ADR 0033 gave Ekklesia a display host and ADR 0034 gave it a login page. Together, the only way to light a television in a foyer was to sign a human being into it and leave that session running on a screen anyone can walk up to: a person's credentials on a wall, a person's session as the thing signage depends on, and the display going dark when they are revoked or their session simply expires. A screen is not a person. Ekklesia now recognizes three principal classes — anonymous, authenticated human, and managed device — and a device is a first-class principal with its own credential and its own explicit permissions. It has no email, no password, and no row in the identity tables, and it satisfies the `authenticated` baseline never, so every route that settles for "somebody is signed in" stays closed to it. Device permissions live in their own table because ekklesia_core_grant.user_id is a non-null foreign key into the user table and making it polymorphic would rewrite the platform's central authorization record to serve one narrow case. That is a schema decision, not a second decision point: the evaluator gained one branch, so a device is allowed or denied by the same function, with the same deny-by-default, as anyone else — with no owner path it could reach and no baseline that stands in for a grant. The six-digit code is not the credential. It is printed across a screen in a public hallway, so it is treated as public: it identifies a request to an administrator and is worth nothing alone. Collecting the credential also requires a 256-bit claim secret held only in the requesting browser's HttpOnly cookie, and approving requires the restricted core.devices.manage permission. Without that split, reading a code off a wall would hand over the screen's identity. The permission a pairing asks for is read from the module's validated display declaration, never from the request, so a browser cannot ask to be granted core.devices.manage or another module's permission. Approval grants exactly that one permission. Credentials are stored only as SHA-256; the raw value exists in the Set-Cookie that issues it and the device's own cookie jar, and is never logged, returned in JSON, or placed in a URL. The cookie is HttpOnly, so the module display code running in that same page cannot read it. Revocation is a server-side column checked on every principal resolution, and re-pairing mints a new identity so an old credential can never come back. State transitions are conditional updates, so one code cannot be approved twice or claimed into two credentials under a race. /api/v1/principal still reports a device as anonymous: it is what the Dashboard uses to decide whether a person is signed in. Displays read their viewer from the descriptor instead, which already performed the authorization — so displays are descriptor-first while the Dashboard stays principal-first, and neither infers an identity by elimination. Proven end to end against real PostgreSQL and real HTTP: an unpaired screen shows a code, an owner approves it, the device opens the display descriptor and a realtime stream, and revocation closes both while the device still holds its cookie. An already-open SSE stream is bounded by realtime's existing five-minute reconnect rather than closed instantly, and that bound is documented rather than called immediate. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
190 lines
6.8 KiB
TypeScript
190 lines
6.8 KiB
TypeScript
import {
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ANONYMOUS_PRINCIPAL,
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createAuthenticatedPrincipal,
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createDevicePrincipal,
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parsePermissionId,
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} from "@ekklesia/contracts";
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import { describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest";
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import { createAuthorizationEvaluator } from "../src/authorization/evaluator.js";
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/**
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* Device authority, decided by the **same** evaluator that decides everything else.
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*
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* The point of these tests is mostly negative: a device must not acquire authority from being a
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* principal, from being paired, from an `authenticated` baseline, or from platform ownership. The
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* only thing that ever makes a device allowed is an explicit permission granted to that exact
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* device (ADR 0036).
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*/
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const displayPermission = parsePermissionId("announcements.slideshow.view");
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const otherPermission = parsePermissionId("calendar.display.view");
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const deviceId = "3f1c8a4e-1d2b-4c3a-9e5f-6a7b8c9d0e1f";
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function evaluator(options: { readonly devicePermissions?: readonly string[] } = {}) {
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const granted = new Set(options.devicePermissions ?? []);
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const hasActivePermission = vi.fn(async (_deviceId: string, permission: string) =>
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granted.has(permission),
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);
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// Deliberately always true: if the evaluator ever consulted these for a device, every assertion
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// below would flip, which is exactly what must not happen.
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const isPlatformOwner = vi.fn(async () => true);
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const hasActiveGrant = vi.fn(async () => true);
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return {
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evaluator: createAuthorizationEvaluator({
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devices: { hasActivePermission } as never,
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grants: { hasActiveGrant } as never,
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platformOwners: { isPlatformOwner } as never,
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}),
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hasActiveGrant,
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hasActivePermission,
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isPlatformOwner,
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};
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}
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describe("device principals go through the ordinary evaluator", () => {
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it("allows a device holding the exact restricted permission", async () => {
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const harness = evaluator({ devicePermissions: [displayPermission] });
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await expect(
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harness.evaluator.authorize({
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baseline: "restricted",
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permission: displayPermission,
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principal: createDevicePrincipal(deviceId),
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}),
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).resolves.toEqual({ allowed: true });
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expect(harness.hasActivePermission).toHaveBeenCalledWith(deviceId, displayPermission);
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});
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it("denies a device any permission it was not granted", async () => {
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const harness = evaluator({ devicePermissions: [displayPermission] });
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// Pairing a screen for one display is not authority over another module's.
