Merge pull request 'feat: support split Dashboard and API origins (ADR 0045)' (#54) from feat/split-origins into main

Reviewed-on: http://git.riverofglorymn.org/River_of_Glory_Church/Ekklesia/pulls/54
Reviewed-by: Joey <[email protected]>

.dockerignore

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+# Build context for deploy/Dockerfile (ADR 0044). The image installs its own dependencies with
+# `pnpm install --frozen-lockfile` and builds its own outputs, so nothing installed or built on the
+# host may enter the context, and no secret or environment file may enter any layer.
+
+# Host-installed dependencies and build outputs: the image produces its own.
+**/node_modules
+**/dist
+**/.turbo
+**/coverage
+**/*.tsbuildinfo
+
+# Environment and secret material. Configuration reaches the container only through its runtime
+# environment; `.env.example` is excluded too, since nothing in the image reads it.
+**/.env
+**/.env.*
+
+# Repository and tooling metadata the image never reads.
+.git
+.github
+.gitea
+.forgejo
+.vscode
+.idea
+**/*.log
+**/.DS_Store

.env.example

@@ -1,14 +1,110 @@
 # Local development only. Replace every credential outside a developer workstation.
+#
+# `pnpm doctor` loads this file's uncommitted `.env` counterpart and evaluates exactly the host
+# infrastructure configuration `pnpm api:start` would use, so the readiness report reflects the real
+# deployment without the API process running.
+
+# Required for a local workstation, and only ever correct there. Anything else — including an
+# unset value — is validated as production, which requires certificate-verified PostgreSQL TLS
+# (EKKLESIA_DATABASE_TLS_MODE defaults to verify-full) and rejects loopback/http identity origins.
+# The plaintext loopback DATABASE_URL below is therefore only usable with this set.
+NODE_ENV=development
+
 POSTGRES_DB=ekklesia
 POSTGRES_USER=ekklesia
 POSTGRES_PASSWORD=ekklesia-development-only
 POSTGRES_PORT=5432
 DATABASE_URL=postgresql://ekklesia:[email protected]:5432/ekklesia
 
+# Ekklesia's object-storage provider (ADR 0030). Absent S3_ENDPOINT means this installation has no
+# object storage, which is a complete deployment: only a module that declares a logical bucket in its
+# manifest is affected, and it is reported blocked rather than breaking anything. Production requires
+# https, exactly as the database transport requires verified TLS.
+#
+# These are host infrastructure. No module ever sees them: a module names a logical bucket and the
+# host resolves the binding.
 S3_ACCESS_KEY=ekklesia-development
 S3_SECRET_KEY=ekklesia-development-secret
-S3_BUCKET=ekklesia-development
 S3_ENDPOINT=http://127.0.0.1:8333
 S3_PORT=8333
 S3_REGION=us-east-1
 S3_FORCE_PATH_STYLE=true
+# The origin a *browser* reaches object storage on, used only when signing temporary read URLs for
+# direct delivery (ADR 0031). Leave it unset whenever S3_ENDPOINT is itself reachable from a browser,
+# which is the case for this development stack: Compose publishes the service on loopback, so the
+# endpoint above serves both roles and direct delivery works with no extra configuration.
+#
+# Set it when Core reaches storage by a name a browser cannot resolve — a Compose service name such
+# as http://object-storage:8333, for instance — and browsers reach it through a public origin:
+#   S3_DELIVERY_ENDPOINT=https://storage.example.org
+# It must be the origin the browser actually requests. An S3-compatible signature covers the request
+# Host, so a URL signed for one origin cannot be rewritten to another afterwards; a reverse proxy in
+# front of storage must therefore pass the original Host header through unchanged. The scheme is not
+# signed, so terminating TLS at that proxy and forwarding plaintext to the service is fine.
+# S3_DELIVERY_ENDPOINT=
+# Namespaces every physical bucket this installation owns, so several Ekklesia-compatible deployments
+# can share one S3-compatible service. Optional; defaults to "ekklesia".
+S3_BUCKET_PREFIX=ekklesia
+# Consumed only by the development Compose service's own bootstrap, never by Ekklesia's provider —
+# physical buckets are derived from a module's manifest declaration, not configured here.
+S3_BUCKET=ekklesia-development
+
+# Ekklesia's outbound email transport (ADR 0037). Absent EKKLESIA_SMTP_HOST means this installation
+# sends no email, which is a complete deployment: nothing in the platform sends any yet, and a
+# future feature that needs to is told so rather than crashing.
+#
+# These are host infrastructure. No module ever sees them, and no feature chooses its own sender:
+# the From address below is the only one this platform can send as.
+#
+# EKKLESIA_SMTP_HOST is a bare hostname — never a URL, a port, or a connection string.
+# EKKLESIA_SMTP_SECURITY is exactly one of:
+#   implicit-tls  TLS from the first byte, conventionally port 465
+#   starttls      plaintext connect then a *required* upgrade, conventionally 587 (the default)
+#   plaintext     no TLS at all; development only, and production refuses it outright
+# EKKLESIA_SMTP_PORT is optional and defaults to the conventional port for the mode.
+#
+# Credentials are optional **as a pair**, because a relay authorized by source IP has neither.
+# Setting one without the other is refused rather than silently connecting anonymously. Never commit
+# a real password: this file is in every clone.
+#
+# A Google Workspace SMTP Relay deployment typically looks like:
+#   EKKLESIA_SMTP_HOST=<the relay host from Google Workspace Admin>
+#   EKKLESIA_SMTP_PORT=587
+#   EKKLESIA_SMTP_SECURITY=starttls
+#   [email protected]
+# Whether it also needs a username and password depends on the relay's authorization setting in
+# Google Workspace Admin, which varies per deployment. See docs/development/email.md.
+# EKKLESIA_SMTP_HOST=
+# EKKLESIA_SMTP_PORT=587
+# EKKLESIA_SMTP_SECURITY=starttls
+# EKKLESIA_SMTP_USERNAME=
+# EKKLESIA_SMTP_PASSWORD=
+# [email protected]
+# EKKLESIA_SMTP_FROM_NAME=Ekklesia
+#
+# EKKLESIA_SMTP_HELO_NAME is the name Ekklesia announces itself as in the SMTP EHLO command.
+#
+# Leave it unset unless a relay refuses the connection. An SMTP client has to identify itself, and
+# with nothing configured Nodemailer derives that from the machine hostname — substituting the
+# address literal [127.0.0.1] whenever the hostname is not fully qualified, which is the normal
+# state of a container or an unnamed VM. Some relays close the connection on that greeting with a
+# 421 before any message is offered, which looks exactly like the relay being unreachable.
+#
+# Set it to a fully qualified domain name your deployment owns — typically the sending domain.
+# No scheme, no port, no brackets, and at least one dot; anything else is refused at startup.
+# EKKLESIA_SMTP_HELO_NAME=example.org
+
+# Where an emailed verification or password-reset link sends a browser (ADR 0038).
+#
+# Absent means the Dashboard is served from EKKLESIA_IDENTITY_BASE_URL, which is the ordinary
+# same-origin production shape. Set it only when a deployment separates the two, for example an API
+# at https://api.example.org and the Dashboard at https://dash.example.org. It must also appear in
+# EKKLESIA_IDENTITY_TRUSTED_ORIGINS, or the identity system refuses the emailed link — Ekklesia
+# checks that at startup rather than letting every recipient discover it.
+#
+# This is the authenticated Dashboard host, never the public church website.
+# EKKLESIA_DASHBOARD_ORIGIN=https://dash.example.org
+#
+# Verification and password recovery need a working relay above. The initial platform-owner
+# bootstrap (pnpm identity:create-initial-owner) deliberately does not: it creates that one account
+# already verified, so a fresh server can be signed in to before any mail exists.

.github/workflows/ci.yml

@@ -1,5 +1,22 @@
 name: CI
 
+# IMPORTANT — the currently inventoried server is Gitea 1.24.2, which *ignores* several keys used
+# below. Per https://docs.gitea.com/1.24/usage/actions/comparison, its unsupported workflow syntax
+# includes `permissions` / `jobs.<job_id>.permissions`, `concurrency`, and
+# `jobs.<job_id>.timeout-minutes`. They are declared here deliberately, so the workflow is already
+# correct on a supported release and on GitHub Actions, but on this server they are inert:
+#
+#   * `permissions:` does NOT restrict the in-job `GITEA_TOKEN`. Job-token permission controls,
+#     repository/owner defaults, and server-side maximum-permission clamping arrive in the 1.26
+#     feature line (https://docs.gitea.com/1.26/usage/actions/token-permissions). Until the server
+#     is upgraded and configured, the token's authority is whatever the server grants — not what
+#     this file requests.
+#   * `concurrency:` and `timeout-minutes:` are NOT bounded-execution guarantees here. Cancellation,
+#     timeout, and teardown must be enforced by the trusted runner provisioner/reaper.
+#
+# `persist-credentials: false` below is unaffected by any of this and is enforced by the action
+# itself. See docs/development/security.md.
+
 on:
   pull_request:
   push:
@@ -20,6 +37,11 @@ jobs:
     steps:
       - name: Check out repository
         uses: actions/checkout@de0fac2e4500dabe0009e67214ff5f5447ce83dd # v6.0.2
+        with:
+          # `actions/checkout` defaults to leaving the job token in `.git/config`, where any later
+          # step — including one a pull request added to this file — could read or reuse it. Nothing
+          # in this workflow pushes, so the credential is never needed after checkout.
+          persist-credentials: false
 
       - name: Set up Node.js
         uses: actions/setup-node@48b55a011bda9f5d6aeb4c2d9c7362e8dae4041e # v6.4.0
@@ -44,6 +66,106 @@ jobs:
     steps:
       - name: Check out repository
         uses: actions/checkout@de0fac2e4500dabe0009e67214ff5f5447ce83dd # v6.0.2
+        with:
+          # `actions/checkout` defaults to leaving the job token in `.git/config`, where any later
+          # step — including one a pull request added to this file — could read or reuse it. Nothing
+          # in this workflow pushes, so the credential is never needed after checkout.
+          persist-credentials: false
 
       - name: Exercise PostgreSQL and S3 infrastructure
         run: bash scripts/smoke-infrastructure.sh
+
+  migration-smoke:
+    needs: verify
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    timeout-minutes: 15
+    steps:
+      - name: Check out repository
+        uses: actions/checkout@de0fac2e4500dabe0009e67214ff5f5447ce83dd # v6.0.2
+        with:
+          # `actions/checkout` defaults to leaving the job token in `.git/config`, where any later
+          # step — including one a pull request added to this file — could read or reuse it. Nothing
+          # in this workflow pushes, so the credential is never needed after checkout.
+          persist-credentials: false
+
+      - name: Set up Node.js
+        uses: actions/setup-node@48b55a011bda9f5d6aeb4c2d9c7362e8dae4041e # v6.4.0
+        with:
+          node-version-file: .node-version
+
+      - name: Activate pinned pnpm
+        run: |
+          corepack enable
+          corepack prepare [email protected] --activate
+
+      - name: Install dependencies
+        run: pnpm install --frozen-lockfile
+
+      - name: Exercise transactional migrations against PostgreSQL
+        run: pnpm test:migrations:integration
+
+  image-build:
+    needs: verify
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    timeout-minutes: 20
+    env:
+      # Cache mounts in deploy/Dockerfile need BuildKit; this selects it even where the Docker CLI
+      # has no buildx plugin.
+      DOCKER_BUILDKIT: "1"
+    steps:
+      - name: Check out repository
+        uses: actions/checkout@de0fac2e4500dabe0009e67214ff5f5447ce83dd # v6.0.2
+        with:
+          # `actions/checkout` defaults to leaving the job token in `.git/config`, where any later
+          # step — including one a pull request added to this file — could read or reuse it. Nothing
+          # in this workflow pushes, so the credential is never needed after checkout.
+          persist-credentials: false
+
+      # The platform-only image (ADR 0044): a checkout has no `modules/`, so this proves the image
+      # builds, validates, and assembles with zero modules. Build only — no registry login, no
+      # credentials, no push, no tag anywhere but this runner's local image store.
+      # Tagged per run and attempt, not only per commit: a pull request and a push of the same commit
+      # can build at once on one runner's Docker daemon, and neither may remove the other's image.
+      - name: Build the production image without modules
+        run: >-
+          docker build
+          --file deploy/Dockerfile
+          --build-arg REVISION="$GITHUB_SHA"
+          --tag ekklesia-ci:"$GITHUB_SHA-${GITHUB_RUN_ID:-0}-${GITHUB_RUN_ATTEMPT:-1}"
+          .
+
+      - name: Remove the image from the runner
+        if: always()
+        run: docker image rm --force ekklesia-ci:"$GITHUB_SHA-${GITHUB_RUN_ID:-0}-${GITHUB_RUN_ATTEMPT:-1}" || true
+
+  deploy-smoke:
+    needs: verify
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    timeout-minutes: 30
+    # Both topologies (ADR 0045): same-origin, the default every installation gets, and split, which
+    # adds a test-only module and drives a real headless browser across the two origins.
+    strategy:
+      fail-fast: false
+      matrix:
+        topology:
+          - same-origin
+          - split
+    env:
+      DOCKER_BUILDKIT: "1"
+      EKKLESIA_SMOKE_TOPOLOGY: ${{ matrix.topology }}
+    steps:
+      - name: Check out repository
+        uses: actions/checkout@de0fac2e4500dabe0009e67214ff5f5447ce83dd # v6.0.2
+        with:
+          # `actions/checkout` defaults to leaving the job token in `.git/config`, where any later
+          # step — including one a pull request added to this file — could read or reuse it. Nothing
+          # in this workflow pushes, so the credential is never needed after checkout.
+          persist-credentials: false
+
+      # The reference deployment end to end (ADR 0044): a platform-only image, base + proxy with
+      # Caddy's internal CA (test-only), an explicit migration apply against this job's own fresh
+      # PostgreSQL, then the API, Dashboard, storage delivery, client-address chain, and verify-full
+      # database TLS through the proxy. Every secret is generated for this run and discarded with
+      # it; nothing is pushed, published, or logged in to.
+      - name: Smoke-test the reference deployment (${{ matrix.topology }})
+        run: bash scripts/smoke-deploy.sh

.gitignore

@@ -13,3 +13,6 @@ generated/*
 
 *.log
 .DS_Store
+
+core/.identity-schema-reference.ts
+core/.identity-schema-check-*

CLAUDE.md

@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
+# CLAUDE.md
+
+Guidance for Claude Code (and other coding agents) working in this repository. This file is
+intentionally short and durable — it points at authoritative sources instead of restating their
+contents, because restated details drift.
+
+## What this repository is
+
+Ekklesia is a modular, self-hosted church platform built as a strictly layered pnpm/TypeScript
+monorepo:
+
+- **Core** (`core/`) owns platform infrastructure: identity, database connectivity, migration
+  execution, module discovery/lifecycle, and other feature-agnostic services. Core never imports a
+  feature module, a surface, or an app.
+- **Modules** (`modules/*`, template at `templates/module`) are independently versioned product
+  packages. They own their own data and migrations, declare capabilities/permissions through
+  `@ekklesia/contracts` and `@ekklesia/module-sdk`, and must never import Core, another module, or a
+  surface directly. Per ADR 0021 a module owns its UI; manifest v7 permits independently optional
+  primary and full-viewport display artifacts, authored in React against the same role-neutral
+  `@ekklesia/module-ui-sdk` ABI. Ekklesia mounts each through a separate surface role, while
+  `pnpm boundaries` still rejects every non-React UI framework and non-`.tsx` presentation source.
+- **Surfaces** (`surfaces/*`) own the containing application shell, navigation, and every
+  presentation concern a module does not. They consume public API/client contracts only, never Core
+  or module internals directly.
+
+These boundaries are enforced by `pnpm boundaries` (`scripts/check-boundaries.ts`), not just
+documented. Read `docs/architecture/repository-boundaries.md` and
+`docs/architecture/platform-architecture.md` before proposing any change that crosses a layer.
+
+## ADRs are authoritative
+
+`docs/architecture/decisions/` records durable architectural decisions. **Accepted ADRs are
+immutable except for status and cross-reference corrections** — do not edit their content to fit a
+new change. A changed decision gets a new ADR that supersedes the old one. Read the full ADR index
+(`docs/architecture/decisions/README.md`) and every ADR relevant to the area you are touching
+before designing a change; do not assume this file's summary of any decision is complete or
+current.
+
+## Read before you design
+
+At minimum, read the current versions of:
+
+- `docs/architecture/decisions/README.md` and every ADR relevant to your change
+- `docs/architecture/platform-architecture.md` and `docs/architecture/repository-boundaries.md`
+- `README.md` (current platform status — what is and is not implemented)
+- `docs/development/repository-workflow.md` and `docs/development/testing.md`
+- `CONTRIBUTING.md`
+
+These files change as the platform evolves. **Inspect the actual current repository state
+(source, tests, package.json scripts, CI workflow) before relying on anything in this file or in
+your own memory of a prior session** — treat stale assumptions as a bug to catch, not a shortcut.
+
+## Working conventions
+
+- Work on a clean branch off an up-to-date `main`; never commit or push directly to `main`; never
+  change branch-protection settings.
+- Keep PRs focused on one bounded slice. Record major architectural changes in an ADR rather than
+  burying them in an implementation.
+- Add or update tests when you change a contract or architectural rule. New behavior needs new
+  test coverage, not just a passing existing suite.
+- Errors that reach a user, log, CLI, or `pnpm doctor` output must be sanitized: never expose
+  secrets, connection strings, raw SQL, raw driver/exception messages, stack traces, causes, or
+  machine-specific paths. Match the sanitization pattern already used by
+  `core/src/migrations/runner.ts` and `core/src/diagnostics/doctor.ts` rather than inventing a new
+  one.
+- Never run a database migration automatically (on import, on startup, in a test that isn't
+  explicitly a migration test, or as a side effect of an unrelated command). Migrations are always
+  an explicit, operator-invoked action.
+
+## Canonical verification commands
+
+Run from the repository root; `package.json` is the source of truth if this list and the file
+ever disagree:
+
+- `pnpm verify` — the full code-only gate (format, lint, boundaries, typecheck, tests, module and
+  migration validation, identity schema drift check, build). Docker-free; never touches a live
+  database.
+- `pnpm test:migrations:integration` — live, disposable-PostgreSQL evidence: migration discovery,
+  planning, and execution, plus the `apps/api` HTTP transport (signup, sign-in, principal
+  resolution, sign-out). Requires Docker. Run this for any change touching either area.
+- `pnpm doctor` — read-only local readiness report. Never treat it as a substitute for `pnpm
+  verify` or the integration suite.
+- `pnpm migrations:plan` / `pnpm migrations:apply` — read-only planning vs. mutating execution
+  against `DATABASE_URL`. Never run `migrations:apply` without the user's explicit intent.
+- `pnpm api:start` — starts the identity HTTP transport against an already-migrated `DATABASE_URL`.
+  It never applies migrations itself. Never run it without the user's explicit intent.
+
+## When you're unsure
+
+If a task would require weakening an existing ADR's guarantee, introducing a second mechanism
+where one already exists (a second migration runner, a second discovery path, a second config
+system), or exposing something the boundary checker currently blocks, stop and surface the
+conflict instead of working around it.

