Add a single platform-owned request-body policy (hono/body-limit) with small, named limits for Better Auth and Core's grant-mutation endpoint, and a new required maxBodyBytes field on the executable module route contract so every module route makes a conscious no-body-or-bounded-body choice, capped at a platform ceiling. Every oversized request gets one sanitized 413 contract and never reaches business logic, authorization, or a handler. Also configure finite Node header/request/keep-alive timeouts, including the non-obvious connectionsCheckingInterval needed for them to take effect promptly, so a slow-header or slow-body connection cannot hold a socket indefinitely. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
515 lines
18 KiB
TypeScript
515 lines
18 KiB
TypeScript
import {
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createAuthenticatedPrincipal,
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parseAuthorizationScope,
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parseEkklesiaUserId,
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parseGrantId,
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parsePermissionId,
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} from "@ekklesia/contracts";
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import {
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type AuthorizationEvaluator,
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type AuthorizationStore,
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AuthorizationStoreError,
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CORE_AUTHORIZATION_GRANTS_MANAGE,
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CORE_PERMISSION_REGISTRY,
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} from "@ekklesia/core/authorization";
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import type { EkklesiaIdentityRuntime } from "@ekklesia/core/identity";
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import { Hono } from "hono";
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import { describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest";
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import { CORE_MUTATION_MAX_BODY_BYTES } from "../src/body-limits.js";
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import { createGrantsRoutes } from "../src/grants-routes.js";
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const trustedOrigin = "https://dashboard.example.test";
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const untrustedOrigin = "https://evil.example.test";
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const manager = createAuthenticatedPrincipal("manager_1");
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const subjectUserId = parseEkklesiaUserId("subject_1");
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// Well-formed but never declared in `CORE_PERMISSION_REGISTRY` — used to prove the routes reject
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// (or, for listing, still return) an unregistered permission id rather than assuming registration.
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const permission = parsePermissionId("calendar.events.read");
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// A permission `CORE_PERMISSION_REGISTRY` actually declares, so tests that must reach
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// `store.createGrant`/`store.revokeGrant` can do so. This suite exercises `createGrantsRoutes` in
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// isolation and intentionally injects `CORE_PERMISSION_REGISTRY` directly rather than a composed
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// platform registry — the routes have no notion of "Core" versus "module" permissions, they only
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// ever consult whichever registry they are given. Coverage proving a module-declared permission
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// works through the exact same route code lives in
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// `apps/api/tests/authorization-middleware.test.ts` (unit) and the "installed module permission
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// end-to-end" scenario in `apps/api/tests/api-http.integration.ts` (live).
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const registeredPermission = CORE_AUTHORIZATION_GRANTS_MANAGE;
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const grantId = parseGrantId("11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111");
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function fakeRuntime(overrides: Partial<EkklesiaIdentityRuntime> = {}): EkklesiaIdentityRuntime {
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return {
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handleAuthRequest: vi.fn(),
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resolvePrincipal: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(manager),
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...overrides,
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};
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}
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function fakeStore(overrides: Partial<AuthorizationStore> = {}): AuthorizationStore {
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return {
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createGrant: vi.fn(),
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grantPlatformOwner: vi.fn(),
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hasActiveGrant: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(false),
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isPlatformOwner: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(false),
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listGrantsForUser: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue([]),
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revokeGrant: vi.fn(),
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revokePlatformOwner: vi.fn(),
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...overrides,
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};
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}
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function buildApp(options: {
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readonly allowed?: boolean;
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readonly runtime?: EkklesiaIdentityRuntime;
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readonly store?: AuthorizationStore;
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}) {
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const evaluator: AuthorizationEvaluator = {
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authorize: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({ allowed: options.allowed ?? true }),
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};
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const runtime = options.runtime ?? fakeRuntime();
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const store = options.store ?? fakeStore();
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const app = new Hono();
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app.route(
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"/",
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createGrantsRoutes({
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evaluator,
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registry: CORE_PERMISSION_REGISTRY,
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runtime,
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store,
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trustedOrigins: new Set([trustedOrigin]),
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}),
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);
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return { app, evaluator, runtime, store };
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}
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describe("GET /api/v1/grants", () => {
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it("denies an anonymous or non-manager authenticated caller (evaluator says no)", async () => {
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const { app, evaluator } = buildApp({ allowed: false });
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const response = await app.request(`/api/v1/grants?userId=${subjectUserId}`);
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expect(response.status).toBe(403);
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expect(evaluator.authorize).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
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expect.objectContaining({ baseline: "restricted" }),
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);
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});
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it("allows a caller the evaluator authorizes — whether by platform ownership or a delegated grants.manage grant, the route cannot tell and does not need to (see core/tests/authorization-evaluator.test.ts for that distinction)", async () => {
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const grants = [
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{
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createdAt: new Date("2026-01-01T00:00:00.000Z"),
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id: grantId,
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permission,
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sourceKind: "explicit" as const,
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userId: subjectUserId,
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},
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];
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const store = fakeStore({ listGrantsForUser: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(grants) });
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const { app } = buildApp({ store });
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const response = await app.request(`/api/v1/grants?userId=${subjectUserId}`);
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const body = (await response.json()) as { grants: unknown[] };
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expect(response.status).toBe(200);
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expect(body.grants).toHaveLength(1);
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expect(store.listGrantsForUser).toHaveBeenCalledWith(subjectUserId, { sourceKind: "explicit" });
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});
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it("rejects a missing or malformed userId query parameter", async () => {
