ekklesiaandClaude Opus 5
1e5866504e
ADR 0022 defined what a module UI is and selected React and TypeScript as the authoring model, but closed by recording that it was not buildable end to end: `browser.json` preserves JSX, bundler plugins are denied, and nothing turned a module's `.tsx` into the artifact its manifest declares. This closes exactly that gap. esbuild produces the artifact. It was already the right answer before it was chosen: this workspace resolves esbuild 0.28.1 through Vite/Vitest today and `pnpm-workspace.yaml` already carries `allowBuilds: esbuild`, so the pinned dependency adds no second copy and no new trust decision. It is also the smallest tool that covers TSX, ESM, browser platform, bundling, source maps, and a define-time constant with no plugin ecosystem. Vite library mode would drag in `@vitejs/plugin-react`, which the module boundary denies on purpose; `tsc` alone cannot bundle, so its output would carry bare `react/jsx-runtime` imports no browser resolves. React is bundled, not externalized. That follows from ADR 0022 rather than from convenience: `mount()` was made the ABI precisely so React would not be part of the host contract, and externalizing it would reverse that through the build system — every host would have to supply a compatible React, and a standalone host might not use React at all. The cost is real and accepted: duplicate runtimes and a ~570 KB unminified artifact. Sharing one runtime later is a build optimization that cannot change the contract, because the contract is a mount function. Output is browser ESM at `es2022`, unminified so an operator can review what they install, with `process.env.NODE_ENV` substituted — React reads it at module scope and would otherwise touch a Node global that does not exist in a browser. The output path is read from the module's own manifest rather than a build convention, so declared and produced artifacts cannot drift, and it is validated with the same `packageRelativePathSchema` discovery enforces, so a build can never write where discovery would later reject. `@ekklesia/module-ui-build` owns every option; modules own none. It uses the existing `tooling` role that modules could already depend on, so this pass required no boundary relaxation at all. Its `bin` points at a committed launcher rather than compiled output because pnpm links bins during install, before Turborepo builds anything — a bin targeting `dist/cli.js` fails to link on a fresh clone and breaks every module's UI build in CI. A module with no `entrypoints.ui` is not an error; the CLI reports nothing to build and exits zero, so one script serves both kinds of module. Styling is React inline style objects. A stylesheet import fails the build rather than emitting a sidecar `.css` that no manifest declares and no host loads — an undeclared asset would appear to work in tests and silently do nothing in a real host. `templates/module` is the canonical example and now ships optional UI. Its tests build the artifact from source, validate it with `parseModuleUiExport`, mount it into a real DOM, assert the rendered output, and unmount it; the artifact is rebuilt per run so the proof can never pass against stale output, and `dist/` stays gitignored. Because verify runs both `pnpm test` and `pnpm build`, a UI that cannot be produced fails CI through two independent paths. One correction worth stating plainly: the UI TypeScript project declares `"types": []`, and a UI file referencing `process` does fail in isolation, but TypeScript still pulls Node globals in transitively — a file importing `@ekklesia/module-ui-sdk` reaches `@ekklesia/contracts` and through its Zod and Drizzle types `process.env` typechecks again. The docs and ADR describe this as the convention it is rather than the guard it is not. Core is untouched. Building is an authoring step; discovery still only validates the artifact a module shipped and never executes or produces one. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
427 lines
30 KiB
Markdown
427 lines
30 KiB
Markdown
# Ekklesia
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Ekklesia is an open, modular church technology platform. Each module is an independently versioned
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product that owns its domain behavior, data, and its own UI, composed into dashboards, websites,
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mobile apps, kiosks, displays, and other surfaces.
