note_created ca.key
+fi
+
+if ! exists ca.crt; then
+	require_openssl
+	openssl req -x509 -new -sha256 -days "$CA_DAYS" -key "$out/ca.key" -out "$out/ca.crt" \
+		-subj "/CN=Ekklesia installation CA" \
+		-addext "basicConstraints=critical,CA:TRUE,pathlen:0" \
+		-addext "keyUsage=critical,keyCertSign,cRLSign" \
+		-addext "subjectKeyIdentifier=hash"
+	note_created ca.crt
+fi
+
+# issue <name>: a key and a certificate whose only subject alternative name is <name>, the Compose
+# service name the client verifies against.
+issue() {
+	name=$1
+	if ! exists "$name.key"; then
+		require_openssl
+		openssl ecparam -name prime256v1 -genkey -noout -out "$out/$name.key"
+		note_created "$name.key"
+	fi
+	if ! exists "$name.crt"; then
+		require_openssl
+		extensions=$(mktemp)
+		request=$(mktemp)
+		trap 'rm -f "$extensions" "$request"' EXIT
+		cat >"$extensions" <<EOF
+basicConstraints=critical,CA:FALSE
+keyUsage=critical,digitalSignature
+extendedKeyUsage=serverAuth
+subjectAltName=DNS:$name
+subjectKeyIdentifier=hash
+authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid
+EOF
+		openssl req -new -sha256 -key "$out/$name.key" -subj "/CN=$name" -out "$request"
+		openssl x509 -req -sha256 -days "$SERVER_DAYS" -in "$request" \
+			-CA "$out/ca.crt" -CAkey "$out/ca.key" -CAcreateserial -CAserial "$out/ca.srl" \
+			-extfile "$extensions" -out "$out/$name.crt" 2>/dev/null
+		rm -f "$extensions" "$request"
+		trap - EXIT
+		note_created "$name.crt"
+	fi
+}
+
+issue postgres
+issue object-storage
+
+# Public material is world-readable; private keys are readable only by the process that needs them.
+chmod 644 "$out/ca.crt" "$out/postgres.crt" "$out/object-storage.crt"
+chmod 600 "$out/ca.key" "$out/postgres.key" "$out/object-storage.key"
+[ -e "$out/ca.srl" ] && chmod 600 "$out/ca.srl"
+
+if [ -n "$created" ]; then
+	echo "init-tls: created$created in $out"
+else
+	echo "init-tls: nothing to create in $out"
+fi
+
+if [ "$(id -u)" -ne 0 ]; then
+	echo "init-tls: ownership not applied: re-run as root to give postgres.key to uid $POSTGRES_UID and object-storage.key to uid $SEAWEED_UID." >&2
+	exit 77
+fi
+
+chown root:root "$out" "$out/ca.key" "$out/ca.crt" "$out/postgres.crt" "$out/object-storage.crt"
+[ -e "$out/ca.srl" ] && chown root:root "$out/ca.srl"
+chown "$POSTGRES_UID:$POSTGRES_UID" "$out/postgres.key"
+chown "$SEAWEED_UID:$SEAWEED_UID" "$out/object-storage.key"
+# The directory itself must be traversable by the two server uids for their bind mounts.
+chmod 755 "$out"
+
+echo "init-tls: postgres.key is owned by uid $POSTGRES_UID and object-storage.key by uid $SEAWEED_UID (mode 600)."
+echo
+echo "Set EKKLESIA_TLS_DIR=$out in deploy/.env, and put this line in ekklesia.env (the CA"
+echo "certificate is public; this is not a secret):"
+echo
+printf 'EKKLESIA_DATABASE_CA="%s"\n' "$(awk 'BEGIN { ORS = "\\n" } { print }' "$out/ca.crt")"

docs/architecture/decisions/0044-self-hosted-reference-deployment.md

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 # 0044: Ekklesia ships one self-hosted reference deployment, composed from pinned sources
 
-- Status: Proposed
+- Status: Accepted
 - Date: 2026-10-01
 - Supersedes: none
 - Related: [ADR 0003](0003-development-infrastructure.md),
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ One host, one Compose project, four long-running services on a private network:
 
 | Service | Role |
 | --- | --- |
-| `proxy` | Caddy. Terminates TLS, serves the only published ports (443, 80 for redirect), routes `/api/*`, `/display/*`, `/assets/*` and the Dashboard to `api`, and a separate storage origin to `object-storage`. |
+| `proxy` | Caddy. Terminates TLS, serves the only published ports (443; and 80, which answers ACME HTTP-01 challenges and redirects everything else to HTTPS), routes `/api/*`, `/display/*`, `/assets/*` and the Dashboard to `api`, and a separate storage origin to `object-storage`. |
 | `api` | The `apps/api` image: Core, the enabled modules, and the built Dashboard and display host. Listens on the private network only. |
 | `postgres` | PostgreSQL 18 with TLS enabled, using a server certificate issued by an installation-private CA. |
 | `object-storage` | SeaweedFS, the same image family as development, reachable by browsers only through the proxy. |
@@ -65,21 +65,31 @@ server. The proxy never serves files from disk.
 ### TLS everywhere, without weakening ADR 0018
 
 - **Browser-facing:** the proxy obtains publicly trusted certificates through ACME. The reference
-  configuration uses the HTTP-01 challenge; the DNS-01 challenge is documented for installations
-  that keep Ekklesia off the public Internet. A LAN-only installation can still hold a real
-  certificate for an internal hostname this way.
+  configuration uses the HTTP-01 challenge on port 80; the DNS-01 challenge is documented for
+  installations that keep Ekklesia off the public Internet. A LAN-only installation can still hold a
+  real certificate for an internal hostname this way. DNS-01 requires a Caddy build that includes a
+  DNS provider module, which the stock Caddy image does not; such an installation builds and pins
+  its own proxy image. A tunnel-only installation needs DNS-01 too: Cloudflare terminates TLS at its
+  edge, so an HTTP-01 challenge cannot reach the proxy through the tunnel.
 - **Tunnel ingress (optional):** an installation may publish the proxy through an outbound tunnel
   (the reference documents `cloudflared`) instead of opening inbound ports. The tunnel connector
   is a separate Compose service that connects to the proxy over HTTPS and verifies the proxy's
-  certificate. The proxy accepts a tunnel-supplied client-address header **only** from the
-  connector's network identity. It overwrites the single forwarding header it sends to `api`, and
-  `api` trusts only the proxy. An installation that serves local displays should give the same
-  hostname a LAN path to the proxy (split-horizon DNS), so displays do not depend on the
-  Internet link.
+  certificate. With a token-managed tunnel, those origin settings (the service `https://proxy:443`,
+  the origin server name, and TLS verification left on) live in the Cloudflare dashboard, not in the
+  repository; the deployment README documents them. The proxy accepts a tunnel-supplied
+  client-address header **only** from the connector's network identity. It overwrites the single
+  forwarding header it sends to `api`, and `api` trusts only the proxy. An installation that serves
+  local displays should give the same hostname a LAN path to the proxy (split-horizon DNS), so
+  displays do not depend on the Internet link.
 - **Database:** the deployment's setup script creates an installation-private CA once, issues a
   server certificate for the `postgres` service name, and gives the API only the CA certificate
   (`EKKLESIA_DATABASE_CA`). The API connects with `verify-full`. No plaintext or encryption-only
   exception is added to Core.
+- **Object storage:** production storage must be `https` (ADR 0030), so the API reaches SeaweedFS
+  over HTTPS on the private network as well. The same setup script issues a server certificate for
+  the `object-storage` service name from the same CA. Core's storage client trusts Node's default CA
+  set, so the API adds the installation CA to it with `NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS`. No storage TLS
+  exception is added to Core either.
 
 ### Object storage
 
@@ -134,8 +144,9 @@ an installation is treated as in production.
 
 ### Secrets
 
-Secrets are supplied to Compose from a root-owned environment file on the host, never committed.
-This includes `EKKLESIA_IDENTITY_SECRET`, database and storage credentials, SMTP credentials, and
+Secrets are supplied to Compose from root-owned environment files on the host, never committed:
+one per service, so no container receives another service's credentials. They include
+`EKKLESIA_IDENTITY_SECRET`, database and storage credentials, SMTP credentials, and
 `EKKLESIA_MODULE_SECRET__*` values. A secret manager is not required.
 
 ## Consequences

docs/architecture/decisions/0045-split-dashboard-and-api-origins.md

@@ -0,0 +1,233 @@
+# 0045: The Dashboard and the API may live on separate origins
+
+- Status: Accepted
+- Date: 2026-10-03
+- Amends: [0034](0034-host-owned-browser-authentication.md)
+- Extends: [0044](0044-self-hosted-reference-deployment.md)
+- Related: [ADR 0011](0011-identity-http-transport-and-public-enrollment.md),
+  [ADR 0012](0012-identity-origin-csrf-protection-under-test.md),
+  [ADR 0018](0018-identity-session-resolution-and-database-transport.md),
+  [ADR 0025](0025-trusted-module-ui-asset-publication.md),
+  [ADR 0032](0032-native-module-realtime-transport.md),
+  [ADR 0033](0033-display-kiosk-host-contract.md),
+  [ADR 0036](0036-managed-device-identity-and-pairing.md),
+  [ADR 0038](0038-email-verification-and-password-recovery.md),
+  [ADR 0043](0043-display-offline-code-fallback.md)
+
+## Context
+
+ADR 0044's reference deployment serves everything a browser needs from one origin: the Dashboard at
+`/`, the API at `/api/*`, and the display host at `/display/*`. ADR 0034 kept a deliberately split
+browser/API origin possible through the exact trusted-origin allowlist and credentialed CORS of
+ADR 0011, ADR 0012, and ADR 0018, but left that topology undesigned: "any eventual choice to place
+the API and Dashboard on different sibling subdomains must be designed and tested rather than
+assumed to share a session."
+
+The first production installation needs exactly that: the Dashboard and the API on sibling
+hostnames (for example `dash.example.org` and `api.example.org`), plus the existing storage
+hostname. The choice has to be made before the first deployment, because a display's bookmark and a
+paired device's cookies are bound to a hostname: moving them later re-pairs every screen.
+
+Most of the platform was already written for this. The shell sends every platform and module request
+with `credentials: "include"` and opens realtime with `withCredentials: true`; CORS on `/api/auth/*`
+and `/api/v1/*` reflects only exact trusted origins with credentials; module artifacts are anonymous
+by design so that cross-origin `import()` works (ADR 0025); emailed links already pass through the
+API and land on `EKKLESIA_DASHBOARD_ORIGIN` (ADR 0038); and display page URLs are resolved against the
+API's origin. Four things were not:
+
+- the Dashboard learns its API origin at **build** time (`EKKLESIA_API_BASE_URL`), so one image
+  cannot serve both topologies;
+- the API's own set of trusted browser origins is exactly `EKKLESIA_IDENTITY_TRUSTED_ORIGINS`, while
+  Better Auth implicitly adds the identity base URL to its own: a page served by the API itself would
+  fail the API's origin check unless an operator listed the API's own origin too;
+- the reference proxy has no routing for two browser-facing hostnames;
+- nothing proves a split deployment end to end, and a Node.js client cannot prove what matters most
+  here: what a real browser sends across the two origins.
+
+## Decision
+
+### Two topologies, one image
+
+An installation runs in exactly one of two shapes, chosen by configuration alone:
+
+| Topology | Dashboard | API and display host | Storage |
+| --- | --- | --- | --- |
+| **Same-origin** (default) | `https://ekklesia.example.org/` | `https://ekklesia.example.org/api/*`, `/display/*` | its own hostname |
+| **Split** | `https://dash.example.org/` | `https://api.example.org/api/*`, `/display/*` | its own hostname |
+
+Same-origin remains the default and keeps working unchanged for every installation that does not
+opt in. The same image and the same built Dashboard serve both.
+
+In both, the API process serves the Dashboard's bytes (ADR 0044 is unchanged in that). In the split
+topology the proxy forwards the Dashboard hostname's two Dashboard paths to the same `api` service;
+the API does not inspect `Host`, and which hostname serves which path is the proxy's job, as every
+other perimeter rule already is.
+
+### The Dashboard learns its API origin at run time
+
+The API writes its own origin into the Dashboard page it serves, as one meta element:
+
+```html
+<meta name="ekklesia-api-origin" content="https://api.example.org" />
+```
+
+The value is the identity base URL's origin (`EKKLESIA_IDENTITY_BASE_URL`), which is by definition
+where `/api` lives; no new setting is introduced. The built page carries the element with an empty
+value; the API fills it once at startup, before computing the page's strong `ETag`, and refuses to
+start if the built page does not contain exactly one such element. The shell reads it before
+anything renders, accepts only an absolute `http(s)` origin with no path, and otherwise fails closed
+with its existing sanitized bootstrap failure. An empty value (a static development server with no
+API) means the page's own origin.
+
+A meta element rather than an inline script keeps the page free of inline script, so a future strict
+`script-src` needs no exception. The build-time `EKKLESIA_API_BASE_URL` is removed; the development
+server injects the same element instead. The display host needs neither: it is always served from
+the API's origin (below) and uses its own.
+
+### The display host lives on the API's origin
+
+In the split topology the display host stays where it is: `https://api.example.org/display/<module>`,
+with its script under `/assets/ekklesia-display/` and its service worker at `/display/sw.js`. A
+screen's bookmark names the API hostname.
+
+- **Device cookies are already bound to the API's hostname.** They are host-only, `HttpOnly`, and
+  `SameSite=Strict` (ADR 0036), and they must accompany device requests to the API, so they live on
+  whichever hostname answers those requests. Serving the display page from that same origin makes it
+  the only hostname a screen depends on; serving it anywhere else adds a second one.
+- **Offline code fallback is unchanged.** The display's service worker never caches a cross-origin
+  response (ADR 0043), which is what keeps signed storage URLs, bearer capabilities, out of the
+  cache. On the API's origin, every artifact it must cache is same-origin. On any other origin, every
+  artifact would be cross-origin, and the offline guarantee would need a weaker rule.
+- **No device request crosses an origin.** Pairing, heartbeats, descriptors, module routes, and
+  realtime from an unattended screen stay same-origin, with no CORS dependence.
+
+The Dashboard keeps linking to display pages exactly as now: their URLs are resolved against the API
+origin.
+
+### The API trusts its own origin
+
+The API's set of trusted browser origins, used for CORS on `/api/auth/*` and `/api/v1/*` and by every
+mutation route's origin check, becomes `EKKLESIA_IDENTITY_TRUSTED_ORIGINS` **plus the identity base
+URL's origin**, matching what Better Auth already does for its own checks. In the split topology the
+display page on the API's origin therefore passes the API's origin check without an operator having
+to list it. Trusted origins remain exact: no wildcard, no pattern, and no parent domain.
+
+### Cookies and identity: unchanged, with one stated requirement
+
+The session cookie keeps every property ADR 0034 gave it: `HttpOnly`, `SameSite=Lax`, `Secure` under
+HTTPS, `Path=/`, and **host-only on the API's hostname**. No `Domain` attribute is set, and the
+Dashboard's hostname never holds a session credential. The Dashboard reaches the API with credentialed
+CORS, and browsers send the cookie because the two hostnames are different origins of the **same
+site**.
+
+That is a requirement of the split topology: the Dashboard and API hostnames must share a registrable
+domain (`dash.example.org` and `api.example.org` do; `dash.example.org` and `api.example.net` do not).
+Across sites, browsers withhold `SameSite=Lax` cookies from cross-origin requests and may block or
+partition third-party cookies altogether. The documentation states it, and Doctor reports the
+topology and warns when the two hostnames are not siblings under one parent domain, because Doctor
+cannot see the Public Suffix List and says so.
+
+In the split topology `EKKLESIA_IDENTITY_BASE_URL` is the API's origin, `EKKLESIA_DASHBOARD_ORIGIN` is
+the Dashboard's, and `EKKLESIA_IDENTITY_TRUSTED_ORIGINS` lists the Dashboard's. Email verification and
+password reset links already point at the API and land on `EKKLESIA_DASHBOARD_ORIGIN` (ADR 0038);
+nothing about them changes.
+
+### CORS stays narrow, and that limit is part of the module contract
+
+Credentialed CORS keeps its current shape: exact reflected origin, `Access-Control-Allow-Credentials:
+true`, the existing method list, `Content-Type` as the only allowed request header beyond the
+CORS-safelisted ones, and no exposed response headers beyond the safelisted ones. The API does not
+reflect arbitrary requested headers.
+
+A module UI's requests go through the host's `api.request` and inherit this policy. The module UI
+contract therefore states it: portable module UI code uses only CORS-safelisted request headers plus
+`Content-Type`, and reads only CORS-safelisted response headers. That is already true of every
+existing module, and it keeps one module artifact working under either topology. Widening it for a
+real module need is a later, explicit change.
+
+### Routing per hostname
+
+The reference proxy gains a second configuration for the split topology, beside the existing one:
+
+| Hostname | Forwarded to `api` | Refused with `404` |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| Dashboard | `/` (emailed links add only a query) and `/assets/ekklesia-dashboard/*` | everything else, including `/api/*` |
+| API | `/api/*` (realtime flushed per event, as now), `/display/*`, `/assets/ekklesia-display/*` | everything else, including `/` and `/assets/ekklesia-dashboard/*` |
+| Storage | unchanged (ADR 0031) | unchanged |
+
+The Dashboard hostname refuses `/api/*` so that the session cookie has exactly one home: a Dashboard
+cannot fall back to a same-origin API on its own hostname. The API hostname answers nothing at `/`.
+Both hostnames keep every forwarding-header rule ADR 0044 established (one overwritten
+`X-Forwarded-For`, the stripped client-chosen headers, and tunnel trust only from the connector's
+address). The proxy overlay takes the Dashboard hostname from one more setting, which the split
+configuration requires and the same-origin configuration ignores.
+
+### What a future Content-Security-Policy must allow
+
+This decision does not add a Content-Security-Policy; the Dashboard page keeps `frame-ancestors
+'none'` and its other headers. When a full policy is designed, the split topology requires the
+Dashboard's to allow the API origin in `script-src` (module artifacts and contributions are imported
+from it) and `connect-src` (platform and module requests, realtime), and the storage origin in
+`img-src`. The display page, being same-origin with the API, needs only its own origin and the
+storage origin.
+
+### Both topologies are proven end to end
+
+The deployment smoke test runs in either topology, and CI runs both. The split run proves, through
+the proxy, the routing table above on every hostname, the API origin in the Dashboard page, exact
+CORS reflection with credentials for the Dashboard origin and none for an untrusted origin, and the
+host-only session cookie.
+
+Because those are browser behaviors, the split run also drives a **real browser**: a headless
+Chromium from an image pinned by digest, controlled over the Chrome DevTools Protocol by the
+smoke-test client with no added dependency. In it, a person signs in through the real form on the
+Dashboard hostname, the session cookie is present only for the API hostname, the Dashboard imports a
+module's UI from the API hostname and the module's own credentialed requests succeed under CORS, no
+request is refused, the module's display page mounts on the API hostname with its service worker, and
+sign-out ends the session. The split run installs the repository's module template as a test-only
+module so these paths exist; installations' own smoke tests cover their real modules. Contribution
+artifacts are imported exactly as UI artifacts are, and the API's tests cover their CORS headers and
+those of realtime streams.
+
+## Consequences
+
+- One image serves both topologies; an installation chooses with configuration and the matching proxy
+  configuration.
+- Same-origin installations change nothing.
+- A split installation depends on exactly two browser-facing hostnames plus storage. Screens and
+  paired devices depend only on the API hostname, which therefore must not change once screens are
+  paired.
+- No credential is broadened: the session cookie stays host-only on the API hostname, device cookies
+  stay host-only and strict, and trusted origins stay exact.
+- Module UI code is held to CORS-safe headers in both topologies, so a module that works in one
+  works in the other.
+- CI gains a second deployment smoke run and a browser in it.
+
+## Alternatives
+
+- **A parent-domain session cookie (`Domain=example.org`).** Rejected, as ADR 0034 already rejected
+  it: it sends the credential to every sibling host and is unnecessary between same-site origins.
+- **The display host on the Dashboard hostname, or on its own hostname.** Rejected: device cookies
+  are bound to the API's hostname regardless, so either adds a second hostname every screen depends
+  on, puts every device request behind CORS, and breaks ADR 0043's same-origin-only offline cache.
+- **The API serving the display host and the device API on a second hostname.** Rejected: two API
+  origins for one identity base URL, with the same cookies split between them.
+- **Inject the API origin with an inline script, or a configuration request.** Rejected: an inline
+  script needs a CSP exception, and a request is a round trip and a failure mode before the first
+  render; a meta element is static and inert.
+- **Keep the API origin a build-time setting.** Rejected: the image would have to be built per
+  installation and per topology.
+- **Require operators to list the API's own origin in the trusted origins.** Rejected: an omission
+  silently breaks every display mutation; Better Auth already trusts its own base URL.
+- **Reflect any requested CORS header.** Rejected for now: no module needs it, and a module that
+  relied on it would be tied to its host's CORS policy.
+- **Prove split mode with HTTP checks only.** Rejected: whether a browser sends the cookie, imports
+  a cross-origin module, and opens a credentialed stream is exactly what is at stake.
+
+## Deferred
+
+- A full Content-Security-Policy, with the requirements above.
+- A broader CORS header policy, when a module needs one.
+- More than one Dashboard origin per installation.
+- Moving an installation between topologies, and the re-pairing that moving the API hostname
+  implies.

