ADR 0033 gave Ekklesia a display host and ADR 0034 gave it a login page. Together, the only way to light a television in a foyer was to sign a human being into it and leave that session running on a screen anyone can walk up to: a person's credentials on a wall, a person's session as the thing signage depends on, and the display going dark when they are revoked or their session simply expires. A screen is not a person. Ekklesia now recognizes three principal classes — anonymous, authenticated human, and managed device — and a device is a first-class principal with its own credential and its own explicit permissions. It has no email, no password, and no row in the identity tables, and it satisfies the `authenticated` baseline never, so every route that settles for "somebody is signed in" stays closed to it. Device permissions live in their own table because ekklesia_core_grant.user_id is a non-null foreign key into the user table and making it polymorphic would rewrite the platform's central authorization record to serve one narrow case. That is a schema decision, not a second decision point: the evaluator gained one branch, so a device is allowed or denied by the same function, with the same deny-by-default, as anyone else — with no owner path it could reach and no baseline that stands in for a grant. The six-digit code is not the credential. It is printed across a screen in a public hallway, so it is treated as public: it identifies a request to an administrator and is worth nothing alone. Collecting the credential also requires a 256-bit claim secret held only in the requesting browser's HttpOnly cookie, and approving requires the restricted core.devices.manage permission. Without that split, reading a code off a wall would hand over the screen's identity. The permission a pairing asks for is read from the module's validated display declaration, never from the request, so a browser cannot ask to be granted core.devices.manage or another module's permission. Approval grants exactly that one permission. Credentials are stored only as SHA-256; the raw value exists in the Set-Cookie that issues it and the device's own cookie jar, and is never logged, returned in JSON, or placed in a URL. The cookie is HttpOnly, so the module display code running in that same page cannot read it. Revocation is a server-side column checked on every principal resolution, and re-pairing mints a new identity so an old credential can never come back. State transitions are conditional updates, so one code cannot be approved twice or claimed into two credentials under a race. /api/v1/principal still reports a device as anonymous: it is what the Dashboard uses to decide whether a person is signed in. Displays read their viewer from the descriptor instead, which already performed the authorization — so displays are descriptor-first while the Dashboard stays principal-first, and neither infers an identity by elimination. Proven end to end against real PostgreSQL and real HTTP: an unpaired screen shows a code, an owner approves it, the device opens the display descriptor and a realtime stream, and revocation closes both while the device still holds its cookie. An already-open SSE stream is bounded by realtime's existing five-minute reconnect rather than closed instantly, and that bound is documented rather than called immediate. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
239 lines
9.6 KiB
TypeScript
239 lines
9.6 KiB
TypeScript
import { type PermissionBaseline, parseModuleManifest } from "@ekklesia/contracts";
|
|
import { describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
|
|
import {
|
|
CORE_AUTHORIZATION_GRANTS_MANAGE,
|
|
CORE_DASHBOARD_NAVIGATION_MANAGE,
|
|
CORE_DEVICES_MANAGE,
|
|
CORE_MODULES_CONFIGURATION_MANAGE,
|
|
CORE_MODULES_LIFECYCLE_MANAGE,
|
|
CORE_MODULES_UI_READ,
|
|
CORE_PERMISSION_DECLARATIONS,
|
|
PermissionRegistryError,
|
|
} from "../src/authorization/index.js";
|
|
import type { DiscoveredModule } from "../src/modules/discovery.js";
|
|
import {
|
|
composePlatformPermissionRegistry,
|
|
ModulePermissionCompositionError,
|
|
} from "../src/modules/permissions.js";
|
|
|
|
interface PermissionInput {
|
|
readonly id: string;
|
|
readonly baseline: PermissionBaseline;
|
|
readonly description: string;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** A minimal, in-memory `DiscoveredModule` double — no filesystem, no real discovery. The manifest
|
|
* is still built through `parseModuleManifest`, so a fixture that would not actually pass manifest
|
|
* validation cannot silently misrepresent what real discovery would ever produce. Only `manifest`
|
|
* is read by `composePlatformPermissionRegistry`; the rest exist only to satisfy the type. */
|
|
function fakeModule(id: string, permissions: readonly PermissionInput[] = []): DiscoveredModule {
|
|
const manifest = parseModuleManifest({
|
|
manifestVersion: 6,
|
|
id,
|
|
name: `${id} module`,
|
|
version: "0.1.0",
|
|
compatibility: { platform: "^0.1.0", moduleSdk: "^0.1.0" },
|
|
permissions,
|
|
entrypoints: {
|
|
// Deliberately a path nothing will ever resolve, proving composition never imports or
|
|
// otherwise touches a module's server entrypoint.