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await expect(
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harness.evaluator.authorize({
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baseline: "restricted",
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permission: otherPermission,
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principal: createDevicePrincipal(deviceId),
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}),
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).resolves.toEqual({ allowed: false });
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});
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it("never satisfies an authenticated baseline, however many permissions it holds", async () => {
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const harness = evaluator({ devicePermissions: [displayPermission] });
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// "A person is signed in" is not true of a television. Every route that settles for the
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// `authenticated` baseline — the module UI inventory among them — stays closed.
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await expect(
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harness.evaluator.authorize({
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baseline: "authenticated",
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permission: displayPermission,
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principal: createDevicePrincipal(deviceId),
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}),
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).resolves.toEqual({ allowed: false });
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expect(harness.hasActivePermission).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
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});
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it("never consults platform ownership or user grants for a device", async () => {
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const harness = evaluator();
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await expect(
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harness.evaluator.authorize({
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baseline: "restricted",
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permission: displayPermission,
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principal: createDevicePrincipal(deviceId),
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}),
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).resolves.toEqual({ allowed: false });
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// Both ports would have answered "yes". A device is denied anyway, because neither is a path a
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// device can reach — there is no device that is a platform owner.
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expect(harness.isPlatformOwner).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
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expect(harness.hasActiveGrant).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
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});
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it("denies every device when the deployment composed no device support at all", async () => {
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const withoutDevices = createAuthorizationEvaluator({
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grants: { hasActiveGrant: async () => true } as never,
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platformOwners: { isPlatformOwner: async () => true } as never,
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});
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await expect(
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withoutDevices.authorize({
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baseline: "restricted",
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permission: displayPermission,
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principal: createDevicePrincipal(deviceId),
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}),
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).resolves.toEqual({ allowed: false });
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});
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it("denies a scoped check for a device rather than treating it as unscoped", async () => {
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const harness = evaluator({ devicePermissions: [displayPermission] });
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await expect(
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harness.evaluator.authorize({
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baseline: "restricted",
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permission: displayPermission,
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principal: createDevicePrincipal(deviceId),
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scope: "event-1",
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}),
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).resolves.toEqual({ allowed: false });
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});
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it("still allows a device through a public baseline, like any other principal", async () => {
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const harness = evaluator();
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await expect(
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harness.evaluator.authorize({
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baseline: "public",
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permission: displayPermission,
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principal: createDevicePrincipal(deviceId),
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}),
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).resolves.toEqual({ allowed: true });
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});
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it("leaves human and anonymous decisions exactly as they were", async () => {
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const harness = evaluator();
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await expect(
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harness.evaluator.authorize({
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baseline: "restricted",
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permission: displayPermission,
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principal: createAuthenticatedPrincipal("user-1"),
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}),
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).resolves.toEqual({ allowed: true });
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await expect(
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harness.evaluator.authorize({
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baseline: "restricted",
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permission: displayPermission,
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principal: ANONYMOUS_PRINCIPAL,
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}),
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).resolves.toEqual({ allowed: false });
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await expect(
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harness.evaluator.authorize({
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baseline: "authenticated",
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permission: displayPermission,
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principal: createAuthenticatedPrincipal("user-1"),
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}),
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).resolves.toEqual({ allowed: true });
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});
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it("propagates a device lookup failure rather than reporting it as denied", async () => {
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const failing = createAuthorizationEvaluator({
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devices: {
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hasActivePermission: async () => {
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throw new Error("database unavailable");
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},
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} as never,
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grants: { hasActiveGrant: async () => false } as never,
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platformOwners: { isPlatformOwner: async () => false } as never,
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});
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// A caller must never be told "no permission" when the true answer is "could not be
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// determined", exactly as for a human.
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await expect(
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failing.authorize({
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baseline: "restricted",
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permission: displayPermission,
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principal: createDevicePrincipal(deviceId),
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}),
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).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: "AUTHORIZATION_EVALUATION_FAILED" });
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});
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});
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