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Ekklesia/surfaces/shell/tests/display-host-protocol.test.ts
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feat: give display devices their own paired identity
ADR 0033 gave Ekklesia a display host and ADR 0034 gave it a login page.
Together, the only way to light a television in a foyer was to sign a
human being into it and leave that session running on a screen anyone can
walk up to: a person's credentials on a wall, a person's session as the
thing signage depends on, and the display going dark when they are
revoked or their session simply expires.

A screen is not a person. Ekklesia now recognizes three principal classes
— anonymous, authenticated human, and managed device — and a device is a
first-class principal with its own credential and its own explicit
permissions. It has no email, no password, and no row in the identity
tables, and it satisfies the `authenticated` baseline never, so every
route that settles for "somebody is signed in" stays closed to it.

Device permissions live in their own table because
ekklesia_core_grant.user_id is a non-null foreign key into the user table
and making it polymorphic would rewrite the platform's central
authorization record to serve one narrow case. That is a schema decision,
not a second decision point: the evaluator gained one branch, so a device
is allowed or denied by the same function, with the same deny-by-default,
as anyone else — with no owner path it could reach and no baseline that
stands in for a grant.

The six-digit code is not the credential. It is printed across a screen in
a public hallway, so it is treated as public: it identifies a request to
an administrator and is worth nothing alone. Collecting the credential
also requires a 256-bit claim secret held only in the requesting browser's
HttpOnly cookie, and approving requires the restricted core.devices.manage
permission. Without that split, reading a code off a wall would hand over
the screen's identity.

The permission a pairing asks for is read from the module's validated
display declaration, never from the request, so a browser cannot ask to be
granted core.devices.manage or another module's permission. Approval
grants exactly that one permission.

Credentials are stored only as SHA-256; the raw value exists in the
Set-Cookie that issues it and the device's own cookie jar, and is never
logged, returned in JSON, or placed in a URL. The cookie is HttpOnly, so
the module display code running in that same page cannot read it.
Revocation is a server-side column checked on every principal resolution,
and re-pairing mints a new identity so an old credential can never come
back. State transitions are conditional updates, so one code cannot be
approved twice or claimed into two credentials under a race.

/api/v1/principal still reports a device as anonymous: it is what the
Dashboard uses to decide whether a person is signed in. Displays read
their viewer from the descriptor instead, which already performed the
authorization — so displays are descriptor-first while the Dashboard stays
principal-first, and neither infers an identity by elimination.

Proven end to end against real PostgreSQL and real HTTP: an unpaired
screen shows a code, an owner approves it, the device opens the display
descriptor and a realtime stream, and revocation closes both while the
device still holds its cookie. An already-open SSE stream is bounded by
realtime's existing five-minute reconnect rather than closed instantly,
and that bound is documented rather than called immediate.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-23 23:41:03 -05:00