docs/architecture/decisions/0046-installation-owned-branding.md

@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
+# 0046: Ekklesia's branding is never forced on an installation
+
+- Status: Proposed
+- Date: 2026-10-03
+- Related: [ADR 0021](0021-modules-as-hostable-products.md),
+  [ADR 0034](0034-host-owned-browser-authentication.md),
+  [ADR 0037](0037-host-provided-outbound-email.md),
+  [ADR 0038](0038-email-verification-and-password-recovery.md),
+  [ADR 0039](0039-shared-design-tokens-and-elements.md),
+  [ADR 0043](0043-display-offline-code-fallback.md),
+  [ADR 0045](0045-split-dashboard-and-api-origins.md)
+
+## Context
+
+Ekklesia is software a church runs for its own people. The people who use an installation (members,
+visitors, volunteers running a screen) know the church, not the software behind it, and the church
+decides how it presents itself to them. Today the platform names itself in places those people see:
+the sign-in screen asks them to "Sign in to Ekklesia", the Dashboard's heading and page title read
+"Ekklesia", emails ask them to verify "your Ekklesia email address", and an offline screen in the
+sanctuary says it is "waiting for Ekklesia".
+
+None of those were decided; they accumulated. This records the rule they should have followed, so
+every later screen, message, and module is held to it.
+
+## Decision
+
+### The principle
+
+**Ekklesia's branding is never forced on an installation.** Anything a member, visitor, or volunteer
+can see is configurable by the installation and removable entirely. That includes, and is not
+limited to:
+
+- page titles, headings, and the name of the application in a browser tab, an installed web app, or
+  a bookmark;
+- sign-in, verification, recovery, and every other authentication screen;
+- emails: the sender's display name, the subject, and the body;
+- display screens, pairing screens, and offline and failure screens on a display;
+- error pages and error messages a person reads;
+- application names and icons, and any "powered by" or attribution text.
+
+"Removable entirely" means an installation can show its own name, or no product name at all, and in
+either case no screen or message a person sees names Ekklesia.
+
+### What is exempt
+
+Internal identifiers are not branding and stay as they are: package names, module ids, URL paths
+(`/api/v1/…`, `/assets/ekklesia-dashboard/…`), HTTP header names, environment variable names, cookie
+names, CSS custom property names, element ids and `data-` attributes, storage, cache, and database
+names, and log field names. A person can find them only by opening developer tools or reading
+configuration, and renaming them would break installations for no one's benefit.
+
+Tooling an operator runs to administer the installation (the command-line tools, Doctor, server logs,
+and startup messages) names the software being operated, as a package name does, and is exempt too.
+So are messages written only for developers: thrown errors that reach a console and never a page, and
+build-time diagnostics for module authors.
+
+### How installations configure it
+
+The platform takes the installation's name from configuration, once, and uses it everywhere a
+person-facing string would otherwise have said "Ekklesia". When no name is configured, the wording is
+neutral ("Sign in", "Verify your email address", "Waiting for the server") rather than falling back to
+"Ekklesia". The default installation therefore names nothing, which is what makes the principle
+checkable: a test can render every person-facing screen and message with no name configured and fail
+on any occurrence of "Ekklesia".
+
+Browser pages receive the name the way they receive the API origin (ADR 0045): the API renders it
+into the page it serves at startup, so the image stays generic and nothing is decided at build time.
+An email's sender display name is the existing `EKKLESIA_SMTP_FROM_NAME` (ADR 0037); its subject and
+body use the same installation name.
+
+Visual identity follows the same rule. The platform ships no logo, favicon, or icon today; any it
+ships later must be replaceable by the installation and removable entirely, and must not appear by
+default. Colours and type are the installation's theme (ADR 0039), not a mark.
+
+### It applies to modules
+
+A module's user-visible text follows the same principle. A module that names its host ("Open the
+Ekklesia Dashboard") also ties itself to one host, which ADR 0021 already asks modules not to do.
+Modules refer to the host generically ("the Dashboard") or not at all.
+
+## Consequences
+
+- Every person-facing string that names the platform today becomes either the configured name or
+  neutral wording. An implementation slice makes that change and adds the test that keeps it true.
+- New screens, emails, and modules are reviewed against this rule; "Ekklesia" in a person-facing
+  string is a defect.
+- Internal identifiers, operator tooling, and developer diagnostics keep the name, so nothing
+  operational is renamed.
+- An installation that wants to credit Ekklesia can do so in its own words; the platform never
+  inserts that credit.
+
+## Alternatives
+
+- **Keep "Ekklesia" as the default and let installations override it.** Rejected: an installation
+  that never thought to configure it would show the software's name to its people, which is forcing
+  it by default, and "no occurrence of Ekklesia" could not be tested in the default state.
+- **Rename internal identifiers too.** Rejected: invisible to the people this protects, and costly
+  to every installation and module.
+- **A configurable "powered by" line, on by default.** Rejected for the same reason as the first
+  alternative.
+- **Per-string customization of every message.** Not needed for this principle: one installation
+  name and neutral wording remove the product's name everywhere. Richer copy customization, if
+  wanted, is separate work.
+
+## Deferred
+
+- The implementation: the setting, its delivery to pages and emails, the rewording, and the
+  regression test.
+- Installation-supplied logos, icons, and favicons, and a web app manifest.
+- Translation and per-string copy customization.

docs/architecture/decisions/README.md

@@ -52,4 +52,6 @@ ADRs capture durable choices that affect more than one package or phase.
 - [0041: One module may contribute a browser renderer to another module's capability](0041-module-browser-contributions.md) — Accepted
 - [0042: Explicit, bounded streaming request bodies](0042-bounded-streaming-request-bodies.md) — Accepted
 - [0043: The display caches its shell and declared code, and nothing else](0043-display-offline-code-fallback.md) — Accepted
-- [0044: Ekklesia ships one self-hosted reference deployment, composed from pinned sources](0044-self-hosted-reference-deployment.md) — Proposed
+- [0044: Ekklesia ships one self-hosted reference deployment, composed from pinned sources](0044-self-hosted-reference-deployment.md) — Accepted
+- [0045: The Dashboard and the API may live on separate origins](0045-split-dashboard-and-api-origins.md) — Accepted
+- [0046: Ekklesia's branding is never forced on an installation](0046-installation-owned-branding.md) — Proposed

docs/architecture/repository-boundaries.md

@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ These rules map platform ownership to filesystem and package boundaries. The exe
   general "browser-safe shared packages are fine" relaxation: `api-client`, `auth-client`,
   `surface-sdk`, and `module-ui-host` remain rejected inside a module. Both approved packages are
   browser-safe by construction — `design-tokens` has no dependencies at all and `ui` depends only on
-  it — so a module UI file that imports them still cannot typecheck `process.env`, proven by a real
+  it and React — so a module UI file that imports them still cannot typecheck `process.env`, proven by a real
   compile under the exact browser project a module uses. Both are also pinned at the bottom of the
   presentation stack by `design-packages-depend-downward-only`: neither may reach an implementation
   layer, an API/auth client, or the backend contracts barrel, because a design package that could
@@ -134,6 +134,14 @@ These rules map platform ownership to filesystem and package boundaries. The exe
 - Workspace package consumers use declared `exports`, not private subpaths.
 - Every internal dependency uses a `workspace:` range and every imported workspace package is
   declared by the consumer.
+- Code a workspace package ships (its `src/` and `bin/`, excluding tests and declaration files)
+  declares every runtime import in `dependencies` or `optionalDependencies`. A peer declaration may
+  stay beside it, but never replaces it: a workspace package is linked into its consumers as a
+  directory, so its imports resolve from its own `node_modules`, where a consumer never satisfies a
+  peer, and a production install (`pnpm install --prod`, as the production image runs) omits
+  development dependencies. Type-only imports are exempt; a `.tsx`/`.jsx` file counts as importing
+  `react`, because the automatic JSX runtime imports `react/jsx-runtime` implicitly
+  (`runtime-imports-are-production-dependencies`).
 - Workspace aliases are forbidden because they obscure package ownership in the dependency graph.
 - Workspace package names are unique and shared packages declare a recognized architectural role.
 - Circular source and workspace-package dependencies are rejected.

docs/development/api.md

@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ No real values are shown here — configure per environment and never commit the
 | `EKKLESIA_API_PORT` | Optional. Listen port, `0`–`65535` (`0` requests an OS-assigned port). Defaults to `3000`. |
 | `EKKLESIA_IDENTITY_SECRET` | At least 32 characters, high entropy (for example `openssl rand -base64 32`). Same requirement as Phase 4A. |
 | `EKKLESIA_IDENTITY_BASE_URL` | Exactly one canonical `http`/`https` origin — scheme, host, and non-default port only, with no path, trailing slash, query, fragment, credentials, or explicit default port. `https` is required in production; loopback and unspecified hosts are rejected in production. |
-| `EKKLESIA_IDENTITY_TRUSTED_ORIGINS` | Comma-separated list of canonical origins, validated identically to the base URL (no wildcards). Used for both Better Auth's own CSRF/origin checks and the API's CORS policy — there is only one trusted-origin list. |
+| `EKKLESIA_IDENTITY_TRUSTED_ORIGINS` | Comma-separated list of canonical origins, validated identically to the base URL (no wildcards). Used for both Better Auth's own CSRF/origin checks and the API's CORS policy — there is only one trusted-origin list. The base URL's own origin is always trusted as well and need not be listed ([ADR 0045](../architecture/decisions/0045-split-dashboard-and-api-origins.md)). |
 | `EKKLESIA_PUBLIC_SIGNUP_ENABLED` | Optional, **development/test only**. Exactly `"true"` enables public sign-up when `NODE_ENV=development`; defaults to disabled, and a production configuration rejects `"true"` outright. Omitted, misspelled, or any other value never enables it. See [Public registration policy](#public-registration-policy). |
 | `EKKLESIA_CLIENT_ADDRESS_MODE` | Optional. `"direct"` (default when unset) or `"trusted-proxy"`. See [Client-address resolution](#client-address-resolution). |
 | `EKKLESIA_CLIENT_ADDRESS_HEADER` | Required only when `EKKLESIA_CLIENT_ADDRESS_MODE=trusted-proxy`. The one forwarded-header name the reverse proxy is trusted to set (for example `x-forwarded-for`). |
@@ -77,6 +77,10 @@ No real values are shown here — configure per environment and never commit the
 | `/api/auth/{get-session,list-sessions,update-session,change-password}` | Deliberately unavailable | Token-bearing native session inspection/mutation endpoints are denied at the Ekklesia HTTP boundary with sanitized `404 {"code":"NOT_FOUND"}`. Use `/api/v1/principal`; no browser session-list/update or password-management contract exists. |
 | `POST\|GET /api/auth/*` | Better Auth (mounted directly) | Supported Better Auth routes retain their native shapes except for the successful email sign-in normalization above. The four denied paths above never reach Better Auth. See [Better Auth's email/password docs](https://www.better-auth.com/docs/authentication/email-password) for supported endpoints such as `/sign-up/email` and `/sign-out`. |
 | `GET /api/v1/principal` | Ekklesia | Returns the minimal `EkklesiaPrincipal` contract as JSON. `Cache-Control: no-store`. |
+| `GET /` | Ekklesia | The built Dashboard page (`surfaces/shell`'s `index.html`), with the API's origin written into it. Served from the API's origin, or from the Dashboard's own hostname through the proxy in the split topology. `no-cache` with a strong `ETag`; framing refused. See [Dashboard host](#dashboard-host). |
+| `GET /assets/ekklesia-dashboard/app.js` | Ekklesia | The Dashboard's one script. `no-cache` with a strong `ETag`; its source map is never served. See [Dashboard host](#dashboard-host). |
+| `GET /api/v1/health/live` | Ekklesia | Unauthenticated liveness: fixed `200 {"status":"live"}` whenever the process is serving HTTP. `Cache-Control: no-store`; GET only. See [Health](#health). |
+| `GET /api/v1/health/ready` | Ekklesia | Unauthenticated readiness: fixed `200 {"status":"ready"}` only when a bounded database ping succeeds and module startup completed, otherwise `503 {"code":"NOT_READY"}`. `Cache-Control: no-store`; GET only. See [Health](#health). |
 | `GET\|POST /api/v1/grants*` | Ekklesia | Explicit authorization grant management, gated by `core.authorization.grants.manage`. Listing is bounded keyset pagination; creation is unscoped-only and conflicts (`409`) on an equivalent effective grant; revocation clears every unrevoked equivalent. See [Authorization](authorization.md#explicit-grant-http-api). |
 | `/api/v1/modules/<module-id>/*` | Installed modules | Every route an installed module registered during its `register` hook, gated by that route's own declared permission. See [Module HTTP routes](#module-http-routes). |
 | `GET /api/v1/module-realtime/<module-id>/<channel>` | Installed modules | Snapshot-first Server-Sent Events for one registered module-local channel, gated by that channel's declared permission. See [Module realtime](#module-realtime). |
@@ -134,6 +138,77 @@ a new raw token when asked to revoke other sessions. The principal response neve
 contains email, name, image, session id or expiry, session token, account/provider details, or any
 role, permission, membership, or volunteer data.
 
+## Dashboard host
+
+`apps/api` serves the built Dashboard itself
+([ADR 0044](../architecture/decisions/0044-self-hosted-reference-deployment.md)). In the default
+same-origin topology it does so from the same origin as `/api`: `EKKLESIA_DASHBOARD_ORIGIN` stays
+unset, the session cookie stays host-only, and no second static server or proxy file root is
+needed. In the split topology
+([ADR 0045](../architecture/decisions/0045-split-dashboard-and-api-origins.md)) the proxy forwards
+the Dashboard's own hostname to the same two routes; the API does not inspect `Host`. It works
+exactly like the display host:
+
+- **A closed set of files, read once at startup.** `@ekklesia/shell/dashboard-assets` exports the
+  exact URLs of two built files, `dist/browser/index.html` and
+  `dist/browser/assets/ekklesia-dashboard/app.js`. `startApi()` reads both before importing any
+  module code or binding the listener, and keeps one frozen snapshot of their text with a SHA-256
+  strong `ETag` for each.
+- **The API's origin is written in at startup.** The built page carries one empty
+  `<meta content="" name="ekklesia-api-origin" />`. Before computing the page's `ETag`, `startApi()`
+  fills it with the identity base URL's origin, which is where `/api` lives in either topology. The
+  shell reads it before rendering, uses the page's own origin when it is empty, and fails closed,
+  making no request, when it is anything but a canonical `http(s)` origin. Nothing about the topology
+  is built into the bundle.
+- **A missing or incompatible build fails startup.** An absent, unreadable, or empty file, or a page
+  without exactly one empty API-origin element, stops `startApi()` with a fixed
+  `DashboardHostAssetError` (`DASHBOARD_HOST_ASSET_UNAVAILABLE`), after closing the resources
+  already opened. It never carries a path or the filesystem error. Build the shell first;
+  `pnpm api:start` already runs the full build.
+- **Two exact routes, never a directory.** `GET /` answers the page and
+  `GET /assets/ekklesia-dashboard/app.js` answers the script. No request value selects a file, and
+  nothing touches the filesystem while answering. Every other path, including `/index.html`,
+  `/app.js`, the script's `.map`, and any traversal spelling, falls through to the ordinary
+  `404 {"code":"NOT_FOUND"}`. There is no catch-all HTML fallback: the Dashboard has no client
+  router, and emailed links land on `/` with a query (see
+  [The four anonymous screens](#the-four-anonymous-screens)). Methods other than `GET` (and Hono's
+  implicit `HEAD`) are also the ordinary `404`.
+- **No source maps.** The build emits `app.js.map` beside the script, but it is not one of the two
+  files, so it is never served, matching module UI publication (ADR 0025). Browser devtools receive
+  a `404` for it.
+
+Neither route resolves a principal or reads a cookie, and neither is under `/api/`, so the API's
+CORS policy does not apply. The bytes grant no authority: the page renders sign-in until
+`/api/v1/principal` says otherwise.
+
+| Header | `GET /` | `GET /assets/ekklesia-dashboard/app.js` |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| `Content-Type` | `text/html; charset=utf-8` | `text/javascript; charset=utf-8` |
+| `Cache-Control` | `no-cache` | `no-cache` |
+| `ETag` | strong SHA-256 of the page | strong SHA-256 of the script |
+| `X-Content-Type-Options` | `nosniff` | `nosniff` |
+| `X-Frame-Options` | `DENY` | — |
+| `Content-Security-Policy` | `frame-ancestors 'none'` | — |
+| `Referrer-Policy` | `no-referrer` | — |
+
+**Caching.** The shell emits fixed, unhashed file names, so both files are revalidated on every
+load, exactly like module UI artifacts and the display host's script. A matching `If-None-Match`
+(strong, weak `W/`, a list, or `*`) answers an empty `304` carrying the same `ETag` and
+`Cache-Control`. The page's `304` also carries its security headers, so a revalidated cache entry
+keeps them. Neither file is ever `immutable`: a rebuilt Dashboard reaches a browser on its next load.
+
+**Page security headers.** The page holds the platform sign-in form, so it refuses to be framed,
+through `X-Frame-Options` and CSP `frame-ancestors`. That is the only directive the policy carries:
+the full Content-Security-Policy is a separate decision. `no-referrer` keeps the page URL out of
+every request the page makes, which matters while an emailed reset token is briefly in it. The shell
+strips that token from the address bar before it renders anything.
+
+**Development.** `pnpm --filter @ekklesia/shell dev` serves `dist/browser` at the same absolute
+paths, because the build emits the script at `assets/ekklesia-dashboard/app.js`. `index.html` names
+that path absolutely, so the page never depends on the URL that served it. For a split-origin
+development API, set `EKKLESIA_API_BASE_URL` for the development server: it writes that origin into
+its copy of the page exactly as the API does in production. A production build ignores it.
+
 ## Dashboard browser authentication
 
 The Dashboard flow is owned by `surfaces/shell`; modules never drive these routes and the
@@ -277,7 +352,10 @@ real server: 7 characters rejected, 8 accepted, 128 accepted, 129 rejected.
 ## Origin, CORS, and cookies
 
 The API reuses the same `EKKLESIA_IDENTITY_TRUSTED_ORIGINS` list for both CORS and Better Auth's
-own origin/CSRF checks — there is no second, competing configuration. CORS reflects a request's
+own origin/CSRF checks — there is no second, competing configuration. Like Better Auth, the API also
+trusts the identity base URL's own origin without it being listed, so a page the API itself serves
+(the display host, or the Dashboard in the same-origin topology) passes the API's origin checks
+([ADR 0045](../architecture/decisions/0045-split-dashboard-and-api-origins.md)). CORS reflects a request's
 `Origin` header back only when it exactly matches a configured trusted origin (never a wildcard,
 since `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` cannot be combined with `Access-Control-Allow-Credentials:
 true`); a disallowed origin never receives the header at all, though the request itself may still
@@ -311,10 +389,18 @@ Cookies keep Better Auth's defaults: `HttpOnly` always, `SameSite=Lax` always, `
 configured base URL is `https://`. Cross-subdomain cookies are not enabled and no cookie `Domain`
 attribute is set, so every cookie is host-only. See [Client-address resolution](#client-address-resolution)
 for how (and whether) a reverse proxy's forwarded headers are trusted — a separate concern from
-CORS/CSRF above. The Dashboard does not broaden this policy: same-origin `/api` proxying is the
-simplest production topology, while a deliberately split browser/API origin must use the exact
-trusted-origin allowlist and credentialed CORS. Sibling subdomains do not implicitly share the
-cookie. No production Dashboard hostname or proxy deployment exists in this repository.
+CORS/CSRF above. The Dashboard does not broaden this policy. In the split topology
+([ADR 0045](../architecture/decisions/0045-split-dashboard-and-api-origins.md)) the cookie stays
+host-only on the API's hostname, and the Dashboard on a sibling hostname reaches the API with
+credentialed CORS; browsers send the cookie because the two hostnames are origins of one site, which
+is therefore a requirement of that topology. The reference deployment provides both topologies
+([`deploy/README.md`](../../deploy/README.md#split-dashboard-and-api-origins)).
+
+**CORS request and response headers are deliberately narrow, and part of the module UI contract.**
+Beyond the CORS-safelisted request headers, only `Content-Type` is allowed, and no response header is
+exposed beyond the safelisted ones. A module UI's `api.request` inherits this policy, so portable
+module UI code sends only safelisted headers plus `Content-Type` and reads only safelisted response
+headers. That keeps one module artifact working in either topology.
 
 ## Logging
 
@@ -1420,6 +1506,51 @@ TLS protects the *connection*, not the exposure: it does not make an internet-re
 safe, and the network boundary remains the deployment's own responsibility. See
 [ADR 0018](../architecture/decisions/0018-identity-session-resolution-and-database-transport.md).
 