CONTRIBUTING.md

@@ -9,6 +9,16 @@ Before opening a change, run:
 pnpm verify
 ```
 
+Migration-runner changes and changes to identity/authentication or the API's session transport also
+require the disposable live PostgreSQL suite:
+
+```bash
+pnpm test:migrations:integration
+```
+
+See the [testing guide](docs/development/testing.md) for the distinction between unit and live
+evidence and for credential-safe troubleshooting.
+
 When adding or changing a module manifest, also run `pnpm modules:validate` directly for focused,
 path-aware discovery errors. It is included in `pnpm verify`.
 
@@ -24,10 +34,50 @@ pnpm infrastructure:config
 - Expose supported entry points through package `exports`; do not import another package's
   private source paths.
 - Use `workspace:` ranges for internal package dependencies.
-- Keep modules backend-only. Module packages cannot contain React, mobile, stylesheet, or other
+- Modules own their own UI and author it in React and TypeScript (ADR 0022). A module package may
-  UI source files.
+  contain `.tsx` and depend on `react`, `react-dom`, and `@ekklesia/module-ui-sdk`, and may author
-- Put rendering, layout, navigation, accessibility, and all other presentation concerns in a
+  plain `.css` inside a browser-artifact source root (ADR 0040). Every other UI framework, `.jsx`,
-  surface.
+  other stylesheet dialects, and other presentation formats remain rejected by `pnpm boundaries`. Primary and display sources live at the exact `src/ui/index.tsx` and
+  `src/display/index.tsx` conventions; one `pnpm build` invocation atomically compiles every role
+  the v7 manifest declares via `@ekklesia/module-ui-build` (ADR 0023/0033), including every declared
+  browser contribution at `src/contributions/<local-name>/index.tsx` (ADR 0041). Module authors write no
+  bundler configuration. A module's stylesheets are compiled into its declared artifact as text and
+  installed by the host into that artifact's own Shadow DOM root, so module styles cannot leak into
+  the Dashboard or another module (ADR 0040). Both roles use the same UI SDK context with no
+  presentation-mode flag, and the same versioned mount ABI.
+- A module may also consume exactly two shared design packages — `@ekklesia/design-tokens` and
+  `@ekklesia/ui` (ADR 0039) — so two modules' screens look like one product. That is a named
+  allowlist: every other shared role (`api-client`, `auth-client`, `surface-sdk`, `module-ui-host`)
+  stays rejected inside a module. Reference registered semantic tokens; never define an
+  `--ekklesia-*` custom property of your own.
+- Module UI reaches its host only through `@ekklesia/module-ui-sdk` — never
+  `@ekklesia/module-ui-host`, which is the host-side loader — and asks the host for its own
+  API by relative path — never by constructing `/api/v1/modules/<id>/...`, which is Ekklesia's
+  private deployment detail and would break standalone hosting.
+- The containing application shell, navigation, global theme, and platform policy belong to Core and
+  the host application, never to a module. Ekklesia's own shell is `surfaces/shell`; it discovers
+  primary module UIs through `GET /api/v1/dashboard/navigation`, resolves a dedicated display
+  through `GET /api/v1/module-displays/<module-id>`, mounts both with
+  `@ekklesia/module-ui-host`, and statically imports no module (ADR 0026/0033).
+- A module may contribute a browser renderer to a capability another module provides
+  (`manifest.contributions`, ADR 0041). The consumer discovers and mounts it through
+  `ModuleUiHostContext.contributions`, never by building a publication URL, and owns the input
+  contract entirely: the platform carries opaque JSON and defines no payload schema, slot, or
+  ordering. A contributed renderer gets its own id and that input, and nothing else.
+- Dedicated displays are module-owned renderers mounted by a separate full-viewport surface at
+  `/display/<module-id>`, never Dashboard UI with hidden chrome. Its page and descriptor require the
+  module-owned, non-public permission declared by `entrypoints.display`; artifact bytes remain
+  anonymous trusted code. Public/device identity, display inventory, and variants are deferred. A
+  display-scoped service worker caches the shell and declared artifacts only, network-first, and
+  never a descriptor, an API response, or anything else authorization-bearing (ADR 0043).
+- Dashboard groups are presentation configuration, never module structure. Do not add a parent
+  module, child module, owning module, or group-derived dependency: real module relationships are
+  the dependency contract's job alone, and grouping must never influence discovery, dependency
+  ordering, startup, or authorization (ADR 0027). A module declares its display name
+  (`manifest.name`); the Dashboard owns where it appears.
+- A surface is browser code. It may depend on browser-safe shared roles only — never
+  `@ekklesia/contracts` or `@ekklesia/module-sdk`, whose type graphs pull Node's globals into the
+  browser — and it reaches the server over HTTP.
 - Add or update tests when changing a contract or architectural rule.
 - Record major architectural changes in an ADR rather than burying them in an implementation.
 

apps/api/package.json

@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+{
+  "name": "@ekklesia/api",
+  "version": "0.1.1",
+  "private": true,
+  "type": "module",
+  "files": [
+    "dist"
+  ],
+  "exports": {
+    ".": {
+      "types": "./dist/app.d.ts",
+      "import": "./dist/app.js"
+    }
+  },
+  "scripts": {
+    "build": "tsc --project tsconfig.build.json",
+    "lint": "biome lint .",
+    "test": "vitest run",
+    "typecheck": "tsc --noEmit --project tsconfig.json"
+  },
+  "dependencies": {
+    "@ekklesia/contracts": "workspace:*",
+    "@ekklesia/core": "workspace:*",
+    "@ekklesia/shell": "workspace:*",
+    "@hono/node-server": "2.0.10",
+    "hono": "4.12.31"
+  },
+  "devDependencies": {
+    "@biomejs/biome": "2.5.3",
+    "@ekklesia/module-ui-host": "workspace:*",
+    "@ekklesia/module-ui-sdk": "workspace:*",
+    "@ekklesia/typescript-config": "workspace:*",
+    "@types/node": "24.13.3",
+    "@types/pg": "8.20.0",
+    "@types/smtp-server": "3.5.13",
+    "better-auth": "1.6.23",
+    "happy-dom": "20.0.11",
+    "pg": "8.22.0",
+    "smtp-server": "3.19.3",
+    "typescript": "7.0.2",
+    "vitest": "4.1.10"
+  },
+  "ekklesia": {
+    "layer": "app"
+  }
+}

apps/api/src/app.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,507 @@
+import {
+  isAuthenticatedPrincipal,
+  type ModuleRuntimeServices,
+  type ModuleSecretSource,
+  type RegisteredModuleHttpRoute,
+} from "@ekklesia/contracts";
+import type {
+  AuthorizationEvaluator,
+  AuthorizationStore,
+  PermissionRegistry,
+} from "@ekklesia/core/authorization";
+import type { DashboardStore } from "@ekklesia/core/dashboard";
+import type { DeviceStore } from "@ekklesia/core/devices";
+import { type EkklesiaIdentityRuntime, IdentityRuntimeError } from "@ekklesia/core/identity";
+import type {
+  DiscoveredModule,
+  ModuleConfigurationLookup,
+  ModuleConfigurationSettings,
+  ModuleConfigurationStore,
+  ModuleLifecycleSnapshot,
+  ModuleLifecycleStore,
+  ModuleRealtimeRegistry,
+  ModuleStorageLookup,
+  ModuleUiPublicationRegistry,
+} from "@ekklesia/core/modules";
+import type { Context, MiddlewareHandler } from "hono";
+import { Hono } from "hono";
+import { cors } from "hono/cors";
+import { AUTH_REQUEST_MAX_BODY_BYTES, platformBodyLimit } from "./body-limits.js";
+import type { DashboardHostAssets } from "./dashboard-host-assets.js";
+import { createDashboardHostRoutes } from "./dashboard-host-routes.js";
+import { createDashboardRoutes } from "./dashboard-routes.js";
+import { createDeviceRoutes } from "./device-routes.js";
+import type { DisplayHostAssets } from "./display-host-assets.js";
+import { createGrantsRoutes } from "./grants-routes.js";
+import { type ApiHealthOptions, createHealthRoutes } from "./health-routes.js";
+import { createModuleConfigurationRoutes } from "./module-configuration-routes.js";
+import { mountModuleDisplayRoutes } from "./module-display-routes.js";
+import { canonicalizeVaryHeader, mountModuleHttpRoutes } from "./module-http-routes.js";
+import { createModuleLifecycleRoutes } from "./module-lifecycle-routes.js";
+import { mountModuleRealtimeRoutes } from "./module-realtime-routes.js";
+import { createModuleUiInventoryRoutes } from "./module-ui-inventory.js";
+import { createModuleUiRoutes } from "./module-ui-routes.js";
+
+export interface CreateApiAppAuthorizationOptions {
+  readonly evaluator: AuthorizationEvaluator;
+  /** The complete platform permission registry (Core's own declarations plus every installed
+   * module's) — always the caller-composed registry `startApi` produces via
+   * `prepareStartupModuleInventory`, never a Core-only fallback constructed here. */
+  readonly registry: PermissionRegistry;
+  readonly store: AuthorizationStore;
+}
+
+export interface CreateApiAppOptions {
+  readonly authorization: CreateApiAppAuthorizationOptions;
+  /** The started module runtime's published, immutable route snapshot — always the caller-started
+   * runtime's exact `routes` (`startDiscoveredModuleRuntime`, `apps/api/src/server.ts`), mounted in
+   * publication order under `/api/v1/modules/<module-id>`. Required rather than defaulted so a
+   * caller not exercising modules must say so explicitly (an empty frozen array), never rely on an
+   * implicit fallback. */
+  readonly moduleRoutes: readonly RegisteredModuleHttpRoute[];
+  /** The started runtime's immutable module-owned realtime registry. Required explicitly even when
+   * empty, for the same reason as module routes: application composition never guesses what ran. */
+  readonly moduleRealtime: ModuleRealtimeRegistry;
+  /** The same frozen services object the caller's started module runtime already passed to every
+   * module's `start`/`stop` hooks (`apps/api/src/server.ts`) — reference-identical, never a fresh
+   * object built here, so a module's HTTP handlers and lifecycle hooks share exactly one
+   * `ModuleDatabase` for the lifetime of this API runtime. */
+  readonly moduleServices: ModuleRuntimeServices;
+  /** The platform's module UI publication policy — always the one Core builds from the exact
+   * discovered inventory this runtime started (`createModuleUiPublicationRegistry`,
+   * `apps/api/src/server.ts`). Required rather than defaulted, for the same reason `moduleRoutes`
+   * is: a caller that publishes no module UI must say so explicitly with an empty registry, never
+   * fall through to an implicit one. See `./module-ui-routes.js`. */
+  readonly moduleUi: ModuleUiPublicationRegistry;
+  /**
+   * Managed display devices. Optional so every existing composition — and every test that has no
+   * interest in devices — builds unchanged; when it is absent no pairing route is mounted, no
+   * device cookie is ever read, and a device principal simply cannot come into being.
+   */
+  readonly devices?: {
+    readonly store: DeviceStore;
+    /** Whether the deployment is reached over https, so the device cookies can assert `Secure`
+     * without becoming unusable on a plaintext development origin. */
+    readonly secureCookies: boolean;
+  };
+  /** Surface-owned display host assets, read once by production startup. Optional only when the
+   * eligible publication registry contains no display entrypoint; route composition rejects an
+   * inconsistent display-bearing registry synchronously. */
+  readonly displayHostAssets?: DisplayHostAssets;
+  /**
+   * The platform's operational module lifecycle: the store holding which modules are enabled, and the
+   * boot snapshot describing what this process actually discovered, resolved, and started (ADR 0028).
+   * Required rather than defaulted, like every other module option here — a caller exercising no
+   * modules says so with an empty snapshot, never falls through to an implicit one.
+   *
+   * The snapshot must come from the same boot as `moduleRoutes` and `moduleUi`; that is what makes
+   * "running" an observation of this process rather than a prediction. See
+   * `./module-lifecycle-routes.js`.
+   */
+  readonly moduleLifecycle: {
+    readonly snapshot: ModuleLifecycleSnapshot;
+    readonly store: ModuleLifecycleStore;
+  };
+  /**
+   * The platform's module configuration resource (ADR 0029): the discovered inventory whose
+   * manifests declare what may be configured, the settings this process resolved at boot (used only
+   * to compute `restartRequired`), the deployment's secret source, and the store.
+   *
+   * Required rather than defaulted, like every other module option here. `secrets` is explicit for
+   * the same reason: a caller that supplies no module secrets says so, and a module requiring one is
+   * then reported `secret_missing` rather than silently starting without it.
+   */
+  readonly moduleConfiguration: {
+    readonly discoveredModules: readonly DiscoveredModule[];
+    readonly bootSettings: ModuleConfigurationSettings;
+    readonly secrets: ModuleSecretSource;
+    readonly store: ModuleConfigurationStore;
+    /** The per-module frozen snapshots the started runtime is actually using — the identical map
+     * `startDiscoveredModuleRuntime` received, so a module's HTTP handler and its lifecycle hooks
+     * read the same object rather than two independently resolved values. */
+    readonly snapshots: ModuleConfigurationLookup;
+  };
+  /**
+   * The platform's module object storage (ADR 0030): the per-module scoped facades the runtime
+   * started with, and whether a host provider is configured at all.
+   *
+   * Required rather than defaulted, like every other module option here — a caller exercising no
+   * storage says so with an empty map and `providerConfigured: false`, never falls through to an
+   * implicit one. Nothing here carries an endpoint, a region, or a credential: those never leave
+   * Core's provider.
+   */
+  readonly moduleStorage: {
+    readonly snapshots: ModuleStorageLookup;
+    readonly providerConfigured: boolean;
+  };
+  /** Core's persistence for how this Dashboard presents installed modules (ADR 0027). Required
+   * rather than defaulted, like every other module option here: a caller that exercises no
+   * Dashboard says so with an explicit store, never falls through to an implicit one. Grouping is
+   * presentation only — nothing reachable through this store influences discovery, dependency
+   * ordering, module startup, or any authorization decision. */
+  readonly dashboard: DashboardStore;
+  /**
+   * The built Dashboard's two files, read once by production startup (ADR 0044). Required rather
+   * than optional, unlike `displayHostAssets`: every installation has a Dashboard, and a missing
+   * shell build fails startup instead of leaving this origin answering `/` with a 404. See
+   * `./dashboard-host-routes.js`.
+   */
+  readonly dashboardHostAssets: DashboardHostAssets;
+  /**
+   * The readiness inputs behind the unauthenticated health routes (ADR 0044). Required rather than
+   * defaulted, like every other dependency here: a composition that cannot reach a database says so
+   * with a check that rejects, never falls through to an implicitly healthy one. `checkDatabase` is
+   * the bare query; the routes themselves bound and serialize it. See `./health-routes.js`.
+   */
+  readonly health: ApiHealthOptions;
+  readonly runtime: EkklesiaIdentityRuntime;
+  /** Exact allowed browser origins. Never a wildcard; combined with `credentials: true`, only an
+   * exact, reflected match is ever returned in `Access-Control-Allow-Origin`. Also the trusted set
+   * `requireTrustedOrigin` checks for grant- and module-route-mutation routes — there is no second,
+   * competing origin configuration. */
+  readonly trustedOrigins: readonly string[];
+}
+
+function sanitizedErrorResponse(c: Context, error: unknown, status: 500 | 503) {
+  const code = error instanceof IdentityRuntimeError ? error.code : "INTERNAL_ERROR";
+  c.header("Cache-Control", "no-store");
+  return c.json({ code }, status);
+}
+
+const EMAIL_SIGN_IN_PATH = "/api/auth/sign-in/email";
+const EMAIL_SIGN_IN_SUCCESS_BODY = JSON.stringify({ ok: true });
+
+/**
+ * Better Auth publishes general-purpose session-management endpoints even when an application has
+ * no client for them. These four can return the raw bearer-equivalent session token with the
+ * pinned configuration: get/list/update return a session record; change-password returns a newly
+ * minted token when asked to revoke other sessions. Ekklesia deliberately exposes only its narrow
+ * `/api/v1/principal` projection and has no native session/password-management browser UI, so the
+ * supported method/path pairs are closed at the outer HTTP boundary before Better Auth executes.
+ */
+const TOKEN_BEARING_AUTH_ENDPOINT_METHODS: Readonly<Record<string, readonly string[]>> =
+  Object.freeze({
+    "/api/auth/change-password": Object.freeze(["POST"]),
+    "/api/auth/get-session": Object.freeze(["GET", "POST"]),
+    "/api/auth/list-sessions": Object.freeze(["GET"]),
+    "/api/auth/update-session": Object.freeze(["POST"]),
+  });
+
+function decodedRequestPathname(request: Request): string | undefined {
+  const encodedPathname = new URL(request.url).pathname;
+  try {
+    // URL.pathname intentionally preserves percent escapes. Decode exactly once before comparing,
+    // matching the maximum decoding a downstream HTTP router may safely perform; malformed
+    // encodings are denied rather than delegated through an ambiguous parser boundary.
+    return decodeURIComponent(encodedPathname);
+  } catch {
+    return undefined;
+  }
+}
+
+function isDisabledTokenBearingAuthRequest(request: Request): boolean {
+  const pathname = decodedRequestPathname(request);
+  if (pathname === undefined) {
+    return true;
+  }
+  // Better Auth is configured not to skip trailing slashes, but treating trailing-slash spellings
+  // as the same denied resource prevents a router-option change from opening a bypass. This does
+  // not collapse interior duplicate slashes or otherwise broaden path normalization.
+  const canonicalPath = pathname.replace(/\/+$/u, "") || "/";
+  return TOKEN_BEARING_AUTH_ENDPOINT_METHODS[canonicalPath]?.includes(request.method) ?? false;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Better Auth's native successful email sign-in response includes the newly created session token
+ * and the complete user object in its JSON body even though the browser already received the
+ * session through an HttpOnly cookie. The browser boundary must never make either value visible to
+ * application JavaScript. Keep this deliberately narrower than a general Better Auth response
+ * adapter: only the exact supported POST endpoint and a body-bearing successful response are
+ * normalized. Every sign-in failure and every other delegated auth endpoint remains Better Auth's
+ * native contract; the explicitly denied token-bearing endpoints above are never delegated.
+ */
+function browserSafeAuthResponse(request: Request, response: Response): Response {
+  const headers = new Headers(response.headers);
+  headers.set("Cache-Control", "no-store");
+
+  if (
+    request.method === "POST" &&
+    decodedRequestPathname(request) === EMAIL_SIGN_IN_PATH &&
+    response.ok &&
+    response.status !== 204 &&
+    response.status !== 205
+  ) {
+    // The upstream length describes the deliberately discarded token/user JSON. Retaining it could
+    // truncate or stall the replacement payload once an HTTP adapter serializes this response.
+    headers.delete("Content-Length");
+    headers.set("Content-Type", "application/json; charset=UTF-8");
+    return new Response(EMAIL_SIGN_IN_SUCCESS_BODY, {
+      headers,
+      status: response.status,
+      statusText: response.statusText,
+    });
+  }
+
+  return new Response(response.body, {
+    headers,
+    status: response.status,
+    statusText: response.statusText,
+  });
+}
+
+/**
+ * Hono's own `cors()` unconditionally appends its own "Vary: Origin" after every response with a
+ * dynamic-function `origin` — including one that already has its own `Vary` (module responses
+ * force `Origin`/`Cookie`; `/api/v1/principal` sets `Origin, Cookie` directly; an `OPTIONS`
+ * preflight sets its own) — so the header `cors()` itself leaves behind can still be an invalid
+ * combined "*, Origin" or contain a case-different duplicate. This wraps `middleware` and
+ * canonicalizes whatever `Vary` remains only *after* it has fully finished, using
+ * `canonicalizeVaryHeader` — the same shared parsing/dedup primitive `mergedVaryHeader` (module
+ * responses) builds on, so there is one implementation to keep in sync, not two that could diverge
+ * — but never `mergedVaryHeader` itself: this boundary wraps *every* response, `OPTIONS` preflights
+ * included, and must never inject `Origin`/`Cookie` onto a response that never had them, only
+ * de-duplicate what is already there. Two return shapes have to be handled: a normal request lets
+ * `middleware` call `next()` and mutate `c.res` in place, so the fix-up goes through `c.header()`
+ * (reassigning `c.res` directly triggers Hono's own header-preserving merge and would silently
+ * restore the uncanonicalized value); an `OPTIONS` preflight makes `cors()` return a new `Response`
+ * directly without ever touching `c.res`, so the fix-up mutates that returned response's headers
+ * instead. Neither path reads or clones the response body, so a streaming body is untouched either
+ * way. Status, body, content type, ordinary headers, authorization, trusted-origin behavior, and
+ * route ordering are all unaffected — only the final `Vary` value changes.
+ */
+function withCanonicalVary(middleware: MiddlewareHandler): MiddlewareHandler {
+  return async (c, next) => {
+    const result = await middleware(c, next);
+    if (result instanceof Response) {
+      const existingVary = result.headers.get("Vary");
+      if (existingVary !== null) {
+        result.headers.set("Vary", canonicalizeVaryHeader(existingVary));
+      }
+      return result;
+    }
+    const existingVary = c.res.headers.get("Vary");
+    if (existingVary !== null) {
+      c.header("Vary", canonicalizeVaryHeader(existingVary));
+    }
+    return result;
+  };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Pure Hono application factory: no I/O, no environment reads, no process side effects, and it
+ * never invokes a module route handler while composing routes. Suitable for unit and integration
+ * tests via `app.fetch` directly, with a fully injected identity runtime and authorization
+ * evaluator/store standing in for real Better Auth/PostgreSQL where appropriate. Synchronously
+ * throws `ModuleRouteConfigurationError` (`./module-http-routes.js`) if `moduleRoutes` and
+ * `authorization.registry` are inconsistent — a route naming a permission the registry does not
+ * register, which should never happen since both derive from the same discovered inventory, but is
+ * checked explicitly rather than silently mounting an unenforceable route.
+ */
+export function createApiApp(options: CreateApiAppOptions): Hono {
+  const { runtime } = options;
+  const allowedOrigins = new Set(options.trustedOrigins);
+
+  const app = new Hono();
+
+  const corsMiddleware = withCanonicalVary(
+    cors({
+      allowHeaders: ["Content-Type"],
+      allowMethods: ["GET", "POST", "PUT", "PATCH", "DELETE", "OPTIONS"],
+      credentials: true,
+      maxAge: 600,
+      origin: (origin) => (origin && allowedOrigins.has(origin) ? origin : undefined),
+    }),
+  );
+  app.use("/api/auth/*", corsMiddleware);
+  app.use("/api/v1/*", corsMiddleware);
+
+  // This gate intentionally precedes the body limiter and the generic Better Auth delegate. A
+  // denied POST neither reads an attacker-controlled body nor executes any identity-runtime code;
+  // it always has the platform's fixed, non-secret 404 shape. Query strings do not affect the
+  // pathname comparison, and the CORS middleware above still applies the exact trusted-origin
+  // policy to the response.
+  app.on(["POST", "GET"], "/api/auth/*", async (c, next) => {
+    if (!isDisabledTokenBearingAuthRequest(c.req.raw)) {
+      return next();
+    }
+    c.header("Cache-Control", "no-store");
+    return c.json({ code: "NOT_FOUND" }, 404);
+  });
+
+  const authBodyLimit = platformBodyLimit(AUTH_REQUEST_MAX_BODY_BYTES);
+  app.on(["POST", "GET"], "/api/auth/*", authBodyLimit, async (c) => {
+    try {
+      const response = await runtime.handleAuthRequest(c.req.raw);
+      // Every Better Auth response — including a session cookie — must never be cached by an
+      // intermediary; constructing a fresh Response (rather than relying on `c.header()`, which
+      // only affects `c.res`) guarantees this regardless of how the handler produced its result,
+      // and never reads or buffers the body.
+      return browserSafeAuthResponse(c.req.raw, response);
+    } catch (error) {
+      return sanitizedErrorResponse(c, error, 500);
+    }
+  });
+
+  app.get("/api/v1/principal", async (c) => {
+    c.header("Cache-Control", "no-store");
+    c.header("Vary", "Origin, Cookie");
+    try {
+      const principal = await runtime.resolvePrincipal(c.req.raw.headers);
+      return c.json(
+        isAuthenticatedPrincipal(principal)
+          ? { kind: "authenticated" as const, userId: principal.userId }
+          : { kind: "anonymous" as const },
+        200,
+      );
+    } catch (error) {
+      return sanitizedErrorResponse(c, error, 503);
+    }
+  });
+
+  // Unauthenticated liveness/readiness under a platform-owned sibling prefix: like every route below,
+  // it is mounted before module routes and never inside `/api/v1/modules/`, which installed modules
+  // own entirely. See `./health-routes.js`.
+  app.route("/", createHealthRoutes(options.health));
+
+  // The Dashboard page and its one script, at exact literal paths outside `/api/` (ADR 0044). They
+  // grant no authority and resolve no principal; the page asks `/api/v1/principal` itself. See
+  // `./dashboard-host-routes.js`.
+  app.route("/", createDashboardHostRoutes(options.dashboardHostAssets));
+
+  app.route(
+    "/",
+    createGrantsRoutes({
+      evaluator: options.authorization.evaluator,
+      registry: options.authorization.registry,
+      runtime,
+      store: options.authorization.store,
+      trustedOrigins: allowedOrigins,
+    }),
+  );
+
+  // A platform-owned route, mounted exactly like Core's own: it serves only artifacts the injected
+  // publication registry already approved, and it can never collide with a module's own routes,
+  // which all live under `/api/v1/modules/`. See `./module-ui-routes.js` for why it is a sibling of
+  // that prefix rather than nested inside it.
+  app.route("/", createModuleUiRoutes({ registry: options.moduleUi }));
+
+  // The browser host's bootstrap query, at the collection root of that same prefix. Unlike the
+  // artifact route above it is authenticated (`core.modules.ui.read`) and per-principal, because it
+  // is the module enumeration ADR 0025 deliberately withheld from the anonymous artifact route.
+  app.route(
+    "/",
+    createModuleUiInventoryRoutes({
+      evaluator: options.authorization.evaluator,
+      moduleUi: options.moduleUi,
+      registry: options.authorization.registry,
+      runtime,
+    }),
+  );
+
+  // A separate, chrome-free browser host. Exact page and descriptor routes are derived from the
+  // same eligible/running publication registry as artifact bytes; a display-only module never
+  // enters Dashboard navigation, and no request value can select a file or permission.
+  mountModuleDisplayRoutes(app, {
+    evaluator: options.authorization.evaluator,
+    moduleUi: options.moduleUi,
+    registry: options.authorization.registry,
+    runtime,
+    ...(options.displayHostAssets ? { assets: options.displayHostAssets } : {}),
+  });
+
+  if (options.devices) {
+    // Host-owned device identity. Siblings of `/api/v1/modules/...`, reachable by no module, and
+    // mounted only when the deployment actually composed device support.
+    app.route(
+      "/",
+      createDeviceRoutes({
+        devices: options.devices.store,
+        evaluator: options.authorization.evaluator,
+        moduleUi: options.moduleUi,
+        registry: options.authorization.registry,
+        runtime,
+        secureCookies: options.devices.secureCookies,
+        trustedOrigins: allowedOrigins,
+      }),
+    );
+  }
+
+  // Layered deliberately on top of the generic inventory above rather than merged into it: the
+  // inventory stays the host-neutral "what is mountable" contract a standalone host could consume,
+  // and this adds Ekklesia's own presentation of those same modules. See `./dashboard-routes.js`.
+  app.route(
+    "/",
+    createDashboardRoutes({
+      evaluator: options.authorization.evaluator,
+      moduleUi: options.moduleUi,
+      registry: options.authorization.registry,
+      runtime,
+      store: options.dashboard,
+      trustedOrigins: allowedOrigins,
+    }),
+  );
+
+  // Mounted before module routes and, critically, under its own sibling prefix: `/api/v1/modules/`
+  // belongs entirely to installed modules, so the platform's own lifecycle resource lives beside it
+  // rather than inside it. See `./module-lifecycle-routes.js`.
+  app.route(
+    "/",
+    createModuleLifecycleRoutes({
+      evaluator: options.authorization.evaluator,
+      registry: options.authorization.registry,
+      runtime,
+      configuration: {
+        secrets: options.moduleConfiguration.secrets,
+        store: options.moduleConfiguration.store,
+      },
+      storage: { providerConfigured: options.moduleStorage.providerConfigured },
+      snapshot: options.moduleLifecycle.snapshot,
+      store: options.moduleLifecycle.store,
+      trustedOrigins: allowedOrigins,
+    }),
+  );
+
+  // Same sibling-prefix rule as the lifecycle resource above: `/api/v1/modules/` belongs entirely
+  // to installed modules. See `./module-configuration-routes.js`.
+  app.route(
+    "/",
+    createModuleConfigurationRoutes({
+      bootSettings: options.moduleConfiguration.bootSettings,
+      discoveredModules: options.moduleConfiguration.discoveredModules,
+      evaluator: options.authorization.evaluator,
+      registry: options.authorization.registry,
+      runtime,
+      secrets: options.moduleConfiguration.secrets,
+      store: options.moduleConfiguration.store,
+      trustedOrigins: allowedOrigins,
+    }),
+  );
+
+  // A sibling platform-owned prefix, never nested under `/api/v1/modules/` where installed modules
+  // own every path. One exact route per runtime-published channel, authorized before subscription.
+  mountModuleRealtimeRoutes(app, {
+    evaluator: options.authorization.evaluator,
+    realtime: options.moduleRealtime,
+    registry: options.authorization.registry,
+    runtime,
+  });
+
+  mountModuleHttpRoutes(app, options.moduleRoutes, {
+    configurations: options.moduleConfiguration.snapshots,
+    storages: options.moduleStorage.snapshots,
+    evaluator: options.authorization.evaluator,
+    registry: options.authorization.registry,
+    realtime: options.moduleRealtime,
+    runtime,
+    services: options.moduleServices,
+    trustedOrigins: allowedOrigins,
+  });
+
+  app.notFound((c) => {
+    c.header("Cache-Control", "no-store");
+    return c.json({ code: "NOT_FOUND" }, 404);
+  });
+  app.onError((_error, c) => sanitizedErrorResponse(c, _error, 500));
+
+  return app;
+}

apps/api/src/authorization-middleware.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
+import type { EkklesiaPrincipal, PermissionId } from "@ekklesia/contracts";
+import type { AuthorizationEvaluator, PermissionRegistry } from "@ekklesia/core/authorization";
+import type { EkklesiaIdentityRuntime } from "@ekklesia/core/identity";
+import type { Context, MiddlewareHandler, Next } from "hono";
+
+const PRINCIPAL_CONTEXT_KEY = "ekklesiaPrincipal";
+
+export interface AuthorizationMiddlewareOptions {
+  readonly evaluator: AuthorizationEvaluator;
+  readonly registry: PermissionRegistry;
+  readonly runtime: EkklesiaIdentityRuntime;
+}
+
+function sanitizedDenial(c: Context, status: 403 | 503, code: string): Response {
+  c.header("Cache-Control", "no-store");
+  return c.json({ code }, status);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Builds a Hono middleware that enforces `permissionId`, resolved exclusively from the injected,
+ * trusted, server-side `PermissionRegistry` — in production, the complete platform registry
+ * `startApi` composes from Core's own declarations plus every installed module's, never a
+ * Core-only fallback. A route never supplies its own baseline, and no request input can influence
+ * which baseline is checked. The principal is resolved exclusively
+ * through the injected identity runtime (`resolvePrincipal`), the same one `/api/v1/principal`
+ * already uses; nothing here ever trusts a client-supplied claim about identity, ownership, or
+ * grants. A permission id that is not registered fails closed (403) exactly like a denied
+ * decision — in normal operation this route only ever hard-codes an already-registered constant,
+ * but the check stays live per-request as defense in depth rather than being trusted once at
+ * composition time.