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const { app, store } = buildApp({});
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const response = await app.request("/api/v1/grants?userId=");
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expect(response.status).toBe(400);
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expect(store.listGrantsForUser).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
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});
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it("maps a store infrastructure failure to a sanitized 503", async () => {
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const store = fakeStore({
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listGrantsForUser: vi
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.fn()
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.mockRejectedValue(new AuthorizationStoreError("AUTHORIZATION_GRANT_LIST_FAILED")),
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});
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const { app } = buildApp({ store });
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const response = await app.request(`/api/v1/grants?userId=${subjectUserId}`);
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expect(response.status).toBe(503);
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expect(await response.json()).toEqual({ code: "AUTHORIZATION_GRANT_LIST_FAILED" });
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});
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});
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describe("POST /api/v1/grants", () => {
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it("rejects a request with no trusted Origin header before ever checking permission", async () => {
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const { app, evaluator } = buildApp({});
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const response = await app.request("/api/v1/grants", {
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body: JSON.stringify({ permission, subjectUserId }),
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headers: { "content-type": "application/json" },
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method: "POST",
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});
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expect(response.status).toBe(403);
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expect(await response.json()).toEqual({ code: "UNTRUSTED_ORIGIN" });
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expect(evaluator.authorize).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
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});
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it("rejects an untrusted Origin header the same way", async () => {
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const { app } = buildApp({});
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const response = await app.request("/api/v1/grants", {
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body: JSON.stringify({ permission, subjectUserId }),
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headers: { "content-type": "application/json", origin: untrustedOrigin },
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method: "POST",
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});
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expect(response.status).toBe(403);
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expect(await response.json()).toEqual({ code: "UNTRUSTED_ORIGIN" });
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});
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it("denies a caller the evaluator does not authorize", async () => {
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const { app, store } = buildApp({ allowed: false });
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const response = await app.request("/api/v1/grants", {
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body: JSON.stringify({ permission, subjectUserId }),
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headers: { "content-type": "application/json", origin: trustedOrigin },
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method: "POST",
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});
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expect(response.status).toBe(403);
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expect(store.createGrant).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
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});
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it("creates an explicit grant, deriving sourceKind and actor server-side from the authenticated principal, never from the request body", async () => {
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const createdGrant = {
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createdAt: new Date("2026-01-01T00:00:00.000Z"),
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id: grantId,
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permission: registeredPermission,
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scope: parseAuthorizationScope("calendar-event:123"),
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sourceKind: "explicit" as const,
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userId: subjectUserId,
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};
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const store = fakeStore({ createGrant: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(createdGrant) });
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const { app } = buildApp({ store });
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const response = await app.request("/api/v1/grants", {
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body: JSON.stringify({
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permission: registeredPermission,
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scope: "calendar-event:123",
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subjectUserId,
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}),
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headers: { "content-type": "application/json", origin: trustedOrigin },
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method: "POST",
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});
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const body = (await response.json()) as { grant: { id: string } };
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expect(response.status).toBe(201);
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expect(body.grant.id).toBe(grantId);
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expect(store.createGrant).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
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expect.objectContaining({
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actor: { type: "user", userId: manager.userId },
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permission: registeredPermission,
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scope: "calendar-event:123",
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sourceKind: "explicit",
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userId: subjectUserId,
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}),
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);
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});
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it("rejects a well-formed but unregistered permission with the same sanitized denial as an unauthorized caller, and never calls the store", async () => {
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const { app, store } = buildApp({});
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const response = await app.request("/api/v1/grants", {
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body: JSON.stringify({ permission, subjectUserId }),
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headers: { "content-type": "application/json", origin: trustedOrigin },
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method: "POST",
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});
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expect(response.status).toBe(403);
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expect(await response.json()).toEqual({ code: "AUTHORIZATION_DENIED" });
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expect(store.createGrant).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
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});
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it.each([
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"actor",
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"owner",
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"isOwner",
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"sourceKind",
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"sourceRef",
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"id",
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"grantId",
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"createdAt",
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"revokedAt",
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"createdByActorId",
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"effectivePermissions",
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])("rejects a request body carrying a disallowed field (%s), even alongside otherwise-valid fields", async (field) => {
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const { app, store } = buildApp({});
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const response = await app.request("/api/v1/grants", {
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body: JSON.stringify({ [field]: "hostile-value", permission, subjectUserId }),
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headers: { "content-type": "application/json", origin: trustedOrigin },
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method: "POST",
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});
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expect(response.status).toBe(400);
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expect(store.createGrant).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
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});
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it("rejects a malformed permission, subject id, scope, or expiresAt", async () => {
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const { app, store } = buildApp({});
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const responses = await Promise.all(
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[
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{ permission: "not-namespaced", subjectUserId },