+## Health
+
+Two unauthenticated endpoints exist for Compose health checks and external monitoring
+([ADR 0044](../architecture/decisions/0044-self-hosted-reference-deployment.md)). They are
+deliberately uninformative: neither names a module, version, dependency, error, or connection
+detail, and `pnpm doctor` remains the detailed operator report.
+
+| Request | Answer |
+| --- | --- |
+| `GET /api/v1/health/live` | Always `200 {"status":"live"}`. Liveness consults nothing; if the process can answer, it is live. |
+| `GET /api/v1/health/ready`, ready | `200 {"status":"ready"}` |
+| `GET /api/v1/health/ready`, not ready | `503 {"code":"NOT_READY"}` |
+| Any other method on either path, including `HEAD` | `405` with `Allow: GET` and no body |
+
+Every answer sets `Cache-Control: no-store`. Neither route resolves a principal, reads a cookie, or
+evaluates authorization. Both live under `/api/v1/health/`, a sibling of the `/api/v1/modules/`
+prefix, so no module route can shadow them, including a module whose id is `health`. As for every
+`/api/v1/*` route, an `OPTIONS` request is answered by the platform's CORS preflight and never
+reaches the handlers.
+
+Readiness is `200` only when **both** of the following hold:
+
+- **Module startup completed, and shutdown has not begun.** `startApi()` binds the HTTP listener
+  only after the module runtime has started, so this holds whenever the server is answering. The
+  first `shutdown()` call clears it before anything drains, so a draining instance reports `503`
+  while liveness still reports `200`. It is checked again after the database ping, in case shutdown
+  began meanwhile.
+- **The database answered a trivial query within 2 seconds** (`READINESS_DATABASE_TIMEOUT_MS`).
+  The ping runs on the one shared pool as a single message,
+  `BEGIN READ ONLY; SET LOCAL statement_timeout = 2000; SELECT 1; COMMIT`. The transaction-local
+  timeout means PostgreSQL cancels a stalled statement itself rather than leaving it running. On
+  any failure the pool discards that connection instead of reusing it. The pool's own 10-second
+  connection, query, and statement timeouts remain the outer bound, for example for a database
+  that cannot be reached at all.
+
+**Pings never pile up.** At most one ping is ever unsettled. Probes that arrive while it runs share
+its result and its single 2-second deadline. Once the deadline passes they answer `503` immediately,
+without starting another query, until that ping has actually settled. A stalled database therefore
+holds at most one pool connection on behalf of health checks, however often a monitor polls. A
+successful result is never cached: every probe after a settled ping runs a new one.
+
+A failed ping is never inspected. The response is the same fixed `503` whether the database
+refused the connection, timed out, rejected the credentials, or was mid-restart, and nothing about
+the failure is logged by the route.
+
 ## Graceful shutdown
 
 `startApi()` (the composition function `apps/api/src/server.ts` exports, used by both the
@@ -1504,7 +1635,8 @@ Cookie: better-auth.session_token=<redacted, now revoked>
 
 See the repository root [README](../../README.md#current-status) and
 [platform architecture](../architecture/platform-architecture.md#current-implementation-status)
-for what has landed across every phase and what remains. Surface work is underway; production
-Dashboard asset hosting, enrollment/recovery, display device identity, and public Website routing
-remain separate work. This document tracks `apps/api`'s own HTTP, module-runtime, and
+for what has landed across every phase and what remains. Surface work is underway; the API now
+serves the built Dashboard ([Dashboard host](#dashboard-host)) in either topology, while the full
+Content-Security-Policy, enrollment/recovery, display device identity, and public Website
+routing remain separate work. This document tracks `apps/api`'s own HTTP, module-runtime, and
 database-composition contracts as they evolve.

docs/development/security.md

@@ -153,7 +153,8 @@ enforced by `requirePermission` regardless; the test suite proves it by having a
 "denied" call its API anyway and still receive `403`.
 
 **The host executes trusted module code in its own page and does not pretend otherwise.** The loader
-performs a same-origin dynamic `import()` — no `eval`, no `new Function`, no `blob:` URL — and the
+performs a dynamic `import()` from the API's origin (the page's own in the same-origin topology, the
+API hostname in the split one, ADR 0045) — no `eval`, no `new Function`, no `blob:` URL — and the
 shell owns the container, the loading state, and every error, so a failing module costs its own panel
 rather than the shell. None of that is containment: once imported, a module UI is ordinary same-realm
 JavaScript, exactly as described above.
@@ -463,10 +464,13 @@ Until that exists, the trusted-code model above is the security model.
 
 ## Current deployment state
 
-As of this branch, **Ekklesia is not deployed**. There is no production API instance, no reverse
-proxy, no public listener, and no deployment automation of any kind in this repository — no deploy
-script, no CI deployment step, no container publish, no orchestration manifest. No `.env` has ever
-been committed; only `.env.example`.
+As of this branch, **Ekklesia is not deployed**. There is no production API instance, no running
+reverse proxy, no public listener, and no deployment automation in this repository — no deploy
+script, no CI deployment step, no container publish. The repository provides a **reference deployment**
+([`deploy/`](../../deploy/README.md)): a production image and the Compose project that runs it, which
+CI builds and smoke-tests end to end on every change against disposable services. Nothing pushes,
+publishes, or runs it against a real installation. No `.env` has ever been committed; only
+`.env.example`, which the image build context excludes.
 
 Two production defaults are relevant but are **not** by themselves a deployment guarantee:
 
@@ -486,9 +490,13 @@ This checklist gates a **public launch**. It does not gate development: Surfaces
 work all proceed against the local development infrastructure while every item below is still
 outstanding.
 
-1. The reverse proxy serves the built Dashboard assets and `/api` on the intended origin, or an
-   explicitly split origin is covered by the exact trusted-origin/CORS configuration. The
-   repository currently supplies neither deployment.
+1. The reverse proxy forwards the Dashboard and `/api` on the intended origin, or an explicitly
+   split origin is covered by the exact trusted-origin/CORS configuration. `apps/api` serves the
+   built Dashboard itself at `/` ([API § Dashboard host](api.md#dashboard-host)), and the
+   reference deployment's proxy routes it ([deploy/README.md](../../deploy/README.md#launch-checklist)
+   maps every item here to its configuration). A split installation (ADR 0045) puts its Dashboard
+   and API hostnames on one registrable domain and uses `Caddyfile.split.example`, which refuses
+   `/api/*` on the Dashboard's hostname so the session cookie has exactly one home.
 2. The origin port is unreachable from the public Internet.
 3. The origin port is also unreachable from any untrusted network/VLAN — only the intended private
    proxy path connects. Security must not depend on an unpublished DNS name or origin IP.

package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "ekklesia",
-  "version": "0.1.0",
+  "version": "0.1.1",
   "private": true,
   "type": "module",
   "description": "Open, modular church technology platform",
@@ -14,7 +14,9 @@
     "authorization:bootstrap-owner": "turbo run build && node --env-file-if-exists=.env core/dist/cli/bootstrap-platform-owner.js",
     "boundaries": "node scripts/check-boundaries.ts",
     "build": "turbo run build",
-    "ci:verify": "pnpm verify && pnpm infrastructure:config",
+    "ci:verify": "pnpm verify && pnpm infrastructure:config && pnpm deploy:config",
+    "deploy:config": "bash scripts/check-deploy-config.sh",
+    "deploy:smoke": "bash scripts/smoke-deploy.sh",
     "doctor": "node scripts/run-doctor.ts",
     "format": "biome format --write .",
     "format:check": "biome format .",

packages/contracts/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@ekklesia/contracts",
-  "version": "0.1.0",
+  "version": "0.1.1",
   "type": "module",
   "files": [
     "dist"

packages/design-tokens/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@ekklesia/design-tokens",
-  "version": "0.1.0",
+  "version": "0.1.1",
   "type": "module",
   "files": [
     "dist"

packages/module-sdk/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@ekklesia/module-sdk",
-  "version": "0.1.0",
+  "version": "0.1.1",
   "type": "module",
   "files": [
     "dist"
@@ -19,12 +19,12 @@
     "typecheck": "tsc --noEmit --project tsconfig.json"
   },
   "dependencies": {
-    "@ekklesia/contracts": "workspace:*"
+    "@ekklesia/contracts": "workspace:*",
+    "drizzle-orm": "0.45.2"
   },
   "devDependencies": {
     "@biomejs/biome": "2.5.3",
     "@types/node": "24.13.3",
-    "drizzle-orm": "0.45.2",
     "typescript": "7.0.2",
     "vitest": "4.1.10"
   },

packages/module-ui-build/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@ekklesia/module-ui-build",
-  "version": "0.1.0",
+  "version": "0.1.1",
   "type": "module",
   "files": [
     "bin",

packages/module-ui-host/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@ekklesia/module-ui-host",
-  "version": "0.1.0",
+  "version": "0.1.1",
   "type": "module",
   "files": [
     "dist"

packages/module-ui-sdk/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@ekklesia/module-ui-sdk",
-  "version": "0.1.0",
+  "version": "0.1.1",
   "type": "module",
   "files": [
     "dist"

packages/module-ui-sdk/src/host-context.ts

@@ -125,6 +125,11 @@ export interface ModuleUiDisplayLocation {
  *
  * A host is responsible for credentials, base URL, and any platform headers. A module UI neither
  * supplies nor sees a session token.
+ *
+ * The module's API may be on another origin than the page (Ekklesia's split topology, ADR 0045), so
+ * a portable module UI keeps to what cross-origin requests always allow: CORS-safelisted request
+ * headers plus `Content-Type`, and only CORS-safelisted response headers read back. Anything more
+ * works under one host topology and fails under another.
  */
 export interface ModuleUiApiClient {
   /**

packages/typescript-config/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@ekklesia/typescript-config",
-  "version": "0.1.0",
+  "version": "0.1.1",
   "private": true,
   "files": [
     "base.json",

packages/ui/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@ekklesia/ui",
-  "version": "0.1.0",
+  "version": "0.1.1",
   "type": "module",
   "files": [
     "dist"
@@ -19,7 +19,8 @@
     "typecheck": "tsc --noEmit --project tsconfig.json && tsc --noEmit --project tsconfig.test.json"
   },
   "dependencies": {
-    "@ekklesia/design-tokens": "workspace:*"
+    "@ekklesia/design-tokens": "workspace:*",
+    "react": "19.2.8"
   },
   "peerDependencies": {
     "react": "19.2.8"
@@ -31,7 +32,6 @@
     "@types/react": "19.2.18",
     "@types/react-dom": "19.2.4",
     "happy-dom": "20.0.11",
-    "react": "19.2.8",
     "react-dom": "19.2.8",
     "typescript": "7.0.2",
     "vitest": "4.1.10"

packages/ui/tests/tokens.test.ts

@@ -67,7 +67,11 @@ describe("the shared elements consume design tokens, never hardcoded theme value
       await readFile(path.join(packageDirectory, "package.json"), "utf8"),
     ) as { dependencies?: Record<string, string>; peerDependencies?: Record<string, string> };
 
-    expect(Object.keys(manifest.dependencies ?? {})).toEqual(["@ekklesia/design-tokens"]);
+    // React is both a production dependency and a peer: the peer states that the consumer's React
+    // must be the same one, and the production declaration is what makes the package's own imports
+    // resolve, since a consumer never satisfies a linked workspace package's peer
+    // (`runtime-imports-are-production-dependencies`).
+    expect(Object.keys(manifest.dependencies ?? {})).toEqual(["@ekklesia/design-tokens", "react"]);
     expect(Object.keys(manifest.peerDependencies ?? {})).toEqual(["react"]);
   });
 

pnpm-lock.yaml

@@ -201,6 +201,9 @@ importers:
       '@ekklesia/contracts':
         specifier: workspace:*
         version: link:../contracts
+      drizzle-orm:
+        specifier: 0.45.2
+        version: 0.45.2(@types/[email protected])([email protected])([email protected])
     devDependencies:
       '@biomejs/biome':
         specifier: 2.5.3
@@ -208,9 +211,6 @@ importers:
       '@types/node':
         specifier: 24.13.3
         version: 24.13.3
-      drizzle-orm:
-        specifier: 0.45.2
-        version: 0.45.2(@types/[email protected])([email protected])([email protected])
       typescript:
         specifier: 7.0.2
         version: 7.0.2
@@ -287,6 +287,9 @@ importers:
       '@ekklesia/design-tokens':
         specifier: workspace:*
         version: link:../design-tokens
+      react:
+        specifier: 19.2.8
+        version: 19.2.8
     devDependencies:
       '@biomejs/biome':
         specifier: 2.5.3
@@ -306,9 +309,6 @@ importers:
       happy-dom:
         specifier: 20.0.11
         version: 20.0.11
-      react:
-        specifier: 19.2.8
-        version: 19.2.8
       react-dom:
         specifier: 19.2.8
         version: 19.2.8([email protected])

scripts/check-boundaries.ts

@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 import { readdir, readFile, stat } from "node:fs/promises";
+import { builtinModules } from "node:module";
 import path from "node:path";
 import { pathToFileURL } from "node:url";
 import { parse } from "yaml";
@@ -506,6 +507,82 @@ function collectImportSpecifiers(sourceText: string): string[] {
   return [...specifiers];
 }
 
+/**
+ * Whether a file is code a workspace package ships and executes: anything under its `src/` or
+ * `bin/`, except tests and declaration files. Build scripts, configuration files, and tests run with
+ * development dependencies installed, so they are outside this rule.
+ */
+function isRuntimeSourceFile(packageRelativePath: string): boolean {
+  const normalized = normalizePath(packageRelativePath);
+  if (!normalized.startsWith("src/") && !normalized.startsWith("bin/")) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  const segments = normalized.split("/");
+  if (segments.some((segment) => ["__tests__", "test", "tests"].includes(segment))) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  const fileName = segments.at(-1) ?? "";
+  return !/\.(?:test|spec)\.[cm]?[jt]sx?$/u.test(fileName) && !/\.d\.[cm]?ts$/u.test(fileName);
+}
+
+/** `import { type A, type B } from "x"` has no runtime binding: without `verbatimModuleSyntax`, the
+ * compiler erases it exactly like `import type`. A default or namespace binding, or any specifier
+ * without `type`, is a runtime import. */
+function importClauseIsTypeOnly(clause: string): boolean {
+  const trimmed = clause.trim();
+  if (!trimmed.startsWith("{") || !trimmed.endsWith("}")) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  const specifiers = trimmed
+    .slice(1, -1)
+    .split(",")
+    .map((specifier) => specifier.trim())
+    .filter((specifier) => specifier.length > 0);
+  return specifiers.length > 0 && specifiers.every((specifier) => /^type\s/u.test(specifier));
+}
+
+/**
+ * Bare specifiers a source file needs at run time: every static, side-effect, and dynamic import
+ * except type-only ones. A `.tsx`/`.jsx` file also needs `react`, because the platform compiles JSX
+ * with the automatic runtime (`"jsx": "react-jsx"`), which imports `react/jsx-runtime` without that
+ * import appearing in the source.
+ */
+function collectRuntimeImportSpecifiers(sourceText: string, extension: string): string[] {
+  const specifiers = new Set<string>();
+  const staticImport = /\b(?:import|export)\s+(type\s+)?([^;]*?)\bfrom\s*["']([^"'\n]+)["']/gu;
+  for (const match of sourceText.matchAll(staticImport)) {
+    const [, typeKeyword, clause = "", specifier] = match;
+    if (specifier && !typeKeyword && !importClauseIsTypeOnly(clause)) {
+      specifiers.add(specifier);
+    }
+  }
+  const sideEffectImport = /\bimport\s*["']([^"'\n]+)["']/gu;
+  const dynamicImport = /\b(?:import|require)\s*\(\s*["']([^"'\n]+)["']\s*\)/gu;
+  for (const pattern of [sideEffectImport, dynamicImport]) {
+    for (const match of sourceText.matchAll(pattern)) {
+      if (match[1]) {
+        specifiers.add(match[1]);
+      }
+    }
+  }
+  if (extension === ".tsx" || extension === ".jsx") {
+    specifiers.add("react/jsx-runtime");
+  }
+  return [...specifiers];
+}
+
+const NODE_BUILTIN_MODULES = new Set(builtinModules);
+
+function isBareSpecifier(specifier: string): boolean {
+  return !(
+    specifier.startsWith(".") ||
+    specifier.startsWith("/") ||
+    specifier.startsWith("#") ||
+    specifier.startsWith("node:") ||
+    /^[a-z][a-z0-9+.-]*:/u.test(specifier)
+  );
+}
+
 async function resolveSourceImport(
   fromFile: string,
   specifier: string,
@@ -906,6 +983,49 @@ export async function checkBoundaries(rootDirectory: string): Promise<BoundaryRe
     sourceGraph.set(relativeFile, new Set());
 
     const sourceText = await readFile(codeFile, "utf8");
+
+    // A workspace package is linked into its consumers as a directory, so Node resolves the
+    // package's own imports from the package's own `node_modules`. A peer dependency is never
+    // satisfied there by the consumer, and a production install (`pnpm install --prod`, as the
+    // production image runs) omits development dependencies. Code a package ships must therefore
+    // declare every runtime import as a production dependency. A peer declaration may stay beside it.
+    const runtimePackage = findContainingPackage(codeFile, packagesByDepth);
+    if (runtimePackage && isRuntimeSourceFile(path.relative(runtimePackage.directory, codeFile))) {
+      const reported = new Set<string>();
+      for (const specifier of collectRuntimeImportSpecifiers(
+        sourceText,
+        path.extname(codeFile).toLowerCase(),
+      )) {
+        if (!isBareSpecifier(specifier)) {
+          continue;
+        }
+        const dependencyName = packageNameFromSpecifier(specifier);
+        const manifest = runtimePackage.manifest;
+        if (
+          reported.has(dependencyName) ||
+          dependencyName === runtimePackage.name ||
+          NODE_BUILTIN_MODULES.has(dependencyName) ||
+          manifest.dependencies?.[dependencyName] !== undefined ||
+          manifest.optionalDependencies?.[dependencyName] !== undefined
+        ) {
+          continue;
+        }
+        reported.add(dependencyName);
+        const declaredAs =
+          manifest.peerDependencies?.[dependencyName] !== undefined
+            ? "only as a peer dependency"
+            : manifest.devDependencies?.[dependencyName] !== undefined
+              ? "only as a development dependency"
+              : "not at all";
+        violations.push({
+          from: relativeFile,
+          message: `${runtimePackage.name} imports ${dependencyName} at run time but declares it ${declaredAs}; a runtime import must be in dependencies.`,
+          rule: "runtime-imports-are-production-dependencies",
+          to: dependencyName,
+        });
+      }
+    }
+
     for (const specifier of collectImportSpecifiers(sourceText)) {
       const dependencyName = packageNameFromSpecifier(specifier);
       if (from.layer === "module" && isModuleUiPackage(dependencyName)) {

scripts/check-deploy-config.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# Validates the reference deployment's Compose files (ADR 0044) in each supported combination:
+# base, base + proxy, and base + proxy + tunnel. Uses only the committed example env files, copied
+# to a temporary directory, so it needs no secret and starts nothing.
+
+set -Eeuo pipefail
+
+repository_root="$(cd -- "$(dirname -- "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")/.." && pwd)"
+cd "$repository_root/deploy"
+
+work="$(mktemp -d)"
+trap 'rm -rf "$work"' EXIT
+
+for name in ekklesia postgres object-storage tunnel; do
+  cp "env/${name}.env.example" "$work/${name}.env"
+done
+cp env/compose.env.example "$work/compose.env"
+cat >>"$work/compose.env" <<EOF_ENV
+EKKLESIA_IMAGE=registry.example.org/ekklesia:0.0.0
+EKKLESIA_ENV_DIR=${work}
+EKKLESIA_HOSTNAME=ekklesia.example.org
+EKKLESIA_STORAGE_HOSTNAME=storage.ekklesia.example.org
+EKKLESIA_ACME_EMAIL=[email protected]
+EOF_ENV
+
+combinations=(
+  "compose.yaml"
+  "compose.yaml compose.proxy.yaml"
+  "compose.yaml compose.proxy.yaml compose.tunnel.yaml"
+)
+for combination in "${combinations[@]}"; do
+  arguments=()
+  for file in $combination; do
+    arguments+=(--file "$file")
+  done
+  if ! docker compose --env-file "$work/compose.env" "${arguments[@]}" --profile ops config --quiet; then
+    echo "Reference deployment Compose configuration is invalid: ${combination}" >&2
+    exit 1
+  fi
+  echo "valid: ${combination}"
+done

scripts/lib/compose-diagnostics.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# Why a disposable Compose project did not become ready: `docker compose ps` and the last log lines
+# of every service, so a CI failure says what went wrong (a port already allocated, a container that
+# exited, a health check that never passed) instead of only that something did.
+#
+#   source scripts/lib/compose-diagnostics.sh
+#   COMPOSE_DIAGNOSTICS_SECRETS=("$password" "$secret_key")   # literal values to mask, optional
+#   compose_report_not_ready "$up_output" "${compose[@]}"
+#
+# Everything printed passes through `compose_diagnostics_redact` first. The projects these scripts
+# start hold only disposable, generated test credentials, but output is redacted anyway: every
+# literal in COMPOSE_DIAGNOSTICS_SECRETS, the value of any `NAME=value` or `NAME: value` whose name
+# looks like a credential, the user-information part of any URL, and the rest of any Authorization
+# header. Terminal control sequences are stripped. Output goes to standard error.
+
+COMPOSE_DIAGNOSTICS_SECRETS=()
+COMPOSE_DIAGNOSTICS_TAIL_LINES=40
+
+# compose_diagnostics_redact: standard input to standard output, with credentials masked.
+compose_diagnostics_redact() {
+  local secrets=""
+  if ((${#COMPOSE_DIAGNOSTICS_SECRETS[@]} > 0)); then
+    secrets="$(printf '%s\n' "${COMPOSE_DIAGNOSTICS_SECRETS[@]}")"
+  fi
+  # Literal values first, by plain substring rather than as patterns. Very short values are skipped:
+  # masking every occurrence of a two-letter word would only make the output unreadable.
+  COMPOSE_DIAGNOSTICS_LITERALS="$secrets" awk '
+    BEGIN { count = split(ENVIRON["COMPOSE_DIAGNOSTICS_LITERALS"], secret, "\n") }
+    {
+      line = $0
+      for (i = 1; i <= count; i++) {
+        if (length(secret[i]) < 6) {
+          continue
+        }
+        masked = ""
+        while ((at = index(line, secret[i])) > 0) {
+          masked = masked substr(line, 1, at - 1) "[redacted]"
+          line = substr(line, at + length(secret[i]))
+        }
+        line = masked line
+      }
+      print line
+    }
+  ' | sed -E \
+    -e 's/\x1b\[[0-9;?]*[A-Za-z]//g' \
+    -e 's#([Aa][Uu][Tt][Hh][Oo][Rr][Ii][Zz][Aa][Tt][Ii][Oo][Nn][[:space:]]*[:=]).*#\1 [redacted]#' \
+    -e 's#([A-Za-z0-9_.-]*([Pp][Aa][Ss][Ss][Ww][Oo][Rr][Dd]|[Pp][Aa][Ss][Ss][Ww][Dd]|[Ss][Ee][Cc][Rr][Ee][Tt]|[Tt][Oo][Kk][Ee][Nn]|[_.-][Kk][Ee][Yy])[A-Za-z0-9_.-]*"?[[:space:]]*[=:][[:space:]]*)("[^"]*"|[^[:space:],;"]+)#\1[redacted]#g' \
+    -e 's#([A-Za-z][A-Za-z0-9+.-]*://)[^/@[:space:]]+@#\1[redacted]@#g'
+}
+
+# compose_report_not_ready <up output> <compose command...>: the failed command's own output, then
+# the project's containers and the tail of each service's logs, all redacted.
+compose_report_not_ready() {
+  local up_output="$1"
+  shift
+  local service services
+  {
+    if [[ -n "$up_output" ]]; then
+      echo "--- docker compose up (last 20 lines)"
+      printf '%s\n' "$up_output" | tail -n 20 | compose_diagnostics_redact
+    fi
+    echo "--- docker compose ps"
+    "$@" ps --all 2>&1 | compose_diagnostics_redact
+    services="$("$@" config --services 2>/dev/null || true)"
+    for service in $services; do
+      echo "--- docker compose logs ${service} (last ${COMPOSE_DIAGNOSTICS_TAIL_LINES} lines)"
+      "$@" logs --no-color --tail "$COMPOSE_DIAGNOSTICS_TAIL_LINES" "$service" 2>&1 |
+        compose_diagnostics_redact
+    done
+    echo "--- end of diagnostics"
+  } >&2
+}