+ *
+ * On success, the resolved `EkklesiaPrincipal` — Core's own narrow `{kind, userId}` contract, not
+ * Better Auth's richer session/user object — is stored on the Hono context so the route handler
+ * can build an actor without resolving the principal a second time. This is deliberately narrower
+ * than the "no generalized session/user object in Hono context" concern ADR 0011 raised about
+ * Better Auth's own documented example: only Core's already-public-safe principal shape is ever
+ * set, never a session token, raw user row, or Better Auth type.
+ *
+ * A genuine infrastructure failure — principal resolution, evaluation, or the underlying
+ * database — is never folded into a 403; it returns a sanitized 503, mirroring
+ * `/api/v1/principal`'s existing behavior for the identical reason: a caller must never see "no
+ * permission" when the true answer is "could not be determined."
+ */
+export function requirePermission(
+  options: AuthorizationMiddlewareOptions,
+  permissionId: PermissionId,
+): MiddlewareHandler {
+  return async (c: Context, next: Next) => {
+    const declaration = options.registry.get(permissionId);
+    if (!declaration) {
+      return sanitizedDenial(c, 403, "AUTHORIZATION_DENIED");
+    }
+
+    let principal: EkklesiaPrincipal;
+    try {
+      principal = await options.runtime.resolvePrincipal(c.req.raw.headers);
+    } catch {
+      return sanitizedDenial(c, 503, "PRINCIPAL_RESOLUTION_FAILED");
+    }
+
+    let decision: { allowed: boolean };
+    try {
+      decision = await options.evaluator.authorize({
+        baseline: declaration.baseline,
+        permission: declaration.id,
+        principal,
+      });
+    } catch {
+      return sanitizedDenial(c, 503, "AUTHORIZATION_EVALUATION_FAILED");
+    }
+
+    if (!decision.allowed) {
+      return sanitizedDenial(c, 403, "AUTHORIZATION_DENIED");
+    }
+
+    c.set(PRINCIPAL_CONTEXT_KEY, principal);
+    await next();
+    return;
+  };
+}
+
+/** Reads the principal a preceding `requirePermission` middleware already resolved and verified.
+ * Throws (a route-wiring bug, not a runtime condition) if called on a route this middleware never
+ * protected. */
+export function getAuthorizedPrincipal(c: Context): EkklesiaPrincipal {
+  const principal = c.get(PRINCIPAL_CONTEXT_KEY) as EkklesiaPrincipal | undefined;
+  if (!principal) {
+    throw new Error("getAuthorizedPrincipal called outside a requirePermission-protected route.");
+  }
+  return principal;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Requires an exact trusted `Origin` header for a cookie-authenticated, state-changing route.
+ * CORS response headers alone are not CSRF protection — they only stop a browser from *reading* a
+ * cross-origin response, not from *sending* the state-changing request in the first place — so
+ * mutation routes need this explicit, server-side check in addition to (not instead of) the
+ * existing CORS policy. A missing or untrusted origin is rejected before the route (or the
+ * permission check) ever runs. Non-browser, non-cookie automation (service accounts/API tokens)
+ * is deliberately out of scope for this slice and has no way to satisfy this check yet.
+ */
+export function requireTrustedOrigin(trustedOrigins: ReadonlySet<string>): MiddlewareHandler {
+  return async (c: Context, next: Next) => {
+    const origin = c.req.header("origin");
+    if (!origin || !trustedOrigins.has(origin)) {
+      return sanitizedDenial(c, 403, "UNTRUSTED_ORIGIN");
+    }
+    await next();
+    return;
+  };
+}

apps/api/src/body-limits.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,218 @@
+import {
+  MODULE_ROUTE_ABSOLUTE_MAX_BODY_BYTES,
+  MODULE_ROUTE_MAX_BODY_BYTES_CEILING,
+  MODULE_ROUTE_STREAMED_MAX_BODY_BYTES_CEILING,
+  type ModuleRouteBodyMode,
+} from "@ekklesia/contracts";
+import type { Context, MiddlewareHandler } from "hono";
+
+/**
+ * The platform's one request-body policy, centralized here rather than scattered as magic numbers
+ * across every route file. Every limit below is deliberately small relative to the actual payload
+ * shapes it guards:
+ *
+ * - `AUTH_REQUEST_MAX_BODY_BYTES` (8 KiB): every enabled Better Auth route
+ *   (`/api/auth/sign-up/email`, `/sign-in/email`, `/sign-out`, ...) accepts only an email, a
+ *   password (bounded to 128 characters — `core/src/identity/runtime.ts`), and an optional short
+ *   display name; the pinned release adds no other enabled provider or field (ADR 0011). A real
+ *   payload is well under 200 bytes; 8 KiB leaves generous headroom for a verbose email address or
+ *   name while remaining two orders of magnitude below the module ceiling.
+ * - `CORE_MUTATION_MAX_BODY_BYTES` (16 KiB): the one Core JSON mutation body, explicit-grant
+ *   creation (`POST /api/v1/grants`), accepts `subjectUserId` (<=128 chars), `permission` (a bounded
+ *   identifier), an optional `scope` (<=256 chars), and an optional ISO `expiresAt` string — every
+ *   field individually bounded well under 1 KiB combined; 16 KiB leaves headroom without inviting
+ *   abuse.
+ * - `MODULE_ROUTE_MAX_BODY_BYTES_CEILING` (1 MiB, re-exported from `@ekklesia/contracts` — the same
+ *   constant a module's own **buffered** route declaration is validated against at registration) is
+ *   the ceiling for every body the platform materializes before a handler runs. It has not moved.
+ * - `MODULE_ROUTE_STREAMED_MAX_BODY_BYTES_CEILING` (32 MiB) is what a route may declare when it
+ *   explicitly opts into `bodyMode: "streamed"` (ADR 0042), and doubles as
+ *   `MODULE_ROUTE_ABSOLUTE_MAX_BODY_BYTES`: no route, in any mode, may declare or accept a larger
+ *   single request body, and no unbounded option exists anywhere in the contract.
+ */
+export const AUTH_REQUEST_MAX_BODY_BYTES = 8 * 1024;
+export const CORE_MUTATION_MAX_BODY_BYTES = 16 * 1024;
+export {
+  MODULE_ROUTE_ABSOLUTE_MAX_BODY_BYTES,
+  MODULE_ROUTE_MAX_BODY_BYTES_CEILING,
+  MODULE_ROUTE_STREAMED_MAX_BODY_BYTES_CEILING,
+};
+
+/** The one stable, sanitized public contract for every request-body-size rejection across the
+ * platform — auth, Core, and module routes alike. Never leaks the configured limit, the offending
+ * size, a declared Content-Length, or any body content. */
+export function requestBodyTooLargeResponse(c: Context): Response {
+  c.header("Cache-Control", "no-store");
+  return c.json({ code: "REQUEST_BODY_TOO_LARGE" }, 413);
+}
+
+/**
+ * A declared `Content-Length`, or `undefined` when there is not exactly one well-formed one.
+ *
+ * A malformed or contradictory value is treated as *absent* rather than as a rejection, deliberately:
+ * the byte counting below bounds the request either way, so refusing here could only ever turn a
+ * legitimate request away without making an illegitimate one any less bounded. Node's own HTTP
+ * parser rejects genuinely malformed framing before this code sees the request at all.
+ */
+function declaredContentLength(request: Request): number | undefined {
+  const header = request.headers.get("content-length");
+  if (header === null || !/^\d{1,15}$/u.test(header.trim())) {
+    return undefined;
+  }
+  return Number.parseInt(header.trim(), 10);
+}
+
+/** Releases a body nothing consumed, so an abandoned or oversized upload does not hold a socket
+ * open waiting to be read. Safe on a stream that is locked, already drained, or already errored. */
+function releaseUnreadBody(request: Request): void {
+  const body = request.body;
+  if (!body || body.locked) {
+    return;
+  }
+  void body.cancel().catch(() => undefined);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Reads at most `maxSize` bytes, stopping and cancelling the source the moment the running total
+ * exceeds it. Never allocates beyond what it has already accepted, so an over-limit body costs one
+ * chunk past the limit rather than the whole upload.
+ */
+async function readBounded(
+  body: ReadableStream<Uint8Array>,
+  maxSize: number,
+): Promise<readonly Uint8Array[] | "over-limit"> {
+  const reader = body.getReader();
+  const chunks: Uint8Array[] = [];
+  let size = 0;
+  try {
+    for (;;) {
+      const { done, value } = await reader.read();
+      if (done) {
+        return chunks;
+      }
+      size += value.byteLength;
+      if (size > maxSize) {
+        await reader.cancel().catch(() => undefined);
+        return "over-limit";
+      }
+      chunks.push(value);
+    }
+  } finally {
+    reader.releaseLock();
+  }
+}
+
+function streamOf(chunks: readonly Uint8Array[]): ReadableStream<Uint8Array> {
+  return new ReadableStream<Uint8Array>({
+    start(controller) {
+      for (const chunk of chunks) {
+        controller.enqueue(chunk);
+      }
+      controller.close();
+    },
+  });
+}
+
+/**
+ * The platform's one request-body limiter, for every route in the application.
+ *
+ * ## Both modes reject a declared oversize before anything else happens
+ *
+ * A `Content-Length` above the limit is refused synchronously, before authorization, before the
+ * handler, and before a single body byte is read. That is the cheap rejection an ordinary
+ * too-large upload takes.
+ *
+ * ## `buffered` — the body is materialized, bounded, before the handler runs
+ *
+ * The exact behaviour every route had before streaming existed, now with the counting done here
+ * rather than by a dependency. Bytes are counted as they arrive and the request is rejected the
+ * moment the running total passes the limit, so a lying or absent `Content-Length` is bounded by
+ * what actually arrived rather than by what was claimed. The handler then receives a request whose
+ * body is fully available and provably within its declared allowance — which is what makes
+ * `await request.json()` safe in a module handler.
+ *
+ * The platform holds at most the route's own declared allowance in memory, and a buffered route may
+ * declare at most 1 MiB. That bound is the whole reason the buffered ceiling has not moved.
+ *
+ * ## `streamed` — the body is counted as the handler consumes it, and never materialized
+ *
+ * Nothing is buffered. The body is wrapped in a counting transform and handed to the handler, which
+ * reads it as a stream; the moment the running total passes the limit the stream errors, the source
+ * is cancelled, and the response is replaced with the same sanitized `413` — even if the handler
+ * caught the error and tried to answer anyway. That last part matters: a limit a handler can swallow
+ * is not a limit.
+ *
+ * The consequence a module author must know is that in this mode a `413` can arrive **after** the
+ * handler has started, so a handler that persists as it reads has to be prepared for a partially
+ * consumed upload. Writing to a temporary key and committing only after the read completes is the
+ * pattern; the platform cannot do it for you, because only the module knows what a partial write
+ * means to its own data.
+ *
+ * ## Ordering
+ *
+ * This runs before permission evaluation for both modes, so a request that is *declared* too large
+ * never reaches authorization work. In `streamed` mode no body byte is read until the handler reads
+ * it, and the handler only runs after authorization succeeds — so an unauthorized caller can never
+ * push a large upload through the platform at all.
+ *
+ * ## Timeouts
+ *
+ * Body reading is bounded in time by the server's own `headersTimeout`/`requestTimeout`
+ * (`apps/api/src/server.ts`), not by anything here. A slow upload is a slow *request*, and the
+ * platform already has one answer for that rather than a second per-route one.
+ */
+export function platformBodyLimit(
+  maxSize: number,
+  mode: ModuleRouteBodyMode = "buffered",
+): MiddlewareHandler {
+  return async function enforceBodyLimit(c, next) {
+    const request = c.req.raw;
+    const declared = declaredContentLength(request);
+    if (declared !== undefined && declared > maxSize) {
+      return requestBodyTooLargeResponse(c);
+    }
+    if (!request.body) {
+      return next();
+    }
+
+    if (mode === "buffered") {
+      const chunks = await readBounded(request.body, maxSize);
+      if (chunks === "over-limit") {
+        return requestBodyTooLargeResponse(c);
+      }
+      c.req.raw = new Request(request, {
+        body: streamOf(chunks),
+        // Required by undici whenever a `Request` is constructed from a stream.
+        duplex: "half",
+      } as RequestInit);
+      return next();
+    }
+
+    let overLimit = false;
+    let total = 0;
+    const counted = request.body.pipeThrough(
+      new TransformStream<Uint8Array, Uint8Array>({
+        transform(chunk, controller) {
+          total += chunk.byteLength;
+          if (total > maxSize) {
+            overLimit = true;
+            // Erroring the transform propagates back to the source and cancels it, so the socket is
+            // released rather than left draining an upload nobody will read.
+            controller.error(new Error("REQUEST_BODY_TOO_LARGE"));
+            return;
+          }
+          controller.enqueue(chunk);
+        },
+      }),
+    );
+    c.req.raw = new Request(request, { body: counted, duplex: "half" } as RequestInit);
+
+    await next();
+
+    if (overLimit) {
+      c.res = requestBodyTooLargeResponse(c);
+    }
+    releaseUnreadBody(c.req.raw);
+    return;
+  };
+}

apps/api/src/client-address.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+import { type ClientAddressResolver, TRUSTED_CLIENT_ADDRESS_HEADER } from "@ekklesia/core/identity";
+import type { Http2Bindings, HttpBindings } from "@hono/node-server";
+
+type NodeServerBindings = HttpBindings | Http2Bindings;
+
+export {
+  type ClientAddressConfig,
+  ClientAddressConfigError,
+  type ClientAddressConfigErrorCode,
+  type ClientAddressConfigInput,
+  type ClientAddressFailureReason,
+  type ClientAddressMode,
+  type ClientAddressResolution,
+  type ClientAddressResolver,
+  createClientAddressConfig,
+  createClientAddressResolver,
+  type DirectClientAddressConfig,
+  findInvalidTrustedProxies,
+  normalizeClientAddress,
+  type TrustedProxyClientAddressConfig,
+} from "@ekklesia/core/identity";
+
+/** A fixed, generic diagnostic — never the peer address, forwarded header content, request path, or
+ * any other request detail — logged only when client-address resolution fails closed. */
+export const CLIENT_ADDRESS_UNRESOLVED_LOG_MESSAGE =
+  "[client-address] A request's caller address could not be resolved safely; rejecting with 503.";
+
+function sanitizedClientAddressUnresolvedResponse(): Response {
+  return new Response(JSON.stringify({ code: "CLIENT_ADDRESS_UNRESOLVED" }), {
+    headers: { "cache-control": "no-store", "content-type": "application/json" },
+    status: 503,
+  });
+}
+
+/**
+ * Wraps a `@hono/node-server` fetch callback at the exact Node/API transport boundary — the one
+ * place in this repository below `apps/api` that reads the raw Node `IncomingMessage` — with
+ * Core's framework-agnostic client-address resolution policy (`@ekklesia/core/identity`). Resolves
+ * the caller's trusted address from the real socket peer (`env.incoming.socket.remoteAddress`)
+ * before the wrapped callback — and therefore Better Auth's own rate limiter — ever sees the
+ * request, then overwrites (never merely appends) any externally supplied copy of
+ * `TRUSTED_CLIENT_ADDRESS_HEADER` with that resolved value. A caller can therefore never choose its
+ * own resolved address, whether by spoofing a forwarded header or by sending the internal header
+ * directly. Resolution failure never reaches the wrapped callback at all — no Better Auth logic, no
+ * Core mutation, and no module handler ever runs for a request whose caller address could not be
+ * resolved safely.
+ */
+export function wrapFetchWithClientAddress(
+  fetchCallback: (request: Request, env: NodeServerBindings) => Response | Promise<Response>,
+  resolver: ClientAddressResolver,
+): (request: Request, env: NodeServerBindings) => Promise<Response> {
+  return async (request: Request, env: NodeServerBindings): Promise<Response> => {
+    const resolution = resolver.resolve({
+      headers: request.headers,
+      peerAddress: env.incoming.socket.remoteAddress,
+    });
+    if (!resolution.ok) {
+      console.error(CLIENT_ADDRESS_UNRESOLVED_LOG_MESSAGE);
+      return sanitizedClientAddressUnresolvedResponse();
+    }
+    const headers = new Headers(request.headers);
+    headers.set(TRUSTED_CLIENT_ADDRESS_HEADER, resolution.address);
+    const sanitizedRequest = new Request(request, { headers });
+    return fetchCallback(sanitizedRequest, env);
+  };
+}

apps/api/src/conditional-request.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+/**
+ * RFC 9110 weak comparison for a GET/HEAD `If-None-Match` precondition, shared by the host-owned
+ * asset routes that answer `304` against a strong validator they computed from their own bytes.
+ */
+export function etagMatches(headerValue: string | undefined, etag: string): boolean {
+  if (headerValue === undefined) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  if (headerValue.trim() === "*") {
+    return true;
+  }
+  return headerValue.split(",").some((candidate) => {
+    const value = candidate.trim();
+    return (value.startsWith("W/") ? value.slice(2) : value) === etag;
+  });
+}

apps/api/src/config.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,218 @@
+import {
+  assertProductionDatabaseTransport,
+  createDatabaseTransportPolicy,
+  type DatabaseTransportPolicy,
+  type DatabaseTransportPolicyInput,
+} from "@ekklesia/core/database";
+import {
+  type CreateIdentityConfigOptions,
+  createIdentityConfig,
+  type IdentityConfig,
+  type IdentityConfigInput,
+} from "@ekklesia/core/identity";
+import {
+  createMailProviderConfig,
+  type MailProviderConfig,
+  type MailProviderConfigInput,
+} from "@ekklesia/core/mail";
+import {
+  createStorageProviderConfig,
+  type StorageProviderConfig,
+  type StorageProviderConfigInput,
+} from "@ekklesia/core/storage";
+import {
+  type ClientAddressConfig,
+  type ClientAddressConfigInput,
+  createClientAddressConfig,
+} from "./client-address.js";
+
+export type ApiConfigErrorCode =
+  | "DATABASE_URL_INVALID"
+  | "DATABASE_URL_MISSING"
+  | "HOST_INVALID"
+  | "PORT_INVALID";
+
+/** Never carries the offending database URL, host, port, or any other caller-supplied value. */
+export class ApiConfigError extends Error {
+  readonly code: ApiConfigErrorCode;
+
+  constructor(code: ApiConfigErrorCode) {
+    super(apiConfigErrorMessages[code]);
+    this.name = "ApiConfigError";
+    this.code = code;
+    this.stack = `${this.name}: ${this.message}`;
+    Object.freeze(this);
+  }
+}
+
+const apiConfigErrorMessages: Readonly<Record<ApiConfigErrorCode, string>> = Object.freeze({
+  DATABASE_URL_INVALID:
+    "The API database URL must be an absolute postgres:// or postgresql:// URL.",
+  DATABASE_URL_MISSING: "The API database URL is required.",
+  HOST_INVALID: "The API listen address must be a non-empty host.",
+  PORT_INVALID:
+    "The API listen port must be an integer between 0 and 65535 (0 requests an OS-assigned port).",
+});
+
+const defaultHost = "127.0.0.1";
+const defaultPort = 3000;
+
+export interface ApiRuntimeConfig {
+  readonly clientAddress: ClientAddressConfig;
+  readonly databaseUrl: string;
+  /** The one validated PostgreSQL transport policy this runtime's single pool uses. */
+  readonly databaseTransport: DatabaseTransportPolicy;
+  readonly host: string;
+  readonly identity: IdentityConfig;
+  readonly port: number;
+  /**
+   * The validated host object-storage provider, or `undefined` when this installation has none
+   * (ADR 0030).
+   *
+   * `undefined` is a complete, valid deployment: modules that declare no logical buckets are
+   * unaffected, and a module that does declare one is reported blocked rather than crashing
+   * anything. These values reach Core's provider and nowhere else — no module, module UI, browser
+   * bundle, diagnostic, or API response ever sees the endpoint or the credentials.
+   */
+  readonly storage: StorageProviderConfig | undefined;
+  /**
+   * The validated host outbound-email provider, or `undefined` when this installation has none
+   * (ADR 0037).
+   *
+   * `undefined` is a valid deployment: the platform starts, every existing feature works, and the
+   * initial platform owner — created already verified by an operator command — can still sign in
+   * (ADR 0038). What it cannot do is verify a new account or deliver a password reset; each attempt
+   * reports a sanitized `MAIL_NOT_CONFIGURED` out of band rather than changing any HTTP response.
+   * These values reach Core's provider and nowhere else — no module, browser bundle, diagnostic, or
+   * API response ever sees the host or the password.
+   */
+  readonly mail: MailProviderConfig | undefined;
+}
+
+export interface ApiRuntimeConfigInput {
+  /** Optional. Defaults to direct mode (trusts only the actual immediate socket peer) — no proxy
+   * trust unless explicitly configured. See `./client-address.js`. */
+  readonly clientAddress?: ClientAddressConfigInput | undefined;
+  readonly databaseUrl?: unknown;
+  /** Optional. Defaults to certificate-verified TLS in production and plaintext in development;
+   * production can never select plaintext. See `@ekklesia/core/database`'s transport policy. */
+  readonly databaseTransport?: DatabaseTransportPolicyInput;
+  readonly host?: unknown;
+  readonly identity: IdentityConfigInput;
+  readonly port?: unknown;
+  /** Optional. Omitted, or with no endpoint, means this installation has no object storage. */
+  readonly storage?: StorageProviderConfigInput;
+  /** Optional. Omitted, or with no host, means this installation sends no outbound email. */
+  readonly mail?: MailProviderConfigInput;
+}
+
+export interface CreateApiRuntimeConfigOptions {
+  readonly environment?: CreateIdentityConfigOptions["environment"];
+}
+
+function validateDatabaseUrl(databaseUrl: unknown): string {
+  if (typeof databaseUrl !== "string" || databaseUrl.trim().length === 0) {
+    throw new ApiConfigError("DATABASE_URL_MISSING");
+  }
+  let protocol: string;
+  try {
+    protocol = new URL(databaseUrl).protocol;
+  } catch {
+    throw new ApiConfigError("DATABASE_URL_INVALID");
+  }
+  if (protocol !== "postgres:" && protocol !== "postgresql:") {
+    throw new ApiConfigError("DATABASE_URL_INVALID");
+  }
+  return databaseUrl;
+}
+
+function validateHost(host: unknown): string {
+  if (host === undefined) {
+    return defaultHost;
+  }
+  if (typeof host !== "string" || host.trim().length === 0) {
+    throw new ApiConfigError("HOST_INVALID");
+  }
+  return host;
+}
+
+function validatePort(port: unknown): number {
+  if (port === undefined) {
+    return defaultPort;
+  }
+  const numericPort = typeof port === "string" ? Number(port) : port;
+  if (
+    typeof numericPort !== "number" ||
+    !Number.isInteger(numericPort) ||
+    numericPort < 0 ||
+    numericPort > 65_535
+  ) {
+    throw new ApiConfigError("PORT_INVALID");
+  }
+  return numericPort;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Validates explicit, typed API runtime configuration, delegating identity fields to Core's
+ * existing `createIdentityConfig` rather than defining a competing identity configuration
+ * contract. Performs no environment reads, network calls, or database access.
+ */
+export function createApiRuntimeConfig(
+  input: ApiRuntimeConfigInput,
+  options: CreateApiRuntimeConfigOptions = {},
+): ApiRuntimeConfig {
+  const databaseUrl = validateDatabaseUrl(input.databaseUrl);
+  const host = validateHost(input.host);
+  const port = validatePort(input.port);
+  const identity = createIdentityConfig(
+    input.identity,
+    options.environment === undefined ? {} : { environment: options.environment },
+  );
+  const clientAddress = createClientAddressConfig(input.clientAddress);
+  const environment = options.environment ?? "production";
+  const databaseTransport = createDatabaseTransportPolicy(input.databaseTransport, {
+    environment,
+  });
+  // Fails here — before `startApi` constructs a pool, Better Auth, the module runtime, or a
+  // listener — if a production deployment would connect without certificate-verified TLS, or if
+  // the URL carries TLS parameters that could override the policy.
+  assertProductionDatabaseTransport(databaseUrl, databaseTransport, environment);
+
+  // Validated in the same pass as every other runtime value, before `startApi` constructs a pool,
+  // a provider client, or a listener — so a malformed endpoint or a half-supplied credential pair
+  // fails startup with a sanitized code rather than surfacing later as a confusing storage error.
+  const storage = createStorageProviderConfig(input.storage, { environment });
+
+  // Validated in the same pass as everything else, so a malformed port, a half-supplied credential
+  // pair, or a production deployment that asked for plaintext SMTP fails startup with a sanitized
+  // code — rather than surfacing later as a confusing failure the first time something tries to
+  // send a password-reset email.
+  const mail = createMailProviderConfig(input.mail, { environment });
+
+  return Object.freeze({
+    clientAddress,
+    databaseTransport,
+    databaseUrl,
+    host,
+    identity,
+    mail,
+    port,
+    storage,
+  });
+}
+
+/**
+ * The exact browser origins the API trusts: CORS on `/api/auth/*` and `/api/v1/*`, and every
+ * mutation route's origin check (ADR 0045).
+ *
+ * The configured trusted origins plus the identity base URL's own origin, which is where the API
+ * lives. Better Auth already trusts its base URL implicitly; this makes the API's own checks agree,
+ * so a page the API itself serves (the display host, and the Dashboard in the same-origin topology)
+ * passes without an operator listing the API's origin. Order is preserved and duplicates removed;
+ * every entry is already a canonical origin.
+ */
+export function apiTrustedOrigins(
+  identity: Pick<IdentityConfig, "baseUrl" | "trustedOrigins">,
+): readonly string[] {
+  return Object.freeze([...new Set([...identity.trustedOrigins, identity.baseUrl])]);
+}

apps/api/src/dashboard-host-assets.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+import { createHash } from "node:crypto";
+import { readFile } from "node:fs/promises";
+import { dashboardHostAssetUrls } from "@ekklesia/shell/dashboard-assets";
+
+/**
+ * The two immutable, platform-owned files that make up the built Ekklesia Dashboard (ADR 0044).
+ *
+ * Exactly the model `./display-host-assets.js` uses: read once, before the HTTP listener is bound,
+ * from the exact URLs the surface package exports. Request input is never involved in this read, the
+ * package is never exposed as a static directory, and the source map beside the script is never
+ * read. Text rather than a mutable `Buffer` keeps the frozen snapshot a genuinely immutable value
+ * every response can reuse.
+ */
+export interface DashboardHostAssets {
+  readonly html: string;
+  readonly htmlEtag: string;
+  readonly script: string;
+  readonly scriptEtag: string;
+}
+
+/** A startup failure with a fixed, non-secret shape. The originating filesystem exception, package
+ * location, and machine path are intentionally not retained or surfaced. */
+export class DashboardHostAssetError extends Error {
+  readonly code = "DASHBOARD_HOST_ASSET_UNAVAILABLE" as const;
+
+  constructor() {
+    super("The Dashboard host browser assets are unavailable.");
+    this.name = "DashboardHostAssetError";
+    this.stack = `${this.name}: ${this.message}`;
+    Object.freeze(this);
+  }
+}
+
+function strongEtag(text: string): string {
+  return `"${createHash("sha256").update(text).digest("base64url")}"`;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Captures one immutable, internally consistent Dashboard asset snapshot.
+ *
+ * Each strong validator is derived from the exact text in the same snapshot, so bytes from one build
+ * can never be paired with an ETag from another. Empty output is a failed shell build rather than a
+ * valid page that can never render anything.
+ */
+export function createDashboardHostAssets(html: string, script: string): DashboardHostAssets {
+  if (html.trim().length === 0 || script.trim().length === 0) {
+    throw new DashboardHostAssetError();
+  }
+  return Object.freeze({
+    html,
+    htmlEtag: strongEtag(html),
+    script,
+    scriptEtag: strongEtag(script),
+  });
+}
+
+/**
+ * The exact element the built Dashboard page carries for its API origin (ADR 0045), empty. The shell
+ * reads the filled-in value at run time; empty means the page's own origin.
+ */
+export const DASHBOARD_API_ORIGIN_PLACEHOLDER = '<meta content="" name="ekklesia-api-origin" />';
+
+function isCanonicalHttpOrigin(value: string): boolean {
+  try {
+    const url = new URL(value);
+    return (url.protocol === "https:" || url.protocol === "http:") && url.origin === value;
+  } catch {
+    return false;
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Writes the API's own origin into the Dashboard page, once, before the page's `ETag` is computed.
+ *
+ * The origin is the identity base URL's, which is where `/api` lives in either topology: the page's
+ * own origin when the Dashboard and the API share one, the API hostname when they are split. The
+ * built page must carry exactly one empty placeholder; anything else is a shell build this API does
+ * not understand, and startup fails rather than serving a page that might send credentials somewhere
+ * unintended. The value is escaped for an attribute even though a canonical origin cannot contain
+ * any character that needs it.
+ */
+export function renderDashboardPage(html: string, apiOrigin: string): string {
+  const parts = html.split(DASHBOARD_API_ORIGIN_PLACEHOLDER);
+  if (parts.length !== 2 || !isCanonicalHttpOrigin(apiOrigin)) {
+    throw new DashboardHostAssetError();
+  }
+  const escaped = apiOrigin
+    .replaceAll("&", "&amp;")
+    .replaceAll('"', "&quot;")
+    .replaceAll("<", "&lt;")
+    .replaceAll(">", "&gt;");
+  return parts.join(`<meta content="${escaped}" name="ekklesia-api-origin" />`);
+}
+
+/** Loads only the two surface-declared files, and renders the API origin into the page. A missing,
+ * unreadable, or incompatible build fails startup rather than leaving an API whose own origin answers
+ * `/` with a 404 or a page that cannot find its API. */
+export async function loadDashboardHostAssets(apiOrigin: string): Promise<DashboardHostAssets> {
+  try {
+    // Sequential deliberately, as for the display host: diagnostics stay deterministic and no
+    // rejected sibling read is left running after this function has already failed.
+    const html = await readFile(new URL(dashboardHostAssetUrls.html), "utf8");
+    const script = await readFile(new URL(dashboardHostAssetUrls.script), "utf8");
+    return createDashboardHostAssets(renderDashboardPage(html, apiOrigin), script);
+  } catch {
+    throw new DashboardHostAssetError();
+  }
+}

apps/api/src/dashboard-host-routes.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
+import { Hono } from "hono";
+import { etagMatches } from "./conditional-request.js";
+import { createDashboardHostAssets, type DashboardHostAssets } from "./dashboard-host-assets.js";
+
+/**
+ * The Dashboard's two host-owned routes (ADR 0044). Neither can collide with anything else the API
+ * serves: `/` is the only page the Dashboard has — it has no client router, and every emailed
+ * verification or reset link lands on `/` with a query (ADR 0038) — and the script lives beside, never
+ * inside, the display host's `/assets/ekklesia-display/` namespace. Module routes all live under
+ * `/api/v1/modules/<module-id>`.
+ */
+export const DASHBOARD_HOST_PAGE_PATH = "/";
+export const DASHBOARD_HOST_SCRIPT_PATH = "/assets/ekklesia-dashboard/app.js";
+
+/**
+ * Revalidate-always with a strong `ETag`, exactly the module UI and display-host script policy. The
+ * shell emits fixed, unhashed file names, so no response here may be cached as `immutable`: a
+ * rebuilt Dashboard must reach a browser on its next load, and an unchanged one costs a `304`.
+ */
+const DASHBOARD_HOST_CACHE_CONTROL = "no-cache";
+
+/**
+ * Headers the Dashboard page carries on every answer, including a `304`, so a revalidated cache
+ * entry never keeps an older set.
+ *
+ * The page holds the platform sign-in form, so it refuses to be framed by anyone — `X-Frame-Options`
+ * for older browsers, and CSP `frame-ancestors`, the one directive a policy here carries until the
+ * full Content-Security-Policy is decided separately. `no-referrer` keeps the page's URL, which can
+ * briefly hold an emailed reset token before the shell strips it, out of every request it makes.
+ */
+const DASHBOARD_PAGE_SECURITY_HEADERS = Object.freeze({
+  "Content-Security-Policy": "frame-ancestors 'none'",
+  "Referrer-Policy": "no-referrer",
+  "X-Content-Type-Options": "nosniff",
+  "X-Frame-Options": "DENY",
+});
+
+/** A composition error, detected before any Dashboard route is registered. Carries no file path,
+ * package location, or asset content. */
+export class DashboardHostConfigurationError extends Error {
+  constructor() {
+    super("The Dashboard host configuration is inconsistent.");
+    this.name = "DashboardHostConfigurationError";
+    this.stack = `${this.name}: ${this.message}`;
+    Object.freeze(this);
+  }
+}
+
