ekklesiaandClaude Opus 5
fa3021e49b
Ekklesia could authenticate people and pair devices but could not send a single message. Better Auth has been configured with emailAndPassword since ADR 0011 and neither of its mail hooks — sendResetPassword and emailVerification.sendVerificationEmail — was ever implemented, so email verification, password recovery, and invitations were all blocked on the same missing thing. That missing thing is a transport, not a Google Workspace integration. Email is now a host-provided infrastructure service with a provider seam, shaped exactly like object storage: feature code says "send this transactional message" and the provider owns the host, port, TLS, credentials, connection behaviour, and every transport error. No provider's hostname appears anywhere in Core, and a test asserts it. Google Workspace SMTP Relay is the expected first deployment and a compatibility target — the same variables address Microsoft 365, a transactional provider, or a local Postfix. The contract is deliberately tiny: one recipient or a small bounded list, a subject, text and/or HTML, an optional reply-to, and nothing else. There is no `from` field at all — the sender is host configuration, so no feature and no future module can choose who mail appears to come from, which is how a platform otherwise acquires an impersonation primitive. Control characters are refused rather than stripped in addresses, display names, subjects, and reply-to values; writing that rule down was not enough, because the first implementation trimmed an address before checking it and silently accepted a trailing carriage return until a test caught it. Security modes are named rather than inferred from a boolean and a port, which is genuinely ambiguous: `secure: false` on 587 means "connect in the clear and hope STARTTLS is offered". `starttls` sets requireTLS so a stripped upgrade fails the send instead of continuing in plaintext, production refuses `plaintext` outright, and certificate verification has no off switch. Credentials are optional as a pair, because a relay authorized by source IP has neither and requiring them would make the intended production arrangement unconfigurable; half a pair fails loudly. Connection, greeting, and socket timeouts are all explicit — the object-storage pass already showed what a network client on library defaults does to a request. Nothing retries: a failure after the message data has gone out is ambiguous, and retrying it turns one password-reset request into several emails, so this is a single bounded attempt and deliberately not an exactly-once promise. Email stays optional. An installation with no SMTP host is a complete deployment, nothing sends at startup, and constructing the transport opens no socket. There is no POST /api/v1/send-email and no route that touches the provider — an authenticated send endpoint is an open relay with extra steps. Modules get nothing either; services are added one at a time when something real needs one, and nothing does yet. Proven against a real in-process SMTP server rather than a mock: delivery with the host's sender on the wire, authentication and its sanitized refusal, a rejected mailbox distinguished from an outage, a refused connection, a silent server hitting its deadline, and a starttls transport refusing to continue when the upgrade is not offered. No test sends real email and no live credential exists in this repository or in CI. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
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Architecture decision records
ADRs capture durable choices that affect more than one package or phase.
- Filenames use a four-digit sequence followed by a short kebab-case title.
- Status is
Proposed,Accepted,Superseded, orRejected. - Accepted ADRs are immutable except for status and cross-reference corrections.
- A changed decision receives a new ADR that links to and supersedes the old one.
Index
- 0001: Four-layer platform boundary — Accepted
- 0002: pnpm workspace and strict TypeScript — Accepted
- 0003: Development infrastructure — Accepted
- 0004: Replace unmaintained MinIO baseline — Accepted
- 0005: Static module manifests and atomic discovery — Superseded
- 0006: Versioned capabilities and compiled module runtime — Accepted
- 0007: Module-owned Drizzle schemas and table isolation — Accepted
- 0008: Module-owned migration contracts and offline validation — Accepted
- 0009: Transactional module migration execution — Accepted
- 0010: Core identity architecture and Better Auth adoption — Accepted
- 0011: Identity HTTP transport and public enrollment policy — Accepted
- 0012: Production-equivalent identity origin/CSRF protection under test — Accepted
- 0013: Core authorization, permission registry, and platform-owner bootstrap — Accepted
- 0014: Module permission declarations and platform permission registry — Accepted
- 0015: Static module HTTP routing and production runtime lifecycle — Accepted
- 0016: Module database access — Accepted
- 0017: Public request perimeter hardening — client address, signup gating, body limits, timeouts — Accepted
- 0018: Identity session resolution, canonical public origins, and PostgreSQL transport policy — Accepted
- 0019: Durable authorization history and grant management — Accepted
- 0020: Module runtime and migration execution hardening — Accepted
- 0021: Modules as independently hostable products — Accepted
- 0022: Module UI authoring model and host contract — Accepted
- 0023: Module UI build pipeline — Accepted
- 0024: Browser-safe module UI SDK and the generic host loader — Accepted
- 0025: Trusted module UI asset publication — Accepted
- 0026: The minimal Ekklesia module UI host — Accepted
- 0027: Dashboard navigation is presentation configuration, and modules stay flat — Accepted
- 0028: Module operational lifecycle — enablement, eligibility, and what "running" means — Accepted
- 0029: Module configuration is manifest-declared, host-resolved, and secret-free at rest — Accepted
- 0030: Modules declare logical buckets; hosts provide object storage — Accepted
- 0031: Browsers fetch objects directly, through opaque temporary read URLs — Accepted
- 0032: Native module realtime is scoped snapshot state over SSE — Accepted
- 0033: Display UI is a separate, permission-gated module entrypoint — Accepted
- 0034: Dashboard browser authentication is host-owned and principal-first — Accepted
- 0035: The first platform owner is created by an operator command, never by a browser — Accepted
- 0036: A display device is its own principal, paired by an administrator — Accepted
- 0037: Outbound email is a host-provided transport, and SMTP is its first provider — Accepted