scripts/lib/deploy-smoke-browser.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,287 @@
+// Real-browser assertions for scripts/smoke-deploy.sh in the split topology (ADR 0045). Runs inside a
+// disposable container on the deployment's `edge` network and drives a headless Chromium, itself a
+// disposable container on the same network, over the Chrome DevTools Protocol, with Node.js's own
+// fetch and WebSocket and no other dependency.
+//
+//   node deploy-smoke-browser.mjs
+//
+// What only a browser can prove: that a person signing in on the Dashboard's hostname gets a session
+// cookie on the API's hostname alone, that the Dashboard then imports a module's UI from the API's
+// origin and the module's credentialed requests succeed under CORS, that the module's display page
+// mounts on the API's origin with that same session, and that sign-out ends it. Output is one line
+// per check; nothing printed carries a credential, cookie value, or response body.
+
+function required(name) {
+  const value = process.env[name];
+  if (!value) {
+    throw new Error(`${name} is required.`);
+  }
+  return value;
+}
+
+const apiOrigin = `https://${required("SMOKE_HOSTNAME")}`;
+const dashboardOrigin = `https://${required("SMOKE_DASHBOARD_HOSTNAME")}`;
+const apiHostname = new URL(apiOrigin).hostname;
+const devtools = required("SMOKE_CDP_ADDRESS");
+const timeoutMs = 30_000;
+
+let failures = 0;
+function check(condition, description) {
+  console.log(`${condition ? "ok  " : "FAIL"} ${description}`);
+  if (!condition) {
+    failures += 1;
+  }
+}
+
+/** The smallest Chrome DevTools Protocol client: numbered commands, flat sessions, and events. */
+async function connect() {
+  // The browser container was started moments ago; give it time to listen.
+  // One overall deadline, with every attempt bounded, so a browser that never comes up fails the
+  // run in seconds rather than waiting out TCP timeouts.
+  const deadline = Date.now() + 30_000;
+  let version;
+  while (version === undefined) {
+    try {
+      const response = await fetch(`http://${devtools}/json/version`, {
+        signal: AbortSignal.timeout(2_000),
+      });
+      version = await response.json();
+    } catch {
+      if (Date.now() > deadline) {
+        throw new Error("The headless browser never answered.");
+      }
+      await new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, 500));
+    }
+  }
+  // Chromium names its WebSocket after the Host it was asked on; ask on the same address.
+  const socketUrl = version.webSocketDebuggerUrl.replace(/^ws:\/\/[^/]+/u, `ws://${devtools}`);
+  const socket = new WebSocket(socketUrl);
+  await new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
+    socket.addEventListener("open", resolve, { once: true });
+    socket.addEventListener("error", () => reject(new Error("DevTools connection failed.")), {
+      once: true,
+    });
+  });
+  let nextId = 1;
+  const pending = new Map();
+  const listeners = [];
+  socket.addEventListener("message", (event) => {
+    const message = JSON.parse(String(event.data));
+    if (message.id !== undefined) {
+      const waiter = pending.get(message.id);
+      pending.delete(message.id);
+      if (message.error) {
+        waiter?.reject(new Error(`DevTools ${waiter.method} failed.`));
+      } else {
+        waiter?.resolve(message.result);
+      }
+      return;
+    }
+    for (const listener of listeners) {
+      listener(message);
+    }
+  });
+  return {
+    close: () => socket.close(),
+    on: (listener) => listeners.push(listener),
+    send(method, params = {}, sessionId = undefined) {
+      const id = nextId;
+      nextId += 1;
+      socket.send(JSON.stringify({ id, method, params, ...(sessionId ? { sessionId } : {}) }));
+      return new Promise((resolve, reject) => pending.set(id, { method, reject, resolve }));
+    },
+  };
+}
+
+const cdp = await connect();
+const { targetId } = await cdp.send("Target.createTarget", { url: "about:blank" });
+const { sessionId } = await cdp.send("Target.attachToTarget", { flatten: true, targetId });
+const send = (method, params) => cdp.send(method, params, sessionId);
+
+/** Every response and failure the page sees, for the API's origin. A CORS refusal is a
+ * `loadingFailed` here, never a response. */
+const responses = [];
+const failed = [];
+cdp.on((message) => {
+  if (message.sessionId !== sessionId) {
+    return;
+  }
+  if (message.method === "Network.responseReceived") {
+    const { response, type } = message.params;
+    responses.push({ status: response.status, type, url: response.url });
+  } else if (message.method === "Network.loadingFailed") {
+    failed.push(message.params);
+  }
+});
+await send("Network.enable");
+await send("Page.enable");
+await send("Runtime.enable");
+// A desktop-sized window: a module may reasonably decline to render its management UI on a small one.
+await send("Emulation.setDeviceMetricsOverride", {
+  deviceScaleFactor: 1,
+  height: 1080,
+  mobile: false,
+  width: 1920,
+});
+
+async function evaluate(expression) {
+  const result = await send("Runtime.evaluate", {
+    awaitPromise: true,
+    expression,
+    returnByValue: true,
+  });
+  if (result.exceptionDetails) {
+    throw new Error("A page expression threw.");
+  }
+  return result.result.value;
+}
+
+async function waitFor(expression, description) {
+  const deadline = Date.now() + timeoutMs;
+  while (Date.now() < deadline) {
+    if (await evaluate(`Boolean(${expression})`).catch(() => false)) {
+      return true;
+    }
+    await new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, 250));
+  }
+  console.log(`FAIL timed out waiting for ${description}`);
+  failures += 1;
+  return false;
+}
+
+async function navigate(url) {
+  await send("Page.navigate", { url });
+}
+
+const selector = (testId) => `document.querySelector('[data-testid="${testId}"]')`;
+
+async function cookiesFor(origin) {
+  const { cookies } = await send("Network.getCookies", { urls: [`${origin}/`] });
+  return cookies;
+}
+
+// --- Sign in on the Dashboard's hostname -------------------------------------------------------
+await navigate(`${dashboardOrigin}/`);
+await waitFor(selector("login-email"), "the sign-in form on the Dashboard hostname");
+await evaluate(`(() => {
+  // React tracks input values through the native setter; assigning .value alone is invisible to it.
+  const setValue = (element, value) => {
+    Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor(HTMLInputElement.prototype, "value").set.call(element, value);
+    element.dispatchEvent(new Event("input", { bubbles: true }));
+  };
+  setValue(${selector("login-email")}, ${JSON.stringify(required("SMOKE_OWNER_EMAIL"))});
+  setValue(${selector("login-password")}, ${JSON.stringify(required("SMOKE_OWNER_PASSWORD"))});
+  ${selector("login-email")}.form.requestSubmit();
+})()`);
+check(
+  await waitFor(selector("host-shell"), "the signed-in Dashboard"),
+  "a person signs in through the real form on the Dashboard hostname",
+);
+
+const apiCookies = await cookiesFor(apiOrigin);
+const dashboardCookies = await cookiesFor(dashboardOrigin);
+check(
+  apiCookies.some((cookie) => cookie.httpOnly && cookie.secure && cookie.domain === apiHostname) &&
+    dashboardCookies.length === 0,
+  "the session cookie is host-only on the API hostname, and the Dashboard hostname holds none",
+);
+
+// --- A module UI, imported from the API's origin -------------------------------------------------
+const moduleButton = "document.querySelector('[data-testid^=\"select-\"]')";
+const hasModule = await waitFor(moduleButton, "a module in the Dashboard navigation");
+if (hasModule) {
+  const moduleId = await evaluate(`${moduleButton}.dataset.testid.slice("select-".length)`);
+  await evaluate(`${moduleButton}.click()`);
+  const mounted = await waitFor(
+    `${selector("module-container")}?.childElementCount > 0 && !${selector("module-loading")} && !${selector("module-error")}`,
+    "the module UI to mount",
+  );
+  check(
+    mounted && !(await evaluate(`Boolean(${selector("module-error")})`)),
+    `the ${moduleId} module UI mounts`,
+  );
+  // Give the module's first requests a moment to settle before judging them.
+  await new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, 1_000));
+  check(
+    responses.some(
+      (response) =>
+        response.url.startsWith(`${apiOrigin}/api/v1/module-ui/${moduleId}/`) &&
+        response.status === 200,
+    ),
+    "its UI artifact was imported from the API's origin",
+  );
+  check(
+    responses.some(
+      (response) =>
+        response.url.startsWith(`${apiOrigin}/api/v1/modules/${moduleId}`) &&
+        response.status >= 200 &&
+        response.status < 300,
+    ),
+    "its own credentialed API request to the API's origin succeeded under CORS",
+  );
+  const streams = responses.filter((response) => response.type === "EventSource");
+  check(
+    streams.every((response) => response.status === 200),
+    `every realtime stream it opened was accepted (${streams.length} opened)`,
+  );
+}
+// A CORS refusal or a blocked request is always a failure. A request the page itself cancelled (a
+// module unmounting, a navigation) is not.
+const refused = failed.filter(
+  (failure) =>
+    failure.corsErrorStatus !== undefined ||
+    failure.blockedReason !== undefined ||
+    !(failure.canceled || failure.errorText === "net::ERR_ABORTED"),
+);
+check(
+  refused.length === 0,
+  `no request from the Dashboard failed or was refused by CORS (${refused.length} refused)`,
+);
+
+// --- The display host, on the API's origin, with the same session --------------------------------
+const displayPath =
+  await evaluate(`fetch(${JSON.stringify(`${apiOrigin}/api/v1/dashboard/navigation`)}, {
+  credentials: "include",
+}).then((response) => response.json()).then((navigation) => {
+  const entries = [...navigation.ungrouped, ...navigation.groups.flatMap((group) => group.modules)];
+  return entries.find((entry) => entry.module.display !== null)?.module.display.url ?? null;
+})`);
+if (displayPath === null) {
+  console.log("skip no installed module publishes a display");
+} else {
+  await navigate(`${apiOrigin}${displayPath}`);
+  check(
+    await waitFor(
+      `${selector("display-module-container")}?.childElementCount > 0 && !${selector("display-error")}`,
+      "the display to mount",
+    ),
+    "the module's display page mounts on the API hostname with the same session",
+  );
+  check(
+    await waitFor(
+      "navigator.serviceWorker.getRegistrations().then((registrations) => registrations.length > 0)",
+      "the display's service worker",
+    ),
+    "the display's offline service worker registers on the API's origin",
+  );
+}
+
+// --- Sign out on the Dashboard -------------------------------------------------------------------
+await navigate(`${dashboardOrigin}/`);
+await waitFor(selector("host-logout"), "the sign-out control");
+await evaluate(`${selector("host-logout")}.click()`);
+check(
+  await waitFor(selector("login-email"), "the sign-in form after sign-out"),
+  "sign-out returns the Dashboard to the sign-in form",
+);
+const principal = await evaluate(`fetch(${JSON.stringify(`${apiOrigin}/api/v1/principal`)}, {
+  credentials: "include",
+}).then((response) => response.json()).then((body) => body.kind)`);
+check(principal === "anonymous", "after sign-out, the API answers anonymous to the same browser");
+
+await cdp.send("Target.closeTarget", { targetId });
+cdp.close();
+if (failures > 0) {
+  console.error(`${failures} check(s) failed`);
+  process.exit(1);
+}

scripts/lib/deploy-smoke-client.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,344 @@
+// HTTP assertions for scripts/smoke-deploy.sh, run inside a disposable container on the reference
+// deployment's `edge` network: every request goes through the proxy by its public hostname, exactly
+// as a browser's would. Not a test of the API in isolation, and never run against a real
+// installation.
+//
+//   node deploy-smoke-client.mjs edge     an ordinary, untrusted peer of the proxy
+//   node deploy-smoke-client.mjs tunnel   the Cloudflare Tunnel connector's fixed address
+//   node deploy-smoke-client.mjs session  the initial owner signing in and out through the proxy
+//
+// Either topology (ADR 0045): SMOKE_HOSTNAME is the API's hostname, and SMOKE_DASHBOARD_HOSTNAME,
+// when set, the Dashboard's. Unset means the same-origin topology, where both are one hostname. Every
+// request goes to the API's origin and carries the Dashboard's origin as `Origin`, as a browser would.
+//
+// Output is one line per check; any failed check exits non-zero. Nothing printed carries a
+// credential, cookie, signed URL, or response body beyond the fixed shapes asserted here.
+
+const mode = process.argv[2];
+const apiOrigin = `https://${required("SMOKE_HOSTNAME")}`;
+const dashboardOrigin = process.env.SMOKE_DASHBOARD_HOSTNAME
+  ? `https://${process.env.SMOKE_DASHBOARD_HOSTNAME}`
+  : apiOrigin;
+const split = dashboardOrigin !== apiOrigin;
+const untrustedOrigin = "https://untrusted.smoke.test";
+
+function required(name) {
+  const value = process.env[name];
+  if (!value) {
+    throw new Error(`${name} is required.`);
+  }
+  return value;
+}
+
+let failures = 0;
+
+function check(condition, description) {
+  console.log(`${condition ? "ok  " : "FAIL"} ${description}`);
+  if (!condition) {
+    failures += 1;
+  }
+}
+
+/** A sign-in attempt that can only fail authentication; what matters is whether the API's
+ * per-client limiter (3 attempts per 10 seconds) counts it against the expected client. */
+async function signInAttempt(headers = {}) {
+  const response = await fetch(`${apiOrigin}/api/auth/sign-in/email`, {
+    body: JSON.stringify({ email: "[email protected]", password: "definitely-not-the-password" }),
+    headers: { "content-type": "application/json", origin: dashboardOrigin, ...headers },
+    method: "POST",
+  });
+  await response.arrayBuffer();
+  return response.status;
+}
+
+async function edgeChecks() {
+  const ready = await fetch(`${apiOrigin}/api/v1/health/ready`);
+  check(
+    ready.status === 200 && (await ready.text()) === '{"status":"ready"}',
+    "GET /api/v1/health/ready through the proxy is 200 ready",
+  );
+
+  const page = await fetch(`${dashboardOrigin}/`);
+  const html = await page.text();
+  check(page.status === 200, "GET / through the proxy is 200");
+  check(
+    page.headers.get("content-type") === "text/html; charset=utf-8" &&
+      html.includes('id="ekklesia-host"') &&
+      html.includes('src="/assets/ekklesia-dashboard/app.js"'),
+    "GET / is the Dashboard HTML",
+  );
+  check(
+    page.headers.get("x-frame-options") === "DENY" &&
+      page.headers.get("content-security-policy") === "frame-ancestors 'none'" &&
+      page.headers.get("referrer-policy") === "no-referrer",
+    "the Dashboard page keeps its security headers through the proxy",
+  );
+
+  check(
+    html.includes(`<meta content="${apiOrigin}" name="ekklesia-api-origin" />`),
+    "the Dashboard page names the API's origin, rendered at run time (ADR 0045)",
+  );
+
+  const script = await fetch(`${dashboardOrigin}/assets/ekklesia-dashboard/app.js`);
+  await script.arrayBuffer();
+  check(script.status === 200, "GET /assets/ekklesia-dashboard/app.js is 200");
+
+  const outside = await fetch(`${dashboardOrigin}/favicon.ico`);
+  check(
+    outside.status === 404 && !(outside.headers.get("content-type") ?? "").includes("json"),
+    "a path the API does not serve is refused by the proxy, never forwarded",
+  );
+
+  const unknownApi = await fetch(`${apiOrigin}/api/v1/does-not-exist`);
+  check(
+    unknownApi.status === 404 && (await unknownApi.text()) === '{"code":"NOT_FOUND"}',
+    "an unknown /api/* path reaches the API and gets its sanitized 404",
+  );
+
+  if (split) {
+    await splitRoutingChecks();
+    await splitCorsChecks();
+  }
+
+  await storageDeliveryCheck();
+
+  // Every caller-supplied forwarding header rotates on every attempt. If any of them reached the
+  // API's client-address resolution, each attempt would land in a fresh limiter bucket and the
+  // fourth would not be limited.
+  const statuses = [];
+  for (let attempt = 1; attempt <= 4; attempt += 1) {
+    statuses.push(
+      await signInAttempt({
+        "cf-connecting-ip": `198.51.100.${attempt}`,
+        forwarded: `for=198.51.100.${attempt + 10}`,
+        "true-client-ip": `198.51.100.${attempt + 20}`,
+        "x-ekklesia-client-address": `198.51.100.${attempt + 50}`,
+        "x-forwarded-for": `198.51.100.${attempt + 30}`,
+        "x-real-ip": `198.51.100.${attempt + 40}`,
+      }),
+    );
+  }
+  check(
+    statuses.slice(0, 3).every((status) => status !== 429 && status < 500) && statuses[3] === 429,
+    `spoofed forwarding headers do not choose the client address (statuses ${statuses.join(",")})`,
+  );
+}
+
+/** A proxy refusal: Caddy's own empty `404`, never the API's JSON one, so the request was not
+ * forwarded at all. */
+async function refusedByProxy(url) {
+  const response = await fetch(url);
+  const body = await response.text();
+  return response.status === 404 && body === "";
+}
+
+/** Each hostname serves exactly its own paths (ADR 0045, "Routing per hostname"). */
+async function splitRoutingChecks() {
+  check(
+    await refusedByProxy(`${dashboardOrigin}/api/v1/health/ready`),
+    "the Dashboard hostname refuses /api/*, so the session cookie has one home",
+  );
+  check(
+    await refusedByProxy(`${dashboardOrigin}/display/example`),
+    "the Dashboard hostname refuses /display/*",
+  );
+  check(await refusedByProxy(`${apiOrigin}/`), "the API hostname serves nothing at /");
+  check(
+    await refusedByProxy(`${apiOrigin}/assets/ekklesia-dashboard/app.js`),
+    "the API hostname refuses the Dashboard's script",
+  );
+  const display = await fetch(`${apiOrigin}/display/does-not-exist`);
+  check(
+    display.status === 404 && (await display.text()) === '{"code":"NOT_FOUND"}',
+    "the API hostname forwards /display/* to the API (the display host's origin)",
+  );
+}
+
+/** Credentialed CORS for exactly the Dashboard's origin, and for nothing else. */
+async function splitCorsChecks() {
+  const preflight = await fetch(`${apiOrigin}/api/auth/sign-in/email`, {
+    headers: {
+      "access-control-request-headers": "content-type",
+      "access-control-request-method": "POST",
+      origin: dashboardOrigin,
+    },
+    method: "OPTIONS",
+  });
+  await preflight.arrayBuffer();
+  check(
+    preflight.status === 204 &&
+      preflight.headers.get("access-control-allow-origin") === dashboardOrigin &&
+      preflight.headers.get("access-control-allow-credentials") === "true",
+    "a preflight from the Dashboard's origin is allowed, with credentials",
+  );
+  const foreignPreflight = await fetch(`${apiOrigin}/api/auth/sign-in/email`, {
+    headers: { "access-control-request-method": "POST", origin: untrustedOrigin },
+    method: "OPTIONS",
+  });
+  await foreignPreflight.arrayBuffer();
+  check(
+    foreignPreflight.headers.get("access-control-allow-origin") === null,
+    "a preflight from any other origin gets no CORS permission",
+  );
+  const principal = await fetch(`${apiOrigin}/api/v1/principal`, {
+    headers: { origin: dashboardOrigin },
+  });
+  await principal.arrayBuffer();
+  check(
+    principal.headers.get("access-control-allow-origin") === dashboardOrigin &&
+      principal.headers.get("access-control-allow-credentials") === "true" &&
+      (principal.headers.get("vary") ?? "").includes("Origin"),
+    "an API response to the Dashboard's origin reflects exactly that origin, with credentials",
+  );
+}
+
+async function storageDeliveryCheck() {
+  // Core's own provider, from the image, exactly as the API composes it: it reaches object-storage
+  // over HTTPS on the private network and signs read URLs for the storage hostname.
+  const { createS3StorageProvider, createStorageProviderConfig } = await import(
+    "/opt/ekklesia/core/dist/storage/index.js"
+  );
+  const config = createStorageProviderConfig(
+    {
+      accessKey: required("S3_ACCESS_KEY"),
+      bucketPrefix: "ekklesia-smoke",
+      deliveryEndpoint: `https://${required("SMOKE_STORAGE_HOSTNAME")}`,
+      endpoint: "https://object-storage:8443",
+      forcePathStyle: true,
+      region: "us-east-1",
+      secretKey: required("S3_SECRET_KEY"),
+    },
+    { environment: "production" },
+  );
+  const provider = createS3StorageProvider(config);
+  try {
+    const bucket = "ekklesia-smoke-delivery";
+    const body = new TextEncoder().encode("delivered through the proxy\n");
+    await provider.ensureBucket(bucket);
+    await provider.put(bucket, "smoke/object.txt", body, {
+      contentLength: body.byteLength,
+      contentType: "text/plain",
+    });
+    const readUrl = await provider.createReadUrl(bucket, "smoke/object.txt", {
+      expiresInSeconds: 300,
+    });
+    const url = new URL(readUrl.url);
+    check(
+      url.origin === `https://${required("SMOKE_STORAGE_HOSTNAME")}`,
+      "a signed read URL names the storage hostname",
+    );
+    const delivered = await fetch(url);
+    const text = await delivered.text();
+    check(
+      delivered.status === 200 && text === "delivered through the proxy\n",
+      "a signed read URL verifies through the proxy (original Host preserved)",
+    );
+    check(
+      (delivered.headers.get("cache-control") ?? "").startsWith("private"),
+      "a delivered object is Cache-Control: private",
+    );
+    await provider.delete(bucket, "smoke/object.txt");
+  } finally {
+    await provider.close();
+  }
+}
+
+async function tunnelChecks() {
+  // From the connector's fixed address, CF-Connecting-IP is the client: one visitor is limited on
+  // its fourth attempt, and a different visitor is not limited by the first one's attempts.
+  const first = [];
+  for (let attempt = 1; attempt <= 4; attempt += 1) {
+    first.push(await signInAttempt({ "cf-connecting-ip": "203.0.113.10" }));
+  }
+  check(
+    first.slice(0, 3).every((status) => status !== 429 && status < 500) && first[3] === 429,
+    `the connector's CF-Connecting-IP identifies the visitor (statuses ${first.join(",")})`,
+  );
+  const second = await signInAttempt({ "cf-connecting-ip": "203.0.113.11" });
+  check(
+    second !== 429 && second < 500,
+    `a second visitor behind the connector has its own limiter bucket (status ${second})`,
+  );
+}
+
+/** The deployed browser authentication contract (launch checklist item 9), as the initial owner
+ * created by the image's own CLI (item 10). */
+async function sessionChecks() {
+  for (const path of [
+    "/api/auth/get-session",
+    "/api/auth/list-sessions",
+    "/api/auth/update-session",
+    "/api/auth/change-password",
+  ]) {
+    const response = await fetch(`${apiOrigin}${path}`, {
+      method: path.endsWith("get-session") || path.endsWith("list-sessions") ? "GET" : "POST",
+      headers: { origin: dashboardOrigin },
+    });
+    check(
+      response.status === 404 && (await response.text()) === '{"code":"NOT_FOUND"}',
+      `${path} is unavailable through the proxy`,
+    );
+  }
+
+  const signIn = await fetch(`${apiOrigin}/api/auth/sign-in/email`, {
+    body: JSON.stringify({
+      email: required("SMOKE_OWNER_EMAIL"),
+      password: required("SMOKE_OWNER_PASSWORD"),
+    }),
+    headers: { "content-type": "application/json", origin: dashboardOrigin },
+    method: "POST",
+  });
+  const signInBody = await signIn.text();
+  const setCookie = signIn.headers.get("set-cookie") ?? "";
+  check(
+    signIn.status === 200 && signInBody === '{"ok":true}',
+    'sign-in returns the fixed {"ok":true}',
+  );
+  const attributes = setCookie.toLowerCase();
+  check(
+    attributes.includes("httponly") &&
+      attributes.includes("secure") &&
+      attributes.includes("samesite=lax") &&
+      !attributes.includes("domain="),
+    "the session cookie is host-only, HttpOnly, Secure, and SameSite=Lax",
+  );
+  const cookie = setCookie.split(";")[0] ?? "";
+
+  const principal = await fetch(`${apiOrigin}/api/v1/principal`, {
+    headers: { cookie, origin: dashboardOrigin },
+  });
+  const principalBody = await principal.json();
+  check(
+    principal.status === 200 && principalBody.kind === "authenticated",
+    "the session resolves an authenticated principal through the proxy",
+  );
+
+  const signOut = await fetch(`${apiOrigin}/api/auth/sign-out`, {
+    body: "{}",
+    headers: { "content-type": "application/json", cookie, origin: dashboardOrigin },
+    method: "POST",
+  });
+  await signOut.arrayBuffer();
+  const after = await fetch(`${apiOrigin}/api/v1/principal`, {
+    headers: { cookie, origin: dashboardOrigin },
+  });
+  check(
+    signOut.status === 200 && (await after.json()).kind === "anonymous",
+    "sign-out ends the session",
+  );
+}
+
+if (mode === "edge") {
+  await edgeChecks();
+} else if (mode === "tunnel") {
+  await tunnelChecks();
+} else if (mode === "session") {
+  await sessionChecks();
+} else {
+  throw new Error('Mode must be "edge", "tunnel", or "session".');
+}
+
+if (failures > 0) {
+  console.log(`${failures} check(s) failed.`);
+  process.exit(1);
+}