+/** Copies and validates injected assets before registering any route, as the display host does, so
+ * a composition can never pair bytes with a validator computed from different bytes. */
+function snapshotAssets(input: DashboardHostAssets): DashboardHostAssets {
+  try {
+    const snapshot = createDashboardHostAssets(input.html, input.script);
+    if (snapshot.htmlEtag !== input.htmlEtag || snapshot.scriptEtag !== input.scriptEtag) {
+      throw new DashboardHostConfigurationError();
+    }
+    return snapshot;
+  } catch {
+    throw new DashboardHostConfigurationError();
+  }
+}
+
+function fixedAsset(
+  ifNoneMatch: string | undefined,
+  body: string,
+  etag: string,
+  contentType: string,
+  extraHeaders: Readonly<Record<string, string>>,
+): Response {
+  if (etagMatches(ifNoneMatch, etag)) {
+    return new Response(null, {
+      headers: { ...extraHeaders, "Cache-Control": DASHBOARD_HOST_CACHE_CONTROL, ETag: etag },
+      status: 304,
+    });
+  }
+  return new Response(body, {
+    headers: {
+      "X-Content-Type-Options": "nosniff",
+      ...extraHeaders,
+      "Cache-Control": DASHBOARD_HOST_CACHE_CONTROL,
+      "Content-Type": contentType,
+      ETag: etag,
+    },
+    status: 200,
+  });
+}
+
+/**
+ * Serves the built Dashboard from the same origin as `/api`, so the identity system keeps its
+ * default same-origin shape.
+ *
+ * Two exact literal routes over one frozen snapshot: never a static directory, never a path or file
+ * name taken from the request, and never the source map. Any other path — `/index.html`, `/app.js`,
+ * the `.map`, a traversal spelling — has no route and falls through to the application's ordinary
+ * sanitized `404`. Like the display host's code, these bytes grant no authority: the page renders
+ * the sign-in form until `/api/v1/principal` says otherwise.
+ */
+export function createDashboardHostRoutes(assets: DashboardHostAssets): Hono {
+  const snapshot = snapshotAssets(assets);
+  const routes = new Hono();
+
+  routes.get(DASHBOARD_HOST_PAGE_PATH, (c) =>
+    fixedAsset(
+      c.req.header("if-none-match"),
+      snapshot.html,
+      snapshot.htmlEtag,
+      "text/html; charset=utf-8",
+      DASHBOARD_PAGE_SECURITY_HEADERS,
+    ),
+  );
+
+  routes.get(DASHBOARD_HOST_SCRIPT_PATH, (c) =>
+    fixedAsset(
+      c.req.header("if-none-match"),
+      snapshot.script,
+      snapshot.scriptEtag,
+      "text/javascript; charset=utf-8",
+      {},
+    ),
+  );
+
+  return routes;
+}

apps/api/src/dashboard-routes.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,310 @@
+import {
+  CORE_DASHBOARD_NAVIGATION_MANAGE,
+  CORE_MODULES_UI_READ,
+} from "@ekklesia/core/authorization";
+import {
+  DASHBOARD_SORT_ORDER_MAX,
+  DASHBOARD_SORT_ORDER_MIN,
+  type DashboardStore,
+  DashboardStoreError,
+  isValidDashboardIdentifier,
+  normalizeDashboardGroupLabel,
+  resolveDashboardNavigation,
+} from "@ekklesia/core/dashboard";
+import type { ModuleUiPublicationRegistry } from "@ekklesia/core/modules";
+import { Hono } from "hono";
+import type { Context } from "hono";
+import {
+  type AuthorizationMiddlewareOptions,
+  getAuthorizedPrincipal,
+  requirePermission,
+  requireTrustedOrigin,
+} from "./authorization-middleware.js";
+import { CORE_MUTATION_MAX_BODY_BYTES, platformBodyLimit } from "./body-limits.js";
+import { describeMountableModules, type HostModuleUiDescriptor } from "./module-ui-inventory.js";
+
+export const DASHBOARD_NAVIGATION_PATH = "/api/v1/dashboard/navigation";
+const DASHBOARD_GROUPS_PATH = `${DASHBOARD_NAVIGATION_PATH}/groups`;
+const DASHBOARD_PLACEMENTS_PATH = `${DASHBOARD_NAVIGATION_PATH}/placements`;
+
+/**
+ * One module as the Dashboard presents it: the module's display name, plus the generic mount
+ * descriptor unchanged.
+ *
+ * The descriptor is **embedded rather than flattened**, and that is the layering made visible.
+ * `module` is exactly `HostModuleUiDescriptor` — the host-neutral answer to "what is mountable and
+ * how" (ADR 0026) — and `name` is the Dashboard's presentation concern layered on top. A standalone
+ * host consumes the inner object and never learns that Ekklesia has folders; Ekklesia's shell
+ * consumes the outer one. Neither contract is warped to serve the other, and there is one
+ * construction of the descriptor rather than two that could drift.
+ */
+export interface DashboardNavigationModuleView {
+  readonly name: string;
+  readonly module: HostModuleUiDescriptor;
+}
+
+export interface DashboardNavigationGroupView {
+  /** The stable key, unchanged by a rename. Addresses the group in the mutation API; never displayed. */
+  readonly id: string;
+  readonly label: string;
+  readonly order: number;
+  readonly modules: readonly DashboardNavigationModuleView[];
+}
+
+export interface DashboardNavigationResponse {
+  readonly groups: readonly DashboardNavigationGroupView[];
+  /** Modules an administrator placed outside every group, and modules never configured at all — a
+   * newly installed module most importantly. Never empty merely because nothing has been arranged. */
+  readonly ungrouped: readonly DashboardNavigationModuleView[];
+}
+
+export interface CreateDashboardRoutesOptions extends AuthorizationMiddlewareOptions {
+  /** The same publication registry the artifact route and the generic inventory serve from: the one
+   * accepted, mountable module set. Navigation never rescans, never reads a manifest, and never
+   * discovers anything of its own. */
+  readonly moduleUi: ModuleUiPublicationRegistry;
+  readonly store: DashboardStore;
+  readonly trustedOrigins: ReadonlySet<string>;
+}
+
+function sanitizedFailure(c: Context, status: 400 | 404 | 503, code: string): Response {
+  c.header("Cache-Control", "no-store");
+  return c.json({ code }, status);
+}
+
+/** Maps the store's own sanitized codes onto HTTP without inventing a second vocabulary. A
+ * validation failure the route already rejects can still arrive here from a concurrent change, so
+ * both paths are handled rather than assumed unreachable. */
+function storeFailure(c: Context, error: unknown): Response {
+  if (error instanceof DashboardStoreError) {
+    if (error.code === "DASHBOARD_GROUP_NOT_FOUND") {
+      return sanitizedFailure(c, 404, error.code);
+    }
+    if (error.code === "DASHBOARD_READ_FAILED" || error.code === "DASHBOARD_WRITE_FAILED") {
+      return sanitizedFailure(c, 503, error.code);
+    }
+    return sanitizedFailure(c, 400, "INVALID_REQUEST");
+  }
+  return sanitizedFailure(c, 503, "DASHBOARD_WRITE_FAILED");
+}
+
+function isRecord(value: unknown): value is Record<string, unknown> {
+  return typeof value === "object" && value !== null && !Array.isArray(value);
+}
+
+function parsedSortOrder(value: unknown): number | undefined {
+  if (
+    typeof value !== "number" ||
+    !Number.isSafeInteger(value) ||
+    value < DASHBOARD_SORT_ORDER_MIN ||
+    value > DASHBOARD_SORT_ORDER_MAX
+  ) {
+    return undefined;
+  }
+  return value;
+}
+
+const GROUP_BODY_KEYS = new Set(["label", "order"]);
+const PLACEMENT_BODY_KEYS = new Set(["groupId", "order"]);
+
+/**
+ * Structured, closed validation — never a free-form configuration blob. Any key beyond the declared
+ * ones makes the whole body invalid rather than being silently dropped, so a caller cannot smuggle a
+ * field a future version might interpret, and a typo fails loudly instead of quietly doing nothing.
+ */
+function parseGroupBody(raw: unknown): { label: string; order: number } | undefined {
+  if (!isRecord(raw) || Object.keys(raw).some((key) => !GROUP_BODY_KEYS.has(key))) {
+    return undefined;
+  }
+  const order = parsedSortOrder(raw.order);
+  const label = normalizeDashboardGroupLabel(raw.label);
+  if (label === undefined || order === undefined) {
+    return undefined;
+  }
+  return { label, order };
+}
+
+function parsePlacementBody(raw: unknown): { groupId: string | null; order: number } | undefined {
+  if (!isRecord(raw) || Object.keys(raw).some((key) => !PLACEMENT_BODY_KEYS.has(key))) {
+    return undefined;
+  }
+  const order = parsedSortOrder(raw.order);
+  const groupId = raw.groupId;
+  if (order === undefined || (groupId !== null && !isValidDashboardIdentifier(groupId))) {
+    return undefined;
+  }
+  return { groupId, order };
+}
+
+async function readJsonBody(c: Context): Promise<unknown> {
+  try {
+    return (await c.req.json()) as unknown;
+  } catch {
+    return undefined;
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * The Ekklesia Dashboard's navigation: how this installation presents its mountable modules, and the
+ * narrow, structured API for changing that.
+ *
+ * ## Navigation is layered on the inventory, not merged into it
+ *
+ * `GET /api/v1/module-ui` (ADR 0026) answers *what may be mounted* and stays host-neutral — a
+ * standalone host uses it and never learns Ekklesia has folders. This route answers *how this
+ * Dashboard presents those modules*, and embeds each generic descriptor untouched inside a
+ * presentation wrapper. Keeping them separate is what stops Dashboard semantics leaking into the
+ * portable module-host contract.
+ *
+ * ## Grouping is presentation, and structurally cannot be anything else
+ *
+ * The resolved view is computed by `resolveDashboardNavigation`, a pure function of stored
+ * configuration and the current module set. It reads no manifest, no dependency, no capability, and
+ * no entrypoint, and it produces no relationship between two modules. Modules stay flat (ADR 0021,
+ * ADR 0027): two modules in one group are exactly as related as two in different groups, and moving
+ * one changes a single presentation row — never its artifact, its API root, its permissions, its
+ * dependencies, or when it starts.
+ *
+ * ## Reading versus organizing
+ *
+ * Reading requires `core.modules.ui.read`, the same permission the generic inventory requires,
+ * because this response *contains* that inventory and serves the same audience: any signed-in user
+ * needs it to see anything at all. Organizing requires `core.dashboard.navigation.manage`
+ * (restricted) — a platform permission, never a module's — and, like every other Core mutation, an
+ * exact trusted `Origin` and a bounded body before authorization work begins.
+ *
+ * Holding the manage permission grants no module authority. Every module route remains enforced
+ * against its own declared permission, and no arrangement of folders changes a single authorization
+ * decision.
+ */
+export function createDashboardRoutes(options: CreateDashboardRoutesOptions): Hono {
+  const routes = new Hono();
+  const middlewareOptions: AuthorizationMiddlewareOptions = {
+    evaluator: options.evaluator,
+    registry: options.registry,
+    runtime: options.runtime,
+  };
+  const requireRead = requirePermission(middlewareOptions, CORE_MODULES_UI_READ);
+  const requireManage = requirePermission(middlewareOptions, CORE_DASHBOARD_NAVIGATION_MANAGE);
+  const requireOrigin = requireTrustedOrigin(options.trustedOrigins);
+  const mutationBodyLimit = platformBodyLimit(CORE_MUTATION_MAX_BODY_BYTES);
+
+  routes.get(DASHBOARD_NAVIGATION_PATH, requireRead, async (c) => {
+    c.header("Cache-Control", "no-store");
+    // Per-principal: the embedded descriptors carry permission hints evaluated for this caller.
+    c.header("Vary", "Origin, Cookie");
+    const principal = getAuthorizedPrincipal(c);
+    try {
+      const [configuration, descriptors] = await Promise.all([
+        options.store.readConfiguration(),
+        describeMountableModules(options.evaluator, principal, options.moduleUi),
+      ]);
+      const view = resolveDashboardNavigation(
+        configuration,
+        descriptors.map((entry) => ({ id: entry.descriptor.id, ...entry })),
+      );
+      const present = (entry: {
+        readonly descriptor: HostModuleUiDescriptor;
+        readonly name: string;
+      }): DashboardNavigationModuleView => ({ module: entry.descriptor, name: entry.name });
+      return c.json(
+        {
+          groups: view.groups.map((group) => ({
+            id: group.id,
+            label: group.label,
+            modules: group.modules.map(present),
+            order: group.order,
+          })),
+          ungrouped: view.ungrouped.map(present),
+        } satisfies DashboardNavigationResponse,
+        200,
+      );
+    } catch (error) {
+      if (error instanceof DashboardStoreError) {
+        return storeFailure(c, error);
+      }
+      // An authorization-evaluation outage, exactly as the generic inventory reports it: a
+      // permission hint that could not be determined is never rendered as "not granted".
+      return sanitizedFailure(c, 503, "AUTHORIZATION_EVALUATION_FAILED");
+    }
+  });
+
+  routes.put(
+    `${DASHBOARD_GROUPS_PATH}/:groupId`,
+    requireOrigin,
+    mutationBodyLimit,
+    requireManage,
+    async (c) => {
+      c.header("Cache-Control", "no-store");
+      const groupId = c.req.param("groupId");
+      const body = parseGroupBody(await readJsonBody(c));
+      if (!body || !isValidDashboardIdentifier(groupId)) {
+        return sanitizedFailure(c, 400, "INVALID_REQUEST");
+      }
+      try {
+        // Idempotent by design: creating and renaming are the same operation against a
+        // client-chosen, stable id, so a rename can never orphan the placements pointing at it.
+        const group = await options.store.upsertGroup({
+          id: groupId,
+          label: body.label,
+          sortOrder: body.order,
+        });
+        return c.json({ id: group.id, label: group.label, order: group.sortOrder }, 200);
+      } catch (error) {
+        return storeFailure(c, error);
+      }
+    },
+  );
+
+  routes.delete(`${DASHBOARD_GROUPS_PATH}/:groupId`, requireOrigin, requireManage, async (c) => {
+    c.header("Cache-Control", "no-store");
+    const groupId = c.req.param("groupId");
+    if (!isValidDashboardIdentifier(groupId)) {
+      return sanitizedFailure(c, 400, "INVALID_REQUEST");
+    }
+    try {
+      // Modules in the group become ungrouped through the schema's `on delete set null`, so no
+      // module is lost and no placement is left pointing at a group that no longer exists.
+      await options.store.deleteGroup(groupId);
+      return c.body(null, 204);
+    } catch (error) {
+      return storeFailure(c, error);
+    }
+  });
+
+  routes.put(
+    `${DASHBOARD_PLACEMENTS_PATH}/:moduleId`,
+    requireOrigin,
+    mutationBodyLimit,
+    requireManage,
+    async (c) => {
+      c.header("Cache-Control", "no-store");
+      const moduleId = c.req.param("moduleId");
+      const body = parsePlacementBody(await readJsonBody(c));
+      if (!body || !isValidDashboardIdentifier(moduleId)) {
+        return sanitizedFailure(c, 400, "INVALID_REQUEST");
+      }
+      try {
+        // A placement may be stored for a module that is not installed: that is how uninstalling
+        // and reinstalling preserves an arrangement. Nothing renders it until the module is back.
+        const placement = await options.store.setPlacement({
+          groupId: body.groupId,
+          moduleId,
+          sortOrder: body.order,
+        });
+        return c.json(
+          {
+            groupId: placement.groupId,
+            moduleId: placement.moduleId,
+            order: placement.sortOrder,
+          },
+          200,
+        );
+      } catch (error) {
+        return storeFailure(c, error);
+      }
+    },
+  );
+
+  return routes;
+}

apps/api/src/database.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+import type { ModuleDatabase } from "@ekklesia/contracts";
+import {
+  type AuthorizationDrizzleDatabase,
+  createAuthorizationDrizzleView,
+} from "@ekklesia/core/authorization";
+import {
+  createDashboardDrizzleView,
+  type DashboardDrizzleDatabase,
+} from "@ekklesia/core/dashboard";
+import { createValidatedPostgresPool, type PostgresPoolOptions } from "@ekklesia/core/database";
+import { createDeviceDrizzleView, type DeviceDrizzleDatabase } from "@ekklesia/core/devices";
+import { createIdentityDrizzleView, type IdentityDrizzleDatabase } from "@ekklesia/core/identity";
+import {
+  createModuleConfigurationView,
+  createModuleDatabaseView,
+  createModuleLifecycleView,
+  type ModuleConfigurationDrizzleDatabase,
+  type ModuleLifecycleDrizzleDatabase,
+} from "@ekklesia/core/modules";
+
+export interface ApiDatabaseHandle {
+  readonly authorization: AuthorizationDrizzleDatabase;
+  readonly devices: DeviceDrizzleDatabase;
+  readonly dashboard: DashboardDrizzleDatabase;
+  readonly identity: IdentityDrizzleDatabase;
+  readonly module: ModuleDatabase;
+  readonly moduleConfiguration: ModuleConfigurationDrizzleDatabase;
+  readonly moduleLifecycle: ModuleLifecycleDrizzleDatabase;
+  /**
+   * One trivial round trip on the shared pool, for readiness (`./health-routes.js`). The `SELECT 1`
+   * runs in a read-only transaction carrying its own `SET LOCAL statement_timeout`, so PostgreSQL
+   * cancels a stalled statement itself rather than the caller merely abandoning it; the pool's
+   * session-wide `statement_timeout`/`query_timeout` remain the outer bound. The four statements
+   * travel as one simple-protocol message, so the check costs a single round trip. On any failure
+   * the pool discards that connection instead of returning it, so a transaction left open by a
+   * cancelled statement never reaches another caller. Rejects with whatever the driver raised; no
+   * caller may surface it.
+   */
+  readonly ping: (statementTimeoutMs: number) => Promise<void>;
+  /** Closes the one shared pool exactly once, regardless of how many typed views were created
+   * over it. Safe to call from both a startup-failure cleanup path and normal shutdown. */
+  readonly close: () => Promise<void>;
+}
+
+function pingStatement(statementTimeoutMs: number): string {
+  // Interpolated rather than bound: neither SET nor a multi-statement simple query accepts
+  // parameters. Only a positive safe integer can ever reach the SQL text.
+  if (!Number.isSafeInteger(statementTimeoutMs) || statementTimeoutMs <= 0) {
+    throw new RangeError("The ping statement timeout must be a positive integer.");
+  }
+  return `BEGIN READ ONLY; SET LOCAL statement_timeout = ${statementTimeoutMs}; SELECT 1; COMMIT`;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Composes the one physical PostgreSQL pool this process uses for Core's identity and
+ * authorization schemas plus the module database facade: one validated, timeout-bounded
+ * `pg.Pool` (`createValidatedPostgresPool`, `@ekklesia/core/database`), wrapped by independent
+ * typed Drizzle views (`createIdentityDrizzleView`, `createAuthorizationDrizzleView`,
+ * `createDashboardDrizzleView`, `createModuleLifecycleView`, `createModuleConfigurationView`,
+ * `createModuleDatabaseView`). No domain
+ * owns or closes the pool in this composition — `close()`
+ * here is the only thing that ever calls `pool.end()`. `createIdentityDrizzleDatabase`/
+ * `createAuthorizationDrizzleDatabase` remain available, unaffected, and independently testable
+ * for callers that only need one domain.
+ */
+export function createApiDatabase(
+  databaseUrl: string,
+  options: PostgresPoolOptions = {},
+): ApiDatabaseHandle {
+  const { close, pool } = createValidatedPostgresPool(databaseUrl, options);
+
+  return Object.freeze({
+    authorization: createAuthorizationDrizzleView(pool),
+    close,
+    devices: createDeviceDrizzleView(pool),
+    dashboard: createDashboardDrizzleView(pool),
+    identity: createIdentityDrizzleView(pool),
+    module: createModuleDatabaseView(pool),
+    moduleConfiguration: createModuleConfigurationView(pool),
+    moduleLifecycle: createModuleLifecycleView(pool),
+    ping: async (statementTimeoutMs: number) => {
+      await pool.query(pingStatement(statementTimeoutMs));
+    },
+  });
+}

apps/api/src/device-principal.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+import { createDevicePrincipal, type EkklesiaPrincipal } from "@ekklesia/contracts";
+import type { DeviceStore } from "@ekklesia/core/devices";
+import { DEVICE_LAST_SEEN_THROTTLE_MS } from "@ekklesia/core/devices";
+import type { EkklesiaIdentityRuntime } from "@ekklesia/core/identity";
+import { DEVICE_SESSION_COOKIE } from "./device-routes.js";
+
+/**
+ * Extends principal resolution with managed devices, without touching how a *person* is resolved
+ * (ADR 0036).
+ *
+ * Composition rather than modification is deliberate. Core's identity runtime is the Better Auth
+ * boundary and knows only about human sessions; teaching it about devices would put two unrelated
+ * credential systems behind one implementation and make "which one answered?" an internal detail.
+ * Wrapping keeps Better Auth's behaviour byte-for-byte unchanged — including that an infrastructure
+ * failure still throws rather than degrading to anonymous — and adds exactly one fallback.
+ *
+ * **A human session always wins.** If Better Auth resolves a person, that is the answer and the
+ * device cookie is never even read. This matters because a browser can hold both: an administrator
+ * who opens a display page on their own laptop after pairing it stays themself, and no device
+ * cookie can dilute or replace a human identity.
+ *
+ * Because every gate in the platform — the display page, the descriptor, module HTTP routes,
+ * realtime — resolves principals through this one function, a device becomes a principal in exactly
+ * one place, and every authorization decision about it is still made by the ordinary evaluator.
+ */
+export interface DevicePrincipalOptions {
+  readonly runtime: EkklesiaIdentityRuntime;
+  readonly devices: DeviceStore;
+  readonly now?: () => Date;
+}
+
+/** RFC 6265 `cookie-string` parsing, matching how Core's own session-cookie detection reads a
+ * header: split on `;`, take the text before the first `=` as the name, compare whole names
+ * exactly. Never a substring test, so `x_ekklesia_device_session` is correctly not a match. */
+function readCookie(headers: Headers, name: string): string | undefined {
+  const header = headers.get("cookie");
+  if (header === null) {
+    return undefined;
+  }
+  for (const pair of header.split(";")) {
+    const separator = pair.indexOf("=");
+    if (separator === -1) {
+      continue;
+    }
+    if (pair.slice(0, separator).trim() === name) {
+      const value = pair.slice(separator + 1).trim();
+      return value.length === 0 ? undefined : value;
+    }
+  }
+  return undefined;
+}
+
+export function withDevicePrincipals(options: DevicePrincipalOptions): EkklesiaIdentityRuntime {
+  const now = options.now ?? ((): Date => new Date());
+
+  return Object.freeze({
+    handleAuthRequest: (request: Request): Promise<Response> =>
+      options.runtime.handleAuthRequest(request),
+
+    async resolvePrincipal(headers: Headers): Promise<EkklesiaPrincipal> {
+      // Unchanged, including its failure behaviour: a genuine outage still throws rather than
+      // silently letting a device credential answer a question about a person.
+      const human = await options.runtime.resolvePrincipal(headers);
+      if (human.kind !== "anonymous") {
+        return human;
+      }
+
+      const credential = readCookie(headers, DEVICE_SESSION_COOKIE);
+      if (credential === undefined) {
+        return human;
+      }
+
+      const at = now();
+      const device = await options.devices.resolveCredential(credential, at);
+      if (!device) {
+        // A revoked, expired, or simply wrong credential is anonymous — never an error the caller
+        // could use to tell those three apart.
+        return human;
+      }
+
+      // Throttled here as well as in SQL: the common case must not even issue a statement, or a
+      // display polling realtime would turn an operational nicety into continuous write traffic.
+      const lastSeen = device.lastSeenAt;
+      if (
+        lastSeen === undefined ||
+        at.getTime() - lastSeen.getTime() >= DEVICE_LAST_SEEN_THROTTLE_MS
+      ) {
+        await options.devices.touchLastSeen(device.deviceId, at).catch(() => undefined);
+      }
+
+      return createDevicePrincipal(device.deviceId);
+    },
+  });
+}

apps/api/src/device-routes.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,357 @@
+import { safeParseEkklesiaDeviceId } from "@ekklesia/contracts";
+import { CORE_DEVICES_MANAGE } from "@ekklesia/core/authorization";
+import type { DeviceStore } from "@ekklesia/core/devices";
+import { DEVICE_CREDENTIAL_TTL_MS } from "@ekklesia/core/devices";
+import type { ModuleUiPublicationRegistry } from "@ekklesia/core/modules";
+import type { Context, Hono } from "hono";
+import { Hono as HonoApp } from "hono";
+import { getCookie, setCookie } from "hono/cookie";
+import {
+  type AuthorizationMiddlewareOptions,
+  getAuthorizedPrincipal,
+  requirePermission,
+  requireTrustedOrigin,
+} from "./authorization-middleware.js";
+import { CORE_MUTATION_MAX_BODY_BYTES, platformBodyLimit } from "./body-limits.js";
+
+/**
+ * Host-owned device identity transport: pairing a display, and managing what has been paired
+ * (ADR 0036).
+ *
+ * Both prefixes are siblings of `/api/v1/modules/...` and cannot collide with any module route.
+ * Nothing here is reachable by module code, and no module-facing contract mentions any of it — a
+ * module receives a principal and its permissions, and never learns that pairing exists.
+ */
+export const DEVICE_PAIRING_PREFIX = "/api/v1/device-pairing";
+export const DEVICES_PREFIX = "/api/v1/devices";
+
+/**
+ * The device's two cookies, deliberately named nothing like Better Auth's session cookie.
+ *
+ * Distinct names are what keep the two identity systems from being confused for one another: the
+ * human resolver looks only for Better Auth's cookie and the device resolver looks only for these,
+ * so neither can ever be satisfied by the other's credential no matter what a caller sends.
+ */
+export const DEVICE_PAIRING_COOKIE = "ekklesia_device_pairing";
+export const DEVICE_SESSION_COOKIE = "ekklesia_device_session";
+
+/** How often an unpaired screen should ask again. Slow enough that a waiting display is not a load
+ * source, fast enough that someone standing at the screen sees it come alive. */
+export const DEVICE_PAIRING_POLL_INTERVAL_MS = 3_000;
+
+export interface DeviceRoutesOptions extends AuthorizationMiddlewareOptions {
+  readonly devices: DeviceStore;
+  /** The same eligible/running publication registry the display routes use. It is the only source
+   * of the permission a pairing request may ask for. */
+  readonly moduleUi: ModuleUiPublicationRegistry;
+  readonly trustedOrigins: ReadonlySet<string>;
+  /** True when the platform is reached over https, which is what `Secure` requires to be usable at
+   * all. Derived from the validated identity base URL, never from a request. */
+  readonly secureCookies: boolean;
+  readonly now?: () => Date;
+}
+
+function noStore(c: Context): void {
+  c.header("Cache-Control", "no-store");
+}
+
+function sanitizedFailure(c: Context, status: 400 | 403 | 404 | 503, code: string): Response {
+  noStore(c);
+  return c.json({ code }, status);
+}
+
+async function readJsonObject(c: Context): Promise<Record<string, unknown> | undefined> {
+  try {
+    const body: unknown = await c.req.json();
+    return typeof body === "object" && body !== null && !Array.isArray(body)
+      ? (body as Record<string, unknown>)
+      : undefined;
+  } catch {
+    return undefined;
+  }
+}
+
+function readString(body: Record<string, unknown>, key: string, max: number): string | undefined {
+  const value = body[key];
+  if (typeof value !== "string") {
+    return undefined;
+  }
+  const trimmed = value.trim();
+  return trimmed.length === 0 || trimmed.length > max ? undefined : trimmed;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Writes one of the device cookies.
+ *
+ * `HttpOnly` so no script — least of all a module's display bundle, which runs in this very page —
+ * can read the value; `SameSite=Strict` because a display only ever talks to the host that serves
+ * it and nothing legitimate arrives cross-site; host-only (no `Domain`) so a sibling hostname
+ * cannot claim it; `Path=/` because the credential is presented to the descriptor, the module API,
+ * and realtime alike. `Secure` follows the deployment's own scheme — asserting it on a plaintext
+ * development origin would make the cookie silently unusable rather than more secure.
+ */
+function writeDeviceCookie(
+  c: Context,
+  options: DeviceRoutesOptions,
+  name: string,
+  value: string,
+  maxAgeSeconds: number,
+): void {
+  setCookie(c, name, value, {
+    httpOnly: true,
+    maxAge: maxAgeSeconds,
+    path: "/",
+    sameSite: "Strict",
+    secure: options.secureCookies,
+  });
+}
+
+export function createDeviceRoutes(options: DeviceRoutesOptions): Hono {
+  const routes = new HonoApp();
+  const now = options.now ?? ((): Date => new Date());
+  const requireManage = requirePermission(options, CORE_DEVICES_MANAGE);
+  const requireOrigin = requireTrustedOrigin(options.trustedOrigins);
+  const mutationBodyLimit = platformBodyLimit(CORE_MUTATION_MAX_BODY_BYTES);
+
+  /**
+   * An unpaired display asks to be paired.
+   *
+   * The **only** thing the caller supplies is which module's display it is sitting on, and even
+   * that is not taken at its word: the module is looked up in the publication registry and the
+   * permission is read from that module's validated display declaration. A browser therefore cannot
+   * ask to be granted `core.devices.manage`, another module's permission, or anything else — the
+   * request records the permission the host derived, and approval grants exactly that.
+   */
+  routes.post(
+    `${DEVICE_PAIRING_PREFIX}/requests`,
+    requireOrigin,
+    mutationBodyLimit,
+    async (c: Context) => {
+      const body = await readJsonObject(c);
+      const moduleId = body === undefined ? undefined : readString(body, "moduleId", 128);
+      if (moduleId === undefined) {
+        return sanitizedFailure(c, 400, "INVALID_REQUEST");
+      }
+      const display = options.moduleUi
+        .listDisplays()
+        .find((candidate) => candidate.moduleId === moduleId);
+      if (!display) {
+        // Unknown, dashboard-only, disabled, or dependency-blocked all answer the same way, so
+        // pairing never becomes a way to enumerate what is installed.
+        return sanitizedFailure(c, 404, "NOT_FOUND");
+      }
+
+      try {
+        const at = now();
+        const created = await options.devices.createPairingRequest({
+          moduleId: display.moduleId,
+          now: at,
+          permissionId: display.displayPermission,
+        });
+        writeDeviceCookie(
+          c,
+          options,
+          DEVICE_PAIRING_COOKIE,
+          created.claimSecret,
+          Math.max(1, Math.ceil((created.expiresAt.getTime() - at.getTime()) / 1000)),
+        );
+        noStore(c);
+        // The code is returned because it has to be shown on the screen. The claim secret is not:
+        // it goes only into the HttpOnly cookie above, so reading the code off a television tells
+        // an onlooker nothing they could use.
+        return c.json(
+          {
+            code: created.code,
+            expiresAt: created.expiresAt.toISOString(),
+            pollIntervalMs: DEVICE_PAIRING_POLL_INTERVAL_MS,
+          },
+          201,
+        );
+      } catch {
+        return sanitizedFailure(c, 503, "DEVICE_PAIRING_UNAVAILABLE");
+      }
+    },
+  );
+
+  /**
+   * The display asks whether it has been approved yet, and collects its credential when it has.
+   *
+   * Authority here is the claim cookie and nothing else. The pairing code is not accepted — it is
+   * public, printed across a screen, and a flow that issued a credential to whoever presented it
+   * would hand the device's identity to anyone who walked past. Consumption is single-use inside
+   * the store, so a replayed or concurrent claim never yields a second credential.
+   */
+  routes.post(
+    `${DEVICE_PAIRING_PREFIX}/claims`,
+    requireOrigin,
+    mutationBodyLimit,
+    async (c: Context) => {
+      const claimSecret = getCookie(c, DEVICE_PAIRING_COOKIE);
+      if (claimSecret === undefined || claimSecret.length === 0) {
+        return sanitizedFailure(c, 400, "DEVICE_PAIRING_UNKNOWN");
+      }
+      try {
+        const at = now();
+        const result = await options.devices.claimPairingRequest({ claimSecret, now: at });
+        noStore(c);
+        if (result.paired) {
+          writeDeviceCookie(
+            c,
+            options,
+            DEVICE_SESSION_COOKIE,
+            result.paired.credential,
+            Math.floor(DEVICE_CREDENTIAL_TTL_MS / 1000),
+          );
+          // The pairing cookie has done its job; leaving it would keep a spent secret on the device.
+          writeDeviceCookie(c, options, DEVICE_PAIRING_COOKIE, "", 0);
+          // Deliberately no credential, device id, or permission in the body: the browser needs to
+          // know only that it may now load the display, and everything it needs travels in the
+          // Set-Cookie header where script cannot reach it.
+          return c.json({ status: "paired" as const }, 200);
+        }
+        return c.json({ status: result.status }, 200);
+      } catch {
+        return sanitizedFailure(c, 503, "DEVICE_PAIRING_UNAVAILABLE");
+      }
+    },
+  );
+
+  /**
