ekklesiaandClaude Opus 5
7a0f624fc3
Principal resolution could not tell a broken session store from a genuinely anonymous request, and did unnecessary database work for callers that never presented a session at all. Both are corrected here. Any cookie previously triggered the ambiguity check, so `Cookie: x=y` on an otherwise anonymous request caused an identity database round trip an unauthenticated caller could drive with a header they chose themselves. `hasConfiguredSessionCookie` now parses the Cookie header per RFC 6265 (split on `;`, name is the text before the first `=`, trimmed) and compares the whole name exactly — never `includes`, a substring test, or an unanchored regular expression — so `better-auth.session_token_x`, `x_better-auth.session_token`, a differently-cased spelling, and a percent-encoded lookalike are all correctly not the session cookie. A duplicated name still reports true: ambiguity fails safe towards checking, and reporting true never grants access on its own. The cookie name is not a second hard-coded copy. One `betterAuthOptions` object now feeds both `betterAuth()` and Better Auth's own supported `getCookies` helper, so the detected name — including the `__Secure-` prefix an https baseURL implies — is derived from the exact configuration Better Auth itself uses, and drift is structurally impossible rather than merely tested. The readiness check itself proved almost nothing: `select 1` still succeeded against a dropped session table, a drifted or removed column, or a revoked SELECT privilege, so Better Auth's ambiguous null was reported as a genuinely anonymous request. `probeSessionStore` now plans a real read of the session relation and the exact columns the adapter depends on, under `where false`: PostgreSQL resolves the relation, every column, and the caller's privilege at plan time while matching zero rows, so no session row, token, or user id can be read, logged, or enumerated by the check. It uses the injected pool, never a second connection, and stays bounded by the existing timeout. A missing relation, dropped column, revoked privilege, unreachable connection, and query timeout now all produce the same sanitized 503 with no relation name, column name, SQL, driver text, host, or stack — proven against real PostgreSQL, since that is the only place a broken store looks exactly like an anonymous request. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
209 lines
14 KiB
Markdown
209 lines
14 KiB
Markdown
# Identity
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Phase 4A established Core's identity foundation: a Core-owned Better Auth database schema, a
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first-class Core-owned migration source, minimal opaque-identity contracts, and an explicit Better
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Auth construction boundary. Phase 4B built the HTTP transport on top of it — see
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[API](api.md) and
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[ADR 0011](../architecture/decisions/0011-identity-http-transport-and-public-enrollment.md) for
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public registration, sign-in, and principal resolution over HTTP. This page covers the identity
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foundation itself; see [ADR 0010](../architecture/decisions/0010-core-identity-and-better-auth-adoption.md)
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for that architectural decision.
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## Ownership
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Authentication and identity are a Core platform concern (ADR 0001), not a feature module and not a
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surface concern. Better Auth is an implementation detail contained entirely behind
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`core/src/identity/`:
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- **Modules never import `better-auth`, `@better-auth/*`, or `auth`, and never receive a Better
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Auth instance, session token, or raw database client.** This holds structurally today: modules
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cannot import `core` at all under `scripts/check-boundaries.ts`'s boundary matrix, regardless of
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what Core exposes.
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- **Surfaces will eventually authenticate through Core-exposed HTTP/API and client contracts**,
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never by querying Better Auth's tables directly. `apps/api` (Phase 4B, see [API](api.md)) is that
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transport for server-side/API consumers; no Dashboard, Website, or Mobile Surface exists yet.
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- Better Auth's `user` row is an authentication identity, not the future church-person/profile
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model. Church membership, ministry roles, contact history, attendance, permissions, and other
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module-specific fields must never be added to the identity tables; a future, separately designed
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model owns that data, linked only through the opaque user identifier.
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## The four Core identity tables
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| Better Auth model | Physical table |
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| --- | --- |
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| `user` | `ekklesia_core_user` |
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| `session` | `ekklesia_core_session` |
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| `account` | `ekklesia_core_account` |
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| `verification` | `ekklesia_core_verification` |
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Declared once, by hand, at `core/src/identity/schema.ts`, and passed explicitly to Better Auth's
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Drizzle adapter as `identityAdapterSchema`. Columns, defaults, uniqueness, foreign keys (cascading
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delete from `session`/`account` to `user`), and indexes mirror the pinned
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`[email protected]` generator output exactly; only the table names differ, so ownership is
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unambiguous inside the shared `public` PostgreSQL schema. No custom fields are added in this
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slice.
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## Ekklesia identity contracts
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`@ekklesia/contracts` exports the only identity-shaped values available today:
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- `EkklesiaUserId` — an opaque, validated string. Parse untrusted input with
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`parseEkklesiaUserId`/`safeParseEkklesiaUserId`.
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- `EkklesiaPrincipal` — a frozen `{ kind: "anonymous" }` (the `ANONYMOUS_PRINCIPAL` singleton) or
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`{ kind: "authenticated", userId }` (built with `createAuthenticatedPrincipal`).