scripts/smoke-deploy.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,488 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# End-to-end smoke test of the reference deployment (ADR 0044): deploy/compose.yaml with
+# deploy/compose.proxy.yaml, a platform-only image, and a disposable PostgreSQL and SeaweedFS that
+# exist only for this run. CI runs it; it is safe to run on a workstation.
+#
+#   bash scripts/smoke-deploy.sh                 builds the image first
+#   EKKLESIA_SMOKE_IMAGE=<image> bash scripts/smoke-deploy.sh
+#   EKKLESIA_SMOKE_TOPOLOGY=split bash scripts/smoke-deploy.sh
+#
+# Either topology (ADR 0045). `same-origin` (the default) serves the Dashboard, the API, and displays
+# from one hostname with Caddyfile.example and a platform-only image. `split` serves the Dashboard on
+# its own hostname with Caddyfile.split.example, builds an image with the repository's module
+# template installed as a test-only module (so a module UI, its API routes, and a display exist), and
+# then drives a real headless Chromium through the Dashboard, the module, the display, and sign-out.
+# With EKKLESIA_SMOKE_IMAGE, the given image is used as is in either topology; a split run then
+# exercises whichever of its modules publishes UI and a display.
+#
+# TEST-ONLY: the proxy runs with Caddy's internal CA (`local_certs`) instead of ACME, because a test
+# run has no public hostname. Never use that option in an installation.
+#
+# Follows the documented first boot: TLS material, secrets, data services, an explicit migration
+# apply against this run's own fresh database, then the API and proxy. Everything it starts, and
+# every file it writes, is removed on exit.
+#
+# Bind mounts are resolved by the Docker daemon, on its host. When this script runs inside a CI job
+# container that drives the host's Docker, its own files are not at those paths, so every file a
+# container mounts is staged under an identical path in the Docker host's /tmp first.
+
+set -Eeuo pipefail
+
+repository_root="$(cd -- "$(dirname -- "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")/.." && pwd)"
+cd "$repository_root"
+
+# shellcheck source=scripts/lib/compose-diagnostics.sh
+source "$repository_root/scripts/lib/compose-diagnostics.sh"
+
+for command in docker openssl awk; do
+  command -v "$command" >/dev/null || {
+    echo "smoke-deploy: $command is required." >&2
+    exit 1
+  }
+done
+docker compose version >/dev/null 2>&1 || {
+  echo "smoke-deploy: Docker Compose is required." >&2
+  exit 1
+}
+
+# The pinned PostgreSQL image doubles as a root shell for file ownership, so the run needs neither
+# root nor sudo on the host.
+postgres_image="postgres:18.4-alpine3.24@sha256:9a8afca54e7861fd90fab5fdf4c42477a6b1cb7d293595148e674e0a3181de15"
+# The split topology's real browser: headless Chromium, pinned by its multi-architecture index digest.
+browser_image="chromedp/headless-shell:151.0.7922.109@sha256:2d349b544a1ea6b5b5fd7c0fe99215ff662339c57407ee2e8c0a11af93516b04"
+
+topology="${EKKLESIA_SMOKE_TOPOLOGY:-same-origin}"
+case "$topology" in
+same-origin | split) ;;
+*)
+  echo "smoke-deploy: EKKLESIA_SMOKE_TOPOLOGY must be same-origin or split." >&2
+  exit 1
+  ;;
+esac
+
+run_id="$(openssl rand -hex 4)"
+project="ekklesia-deploy-smoke-${run_id}"
+work="$(mktemp -d)"
+image="${EKKLESIA_SMOKE_IMAGE:-}"
+built_image=""
+# `hostname` is always the API's (and the display host's); the Dashboard has its own only when split.
+if [[ "$topology" == split ]]; then
+  hostname="api.smoke.test"
+  dashboard_hostname="dash.smoke.test"
+  caddyfile_example="deploy/Caddyfile.split.example"
+else
+  hostname="ekklesia.smoke.test"
+  dashboard_hostname=""
+  caddyfile_example="deploy/Caddyfile.example"
+fi
+dashboard_origin="https://${dashboard_hostname:-$hostname}"
+storage_hostname="storage.smoke.test"
+browser_container=""
+
+# choose_edge_network: a per-run edge subnet that no network on this Docker daemon already uses, so
+# concurrent runs sharing a runner's daemon do not collide. Two runs can still pick the same free
+# subnet at the same moment; the first `up` below detects that and chooses again. Fixed addresses come
+# from the upper half, outside Docker's dynamic range, exactly as documented.
+choose_edge_network() {
+  local in_use candidate attempt
+  in_use="$(
+    docker network ls --quiet |
+      xargs -r docker network inspect --format '{{range .IPAM.Config}}{{println .Subnet}}{{end}}' 2>/dev/null |
+      sed -n 's#^10\.249\.\([0-9]*\)\.0/24$#\1#p'
+  )" || in_use=""
+  for attempt in $(seq 1 100); do
+    candidate=$((RANDOM % 200 + 20))
+    if ! grep -qx "$candidate" <<<"$in_use"; then
+      octet="$candidate"
+      edge_subnet="10.249.${octet}.0/24"
+      edge_range="10.249.${octet}.0/25"
+      proxy_address="10.249.${octet}.254"
+      tunnel_address="10.249.${octet}.253"
+      # A test-only client address, also outside the dynamic range, so its limiter bucket is its own.
+      session_client_address="10.249.${octet}.252"
+      # The headless browser's fixed address, likewise (split topology only).
+      browser_address="10.249.${octet}.251"
+      return 0
+    fi
+  done
+  echo "smoke-deploy: no free 10.249.x.0/24 edge subnet on this Docker daemon." >&2
+  exit 1
+}
+choose_edge_network
+
+# daemon_work: where the Docker daemon sees this run's mounted files. The same directory as `work`
+# on a workstation; a staged copy on the Docker host when this script runs in a job container.
+if [[ -f /.dockerenv ]]; then
+  daemon_work="/tmp/${project}"
+  docker run --rm --entrypoint mkdir -v /tmp:/host-tmp "$postgres_image" -p "/host-tmp/${project}"
+  # stage <path relative to work>: copy it to the same relative path under daemon_work, keeping
+  # numeric ownership and modes.
+  stage() {
+    tar -C "$work" -cf - "$1" |
+      docker run --rm -i --entrypoint tar -v "$daemon_work:/w" "$postgres_image" -xpf - -C /w
+  }
+else
+  daemon_work="$work"
+  stage() { :; }
+fi
+
+compose=(
+  docker compose
+  --project-name "$project"
+  --project-directory "$daemon_work/deploy"
+  --env-file "$work/compose.env"
+  --file deploy/compose.yaml
+  --file deploy/compose.proxy.yaml
+)
+
+cleanup() {
+  local status=$?
+  trap - EXIT INT TERM
+  if [[ -n "$browser_container" ]]; then
+    docker rm --force "$browser_container" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
+  fi
+  if [[ -f "$work/compose.env" ]]; then
+    "${compose[@]}" --profile ops down --volumes --remove-orphans --timeout 10 >/dev/null 2>&1 || status=1
+  fi
+  # Some files are owned by the PostgreSQL and SeaweedFS uids by now; remove them as root, in the
+  # same image that set that ownership. In a job container the daemon cannot see `work` (and the
+  # job itself runs as root), so only the staged copy on the Docker host needs this.
+  if [[ "$daemon_work" == "$work" ]]; then
+    docker run --rm --entrypoint rm -v "$work:/work" "$postgres_image" -rf /work/tls /work/env \
+      >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
+  else
+    docker run --rm --entrypoint rm -v /tmp:/host-tmp "$postgres_image" -rf "/host-tmp/${project}" \
+      >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
+  fi
+  rm -rf "$work" || true
+  if [[ -n "$built_image" ]]; then
+    docker image rm --force "$built_image" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
+  fi
+  exit "$status"
+}
+trap cleanup EXIT INT TERM
+
+step() {
+  echo "==> $*"
+}
+
+fail() {
+  echo "smoke-deploy: $*" >&2
+  exit 1
+}
+
+if [[ -z "$image" && "$topology" == same-origin ]]; then
+  step "Building the platform-only image"
+  built_image="ekklesia-deploy-smoke:${run_id}"
+  DOCKER_BUILDKIT=1 docker build --quiet --file deploy/Dockerfile --tag "$built_image" . >/dev/null
+  image="$built_image"
+elif [[ -z "$image" ]]; then
+  # TEST-ONLY: the repository's module template, installed as the module `example`, in a copy of the
+  # working tree. Its lockfile importer moves with it; the depth is the same, so every relative link
+  # in that importer stays correct and the install stays frozen.
+  step "Building an image with the module template installed as a test-only module"
+  command -v git >/dev/null || fail "git is required to build the split topology's test image."
+  context="$work/build-context"
+  mkdir -p "$context"
+  git ls-files -z --cached --others --exclude-standard |
+    tar --null --files-from=- --create --file=- |
+    tar -C "$context" -xf -
+  mkdir -p "$context/modules"
+  mv "$context/templates/module" "$context/modules/example"
+  [[ "$(grep -c '^  templates/module:$' "$context/pnpm-lock.yaml")" == 1 ]] ||
+    fail "the lockfile has no single templates/module importer to move."
+  sed -i 's|^  templates/module:$|  modules/example:|' "$context/pnpm-lock.yaml"
+  built_image="ekklesia-deploy-smoke:${run_id}"
+  DOCKER_BUILDKIT=1 docker build --quiet --file "$context/deploy/Dockerfile" --tag "$built_image" \
+    "$context" >/dev/null || fail "the test-module image did not build."
+  rm -rf "$context"
+  image="$built_image"
+fi
+
+# The compose project directory: its relative bind mount (postgres/pg_hba.conf) resolves here.
+cp -R deploy "$work/deploy"
+stage deploy
+
+step "Creating the installation-private CA and server certificates"
+init_status=0
+sh deploy/scripts/init-tls.sh "$work/tls" >/dev/null 2>&1 || init_status=$?
+if ((init_status != 0 && init_status != 77)); then
+  fail "init-tls.sh failed to create TLS material."
+fi
+stage tls
+# The root-only ownership pass, exactly as an operator would re-run the script with root.
+ownership_output="$(
+  docker run --rm --entrypoint sh -v "$daemon_work/tls:/tls" \
+    -v "$daemon_work/deploy/scripts:/scripts:ro" "$postgres_image" /scripts/init-tls.sh /tls
+)" || fail "init-tls.sh could not apply ownership."
+database_ca_line="$(grep '^EKKLESIA_DATABASE_CA=' <<<"$ownership_output")" ||
+  fail "init-tls.sh did not print the EKKLESIA_DATABASE_CA line."
+# A second run must create nothing and still succeed.
+rerun_output="$(
+  docker run --rm --entrypoint sh -v "$daemon_work/tls:/tls" \
+    -v "$daemon_work/deploy/scripts:/scripts:ro" "$postgres_image" /scripts/init-tls.sh /tls
+)" || fail "init-tls.sh failed on a second run."
+grep -q 'nothing to create' <<<"$rerun_output" || fail "init-tls.sh is not idempotent."
+
+step "Writing env files from the examples, with freshly generated secrets"
+secrets="$(sh deploy/scripts/gen-secrets.sh)"
+secret() {
+  awk -F= -v key="$1" '$1 == key { sub(/^[^=]*=/, ""); print; exit }' <<<"$secrets"
+}
+postgres_password="$(secret POSTGRES_PASSWORD)"
+s3_access_key="$(secret S3_ACCESS_KEY)"
+s3_secret_key="$(secret S3_SECRET_KEY)"
+identity_secret="$(secret EKKLESIA_IDENTITY_SECRET)"
+# Masked in any diagnostics below, along with anything else that looks like a credential.
+COMPOSE_DIAGNOSTICS_SECRETS=("$postgres_password" "$s3_access_key" "$s3_secret_key" "$identity_secret")
+
+mkdir -p "$work/env"
+# set_env <file> <key> <value>: replaces an uncommented KEY= line, keeping the value byte-exact.
+set_env() {
+  KEY="$2" VALUE="$3" awk '
+    BEGIN { found = 0 }
+    index($0, ENVIRON["KEY"] "=") == 1 { print ENVIRON["KEY"] "=" ENVIRON["VALUE"]; found = 1; next }
+    { print }
+    END { if (!found) print ENVIRON["KEY"] "=" ENVIRON["VALUE"] }
+  ' "$1" >"$1.next"
+  mv "$1.next" "$1"
+}
+for name in ekklesia postgres object-storage; do
+  cp "deploy/env/${name}.env.example" "$work/env/${name}.env"
+done
+ekklesia_env="$work/env/ekklesia.env"
+set_env "$ekklesia_env" DATABASE_URL "postgresql://ekklesia:${postgres_password}@postgres:5432/ekklesia"
+set_env "$ekklesia_env" EKKLESIA_DATABASE_CA "${database_ca_line#EKKLESIA_DATABASE_CA=}"
+set_env "$ekklesia_env" EKKLESIA_IDENTITY_BASE_URL "https://${hostname}"
+set_env "$ekklesia_env" EKKLESIA_IDENTITY_TRUSTED_ORIGINS "$dashboard_origin"
+if [[ "$topology" == split ]]; then
+  set_env "$ekklesia_env" EKKLESIA_DASHBOARD_ORIGIN "$dashboard_origin"
+fi
+set_env "$ekklesia_env" EKKLESIA_IDENTITY_SECRET "$identity_secret"
+set_env "$ekklesia_env" S3_DELIVERY_ENDPOINT "https://${storage_hostname}"
+set_env "$ekklesia_env" S3_ACCESS_KEY "$s3_access_key"
+set_env "$ekklesia_env" S3_SECRET_KEY "$s3_secret_key"
+set_env "$work/env/postgres.env" POSTGRES_PASSWORD "$postgres_password"
+set_env "$work/env/object-storage.env" AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID "$s3_access_key"
+set_env "$work/env/object-storage.env" AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY "$s3_secret_key"
+chmod 600 "$work"/env/*.env
+
+# TEST-ONLY: Caddy's internal CA instead of ACME. Inserted as the first global option.
+awk '!done && $0 == "{" { print; print "\tlocal_certs"; done = 1; next } { print }' \
+  "$caddyfile_example" >"$work/Caddyfile"
+grep -q $'^\tlocal_certs$' "$work/Caddyfile" || fail "could not enable local_certs for the test proxy."
+stage Caddyfile
+
+cat >"$work/compose.env" <<EOF
+EKKLESIA_IMAGE=${image}
+EKKLESIA_ENV_DIR=${work}/env
+EKKLESIA_TLS_DIR=${daemon_work}/tls
+EKKLESIA_HOSTNAME=${hostname}
+EKKLESIA_DASHBOARD_HOSTNAME=${dashboard_hostname}
+EKKLESIA_STORAGE_HOSTNAME=${storage_hostname}
+EKKLESIA_ACME_EMAIL=[email protected]
+EKKLESIA_CADDYFILE=${daemon_work}/Caddyfile
+EKKLESIA_PUBLISH_ADDRESS=127.0.0.1
+EKKLESIA_HTTP_PORT=0
+EKKLESIA_HTTPS_PORT=0
+EKKLESIA_EDGE_SUBNET=${edge_subnet}
+EKKLESIA_EDGE_DYNAMIC_RANGE=${edge_range}
+EKKLESIA_PROXY_ADDRESS=${proxy_address}
+EKKLESIA_TUNNEL_ADDRESS=${tunnel_address}
+EOF
+
+step "Starting PostgreSQL and object storage"
+# This `up` creates the edge network. If another run claimed the same subnet since it was chosen,
+# Docker refuses with an address-pool overlap: choose another and start again, a bounded number of
+# times. Any other failure is reported with the project's containers and logs.
+for attempt in 1 2 3 4 5; do
+  if up_output="$(
+    "${compose[@]}" up --detach --wait --wait-timeout 180 postgres object-storage 2>&1
+  )"; then
+    break
+  fi
+  if [[ "$up_output" == *"overlap"* ]] && ((attempt < 5)); then
+    echo "     edge subnet ${edge_subnet} was taken by a concurrent run; choosing another"
+    "${compose[@]}" down --volumes --remove-orphans --timeout 10 >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
+    choose_edge_network
+    set_env "$work/compose.env" EKKLESIA_EDGE_SUBNET "$edge_subnet"
+    set_env "$work/compose.env" EKKLESIA_EDGE_DYNAMIC_RANGE "$edge_range"
+    set_env "$work/compose.env" EKKLESIA_PROXY_ADDRESS "$proxy_address"
+    set_env "$work/compose.env" EKKLESIA_TUNNEL_ADDRESS "$tunnel_address"
+    continue
+  fi
+  compose_report_not_ready "$up_output" "${compose[@]}"
+  fail "PostgreSQL and object storage did not become healthy."
+done
+
+step "Planning, then explicitly applying, migrations against this run's fresh database"
+"${compose[@]}" run --rm --no-deps migrate >/dev/null || fail "migrate (plan) failed."
+"${compose[@]}" run --rm --no-deps migrate node core/dist/cli/apply-migrations.js >/dev/null ||
+  fail "migrate (apply) failed."
+
+step "Starting the API and the proxy"
+if ! up_output="$("${compose[@]}" up --detach --wait --wait-timeout 180 2>&1)"; then
+  compose_report_not_ready "$up_output" "${compose[@]}"
+  fail "the API and proxy did not become healthy."
+fi
+
+# Caddy creates its internal CA on first start. The test clients trust it, plus the installation CA
+# for their direct connection to object-storage.
+for _ in $(seq 1 30); do
+  if "${compose[@]}" exec -T proxy cat /data/caddy/pki/authorities/local/root.crt \
+    >"$work/caddy-root.crt" 2>/dev/null && [[ -s "$work/caddy-root.crt" ]]; then
+    break
+  fi
+  sleep 1
+done
+[[ -s "$work/caddy-root.crt" ]] || fail "the test proxy's internal CA did not appear."
+cat "$work/caddy-root.crt" "$work/tls/ca.crt" >"$work/client-ca.pem"
+cp scripts/lib/deploy-smoke-client.mjs "$work/client.mjs"
+stage client-ca.pem
+stage client.mjs
+
+edge_network="${project}_edge"
+host_mappings=(--add-host "${hostname}:${proxy_address}" --add-host "${storage_hostname}:${proxy_address}")
+if [[ -n "$dashboard_hostname" ]]; then
+  host_mappings+=(--add-host "${dashboard_hostname}:${proxy_address}")
+fi
+client() {
+  local mode="$1"
+  shift
+  docker run --rm --read-only --cap-drop ALL --security-opt no-new-privileges \
+    --network "$edge_network" "$@" "${host_mappings[@]}" \
+    -e NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS=/smoke/client-ca.pem -e SMOKE_HOSTNAME="$hostname" \
+    -e SMOKE_DASHBOARD_HOSTNAME="$dashboard_hostname" \
+    -e SMOKE_STORAGE_HOSTNAME="$storage_hostname" \
+    -e S3_ACCESS_KEY="$s3_access_key" -e S3_SECRET_KEY="$s3_secret_key" \
+    -v "$daemon_work/client.mjs:/smoke/client.mjs:ro" \
+    -v "$daemon_work/client-ca.pem:/smoke/client-ca.pem:ro" \
+    --entrypoint node "$image" /smoke/client.mjs "$mode"
+}
+
+step "Checking the API, Dashboard, storage delivery, and client-address chain through the proxy"
+client edge || fail "edge checks failed."
+
+step "Checking the tunnel connector's client-address path from its fixed address"
+client tunnel --ip "$tunnel_address" || fail "tunnel checks failed."
+
+step "Creating the initial owner with the image's own CLI, then signing in and out through the proxy"
+owner_email="[email protected]"
+owner_password="$(openssl rand -hex 16)"
+printf '%s' "$owner_password" |
+  "${compose[@]}" run --rm --no-deps -T migrate node core/dist/cli/create-initial-owner.js \
+    --email "$owner_email" >/dev/null || fail "creating the initial owner failed."
+echo "ok   the initial owner was created from the image (password on standard input)"
+client session --ip "$session_client_address" \
+  -e SMOKE_OWNER_EMAIL="$owner_email" -e SMOKE_OWNER_PASSWORD="$owner_password" ||
+  fail "session checks failed."
+
+if [[ "$topology" == split ]]; then
+  step "Driving a real browser through the split Dashboard, a module, its display, and sign-out"
+  # Chromium trusts this run's proxy through the public-key hash of Caddy's internal intermediate CA,
+  # which signs every certificate the test proxy serves: no CA is installed anywhere, and nothing but
+  # this run's certificates is accepted.
+  "${compose[@]}" exec -T proxy cat /data/caddy/pki/authorities/local/intermediate.crt \
+    >"$work/caddy-intermediate.crt" || fail "the test proxy's intermediate CA is unavailable."
+  spki="$(openssl x509 -in "$work/caddy-intermediate.crt" -pubkey -noout |
+    openssl pkey -pubin -outform der | openssl dgst -sha256 -binary | openssl base64 -A)"
+  browser_container="${project}-browser"
+  # The image's entry script passes its arguments on unquoted, so none may contain a space: the
+  # hostnames reach Chromium through /etc/hosts, which it reads, rather than a resolver rule.
+  docker run --detach --rm --name "$browser_container" \
+    --cap-drop ALL --security-opt no-new-privileges --tmpfs /tmp \
+    --network "$edge_network" --ip "$browser_address" "${host_mappings[@]}" \
+    "$browser_image" \
+    "--ignore-certificate-errors-spki-list=${spki}" \
+    --user-data-dir=/tmp/profile >/dev/null || fail "the headless browser did not start."
+  cp scripts/lib/deploy-smoke-browser.mjs "$work/browser.mjs"
+  stage browser.mjs
+  docker run --rm --read-only --cap-drop ALL --security-opt no-new-privileges \
+    --network "$edge_network" \
+    -e SMOKE_CDP_ADDRESS="${browser_address}:9222" \
+    -e SMOKE_HOSTNAME="$hostname" -e SMOKE_DASHBOARD_HOSTNAME="$dashboard_hostname" \
+    -e SMOKE_OWNER_EMAIL="$owner_email" -e SMOKE_OWNER_PASSWORD="$owner_password" \
+    -v "$daemon_work/browser.mjs:/smoke/browser.mjs:ro" \
+    --entrypoint node "$image" /smoke/browser.mjs || fail "browser checks failed."
+fi
+
+step "Proving the API's database connection is certificate-verified TLS"
+api_container="$("${compose[@]}" ps -q api)"
+api_data_address="$(
+  docker inspect --format "{{(index .NetworkSettings.Networks \"${project}_data\").IPAddress}}" \
+    "$api_container"
+)"
+[[ -n "$api_data_address" ]] || fail "could not find the API's database-network address."
+psql_as_superuser() {
+  "${compose[@]}" exec -T postgres psql -U ekklesia -d ekklesia -Atc "$1"
+}
+tls_connections="$(psql_as_superuser "SELECT count(*) FROM pg_stat_ssl s JOIN pg_stat_activity a USING (pid) WHERE a.client_addr = '${api_data_address}' AND s.ssl AND s.version = 'TLSv1.3'")"
+plain_connections="$(psql_as_superuser "SELECT count(*) FROM pg_stat_ssl s JOIN pg_stat_activity a USING (pid) WHERE a.client_addr = '${api_data_address}' AND NOT s.ssl")"
+((tls_connections > 0)) || fail "the API holds no TLS 1.3 database connection."
+((plain_connections == 0)) || fail "the API holds a database connection without TLS."
+echo "ok   the API's database connections are TLS 1.3 (${tls_connections}), none plaintext"
+
+# PostgreSQL itself refuses a network connection without TLS.
+if "${compose[@]}" exec -T -e PGPASSWORD="$postgres_password" postgres \
+  psql "host=postgres user=ekklesia dbname=ekklesia sslmode=disable" -Atc 'SELECT 1' >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+  fail "PostgreSQL accepted a plaintext network connection."
+fi
+echo "ok   PostgreSQL refuses a plaintext network connection"
+
+# The server cannot see whether a client verified it, so verification is proven by refusal: the
+# same command fails against a CA that did not issue the certificate, and against a host the
+# certificate does not name.
+openssl ecparam -name prime256v1 -genkey -noout -out "$work/other-ca.key" 2>/dev/null
+openssl req -x509 -new -sha256 -days 1 -key "$work/other-ca.key" -out "$work/other-ca.crt" \
+  -subj "/CN=Unrelated CA" 2>/dev/null
+# expect_connection_refused <description> <compose run arguments...>: the command must fail, and fail
+# at the connection, not on a configuration error that would prove nothing about verification.
+expect_connection_refused() {
+  local description="$1"
+  shift
+  local output
+  if output="$("${compose[@]}" run --rm --no-deps "$@" 2>&1)"; then
+    fail "the database connection accepted ${description}."
+  fi
+  grep -q 'MIGRATION_CONNECTION_FAILED' <<<"$output" ||
+    fail "rejecting ${description} failed for a reason other than the connection."
+}
+expect_connection_refused "a certificate from a CA it was not given" \
+  -e EKKLESIA_DATABASE_CA="$(cat "$work/other-ca.crt")" migrate
+echo "ok   the database connection rejects a certificate its CA did not issue"
+postgres_address="$(
+  docker inspect --format "{{(index .NetworkSettings.Networks \"${project}_data\").IPAddress}}" \
+    "$("${compose[@]}" ps -q postgres)"
+)"
+expect_connection_refused "a certificate for a different host name" \
+  -e DATABASE_URL="postgresql://ekklesia:${postgres_password}@${postgres_address}:5432/ekklesia" migrate
+echo "ok   the database connection rejects a certificate that does not name the host"
+"${compose[@]}" run --rm --no-deps migrate >/dev/null || fail "the control connection failed."
+echo "ok   the same connection succeeds with the installation CA and the name postgres"
+
+step "Running Doctor from the image"
+doctor_output="$("${compose[@]}" run --rm --no-deps migrate node core/dist/cli/doctor.js 2>&1)" ||
+  fail "Doctor reported the installation not ready."
+grep -q 'Result: READY' <<<"$doctor_output" || fail "Doctor did not report READY."
+grep -q 'TLS required with certificate and hostname verification (explicit private CA supplied)' \
+  <<<"$doctor_output" || fail "Doctor did not report verify-full with the private CA."
+grep -q '✓ Object storage reachable' <<<"$doctor_output" ||
+  fail "Doctor could not reach object storage over HTTPS."
+for value in "$postgres_password" "$s3_secret_key" "$identity_secret"; do
+  if grep -qF -- "$value" <<<"$doctor_output"; then
+    fail "Doctor output contains a secret."
+  fi
+done
+echo "ok   Doctor: READY, verify-full with the private CA, storage reachable, no secret printed"
+
+api_logs="$("${compose[@]}" logs --no-color api 2>&1)"
+for value in "$postgres_password" "$s3_secret_key" "$identity_secret" "$owner_password"; do
+  if grep -qF -- "$value" <<<"$api_logs"; then
+    fail "the API's logs contain a secret."
+  fi
+done
+restarts="$(docker inspect --format '{{.RestartCount}}' "$api_container")"
+((restarts == 0)) || fail "the API restarted ${restarts} time(s)."
+echo "ok   the API logged no secret and never restarted"
+
+echo "Reference deployment smoke test passed."