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## Current status
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Phase 3 is complete, and Phase 4A (Core identity foundation), Phase 4B (identity HTTP transport),
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Phase 4C (Core authorization), Phase 5A (module authorization integration), Phase 5B (module HTTP
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transport), and Phase 5C (module database access) have landed. **Phase 5D (security hardening
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against an independent security audit) is complete: all five passes have landed and the final
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independent whole-repository re-audit has closed, under the current trusted-contributor,
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not-yet-deployed threat model — and Phase 6 is unblocked and underway.** The operational
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requirements that remain are prerequisites for two specific *future* activities — executing
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untrusted CI contributions, and a public production launch — and neither gates Phase 6; see the
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pass 5 closure below and
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[Security model and deployment trust boundaries](docs/development/security.md). The repository includes
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public module contracts, independently versioned capabilities, static module manifests,
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deterministic automatic discovery, compiled server loading, a staged capability registry,
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dependency-ordered lifecycle with rollback, module-owned Drizzle table contracts, deterministic
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schema aggregation, and a cloneable backend-only module template. Migration artifacts have
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module-owned Drizzle contracts, deterministic offline discovery, explicit destructive-change
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declarations, and exact checksums. Core provides read-only applied-history planning and a locked,
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whole-batch transactional PostgreSQL runner with exact external destructive approval matching. A
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hermetic live PostgreSQL suite proves history, rollback, statement breakpoints, advisory-lock
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concurrency and release, exact destructive approvals, and sanitization against the production
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adapter. A Core-owned `pnpm doctor` dashboard combines the existing static discovery and read-only
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migration-planning services into one concise readiness report.
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Phase 4A added Core-owned identity foundations: a Core-owned Better Auth database schema
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(`ekklesia_core_user`, `ekklesia_core_session`, `ekklesia_core_account`,
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`ekklesia_core_verification`), a first-class Core-owned migration source that coexists with
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module-owned migrations under the exact same migration system, minimal opaque-identity contracts
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in `@ekklesia/contracts`, and an explicit Better Auth construction boundary in Core. See
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[Identity](docs/development/identity.md) and
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[ADR 0010](docs/architecture/decisions/0010-core-identity-and-better-auth-adoption.md).
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Phase 4B adds identity HTTP transport: a minimal Hono-based `apps/api` composition root
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(`pnpm api:start`) mounts Better Auth at `/api/auth/*` and exposes `GET /api/v1/principal` behind
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Core's own Fetch-compatible identity runtime — Core still does not depend on Hono, and modules
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still cannot reach any of this. Public email/password registration is the intended eventual
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product policy — every account receives identical lowest-privilege baseline status and signup
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order never grants elevation — but is now **disabled by default, and cannot be enabled in
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production at all** until durable abuse controls exist (Phase 5D pass 1, below). See
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[API](docs/development/api.md) and
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[ADR 0011](docs/architecture/decisions/0011-identity-http-transport-and-public-enrollment.md).
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**No email verification, password recovery, or Dashboard exists yet** — that, along with
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production approval-provider composition, jobs, physical storage provisioning, surfaces, and
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feature modules, remains later vertical slices. Public registration is not yet ready for a real
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public launch.
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Phase 4C adds Core's authorization foundation on top of identity: a schema, evaluator, and store
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for platform owners, explicit grants, and relationship-derived grants; a smallest-possible
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immutable permission registry; an explicit, single-use, concurrency-safe platform-owner bootstrap
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command (`pnpm authorization:bootstrap-owner`, never HTTP-exposed, never inferred from signup
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order); and, in `apps/api`, reusable Hono authorization enforcement plus a narrowly scoped
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`/api/v1/grants` HTTP API for managing *explicit* grants only, requiring an exact trusted `Origin`
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on every mutation. Roles/groups/teams/tenants, an owner-management HTTP endpoint, and service
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accounts/API tokens remain later work. See [Authorization](docs/development/authorization.md) and
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[ADR 0013](docs/architecture/decisions/0013-core-authorization-and-owner-bootstrap.md).