|
|
server: "./dist/does-not-exist/index.js",
|
|
},
|
|
});
|
|
return {
|
|
directory: `/modules/${id}`,
|
|
entrypoints: { server: `/modules/${id}/dist/does-not-exist/index.js` },
|
|
manifest,
|
|
manifestPath: `/modules/${id}/ekklesia.module.json`,
|
|
packageName: `@test/${id}`,
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
describe("composePlatformPermissionRegistry", () => {
|
|
it("composes a Core-only registry when no modules are supplied", () => {
|
|
const registry = composePlatformPermissionRegistry([]);
|
|
|
|
expect(registry.declarations).toEqual(CORE_PERMISSION_DECLARATIONS);
|
|
expect(registry.has(CORE_AUTHORIZATION_GRANTS_MANAGE)).toBe(true);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("composes Core and multiple discovered modules' declarations into one registry", () => {
|
|
const calendar = fakeModule("calendar", [
|
|
{ id: "calendar.events.read", baseline: "restricted", description: "Read events." },
|
|
]);
|
|
const people = fakeModule("people", [
|
|
{ id: "people.directory.read", baseline: "authenticated", description: "Read directory." },
|
|
]);
|
|
|
|
const registry = composePlatformPermissionRegistry([calendar, people]);
|
|
|
|
expect(registry.has(CORE_AUTHORIZATION_GRANTS_MANAGE)).toBe(true);
|
|
expect(registry.has(CORE_MODULES_UI_READ)).toBe(true);
|
|
expect(registry.has("calendar.events.read")).toBe(true);
|
|
expect(registry.has("people.directory.read")).toBe(true);
|
|
expect(registry.has(CORE_DASHBOARD_NAVIGATION_MANAGE)).toBe(true);
|
|
expect(registry.has(CORE_MODULES_LIFECYCLE_MANAGE)).toBe(true);
|
|
expect(registry.has(CORE_MODULES_CONFIGURATION_MANAGE)).toBe(true);
|
|
// Core's own five declarations plus one from each module.
|
|
expect(registry.declarations).toHaveLength(8);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("preserves deterministic order: Core first, then modules in the supplied order, then declarations in manifest order", () => {
|
|
const calendar = fakeModule("calendar", [
|
|
{ id: "calendar.events.read", baseline: "restricted", description: "Read events." },
|
|
{ id: "calendar.events.write", baseline: "restricted", description: "Write events." },
|
|
]);
|
|
const people = fakeModule("people", [
|
|
{ id: "people.directory.read", baseline: "authenticated", description: "Read directory." },
|
|
]);
|
|
|
|
const registry = composePlatformPermissionRegistry([calendar, people]);
|
|
|
|
expect(registry.declarations.map((declaration) => declaration.id)).toEqual([
|
|
CORE_AUTHORIZATION_GRANTS_MANAGE,
|
|
CORE_MODULES_UI_READ,
|
|
CORE_DASHBOARD_NAVIGATION_MANAGE,
|
|
CORE_MODULES_LIFECYCLE_MANAGE,
|
|
CORE_MODULES_CONFIGURATION_MANAGE,
|
|
CORE_DEVICES_MANAGE,
|
|
"calendar.events.read",
|
|
"calendar.events.write",
|
|
"people.directory.read",
|
|
]);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it.each([
|
|
"public",
|
|
"authenticated",
|
|
"restricted",
|
|
] as const)("preserves the exact %s baseline and description of a module declaration", (baseline) => {
|
|
const calendar = fakeModule("calendar", [
|
|
{ id: "calendar.events.read", baseline, description: "Read calendar events." },
|
|
]);
|
|
|
|
const registry = composePlatformPermissionRegistry([calendar]);
|
|
|
|
expect(registry.get("calendar.events.read")).toEqual({
|
|
id: "calendar.events.read",
|
|
baseline,
|
|
description: "Read calendar events.",
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("still fails closed for a permission no module or Core ever declared", () => {
|
|
const registry = composePlatformPermissionRegistry([]);
|
|
|
|
expect(registry.has("calendar.events.read")).toBe(false);
|
|
expect(registry.get("calendar.events.read")).toBeUndefined();
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("fails composition on an exact duplicate permission id supplied by two module entries", () => {
|
|
// A permission id must start with its own module's id, so a genuine cross-module collision is
|
|
// only reachable if the supplied list itself contains the same module id twice — real
|
|
// discovery already guarantees module-id uniqueness (`MODULE_ID_DUPLICATE`), but composition
|
|
// re-derives duplicate detection from the flat declaration list regardless, rather than
|
|
// trusting that upstream guarantee alone.