+   * An administrator types the code from the screen and sees what it is asking for, before deciding.
+   *
+   * The code travels in a request body rather than a path or query so it does not land in access
+   * logs, browser history, or a `Referer`. Reaching this at all requires `core.devices.manage`, so
+   * it is not an enumeration oracle for anyone who is not already trusted to approve pairings.
+   */
+  routes.post(
+    `${DEVICE_PAIRING_PREFIX}/lookups`,
+    requireOrigin,
+    mutationBodyLimit,
+    requireManage,
+    async (c: Context) => {
+      const body = await readJsonObject(c);
+      const code = body === undefined ? undefined : readString(body, "code", 16);
+      if (code === undefined || !/^[0-9]{6}$/u.test(code)) {
+        return sanitizedFailure(c, 400, "INVALID_REQUEST");
+      }
+      try {
+        const found = await options.devices.findPendingByCode(code, now());
+        if (!found) {
+          return sanitizedFailure(c, 404, "DEVICE_PAIRING_UNKNOWN");
+        }
+        noStore(c);
+        return c.json(
+          {
+            expiresAt: found.expiresAt.toISOString(),
+            moduleId: found.moduleId,
+            permissionId: found.permissionId,
+            requestedAt: found.createdAt.toISOString(),
+          },
+          200,
+        );
+      } catch {
+        return sanitizedFailure(c, 503, "DEVICE_PAIRING_UNAVAILABLE");
+      }
+    },
+  );
+
+  /** Approval. The administrator names the device; the unpaired screen never names itself. */
+  routes.post(
+    `${DEVICE_PAIRING_PREFIX}/approvals`,
+    requireOrigin,
+    mutationBodyLimit,
+    requireManage,
+    async (c: Context) => {
+      const body = await readJsonObject(c);
+      const code = body === undefined ? undefined : readString(body, "code", 16);
+      const deviceName = body === undefined ? undefined : readString(body, "deviceName", 128);
+      if (code === undefined || !/^[0-9]{6}$/u.test(code) || deviceName === undefined) {
+        return sanitizedFailure(c, 400, "INVALID_REQUEST");
+      }
+      const principal = getAuthorizedPrincipal(c);
+      if (principal.kind !== "authenticated") {
+        // Unreachable through `requireManage`, which only ever admits a person. Stated rather than
+        // assumed, so a device could never be recorded as having approved its own pairing.
+        return sanitizedFailure(c, 403, "AUTHORIZATION_DENIED");
+      }
+      try {
+        const approved = await options.devices.approvePairingRequest({
+          approvedBy: principal.userId,
+          code,
+          deviceName,
+          now: now(),
+        });
+        if (!approved) {
+          // Expired, already approved, already consumed, or never existed. One answer for all of
+          // them: which one it was is not information this endpoint owes anybody.
+          return sanitizedFailure(c, 404, "DEVICE_PAIRING_UNKNOWN");
+        }
+        noStore(c);
+        return c.json({ moduleId: approved.moduleId, permissionId: approved.permissionId }, 200);
+      } catch {
+        return sanitizedFailure(c, 503, "DEVICE_PAIRING_UNAVAILABLE");
+      }
+    },
+  );
+
+  routes.get(DEVICES_PREFIX, requireManage, async (c: Context) => {
+    try {
+      const devices = await options.devices.listDevices();
+      noStore(c);
+      return c.json(
+        {
+          devices: devices.map((device) => ({
+            createdAt: device.createdAt.toISOString(),
+            id: device.id,
+            name: device.name,
+            permissions: device.permissions,
+            revoked: device.revokedAt !== undefined,
+            ...(device.lastSeenAt === undefined
+              ? {}
+              : { lastSeenAt: device.lastSeenAt.toISOString() }),
+            ...(device.revokedAt === undefined
+              ? {}
+              : { revokedAt: device.revokedAt.toISOString() }),
+          })),
+        },
+        200,
+      );
+    } catch {
+      return sanitizedFailure(c, 503, "DEVICE_LOOKUP_UNAVAILABLE");
+    }
+  });
+
+  /**
+   * Revocation, which is a server-side fact rather than a request that the remote browser discard
+   * anything. The device's own copy of its credential keeps existing and stops working.
+   */
+  routes.post(
+    `${DEVICES_PREFIX}/:deviceId/revoke`,
+    requireOrigin,
+    mutationBodyLimit,
+    requireManage,
+    async (c: Context) => {
+      const parsed = safeParseEkklesiaDeviceId(c.req.param("deviceId"));
+      if (!parsed.success) {
+        return sanitizedFailure(c, 400, "INVALID_REQUEST");
+      }
+      const principal = getAuthorizedPrincipal(c);
+      if (principal.kind !== "authenticated") {
+        return sanitizedFailure(c, 403, "AUTHORIZATION_DENIED");
+      }
+      try {
+        await options.devices.revokeDevice({
+          deviceId: parsed.data,
+          now: now(),
+          revokedBy: principal.userId,
+        });
+      } catch {
+        return sanitizedFailure(c, 404, "NOT_FOUND");
+      }
+      noStore(c);
+      return c.body(null, 204);
+    },
+  );
+
+  return routes;
+}

apps/api/src/display-host-assets.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+import { createHash } from "node:crypto";
+import { readFile } from "node:fs/promises";
+import { displayHostAssetUrls } from "@ekklesia/shell/display-assets";
+
+/**
+ * The three immutable, platform-owned files that make up Ekklesia's display browser host.
+ *
+ * They are read once, before the HTTP listener is bound, from the exact URLs exported by the
+ * surface package. Request input is never involved in this read and the package is never exposed as
+ * a static directory. Keeping text rather than a mutable `Buffer` also makes the frozen snapshot a
+ * genuinely immutable value that every response can reuse safely.
+ */
+export interface DisplayHostAssets {
+  readonly html: string;
+  readonly script: string;
+  readonly scriptEtag: string;
+  /** The display's offline service worker (ADR 0043) — a third fixed, platform-owned file, served
+   * at a path whose directory is its scope so it controls display pages and nothing else. */
+  readonly serviceWorker: string;
+  readonly serviceWorkerEtag: string;
+}
+
+/** A startup failure with a fixed, non-secret shape. The originating filesystem exception, package
+ * location, and machine path are intentionally not retained or surfaced. */
+export class DisplayHostAssetError extends Error {
+  readonly code = "DISPLAY_HOST_ASSET_UNAVAILABLE" as const;
+
+  constructor() {
+    super("The display host browser assets are unavailable.");
+    this.name = "DisplayHostAssetError";
+    this.stack = `${this.name}: ${this.message}`;
+    Object.freeze(this);
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Captures one immutable, internally consistent display-host asset snapshot.
+ *
+ * The strong validator is always derived from the exact script text in the same snapshot; callers
+ * cannot accidentally pair bytes from one build with an ETag from another. Empty output is a
+ * failed host build rather than a valid page that can never mount anything.
+ */
+export function createDisplayHostAssets(
+  html: string,
+  script: string,
+  serviceWorker: string,
+): DisplayHostAssets {
+  if (html.trim().length === 0 || script.trim().length === 0 || serviceWorker.trim().length === 0) {
+    throw new DisplayHostAssetError();
+  }
+  return Object.freeze({
+    html,
+    script,
+    scriptEtag: `"${createHash("sha256").update(script).digest("base64url")}"`,
+    serviceWorker,
+    serviceWorkerEtag: `"${createHash("sha256").update(serviceWorker).digest("base64url")}"`,
+  });
+}
+
+/** Loads only the three surface-declared files. A missing or unreadable build fails startup rather
+ * than leaving a display route that can authorize successfully and then return a broken shell. */
+export async function loadDisplayHostAssets(): Promise<DisplayHostAssets> {
+  try {
+    // Sequential deliberately: should both files be absent, diagnostics stay deterministic and no
+    // rejected sibling promise is left running after this function has already failed.
+    const html = await readFile(new URL(displayHostAssetUrls.html), "utf8");
+    const script = await readFile(new URL(displayHostAssetUrls.script), "utf8");
+    const serviceWorker = await readFile(new URL(displayHostAssetUrls.serviceWorker), "utf8");
+    return createDisplayHostAssets(html, script, serviceWorker);
+  } catch {
+    throw new DisplayHostAssetError();
+  }
+}

apps/api/src/grants-routes.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,419 @@
+import type { EkklesiaUserId, GrantId, PermissionId } from "@ekklesia/contracts";
+import {
+  createUserActor,
+  isAuthenticatedPrincipal,
+  safeParseEkklesiaUserId,
+  safeParseGrantId,
+  safeParsePermissionId,
+} from "@ekklesia/contracts";
+import {
+  AUTHORIZATION_GRANT_LIST_MAX_LIMIT,
+  type AuthorizationStore,
+  AuthorizationStoreError,
+  CORE_AUTHORIZATION_GRANTS_MANAGE,
+  type GrantPageBoundary,
+  type GrantRecord,
+} from "@ekklesia/core/authorization";
+import { Hono } from "hono";
+import type { Context } from "hono";
+import {
+  type AuthorizationMiddlewareOptions,
+  getAuthorizedPrincipal,
+  requirePermission,
+  requireTrustedOrigin,
+} from "./authorization-middleware.js";
+import { CORE_MUTATION_MAX_BODY_BYTES, platformBodyLimit } from "./body-limits.js";
+
+export interface CreateGrantsRoutesOptions extends AuthorizationMiddlewareOptions {
+  readonly store: AuthorizationStore;
+  readonly trustedOrigins: ReadonlySet<string>;
+  /** Injected only so expiration validation is deterministic under test. Production composition
+   * leaves this unset and the routes read real time. */
+  readonly now?: () => Date;
+}
+
+const DEFAULT_LIST_LIMIT = 50;
+
+function sanitizedStoreErrorResponse(c: Context, error: unknown): Response {
+  c.header("Cache-Control", "no-store");
+  if (error instanceof AuthorizationStoreError) {
+    if (error.code === "AUTHORIZATION_GRANT_NOT_FOUND") {
+      return c.json({ code: error.code }, 404);
+    }
+    // The one conflict the caller can act on. It deliberately reveals nothing about the grant that
+    // already exists — not its id, actor, scope, source reference, or expiry — only that an
+    // equivalent authorization is already effective for this subject.
+    if (error.code === "AUTHORIZATION_GRANT_ALREADY_EXISTS") {
+      return c.json({ code: error.code }, 409);
+    }
+    // Defense in depth: the routes below reject both of these before ever reaching the store, so
+    // arriving here means a request-shaped problem slipped through. It is still a client input
+    // failure, never an infrastructure one, and it reports exactly like any other malformed
+    // request rather than leaking the store's internal distinction.
+    if (
+      error.code === "AUTHORIZATION_GRANT_EXPIRATION_INVALID" ||
+      error.code === "AUTHORIZATION_GRANT_LIMIT_INVALID"
+    ) {
+      return c.json({ code: "INVALID_REQUEST" }, 400);
+    }
+    return c.json({ code: error.code }, 503);
+  }
+  return c.json({ code: "INTERNAL_ERROR" }, 503);
+}
+
+interface ParsedCreateGrantBody {
+  readonly expiresAt?: Date;
+  readonly permission: PermissionId;
+  readonly subjectUserId: EkklesiaUserId;
+}
+
+const CREATE_GRANT_ALLOWED_KEYS = new Set(["subjectUserId", "permission", "expiresAt"]);
+
+/**
+ * The one accepted expiration representation: `YYYY-MM-DDTHH:mm:ss.sssZ`, byte-for-byte equal to
+ * the parsed `Date`'s own `toISOString()`.
+ *
+ * `new Date(value)` alone was far too permissive. It silently *normalized* impossible dates
+ * (`2026-02-31T00:00:00.000Z` became March 3rd) and accepted locale-shaped input
+ * (`"March 5, 2027"`), date-only values, offsets, and missing milliseconds — so what an operator
+ * typed and what the platform stored could differ without any error. The regular expression pins
+ * the lexical form and the round-trip comparison rejects every value the parser would otherwise
+ * quietly rewrite.
+ */
+const CANONICAL_INSTANT_PATTERN = /^\d{4}-\d{2}-\d{2}T\d{2}:\d{2}:\d{2}\.\d{3}Z$/u;
+
+function parseCanonicalFutureInstant(value: unknown, now: Date): Date | undefined {
+  if (typeof value !== "string" || !CANONICAL_INSTANT_PATTERN.test(value)) {
+    return undefined;
+  }
+  const parsed = new Date(value);
+  if (Number.isNaN(parsed.getTime()) || parsed.toISOString() !== value) {
+    return undefined;
+  }
+  // Strictly future: an expiration equal to or before the acceptance clock produces a grant that
+  // is already dead, which is never what the caller meant.
+  if (parsed.getTime() <= now.getTime()) {
+    return undefined;
+  }
+  return parsed;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Accepts only `subjectUserId`, `permission`, and an optional `expiresAt`. Any other key present —
+ * `actor`, `sourceKind`, `sourceRef`, any audit field, `createdAt`, `revokedAt`, a grant id, or
+ * anything claiming owner/effective-permission state — makes the whole body invalid rather than
+ * being silently dropped, so a caller cannot smuggle server-derived fields through a request that
+ * otherwise looks well-formed.
+ *
+ * **`scope` is deliberately among the rejected keys**, including when supplied as `null`, empty, or
+ * an otherwise valid scope string. Core's scoped-grant semantics remain intact for trusted internal
+ * callers, but no HTTP route middleware supplies a scope to the evaluator today, so a scope
+ * accepted here would produce a grant that looks meaningful, persists, appears in listings, and can
+ * authorize nothing at all. Accepting it would be offering a switch that is not connected to
+ * anything. When a server-owned resolver exists, this is the one place that changes.
+ */
+function parseCreateGrantBody(raw: unknown, now: Date): ParsedCreateGrantBody | undefined {
+  if (typeof raw !== "object" || raw === null || Array.isArray(raw)) {
+    return undefined;
+  }
+  const body = raw as Record<string, unknown>;
+  if (Object.keys(body).some((key) => !CREATE_GRANT_ALLOWED_KEYS.has(key))) {
+    return undefined;
+  }
+
+  const subjectUserId = safeParseEkklesiaUserId(body.subjectUserId);
+  if (!subjectUserId.success) {
+    return undefined;
+  }
+  const permission = safeParsePermissionId(body.permission);
+  if (!permission.success) {
+    return undefined;
+  }
+
+  let expiresAt: Date | undefined;
+  if (body.expiresAt !== undefined) {
+    expiresAt = parseCanonicalFutureInstant(body.expiresAt, now);
+    if (expiresAt === undefined) {
+      return undefined;
+    }
+  }
+
+  return Object.freeze({
+    ...(expiresAt === undefined ? {} : { expiresAt }),
+    permission: permission.data,
+    subjectUserId: subjectUserId.data,
+  });
+}
+
+const CURSOR_VERSION = 1;
+const BASE64URL_PATTERN = /^[A-Za-z0-9_-]+$/u;
+
+/**
+ * An opaque pagination *position*, not an authorization token. It carries only the subject user id,
+ * the boundary row's creation instant, and the boundary grant id — never a permission, scope,
+ * source reference, actor, credential, or secret — so there is nothing in it worth protecting.
+ *
+ * It is deliberately unsigned. Signing would imply the cursor carries authority it does not have:
+ * the permission check and the server-side subject filter remain authoritative on every page, and
+ * a forged cursor can at most name a different position within grants the caller is already
+ * entitled to list. The strict decode below still refuses anything that is not exactly what this
+ * function would emit.
+ */
+function encodeCursor(userId: EkklesiaUserId, boundary: GrantPageBoundary): string {
+  return Buffer.from(
+    JSON.stringify({
+      g: boundary.id,
+      t: boundary.createdAt.toISOString(),
+      u: userId,
+      v: CURSOR_VERSION,
+    }),
+    "utf8",
+  ).toString("base64url");
+}
+
+/**
+ * Strict in every dimension: canonical unpadded base64url, valid UTF-8 JSON, an object with exactly
+ * the four expected keys, the exact version, a subject matching the *requested* one, a canonical
+ * `toISOString()` timestamp, a canonical `GrantId`, and — the catch-all — a re-encoding that
+ * reproduces the supplied string byte-for-byte, which rejects padding, trailing data, and any
+ * alternative encoding of the same payload. A rejected cursor reveals nothing it decoded.
+ */
+function decodeCursor(raw: string, userId: EkklesiaUserId): GrantPageBoundary | undefined {
+  if (!BASE64URL_PATTERN.test(raw)) {
+    return undefined;
+  }
+  let parsed: unknown;
+  try {
+    parsed = JSON.parse(Buffer.from(raw, "base64url").toString("utf8"));
+  } catch {
+    return undefined;
+  }
+  if (typeof parsed !== "object" || parsed === null || Array.isArray(parsed)) {
+    return undefined;
+  }
+  const payload = parsed as Record<string, unknown>;
+  if (Object.keys(payload).sort().join(",") !== "g,t,u,v") {
+    return undefined;
+  }
+  if (payload.v !== CURSOR_VERSION || payload.u !== userId || typeof payload.t !== "string") {
+    return undefined;
+  }
+  const createdAt = new Date(payload.t);
+  if (Number.isNaN(createdAt.getTime()) || createdAt.toISOString() !== payload.t) {
+    return undefined;
+  }
+  const id = safeParseGrantId(payload.g);
+  if (!id.success) {
+    return undefined;
+  }
+  const boundary: GrantPageBoundary = Object.freeze({ createdAt, id: id.data });
+  if (encodeCursor(userId, boundary) !== raw) {
+    return undefined;
+  }
+  return boundary;
+}
+
+const LIST_ALLOWED_QUERY_KEYS = new Set(["userId", "limit", "cursor"]);
+/** Canonical base-10, no sign, no leading zero, no decimal point, no whitespace, no exponent. */
+const CANONICAL_POSITIVE_INTEGER_PATTERN = /^[1-9][0-9]*$/u;
+
+interface ParsedListQuery {
+  readonly after?: GrantPageBoundary;
+  readonly limit: number;
+  readonly subjectUserId: EkklesiaUserId;
+}
+
+/** Fully validated before any store or database work happens, so an invalid page request never
+ * becomes a query, and never becomes a way to probe which subjects or grants exist. */
+function parseListQuery(url: string): ParsedListQuery | undefined {
+  const searchParams = new URL(url).searchParams;
+  for (const key of searchParams.keys()) {
+    if (!LIST_ALLOWED_QUERY_KEYS.has(key) || searchParams.getAll(key).length > 1) {
+      return undefined;
+    }
+  }
+
+  const subjectUserId = safeParseEkklesiaUserId(searchParams.get("userId"));
+  if (!subjectUserId.success) {
+    return undefined;
+  }
+
+  let limit = DEFAULT_LIST_LIMIT;
+  const rawLimit = searchParams.get("limit");
+  if (rawLimit !== null) {
+    if (!CANONICAL_POSITIVE_INTEGER_PATTERN.test(rawLimit)) {
+      return undefined;
+    }
+    limit = Number(rawLimit);
+    if (!Number.isSafeInteger(limit) || limit < 1 || limit > AUTHORIZATION_GRANT_LIST_MAX_LIMIT) {
+      return undefined;
+    }
+  }
+
+  let after: GrantPageBoundary | undefined;
+  const rawCursor = searchParams.get("cursor");
+  if (rawCursor !== null) {
+    after = decodeCursor(rawCursor, subjectUserId.data);
+    if (after === undefined) {
+      return undefined;
+    }
+  }
+
+  return Object.freeze({
+    ...(after === undefined ? {} : { after }),
+    limit,
+    subjectUserId: subjectUserId.data,
+  });
+}
+
+function serializeGrant(grant: GrantRecord) {
+  return {
+    createdAt: grant.createdAt.toISOString(),
+    expiresAt: grant.expiresAt ? grant.expiresAt.toISOString() : null,
+    id: grant.id,
+    permission: grant.permission,
+    revokedAt: grant.revokedAt ? grant.revokedAt.toISOString() : null,
+    scope: grant.scope ?? null,
+    sourceKind: grant.sourceKind,
+    userId: grant.userId,
+  };
+}
+
+/**
+ * The v1 explicit-grant management API: list, create, and revoke *explicit* grants only. Every
+ * route requires `core.authorization.grants.manage`; a platform owner passes through the
+ * evaluator's existing owner bypass without ever needing an explicit grant of this permission
+ * themselves — that bypass is exactly how a platform owner deliberately delegates grant
+ * administration to another account by granting them this one permission.
+ *
+ * Relationship-derived grants are never reachable through this API in either direction: creation
+ * always hard-codes `sourceKind: "explicit"` server-side (the request body cannot supply a
+ * `sourceKind` at all), and revocation is constrained to `sourceKind: "explicit"`, so attempting
+ * to revoke a relationship-derived grant by id behaves exactly like the grant does not exist —
+ * those grants remain owned by the module operation that established the relationship.
+ *
+ * Creation is unscoped-only; see `parseCreateGrantBody`.
+ */
+export function createGrantsRoutes(options: CreateGrantsRoutesOptions): Hono {
+  const routes = new Hono();
+  const now = options.now ?? ((): Date => new Date());
+  const requireManagePermission = requirePermission(options, CORE_AUTHORIZATION_GRANTS_MANAGE);
+  const requireOrigin = requireTrustedOrigin(options.trustedOrigins);
+  // Origin is checked first (a rejected cross-origin mutation must never have its body read), then
+  // the body-size limit runs before permission evaluation, so an oversized mutation never reaches
+  // authorization work or the store.
+  const mutationBodyLimit = platformBodyLimit(CORE_MUTATION_MAX_BODY_BYTES);
+
+  routes.get("/api/v1/grants", requireManagePermission, async (c) => {
+    c.header("Cache-Control", "no-store");
+    // Reached only after `requireManagePermission` allowed the caller, so query validation can
+    // never disclose a validation distinction — or the existence of any subject or grant — to an
+    // unauthorized caller.
+    const query = parseListQuery(c.req.url);
+    if (!query) {
+      return c.json({ code: "INVALID_REQUEST" }, 400);
+    }
+    try {
+      const page = await options.store.listGrantsForUser(query.subjectUserId, {
+        ...(query.after === undefined ? {} : { after: query.after }),
+        limit: query.limit,
+        sourceKind: "explicit",
+      });
+      return c.json(
+        {
+          grants: page.grants.map(serializeGrant),
+          nextCursor:
+            page.nextBoundary === undefined
+              ? null
+              : encodeCursor(query.subjectUserId, page.nextBoundary),
+        },
+        200,
+      );
+    } catch (error) {
+      return sanitizedStoreErrorResponse(c, error);
+    }
+  });
+
+  routes.post(
+    "/api/v1/grants",
+    requireOrigin,
+    mutationBodyLimit,
+    requireManagePermission,
+    async (c) => {
+      c.header("Cache-Control", "no-store");
+      const principal = getAuthorizedPrincipal(c);
+      if (!isAuthenticatedPrincipal(principal)) {
+        return c.json({ code: "AUTHORIZATION_DENIED" }, 403);
+      }
+
+      let rawBody: unknown;
+      try {
+        rawBody = await c.req.json();
+      } catch {
+        return c.json({ code: "INVALID_REQUEST" }, 400);
+      }
+      const parsed = parseCreateGrantBody(rawBody, now());
+      if (!parsed) {
+        return c.json({ code: "INVALID_REQUEST" }, 400);
+      }
+
+      // A well-formed PermissionId is not necessarily a *registered* one. Only the trusted registry
+      // (never the request) decides what may be granted — the same registry `requireManagePermission`
+      // already consults for the caller's own `core.authorization.grants.manage` check — so a caller
+      // cannot pre-create a dormant grant for an invented identifier that later becomes effective the
+      // moment someone registers it. Sanitized identically to any other denial: this must never reveal
+      // whether the identifier was malformed (400, above) or simply unregistered (403, here).
+      if (!options.registry.has(parsed.permission)) {
+        return c.json({ code: "AUTHORIZATION_DENIED" }, 403);
+      }
+
+      try {
+        const grant = await options.store.createGrant({
+          actor: createUserActor(principal.userId),
+          ...(parsed.expiresAt === undefined ? {} : { expiresAt: parsed.expiresAt }),
+          permission: parsed.permission,
+          sourceKind: "explicit",
+          userId: parsed.subjectUserId,
+        });
+        return c.json({ grant: serializeGrant(grant) }, 201);
+      } catch (error) {
+        return sanitizedStoreErrorResponse(c, error);
+      }
+    },
+  );
+
+  routes.post(
+    "/api/v1/grants/:grantId/revoke",
+    requireOrigin,
+    mutationBodyLimit,
+    requireManagePermission,
+    async (c) => {
+      c.header("Cache-Control", "no-store");
+      const principal = getAuthorizedPrincipal(c);
+      if (!isAuthenticatedPrincipal(principal)) {
+        return c.json({ code: "AUTHORIZATION_DENIED" }, 403);
+      }
+
+      // Canonical-UUID validation happens after authorization but strictly before any store or
+      // database call: a malformed id previously reached PostgreSQL's own UUID comparison and came
+      // back as an indistinguishable infrastructure failure (503) rather than a request problem.
+      const grantId = safeParseGrantId(c.req.param("grantId"));
+      if (!grantId.success) {
+        return c.json({ code: "INVALID_REQUEST" }, 400);
+      }
+
+      try {
+        await options.store.revokeGrant({
+          actor: createUserActor(principal.userId),
+          grantId: grantId.data satisfies GrantId,
+          sourceKind: "explicit",
+        });
+        return c.json({ success: true }, 200);
+      } catch (error) {
+        return sanitizedStoreErrorResponse(c, error);
+      }
+    },
+  );
+
+  return routes;
+}

apps/api/src/health-routes.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
+import { Hono } from "hono";
+
+/**
+ * The longest a readiness probe waits on the database before answering `503` (ADR 0044). Short
+ * enough for a Compose health check or an external monitor to treat a stall as "not ready" rather
+ * than as a hung probe, and well inside the shared pool's own 10s connection and operation
+ * timeouts, which bound the underlying query independently.
+ */
+export const READINESS_DATABASE_TIMEOUT_MS = 2_000;
+
+export const HEALTH_LIVE_PATH = "/api/v1/health/live";
+export const HEALTH_READY_PATH = "/api/v1/health/ready";
+
+export interface ApiHealthOptions {
+  /**
+   * One trivial database round trip. Resolves when the database answered; rejects on any failure.
+   * The rejection is never read — not its message, code, or cause — so nothing a driver says can
+   * reach a response. The route bounds the wait and never overlaps two calls; this function only
+   * has to perform the query.
+   */
+  readonly checkDatabase: () => Promise<void>;
+  /** Whether module startup has completed. `false` again from the moment shutdown begins, so a
+   * draining instance stops reporting ready while it finishes in-flight requests. */
+  readonly isModuleStartupComplete: () => boolean;
+}
+
+const LIVE_BODY = Object.freeze({ status: "live" });
+const READY_BODY = Object.freeze({ status: "ready" });
+const NOT_READY_BODY = Object.freeze({ code: "NOT_READY" });
+
+/**
+ * Wraps `checkDatabase` so at most one call is ever unsettled, and no probe waits longer than
+ * `timeoutMs`.
+ *
+ * Every probe arriving while a check is unsettled shares that check's outcome, including after its
+ * deadline has passed: the deadline resolves the shared outcome to `false`, so those later probes
+ * answer immediately. A new check starts only once the previous call has actually settled. A timed-
+ * out query still occupies a pool connection until the database or the pool's own timeouts end it,
+ * so starting a fresh query on every probe would let a stalled database drain the pool one health
+ * check at a time.
+ */
+function createBoundedDatabaseCheck(
+  checkDatabase: () => Promise<void>,
+  timeoutMs: number,
+): () => Promise<boolean> {
+  let inFlight: Promise<boolean> | undefined;
+
+  return () => {
+    if (inFlight !== undefined) {
+      return inFlight;
+    }
+    let timer: ReturnType<typeof setTimeout> | undefined;
+    // The executor runs `checkDatabase` synchronously, so a synchronous throw is a rejection like
+    // any other rather than an exception escaping the route.
+    const settled = new Promise<void>((resolve) => resolve(checkDatabase())).then(
+      () => true,
+      () => false,
+    );
+    const outcome = Promise.race([
+      settled,
+      new Promise<false>((resolve) => {
+        timer = setTimeout(() => resolve(false), timeoutMs);
+      }),
+    ]);
+    inFlight = outcome;
+    void settled.then(() => {
+      clearTimeout(timer);
+      inFlight = undefined;
+    });
+    return outcome;
+  };
+}
+
+/** The same fixed refusal `./module-realtime-routes.js` uses: Hono lets a GET handler answer HEAD,
+ * and these routes accept GET alone. */
+function methodNotAllowed(): Response {
+  return new Response(null, {
+    headers: { Allow: "GET", "Cache-Control": "no-store" },
+    status: 405,
+  });
+}
+
+/**
+ * Unauthenticated liveness and readiness (ADR 0044), for Compose health checks and external
+ * monitoring. Neither route resolves a principal or reads a cookie, and both return fixed bodies
+ * that name no module, version, error, or connection detail; `pnpm doctor` remains the detailed
+ * operator report. They live under `/api/v1/health/`, a sibling of the `/api/v1/modules/` prefix that
+ * installed modules own entirely, so no module route can shadow them.
+ */
+export function createHealthRoutes(options: ApiHealthOptions): Hono {
+  const checkDatabase = createBoundedDatabaseCheck(
+    options.checkDatabase,
+    READINESS_DATABASE_TIMEOUT_MS,
+  );
+  const routes = new Hono();
+
+  routes.all(HEALTH_LIVE_PATH, (c) => {
+    if (c.req.method !== "GET") {
+      return methodNotAllowed();
+    }
+    c.header("Cache-Control", "no-store");
+    return c.json(LIVE_BODY, 200);
+  });
+
+  routes.all(HEALTH_READY_PATH, async (c) => {
+    if (c.req.method !== "GET") {
+      return methodNotAllowed();
+    }
+    c.header("Cache-Control", "no-store");
+    if (!options.isModuleStartupComplete()) {
+      return c.json(NOT_READY_BODY, 503);
+    }
+    const databaseReady = await checkDatabase();
+    // Checked again afterwards: shutdown may have begun while the query was in flight.
+    return databaseReady && options.isModuleStartupComplete()
+      ? c.json(READY_BODY, 200)
+      : c.json(NOT_READY_BODY, 503);
+  });
+
+  return routes;
+}

apps/api/src/module-configuration-routes.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,375 @@
+import {
+  type ModuleConfigurationDeclaration,
+  MODULE_CONFIGURATION_VALUE_MAX_LENGTH,
+  moduleConfigurationKeySchema,
+  moduleIdSchema,
+  type ModuleSecretSource,
+} from "@ekklesia/contracts";
+import { CORE_MODULES_CONFIGURATION_MANAGE } from "@ekklesia/core/authorization";
+import {
+  type DiscoveredModule,
+  type ModuleConfigurationSettings,
+  type ModuleConfigurationStore,
+  ModuleConfigurationStoreError,
+  resolveModuleConfigurationFor,
+} from "@ekklesia/core/modules";
+import { Hono } from "hono";
+import type { Context } from "hono";
+import {
+  type AuthorizationMiddlewareOptions,
+  requirePermission,
+  requireTrustedOrigin,
+} from "./authorization-middleware.js";
+import { CORE_MUTATION_MAX_BODY_BYTES, platformBodyLimit } from "./body-limits.js";
+
+/**
+ * A **sibling** of `/api/v1/modules/`, never a child — the third application of the rule ADR 0025
+ * established and ADR 0028 reapplied. `config` and `configuration` are both ordinary lowercase
+ * static segments under `moduleRoutePathSchema`, so a module named `announcements` may legitimately
+ * register `PUT /config` and land on exactly `/api/v1/modules/announcements/config`. Publishing the
+ * platform's own configuration mutation there would put Core and an installed module in one URL
+ * namespace with registration order deciding which one answers — for a route that changes how
+ * modules behave.
+ */
+export const MODULE_CONFIGURATION_PATH = "/api/v1/module-configuration";
+const MODULE_CONFIGURATION_MODULE_PATH = `${MODULE_CONFIGURATION_PATH}/:moduleId`;
+
+/**
+ * One declared key as an operator sees it: the module's own declaration, plus what is currently
+ * stored, plus what the running process actually used.
+ *
+ * `value` is **absent for every `secret` key, always**. Not null, not redacted, not a placeholder —
+ * absent, because there is no code path that could put secret material here: Ekklesia never persists
+ * it, and the resolver's snapshot is never serialized. `configured` reports whether the deployment
+ * supplied one, which is the only thing an operator needs to know from here.
+ */
+export interface ModuleConfigurationKeyView {
+  readonly key: string;
+  readonly type: ModuleConfigurationDeclaration["type"];
+  readonly required: boolean;
+  readonly description?: string;
+  /** The declared default, for non-secret keys that have one. Part of the module's public manifest. */
+  readonly default?: string | number | boolean;
+  /** Present only for `type: "enum"`. */
+  readonly values?: readonly string[];
+  /** The stored value, when one is stored and the key is not a secret. Absent means "no value
+   * stored" — the default applies, or the key is unset. */
+  readonly value?: string;
+  /** For a secret: whether the deployment supplies it. For anything else: whether a value is stored.
+   * Never implies the value is valid — see the module's `runtime` entry for that. */
+  readonly configured: boolean;
+}
+
+export interface ModuleConfigurationView {
+  readonly moduleId: string;
+  readonly version: string;
+  readonly keys: readonly ModuleConfigurationKeyView[];
+  /** Stored keys this module's current manifest no longer declares. Retained rather than deleted, so