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Phase 5A wires module-declared permissions into that same authorization system: the module manifest
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(version 3 at the time, version 4 today) declares permissions as complete
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`{id, baseline, description}` declarations (never a bare string), and `apps/api` discovers every installed module and composes one immutable platform
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permission registry — Core's own declarations plus every module's — before constructing its
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database pool, Better Auth instance, or HTTP server. A module's declared permission is then
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enforceable and grantable through the exact same `requirePermission` middleware and
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`/api/v1/grants` HTTP API Core's own permissions already use, with `core.*` reserved and never
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claimable by a module. `pnpm doctor` and `pnpm modules:validate` both validate permission
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composition. Installing, removing, or editing a module currently requires an API restart; removing
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one makes its permission unavailable to new checks and new grants without deleting or revoking any
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historical grant or audit row. See
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[Authorization](docs/development/authorization.md#module-permission-composition),
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[Module development](docs/module-development/README.md), and
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[ADR 0014](docs/architecture/decisions/0014-module-permission-declarations-and-platform-registry.md).
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Phase 5B mounts a module's own HTTP routes in production. A module registers framework-neutral
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Fetch (`Request`/`Response`) route handlers during its existing `register` hook; Core collects them
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into an immutable snapshot alongside its capabilities, and `apps/api` discovers modules exactly
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once, starts the module runtime from that same discovered inventory, and mounts its published
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routes under `/api/v1/modules/<module-id>` — after every module has registered and started
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successfully, so no request can reach a module before startup completes. Every route is enforced
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through the identical `requirePermission` middleware and composed permission registry Core's own
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routes use (a module can never supply its own baseline), state-changing methods require a trusted
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`Origin`, and a handler failure or non-`Response` return becomes a fixed, sanitized `500` — never a
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raw error, stack, path, or permission id. Relationship-derived grant creation remains later work.
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See [API](docs/development/api.md#module-http-routes),
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[Module development](docs/module-development/README.md#http-routes), and
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[ADR 0014](docs/architecture/decisions/0014-module-permission-declarations-and-platform-registry.md#deferred).
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Phase 5C gives a module's own lifecycle hooks and HTTP handlers typed access to their own
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PostgreSQL tables. `context.services.database` — a restricted, typed `ModuleDatabase` view over
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Drizzle's `select`/`selectDistinct`/`selectDistinctOn`/`insert`/`update`/`delete`/`execute`/
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`transaction`, never a raw `pg` client, pool, or connection string — is available to `start`,
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`stop`, and every authorized route handler, and reuses the one PostgreSQL pool `apps/api` already
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owns; registration remains declarative and database-free. Modules continue to own and import their
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own Drizzle schemas and generated migrations, applied explicitly and never automatically at
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startup. See [API](docs/development/api.md#module-database-access),
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[Module development](docs/module-development/README.md#database-access), and
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[ADR 0016](docs/architecture/decisions/0016-module-database-access.md).
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Phase 5D pass 1 of 5 hardens the public request perimeter against an independent security audit
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of the Phase 5C checkpoint, without adding a Surface, a product module, or any new capability.
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Better Auth's authentication rate limiter now resolves client identity from a server-owned
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client-address boundary (`core/src/identity/client-address.ts`, wired in at the Node/API transport
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boundary) — direct mode trusts only the real socket peer by default, and an explicit trusted-proxy
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mode is required before any forwarded header is ever consulted, closing a rotating-header
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rate-limit bypass. Public sign-up is now **disabled by default, and a production configuration that
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tries to enable it fails closed** (`PUBLIC_SIGNUP_UNSUPPORTED_IN_PRODUCTION`, reported by `pnpm
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doctor` as a blocking failure) — the durable abuse-control prerequisites do not exist yet, so only
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development/test composition may enable it. Every public body-consuming route — Better Auth,
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Core's grant-mutation endpoint, and every module route (via a new, required `maxBodyBytes` field on
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the executable route contract) — now has an explicit, platform-enforced byte ceiling with one
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sanitized `413` contract. The Node HTTP server now has finite header/request timeouts, whose real
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transport-level failures are observed and logged in sanitized form. See
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[API](docs/development/api.md), [Module development](docs/module-development/README.md#http-routes),
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and [ADR 0017](docs/architecture/decisions/0017-public-request-perimeter-hardening.md). **This pass
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does not add distributed rate limiting, durable public-signup abuse control, or any deployment/TLS
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guarantee, and it did not by itself complete Phase 5D** — at the close of this pass, passes 2–5
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(identity/database transport hardening, authorization integrity, module/runtime/migration
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correctness, and deployment/supply-chain closure plus a final independent re-audit) were still
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outstanding, and Phase 6 (Surface work) was blocked until they landed.