scripts/smoke-infrastructure.sh

@@ -7,6 +7,8 @@ cd "$repository_root"
 
 # shellcheck source=scripts/lib/compose-job-network.sh
 source "$repository_root/scripts/lib/compose-job-network.sh"
+# shellcheck source=scripts/lib/compose-diagnostics.sh
+source "$repository_root/scripts/lib/compose-diagnostics.sh"
 
 command -v docker >/dev/null || {
   echo "Docker is required for the infrastructure smoke test." >&2
@@ -28,7 +30,9 @@ if [[ "$curl_help" != *"--aws-sigv4"* ]]; then
   exit 1
 fi
 
-raw_project="ekklesia-smoke-${GITHUB_RUN_ID:-local}-${GITHUB_RUN_ATTEMPT:-0}-$$"
+# Unique per invocation, not only per run: several runs can share a runner's Docker daemon at once,
+# and the shell's PID is often identical across job containers.
+raw_project="ekklesia-smoke-${GITHUB_RUN_ID:-local}-${GITHUB_RUN_ATTEMPT:-0}-$$-${RANDOM}${RANDOM}"
 project="${raw_project//[^a-zA-Z0-9_-]/-}"
 project="${project,,}"
 temporary_directory="$(mktemp -d)"
@@ -46,6 +50,8 @@ export S3_SECRET_KEY="ekklesia-smoke-secret-key"
 export S3_BUCKET="ekklesia-smoke"
 export S3_REGION="us-east-1"
 export S3_PORT="${EKKLESIA_SMOKE_S3_PORT:-0}"
+COMPOSE_DIAGNOSTICS_SECRETS=("$POSTGRES_PASSWORD" "$S3_ACCESS_KEY" "$S3_SECRET_KEY")
+up_output=""
 
 compose=(
   docker compose
@@ -63,7 +69,7 @@ cleanup() {
   local cleanup_output
   trap - EXIT INT TERM
   if ((exit_status != 0)); then
-    "${compose[@]}" logs --no-color >&2 || true
+    compose_report_not_ready "$up_output" "${compose[@]}" || true
   fi
   if ! compose_job_network_disconnect; then
     echo "Infrastructure smoke network cleanup failed." >&2
@@ -88,8 +94,15 @@ trap 'exit 130' INT
 trap 'exit 143' TERM
 
 "${compose[@]}" config --quiet
-"${compose[@]}" up --detach --wait --wait-timeout 120
-"${compose[@]}" up --detach --wait --wait-timeout 120
+# Started twice: the second `up` proves the project is idempotent. A failure's own output is kept for
+# the cleanup's diagnostics, which also print every container and the tail of its logs.
+for _ in 1 2; do
+  if ! up_output="$("${compose[@]}" up --detach --wait --wait-timeout 120 2>&1)"; then
+    echo "Disposable PostgreSQL and object storage did not become ready." >&2
+    exit 1
+  fi
+done
+up_output=""
 
 database_result="$(
   "${compose[@]}" exec -T \

scripts/test-migrations-integration.sh

@@ -7,6 +7,8 @@ cd "$repository_root"
 
 # shellcheck source=scripts/lib/compose-job-network.sh
 source "$repository_root/scripts/lib/compose-job-network.sh"
+# shellcheck source=scripts/lib/compose-diagnostics.sh
+source "$repository_root/scripts/lib/compose-diagnostics.sh"
 
 command -v docker >/dev/null || {
   echo "Docker is required for the PostgreSQL migration integration suite." >&2
@@ -25,14 +27,20 @@ if ! compose_job_network_initialize; then
   exit 1
 fi
 
-raw_project="ekklesia-migration-${GITHUB_RUN_ID:-local}-${GITHUB_RUN_ATTEMPT:-0}-${GITHUB_JOB:-job}-$$"
+# Unique per invocation, not only per run: several runs (and several jobs of one run) can share a
+# runner's Docker daemon at once, and the shell's PID is often identical across job containers.
+raw_project="ekklesia-migration-${GITHUB_RUN_ID:-local}-${GITHUB_RUN_ATTEMPT:-0}-${GITHUB_JOB:-job}-$$-${RANDOM}${RANDOM}"
 project="${raw_project//[^a-zA-Z0-9_-]/-}"
 project="${project,,}"
 
 export POSTGRES_DB="ekklesia_migration_test"
 export POSTGRES_USER="ekklesia_migration_test"
 export POSTGRES_PASSWORD="temporary-$project-${RANDOM}-${RANDOM}"
+# Both host ports are ephemeral: concurrent runs on one Docker daemon must never contend for a
+# fixed one. `.env.example` pins the storage port for local development, so it is overridden here
+# exactly like the database's. The bound ports are discovered below.
 export POSTGRES_PORT="0"
+export S3_PORT="0"
 
 compose=(
   docker compose
@@ -72,8 +80,17 @@ fi
 # and CI already knows how to provision. SeaweedFS is the intended deployment target (ADR 0004), and
 # proving the storage contract against a mock instead would have hidden the provider quirks this
 # suite exists to catch.
-if ! "${compose[@]}" up --detach --wait --wait-timeout 180 postgres object-storage >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+# Masked in any diagnostics below, along with anything else that looks like a credential.
+COMPOSE_DIAGNOSTICS_SECRETS=(
+  "$POSTGRES_PASSWORD"
+  "$(grep -E '^S3_ACCESS_KEY=' .env.example | cut -d= -f2-)"
+  "$(grep -E '^S3_SECRET_KEY=' .env.example | cut -d= -f2-)"
+)
+if ! up_output="$(
+  "${compose[@]}" up --detach --wait --wait-timeout 180 postgres object-storage 2>&1
+)"; then
   echo "Disposable PostgreSQL and object storage did not become ready." >&2
+  compose_report_not_ready "$up_output" "${compose[@]}"
   exit 1
 fi
 

surfaces/shell/index.html

@@ -3,6 +3,10 @@
   <head>
     <meta charset="utf-8" />
     <meta content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1" name="viewport" />
+    <!-- The API's origin (ADR 0045). The API serving this page fills it in at startup; empty means
+         this page's own origin, the same-origin topology. Never an inline script, so a strict
+         script-src needs no exception for it. -->
+    <meta content="" name="ekklesia-api-origin" />
     <title>Ekklesia</title>
   </head>
   <body style="margin: 0; min-width: 0">
@@ -11,7 +15,9 @@
     <div id="ekklesia-host"></div>
     <!-- A real module script, from the same origin, with no inline script anywhere on the page:
          a deployment can therefore apply a strict script-src without exceptions, and the runtime
-         `import()` of a published module artifact stays same-origin under it. -->
-    <script src="./app.js" type="module"></script>
+         `import()` of a published module artifact stays same-origin under it. The path is absolute
+         and fixed, exactly like the display host's, so it names one host-owned route rather than a
+         file relative to whatever URL served the page. -->
+    <script src="/assets/ekklesia-dashboard/app.js" type="module"></script>
   </body>
 </html>

surfaces/shell/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@ekklesia/shell",
-  "version": "0.1.0",
+  "version": "0.1.1",
   "private": true,
   "type": "module",
   "files": [
@@ -11,6 +11,10 @@
       "types": "./dist/index.d.ts",
       "import": "./dist/index.js"
     },
+    "./dashboard-assets": {
+      "types": "./dist/dashboard-assets.d.ts",
+      "import": "./dist/dashboard-assets.js"
+    },
     "./display-assets": {
       "types": "./dist/display-assets.d.ts",
       "import": "./dist/display-assets.js"

surfaces/shell/scripts/build-browser.mjs

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-import { copyFile, mkdir, rm } from "node:fs/promises";
+import { copyFile, mkdir, readFile, rm, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises";
 import path from "node:path";
 import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
 import esbuild from "esbuild";
@@ -23,12 +23,16 @@ const outputDirectory = path.join(packageDirectory, "dist", "browser");
 const serve = process.argv.includes("--serve");
 
 /**
- * Empty means "the API is on this page's own origin" — the expected production shape. Set it to an
- * absolute origin for split-origin development (`EKKLESIA_API_BASE_URL=http://127.0.0.1:3000`), and
- * add this page's own origin to `EKKLESIA_IDENTITY_TRUSTED_ORIGINS` so the API reflects it for CORS
- * and the session cookie travels.
+ * Development only: the API origin the development server writes into its copy of the Dashboard page,
+ * exactly as `apps/api` does at startup in production (ADR 0045). Empty means "the API is on this
+ * page's own origin". Set it to an absolute origin for split-origin development
+ * (`EKKLESIA_API_BASE_URL=http://127.0.0.1:3000`), and add this page's own origin to
+ * `EKKLESIA_IDENTITY_TRUSTED_ORIGINS` so the API reflects it for CORS and the session cookie travels.
+ * A production build never reads it: the built page always carries an empty value, and the bundle
+ * carries no origin at all.
  */
-const apiBaseUrl = process.env.EKKLESIA_API_BASE_URL ?? "";
+const apiBaseUrl = serve ? (process.env.EKKLESIA_API_BASE_URL ?? "") : "";
+const API_ORIGIN_PLACEHOLDER = '<meta content="" name="ekklesia-api-origin" />';
 
 /** @type {import("esbuild").BuildOptions} */
 const buildOptions = {
@@ -37,12 +41,13 @@ const buildOptions = {
   // artifacts it is told about, which are real URLs rather than bare specifiers.
   bundle: true,
   define: {
-    __EKKLESIA_API_BASE_URL__: JSON.stringify(apiBaseUrl),
     // React reads this at module scope and a browser has no `process`.
     "process.env.NODE_ENV": JSON.stringify(serve ? "development" : "production"),
   },
   entryPoints: {
-    app: path.join(packageDirectory, "src", "browser", "main.tsx"),
+    // Emitted under the exact path `apps/api` serves it from (ADR 0044), so the development server's
+    // `servedir` and production answer the same absolute URL `index.html` names.
+    "assets/ekklesia-dashboard/app": path.join(packageDirectory, "src", "browser", "main.tsx"),
     "display/app": path.join(packageDirectory, "src", "display", "main.tsx"),
     // The display service worker (ADR 0043). A separate entry because a worker is a separate
     // realm with its own globals; bundling it into the page would make it unregisterable and its
@@ -65,7 +70,17 @@ const buildOptions = {
 await rm(outputDirectory, { force: true, recursive: true });
 await mkdir(outputDirectory, { recursive: true });
 await mkdir(path.join(outputDirectory, "display"), { recursive: true });
-await copyFile(path.join(packageDirectory, "index.html"), path.join(outputDirectory, "index.html"));
+const dashboardPage = await readFile(path.join(packageDirectory, "index.html"), "utf8");
+if (dashboardPage.split(API_ORIGIN_PLACEHOLDER).length !== 2) {
+  throw new Error("index.html must contain exactly one empty ekklesia-api-origin meta element.");
+}
+await writeFile(
+  path.join(outputDirectory, "index.html"),
+  dashboardPage.replace(
+    API_ORIGIN_PLACEHOLDER,
+    `<meta content="${apiBaseUrl.replaceAll("&", "&amp;").replaceAll('"', "&quot;")}" name="ekklesia-api-origin" />`,
+  ),
+);
 await copyFile(
   path.join(packageDirectory, "display.html"),
   path.join(outputDirectory, "display", "index.html"),

surfaces/shell/src/auth-protocol.ts

@@ -277,3 +277,36 @@ export function readAuthLanding(search: string): HostAuthLanding | undefined {
   }
   return undefined;
 }
+
+/**
+ * Captures what an emailed verification or reset link asked for, then removes it from the address
+ * bar.
+ *
+ * A password-reset token is a bearer credential for one account. Leaving it in `location.search`
+ * would put it in the browser's history, in the tab title's shareable URL, and in the `Referer` of
+ * anything the page subsequently loaded. `history.replaceState` rewrites the entry in place rather
+ * than pushing a new one, so the Back button cannot return to the URL that held it. It is
+ * deliberately *not* stored anywhere afterwards — it lives only in React state for the lifetime of
+ * the reset form, and never in `localStorage` or `sessionStorage`.
+ *
+ * The location and history are passed in rather than read here, so this module still reads no
+ * global and `browser/main.tsx` remains the shell's one browser-global boundary. Only a recognized
+ * Ekklesia landing rewrites the URL; any other query is left exactly as it arrived.
+ */
+export function consumeAuthLanding(
+  location: Pick<Location, "pathname" | "search">,
+  history: Pick<History, "replaceState">,
+): HostAuthLanding | undefined {
+  const landing = readAuthLanding(location.search);
+  if (!landing) {
+    return undefined;
+  }
+  try {
+    history.replaceState(null, "", location.pathname);
+  } catch {
+    // A browser that refuses the rewrite (an exotic sandbox, a file: URL) must still be able to
+    // finish the flow: the token is already captured, and failing here would strand the person on a
+    // page that cannot do anything.
+  }
+  return landing;
+}

surfaces/shell/src/browser/main.tsx

@@ -1,61 +1,27 @@
 import { installEkklesiaDesignTokens } from "@ekklesia/design-tokens";
 import { EkklesiaUiStyles } from "@ekklesia/ui";
 import { createRoot } from "react-dom/client";
-import { type HostAuthLanding, readAuthLanding } from "../auth-protocol.js";
-import type { EkklesiaHostConfig } from "../host-protocol.js";
+import { consumeAuthLanding } from "../auth-protocol.js";
+import { type EkklesiaHostConfig, resolveApiOrigin } from "../host-protocol.js";
 import { HostApp } from "./HostApp.js";
 
