ekklesiaandClaude Opus 5
c8fa13dd6a
A fresh production installation deadlocked. ADR 0034 gave Ekklesia a login
page and ADR 0019 gave it a single-use platform-owner bootstrap, but that
bootstrap grants ownership to a user id that already exists and has no way
to bring one into being. Public signup is disabled by default and
production cannot enable it at all, so a newly deployed instance had a
login page, no account, and no supported way to create one — only hand-
written SQL or briefly opening public registration.
pnpm identity:create-initial-owner -- --email [email protected]
creates the identity and grants it ownership, in the same shape as the
other operator commands: trusted local tooling, reachable only by someone
who already holds the database credentials, serving no HTTP route. No
/signup, /register, or /setup route is added, no bootstrap endpoint, and
no setup token; public signup stays disabled in every environment and a
test asserts a freshly bootstrapped deployment still refuses
/api/auth/sign-up/email.
The identity is created through Better Auth's own sign-up path, so
hashing, salting, normalization and the 8-128 bound are the identity
system's rather than a second implementation that could drift. Because the
server's instance refuses account creation, the command builds its own
in-process instance; nothing in apps/api imports it and the running
server's posture is untouched.
The sign-up result is verified rather than trusted. Better Auth returns a
fabricated success for an already-registered address — a user object whose
id was never persisted, database unchanged. That is correct enumeration
defence on a public endpoint and a trap here, so the identity is always
read back from the database and that read, not the response, is what the
grant uses.
An existing usable identity is adopted: ownership is granted and its
password left alone, reported as an adoption rather than a creation. This
is the recovery path for the one partial failure possible, since sign-up
commits on Better Auth's connection and the grant is a separate
transaction. A credential-less row is refused instead — making it an owner
would consume the single use on an identity nobody can authenticate as. A
password is never reset and an account is never taken over.
Whole invocations are serialized by an advisory lock on their own key, so
a race cannot leave a stray signable-in account behind; the grant's own
locked single-use transaction is unchanged. There is no --force or reset.
The password is prompted for invisibly or read from stdin, never from
argv (--password is refused with an explanation) and never from an
environment variable, so nothing about it becomes permanent deployment
configuration. The command needs DATABASE_URL and nothing else — verified
that sign-up needs no secret, base URL, or trusted origins, and that the
resulting account signs in through a separately configured server — so the
first owner can be created before TLS or DNS exist. It never migrates.
Proven end to end rather than at the database: a fresh installation is
bootstrapped, signed in through the real browser login transport with
signup disabled, its principal read, and used to open an owner-protected
resource that stays closed to anonymous callers.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
4.6 KiB
4.6 KiB
Architecture decision records
ADRs capture durable choices that affect more than one package or phase.
- Filenames use a four-digit sequence followed by a short kebab-case title.
- Status is
Proposed,Accepted,Superseded, orRejected. - Accepted ADRs are immutable except for status and cross-reference corrections.
- A changed decision receives a new ADR that links to and supersedes the old one.
Index
- 0001: Four-layer platform boundary — Accepted
- 0002: pnpm workspace and strict TypeScript — Accepted
- 0003: Development infrastructure — Accepted
- 0004: Replace unmaintained MinIO baseline — Accepted
- 0005: Static module manifests and atomic discovery — Superseded
- 0006: Versioned capabilities and compiled module runtime — Accepted
- 0007: Module-owned Drizzle schemas and table isolation — Accepted
- 0008: Module-owned migration contracts and offline validation — Accepted
- 0009: Transactional module migration execution — Accepted
- 0010: Core identity architecture and Better Auth adoption — Accepted
- 0011: Identity HTTP transport and public enrollment policy — Accepted
- 0012: Production-equivalent identity origin/CSRF protection under test — Accepted
- 0013: Core authorization, permission registry, and platform-owner bootstrap — Accepted
- 0014: Module permission declarations and platform permission registry — Accepted
- 0015: Static module HTTP routing and production runtime lifecycle — Accepted
- 0016: Module database access — Accepted
- 0017: Public request perimeter hardening — client address, signup gating, body limits, timeouts — Accepted
- 0018: Identity session resolution, canonical public origins, and PostgreSQL transport policy — Accepted
- 0019: Durable authorization history and grant management — Accepted
- 0020: Module runtime and migration execution hardening — Accepted
- 0021: Modules as independently hostable products — Accepted
- 0022: Module UI authoring model and host contract — Accepted
- 0023: Module UI build pipeline — Accepted
- 0024: Browser-safe module UI SDK and the generic host loader — Accepted
- 0025: Trusted module UI asset publication — Accepted
- 0026: The minimal Ekklesia module UI host — Accepted
- 0027: Dashboard navigation is presentation configuration, and modules stay flat — Accepted
- 0028: Module operational lifecycle — enablement, eligibility, and what "running" means — Accepted
- 0029: Module configuration is manifest-declared, host-resolved, and secret-free at rest — Accepted
- 0030: Modules declare logical buckets; hosts provide object storage — Accepted
- 0031: Browsers fetch objects directly, through opaque temporary read URLs — Accepted
- 0032: Native module realtime is scoped snapshot state over SSE — Accepted
- 0033: Display UI is a separate, permission-gated module entrypoint — Accepted
- 0034: Dashboard browser authentication is host-owned and principal-first — Accepted
- 0035: The first platform owner is created by an operator command, never by a browser — Accepted