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Phase 5D pass 2 of 5 corrects identity session resolution and enforces a database transport policy.
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A request carrying no cookies, or only unrelated cookies, now performs **no** identity database
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work at all; only a request presenting the configured session cookie that Better Auth resolved to
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`null` is disambiguated, by a real read of the session relation and the exact columns the adapter
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depends on (under `where false`, so no row is ever read) rather than the previous `select 1`. A
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missing table, dropped column, revoked privilege, unreachable database, or query timeout therefore
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produces a sanitized `503`, never a silent anonymous downgrade. The identity base URL and every
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trusted origin must now be exactly one canonical origin, and production rejects the full
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loopback/unspecified address space rather than three literal spellings. **Production PostgreSQL
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connections now require TLS with certificate *and* hostname verification** — from the API, both
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migration commands, the bootstrap CLI, and `pnpm doctor` alike — with no encryption-only mode, no
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`rejectUnauthorized: false` escape hatch, no plaintext exception (not even for a loopback
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database), and an explicit refusal of a `DATABASE_URL` that tries to carry its own TLS parameters,
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which the pinned driver would otherwise let silently override the policy. See
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[Identity](docs/development/identity.md), [API](docs/development/api.md#database-transport-tls), and
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[ADR 0018](docs/architecture/decisions/0018-identity-session-resolution-and-database-transport.md).
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**This pass adds no secret store, no certificate rotation, no client-certificate authentication, and
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no distributed rate limiting; TLS protects the connection, not the exposure, so the network boundary
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remains the deployment's own responsibility. This pass did not by itself complete Phase 5D** — at
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its close, passes 3–5 (authorization integrity, module/runtime/migration correctness, and
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deployment/supply-chain closure plus a final independent re-audit) were still outstanding.
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Phase 5D pass 3 of 5 preserves authorization security history and makes explicit-grant management
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unambiguous and bounded. Authorization **audit history now survives user deletion**: the audit
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subject is a retained identifier snapshot with no cascading foreign key, so deleting a user still
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removes their live grants and platform-owner row but no longer destroys the record of what they had
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been granted and by whom. Platform-owner bootstrap's single use moved to a dedicated singleton with
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no user foreign key — previously deleting the bootstrapped owner's user row silently reopened the
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one operation that establishes a platform's first administrator; the operational consequence is that
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**deleting the last owner does not reactivate bootstrap**, and existing installations are backfilled
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as consumed by the new migration. Two equivalent grants can no longer both be effective: creation
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conflicts with a sanitized `409`, serialized under real PostgreSQL concurrency, and one revocation
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now clears every unrevoked equivalent with a per-row audit entry, so revoking a grant can no longer
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report success while a duplicate keeps authorizing the user. Grant ids must be canonical UUIDs and
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expirations one exact future-only format, both decided before any database call; the generic HTTP
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surface creates unscoped grants only; and listing is bounded keyset pagination with an opaque,
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unsigned position cursor. One forward Core migration (`0002_authorization_integrity`,
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`{"mode":"none"}`) must be applied before the new code starts. See
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[Authorization](docs/development/authorization.md) and
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[ADR 0019](docs/architecture/decisions/0019-durable-authorization-history-and-grant-management.md).
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**This pass adds no roles, teams, tenants, service accounts, scope resolver, user-deletion endpoint,
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or owner-recovery workflow; audit append-only behavior remains an application convention, not a
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database or cryptographic guarantee. This pass did not by itself complete Phase 5D** — at its close,
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passes 4 (module/runtime/migration correctness) and 5 (deployment/supply chain plus a final
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independent re-audit) were still outstanding, and Phase 6 was blocked until they landed.