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{ permission, subjectUserId: "" },
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{ permission, scope: "", subjectUserId },
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{ expiresAt: "not-a-date", permission, subjectUserId },
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].map((body) =>
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app.request("/api/v1/grants", {
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body: JSON.stringify(body),
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headers: { "content-type": "application/json", origin: trustedOrigin },
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method: "POST",
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}),
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),
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);
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for (const response of responses) {
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expect(response.status).toBe(400);
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}
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expect(store.createGrant).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
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});
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it("maps a store infrastructure failure to a sanitized 503", async () => {
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const store = fakeStore({
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createGrant: vi
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.fn()
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.mockRejectedValue(new AuthorizationStoreError("AUTHORIZATION_GRANT_CREATE_FAILED")),
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});
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const { app } = buildApp({ store });
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const response = await app.request("/api/v1/grants", {
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body: JSON.stringify({ permission: registeredPermission, subjectUserId }),
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headers: { "content-type": "application/json", origin: trustedOrigin },
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method: "POST",
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});
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expect(response.status).toBe(503);
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expect(await response.json()).toEqual({ code: "AUTHORIZATION_GRANT_CREATE_FAILED" });
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});
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});
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describe("POST /api/v1/grants/:grantId/revoke", () => {
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it("rejects a request with no trusted Origin header before ever checking permission", async () => {
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const { app, evaluator } = buildApp({});
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const response = await app.request(`/api/v1/grants/${grantId}/revoke`, { method: "POST" });
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expect(response.status).toBe(403);
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expect(await response.json()).toEqual({ code: "UNTRUSTED_ORIGIN" });
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expect(evaluator.authorize).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
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});
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it("revokes an explicit grant, deriving the actor server-side from the authenticated principal", async () => {
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const store = fakeStore({ revokeGrant: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined) });
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const { app } = buildApp({ store });
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const response = await app.request(`/api/v1/grants/${grantId}/revoke`, {
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headers: { origin: trustedOrigin },
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method: "POST",
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});
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expect(response.status).toBe(200);
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expect(await response.json()).toEqual({ success: true });
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expect(store.revokeGrant).toHaveBeenCalledWith({
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actor: { type: "user", userId: manager.userId },
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grantId,
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sourceKind: "explicit",
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});
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});
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it("always constrains revocation to sourceKind explicit, so a relationship-derived grant can never be targeted by id", async () => {
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// The store itself enforces this by treating a sourceKind mismatch exactly like a missing
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// grant; this test proves the route always asks for that constraint, and correctly surfaces
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// the resulting "not found" as 404 rather than leaking that the grant exists but is the wrong
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// kind.
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const store = fakeStore({
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revokeGrant: vi
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.fn()
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.mockRejectedValue(new AuthorizationStoreError("AUTHORIZATION_GRANT_NOT_FOUND")),
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});
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const { app } = buildApp({ store });
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const response = await app.request(`/api/v1/grants/${grantId}/revoke`, {
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headers: { origin: trustedOrigin },
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method: "POST",
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});
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expect(response.status).toBe(404);
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expect(await response.json()).toEqual({ code: "AUTHORIZATION_GRANT_NOT_FOUND" });
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expect(store.revokeGrant).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
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expect.objectContaining({ sourceKind: "explicit" }),
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);
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});
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it("rejects a malformed grant id", async () => {
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const { app, store } = buildApp({});
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const response = await app.request("/api/v1/grants/%20/revoke", {
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headers: { origin: trustedOrigin },
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method: "POST",
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});
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expect(response.status).toBe(400);
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expect(store.revokeGrant).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
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});
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it("maps a store infrastructure failure to a sanitized 503", async () => {
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const store = fakeStore({
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revokeGrant: vi
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.fn()
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.mockRejectedValue(new AuthorizationStoreError("AUTHORIZATION_GRANT_REVOKE_FAILED")),
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});
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const { app } = buildApp({ store });
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const response = await app.request(`/api/v1/grants/${grantId}/revoke`, {
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headers: { origin: trustedOrigin },
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method: "POST",
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});
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expect(response.status).toBe(503);
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expect(await response.json()).toEqual({ code: "AUTHORIZATION_GRANT_REVOKE_FAILED" });
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});
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});
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describe("Core grant mutation request body limit", () => {
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it("accepts a comfortably-under-limit grant-creation body and rejects one byte over the exact limit", async () => {
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const store = fakeStore();
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const { app } = buildApp({ store });
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const overSizedBody = "a".repeat(CORE_MUTATION_MAX_BODY_BYTES + 1);
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const overResponse = await app.request("/api/v1/grants", {
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body: overSizedBody,
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headers: {
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"content-length": String(overSizedBody.length),
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"content-type": "application/json",
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origin: trustedOrigin,
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},
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method: "POST",
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});
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expect(overResponse.status).toBe(413);
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expect(await overResponse.json()).toEqual({ code: "REQUEST_BODY_TOO_LARGE" });
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expect(store.createGrant).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
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// A well-formed, comfortably-under-limit payload still succeeds through the same route.