-/**
- * Replaced at build time by `scripts/build-browser.mjs` with a JSON string literal: the API origin
- * when `EKKLESIA_API_BASE_URL` was set for the build, and `""` otherwise. Declared rather than read
- * from `process.env`, because a browser has no `process` and the substitution must be visible here
- * instead of hidden in bundler configuration.
- */
-declare const __EKKLESIA_API_BASE_URL__: string;
-
 /**
  * The one place the shell touches a browser global.
  *
- * An empty build-time value means the API is served from the same origin as this page, which is the
- * expected production shape; a non-empty one is the split-origin development shape the platform's
- * trusted-origin configuration already supports (`EKKLESIA_IDENTITY_TRUSTED_ORIGINS` must list this
- * page's origin for the session cookie to travel). Everything downstream receives the resolved
- * origin as a plain argument, so no other file in this package reads `window`.
+ * The API that served this page wrote its own origin into `<meta name="ekklesia-api-origin">`
+ * (ADR 0045): empty in the same-origin topology, the API's hostname when the Dashboard and the API
+ * live on separate origins. Read at run time, so one built shell serves either topology. Everything
+ * downstream receives the resolved origin as a plain argument, so no other file in this package
+ * reads `window`.
  */
-const config: EkklesiaHostConfig = {
-  apiBaseUrl: __EKKLESIA_API_BASE_URL__ || window.location.origin,
-};
+const apiBaseUrl = resolveApiOrigin(
+  document.querySelector<HTMLMetaElement>('meta[name="ekklesia-api-origin"]')?.content,
+  window.location.origin,
+);
 
-/**
- * Captures what an emailed verification or reset link asked for, then removes it from the address
- * bar.
- *
- * A password-reset token is a bearer credential for one account. Leaving it in `location.search`
- * would put it in the browser's history, in the tab title's shareable URL, and in the `Referer` of
- * anything the page subsequently loaded. `history.replaceState` rewrites the entry in place rather
- * than pushing a new one, so the Back button cannot return to the URL that held it. It is
- * deliberately *not* stored anywhere afterwards — it lives only in React state for the lifetime of
- * the reset form, and never in `localStorage` or `sessionStorage`.
- *
- * The parse is a pure function that recognizes only Ekklesia's own two landings, so nothing in the
- * query string can name a destination.
- */
-function captureAuthLanding(): HostAuthLanding | undefined {
-  const landing = readAuthLanding(window.location.search);
-  if (!landing) {
-    return undefined;
-  }
-  try {
-    window.history.replaceState(null, "", window.location.pathname);
-  } catch {
-    // A browser that refuses the rewrite (an exotic sandbox, a file: URL) must still be able to
-    // finish the flow: the token is already captured, and failing here would strand the person on a
-    // page that cannot do anything.
-  }
-  return landing;
-}
-
-const authLanding = captureAuthLanding();
+/** Read once, before anything renders, and stripped from the address bar in the same step. See
+ * `consumeAuthLanding` for why the token must not stay in the URL. */
+const authLanding = consumeAuthLanding(window.location, window.history);
 
 const container = document.getElementById("ekklesia-host");
 if (!container) {
@@ -73,13 +39,29 @@ if (!container) {
  */
 installEkklesiaDesignTokens(document);
 
+/**
+ * A page whose API origin is not a canonical origin fails closed: it makes no request at all, because
+ * every request it would make carries credentials to an address it cannot vouch for. The message is
+ * fixed and names no address.
+ */
+function renderHost(config: EkklesiaHostConfig | undefined) {
+  if (!config) {
+    return (
+      <main data-testid="host-configuration-invalid" role="alert">
+        This page cannot start: the server address it was given is not valid.
+      </main>
+    );
+  }
+  return authLanding ? (
+    <HostApp authLanding={authLanding} config={config} />
+  ) : (
+    <HostApp config={config} />
+  );
+}
+
 createRoot(container).render(
   <>
     <EkklesiaUiStyles />
-    {authLanding ? (
-      <HostApp authLanding={authLanding} config={config} />
-    ) : (
-      <HostApp config={config} />
-    )}
+    {renderHost(apiBaseUrl === undefined ? undefined : { apiBaseUrl })}
   </>,
 );

surfaces/shell/src/dashboard-assets.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+/**
+ * Exact built files a deployable app may publish for the Ekklesia Dashboard (ADR 0044).
+ *
+ * The same shape as `./display-assets.ts`, for the same reason: these are file URLs relative to this
+ * package's compiled `dist/dashboard-assets.js`, not repository paths and not request-derived
+ * selectors. `apps/api` reads these exact two files before binding and serves their bytes at fixed
+ * host-owned routes on the same origin as `/api`. Nothing here exposes a directory or a generic
+ * static-file root, and the source map beside the script is deliberately not listed.
+ */
+const packageRoot = new URL("../", import.meta.url);
+
+export const dashboardHostAssetUrls = Object.freeze({
+  html: new URL("dist/browser/index.html", packageRoot).href,
+  script: new URL("dist/browser/assets/ekklesia-dashboard/app.js", packageRoot).href,
+});

surfaces/shell/src/display/main.tsx

@@ -6,10 +6,13 @@ import { parseDisplayRoute } from "../host-protocol.js";
 import { DisplayApp } from "./DisplayApp.js";
 import { type DisplayConnectivitySource, registerDisplayServiceWorker } from "./offline-status.js";
 
-declare const __EKKLESIA_API_BASE_URL__: string;
-
+/**
+ * The display host is always served from the API's own origin, in either topology (ADR 0045): its
+ * device cookies, pairing, descriptors, module requests, and realtime are all same-origin, and its
+ * offline cache stores only same-origin responses (ADR 0043).
+ */
 const config: EkklesiaHostConfig = {
-  apiBaseUrl: __EKKLESIA_API_BASE_URL__ || window.location.origin,
+  apiBaseUrl: window.location.origin,
 };
 
 const container = document.getElementById("ekklesia-display");

surfaces/shell/src/host-protocol.ts

@@ -4,10 +4,11 @@ import type { ModuleUiPrincipal } from "@ekklesia/module-ui-sdk";
  * How this shell reaches the Ekklesia API.
  *
  * `apiBaseUrl` is an absolute **origin** (`https://ekklesia.example.test`, `http://127.0.0.1:3000`)
- * rather than something read from a global. The browser entry point supplies it — from a build-time
- * value when the shell and the API are served from different origins in development, and from
- * `window.location.origin` otherwise — so every function below is a pure function of its arguments
- * and can be exercised without a DOM, a `window`, or a page. Nothing here reads a global.
+ * rather than something read from a global. The browser entry point supplies it — from the API
+ * origin the serving API wrote into the Dashboard page (ADR 0045, {@link resolveApiOrigin}), and from
+ * `window.location.origin` for the display host, which is always served from the API's own origin —
+ * so every function below is a pure function of its arguments and can be exercised without a DOM, a
+ * `window`, or a page. Nothing here reads a global.
  */
 export interface EkklesiaHostConfig {
   readonly apiBaseUrl: string;
@@ -702,6 +703,34 @@ export function parseHostPrincipal(payload: unknown): ModuleUiPrincipal {
   throw new HostProtocolError("HOST_RESPONSE_INVALID");
 }
 
+/**
+ * The API origin a Dashboard page was served with (ADR 0045).
+ *
+ * `declared` is the `content` of the page's `<meta name="ekklesia-api-origin">`, which the serving API
+ * fills in at startup. Absent or empty means the API shares this page's origin, the same-origin
+ * topology. Anything else must be exactly a canonical `http(s)` origin — no path, no trailing slash,
+ * no credentials, no query — or the result is `undefined` and the page must fail closed rather than
+ * send credentialed requests to an address it cannot vouch for.
+ */
+export function resolveApiOrigin(
+  declared: string | null | undefined,
+  pageOrigin: string,
+): string | undefined {
+  if (declared === null || declared === undefined || declared === "") {
+    return pageOrigin;
+  }
+  let url: URL;
+  try {
+    url = new URL(declared);
+  } catch {
+    return undefined;
+  }
+  if ((url.protocol !== "https:" && url.protocol !== "http:") || url.origin !== declared) {
+    return undefined;
+  }
+  return url.origin;
+}
+
 /** Resolves a root-relative platform path against the configured API origin. The one place the
  * shell turns a server-produced path into an absolute URL. */
 export function resolveApiUrl(config: EkklesiaHostConfig, rootRelativePath: string): string {

surfaces/shell/src/index.ts

@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ export {
   parseDisplayRoute,
   parseHostModuleDisplay,
   parseHostPrincipal,
+  resolveApiOrigin,
   resolveApiUrl,
 } from "./host-protocol.js";
 export {

surfaces/shell/tests/auth-recovery.test.tsx

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 import { act } from "react";
 import { createRoot, type Root } from "react-dom/client";
 import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest";
-import { type HostAuthLanding, readAuthLanding } from "../src/auth-protocol.js";
+import { consumeAuthLanding, type HostAuthLanding, readAuthLanding } from "../src/auth-protocol.js";
 import { HostApp } from "../src/browser/HostApp.js";
 import type { EkklesiaHostConfig } from "../src/host-protocol.js";
 
@@ -140,6 +140,58 @@ async function submit(hostTestId: string): Promise<void> {
   });
 }
 
+describe("consuming an emailed-link landing", () => {
+  it("captures a reset token and strips the whole query from the address bar in place", () => {
+    window.history.replaceState({}, "", "/?ekklesia_auth=reset-password&token=secret-reset-token");
+    const lengthBefore = window.history.length;
+
+    const landing = consumeAuthLanding(window.location, window.history);
+
+    expect(landing).toEqual({ kind: "reset-password", token: "secret-reset-token" });
+    expect(window.location.search).toBe("");
+    expect(window.location.href).not.toContain("secret-reset-token");
+    // Replaced, not pushed: Back cannot return to the entry that held the token.
+    expect(window.history.length).toBe(lengthBefore);
+  });
+
+  it("strips every recognized landing, including a failed verification and an invalid reset link", () => {
+    for (const search of [
+      "?ekklesia_auth=verify-email",
+      "?ekklesia_auth=verify-email&error=TOKEN_EXPIRED",
+      "?ekklesia_auth=reset-password&error=INVALID_TOKEN",
+      "?ekklesia_auth=reset-password&token=not%20a%20valid%20token",
+    ]) {
+      window.history.replaceState({}, "", `/${search}`);
+
+      expect(consumeAuthLanding(window.location, window.history), search).toBeDefined();
+      expect(window.location.search, search).toBe("");
+    }
+  });
+
+  it("leaves an unrelated query untouched and rewrites nothing", () => {
+    window.history.replaceState({}, "", "/?unrelated=1");
+    const replaceState = vi.fn();
+
+    expect(consumeAuthLanding(window.location, { replaceState })).toBeUndefined();
+    expect(replaceState).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    expect(window.location.search).toBe("?unrelated=1");
+  });
+
+  it("still returns the captured landing when the browser refuses the rewrite", () => {
+    const replaceState = vi.fn(() => {
+      throw new Error("SecurityError");
+    });
+
+    expect(
+      consumeAuthLanding(
+        { pathname: "/", search: "?ekklesia_auth=reset-password&token=abc123" },
+        { replaceState },
+      ),
+    ).toEqual({ kind: "reset-password", token: "abc123" });
+    expect(replaceState).toHaveBeenCalledWith(null, "", "/");
+  });
+});
+
 describe("emailed-link landing parsing", () => {
   it("recognizes exactly Ekklesia's own two landings", () => {
     expect(readAuthLanding("?ekklesia_auth=verify-email")).toEqual({ kind: "verified" });

surfaces/shell/tests/dashboard-assets.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+// @vitest-environment node
+import { readFile } from "node:fs/promises";
+import path from "node:path";
+import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
+import { describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
+import { dashboardHostAssetUrls } from "../src/dashboard-assets.js";
+
+const packageDirectory = path.dirname(path.dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)));
+
+describe("Dashboard host asset locator", () => {
+  it("exports only frozen immutable href strings for the two exact built files, never the source map", () => {
+    expect(Object.isFrozen(dashboardHostAssetUrls)).toBe(true);
+    expect(dashboardHostAssetUrls).toEqual({
+      html: new URL("dist/browser/index.html", `file://${packageDirectory}/`).href,
+      script: new URL(
+        "dist/browser/assets/ekklesia-dashboard/app.js",
+        `file://${packageDirectory}/`,
+      ).href,
+    });
+    expect(JSON.stringify(dashboardHostAssetUrls)).not.toContain(".map");
+  });
+
+  it("publishes the locator through a narrow package subpath, not the shell root barrel", async () => {
+    const manifest = JSON.parse(
+      await readFile(path.join(packageDirectory, "package.json"), "utf8"),
+    ) as { exports?: Record<string, unknown> };
+    expect(manifest.exports?.["./dashboard-assets"]).toEqual({
+      import: "./dist/dashboard-assets.js",
+      types: "./dist/dashboard-assets.d.ts",
+    });
+
+    const rootSource = await readFile(path.join(packageDirectory, "src/index.ts"), "utf8");
+    expect(rootSource).not.toContain("dashboardHostAssetUrls");
+    expect(rootSource).not.toContain("dashboard-assets");
+  });
+
+  it("loads exactly one fixed, absolute, same-origin script and no inline script", async () => {
+    const html = await readFile(path.join(packageDirectory, "index.html"), "utf8");
+
+    expect(html).toContain('id="ekklesia-host"');
+    expect(html.match(/<script\b/gu)).toHaveLength(1);
+    expect(html).toContain(
+      '<script src="/assets/ekklesia-dashboard/app.js" type="module"></script>',
+    );
+  });
+
+  it("carries exactly one empty API-origin meta element for the serving API to fill (ADR 0045)", async () => {
+    const html = await readFile(path.join(packageDirectory, "index.html"), "utf8");
+
+    expect(html.match(/name="ekklesia-api-origin"/gu)).toHaveLength(1);
+    expect(html).toContain('<meta content="" name="ekklesia-api-origin" />');
+  });
+
+  it("bakes no API origin into the bundle: the build defines nothing but NODE_ENV", async () => {
+    const buildScript = await readFile(
+      path.join(packageDirectory, "scripts/build-browser.mjs"),
+      "utf8",
+    );
+
+    expect(buildScript).not.toContain("__EKKLESIA_API_BASE_URL__");
+  });
+
+  it("builds the Dashboard entry at the exact path the locator names", async () => {
+    const buildScript = await readFile(
+      path.join(packageDirectory, "scripts/build-browser.mjs"),
+      "utf8",
+    );
+
+    expect(buildScript).toContain('"assets/ekklesia-dashboard/app": path.join(');
+  });
+});

surfaces/shell/tests/host-protocol.test.ts

@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ import {
   loadHostPrincipal,
   parseDashboardNavigation,
   parseHostPrincipal,
+  resolveApiOrigin,
 } from "../src/host-protocol.js";
 import { createModuleUiContext, moduleUiSourceUrl } from "../src/module-context.js";
 
@@ -101,6 +102,39 @@ function navigationWithModule(module: unknown): unknown {
   return { groups: [], ungrouped: [{ module, name: "Example Module" }] };
 }
 
+describe("host protocol — API origin (ADR 0045)", () => {
+  const pageOrigin = "https://dash.example.test";
+
+  it("uses the page's own origin when the page declares none (same-origin topology)", () => {
+    expect(resolveApiOrigin(undefined, pageOrigin)).toBe(pageOrigin);
+    expect(resolveApiOrigin(null, pageOrigin)).toBe(pageOrigin);
+    expect(resolveApiOrigin("", pageOrigin)).toBe(pageOrigin);
+  });
+
+  it("uses a declared canonical origin (split topology)", () => {
+    expect(resolveApiOrigin("https://api.example.test", pageOrigin)).toBe(
+      "https://api.example.test",
+    );
+    expect(resolveApiOrigin("http://127.0.0.1:3000", pageOrigin)).toBe("http://127.0.0.1:3000");
+  });
+
+  it.each([
+    ["a trailing slash", "https://api.example.test/"],
+    ["a path", "https://api.example.test/api"],
+    ["a query", "https://api.example.test?x=1"],
+    ["credentials", "https://user:[email protected]"],
+    ["a non-canonical spelling", "HTTPS://API.example.test"],
+    ["a default port spelled out", "https://api.example.test:443"],
+    ["another scheme", "javascript:alert(1)"],
+    ["a protocol-relative value", "//api.example.test"],
+    ["a relative value", "/api"],
+    ["surrounding whitespace", " https://api.example.test"],
+    ["something that is not a URL", "api.example.test"],
+  ])("refuses %s, so the page fails closed", (_case, declared) => {
+    expect(resolveApiOrigin(declared, pageOrigin)).toBeUndefined();
+  });
+});
+
 describe("host protocol — descriptor validation", () => {
   it("parses a well-formed descriptor out of the navigation view", () => {
     const navigation = parseDashboardNavigation(navigationWithModule(inventoryPayload.modules[0]));

surfaces/shell/tests/modularity.test.ts

@@ -120,7 +120,6 @@ describe("the shell builds no module knowledge into its bundle", () => {
       absWorkingDir: packageDirectory,
       bundle: true,
       define: {
-        __EKKLESIA_API_BASE_URL__: '""',
         "process.env.NODE_ENV": '"production"',
       },
       entryPoints: [path.join(sourceDirectory, "browser", "main.tsx")],
@@ -200,7 +199,6 @@ describe("the display host is a separate generic browser bundle", () => {
       absWorkingDir: packageDirectory,
       bundle: true,
       define: {
-        __EKKLESIA_API_BASE_URL__: '""',
         "process.env.NODE_ENV": '"production"',
       },
       entryPoints: [path.join(sourceDirectory, "display", "main.tsx")],

surfaces/shell/tsconfig.build.json

@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
   },
   "include": [
     "src/index.ts",
+    "src/dashboard-assets.ts",
     "src/display-assets.ts",
     "src/host-protocol.ts",
     "src/module-context.ts"

tests/boundaries.test.ts

@@ -56,6 +56,10 @@ describe("repository dependency boundaries", () => {
     ["design-package-depends-upward", "design-packages-depend-downward-only"],
     ["cross-package-relative", "workspace-imports-use-public-exports"],
     ["cycle", "no-circular-source-dependencies"],
+    ["runtime-peer-only-dependency", "runtime-imports-are-production-dependencies"],
+    ["runtime-dev-only-dependency", "runtime-imports-are-production-dependencies"],
+    ["runtime-jsx-implies-react", "runtime-imports-are-production-dependencies"],
+    ["runtime-undeclared-dependency", "runtime-imports-are-production-dependencies"],
   ])("rejects %s", async (fixture, expectedRule) => {
     const result = await checkBoundaries(path.join(fixtures, fixture));
     expect(result.violations.map((violation) => violation.rule)).toContain(expectedRule);
@@ -106,6 +110,57 @@ describe("repository dependency boundaries", () => {
     expect(uiViolations.map((violation) => violation.message).join(" ")).not.toContain("compat");
   });
 