+   * a downgrade or a rename does not destroy an operator's value, and surfaced here so it is visible
+   * rather than merely tolerated. */
+  readonly unknownKeys: readonly string[];
+  /** `true` when the stored configuration no longer matches what this process resolved at boot. A
+   * configuration change is applied by the next restart; nothing is hot-reloaded (ADR 0029). */
+  readonly restartRequired: boolean;
+}
+
+export interface CreateModuleConfigurationRoutesOptions extends AuthorizationMiddlewareOptions {
+  /** The discovered inventory this process booted from — the source of every declaration this route
+   * validates against. Never re-discovered: a manifest that changed on disk since boot is not what
+   * the running platform is using. */
+  readonly discoveredModules: readonly DiscoveredModule[];
+  /** The stored settings this process resolved at boot, used only to compute `restartRequired` by
+   * comparison with what is stored now. */
+  readonly bootSettings: ModuleConfigurationSettings;
+  readonly secrets: ModuleSecretSource;
+  readonly store: ModuleConfigurationStore;
+  readonly trustedOrigins: ReadonlySet<string>;
+}
+
+function sanitizedFailure(c: Context, status: 400 | 404 | 503, code: string): Response {
+  c.header("Cache-Control", "no-store");
+  return c.json({ code }, status);
+}
+
+/** Maps the store's own sanitized codes onto HTTP without inventing a second vocabulary. The store's
+ * errors never carry a value, so nothing here can leak one either. */
+function storeFailure(c: Context, error: unknown, fallback: "read" | "write"): Response {
+  if (error instanceof ModuleConfigurationStoreError) {
+    if (
+      error.code === "MODULE_CONFIGURATION_READ_FAILED" ||
+      error.code === "MODULE_CONFIGURATION_WRITE_FAILED"
+    ) {
+      return sanitizedFailure(c, 503, error.code);
+    }
+    return sanitizedFailure(c, 400, "INVALID_REQUEST");
+  }
+  return sanitizedFailure(
+    c,
+    503,
+    fallback === "read" ? "MODULE_CONFIGURATION_READ_FAILED" : "MODULE_CONFIGURATION_WRITE_FAILED",
+  );
+}
+
+function isRecord(value: unknown): value is Record<string, unknown> {
+  return typeof value === "object" && value !== null && !Array.isArray(value);
+}
+
+const BODY_KEYS = new Set(["values"]);
+
+/**
+ * The canonical text form of a submitted value, or `undefined` when it is not one this key accepts.
+ *
+ * Accepts JSON's own types — a number for `integer`, a boolean for `boolean`, a string for the rest
+ * — and converts to the single canonical text form the store persists and the resolver parses. It
+ * never accepts a string for a number (`"7"`), so exactly one spelling reaches storage and a stored
+ * row can never validate differently from the request that created it.
+ */
+function canonicalStoredValue(
+  declaration: ModuleConfigurationDeclaration,
+  submitted: unknown,
+): string | undefined {
+  switch (declaration.type) {
+    case "integer": {
+      return typeof submitted === "number" && Number.isSafeInteger(submitted)
+        ? String(submitted)
+        : undefined;
+    }
+    case "boolean": {
+      return typeof submitted === "boolean" ? String(submitted) : undefined;
+    }
+    case "string":
+    case "enum":
+    case "url": {
+      return typeof submitted === "string" &&
+        submitted.length <= MODULE_CONFIGURATION_VALUE_MAX_LENGTH
+        ? submitted
+        : undefined;
+    }
+    case "secret": {
+      // Unreachable: a secret key is rejected before this is called. The branch exists so adding a
+      // type to the union is a compile error rather than a silent acceptance of secret material.
+      return undefined;
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+async function readJsonBody(c: Context): Promise<unknown> {
+  try {
+    return (await c.req.json()) as unknown;
+  } catch {
+    return undefined;
+  }
+}
+
+function declarationView(
+  declaration: ModuleConfigurationDeclaration,
+  storedValue: string | undefined,
+  secretConfigured: boolean,
+): ModuleConfigurationKeyView {
+  const isSecret = declaration.type === "secret";
+  return {
+    // A secret is `configured` when the deployment supplies it; anything else when a value is
+    // stored. The two are different questions with one honest answer each.
+    configured: isSecret ? secretConfigured : storedValue !== undefined,
+    key: declaration.key,
+    required: declaration.required,
+    type: declaration.type,
+    ...(declaration.description === undefined ? {} : { description: declaration.description }),
+    ...(isSecret || declaration.default === undefined ? {} : { default: declaration.default }),
+    ...(declaration.type === "enum" ? { values: declaration.values } : {}),
+    // The one place a stored value reaches a response — and structurally never for a secret.
+    ...(isSecret || storedValue === undefined ? {} : { value: storedValue }),
+  };
+}
+
+/**
+ * The platform's module configuration resource: what each installed module declares it needs, what
+ * an operator has stored, and whether the running process is still using it.
+ *
+ * ## Secrets are absent, not filtered
+ *
+ * There is no branch here that redacts a secret, because there is nothing to redact: Ekklesia never
+ * persists secret material, so the store this route reads from contains none. A `secret` key's
+ * `value` field is omitted by construction and `configured` is computed by asking the deployment's
+ * secret source a yes/no question. A future code change that tried to serve a secret value would
+ * have to first invent somewhere to read one from.
+ *
+ * ## Changing configuration does not change the running process
+ *
+ * `PUT` replaces the stored document. It does not restart, reload, or reconfigure anything: modules
+ * receive a frozen snapshot resolved once at startup (ADR 0029), so the response reports
+ * `restartRequired` rather than pretending the change took effect.
+ *
+ * ## Closed validation against the module's own declaration
+ *
+ * A submitted key the module does not declare is rejected, as is a value of the wrong JSON type or a
+ * value failing the module's declared constraints. Nothing is coerced, truncated, or dropped:
+ * `{"slideSeconds": "7"}` is a `400`, not a silent `7`. A secret key is rejected outright — there is
+ * no supported way to submit secret material to this platform.
+ */
+export function createModuleConfigurationRoutes(
+  options: CreateModuleConfigurationRoutesOptions,
+): Hono {
+  const routes = new Hono();
+  const requireManage = requirePermission(
+    { evaluator: options.evaluator, registry: options.registry, runtime: options.runtime },
+    CORE_MODULES_CONFIGURATION_MANAGE,
+  );
+  const requireOrigin = requireTrustedOrigin(options.trustedOrigins);
+  const mutationBodyLimit = platformBodyLimit(CORE_MUTATION_MAX_BODY_BYTES);
+  const modulesById = new Map(
+    options.discoveredModules.map((module) => [module.manifest.id, module] as const),
+  );
+
+  const storedFor = (
+    settings: ModuleConfigurationSettings,
+    moduleId: string,
+  ): ReadonlyMap<string, string> =>
+    new Map(
+      settings.records
+        .filter((record) => record.moduleId === moduleId)
+        .map((record) => [record.key, record.value] as const),
+    );
+
+  /** Two documents differ when the exact set of (key, value) pairs differs. Compared against the
+   * settings this process actually resolved at boot, so `restartRequired` is an observation rather
+   * than a guess. */
+  const differsFromBoot = (moduleId: string, current: ReadonlyMap<string, string>): boolean => {
+    const boot = storedFor(options.bootSettings, moduleId);
+    if (boot.size !== current.size) {
+      return true;
+    }
+    for (const [key, value] of current) {
+      if (boot.get(key) !== value) {
+        return true;
+      }
+    }
+    return false;
+  };
+
+  const buildView = (
+    module: DiscoveredModule,
+    settings: ModuleConfigurationSettings,
+  ): ModuleConfigurationView => {
+    const stored = storedFor(settings, module.manifest.id);
+    const resolved = resolveModuleConfigurationFor(module.manifest, {
+      secrets: options.secrets,
+      settings,
+    });
+    return {
+      keys: module.manifest.configuration.map((declaration) =>
+        declarationView(
+          declaration as ModuleConfigurationDeclaration,
+          stored.get(declaration.key),
+          // Asked, never read into the response: the answer is a boolean, and the value it was
+          // derived from never leaves the resolver.
+          declaration.type === "secret"
+            ? options.secrets.get(module.manifest.id, declaration.key) !== undefined
+            : false,
+        ),
+      ),
+      moduleId: module.manifest.id,
+      restartRequired: differsFromBoot(module.manifest.id, stored),
+      unknownKeys: resolved.unknownKeys,
+      version: module.manifest.version,
+    };
+  };
+
+  routes.get(MODULE_CONFIGURATION_MODULE_PATH, requireManage, async (c) => {
+    c.header("Cache-Control", "no-store");
+    c.header("Vary", "Origin, Cookie");
+    const moduleId = c.req.param("moduleId");
+    const module = moduleId === undefined ? undefined : modulesById.get(moduleId);
+    if (!module || !moduleIdSchema.safeParse(moduleId).success) {
+      return sanitizedFailure(c, 404, "MODULE_NOT_INSTALLED");
+    }
+    try {
+      return c.json(buildView(module, await options.store.readSettings()), 200);
+    } catch (error) {
+      return storeFailure(c, error, "read");
+    }
+  });
+
+  routes.put(
+    MODULE_CONFIGURATION_MODULE_PATH,
+    requireOrigin,
+    mutationBodyLimit,
+    requireManage,
+    async (c) => {
+      c.header("Cache-Control", "no-store");
+      const moduleId = c.req.param("moduleId");
+      const raw = await readJsonBody(c);
+      if (!isRecord(raw) || Object.keys(raw).some((key) => !BODY_KEYS.has(key))) {
+        return sanitizedFailure(c, 400, "INVALID_REQUEST");
+      }
+      const submitted = raw.values;
+      if (!isRecord(submitted)) {
+        return sanitizedFailure(c, 400, "INVALID_REQUEST");
+      }
+      const module = moduleId === undefined ? undefined : modulesById.get(moduleId);
+      if (!module || !moduleIdSchema.safeParse(moduleId).success) {
+        return sanitizedFailure(c, 404, "MODULE_NOT_INSTALLED");
+      }
+
+      const declarations = new Map(
+        module.manifest.configuration.map(
+          (declaration) =>
+            [declaration.key, declaration as ModuleConfigurationDeclaration] as const,
+        ),
+      );
+      const values: { key: string; value: string }[] = [];
+      // `Object.keys` on a parsed JSON object never yields inherited properties, and every key is
+      // re-validated against the platform's one configuration-key grammar before it is used, so a
+      // body carrying `__proto__` or `constructor` is a plain `400` rather than anything stranger.
+      for (const key of Object.keys(submitted)) {
+        if (!moduleConfigurationKeySchema.safeParse(key).success) {
+          return sanitizedFailure(c, 400, "INVALID_REQUEST");
+        }
+        const declaration = declarations.get(key);
+        if (!declaration) {
+          return sanitizedFailure(c, 400, "CONFIGURATION_KEY_UNDECLARED");
+        }
+        if (declaration.type === "secret") {
+          // Deliberate and permanent for this pass: Ekklesia has no encryption at rest, so there is
+          // no honest way to accept secret material over HTTP and store it. Secrets are supplied by
+          // the deployment environment (ADR 0029).
+          return sanitizedFailure(c, 400, "CONFIGURATION_SECRET_NOT_WRITABLE");
+        }
+        const canonical = canonicalStoredValue(declaration, submitted[key]);
+        if (canonical === undefined) {
+          return sanitizedFailure(c, 400, "CONFIGURATION_VALUE_INVALID");
+        }
+        values.push({ key, value: canonical });
+      }
+
+      // Constraint validation runs through the **same resolver the platform boots with**, over the
+      // exact document about to be stored, rather than a second copy of the type rules here. That
+      // is what guarantees the API and startup can never disagree about whether a value is valid:
+      // there is one implementation, and this is it.
+      //
+      // An *incomplete* document is accepted deliberately — an operator may save partial work, and
+      // the module is then reported `blocked · configuration_missing` until they finish. An
+      // *invalid* one never is: storing a value that could not survive the next boot would hand
+      // back a success for a change that silently breaks the module.
+      const candidate = resolveModuleConfigurationFor(module.manifest, {
+        secrets: options.secrets,
+        settings: {
+          records: values.map((entry) => ({ ...entry, moduleId: module.manifest.id })),
+        },
+      });
+      if (candidate.issue?.reason === "configuration_invalid") {
+        return sanitizedFailure(c, 400, "CONFIGURATION_VALUE_INVALID");
+      }
+
+      try {
+        await options.store.replace({ moduleId: module.manifest.id, values });
+        // Re-read rather than predict, so this response and a later GET can never disagree.
+        return c.json(buildView(module, await options.store.readSettings()), 200);
+      } catch (error) {
+        return storeFailure(c, error, "write");
+      }
+    },
+  );
+
+  return routes;
+}

apps/api/src/module-display-path.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+/**
+ * Canonical browser routes owned by the platform's display host.
+ *
+ * Kept separate from the route registration module so both the display host and module-UI
+ * inventory can publish the same path without introducing a dependency cycle.
+ */
+export const MODULE_DISPLAY_DESCRIPTOR_PREFIX = "/api/v1/module-displays";
+export const MODULE_DISPLAY_PAGE_PREFIX = "/display";
+
+export function moduleDisplayPageUrl(moduleId: string): string {
+  return `${MODULE_DISPLAY_PAGE_PREFIX}/${encodeURIComponent(moduleId)}`;
+}
+
+export function moduleDisplayDescriptorUrl(moduleId: string): string {
+  return `${MODULE_DISPLAY_DESCRIPTOR_PREFIX}/${encodeURIComponent(moduleId)}`;
+}

apps/api/src/module-display-routes.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,288 @@
+import type { EkklesiaPrincipal } from "@ekklesia/contracts";
+import type { ModuleUiPublicationRegistry, PublishableModuleDisplay } from "@ekklesia/core/modules";
+import type { Context, Hono } from "hono";
+import {
+  type AuthorizationMiddlewareOptions,
+  getAuthorizedPrincipal,
+  requirePermission,
+} from "./authorization-middleware.js";
+import { etagMatches } from "./conditional-request.js";
+import { createDisplayHostAssets, type DisplayHostAssets } from "./display-host-assets.js";
+export {
+  MODULE_DISPLAY_DESCRIPTOR_PREFIX,
+  MODULE_DISPLAY_PAGE_PREFIX,
+  moduleDisplayDescriptorUrl,
+  moduleDisplayPageUrl,
+} from "./module-display-path.js";
+import { moduleDisplayDescriptorUrl, moduleDisplayPageUrl } from "./module-display-path.js";
+import { moduleApiBaseUrl } from "./module-http-routes.js";
+import { moduleRealtimeBaseUrl } from "./module-realtime-routes.js";
+import {
+  describeModuleContributions,
+  grantedModulePermissionIds,
+  type HostModuleContributionDescriptor,
+} from "./module-ui-inventory.js";
+import { moduleDisplayUiArtifactUrl } from "./module-ui-routes.js";
+
+/** Host-owned namespaces. Neither can collide with module HTTP routes, all of which live under
+ * `/api/v1/modules/<module-id>`, and neither string enters the module-facing UI ABI. */
+export const DISPLAY_HOST_SCRIPT_PATH = "/assets/ekklesia-display/app.js";
+/**
+ * Where the display's offline service worker is served (ADR 0043).
+ *
+ * The path is chosen for its **directory**: a service worker's default scope is the directory it was
+ * served from, so `/display/sw.js` controls display pages and nothing else. Serving it from
+ * `/assets/…` beside the host script would scope it to `/assets/`, where no page lives, and widening
+ * it with `Service-Worker-Allowed` would put the Dashboard under a worker it has no use for.
+ *
+ * `sw.js` cannot collide with a display page: a display page is registered at the exact literal
+ * `/display/<module-id>` for each display-capable module, and `sw.js` is not a valid module id.
+ */
+export const DISPLAY_SERVICE_WORKER_PATH = "/display/sw.js";
+
+/** The portable facts a browser host needs to mount this module's one display artifact. It mirrors
+ * the primary UI descriptor while naming the role explicitly, so a host cannot accidentally load a
+ * management artifact into a signage route. No outer Ekklesia route or filesystem path crosses the
+ * boundary. */
+export interface HostModuleDisplayDescriptor {
+  readonly id: string;
+  readonly version: string;
+  readonly display: { readonly url: string };
+  /** The public page a screen opens to mount this display. This is distinct from `display.url`,
+   * which is the compiled artifact imported by the platform host. */
+  readonly page: { readonly url: string };
+  readonly api: { readonly baseUrl: string };
+  readonly realtime: { readonly baseUrl: string };
+  readonly permissions: readonly string[];
+  /** Renderers other modules contributed to capabilities this module provides (ADR 0041) — the
+   * mechanism a signage-style display uses to show another module's content without importing it. */
+  readonly contributions: readonly HostModuleContributionDescriptor[];
+}
+
+/**
+ * Who the host resolved as the viewer of this display.
+ *
+ * The descriptor reports it because the display host must not ask `/api/v1/principal` — that
+ * endpoint answers a question about *people*, and a paired device is deliberately anonymous to it
+ * (ADR 0036). Reading the viewer from the response that already performed the authorization means
+ * the display never has to infer "no human session, so presumably a device", and the two identity
+ * classes never have to be told apart by elimination.
+ */
+export type HostDisplayViewer =
+  | { readonly kind: "authenticated"; readonly userId: string }
+  | { readonly kind: "device"; readonly deviceId: string };
+
+export interface HostModuleDisplayResource {
+  readonly module: HostModuleDisplayDescriptor;
+  readonly viewer: HostDisplayViewer;
+}
+
+export interface ModuleDisplayRoutesOptions extends AuthorizationMiddlewareOptions {
+  /** The same immutable, eligible/running publication registry used for artifact bytes. */
+  readonly moduleUi: ModuleUiPublicationRegistry;
+  /** Omitted only when the registry contains no display entrypoints. Production reads the exact
+   * surface-owned files before binding and supplies their frozen contents here. */
+  readonly assets?: DisplayHostAssets;
+}
+
+/** A composition error, detected before any display route is registered. Carries no module id,
+ * permission id, path, or package location. */
+export class ModuleDisplayConfigurationError extends Error {
+  constructor() {
+    super("The module display host configuration is inconsistent.");
+    this.name = "ModuleDisplayConfigurationError";
+    this.stack = `${this.name}: ${this.message}`;
+    Object.freeze(this);
+  }
+}
+
+function displayFailure(c: Context): Response {
+  c.header("Cache-Control", "no-store");
+  return c.json({ code: "AUTHORIZATION_EVALUATION_FAILED" }, 503);
+}
+
+/** Copies and validates injected assets before registering any route. Production's loader already
+ * creates this exact shape, while this check keeps a test/composition caller from pairing mutable
+ * bytes with a stale validator. */
+function snapshotAssets(input: DisplayHostAssets): DisplayHostAssets {
+  try {
+    const snapshot = createDisplayHostAssets(input.html, input.script, input.serviceWorker);
+    if (
+      snapshot.scriptEtag !== input.scriptEtag ||
+      snapshot.serviceWorkerEtag !== input.serviceWorkerEtag
+    ) {
+      throw new ModuleDisplayConfigurationError();
+    }
+    return snapshot;
+  } catch {
+    throw new ModuleDisplayConfigurationError();
+  }
+}
+
+function describeViewer(principal: EkklesiaPrincipal): HostDisplayViewer | undefined {
+  if (principal.kind === "authenticated") {
+    return { kind: "authenticated", userId: principal.userId };
+  }
+  if (principal.kind === "device") {
+    return { deviceId: principal.deviceId, kind: "device" };
+  }
+  // Unreachable behind the permission gate: the display permission is `restricted`, which no
+  // anonymous principal satisfies. Stated rather than assumed.
+  return undefined;
+}
+
+async function describeDisplay(
+  options: ModuleDisplayRoutesOptions,
+  principal: EkklesiaPrincipal,
+  display: PublishableModuleDisplay,
+  viewer: HostDisplayViewer,
+): Promise<HostModuleDisplayResource> {
+  return {
+    viewer,
+    module: {
+      api: { baseUrl: moduleApiBaseUrl(display.moduleId) },
+      contributions: describeModuleContributions(options.moduleUi, display.moduleId),
+      display: { url: moduleDisplayUiArtifactUrl(display) },
+      id: display.moduleId,
+      page: { url: moduleDisplayPageUrl(display.moduleId) },
+      permissions: await grantedModulePermissionIds(
+        options.evaluator,
+        principal,
+        display.permissions,
+      ),
+      realtime: { baseUrl: moduleRealtimeBaseUrl(display.moduleId) },
+      version: display.version,
+    },
+  };
+}
+
+function mountDisplay(
+  app: Hono,
+  options: ModuleDisplayRoutesOptions & { readonly assets: DisplayHostAssets },
+  display: PublishableModuleDisplay,
+): void {
+  // The permission comes from an already-validated manifest/publication record. A request selects
+  // neither the permission nor the artifact; it can only hit this exact pre-composed route.
+  const requireDisplayPermission = requirePermission(options, display.displayPermission);
+
+  /**
+   * The page itself is **not** permission-gated, and the descriptor below still is.
+   *
+   * An unattended screen has no identity until someone pairs it, so a gate here would mean a new
+   * television could only ever be told 403 — there would be nowhere for it to display a pairing
+   * code, and the only way to adopt one would be to sign a human into it, which is exactly the
+   * model this pass exists to remove (ADR 0036).
+   *
+   * Serving it costs nothing, because it carries nothing: these are the same inert, module-agnostic
+   * bytes for every display, with no module id, no data, and one absolute script URL that was
+   * already public. Authorization lives entirely in the descriptor — the page can render, and then
+   * learns it may show only a pairing code. What this does reveal is that a module with a display
+   * exists at that path, which any pairing flow must reveal to the device it is pairing.
+   */
+  app.get(moduleDisplayPageUrl(display.moduleId), () => {
+    return new Response(options.assets.html, {
+      headers: {
+        "Cache-Control": "no-store",
+        "Content-Type": "text/html; charset=utf-8",
+        "X-Content-Type-Options": "nosniff",
+      },
+      status: 200,
+    });
+  });
+
+  app.get(moduleDisplayDescriptorUrl(display.moduleId), requireDisplayPermission, async (c) => {
+    c.header("Cache-Control", "no-store");
+    c.header("Vary", "Origin, Cookie");
+    try {
+      const principal = getAuthorizedPrincipal(c);
+      const viewer = describeViewer(principal);
+      if (!viewer) {
+        return displayFailure(c);
+      }
+      return c.json(await describeDisplay(options, principal, display, viewer), 200);
+    } catch {
+      return displayFailure(c);
+    }
+  });
+}
+
+/**
+ * Mounts one stable page and one descriptor route per eligible, running display declaration.
+ *
+ * There is deliberately no display inventory in this pass. A management UI may need one later,
+ * but a bookmarked TV needs only its version-independent page URL. Unknown, dashboard-only,
+ * disabled, and dependency-blocked modules have no registered route and collapse into the
+ * application's ordinary sanitized 404.
+ *
+ * The page is an inert, module-agnostic shell: its bytes contain no module id and its one absolute
+ * script URL cannot be rebased by a deep `/display/<id>` path. The browser reads the validated id
+ * from its outer URL, requests the permission-gated descriptor, and only then imports the exact
+ * versioned display artifact that the server supplied.
+ */
+export function mountModuleDisplayRoutes(app: Hono, options: ModuleDisplayRoutesOptions): void {
+  const displays = options.moduleUi.listDisplays();
+  if (displays.length === 0) {
+    return;
+  }
+  if (!options.assets) {
+    throw new ModuleDisplayConfigurationError();
+  }
+  const assets = snapshotAssets(options.assets);
+  for (const display of displays) {
+    if (!options.registry.has(display.displayPermission)) {
+      throw new ModuleDisplayConfigurationError();
+    }
+  }
+
+  // One fixed host bundle, never a directory and never a request-selected package file. Like module
+  // artifact bytes, fetching this platform code grants no authority; the page and descriptor are
+  // where identity and the module-owned display permission are enforced.
+  app.get(DISPLAY_HOST_SCRIPT_PATH, (c) => {
+    if (etagMatches(c.req.header("if-none-match"), assets.scriptEtag)) {
+      return new Response(null, {
+        headers: { "Cache-Control": "no-cache", ETag: assets.scriptEtag },
+        status: 304,
+      });
+    }
+    return new Response(assets.script, {
+      headers: {
+        "Cache-Control": "no-cache",
+        "Content-Type": "text/javascript; charset=utf-8",
+        ETag: assets.scriptEtag,
+        "X-Content-Type-Options": "nosniff",
+      },
+      status: 200,
+    });
+  });
+
+  /**
+   * The worker itself is `no-cache` with a strong validator, exactly like the host script: a browser
+   * re-checks it on its own schedule, and the worker deliberately never caches *itself*, which is
+   * how a screen avoids being trapped on an obsolete worker.
+   *
+   * Like the host script and module artifact bytes, fetching this code grants no authority. It
+   * caches only public code and never a permission decision, so serving it anonymously withholds
+   * nothing the platform was protecting.
+   */
+  app.get(DISPLAY_SERVICE_WORKER_PATH, (c) => {
+    if (etagMatches(c.req.header("if-none-match"), assets.serviceWorkerEtag)) {
+      return new Response(null, {
+        headers: { "Cache-Control": "no-cache", ETag: assets.serviceWorkerEtag },
+        status: 304,
+      });
+    }
+    return new Response(assets.serviceWorker, {
+      headers: {
+        "Cache-Control": "no-cache",
+        "Content-Type": "text/javascript; charset=utf-8",
+        ETag: assets.serviceWorkerEtag,
+        "X-Content-Type-Options": "nosniff",
+      },
+      status: 200,
+    });
+  });
+
+  for (const display of displays) {
+    mountDisplay(app, { ...options, assets }, display);
+  }
+}

apps/api/src/module-http-routes.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,284 @@
+import {
+  EMPTY_MODULE_CONFIGURATION,
+  EMPTY_MODULE_STORAGE,
+  type ModuleId,
+  type ModuleRouteHandlerContext,
+  type ModuleRuntimeServices,
+  type RegisteredModuleHttpRoute,
+} from "@ekklesia/contracts";
+import type {
+  ModuleConfigurationLookup,
+  ModuleRealtimeRegistry,
+  ModuleStorageLookup,
+} from "@ekklesia/core/modules";
+import type { Context, Hono } from "hono";
+import {
+  type AuthorizationMiddlewareOptions,
+  getAuthorizedPrincipal,
+  requirePermission,
+  requireTrustedOrigin,
+} from "./authorization-middleware.js";
+import { platformBodyLimit } from "./body-limits.js";
+
+const MODULE_ROUTE_PREFIX = "/api/v1/modules";
+const STATE_CHANGING_METHODS: ReadonlySet<string> = new Set(["DELETE", "PATCH", "POST", "PUT"]);
+const STRIPPED_CORS_RESPONSE_HEADERS = [
+  "access-control-allow-credentials",
+  "access-control-allow-headers",
+  "access-control-allow-methods",
+  "access-control-allow-origin",
+  "access-control-expose-headers",
+  "access-control-max-age",
+];
+
+export interface ModuleHttpRoutesOptions extends AuthorizationMiddlewareOptions {
+  readonly trustedOrigins: ReadonlySet<string>;
+  /** The same frozen services object the started module runtime's `start`/`stop` hooks already
+   * received for this API runtime — never a fresh one built per request, and never touched for a
+   * denied, trusted-origin-rejected, or `OPTIONS` request, since a handler is only ever invoked
+   * after authorization succeeds. */
+  readonly services: ModuleRuntimeServices;
+  /**
+   * Per-module frozen configuration snapshots — the exact map the module runtime started from
+   * (ADR 0029), so a handler and that module's `start`/`stop` hooks receive the identical object
+   * rather than two independently resolved values. A module with no entry receives
+   * `EMPTY_MODULE_CONFIGURATION`, so `context.config` is always present.
+   *
+   * Unlike `services`, which is one shared object, this is keyed by module id: a handler can only
+   * ever reach its own module's configuration, because that is the only entry looked up for it.
+   */
+  readonly configurations: ModuleConfigurationLookup;
+  /**
+   * Per-module scoped object storage — the exact map the module runtime started from (ADR 0030), so
+   * a handler and that module's lifecycle hooks share one facade rather than two independently
+   * resolved ones.
+   *
+   * Keyed by module id, like `configurations` and unlike `services`: a handler can only ever reach
+   * its own module's storage, because that is the only entry looked up for it.
+   */
+  readonly storages: ModuleStorageLookup;
+  /** The same started registry whose scoped publishers lifecycle hooks receive. */
+  readonly realtime: ModuleRealtimeRegistry;
+}
+
+/** Never carries the offending permission id, route path, module id, or any other configuration
+ * detail — a forged or inconsistent route snapshot is a startup-time composition bug, not
+ * something to describe in detail to whatever eventually logs it. */
+export class ModuleRouteConfigurationError extends Error {
+  constructor() {
+    super("A published module HTTP route references a permission that is not registered.");
+    this.name = "ModuleRouteConfigurationError";
+    this.stack = `${this.name}: ${this.message}`;
+    Object.freeze(this);
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * The root a module's own HTTP API is mounted at — the one place that URL shape is constructed.
+ *
+ * Exported because a browser host has to resolve `context.api.request("records")`
+ * (`ModuleUiApiClient`, `@ekklesia/module-ui-sdk`) to a real Ekklesia URL, and a module UI must
+ * never build that prefix itself: it is Ekklesia's private deployment detail, and a module that
+ * hardcoded it could not be hosted anywhere else (ADR 0022). The server hands the resolved base to
+ * the host through the module UI inventory (`./module-ui-inventory.js`) rather than letting the
+ * browser re-spell this template, so this prefix can change without touching either.
+ *
+ * Percent-encoded for the same reason `moduleUiArtifactUrl` is: a value that somehow did not come
+ * from a validated manifest can only ever become one segment's worth of text, never a new segment.
+ * A real module id (lowercase kebab-case, `moduleIdSchema`) is unaffected by the encoding.
+ */
+export function moduleApiBaseUrl(moduleId: string): string {
+  return `${MODULE_ROUTE_PREFIX}/${encodeURIComponent(moduleId)}`;
+}
+
+/** "/" is the module's own root and maps to the bare module prefix, never a required trailing
+ * slash; every other local path appends directly. Root and non-root therefore never collide, and
+ * `/api/v1/modules/<module-id>/` (the root path with a trailing slash) is never produced here. */
+function moduleRoutePath(moduleId: ModuleId, routePath: string): string {
+  const base = moduleApiBaseUrl(moduleId);
+  return routePath === "/" ? base : `${base}${routePath}`;
+}
+
+function sanitizedModuleHandlerFailure(c: Context): Response {
+  c.header("Cache-Control", "no-store");
+  return c.json({ code: "MODULE_HANDLER_FAILED" }, 500);
+}
+
+/**
+ * The one shared `Vary` parsing/canonicalization primitive: splits and trims comma-separated
+ * tokens and de-duplicates them case-insensitively — `Vary` lists header *names*, which are
+ * themselves case-insensitive, so a module's own `origin` must collapse with a later `Origin`
+ * rather than appear as a separate, redundant entry — while preserving first-seen casing and
+ * relative order. Never returns early on `*`; callers decide what a `*` token means for their own
+ * policy (see `mergedVaryHeader` and `canonicalizeVaryHeader` below, the two callers that build on
+ * this instead of re-implementing parsing/dedup independently).
+ */
+function parseVaryTokens(existingVary: string | null): Map<string, string> {
+  const canonicalByLowercase = new Map<string, string>();
+  for (const token of (existingVary ?? "").split(",")) {
+    const trimmed = token.trim();
+    if (trimmed.length === 0) {
+      continue;
+    }
+    const key = trimmed.toLowerCase();
+    if (!canonicalByLowercase.has(key)) {
+      canonicalByLowercase.set(key, trimmed);
+    }
+  }
+  return canonicalByLowercase;
+}
+
+/** A literal `*` (RFC 9110 §12.5.5) must never be combined with any other value; since `*` already
+ * means "may vary on anything," a strictly broader signal than any explicit list, its presence
+ * collapses the result to `*` alone rather than producing an invalid combination. */