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No roles, permissions, organization/campus IDs, group memberships, profile fields, email, session
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tokens, or password data are exposed through this contract. Extending it requires a deliberate,
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separately reviewed change.
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## Core-owned migrations coexist with module migrations
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Identity's schema ships as a first-class Core-owned migration source at `core/drizzle/`, in the
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exact Drizzle Kit / Ekklesia migration format ADR 0008 and ADR 0009 define — the same journal,
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per-file SHA-256 checksum, and `_ekklesia.json` destructive-policy sidecar every module migration
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uses. Core is not a module: it has no `ekklesia.module.json` manifest and is never passed through
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module discovery. Instead, `core/src/migrations/core-source.ts` discovers `core/drizzle` directly
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under the reserved source identifier `"core"`, and
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`core/src/migrations/aggregate.ts`'s `discoverAllMigrations` merges it with the existing module
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aggregate, **Core first**. An installed module manifest that ever declares `id: "core"` is rejected
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at discovery time so Core and module migration identities can never collide.
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The transactional runner, advisory lock, breakpoint splitter, and the fixed
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`public.ekklesia_core_migrations` history table (ADR 0009) are unchanged: Core's migration honestly
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populates the existing `module_id` column with the literal value `"core"`, exactly like a module
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populates it with its own module ID. There is exactly one migration system and one executor.
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## Validating and applying migrations
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```bash
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pnpm migrations:validate # offline; Core's migration plus every module's, Core first
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pnpm migrations:plan # read-only comparison against PostgreSQL applied history
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pnpm migrations:apply # locked, transactional application of the pending batch
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pnpm doctor # includes Core's migration in its discovery/plan checks
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```
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No new commands are required to include identity: it flows through the existing migration
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commands automatically. A fresh database applies the Core identity migration through
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`pnpm migrations:apply` like any other pending migration; a second application is a genuine no-op.
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Doctor, planning, and importing any identity module never create the identity tables — only an
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explicit `pnpm migrations:apply` mutates the database.
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## Upgrading the Better Auth schema
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Better Auth schema changes must never be applied to production directly. Follow this workflow
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whenever the pinned Better Auth version changes:
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1. Deliberately update the pinned `better-auth`, `auth`, and `drizzle-kit` versions in
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`core/package.json`.
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2. Regenerate the canonical schema with the pinned local CLI:
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`pnpm --filter @ekklesia/core identity:schema:generate` (writes a local, gitignored
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`core/.identity-schema-reference.ts` — never committed).
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3. Review the diff between that reference file and the checked-in
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`core/src/identity/schema.ts`, deliberately updating the latter (table names, relations, and
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any structural change) while preserving Core's explicit `ekklesia_core_*` naming.
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4. Generate a new forward-only Core migration:
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`pnpm --filter @ekklesia/core identity:migration:generate` (drizzle-kit, writes into
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`core/drizzle/`). Add the matching entry to `core/drizzle/meta/_ekklesia.json`, declaring
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`{"mode":"none"}` or `{"mode":"approval-required","reason":"..."}` for any destructive change.
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5. Validate and test it through Ekklesia's existing migration system:
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`pnpm migrations:validate`, `pnpm identity:schema:validate`, and
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`pnpm test:migrations:integration`.
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6. Never edit an already-applied migration. Editing changes its checksum, and Core's runner
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refuses an applied migration whose packaged bytes no longer match its recorded history.
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`pnpm identity:schema:validate` automates steps 2–3 as a read-only check: it regenerates Better
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Auth's canonical schema into a temporary, package-local directory with the pinned local CLI,
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structurally compares every core model's columns, types, nullability, defaults, foreign keys, and
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indexes against the checked-in schema, and always removes the temporary output — no `DATABASE_URL`
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required. It is part of `pnpm verify`.
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## Required identity configuration
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`createIdentityConfig` (`core/src/identity/config.ts`) validates three explicit values before
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`core/src/identity/runtime.ts`'s `createIdentityRuntime` constructs Better Auth. This document
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intentionally contains no real values — configure them per environment, never commit them:
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| Value | Requirement |
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| --- | --- |
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| Secret | At least 32 characters, high entropy (for example `openssl rand -base64 32`). No built-in default is ever provided; a missing or too-short secret is rejected explicitly. |
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| Base URL | An absolute `http`/`https` URL. In production, `https` is required and loopback hosts are rejected. |
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| Trusted origins | One or more absolute `http`/`https` origins with no path, query, or fragment. Wildcards are rejected in this slice. In production, `https` is required and loopback hosts are rejected. |
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Local development origins (for example `http://localhost:3000`) are only accepted when the caller
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explicitly passes `environment: "development"` — never silently. Every configuration failure
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raises a sanitized `IdentityConfigError` carrying only a stable code, never the offending value.
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Secret rotation (Better Auth's plural `secrets` list) and cross-subdomain cookies are deferred; see
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ADR 0010.