|
|
const first = fakeModule("calendar", [
|
|
{ id: "calendar.events.read", baseline: "restricted", description: "Read events." },
|
|
]);
|
|
const second = fakeModule("calendar", [
|
|
{ id: "calendar.events.read", baseline: "public", description: "Also read events." },
|
|
]);
|
|
|
|
expect(() => composePlatformPermissionRegistry([first, second])).toThrow(
|
|
PermissionRegistryError,
|
|
);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("rejects a module contributing a permission in the reserved core.* namespace, without leaking a module path", () => {
|
|
// Only a module whose own id is literally "core" can produce a "core."-prefixed permission
|
|
// that still passes the manifest's own module-namespace check — this proves composition
|
|
// catches that case rather than trusting the manifest's self-consistency alone.
|
|
const impostor = fakeModule("core", [
|
|
{ id: "core.rogue.permission", baseline: "restricted", description: "Not really Core's." },
|
|
]);
|
|
|
|
let captured: unknown;
|
|
try {
|
|
composePlatformPermissionRegistry([impostor]);
|
|
} catch (error) {
|
|
captured = error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
expect(captured).toBeInstanceOf(ModulePermissionCompositionError);
|
|
expect(captured).toMatchObject({
|
|
code: "MODULE_PERMISSION_RESERVED_NAMESPACE",
|
|
moduleId: "core",
|
|
permissionId: "core.rogue.permission",
|
|
});
|
|
const publicText = String(captured);
|
|
expect(publicText).not.toContain("/modules/core");
|
|
expect(publicText).not.toContain("ekklesia.module.json");
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("rejects a reserved-namespace collision even when it would not otherwise duplicate an existing id", () => {
|
|
const impostor = fakeModule("core", [
|
|
{
|
|
id: "core.authorization.grants.manage",
|
|
baseline: "restricted",
|
|
description: "Attempting to shadow Core's own permission.",
|
|
},
|
|
]);
|
|
|
|
expect(() => composePlatformPermissionRegistry([impostor])).toThrow(
|
|
ModulePermissionCompositionError,
|
|
);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("removes a module's permissions from the resulting registry once that module is absent from the supplied list", () => {
|
|
const calendar = fakeModule("calendar", [
|
|
{ id: "calendar.events.read", baseline: "restricted", description: "Read events." },
|
|
]);
|
|
|
|
const withCalendar = composePlatformPermissionRegistry([calendar]);
|
|
expect(withCalendar.has("calendar.events.read")).toBe(true);
|
|
|
|
const withoutCalendar = composePlatformPermissionRegistry([]);
|
|
expect(withoutCalendar.has("calendar.events.read")).toBe(false);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("performs no I/O: composition is synchronous and never imports a module's entrypoint", () => {
|
|
const calendar = fakeModule("calendar", [
|
|
{ id: "calendar.events.read", baseline: "restricted", description: "Read events." },
|
|
]);
|
|
|
|
// A synchronous return (not a Promise) from a fixture whose entrypoint deliberately resolves
|
|
// to nothing on disk is direct evidence no filesystem or module-code operation occurred.
|
|
const result = composePlatformPermissionRegistry([calendar]);
|
|
expect(result).not.toBeInstanceOf(Promise);
|
|
expect(result.has("calendar.events.read")).toBe(true);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("does not mutate the supplied module list or Core's own declaration list", () => {
|
|
const calendar = fakeModule("calendar", [
|
|
{ id: "calendar.events.read", baseline: "restricted", description: "Read events." },
|
|
]);
|
|
const modules = Object.freeze([calendar]);
|
|
const coreDeclarationsBefore = [...CORE_PERMISSION_DECLARATIONS];
|
|
|
|
composePlatformPermissionRegistry(modules);
|
|
|
|
expect(modules).toEqual([calendar]);
|
|
expect(CORE_PERMISSION_DECLARATIONS).toEqual(coreDeclarationsBefore);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("returns a registry and declarations that remain immutable, including module-contributed ones", () => {
|
|
const calendar = fakeModule("calendar", [
|
|
{ id: "calendar.events.read", baseline: "restricted", description: "Read events." },
|
|
]);
|
|
|
|
const registry = composePlatformPermissionRegistry([calendar]);
|
|
|
|
expect(Object.isFrozen(registry)).toBe(true);
|
|
expect(Object.isFrozen(registry.declarations)).toBe(true);
|
|
for (const declaration of registry.declarations) {
|
|
expect(Object.isFrozen(declaration)).toBe(true);
|
|
}
|
|
});
|
|
});
|