+function serializeVaryTokens(tokens: ReadonlyMap<string, string>): string {
+  if (tokens.has("*")) {
+    return "*";
+  }
+  return [...tokens.values()].join(", ");
+}
+
+/**
+ * Used only for a module's own response: always emits the canonical `Origin`/`Cookie` casing
+ * regardless of how (or whether) a module already listed them, since every module response is
+ * forced to vary on both (see `sanitizeModuleResponse`) — this is a deliberate product policy for
+ * module responses specifically, not a generic property every response through the platform's CORS
+ * boundary should have forced onto it (an `OPTIONS` preflight, for one, has no `Cookie` concept at
+ * all).
+ */
+export function mergedVaryHeader(existingVary: string | null): string {
+  const tokens = parseVaryTokens(existingVary);
+  if (tokens.has("*")) {
+    return "*";
+  }
+  tokens.set("origin", "Origin");
+  tokens.set("cookie", "Cookie");
+  return serializeVaryTokens(tokens);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Used at the app-level CORS boundary (`apps/api/src/app.ts`), which wraps every response —
+ * `OPTIONS` preflights and Core's own routes included, not only module ones — after Hono's own
+ * `cors()` has already appended its own `Vary: Origin`. Unlike `mergedVaryHeader`, this never
+ * injects a token that was not already present; it only de-duplicates and collapses `*`, since a
+ * generic boundary must not assume every response wants `Origin`/`Cookie` forced onto it.
+ */
+export function canonicalizeVaryHeader(existingVary: string): string {
+  return serializeVaryTokens(parseVaryTokens(existingVary));
+}
+
+/**
+ * The platform owns CORS and caching for every module route: strips any CORS-control header a
+ * handler set (defense in depth — the outer `cors()` middleware already computes the authoritative
+ * values for the actual response) and forces `Cache-Control: no-store` plus a `Vary` that always
+ * includes `Origin` and `Cookie`, since even a public-baseline handler receives an authorized
+ * principal and may personalize its response. A separate cache-policy contract is future work;
+ * this is the conservative default until then. A module's own legitimate `Vary` values (if any)
+ * are preserved alongside the forced ones. Never reads or buffers `response.body` — it is passed
+ * through to the new `Response` unread, so a streaming body is neither consumed nor blocked here.
+ */
+function sanitizeModuleResponse(response: Response): Response {
+  const headers = new Headers(response.headers);
+  for (const headerName of STRIPPED_CORS_RESPONSE_HEADERS) {
+    headers.delete(headerName);
+  }
+  headers.set("Cache-Control", "no-store");
+  headers.set("Vary", mergedVaryHeader(headers.get("Vary")));
+  return new Response(response.body, {
+    headers,
+    status: response.status,
+    statusText: response.statusText,
+  });
+}
+
+/**
+ * Mounts `StartedModuleRuntime`'s published, immutable route snapshot into `app`, in publication
+ * order — never sorted or mutated, and never invoking a handler while mounting. Every route is
+ * protected by the exact same `requirePermission` middleware Core's own routes use, with
+ * `route.permission` as the only permission id ever consulted and its baseline coming exclusively
+ * from `options.registry`; a state-changing method (`POST`/`PUT`/`PATCH`/`DELETE`) additionally
+ * requires `requireTrustedOrigin` before authorization ever runs. `GET` inherits Hono's own
+ * implicit `HEAD` handling, which re-enters this exact same middleware chain and strips the
+ * response body afterward — there is no separate `HEAD` registration or permission path.
+ * `route.handler` is invoked only after authorization succeeds, with the raw Fetch `Request` and a
+ * frozen context carrying exactly `config`, `moduleId`, `params`, `principal`, `realtime`,
+ * `services`, and `storage` — never a Hono `Context`, authorization store, raw provider, or
+ * deployment-wide configuration. `services.database` is the module's only reachable database
+ * surface, and the whole context is unreachable to anything short of a successfully authorized
+ * handler invocation (a denied request, a rejected trusted-origin check, and `OPTIONS` never reach
+ * this handler at all).
+ *
+ * Because the routes and registry both derive from the same discovered inventory
+ * (`prepareStartupModuleInventory`), every registered route permission should already be
+ * registered; this loop still checks that invariant explicitly and throws
+ * `ModuleRouteConfigurationError` before mounting anything further if it ever does not hold, so a
+ * forged or hand-built route snapshot fails app construction instead of silently mounting an
+ * unenforceable route. `requirePermission`'s own per-request registry lookup remains the live,
+ * defense-in-depth enforcement regardless.
+ */
+export function mountModuleHttpRoutes(
+  app: Hono,
+  routes: readonly RegisteredModuleHttpRoute[],
+  options: ModuleHttpRoutesOptions,
+): void {
+  const middlewareOptions: AuthorizationMiddlewareOptions = {
+    evaluator: options.evaluator,
+    registry: options.registry,
+    runtime: options.runtime,
+  };
+  const requireOrigin = requireTrustedOrigin(options.trustedOrigins);
+
+  for (const route of routes) {
+    if (!options.registry.has(route.permission)) {
+      throw new ModuleRouteConfigurationError();
+    }
+
+    const requireRoutePermission = requirePermission(middlewareOptions, route.permission);
+    // The route's own conscious body contract (`route.maxBodyBytes` — 0 means no body accepted at
+    // all) is enforced before permission evaluation ever runs, so a request *declared* oversized
+    // never reaches authorization work, let alone the handler or the module database. In
+    // `streamed` mode no body byte is read until the handler reads it, and the handler runs only
+    // after authorization succeeds, so an unauthorized caller can never push an upload through
+    // (ADR 0042).
+    const routeBodyLimit = platformBodyLimit(route.maxBodyBytes, route.bodyMode);
+    const path = moduleRoutePath(route.moduleId, route.path);
+    const finalHandler = async (c: Context): Promise<Response> => {
+      const context: ModuleRouteHandlerContext = Object.freeze({
+        config: options.configurations.get(route.moduleId) ?? EMPTY_MODULE_CONFIGURATION,
+        moduleId: route.moduleId,
+        storage: options.storages.get(route.moduleId) ?? EMPTY_MODULE_STORAGE,
+        params: Object.freeze({ ...c.req.param() }),
+        principal: getAuthorizedPrincipal(c),
+        realtime: options.realtime.publisherFor(route.moduleId),
+        services: options.services,
+      });
+
+      let response: Response;
+      try {
+        response = await route.handler(c.req.raw, context);
+      } catch {
+        return sanitizedModuleHandlerFailure(c);
+      }
+      if (!(response instanceof Response)) {
+        return sanitizedModuleHandlerFailure(c);
+      }
+      return sanitizeModuleResponse(response);
+    };
+
+    // Hono's `on()` overloads resolve by literal call arity, not by the runtime length of a spread
+    // array — each branch below is therefore a distinct, fixed-arity call rather than one call
+    // spreading a variable-length handlers array.
+    if (STATE_CHANGING_METHODS.has(route.method)) {
+      app.on(
+        route.method,
+        path,
+        requireOrigin,
+        routeBodyLimit,
+        requireRoutePermission,
+        finalHandler,
+      );
+    } else {
+      app.on(route.method, path, routeBodyLimit, requireRoutePermission, finalHandler);
+    }
+  }
+}

apps/api/src/module-lifecycle-routes.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,286 @@
+import type {
+  ModuleBlockedReason,
+  ModuleBlockingDependency,
+  ModuleRuntimeState,
+  ModuleSecretSource,
+} from "@ekklesia/contracts";
+import { CORE_MODULES_LIFECYCLE_MANAGE } from "@ekklesia/core/authorization";
+import {
+  type ModuleConfigurationStore,
+  type ModuleLifecycleSnapshot,
+  type ModuleStorageAvailability,
+  type ModuleLifecycleStore,
+  ModuleLifecycleStoreError,
+  type ModuleLifecycleView,
+  resolveModuleLifecycleView,
+} from "@ekklesia/core/modules";
+import { Hono } from "hono";
+import type { Context } from "hono";
+import {
+  type AuthorizationMiddlewareOptions,
+  requirePermission,
+  requireTrustedOrigin,
+} from "./authorization-middleware.js";
+import { CORE_MUTATION_MAX_BODY_BYTES, platformBodyLimit } from "./body-limits.js";
+
+/**
+ * A **sibling** of `/api/v1/modules/`, never a child of it — the same rule ADR 0025 established for
+ * `/api/v1/module-ui`, and for the same concrete reason. Every module HTTP route is mounted under
+ * `/api/v1/modules/<module-id>/<local path>`, and `moduleRoutePathSchema` accepts `enabled` as an
+ * ordinary static segment, so a module named `announcements` registering `PUT /enabled` would land
+ * on exactly `/api/v1/modules/announcements/enabled`. Publishing the platform's own lifecycle
+ * mutation there would put Core and an installed module in one URL namespace with registration
+ * order deciding which one answers — for a route that changes whether modules run. A sibling prefix
+ * cannot collide.
+ */
+export const MODULE_LIFECYCLE_PATH = "/api/v1/module-lifecycle";
+const MODULE_LIFECYCLE_ENABLED_PATH = `${MODULE_LIFECYCLE_PATH}/:moduleId/enabled`;
+
+/**
+ * One module as an operator sees it. Two clearly separated axes, deliberately never merged into a
+ * single status word.
+ *
+ * `configured` is the decision that survives restarts. `runtime` is what *this process* did. They
+ * can legitimately disagree — Ekklesia does not hot-load or hot-unload modules — and
+ * `restartRequired` names that disagreement instead of hiding it behind a status that would be a
+ * lie in one direction or the other.
+ *
+ * Nothing here carries a filesystem path, a package name, a manifest path, a directory, an
+ * entrypoint, a caught error, or a stack. The only identifiers are module ids, capability ids, and
+ * a fixed reason code from a closed set — all of them values the platform itself produced and
+ * validated.
+ */
+export interface ModuleLifecycleModuleView {
+  readonly id: string;
+  readonly version: string;
+  readonly configured: {
+    readonly enabled: boolean;
+    /** `false` means nobody has decided and the platform default (enabled) applies. */
+    readonly explicit: boolean;
+  };
+  readonly runtime: {
+    readonly state: ModuleRuntimeState;
+    readonly reason?: ModuleBlockedReason;
+    /** Present for a dependency reason. */
+    readonly dependency?: ModuleBlockingDependency;
+    /** Present for a configuration reason (ADR 0029): the offending key, never its value. A key is
+     * declared in a public manifest; a value may be a credential or arbitrary operator text. */
+    readonly configurationKey?: string;
+    /** Present for a storage reason (ADR 0030): the logical bucket the module declared, never an
+     * endpoint, a credential, or the physical bucket the host maps it to. */
+    readonly storageBucketId?: string;
+  };
+  readonly restartRequired: boolean;
+}
+
+export interface ModuleLifecycleResponse {
+  readonly modules: readonly ModuleLifecycleModuleView[];
+}
+
+export interface CreateModuleLifecycleRoutesOptions extends AuthorizationMiddlewareOptions {
+  /** The boot snapshot: the discovered inventory this process started from, the eligibility it
+   * resolved, and the modules the runtime reports it actually started. Captured once at startup and
+   * never recomputed — this endpoint describes the platform that is running, not one that would run
+   * if it were restarted right now. */
+  readonly snapshot: ModuleLifecycleSnapshot;
+  readonly store: ModuleLifecycleStore;
+  /**
+   * How to re-read the *other* axis that decides eligibility (ADR 0029). Since a module's own
+   * configuration can block it, `restartRequired` must be computed against live configuration as
+   * well as live enablement — otherwise correcting a missing required value would report no pending
+   * restart for a module the next boot really will start.
+   */
+  readonly configuration: {
+    readonly store: ModuleConfigurationStore;
+    readonly secrets: ModuleSecretSource;
+  };
+  /** The other axis that decides eligibility (ADR 0030). A boolean, never a probe: whether storage
+   * is *configured* decides eligibility, while whether it is *reachable right now* never does. */
+  readonly storage: ModuleStorageAvailability;
+  readonly trustedOrigins: ReadonlySet<string>;
+}
+
+function sanitizedFailure(c: Context, status: 400 | 404 | 503, code: string): Response {
+  c.header("Cache-Control", "no-store");
+  return c.json({ code }, status);
+}
+
+/** Maps the store's own sanitized codes onto HTTP without inventing a second vocabulary, exactly as
+ * `dashboard-routes.ts` does. */
+function storeFailure(c: Context, error: unknown, fallback: "read" | "write"): Response {
+  if (error instanceof ModuleLifecycleStoreError) {
+    if (
+      error.code === "MODULE_LIFECYCLE_READ_FAILED" ||
+      error.code === "MODULE_LIFECYCLE_WRITE_FAILED"
+    ) {
+      return sanitizedFailure(c, 503, error.code);
+    }
+    return sanitizedFailure(c, 400, "INVALID_REQUEST");
+  }
+  return sanitizedFailure(
+    c,
+    503,
+    fallback === "read" ? "MODULE_LIFECYCLE_READ_FAILED" : "MODULE_LIFECYCLE_WRITE_FAILED",
+  );
+}
+
+function isRecord(value: unknown): value is Record<string, unknown> {
+  return typeof value === "object" && value !== null && !Array.isArray(value);
+}
+
+const ENABLED_BODY_KEYS = new Set(["enabled"]);
+
+/**
+ * Structured, closed validation — never a configuration blob. Any key beyond `enabled` makes the
+ * whole body invalid rather than being silently dropped, so a caller cannot smuggle a field a
+ * future version might interpret, and a typo fails loudly instead of quietly doing nothing. Mirrors
+ * `parseGroupBody`/`parsePlacementBody` (`./dashboard-routes.js`) exactly.
+ */
+function parseEnabledBody(raw: unknown): { enabled: boolean } | undefined {
+  if (!isRecord(raw) || Object.keys(raw).some((key) => !ENABLED_BODY_KEYS.has(key))) {
+    return undefined;
+  }
+  return typeof raw.enabled === "boolean" ? { enabled: raw.enabled } : undefined;
+}
+
+async function readJsonBody(c: Context): Promise<unknown> {
+  try {
+    return (await c.req.json()) as unknown;
+  } catch {
+    return undefined;
+  }
+}
+
+function present(view: ModuleLifecycleView): ModuleLifecycleModuleView {
+  return {
+    configured: { enabled: view.configured.enabled, explicit: view.configured.explicit },
+    id: view.moduleId,
+    restartRequired: view.restartRequired,
+    runtime: {
+      state: view.runtime.state,
+      ...(view.runtime.reason === undefined ? {} : { reason: view.runtime.reason }),
+      ...(view.runtime.dependency === undefined ? {} : { dependency: view.runtime.dependency }),
+      ...(view.runtime.configurationKey === undefined
+        ? {}
+        : { configurationKey: view.runtime.configurationKey }),
+      ...(view.runtime.storageBucketId === undefined
+        ? {}
+        : { storageBucketId: view.runtime.storageBucketId }),
+    },
+    version: view.version,
+  };
+}
+
+/**
+ * The platform's operational lifecycle resource: which installed modules are enabled, what this
+ * process actually did with each of them, and the narrow, structured API for changing that.
+ *
+ * ## Enablement is host configuration, and structurally cannot be anything else
+ *
+ * A module neither declares nor reads its own enabled state. Nothing in a manifest, a capability, a
+ * permission declaration, or a lifecycle hook can influence a value stored here, and a module is
+ * never told it is enabled — its host simply loads and starts it, or does not. That is what keeps
+ * the same module implementation reusable under a future standalone host, whose loading decisions
+ * are its own (ADR 0028).
+ *
+ * ## Changing configuration does not change the running process
+ *
+ * `PUT` writes a decision. It does not start, stop, load, unload, or reconfigure anything: there is
+ * no hot module installation or removal in this platform (ADR 0015, unchanged). The response
+ * therefore reports the new configuration *and* the unchanged runtime observation *and*
+ * `restartRequired`, rather than pretending the module stopped. Hot-unloading a module to make a
+ * button feel immediate would trade a real guarantee — that a module's ESM evaluation happens
+ * exactly once, and can never be rolled back — for a cosmetic one.
+ *
+ * ## Only a module this process can see may be configured
+ *
+ * `PUT` against an id that is not in the boot inventory is a `404`. Unlike an inert Dashboard
+ * placement, an enablement record is operational configuration, and accepting one for an arbitrary
+ * identifier would make this an unbounded write surface for a delegable permission. *Existing*
+ * records for modules that are no longer deployed are still retained and simply ignored, so
+ * redeploying a module restores the decision (see `resolveModuleEligibility`).
+ *
+ * ## Reading is administrative too
+ *
+ * Both verbs require `core.modules.lifecycle.manage` (restricted). This resource is the only place
+ * a disabled module, a blocked module, and the required-dependency edges between them are visible;
+ * `core.modules.ui.read` deliberately covers only what is mountable. Mutations additionally require
+ * an exact trusted `Origin` and a bounded body before authorization work begins, exactly like every
+ * other Core mutation.
+ */
+export function createModuleLifecycleRoutes(options: CreateModuleLifecycleRoutesOptions): Hono {
+  const routes = new Hono();
+  const requireManage = requirePermission(
+    { evaluator: options.evaluator, registry: options.registry, runtime: options.runtime },
+    CORE_MODULES_LIFECYCLE_MANAGE,
+  );
+  const requireOrigin = requireTrustedOrigin(options.trustedOrigins);
+  const mutationBodyLimit = platformBodyLimit(CORE_MUTATION_MAX_BODY_BYTES);
+  const installedModuleIds = new Set(
+    options.snapshot.discoveredModules.map((module) => module.manifest.id),
+  );
+
+  routes.get(MODULE_LIFECYCLE_PATH, requireManage, async (c) => {
+    c.header("Cache-Control", "no-store");
+    // Not per-principal in content, but it is cookie-authorized, so it varies for the same reason
+    // every other authorized Core read does.
+    c.header("Vary", "Origin, Cookie");
+    try {
+      const [configuration, settings] = await Promise.all([
+        options.store.readConfiguration(),
+        options.configuration.store.readSettings(),
+      ]);
+      const modules = resolveModuleLifecycleView(
+        options.snapshot,
+        configuration,
+        { secrets: options.configuration.secrets, settings },
+        options.storage,
+      ).map(present);
+      return c.json({ modules } satisfies ModuleLifecycleResponse, 200);
+    } catch (error) {
+      return storeFailure(c, error, "read");
+    }
+  });
+
+  routes.put(
+    MODULE_LIFECYCLE_ENABLED_PATH,
+    requireOrigin,
+    mutationBodyLimit,
+    requireManage,
+    async (c) => {
+      c.header("Cache-Control", "no-store");
+      const moduleId = c.req.param("moduleId");
+      const body = parseEnabledBody(await readJsonBody(c));
+      if (!body) {
+        return sanitizedFailure(c, 400, "INVALID_REQUEST");
+      }
+      if (!installedModuleIds.has(moduleId)) {
+        return sanitizedFailure(c, 404, "MODULE_NOT_INSTALLED");
+      }
+      try {
+        await options.store.setEnabled({ enabled: body.enabled, moduleId });
+        // Re-read rather than predict: the response describes the configuration that is actually
+        // stored now, resolved against the same boot snapshot the collection read uses, so the two
+        // endpoints can never disagree about `restartRequired`.
+        const [configuration, settings] = await Promise.all([
+          options.store.readConfiguration(),
+          options.configuration.store.readSettings(),
+        ]);
+        const view = resolveModuleLifecycleView(
+          options.snapshot,
+          configuration,
+          { secrets: options.configuration.secrets, settings },
+          options.storage,
+        ).find((entry) => entry.moduleId === moduleId);
+        if (!view) {
+          return sanitizedFailure(c, 503, "MODULE_LIFECYCLE_READ_FAILED");
+        }
+        return c.json(present(view), 200);
+      } catch (error) {
+        return storeFailure(c, error, "write");
+      }
+    },
+  );
+
+  return routes;
+}

apps/api/src/module-realtime-routes.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,252 @@
+import { ModuleRealtimeError, type ModuleId, type PermissionId } from "@ekklesia/contracts";
+import type {
+  ModuleRealtimePublication,
+  ModuleRealtimeRegistry,
+  RegisteredModuleRealtimeChannel,
+} from "@ekklesia/core/modules";
+import type { Context, Hono } from "hono";
+import {
+  type AuthorizationMiddlewareOptions,
+  requirePermission,
+} from "./authorization-middleware.js";
+
+const MODULE_REALTIME_PREFIX = "/api/v1/module-realtime";
+
+/** Host-owned keepalive interval. Comments keep idle HTTP streams alive without entering module code,
+ * consuming a sequence, or becoming a browser-visible state update. */
+export const MODULE_REALTIME_KEEPALIVE_MS = 15_000;
+/** Forces a fresh cookie/permission evaluation periodically rather than letting an authorization
+ * decision live for an unbounded stream lifetime. EventSource reconnects after the clean EOF. */
+export const MODULE_REALTIME_MAX_CONNECTION_AGE_MS = 5 * 60_000;
+
+export interface ModuleRealtimeTransportTiming {
+  /** Test-only narrowing of the production keepalive. Production composition never sets this. */
+  readonly keepaliveMs?: number;
+  /** Test-only narrowing of the production reauthorization interval. */
+  readonly maxConnectionAgeMs?: number;
+}
+
+export interface ModuleRealtimeRoutesOptions
+  extends AuthorizationMiddlewareOptions,
+    ModuleRealtimeTransportTiming {
+  readonly realtime: ModuleRealtimeRegistry;
+}
+
+/** The server is the sole author of this deployment-private base. Module UI receives it through the
+ * host descriptor and never reconstructs the platform prefix or supplies its own module id. */
+export function moduleRealtimeBaseUrl(moduleId: string): string {
+  return `${MODULE_REALTIME_PREFIX}/${encodeURIComponent(moduleId)}`;
+}
+
+function moduleRealtimeChannelUrl(moduleId: ModuleId, channel: string): string {
+  return `${moduleRealtimeBaseUrl(moduleId)}/${encodeURIComponent(channel)}`;
+}
+
+/** A forged runtime snapshot that could not be permission-gated is a composition failure. Carries no
+ * module/channel/permission value and is thrown before any route from that snapshot is usable. */
+export class ModuleRealtimeConfigurationError extends Error {
+  constructor() {
+    super("A published module realtime channel references a permission that is not registered.");
+    this.name = "ModuleRealtimeConfigurationError";
+    this.stack = `${this.name}: ${this.message}`;
+    Object.freeze(this);
+  }
+}
+
+function realtimeEnvelope(publication: ModuleRealtimePublication): string {
+  // `serializedPayload` was validated and serialized exactly once by Core. Concatenating it as the
+  // JSON value preserves every opaque string — including signed object-delivery URLs — byte for byte.
+  return `{"sequence":${publication.sequence},"payload":${publication.serializedPayload}}`;
+}
+
+function realtimeEvent(
+  kind: "snapshot" | "update",
+  publication: ModuleRealtimePublication,
+): string {
+  // Core's compact JSON serialization contains no literal CR/LF bytes inside strings, so one `data`
+  // line is sufficient. Deliberately no SSE `id`: this transport does not implement Last-Event-ID
+  // replay, and a process-local sequence must not be mistaken for a durable cursor.
+  return `event: ${kind}\ndata: ${realtimeEnvelope(publication)}\n\n`;
+}
+
+function sanitizedRealtimeFailure(c: Context, error: unknown): Response {
+  c.header("Cache-Control", "no-store");
+  const code =
+    error instanceof ModuleRealtimeError && error.code === "REALTIME_SUBSCRIBER_LIMIT"
+      ? "REALTIME_SUBSCRIBER_LIMIT"
+      : "REALTIME_UNAVAILABLE";
+  return c.json({ code }, 503);
+}
+
+interface CancelableDelay {
+  readonly promise: Promise<"keepalive">;
+  cancel(): void;
+}
+
+function keepaliveDelay(milliseconds: number): CancelableDelay {
+  let timer: ReturnType<typeof setTimeout> | undefined;
+  const promise = new Promise<"keepalive">((resolve) => {
+    timer = setTimeout(() => resolve("keepalive"), milliseconds);
+  });
+  return {
+    cancel: () => clearTimeout(timer),
+    promise,
+  };
+}
+
+function createRealtimeStream(
+  definition: RegisteredModuleRealtimeChannel,
+  registry: ModuleRealtimeRegistry,
+  keepaliveMs: number,
+  maxConnectionAgeMs: number,
+): ReadableStream<Uint8Array> {
+  const encoder = new TextEncoder();
+  const subscription = registry.subscribe(definition.moduleId, definition.channel);
+  let snapshotPending = true;
+  let closed = false;
+  let pendingRead: Promise<ModuleRealtimePublication | undefined> | undefined;
+  let activeDelay: CancelableDelay | undefined;
+  let expiryTimer: ReturnType<typeof setTimeout> | undefined;
+
+  const close = (): void => {
+    if (closed) {
+      return;
+    }
+    closed = true;
+    activeDelay?.cancel();
+    activeDelay = undefined;
+    clearTimeout(expiryTimer);
+    expiryTimer = undefined;
+    subscription.close();
+  };
+
+  return new ReadableStream<Uint8Array>({
+    start(controller) {
+      expiryTimer = setTimeout(() => {
+        close();
+        try {
+          controller.close();
+        } catch {
+          // A simultaneous browser cancellation or completed pull already closed the controller.
+        }
+      }, maxConnectionAgeMs);
+    },
+    cancel: () => close(),
+    async pull(controller) {
+      if (closed) {
+        return;
+      }
+      try {
+        if (snapshotPending) {
+          snapshotPending = false;
+          controller.enqueue(encoder.encode(realtimeEvent("snapshot", subscription.snapshot)));
+          return;
+        }
+
+        // Only one Core read is ever outstanding. If a keepalive wins the race, the same read is
+        // retained for the next pull instead of allocating a second listener. Core itself holds only
+        // one newest pending publication, and this stream asks for work only when the browser-facing
+        // ReadableStream has demand, so a slow client cannot create an array at either layer.
+        pendingRead ??= subscription.read();
+        activeDelay = keepaliveDelay(keepaliveMs);
+        const result = await Promise.race([pendingRead, activeDelay.promise]);
+        activeDelay.cancel();
+        activeDelay = undefined;
+
+        if (result === "keepalive") {
+          controller.enqueue(encoder.encode(": keepalive\n\n"));
+          return;
+        }
+
+        pendingRead = undefined;
+        if (result === undefined) {
+          close();
+          controller.close();
+          return;
+        }
+        controller.enqueue(encoder.encode(realtimeEvent("update", result)));
+      } catch {
+        close();
+        try {
+          controller.close();
+        } catch {
+          // The browser may have canceled between the awaited read/timer and this close. Cancellation
+          // already performed the same idempotent subscription cleanup.
+        }
+      }
+    },
+  });
+}
+
+function mountChannel(
+  app: Hono,
+  definition: RegisteredModuleRealtimeChannel,
+  options: ModuleRealtimeRoutesOptions,
+  keepaliveMs: number,
+  maxConnectionAgeMs: number,
+): void {
+  const requireChannelPermission = requirePermission(
+    options,
+    definition.permission as PermissionId,
+  );
+  app.get(
+    moduleRealtimeChannelUrl(definition.moduleId, definition.channel),
+    requireChannelPermission,
+    (c) => {
+      // Hono deliberately lets a registered GET handler answer HEAD. That is useful for finite
+      // resources, but unsafe for an infinite stream: the adapter discards the response body without
+      // necessarily canceling it, which could retain a Core subscriber forever. Refuse HEAD before
+      // allocating anything. Authentication/authorization has still run through the same middleware.
+      if (c.req.method !== "GET") {
+        return new Response(null, {
+          headers: { Allow: "GET", "Cache-Control": "no-store" },
+          status: 405,
+        });
+      }
+      let stream: ReadableStream<Uint8Array>;
+      try {
+        stream = createRealtimeStream(
+          definition,
+          options.realtime,
+          keepaliveMs,
+          maxConnectionAgeMs,
+        );
+      } catch (error) {
+        return sanitizedRealtimeFailure(c, error);
+      }
+      return new Response(stream, {
+        headers: {
+          "Cache-Control": "no-store",
+          Connection: "keep-alive",
+          "Content-Type": "text/event-stream; charset=utf-8",
+          Vary: "Origin, Cookie",
+          // Honored by nginx and harmless elsewhere. Other proxies must likewise disable buffering for
+          // this path; no proxy-specific behavior enters the module-facing contract.
+          "X-Accel-Buffering": "no",
+        },
+        status: 200,
+      });
+    },
+  );
+}
+
+/** Mounts one exact, immutable, permission-gated GET route per successfully started module channel.
+ * There is no dynamic module/channel lookup route and no request-controlled permission selection. */
+export function mountModuleRealtimeRoutes(app: Hono, options: ModuleRealtimeRoutesOptions): void {
+  const keepaliveMs = options.keepaliveMs ?? MODULE_REALTIME_KEEPALIVE_MS;
+  const maxConnectionAgeMs = options.maxConnectionAgeMs ?? MODULE_REALTIME_MAX_CONNECTION_AGE_MS;
+  if (!Number.isSafeInteger(keepaliveMs) || keepaliveMs <= 0) {
+    throw new TypeError("The module realtime keepalive interval is invalid.");
+  }
+  if (!Number.isSafeInteger(maxConnectionAgeMs) || maxConnectionAgeMs <= 0) {
+    throw new TypeError("The module realtime maximum connection age is invalid.");
+  }
+  for (const definition of options.realtime.channels) {
+    if (!options.registry.has(definition.permission)) {
+      throw new ModuleRealtimeConfigurationError();
+    }
+  }
+  for (const definition of options.realtime.channels) {
+    mountChannel(app, definition, options, keepaliveMs, maxConnectionAgeMs);
+  }
+}

apps/api/src/module-ui-inventory.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,296 @@
+import type { EkklesiaPrincipal, PermissionDeclaration } from "@ekklesia/contracts";
+import { CORE_MODULES_UI_READ } from "@ekklesia/core/authorization";
+import type {
+  ModuleUiPublicationRegistry,
+  PublishableModuleContribution,
+  PublishableModuleUi,
+} from "@ekklesia/core/modules";
+import { Hono } from "hono";
+import type { Context } from "hono";
+import {
+  type AuthorizationMiddlewareOptions,
+  getAuthorizedPrincipal,
+  requirePermission,
+} from "./authorization-middleware.js";
+import { moduleApiBaseUrl } from "./module-http-routes.js";
+import { moduleDisplayPageUrl } from "./module-display-path.js";
+import { moduleRealtimeBaseUrl } from "./module-realtime-routes.js";
+import {
+  MODULE_UI_ASSET_PREFIX,
+  moduleContributionArtifactUrl,
+  moduleUiArtifactUrl,
+} from "./module-ui-routes.js";
+
+/**
+ * The collection root of the module UI resource: `/api/v1/module-ui` lists what a browser host may
+ * mount, and `/api/v1/module-ui/<module-id>/<version>` (ADR 0025) serves one artifact's bytes. One
+ * prefix, one resource, two representations.
+ */
+export const MODULE_UI_INVENTORY_PATH = MODULE_UI_ASSET_PREFIX;
+
+/**
+ * Exactly what a browser host needs to mount one module's UI, and deliberately nothing else.
+ *
+ * No filesystem path, package root, package name, server/schema/migrations entrypoint, manifest
+ * version, capability, dependency, or storage bucket appears here. Those are server-side facts a
+ * browser has no use for, and several of them are precisely what ADR 0025's publication route
+ * exists to keep off the wire.
+ *
+ * There is also no `name`, `icon`, `description`, `category`, `folder`, or `order`. Those are
+ * *navigation* concerns, and ADR 0021 established that Dashboard grouping is presentation
+ * configuration an administrator owns rather than something a module declares. A field added here
+ * now would quietly become module-owned navigation metadata before that design exists; the
+ * temporary selector renders the module id instead.
+ */
+export interface HostModuleUiDescriptor {
+  readonly id: string;
+  readonly version: string;
+  /** Where the browser fetches this module's compiled UI artifact. Produced by the server's own
+   * canonical helper (`moduleUiArtifactUrl`), never re-spelled in the browser, so publication
+   * routing can change without touching a single line of host or module code. */
+  readonly ui: { readonly url: string };
+  /** Canonical page for this module's separately declared display artifact, or `null` when the
+   * module publishes no display. Server-produced so neither shell nor module spells platform
+   * routing or infers deployment topology. */
+  readonly display: { readonly url: string } | null;
+  /** The root this module's own HTTP API is mounted at, so the host can resolve the relative paths
+   * a module UI asks for (`context.api.request("records")`). Server-produced for the same reason