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## The identity runtime (Core's Better Auth transport boundary)
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`@ekklesia/core/identity` publicly exports `createIdentityRuntime({config, db})`
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(`core/src/identity/runtime.ts`), which constructs Better Auth explicitly and returns a frozen
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`EkklesiaIdentityRuntime` exposing exactly two Fetch-standard capabilities:
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`handleAuthRequest(request): Promise<Response>` (delegates directly to Better Auth's handler; its
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normal responses, including its own error responses, pass through unmodified) and
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`resolvePrincipal(headers): Promise<EkklesiaPrincipal>` (never silently downgrades a database
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outage to an anonymous result — see ADR 0011 and [session resolution](#how-a-principal-is-resolved)
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below). Neither method, nor anything else
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exported from `@ekklesia/core/identity`, exposes `auth.api`, Better Auth's session/user types, the
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Drizzle adapter, the raw database, a session token, or Better Auth configuration. `apps/api` is the
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only current consumer of this boundary; see [API](api.md).
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Construction also explicitly configures four things the pinned release would otherwise leave on an
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environment-sensitive or implicit default, all covered by [ADR 0012](../architecture/decisions/0012-identity-origin-csrf-protection-under-test.md)
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and [API](api.md#logging):
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`advanced.disableCSRFCheck`/`disableOriginCheck` are both pinned to `false` (the default silently
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skips both under a test runner), Better Auth's `logger` is replaced with one that drops its message
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and arguments and emits only a fixed, generic string for error-level events, `onAPIError: { throw:
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true }` routes a genuinely unexpected failure out to `handleAuthRequest`'s own sanitized boundary
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instead of letting Better Auth's `better-call` transport dependency log it raw through a path no
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`logger` configuration can reach, and `emailAndPassword.minPasswordLength`/`maxPasswordLength` are
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pinned to `8`/`128` instead of left on Better Auth's fallback default.
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`createIdentityDrizzleDatabase` (`core/src/identity/database.ts`) also accepts an optional
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`operationTimeoutMs`, applied as both `pg`'s `query_timeout` and `statement_timeout` — bounding a
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hung or slow query, which `connectionTimeoutMs` alone cannot do since it only bounds establishing
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the connection. `apps/api` sets both timeouts explicitly (see [API](api.md)); an invalid value is
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rejected the same sanitized way an invalid connection string already is.
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## How a principal is resolved
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`resolvePrincipal(headers)` returns the anonymous principal for a missing, expired, revoked, or
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malformed session, and throws a sanitized `PRINCIPAL_RESOLUTION_FAILED` for an infrastructure
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failure. Telling those apart takes explicit work, because Better Auth's `getSession` swallows
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internal failures and returns `null` for them exactly as it does for a genuinely absent session.
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1. **No cookies, or only unrelated cookies → no identity database work at all.** `Cookie: x=y` is
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not evidence that Better Auth ever attempted to resolve an Ekklesia session, so its `null` is
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unambiguous and the anonymous principal is returned immediately. An unauthenticated caller
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cannot drive identity database load with a cookie header they chose themselves.
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2. **The configured session cookie is present, and Better Auth returned `null` → the ambiguous
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case, and only then is the session store checked.** Detection is an exact, whole-name cookie
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comparison (RFC 6265 parsing; names are case-sensitive and never percent-decoded), so
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`better-auth.session_token_x` and `x_better-auth.session_token` are correctly *not* the session
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cookie. The name itself is derived from the same options object passed to Better Auth, via its
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own exported `getCookies` helper — including the `__Secure-` prefix an `https` base URL implies
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— so there is no second copy of it to drift.
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3. **The check reads the real session relation**, not `select 1`: it plans a read of the exact
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columns the Better Auth adapter depends on under a `where false` predicate. PostgreSQL resolves
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the relation, every named column, and the caller's `SELECT` privilege while matching zero rows,
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so no session row, token, or user id can be read, logged, or enumerated by the check. It runs on
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the injected pool — never a second connection — under a bounded 3-second timeout.
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A missing session table, a dropped or drifted column, a revoked `SELECT` privilege, an unreachable
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database, and a query timeout therefore all produce a sanitized
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`503 {"code":"PRINCIPAL_RESOLUTION_FAILED"}` — never a silent anonymous result. The response body,
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logs, and error carry no relation name, column name, SQL, driver message, host, or stack.
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## What is not operational yet
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No email verification, password recovery, invitation flow, email delivery, social or OAuth
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provider, passkey, magic link, two-factor authentication, or roles/groups/teams/tenants model
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exists. Public registration, sign-in, principal resolution, and sign-out over HTTP **are**
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operational as of Phase 4B — see [API](api.md) for the transport and routes, and ADR 0011 for why
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public registration is intentional and grants no elevation. Core's authorization foundation
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(platform owners, explicit grants, an immutable permission registry) landed in Phase 4C and is
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covered separately — see [Authorization](authorization.md) — not a Dashboard Surface, which still
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depends on an authorization model that only now exists and has not yet been built on.
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