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Phase 5D pass 4 of 5 hardens the module runtime and the migration commands. **Two routes of one
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module that could both match the same request path are now rejected at registration**
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(`MODULE_ROUTE_OVERLAP`) instead of being resolved by declaration order — with different permissions
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on `/events/:id` and `/events/new`, registration order alone previously decided which permission
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guarded `/events/new`. Decoded route parameters are documented as untrusted, module-owned input that
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handlers must validate against their own domain grammar; no generic validator or route field was
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added. A module whose `start` hook fails is now rolled back through **its own** `stop` hook first,
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so partially acquired resources are released, and every stop/rollback hook runs under a fixed
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10-second deadline while HTTP shutdown drains for at most 30 seconds before force-closing
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connections through Node's supported public APIs — shutdown is finite at every stage, reports a
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forced drain or a hook failure as an unsuccessful shutdown, and always still reaches pool closure.
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`migrations:plan`/`migrations:apply` now connect with fixed 10-second connection, query, and
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`statement_timeout` defaults that a `DATABASE_URL` cannot weaken (the pinned driver lets a
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connection string override explicit options — verified), and each migration's SQL is sent to
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PostgreSQL **intact, as one parsed batch** inside the existing transaction rather than split on the
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literal `--> statement-breakpoint` bytes, which corrupted any migration containing those bytes in a
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string literal, dollar-quoted body, quoted identifier, or comment. See
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[Module development](docs/module-development/README.md#http-routes),
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[API](docs/development/api.md#graceful-shutdown), and
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[ADR 0020](docs/architecture/decisions/0020-module-runtime-and-migration-execution-hardening.md).
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**Deadlines bound how long the platform waits; they do not cancel or sandbox trusted in-process
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module code, and closing a socket does not prove a handler promise ended. No custom SQL parser
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exists. Modules remain trusted compiled backend code with no process, role, schema, or tenant
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isolation. This pass did not by itself complete Phase 5D** — at its close, pass 5
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(deployment/supply chain plus an independent whole-repository re-audit) was still outstanding, and
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Phase 6 was blocked until it landed.
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Phase 5D pass 5 of 5 closes the phase with an independent whole-repository re-audit and the
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repository-local half of deployment and supply-chain hardening. The re-audit swept every layer —
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Core, contracts, `apps/api`, scripts, the CI workflow, and documentation — and its repository-local
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findings are resolved here: every dependency advisory is remediated (both `pnpm audit` and
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`pnpm audit --prod` report no known vulnerabilities), every CI action reference is pinned to a full
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immutable commit SHA, installs run `--frozen-lockfile`, no workflow references a repository or
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instance secret, every checkout step sets `persist-credentials: false`, a checksum-verified secret
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scan found no committed credential in the history, and one canonical
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[security document](docs/development/security.md) now states the trusted-module model, the
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undeployed state, and the launch checklist in a single place. **CI is accepted as a
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trusted-code-only boundary**: the self-hosted Gitea runner executes only code controlled and
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reviewed by trusted repository collaborators, and unknown or untrusted pull requests must not
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execute on it automatically. What remains is operational and cannot be proven from this repository —
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upgrading Gitea past 1.24.2 (which *ignores* the workflow's `permissions`, `concurrency`, and
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`timeout-minutes` declarations), clamping job-token authority server-side, enforcing timeout and
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teardown in a trusted provisioner/reaper, and proving disposable runner isolation. Those are
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prerequisites for **executing untrusted contributions**, alongside the deployment checklist that
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gates a **public launch**; moving future public contribution workflows to a service with isolated
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hosted runners is an acceptable alternative. **Neither set of requirements blocks Phase 6** — Surface
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development proceeds under the current trusted-contributor, not-yet-deployed model. Runner topology
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and job-token authority remain unverified and are not described as isolated. See
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[Security model and deployment trust boundaries](docs/development/security.md).