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const underResponse = await app.request("/api/v1/grants", {
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body: JSON.stringify({ permission: registeredPermission, subjectUserId }),
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headers: { "content-type": "application/json", origin: trustedOrigin },
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method: "POST",
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});
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expect(underResponse.status).not.toBe(413);
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});
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it("rejects an oversized declared Content-Length on grant creation without invoking permission evaluation", async () => {
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const evaluatorAuthorize = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({ allowed: true });
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const evaluator: AuthorizationEvaluator = { authorize: evaluatorAuthorize };
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const store = fakeStore();
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const app = new Hono();
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app.route(
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"/",
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createGrantsRoutes({
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evaluator,
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registry: CORE_PERMISSION_REGISTRY,
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runtime: fakeRuntime(),
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store,
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trustedOrigins: new Set([trustedOrigin]),
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}),
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);
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const response = await app.request("/api/v1/grants", {
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body: "a",
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headers: {
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"content-length": String(CORE_MUTATION_MAX_BODY_BYTES * 10),
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"content-type": "application/json",
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origin: trustedOrigin,
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},
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method: "POST",
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});
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expect(response.status).toBe(413);
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expect(evaluatorAuthorize).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
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expect(store.createGrant).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
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});
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it("rejects an oversized streamed grant-creation body with no declared Content-Length", async () => {
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const store = fakeStore();
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const { app } = buildApp({ store });
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const chunk = new Uint8Array(1024).fill(97);
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let enqueued = 0;
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const stream = new ReadableStream<Uint8Array>({
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pull(controller) {
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if (enqueued > CORE_MUTATION_MAX_BODY_BYTES) {
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controller.close();
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return;
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}
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enqueued += chunk.length;
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controller.enqueue(chunk);
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},
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});
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const response = await app.request("/api/v1/grants", {
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body: stream,
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duplex: "half",
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headers: { "content-type": "application/json", origin: trustedOrigin },
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method: "POST",
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} as RequestInit);
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expect(response.status).toBe(413);
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expect(await response.json()).toEqual({ code: "REQUEST_BODY_TOO_LARGE" });
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expect(store.createGrant).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
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});
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it("does not read an oversized body from an untrusted Origin: the trusted-origin rejection wins first", async () => {
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const store = fakeStore();
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const { app } = buildApp({ store });
|
|
const chunk = new Uint8Array(1024).fill(97);
|
|
let pullCount = 0;
|
|
const stream = new ReadableStream<Uint8Array>({
|
|
pull(controller) {
|
|
pullCount += 1;
|
|
if (pullCount > 3) {
|
|
controller.close();
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
controller.enqueue(chunk);
|
|
},
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
const response = await app.request("/api/v1/grants", {
|
|
body: stream,
|
|
duplex: "half",
|
|
headers: { "content-type": "application/json", origin: untrustedOrigin },
|
|
method: "POST",
|
|
} as RequestInit);
|
|
|
|
expect(response.status).toBe(403);
|
|
expect(await response.json()).toEqual({ code: "UNTRUSTED_ORIGIN" });
|
|
expect(store.createGrant).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("also bounds the revoke mutation body", async () => {
|
|
const store = fakeStore();
|
|
const { app } = buildApp({ store });
|
|
|
|
const response = await app.request(`/api/v1/grants/${grantId}/revoke`, {
|
|
body: "a".repeat(CORE_MUTATION_MAX_BODY_BYTES + 1),
|
|
headers: {
|
|
"content-length": String(CORE_MUTATION_MAX_BODY_BYTES + 1),
|
|
origin: trustedOrigin,
|
|
},
|
|
method: "POST",
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
expect(response.status).toBe(413);
|
|
expect(store.revokeGrant).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
|
|
});
|
|
});
|