216 lines
8.3 KiB
TypeScript

import { describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest";
import {
bootstrapDisplayHost,
loadModuleDisplay,
moduleDisplayDescriptorPath,
parseDisplayRoute,
parseHostModuleDisplay,
} from "../src/host-protocol.js";
const apiBaseUrl = "https://ekklesia.example.test";
function displayPayload(overrides: Record<string, unknown> = {}): {
readonly module: Record<string, unknown>;
readonly viewer: Record<string, unknown>;
} {
return {
// The host states who it authorized, so the display never has to infer it from the absence of a
// human session (ADR 0036).
viewer: { kind: "authenticated", userId: "user-1" },
module: {
api: { baseUrl: "/api/v1/modules/announcements" },
display: { url: "/api/v1/module-ui/announcements/1.2.0/display" },
id: "announcements",
permissions: ["announcements.slideshow.view"],
realtime: { baseUrl: "/api/v1/module-realtime/announcements" },
version: "1.2.0",
...overrides,
},
};
}
function json(body: unknown, status = 200): Response {
return new Response(JSON.stringify(body), {
headers: { "content-type": "application/json" },
status,
});
}
describe("display host protocol — strict descriptor", () => {
it("parses the exact display role into the generic mount descriptor", () => {
const parsed = parseHostModuleDisplay(displayPayload());
expect(parsed).toEqual({
module: {
apiBaseUrl: "/api/v1/modules/announcements",
id: "announcements",
permissions: ["announcements.slideshow.view"],
realtimeBaseUrl: "/api/v1/module-realtime/announcements",
uiUrl: "/api/v1/module-ui/announcements/1.2.0/display",
version: "1.2.0",
},
viewer: { kind: "authenticated", userId: "user-1" },
});
expect(Object.isFrozen(parsed)).toBe(true);
expect(Object.isFrozen(parsed.module)).toBe(true);
expect(Object.isFrozen(parsed.module.permissions)).toBe(true);
});
it("rejects malformed identities, shapes, permissions, and any non-root-relative URL", () => {
const invalid: unknown[] = [
{},
{ ...displayPayload(), extra: true },
displayPayload({ id: "Announcements" }),
displayPayload({ id: "announcements/other" }),
displayPayload({ id: "a".repeat(65) }),
displayPayload({ version: "v1.2.0" }),
displayPayload({ version: "01.2.0" }),
displayPayload({ permissions: "announcements.slideshow.view" }),
displayPayload({ permissions: [""] }),
displayPayload({
permissions: ["announcements.slideshow.view", "announcements.slideshow.view"],
}),
displayPayload({ api: { baseUrl: "https://evil.example.test/api" } }),
displayPayload({ display: { url: "//evil.example.test/display.js" } }),
displayPayload({ display: { url: "/display.js?token=secret" } }),
displayPayload({ display: { url: "/api/%2e%2e/grants" } }),
displayPayload({ display: { url: "/api/%2Fgrants" } }),
displayPayload({ display: { url: "/api//display.js" } }),
displayPayload({ realtime: { baseUrl: "/\\evil.example.test/live" } }),
displayPayload({ display: { url: "/display.js", extra: true } }),
];
for (const payload of invalid) {
expect(() => parseHostModuleDisplay(payload), JSON.stringify(payload)).toThrowError(
expect.objectContaining({ code: "HOST_RESPONSE_INVALID" }),
);
}
});
it("does not accept a Dashboard artifact in place of a display artifact", () => {
const module = (displayPayload() as { module: Record<string, unknown> }).module;
const { display: _display, ...withoutDisplay } = module;
expect(() =>
parseHostModuleDisplay({
module: {
...withoutDisplay,
ui: { url: "/api/v1/module-ui/announcements/1.2.0" },
},
}),
).toThrowError(expect.objectContaining({ code: "HOST_RESPONSE_INVALID" }));
});
});
describe("display host protocol — outer route", () => {
it("accepts one exact stable version-independent module route", () => {
expect(parseDisplayRoute("/display/announcements")).toBe("announcements");
expect(moduleDisplayDescriptorPath("announcements")).toBe(
"/api/v1/module-displays/announcements",
);
});
it("rejects extra segments, trailing slashes, malformed escapes, and path escapes", () => {
for (const pathname of [
"/display",
"/display/",
"/display/announcements/",
"/display/announcements/settings",
"/display/%2fapi",
"/display/..",
"/display/%",
"/modules/announcements/display",
]) {
expect(() => parseDisplayRoute(pathname), pathname).toThrowError(
expect.objectContaining({ code: "DISPLAY_ROUTE_INVALID" }),
);
}
});
});
describe("display host protocol — authenticated bootstrap", () => {
it("asks only the descriptor, which is the display's actual authorization boundary", async () => {
const calls: Array<{ init: RequestInit | undefined; url: string }> = [];
const fetch = vi.fn(async (input: RequestInfo | URL, init?: RequestInit) => {
const url = String(input);
calls.push({ init, url });
return json(displayPayload());
}) as unknown as typeof globalThis.fetch;
const bootstrap = await bootstrapDisplayHost({ apiBaseUrl, fetch }, "announcements");
expect(bootstrap.status).toBe("ready");
// Deliberately **not** principal-first, unlike the Dashboard: `/api/v1/principal` answers about
// people, and a paired device is anonymous to it by design, so asking it first would conclude
// that every display in the building was signed out (ADR 0036).
expect(calls.map((call) => call.url)).toEqual([
`${apiBaseUrl}/api/v1/module-displays/announcements`,
]);
expect(calls.every((call) => call.init?.credentials === "include")).toBe(true);
});
it("reports the viewer the host authorized, for a person and for a device alike", async () => {
const forViewer = async (viewer: Record<string, unknown>) => {
const fetch = vi.fn(async () =>
json({ ...displayPayload(), viewer }),
) as unknown as typeof globalThis.fetch;
return bootstrapDisplayHost({ apiBaseUrl, fetch }, "announcements");
};
expect((await forViewer({ kind: "authenticated", userId: "user-1" })).principal).toEqual({
kind: "authenticated",
userId: "user-1",
});
expect(
(await forViewer({ deviceId: "3f1c8a4e-1d2b-4c3a-9e5f-6a7b8c9d0e1f", kind: "device" }))
.principal,
).toEqual({ deviceId: "3f1c8a4e-1d2b-4c3a-9e5f-6a7b8c9d0e1f", kind: "device" });
});
it("refuses a descriptor that claims an anonymous or malformed viewer", async () => {
// A `restricted` display permission admits no anonymous principal, so a server saying it
// authorized one is a protocol violation rather than a state to render.
for (const viewer of [
{ kind: "anonymous" },
{ kind: "device" },
{ kind: "authenticated" },
{ deviceId: "", kind: "device" },
{ kind: "device", userId: "user-1" },
]) {
expect(() => parseHostModuleDisplay({ ...displayPayload(), viewer })).toThrowError(
expect.objectContaining({ code: "HOST_RESPONSE_INVALID" }),
);
}
});
it("distinguishes denied, unavailable, unauthenticated, and infrastructure failures safely", async () => {
for (const [status, code] of [
[401, "HOST_UNAUTHENTICATED"],
[403, "DISPLAY_ACCESS_DENIED"],
[404, "DISPLAY_NOT_AVAILABLE"],
[503, "HOST_REQUEST_FAILED"],
] as const) {
const fetch = vi.fn(async () =>
json({ detail: "/srv/modules/announcements secret-token" }, status),
) as unknown as typeof globalThis.fetch;
const error = await loadModuleDisplay({ apiBaseUrl, fetch }, "announcements").catch(
(caught: unknown) => caught,
);
expect(error).toMatchObject({ code });
expect((error as Error).message).not.toContain("/srv/");
expect((error as Error).message).not.toContain("secret-token");
}
});
it("rejects a stale or misrouted descriptor whose identity differs from the requested display", async () => {
const fetch = vi.fn(async () =>
json(displayPayload({ id: "calendar" })),
) as unknown as typeof globalThis.fetch;
await expect(loadModuleDisplay({ apiBaseUrl, fetch }, "announcements")).rejects.toMatchObject({
code: "HOST_RESPONSE_INVALID",
});
});
});