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Phase 6A established the **module product contract**. Ekklesia's modules are no
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longer backend-only capability packages: a module is an independently versioned *product* that owns
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its domain behavior, data, permissions, routes, migrations, and — new in this pass — **its own UI**.
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Core keeps the containing application shell and every platform policy (authentication, authorization
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enforcement, platform context, top-level routing, navigation, global theme, error boundaries,
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trusted-origin/CORS). Modules stay **flat peers**: `video`, `livestream`, and `announcements` are
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independent first-class modules with no parent/child relationship, and a Dashboard folder such as
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`Media` is presentation configuration an administrator can reorganize, never module architecture and
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never a dependency. The long-term goal is one module implementation hosted by Ekklesia *and*, later,
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by a standalone application — never two codebases for one domain. See
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[ADR 0021](docs/architecture/decisions/0021-modules-as-hostable-products.md).
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**What that pass shipped is the static contract only.** `manifestVersion: 4` adds one
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optional field, `entrypoints.ui`, a package-relative path to a compiled ESM artifact validated
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during discovery exactly like `server` and `schema` — inside the package, real file, no source
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TypeScript. Discovery stays inert: **nothing imports, mounts, or renders that entrypoint**, exactly
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like the long-declared `entrypoints.jobs`. Upgrading a backend-only version 3 manifest is a
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one-character edit; version 3 is rejected outright rather than reinterpreted, as version 2 was
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before it. **The Dashboard shell, a UI runtime or renderer, navigation
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registration, Dashboard grouping, a standalone host, a module installer or marketplace, hot-loading,
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and every feature module do not exist.** Restart-based discovery, explicit operator-invoked
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migrations, and the trusted compiled-module model are unchanged.
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Phase 6B pass 1 answers the question Phase 6A deliberately left open: **what a module UI actually is,
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and what a host gives it.** Module UI is authored in **React and TypeScript**, and a module package
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may now contain `.tsx` and depend on `react`/`react-dom` — every other UI framework stays rejected by
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`pnpm boundaries`, and the layer rules are untouched, so module UI still cannot import Core, an app,
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a surface, or another module. React is the supported *authoring* model but is deliberately **not** in
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the contract: a module's compiled `entrypoints.ui` artifact default-exports
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`defineModuleUi({ id, version, mount })`, and `mount(container, context)` receives a DOM element and
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returns an unmount function. A host needs an element and a context, never a matching framework.
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The new `@ekklesia/module-ui-sdk` package (no runtime dependencies; its one dependency on
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`@ekklesia/contracts` is type-only) carries that contract for module authors and hosts alike. The
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host context is deliberately four members — `moduleId`, `api`, `principal`, `permissions` — and
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nothing else. **A module UI asks its host for its own API by relative path** (`api.request("posts")`)
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and never constructs `/api/v1/modules/<id>/...`, which is Ekklesia's private deployment detail; that
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one rule is what keeps a future standalone host possible, and the test suite proves it by mounting
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one fixture artifact under two hosts with different origins and URL shapes. **Client-side permission
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hints are presentation only** — server-side `requirePermission` remains the sole authority — and
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**module UI is trusted code in the host's own browser realm**: no iframe, no sandbox, matching the
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backend trust model rather than pretending to improve on it. See
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[ADR 0022](docs/architecture/decisions/0022-module-ui-authoring-and-host-contract.md).
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Core still never loads browser code: discovery validates the `entrypoints.ui` path and never
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evaluates it, and hosts do their own dynamic import.