+  it("accepts runtime imports declared as production dependencies, and everything that is not shipped runtime code", async () => {
+    // Production and optional dependencies, a peer kept beside its production declaration, Node
+    // built-ins, the package's own exports, type-only imports of development dependencies, and
+    // tests or build scripts that run with development dependencies installed.
+    const result = await checkBoundaries(path.join(fixtures, "legal-runtime-dependencies"));
+
+    expect(result.violations).toEqual([]);
+  });
+
+  it.each([
+    [
+      "runtime-peer-only-dependency",
+      "packages/sdk/src/index.ts",
+      "drizzle-orm",
+      "only as a peer dependency",
+    ],
+    [
+      "runtime-dev-only-dependency",
+      "packages/sdk/src/index.ts",
+      "zod",
+      "only as a development dependency",
+    ],
+    // The automatic JSX runtime imports `react/jsx-runtime` without that import appearing in source.
+    [
+      "runtime-jsx-implies-react",
+      "packages/ui/src/index.tsx",
+      "react",
+      "only as a peer dependency",
+    ],
+    [
+      "runtime-undeclared-dependency",
+      "modules/calendar/src/server/index.ts",
+      "sharp",
+      "not at all",
+    ],
+  ])("reports %s once, naming the file, the package, and how it is declared", async (fixture, from, to, declaredAs) => {
+    // A workspace package's imports resolve from its own node_modules: a peer is never satisfied
+    // there by the consumer, and a production install omits development dependencies, so each of
+    // these imports fails at run time in the production image even though development works.
+    const result = await checkBoundaries(path.join(fixtures, fixture));
+
+    expect(result.violations).toEqual([
+      {
+        from,
+        message: expect.stringContaining(`declares it ${declaredAs}`),
+        rule: "runtime-imports-are-production-dependencies",
+        to,
+      },
+    ]);
+  });
+
   it("still rejects module UI source that reaches into Core internals", async () => {
     // Allowing `.tsx` inside a module changed which *formats* a module may contain. It did not
     // change which layers a module may import: module UI is subject to the identical layer rules

tests/ci-scripts.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,165 @@
+import { execFile } from "node:child_process";
+import { readFile } from "node:fs/promises";
+import path from "node:path";
+import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
+import { promisify } from "node:util";
+import { describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
+
+/**
+ * The scripts CI runs against a shared Docker daemon. Several runs, and several jobs of one run, can
+ * be active on one runner at once (and the inventoried Gitea ignores workflow `concurrency`), so
+ * nothing they start may claim a fixed host port, a fixed project or network name, or a fixed
+ * subnet. And when a disposable project does not become ready, the failure must say why without
+ * printing a credential.
+ */
+
+const repositoryRoot = path.resolve(path.dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)), "..");
+const execFileAsync = promisify(execFile);
+
+const ciScripts = [
+  "scripts/test-migrations-integration.sh",
+  "scripts/smoke-infrastructure.sh",
+  "scripts/smoke-deploy.sh",
+];
+
+async function source(relativePath: string): Promise<string> {
+  return readFile(path.join(repositoryRoot, relativePath), "utf8");
+}
+
+/** Runs the real helper under bash with the given literal secrets and input. */
+async function redact(input: string, secrets: readonly string[] = []): Promise<string> {
+  const helper = path.join(repositoryRoot, "scripts", "lib", "compose-diagnostics.sh");
+  const script = `source "$1"; shift; COMPOSE_DIAGNOSTICS_SECRETS=("$@"); printf '%s' "$INPUT" | compose_diagnostics_redact`;
+  const { stdout } = await execFileAsync("bash", ["-c", script, "redact", helper, ...secrets], {
+    env: { ...process.env, INPUT: input },
+  });
+  return stdout;
+}
+
+describe("CI scripts on a shared Docker daemon", () => {
+  it("publish every host port ephemerally, never a fixed one", async () => {
+    const migrations = await source("scripts/test-migrations-integration.sh");
+    // `.env.example` pins both ports for local development; the suite must override both.
+    expect(migrations).toContain('export POSTGRES_PORT="0"');
+    expect(migrations).toContain('export S3_PORT="0"');
+
+    const infrastructure = await source("scripts/smoke-infrastructure.sh");
+    expect(infrastructure).toContain('export POSTGRES_PORT="${EKKLESIA_SMOKE_POSTGRES_PORT:-0}"');
+    expect(infrastructure).toContain('export S3_PORT="${EKKLESIA_SMOKE_S3_PORT:-0}"');
+
+    const deploy = await source("scripts/smoke-deploy.sh");
+    expect(deploy).toContain("EKKLESIA_HTTP_PORT=0");
+    expect(deploy).toContain("EKKLESIA_HTTPS_PORT=0");
+
+    for (const relativePath of ciScripts) {
+      const text = await source(relativePath);
+      // No `-p 8333:…`, `127.0.0.1:5432:…`, or `PORT=<non-zero>` anywhere.
+      expect(text, relativePath).not.toMatch(/\b(?:-p|--publish)\s+[^\s]*\d{2,5}:\d/u);
+      expect(text, relativePath).not.toMatch(/\b[A-Z_]*PORT="?[1-9]\d*"?\s*$/mu);
+    }
+  });
+
+  it("give every Compose project a name unique to the invocation, not only the run", async () => {
+    expect(await source("scripts/test-migrations-integration.sh")).toMatch(
+      /raw_project="ekklesia-migration-[^"\n]*\$\$-\$\{RANDOM\}\$\{RANDOM\}"/u,
+    );
+    expect(await source("scripts/smoke-infrastructure.sh")).toMatch(
+      /raw_project="ekklesia-smoke-[^"\n]*\$\$-\$\{RANDOM\}\$\{RANDOM\}"/u,
+    );
+    const deploy = await source("scripts/smoke-deploy.sh");
+    expect(deploy).toContain('run_id="$(openssl rand -hex 4)"');
+    expect(deploy).toContain('project="ekklesia-deploy-smoke-${run_id}"');
+    for (const relativePath of ciScripts) {
+      expect(await source(relativePath), relativePath).toContain('--project-name "$project"');
+    }
+  });
+
+  it("choose the deploy smoke's edge subnet from those not in use, and choose again on a race", async () => {
+    const deploy = await source("scripts/smoke-deploy.sh");
+    expect(deploy).not.toMatch(/^octet=\$\(\(RANDOM/mu);
+    expect(deploy).toContain("choose_edge_network() {");
+    expect(deploy).toContain("docker network inspect --format '{{range .IPAM.Config}}");
+    expect(deploy).toContain('[[ "$up_output" == *"overlap"* ]]');
+  });
+
+  it("tag the CI image per run and attempt, so concurrent runs of one commit cannot remove it", async () => {
+    const workflow = await source(".github/workflows/ci.yml");
+    expect(workflow).toContain(
+      'ekklesia-ci:"$GITHUB_SHA-${GITHUB_RUN_ID:-0}-${GITHUB_RUN_ATTEMPT:-1}"',
+    );
+    expect(workflow).not.toContain('ekklesia-ci:"$GITHUB_SHA"');
+  });
+
+  it("report every readiness failure with the project's containers and logs, through the redactor only", async () => {
+    for (const relativePath of ciScripts) {
+      const text = await source(relativePath);
+      expect(text, relativePath).toContain(
+        'source "$repository_root/scripts/lib/compose-diagnostics.sh"',
+      );
+      expect(text, relativePath).toContain("compose_report_not_ready");
+      expect(text, relativePath).toContain("COMPOSE_DIAGNOSTICS_SECRETS=(");
+      // Compose output is never printed raw: logs are only ever captured (the deploy smoke scans
+      // the API's for secrets), and a readiness failure's own output is never discarded.
+      for (const line of text
+        .split("\n")
+        .filter((candidate) => candidate.includes('compose[@]}" logs'))) {
+        expect(line, relativePath).toMatch(/="\$\("\$\{compose\[@\]\}" logs /u);
+      }
+      expect(text, relativePath).not.toMatch(/up --detach --wait[^\n]*>\/dev\/null 2>&1/u);
+    }
+  });
+});
+
+describe("compose diagnostics redaction", () => {
+  it("masks credential-looking values, URL user information, and Authorization headers", async () => {
+    const output = await redact(
+      [
+        "POSTGRES_PASSWORD=hunter2hunter2",
+        '  "AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY": "abc/def+ghi"',
+        "S3_ACCESS_KEY=AKIAEXAMPLE other=fine",
+        "api_key: xyz123",
+        "connecting to postgresql://ekklesia:s3cr3t@postgres:5432/ekklesia",
+        "Authorization: Bearer eyJhbGciOi.payload.sig",
+        "EKKLESIA_IDENTITY_SECRET=0123456789abcdef",
+      ].join("\n"),
+    );
+
+    for (const secret of [
+      "hunter2hunter2",
+      "abc/def+ghi",
+      "AKIAEXAMPLE",
+      "xyz123",
+      "s3cr3t",
+      "eyJhbGciOi",
+      "0123456789abcdef",
+    ]) {
+      expect(output).not.toContain(secret);
+    }
+    expect(output).toContain("POSTGRES_PASSWORD=[redacted]");
+    expect(output).toContain("other=fine");
+    expect(output).toContain("postgresql://[redacted]@postgres:5432/ekklesia");
+  });
+
+  it("masks every occurrence of a supplied literal, wherever it appears", async () => {
+    const output = await redact("started with temporary-pw-12345 and again temporary-pw-12345", [
+      "temporary-pw-12345",
+    ]);
+    expect(output).toBe("started with [redacted] and again [redacted]\n");
+  });
+
+  it("keeps the diagnosis itself readable", async () => {
+    const diagnosis =
+      "Error response from daemon: Bind for 127.0.0.1:8333 failed: port is already allocated";
+    expect(await redact(diagnosis)).toBe(`${diagnosis}\n`);
+    expect(await redact("duplicate key value violates unique constraint")).toBe(
+      "duplicate key value violates unique constraint\n",
+    );
+    expect(await redact('password authentication failed for user "ekklesia"')).toBe(
+      'password authentication failed for user "ekklesia"\n',
+    );
+  });
+
+  it("strips terminal control sequences from container logs", async () => {
+    expect(await redact("\u001b[2Kpostgres-1  | ready")).toBe("postgres-1  | ready\n");
+  });
+});

tests/deploy.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,231 @@
+import { readFile } from "node:fs/promises";
+import path from "node:path";
+import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
+import { describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
+import { parse } from "yaml";
+
+/**
+ * Structural guarantees of the reference deployment (ADR 0044), checked on the files themselves so
+ * an edit cannot quietly weaken them. `scripts/smoke-deploy.sh` proves the same configuration
+ * actually runs; this proves it still says what the documentation promises.
+ */
+
+interface ComposeService {
+  build?: unknown;
+  cap_add?: string[];
+  cap_drop?: string[];
+  command?: string[];
+  env_file?: string[];
+  environment?: Record<string, string>;
+  healthcheck?: { disable?: boolean };
+  image?: string;
+  init?: boolean;
+  networks?: Record<string, { ipv4_address?: string } | null>;
+  ports?: string[];
+  profiles?: string[];
+  read_only?: boolean;
+  security_opt?: string[];
+  tmpfs?: string[];
+}
+
+interface ComposeDocument {
+  networks?: Record<
+    string,
+    { internal?: boolean; ipam?: { config?: { subnet?: string; ip_range?: string }[] } }
+  >;
+  services?: Record<string, ComposeService>;
+}
+
+const repositoryRoot = path.resolve(path.dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)), "..");
+const deployDirectory = path.join(repositoryRoot, "deploy");
+
+async function compose(file: string): Promise<ComposeDocument> {
+  // `merge: true` resolves the base file's `<<:` hardening anchors exactly as Compose does.
+  return parse(await readFile(path.join(deployDirectory, file), "utf8"), {
+    merge: true,
+  }) as ComposeDocument;
+}
+
+async function text(file: string): Promise<string> {
+  return readFile(path.join(deployDirectory, file), "utf8");
+}
+
+function envAssignments(source: string): Map<string, string> {
+  const assignments = new Map<string, string>();
+  for (const line of source.split("\n")) {
+    const match = /^([A-Z][A-Z0-9_]*)=(.*)$/u.exec(line);
+    if (match?.[1]) {
+      assignments.set(match[1], match[2] ?? "");
+    }
+  }
+  return assignments;
+}
+
+const DIGEST_PINNED = /^[^\s:@]+(?::[^\s@]+)?@sha256:[0-9a-f]{64}$/u;
+
+describe("reference deployment compose files", () => {
+  it("keeps PostgreSQL on its internal network only, and publishes no port from the base", async () => {
+    const base = await compose("compose.yaml");
+    const services = base.services ?? {};
+
+    expect(Object.keys(services).sort()).toEqual(["api", "migrate", "object-storage", "postgres"]);
+    expect(Object.keys(services.postgres?.networks ?? {})).toEqual(["data"]);
+    expect(base.networks?.data?.internal).toBe(true);
+    expect(base.networks?.storage?.internal).toBe(true);
+    for (const [name, service] of Object.entries(services)) {
+      expect(service.ports, name).toBeUndefined();
+    }
+
+    for (const overlay of ["compose.proxy.yaml", "compose.tunnel.yaml"]) {
+      const document = await compose(overlay);
+      expect(document.services?.postgres, overlay).toBeUndefined();
+    }
+  });
+
+  it("pins every third-party image by digest and runs the API only from EKKLESIA_IMAGE", async () => {
+    const documents = await Promise.all(
+      ["compose.yaml", "compose.proxy.yaml", "compose.tunnel.yaml"].map(compose),
+    );
+    for (const document of documents) {
+      for (const [name, service] of Object.entries(document.services ?? {})) {
+        expect(service.build, name).toBeUndefined();
+        if (service.image === undefined) {
+          continue;
+        }
+        if (name === "api" || name === "migrate") {
+          expect(service.image, name).toMatch(/^\$\{EKKLESIA_IMAGE:\?/u);
+        } else {
+          expect(service.image, name).toMatch(DIGEST_PINNED);
+        }
+      }
+    }
+  });
+
+  it("hardens api and migrate, keeps migrate operator-only, and never lets it apply by default", async () => {
+    const services = (await compose("compose.yaml")).services ?? {};
+    for (const name of ["api", "migrate"]) {
+      const service = services[name];
+      expect(service?.init, name).toBe(true);
+      expect(service?.read_only, name).toBe(true);
+      expect(service?.tmpfs, name).toEqual(["/tmp"]);
+      expect(service?.cap_drop, name).toEqual(["ALL"]);
+      expect(service?.security_opt, name).toContain("no-new-privileges:true");
+      expect(service?.environment?.NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS, name).toBe("/run/ekklesia/tls/ca.crt");
+    }
+    const migrate = services.migrate;
+    expect(migrate?.profiles).toEqual(["ops"]);
+    expect(migrate?.healthcheck?.disable).toBe(true);
+    expect(migrate?.command).toEqual(["node", "core/dist/cli/plan-migrations.js"]);
+    expect(JSON.stringify(services)).not.toContain("apply-migrations");
+  });
+
+  it("serves PostgreSQL and object storage over TLS from the installation-private CA", async () => {
+    const services = (await compose("compose.yaml")).services ?? {};
+    expect(services.postgres?.command).toEqual(
+      expect.arrayContaining([
+        "ssl=on",
+        "ssl_min_protocol_version=TLSv1.3",
+        "hba_file=/etc/ekklesia/pg_hba.conf",
+      ]),
+    );
+    expect(services["object-storage"]?.command).toEqual(
+      expect.arrayContaining(["-s3.port.https=8443"]),
+    );
+
+    const hba = (await text("postgres/pg_hba.conf"))
+      .split("\n")
+      .filter((line) => line.trim() !== "" && !line.trim().startsWith("#"))
+      .map((line) => line.trim().split(/\s+/u));
+    expect(hba).toEqual([
+      ["local", "all", "all", "trust"],
+      ["hostssl", "all", "all", "all", "scram-sha-256"],
+      ["hostnossl", "all", "all", "all", "reject"],
+    ]);
+  });
+
+  it("makes the proxy the API's only trusted peer, at a fixed address outside the dynamic range", async () => {
+    const proxyOverlay = await compose("compose.proxy.yaml");
+    const proxy = proxyOverlay.services?.proxy;
+    const proxyAddress = proxy?.networks?.edge?.ipv4_address;
+    expect(proxyAddress).toBe("${EKKLESIA_PROXY_ADDRESS:-10.249.250.254}");
+    expect(proxyOverlay.services?.api?.environment).toEqual({
+      EKKLESIA_CLIENT_ADDRESS_HEADER: "x-forwarded-for",
+      EKKLESIA_CLIENT_ADDRESS_MODE: "trusted-proxy",
+      EKKLESIA_CLIENT_ADDRESS_TRUSTED_PROXIES: `${proxyAddress}/32`,
+    });
+    expect(proxyOverlay.networks?.edge?.ipam?.config).toEqual([
+      {
+        ip_range: "${EKKLESIA_EDGE_DYNAMIC_RANGE:-10.249.250.0/25}",
+        subnet: "${EKKLESIA_EDGE_SUBNET:-10.249.250.0/24}",
+      },
+    ]);
+    expect(proxy?.cap_drop).toEqual(["ALL"]);
+    expect(proxy?.cap_add).toEqual(["NET_BIND_SERVICE"]);
+
+    const tunnel = (await compose("compose.tunnel.yaml")).services?.tunnel;
+    expect(tunnel?.networks?.edge?.ipv4_address).toBe("${EKKLESIA_TUNNEL_ADDRESS:-10.249.250.253}");
+    expect(tunnel?.env_file).toEqual(["${EKKLESIA_ENV_DIR:-/etc/ekklesia}/tunnel.env"]);
+  });
+
+  it("routes only the API's own paths, overwrites the forwarding header, and never ships local_certs", async () => {
+    const caddyfile = await text("Caddyfile.example");
+    const directives = caddyfile
+      .split("\n")
+      .filter((line) => !line.trim().startsWith("#"))
+      .join("\n");
+
+    expect(directives).toContain("@ekklesia path / /api/* /display/* /assets/*");
+    expect(directives).toContain("header_up X-Forwarded-For {client_ip}");
+    expect(directives).toContain("header_up -CF-Connecting-IP");
+    expect(directives).toContain("trusted_proxies static {$EKKLESIA_TUNNEL_ADDRESS}/32");
+    expect(directives).toContain("header_up Host {host}");
+    expect(directives).toContain("tls_trust_pool file /etc/caddy/ekklesia-ca.crt");
+    // Caddy's internal CA is a test-only substitution made by scripts/smoke-deploy.sh.
+    expect(directives).not.toContain("local_certs");
+    expect(directives).not.toMatch(/tls\s+internal/u);
+  });
+});
+
+describe("reference deployment env examples", () => {
+  it("contain no secret values", async () => {
+    const secretKeys = new Map([
+      ["env/ekklesia.env.example", ["EKKLESIA_IDENTITY_SECRET", "S3_ACCESS_KEY", "S3_SECRET_KEY"]],
+      ["env/postgres.env.example", ["POSTGRES_PASSWORD"]],
+      ["env/object-storage.env.example", ["AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID", "AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY"]],
+      ["env/tunnel.env.example", ["TUNNEL_TOKEN"]],
+    ]);
+    for (const [file, keys] of secretKeys) {
+      const assignments = envAssignments(await text(file));
+      for (const key of keys) {
+        expect(assignments.get(key), `${file} ${key}`).toBe("");
+      }
+    }
+    const ekklesia = envAssignments(await text("env/ekklesia.env.example"));
+    expect(ekklesia.get("DATABASE_URL")).toBe(
+      "postgresql://<user>:<password>@postgres:5432/<database>",
+    );
+    expect(ekklesia.get("EKKLESIA_DATABASE_TLS_MODE")).toBe("verify-full");
+    expect(ekklesia.get("S3_ENDPOINT")).toBe("https://object-storage:8443");
+  });
+
+  it("names every variable Core's host configuration reads", async () => {
+    // The single place executables read the environment (core/src/host/configuration.ts). A new
+    // variable there without a line here would leave an operator guessing.
+    const hostConfiguration = await readFile(
+      path.join(repositoryRoot, "core", "src", "host", "configuration.ts"),
+      "utf8",
+    );
+    const read = new Set(
+      [...hostConfiguration.matchAll(/environment\.([A-Z][A-Z0-9_]+)/gu)].map((match) => match[1]),
+    );
+    const example = await text("env/ekklesia.env.example");
+    // Set by the image, not by an operator.
+    read.delete("NODE_ENV");
+    // Guards against a pattern that silently stops matching and checks nothing.
+    expect(read.size).toBeGreaterThan(20);
+    for (const name of read) {
+      expect(example, String(name)).toMatch(new RegExp(`^#? ?${name}=`, "mu"));
+    }
+    expect(example).toContain("EKKLESIA_MODULE_SECRET__<MODULE_ID>__<KEY>=");
+  });
+});

tests/fixtures/boundaries/legal-runtime-dependencies/packages/sdk/package.json

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+{
+  "name": "@ekklesia/sdk",
+  "version": "0.0.0",
+  "type": "module",
+  "dependencies": {
+    "drizzle-orm": "0.45.2",
+    "react": "19.2.8",
+    "polyfill": "1.0.0"
+  },
+  "peerDependencies": {
+    "drizzle-orm": "0.45.2",
+    "react": "19.2.8"
+  },
+  "optionalDependencies": {
+    "fsevents": "2.3.3"
+  },
+  "devDependencies": {
+    "esbuild": "0.28.1",
+    "type-only": "1.0.0",
+    "vitest": "4.1.10"
+  },
+  "exports": {
+    ".": "./src/index.ts",
+    "./schema": "./src/index.ts"
+  },
+  "ekklesia": {
+    "layer": "module-sdk"
+  }
+}

tests/fixtures/boundaries/legal-runtime-dependencies/packages/sdk/scripts/build.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+import { build } from "esbuild";
+
+await build({ entryPoints: ["src/index.ts"] });

tests/fixtures/boundaries/legal-runtime-dependencies/packages/sdk/src/index.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+import { describe, it } from "vitest";
+
+describe("sdk", () => {
+  it("runs with development dependencies installed", () => undefined);
+});

tests/fixtures/boundaries/legal-runtime-dependencies/packages/sdk/src/index.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+import { readFile } from "fs/promises";
+import path from "node:path";
+import "polyfill";
+import { pgTableCreator } from "drizzle-orm/pg-core";
+import type { Config } from "type-only";
+import { type Options, type Settings } from "type-only/settings";
+export type { Shape } from "type-only/shape";
+export { createSchema } from "@ekklesia/sdk/schema";
+
+export async function load(config: Config, options: Options, settings: Settings) {
+  const watcher = await import("fsevents");
+  return { config, options, path, readFile, settings, table: pgTableCreator, watcher };
+}

tests/fixtures/boundaries/legal-runtime-dependencies/packages/sdk/src/view.tsx

@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+export function View() {
+  return <div />;
+}

tests/fixtures/boundaries/legal-runtime-dependencies/packages/sdk/tests/fixture.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+import { build } from "esbuild";
+
+export const builder = build;

tests/fixtures/boundaries/module-imports-ui-host/modules/calendar/package.json

@@ -3,7 +3,8 @@
   "version": "0.0.0",
   "type": "module",
   "dependencies": {
-    "@ekklesia/module-ui-host": "workspace:*"
+    "@ekklesia/module-ui-host": "workspace:*",
+    "react": "19.2.8"
   },
   "exports": {
     ".": "./src/index.ts"

tests/fixtures/boundaries/module-ui-imports-core/modules/announcements/package.json

@@ -2,6 +2,9 @@
   "name": "@ekklesia/module-announcements",
   "version": "0.0.0",
   "type": "module",
+  "dependencies": {
+    "react": "19.2.8"
+  },
   "exports": {
     ".": "./src/index.ts"
   },

tests/fixtures/boundaries/runtime-dev-only-dependency/packages/sdk/package.json

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+{
+  "name": "@ekklesia/sdk",
+  "version": "0.0.0",
+  "type": "module",
+  "devDependencies": { "zod": "4.0.0" },
+  "exports": {
+    ".": "./src/index.ts"
+  },
+  "ekklesia": {
+    "layer": "module-sdk"
+  }
+}