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Phase 6B pass 2 makes that contract **buildable end to end**. A module author writes React and
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TypeScript at `src/ui/index.tsx` and runs its normal `pnpm build`; **esbuild** compiles it to the
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browser ESM artifact the manifest declares. Authors write no bundler configuration — the new
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`@ekklesia/module-ui-build` package owns all of it, and because it uses the existing `tooling` role
|
||
that modules could already depend on, **this pass required no boundary relaxation at all**. The
|
||
output path is read from the manifest rather than a build convention, so the declared and produced
|
||
artifacts cannot drift.
|
||
|
||
**React is bundled into each artifact rather than shared from the host.** That is the decision ADR
|
||
0022 implies: `mount()` is the ABI precisely so React is *not* part of the host contract, and
|
||
externalizing it would make every host supply a compatible React — defeating standalone hosting. The
|
||
accepted cost is duplicate React runtimes and large unminified artifacts (~570 KB for the template);
|
||
sharing one runtime later is a build optimization that does not change the contract. Styling is React
|
||
inline style objects only: a stylesheet import **fails the build** rather than emitting a sidecar
|
||
`.css` that no manifest declares and no host loads. Building is an authoring step — Core never builds,
|
||
and installing a module or starting the API never triggers one.
|
||
|
||
`templates/module` is the canonical example and now ships optional UI. Its tests build the artifact
|
||
from source, validate it with `parseModuleUiExport`, mount it into a real DOM, assert the rendered
|
||
output, and unmount it — so a UI that cannot be produced fails CI, and no generated file is ever
|
||
committed. See [ADR 0023](docs/architecture/decisions/0023-module-ui-build-pipeline.md).
|
||
|
||
**Still no host.** A module UI can be authored, built, and tested; **nothing serves one to a user
|
||
yet.** The Dashboard shell, navigation, a design system, a stylesheet loading contract, and the
|
||
standalone host do not exist.
|
||
|
||
**Security model.** Installed modules are trusted compiled backend code that runs arbitrary
|
||
JavaScript in the API process and shares its PostgreSQL role — table prefixes, manifests, permission
|
||
declarations, typed facades, and frozen contexts are correctness boundaries, not a sandbox. Ekklesia
|
||
is also **not currently deployed**: there is no production instance, reverse proxy, public listener,
|
||
or deployment automation, so the origin/proxy/throttling properties a public launch requires are
|
||
unproven launch-blockers rather than existing guarantees. Read
|
||
[Security model and deployment trust boundaries](docs/development/security.md) before installing a
|
||
module or exposing the API.
|
||
|
||
## Quick start
|
||
|
||
Prerequisites: Node.js 24 LTS, pnpm 11.12, and Docker with Compose.
|
||
|
||
```bash
|
||
pnpm install --frozen-lockfile
|
||
cp .env.example .env # keep its NODE_ENV=development: see below
|
||
pnpm infrastructure:up
|
||
pnpm modules:validate
|
||
pnpm migrations:validate
|
||
pnpm identity:schema:validate
|
||
pnpm doctor
|
||
pnpm migrations:plan
|
||
pnpm test:migrations:integration
|
||
pnpm verify
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
`pnpm doctor` builds the workspace first, then reports the supported Node.js runtime, installed
|
||
modules and dependency order, schema and migration inventories, the effective PostgreSQL transport
|
||
(TLS) policy, optional read-only PostgreSQL planning, and the current object-storage integration
|
||
state. `.env.example` sets `NODE_ENV=development` deliberately: anything else, including an unset
|
||
value, is validated as production, and production requires certificate-verified PostgreSQL TLS and
|
||
rejects loopback/`http` identity origins — so the plaintext loopback database this repository's own
|
||
development infrastructure provides is only usable with it set.
|
||
|
||
Doctor never applies migrations, creates a history table, starts module servers, or performs
|
||
storage operations. Schema discovery does import
|
||
compiled schema-definition entrypoints; those entrypoints are contractually side-effect-free.
|
||
|
||
With no installed modules and no `DATABASE_URL`, the current repository produces a report shaped
|
||
like this:
|
||
|
||
```text
|
||
Ekklesia Doctor
|
||
|
||
Platform
|
||
✓ Runtime version supported
|
||
Active Node.js satisfies the declared supported range.
|
||
|
||
Modules
|
||
✓ Module discovery complete
|
||
0 modules installed
|
||
✓ Dependency graph valid
|
||
Dependency order is empty.
|
||
✓ Permission registry composed
|
||
1 permission registered
|
||
|
||
Data definitions
|
||
✓ Schemas validated
|
||
0 modules · 0 tables
|
||
✓ Migrations validated
|
||
3 migrations · checksums valid
|
||
core:0000_identity_core_tables · f8f2086ef06f
|
||
core:0001_authorization_core_tables · 830e1fbc26d0
|
||
core:0002_authorization_integrity · 634294731180
|
||
|
||
PostgreSQL
|
||
✓ Database TLS verified
|
||
TLS required with certificate and hostname verification.
|
||
○ Connection check skipped
|
||
DATABASE_URL is not configured.
|
||
○ Migration plan skipped
|
||
A validated migration inventory and configured PostgreSQL connection are required.
|
||
|
||
Identity
|
||
○ Identity configuration skipped
|
||
Core identity schema defines 4 tables (ekklesia_core_account, ekklesia_core_session, ekklesia_core_user, ekklesia_core_verification).
|
||
Identity runtime configuration (signing key, base URL, trusted origins) is not set.
|
||
|
||
Object storage
|
||
○ Check unavailable
|
||
Core storage integration has not been implemented yet.
|
||
|
||
Result: READY WITH WARNINGS
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
Checks have stable pass, warning, failure, or skipped states. Warnings and skipped optional checks
|
||
produce `READY WITH WARNINGS` and exit zero; any failure produces `NOT READY` and exit one. The
|
||
dashboard is human-readable local guidance, not a replacement for automated CI evidence.
|
||
|
||
`pnpm migrations:plan` uses `DATABASE_URL` from the uncommitted `.env` and is read-only.
|
||
`pnpm migrations:apply` uses the same validated inventory but mutates PostgreSQL under Core's
|
||
advisory lock and one transaction. Review the plan before applying. Destructive migrations are
|
||
blocked by default and require an exact externally supplied approval; there is no force flag.
|
||
|
||
The runner has both deterministic unit coverage through a narrow database port and a separate live
|
||
PostgreSQL integration suite. The live command creates and destroys disposable Docker
|
||
infrastructure; it remains separate from the Docker-free `pnpm verify` gate.
|
||
|
||
`pnpm identity:schema:validate` regenerates Better Auth's canonical schema with the pinned local
|
||
CLI into a temporary location and structurally compares it against the checked-in
|
||
`core/src/identity/schema.ts`, then removes the temporary output. It requires no `DATABASE_URL`
|
||
and is part of `pnpm verify`. See [Identity](docs/development/identity.md) for the full upgrade
|
||
workflow.
|
||
|
||
`pnpm api:start` builds the workspace, then starts the identity HTTP transport
|
||
(`GET /api/v1/principal`, Better Auth mounted at `/api/auth/*`) against an already-migrated
|
||
`DATABASE_URL` — it never applies migrations itself. See [API](docs/development/api.md) for
|
||
required configuration, routes, and a full request/response transcript.
|
||
|
||
Run `pnpm infrastructure:smoke` for an isolated end-to-end PostgreSQL and authenticated S3 check.
|
||
|
||
The development services bind only to loopback:
|
||
|
||
- PostgreSQL: `127.0.0.1:5432`
|
||
- S3-compatible object storage: `127.0.0.1:8333`
|
||
|
||
The values in `.env.example` are development-only and must never be reused in a deployed
|
||
environment.
|
||
|
||
## Architecture
|
||
|
||
- [Platform architecture](docs/architecture/platform-architecture.md)
|
||
- [Repository boundaries](docs/architecture/repository-boundaries.md)
|
||
- [Repository workflow](docs/development/repository-workflow.md)
|
||
- [Testing](docs/development/testing.md)
|
||
- [Identity](docs/development/identity.md)
|
||
- [API](docs/development/api.md)
|
||
- [Authorization](docs/development/authorization.md)
|
||
- [Module development](docs/module-development/README.md)
|
||
- [Architecture decisions](docs/architecture/decisions/README.md)
|
||
|
||
No open-source license has been selected yet. A license should be added only after the project
|
||
owner makes that decision.
|