+   * `ui.url` is: `/api/v1/modules/<id>` is Ekklesia's private deployment detail, and neither the
+   * module nor the browser host should be the one spelling it. */
+  readonly api: { readonly baseUrl: string };
+  /** Server-produced root for this module's host-neutral browser realtime facade. The browser host,
+   * not module UI, resolves and appends a validated local channel. */
+  readonly realtime: { readonly baseUrl: string };
+  /**
+   * The subset of **this module's own declared permissions** that the current principal holds,
+   * evaluated server-side by Core's one authorization evaluator.
+   *
+   * Scoped to the module deliberately: a host has no business handing one module the platform's
+   * whole authorization state, and the module's manifest already declares exactly which permissions
+   * its UI can meaningfully ask about. Granted ids only — a permission the principal lacks is simply
+   * absent, so this never enumerates a module's full permission surface to someone who holds none of
+   * it.
+   *
+   * **These are presentation hints, not authority** (ADR 0022). They exist so a UI can hide a
+   * control instead of offering one that would fail. Every module route remains enforced by
+   * `requirePermission` against the composed platform registry, and that enforcement neither reads
+   * nor trusts anything in this array.
+   */
+  readonly permissions: readonly string[];
+  /** Renderers other modules contributed to capabilities this module provides (ADR 0041). Empty for
+   * the overwhelming majority of modules, which provide no extension point. */
+  readonly contributions: readonly HostModuleContributionDescriptor[];
+}
+
+/**
+ * One renderer another module contributed to a capability **this** module provides (ADR 0041).
+ *
+ * The URL is server-produced, exactly like `ui.url`, `api.baseUrl`, and `realtime.baseUrl`: a
+ * consuming module names a contribution and the host resolves it, so no module ever builds
+ * Ekklesia's publication URL and every one of them stays hostable elsewhere.
+ *
+ * There is no payload schema, slot, order, or rendering hint here, and there will not be: what a
+ * contributed renderer draws and what shape its input takes are the consuming module's contract,
+ * carried in the browser between two modules without passing through the platform.
+ */
+export interface HostModuleContributionDescriptor {
+  readonly id: string;
+  readonly version: string;
+  /** The capability it was contributed to — one this module declares. */
+  readonly capability: string;
+  readonly url: string;
+}
+
+export interface HostModuleUiInventory {
+  readonly modules: readonly HostModuleUiDescriptor[];
+}
+
+/**
+ * The one place a publishable contribution becomes a browser descriptor, shared by the primary-UI
+ * inventory and the display descriptor so the two can never disagree about what a consuming module
+ * may mount.
+ */
+export function describeModuleContributions(
+  registry: ModuleUiPublicationRegistry,
+  moduleId: string,
+): readonly HostModuleContributionDescriptor[] {
+  return registry
+    .contributionsForModule(moduleId)
+    .map((contribution: PublishableModuleContribution) => ({
+      capability: contribution.capability,
+      id: contribution.contributionId,
+      url: moduleContributionArtifactUrl(
+        { moduleId: contribution.moduleId, version: contribution.moduleVersion },
+        contribution.contributionId,
+      ),
+      version: contribution.version,
+    }));
+}
+
+export interface CreateModuleUiInventoryRoutesOptions extends AuthorizationMiddlewareOptions {
+  /** The same publication registry the artifact route serves from — the single accepted/publishable
+   * module set (`createModuleUiPublicationRegistry`, `@ekklesia/core/modules`). This route performs
+   * no discovery, reads no manifest, and touches no filesystem; a module absent from this registry
+   * is absent from the inventory, by construction rather than by filtering. Named `moduleUi` rather
+   * than `registry` because `AuthorizationMiddlewareOptions.registry` is already the *permission*
+   * registry, and one route needs both. */
+  readonly moduleUi: ModuleUiPublicationRegistry;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Evaluates one module's declared permissions against the caller, returning only the granted ids.
+ *
+ * Uses Core's one evaluator, so baselines, the platform-owner bypass, grant expiry, and
+ * deny-by-default all behave exactly as they do on a real request — there is no second,
+ * browser-only interpretation of what a permission means. An infrastructure failure propagates as
+ * `AuthorizationEvaluationError` rather than being folded into "not granted", because a hint that
+ * silently read "denied" during a database outage would blank the whole UI and look like a
+ * permissions problem.
+ */
+/** Shared by the primary-UI inventory and the singular display descriptor. Both provide the same
+ * presentation-only subset of a module's own declarations and use Core's one evaluator. */
+export async function grantedModulePermissionIds(
+  evaluator: AuthorizationMiddlewareOptions["evaluator"],
+  principal: EkklesiaPrincipal,
+  declarations: readonly PermissionDeclaration[],
+): Promise<readonly string[]> {
+  const decisions = await Promise.all(
+    declarations.map(async (declaration) => ({
+      allowed: (
+        await evaluator.authorize({
+          baseline: declaration.baseline,
+          permission: declaration.id,
+          principal,
+        })
+      ).allowed,
+      id: String(declaration.id),
+    })),
+  );
+  return decisions.filter((decision) => decision.allowed).map((decision) => decision.id);
+}
+
+async function describeModule(
+  evaluator: AuthorizationMiddlewareOptions["evaluator"],
+  principal: EkklesiaPrincipal,
+  published: PublishableModuleUi,
+  registry: ModuleUiPublicationRegistry,
+): Promise<HostModuleUiDescriptor> {
+  const display = registry.resolveDisplay(published.moduleId, published.version);
+  return {
+    api: { baseUrl: moduleApiBaseUrl(published.moduleId) },
+    contributions: describeModuleContributions(registry, published.moduleId),
+    display: display === undefined ? null : { url: moduleDisplayPageUrl(published.moduleId) },
+    id: published.moduleId,
+    permissions: await grantedModulePermissionIds(evaluator, principal, published.permissions),
+    realtime: { baseUrl: moduleRealtimeBaseUrl(published.moduleId) },
+    ui: { url: moduleUiArtifactUrl(published) },
+    version: published.version,
+  };
+}
+
+/** One mountable module, described once: the host-neutral mount descriptor plus the module's own
+ * display name, kept beside it rather than inside it. */
+export interface MountableModuleDescription {
+  readonly descriptor: HostModuleUiDescriptor;
+  /** `manifest.name`. Presentation *identity* the module owns — never its placement, which the
+   * Dashboard owns (ADR 0027). Deliberately absent from `HostModuleUiDescriptor`, so the
+   * host-neutral contract a standalone host consumes stays free of presentation concerns. */
+  readonly name: string;
+}
+
+/**
+ * The one composition of the mountable-module set, shared by the generic inventory route and the
+ * Dashboard navigation route (`./dashboard-routes.js`).
+ *
+ * Both derive from the same publication registry and the same evaluator, so the two endpoints can
+ * never disagree about what exists, what its URLs are, or what the caller may do inside it. Sharing
+ * this function rather than duplicating the mapping is what makes that a structural property instead
+ * of a convention.
+ */
+export async function describeMountableModules(
+  evaluator: AuthorizationMiddlewareOptions["evaluator"],
+  principal: EkklesiaPrincipal,
+  registry: ModuleUiPublicationRegistry,
+): Promise<readonly MountableModuleDescription[]> {
+  return Promise.all(
+    registry.list().map(async (published) => ({
+      descriptor: await describeModule(evaluator, principal, published, registry),
+      name: published.name,
+    })),
+  );
+}
+
+/** Mirrors `requirePermission`'s own infrastructure-failure result exactly: a permission hint that
+ * could not be determined is never reported as "not granted". Carries no module id, permission id,
+ * or caught error. */
+function sanitizedInventoryFailure(c: Context): Response {
+  c.header("Cache-Control", "no-store");
+  return c.json({ code: "AUTHORIZATION_EVALUATION_FAILED" }, 503);
+}
+
+/**
+ * The browser host's one bootstrap query: which module UIs may I mount, where do I fetch each one,
+ * where does each one's API live, and what may this viewer do inside it.
+ *
+ * ## It is not a module management API
+ *
+ * It lists mountable UIs and nothing else. There is no create, update, enable, disable, install, or
+ * configure; no module that declares no UI; and no field beyond what constructing a
+ * `ModuleUiHostContext` requires. Ekklesia has no enable/disable state to report —
+ * `ModuleLifecycleStage` is vocabulary with no runtime state machine behind it — and inventing one
+ * here would be inventing a lifecycle rather than reporting one.
+ *
+ * ## The module set comes from the publication registry, never a rescan
+ *
+ * `moduleUi.list()` is the exact accepted set ADR 0025 publishes artifacts from: modules that
+ * survived discovery and declare `entrypoints.ui`, captured after the module runtime started. This
+ * route never scans a directory, reads a manifest, or reconstructs a module from `package.json`, so
+ * the inventory and the artifact route can never disagree about what exists. Order is the
+ * registry's own discovery order, which is deterministic (topologically sorted, then by id).
+ *
+ * ## Authenticated, deliberately, unlike the artifact route
+ *
+ * ADR 0025 made the artifact bytes anonymous — fetching compiled UI code confers no authority — but
+ * was careful that the route never became an enumeration oracle: unknown module, no UI, and wrong
+ * version collapse into one indistinguishable `404`, so a caller must already know both halves of an
+ * identity to learn anything. **This endpoint is that enumeration.** Serving it anonymously would
+ * hand over exactly what that route withholds, so it requires `core.modules.ui.read` (baseline
+ * `authenticated`): any signed-in user of the installation, and nobody else.
+ *
+ * Enforcement goes through the same `requirePermission` middleware every other protected route uses
+ * — no second browser-auth mechanism — which also resolves the principal exactly once and keeps a
+ * genuine denial (`403`) distinct from an infrastructure failure (`503`).
+ *
+ * The response is per-principal (its `permissions` depend on who is asking), so it is `no-store` and
+ * varies on `Origin` and `Cookie`, exactly like `/api/v1/principal`.
+ */
+export function createModuleUiInventoryRoutes(options: CreateModuleUiInventoryRoutesOptions): Hono {
+  const routes = new Hono();
+  const requireInventoryPermission = requirePermission(
+    { evaluator: options.evaluator, registry: options.registry, runtime: options.runtime },
+    CORE_MODULES_UI_READ,
+  );
+
+  routes.get(MODULE_UI_INVENTORY_PATH, requireInventoryPermission, async (c) => {
+    c.header("Cache-Control", "no-store");
+    c.header("Vary", "Origin, Cookie");
+    // Resolved and already authorized by the middleware above; never resolved a second time here.
+    // The `authenticated` baseline guarantees this is an authenticated principal.
+    const principal = getAuthorizedPrincipal(c);
+    try {
+      const described = await describeMountableModules(
+        options.evaluator,
+        principal,
+        options.moduleUi,
+      );
+      // Only the host-neutral descriptor reaches this response: the display name stays out of the
+      // portable contract and is carried by the Dashboard navigation view instead.
+      const modules = described.map((entry) => entry.descriptor);
+      return c.json({ modules } satisfies HostModuleUiInventory, 200);
+    } catch {
+      return sanitizedInventoryFailure(c);
+    }
+  });
+
+  return routes;
+}

apps/api/src/module-ui-routes.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,289 @@
+import { createHash } from "node:crypto";
+import { readFile } from "node:fs/promises";
+import type { ModuleUiPublicationRegistry } from "@ekklesia/core/modules";
+import { Hono } from "hono";
+import type { Context } from "hono";
+
+/**
+ * The platform-owned URL space for published module UI artifacts.
+ *
+ * Deliberately **not** nested under `/api/v1/modules/<module-id>`, and that is a security decision
+ * rather than a stylistic one. A module may declare any route path matching Core's own grammar
+ * (`moduleRoutePathSchema`, `@ekklesia/contracts`), and `ui` is a perfectly legal lowercase static
+ * segment — so a module registering `GET /ui/:version` would be mounted at exactly
+ * `/api/v1/modules/<module-id>/ui/<version>`. Publishing there would put the platform and installed
+ * modules in the same URL namespace, with Hono's registration order silently deciding which one
+ * answers. A sibling prefix can never collide: every module route begins `/api/v1/modules/`, and
+ * nothing the platform serves here does.
+ *
+ * It stays under `/api/v1/*` so it inherits the application's one CORS policy (exact reflected
+ * trusted origins, never a wildcard) — which a cross-origin browser `import()` of this URL requires
+ * — instead of introducing a second, separately-configured public URL space.
+ */
+export const MODULE_UI_ASSET_PREFIX = "/api/v1/module-ui";
+
+/**
+ * Revalidate-always, with a strong `ETag` doing the actual work.
+ *
+ * The URL carries module id and exact installed version, which is *identity*, not *immutability*.
+ * Ekklesia has no installer, no content addressing, and no integrity verification, so nothing stops
+ * an operator from rebuilding version `1.2.3` with different bytes and restarting — the ordinary
+ * inner-loop of developing a module. `immutable` (or any non-zero `max-age`) would therefore be a
+ * promise the platform cannot keep, and a browser that cached a superseded artifact under a reused
+ * version would have no way to recover.
+ *
+ * `no-cache` is not `no-store`: the response is still cached, it just has to be revalidated. With
+ * the `ETag` below, an unchanged artifact costs one conditional request and a `304`, and a changed
+ * one is picked up immediately. A version bump changes the URL and never collides at all. When a
+ * real installer can guarantee that an installed version's bytes never change, this is the single
+ * constant that would move to immutable caching.
+ */
+export const MODULE_UI_CACHE_CONTROL = "no-cache";
+
+/** Modern ESM is served as `text/javascript`, the one JavaScript type the WHATWG MIME sniffing
+ * standard designates as canonical; `application/javascript` is a legacy alias. A browser refuses
+ * to evaluate an ES module served as anything else, so this is a correctness requirement, not a
+ * courtesy. */
+export const MODULE_UI_CONTENT_TYPE = "text/javascript; charset=utf-8";
+
+export interface ModuleUiIdentity {
+  readonly moduleId: string;
+  readonly version: string;
+}
+
+/**
+ * The one canonical way to turn an installed module's identity into the browser URL its UI artifact
+ * is published at. Every producer of that URL — this package's own route registration, a future
+ * module-metadata endpoint, and a future Dashboard host — goes through here, so the URL shape is
+ * defined once instead of being re-spelled as a template string in each of them.
+ *
+ * The result is a **root-relative browser URL, never a filesystem path** — the distinction ADR 0024
+ * built the loader around. A host on the API's own origin passes it to `loadModuleUi` unchanged; a
+ * host on a different origin resolves it against the same API base URL it already needs for
+ * `ModuleUiApiClient` (`new URL(moduleUiArtifactUrl(identity), apiBaseUrl)`). It is deliberately not
+ * absolute: the API's public origin is deployment configuration, and baking one in here would break
+ * both split-origin deployments and reverse proxies.
+ *
+ * This function accepts **identity only**. There is no parameter for a filename, a relative path,
+ * or any other artifact selector, so no caller — however careless — can use it to reach a second
+ * file in a module package. Both components are percent-encoded, so even a value that never came
+ * from a validated manifest can only ever produce one extra path segment's worth of text, never a
+ * new segment, a traversal, a query, or a fragment. A value that needed encoding will simply fail
+ * to resolve against the publication registry.
+ */
+export function moduleUiArtifactUrl(identity: ModuleUiIdentity): string {
+  return `${MODULE_UI_ASSET_PREFIX}/${encodeURIComponent(identity.moduleId)}/${encodeURIComponent(
+    identity.version,
+  )}`;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Canonical browser URL for a module's independently declared display artifact.
+ *
+ * The literal trailing segment is host-owned, not a caller-selected role. Keeping this as a
+ * separate helper and an exact route means neither request input nor a generic role parameter can
+ * select a neighbouring artifact. A future standalone host may expose a different outer display
+ * page while consuming this same published module artifact internally.
+ */
+export function moduleDisplayUiArtifactUrl(identity: ModuleUiIdentity): string {
+  return `${moduleUiArtifactUrl(identity)}/display`;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Canonical browser URL for one of a module's declared browser contributions (ADR 0041).
+ *
+ * The literal `contributions` segment is host-owned and cannot collide with the two-segment artifact
+ * route or the `display` sibling. The contribution id is percent-encoded for the same reason the
+ * module id and version are: a value that somehow did not come from a validated manifest can only
+ * ever become one segment's worth of text — never a new segment, a traversal, a query, or a
+ * fragment — and a value that needed encoding simply fails to resolve against the registry.
+ *
+ * Like every other publication helper, this takes **identity only**. There is no parameter for a
+ * filename or any other artifact selector, so no caller can use it to reach a second file inside a
+ * module package.
+ */
+export function moduleContributionArtifactUrl(
+  identity: ModuleUiIdentity,
+  contributionId: string,
+): string {
+  return `${moduleUiArtifactUrl(identity)}/contributions/${encodeURIComponent(contributionId)}`;
+}
+
+/**
+ * One 404 for every "there is nothing to publish here" case: the module is not installed, the
+ * installed module declares no artifact for the requested UI role, or the requested version is not
+ * the installed one.
+ *
+ * They are deliberately indistinguishable. The route requires no authentication (see
+ * `createModuleUiRoutes`), so a distinguishable response would let an anonymous caller enumerate
+ * which modules an installation runs and at which versions. Collapsing them means a caller must
+ * already know both the exact module id and the exact version to learn anything at all.
+ */
+function notPublished(c: Context): Response {
+  c.header("Cache-Control", "no-store");
+  return c.json({ code: "MODULE_UI_NOT_PUBLISHED" }, 404);
+}
+
+/**
+ * The artifact was validated at discovery and is not retrievable now — deleted, replaced by a
+ * directory, or unreadable. That is a server-side condition rather than a bad request, and often a
+ * transient one (an operator mid-upgrade), so it reports like every other "could not be determined"
+ * result in this application: a sanitized 503 with a fixed code. Never carries the artifact path,
+ * the module directory, the `errno`, or the caught error.
+ */
+function artifactUnavailable(c: Context): Response {
+  c.header("Cache-Control", "no-store");
+  return c.json({ code: "MODULE_UI_ARTIFACT_UNAVAILABLE" }, 503);
+}
+
+/**
+ * RFC 9110 §13.1.2 evaluation of `If-None-Match`: `*` matches any existing representation, and
+ * every listed entity-tag is compared with the **weak** comparison function, so a client echoing
+ * `W/"…"` still matches the strong tag this route issued. Anything unparsable simply fails to
+ * match, which costs a full 200 and can never produce a wrongly-fresh 304.
+ */
+function isNotModified(headerValue: string | undefined, etag: string): boolean {
+  if (headerValue === undefined) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  if (headerValue.trim() === "*") {
+    return true;
+  }
+  return headerValue.split(",").some((candidate) => {
+    const value = candidate.trim();
+    return (value.startsWith("W/") ? value.slice(2) : value) === etag;
+  });
+}
+
+interface PublishedArtifact {
+  readonly artifactPath: string;
+}
+
+/** Serve one exact path Core already validated, with one response contract for both UI roles. */
+async function serveArtifact(c: Context, published: PublishedArtifact): Promise<Response> {
+  // Discovery validated this exact path earlier; the file may still have changed or vanished
+  // since. The response is produced from whatever a single read of that one path returns right
+  // now — there is deliberately no fallback path, no re-resolution, and no retry against a
+  // reconstructed location, so a vanished artifact fails rather than quietly resolving to
+  // something else.
+  let artifact: Buffer;
+  try {
+    artifact = await readFile(published.artifactPath);
+  } catch {
+    return artifactUnavailable(c);
+  }
+
+  // Hashing the bytes actually being served — rather than trusting an mtime or size — means the
+  // validator can never describe a different revision than the body does.
+  const etag = `"${createHash("sha256").update(artifact).digest("base64url")}"`;
+  if (isNotModified(c.req.header("if-none-match"), etag)) {
+    return new Response(null, {
+      headers: { "Cache-Control": MODULE_UI_CACHE_CONTROL, ETag: etag },
+      status: 304,
+    });
+  }
+
+  return new Response(artifact, {
+    headers: {
+      "Cache-Control": MODULE_UI_CACHE_CONTROL,
+      "Content-Type": MODULE_UI_CONTENT_TYPE,
+      ETag: etag,
+      // The declared type is the only type: a browser must not be allowed to sniff a module
+      // artifact into some other interpretation, and `import()` requires the JavaScript type
+      // anyway.
+      "X-Content-Type-Options": "nosniff",
+    },
+    status: 200,
+  });
+}
+
+export interface CreateModuleUiRoutesOptions {
+  /** The platform's publication policy, built by Core from the discovered, started module
+   * inventory (`createModuleUiPublicationRegistry`, `@ekklesia/core/modules`). This route derives
+   * every byte it serves from this registry and nothing else. */
+  readonly registry: ModuleUiPublicationRegistry;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Publishes installed modules' validated `entrypoints.ui` artifacts at a platform-owned browser
+ * URL, closing the one gap between Core's server-side artifact path and the generic loader's
+ * browser-side URL (ADR 0024, ADR 0025).
+ *
+ * ## The request never touches the filesystem
+ *
+ * `:moduleId`, `:version`, and (for a contribution) `:contributionId` are **lookup keys, not path
+ * components**. They are handed to the registry and, on an exact match, the already-canonical
+ * `artifactPath` that Core's discovery resolved and validated is read directly. No request value is ever joined, resolved,
+ * normalized, or concatenated into a path, and there is no wildcard segment for one to hide in — so
+ * traversal, an encoded separator, a symlink, a sibling file, a source map, and a package-root file
+ * are all unreachable by construction rather than by filtering. An installed module directory never
+ * becomes a static file root, and only the single artifact its manifest declares is reachable.
+ *
+ * ## No authentication, deliberately
+ *
+ * Retrieving the artifact confers no authority. The bundle is compiled first-party UI code an
+ * operator reviewed and installed; it carries no credential, and the host — not the artifact —
+ * supplies the principal and permissions at mount time. Every module API stays behind
+ * `requirePermission` against the composed platform registry, and nothing about fetching this file
+ * changes a single authorization decision.
+ *
+ * Requiring a session would also break the thing it is meant to protect: a browser's dynamic
+ * `import()` uses `credentials: "same-origin"`, so a cross-origin import (the split-origin
+ * deployments `EKKLESIA_IDENTITY_TRUSTED_ORIGINS` exists to support) sends no cookie and would fail
+ * — a failure that tests green on a server and only shows up in a real browser, exactly the class of
+ * error ADR 0024 exists to prevent. Working around it would mean fetching the bytes and importing a
+ * `blob:` URL, which costs a host its `script-src` CSP.
+ *
+ * The honest cost is stated in ADR 0025: an anonymous caller who already knows a module id **and**
+ * its exact installed version can download that module's UI bundle. That is information disclosure,
+ * not authority, and it is the reason the failure responses above are indistinguishable.
+ *
+ * ## The artifact is never executed
+ *
+ * This route reads bytes and writes bytes. It does not `import()`, evaluate, transform, minify,
+ * re-bundle, or rewrite the artifact, and a module UI whose top level throws is served exactly like
+ * any other. Core's rule that discovery never executes `entrypoints.ui` (ADR 0021) is unchanged, and
+ * publication does not become a second, quieter way to run browser code on the server.
+ */
+export function createModuleUiRoutes(options: CreateModuleUiRoutesOptions): Hono {
+  const routes = new Hono();
+
+  routes.get(
+    `${MODULE_UI_ASSET_PREFIX}/:moduleId/:version/contributions/:contributionId`,
+    async (c) => {
+      // Three lookup keys, one exact registry match, one already-validated canonical path. Nothing
+      // is composed, so a contribution artifact is reachable on exactly the same terms as a module
+      // UI artifact and on no others.
+      const published = options.registry.resolveContribution(
+        c.req.param("moduleId"),
+        c.req.param("version"),
+        c.req.param("contributionId"),
+      );
+      if (!published) {
+        return notPublished(c);
+      }
+      return serveArtifact(c, published);
+    },
+  );
+
+  routes.get(`${MODULE_UI_ASSET_PREFIX}/:moduleId/:version/display`, async (c) => {
+    const published = options.registry.resolveDisplay(
+      c.req.param("moduleId"),
+      c.req.param("version"),
+    );
+    if (!published) {
+      return notPublished(c);
+    }
+    return serveArtifact(c, published);
+  });
+
+  routes.get(`${MODULE_UI_ASSET_PREFIX}/:moduleId/:version`, async (c) => {
+    const published = options.registry.resolve(c.req.param("moduleId"), c.req.param("version"));
+    if (!published) {
+      return notPublished(c);
+    }
+    return serveArtifact(c, published);
+  });
+
+  return routes;
+}

apps/api/src/platform-permissions.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,143 @@
+import { readFile } from "node:fs/promises";
+import path from "node:path";
+import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
+import type { PermissionRegistry } from "@ekklesia/core/authorization";
+import {
+  composePlatformPermissionRegistry,
+  discoverModules,
+  type DiscoveredModule,
+} from "@ekklesia/core/modules";
+
+export type PlatformPermissionConfigurationErrorCode = "PLATFORM_PERMISSION_CONFIGURATION_INVALID";
+
+/** Never carries the underlying package.json path, filesystem error, module directory, manifest
+ * content, or any other machine detail — a broken repository layout is a startup-time
+ * configuration problem, not something to describe in detail to whatever eventually logs it. */
+export class PlatformPermissionConfigurationError extends Error {
+  readonly code: PlatformPermissionConfigurationErrorCode;
+
+  constructor() {
+    super("Module discovery configuration could not be resolved.");
+    this.name = "PlatformPermissionConfigurationError";
+    this.code = "PLATFORM_PERMISSION_CONFIGURATION_INVALID";
+    this.stack = `${this.name}: ${this.message}`;
+    Object.freeze(this);
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Resolves the repository root from this compiled/source file's own location, never
+ * `process.cwd()` — package-scoped test runs execute with `apps/api` as the working directory,
+ * which would silently point discovery at the wrong `modules/` directory. `apps/api/dist/*.js`
+ * (compiled) and `apps/api/src/*.ts` (source, under a test runner transforming TypeScript
+ * on the fly) sit at the identical depth from the repository root, so the same fixed number of
+ * `..` segments resolves correctly in both.
+ */
+function resolveRepositoryRoot(): string {
+  return path.resolve(path.dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)), "..", "..", "..");
+}
+
+interface PackageVersionFile {
+  readonly version?: unknown;
+}
+
+async function readPackageVersion(packagePath: string): Promise<string> {
+  let packageData: PackageVersionFile;
+  try {
+    packageData = JSON.parse(await readFile(packagePath, "utf8")) as PackageVersionFile;
+  } catch {
+    throw new PlatformPermissionConfigurationError();
+  }
+  if (typeof packageData.version !== "string" || packageData.version.trim().length === 0) {
+    throw new PlatformPermissionConfigurationError();
+  }
+  return packageData.version;
+}
+
+export interface PrepareStartupModuleInventoryOptions {
+  /** Test-only escape hatch: overrides the directory module discovery scans for installed
+   * modules. Never set by the executable entry point — production always discovers the real
+   * repository's `modules/` directory. Platform and Module SDK versions are always read from the
+   * real repository's own `package.json` files regardless of this override. */
+  readonly modulesDirectoryOverride?: string;
+  /** Test-only escape hatch: supplies an already-discovered module list directly, skipping the
+   * filesystem discovery step entirely, while still running the real `composePlatformPermissionRegistry`
+   * on it — and, if startup progresses that far, driving module runtime startup with this exact
+   * list too. Exists because a genuine exact permission-id collision between two modules is
+   * unreachable through real discovery: module ids are unique (discovery itself rejects a
+   * duplicate) and every permission id is namespaced by its own module's id, so no two
+   * really-discovered modules can ever contribute the same permission id. Proving
+   * `PermissionRegistryError`'s own duplicate-rejection behavior in composition, and that startup
+   * has created no pool before it runs, requires supplying deliberately conflicting declarations
+   * directly. (A module-vs-Core collision, by contrast, *is* reachable through real discovery — a
+   * module whose own id is `"core"` — and surfaces as `ModulePermissionCompositionError`, not this
+   * case; `modulesDirectoryOverride` with a real fixture is what proves that one.) Never set by the
+   * executable entry point.
+   */
+  readonly discoveredModulesOverride?: readonly DiscoveredModule[];
+}
+
+export type ComposeStartupPermissionRegistryOptions = PrepareStartupModuleInventoryOptions;
+
+export interface StartupModuleInventory {
+  /** The exact discovered-module list — in discovery order — permission composition ran against.
+   * Production startup (`apps/api/src/server.ts`) passes this same list to
+   * `startDiscoveredModuleRuntime` rather than letting the module runtime rediscover modules a
+   * second time. */
+  readonly modules: readonly DiscoveredModule[];
+  readonly permissionRegistry: PermissionRegistry;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Discovers every installed module's manifest exactly once and composes the one immutable platform
+ * permission registry (Core's own declarations plus every module's) from that exact discovered
+ * list — the production source of truth `apps/api` enforces every request against, and the exact
+ * module inventory `startDiscoveredModuleRuntime` starts from. Only manifests are read here; no
+ * module server entrypoint is imported or executed, and no module lifecycle hook runs. Read the
+ * platform and Module SDK versions only when this function actually executes, never at import
+ * time.
+ */
+export async function prepareStartupModuleInventory(
+  options: PrepareStartupModuleInventoryOptions = {},
+): Promise<StartupModuleInventory> {
+  if (options.discoveredModulesOverride) {
+    const modules = options.discoveredModulesOverride;
+    return Object.freeze({
+      modules,
+      permissionRegistry: composePlatformPermissionRegistry(modules),
+    });
+  }
+
+  const repositoryRoot = resolveRepositoryRoot();
+  const [platformVersion, moduleSdkVersion] = await Promise.all([
+    readPackageVersion(path.join(repositoryRoot, "package.json")),
+    readPackageVersion(path.join(repositoryRoot, "packages/module-sdk/package.json")),
+  ]);
+
+  const modules = await discoverModules({
+    moduleSdkVersion,
+    modulesDirectory: options.modulesDirectoryOverride ?? path.join(repositoryRoot, "modules"),
+    platformVersion,
+  });
+
+  return Object.freeze({
+    modules,
+    permissionRegistry: composePlatformPermissionRegistry(modules),
+  });
+}
+
+/**
+ * Compatible wrapper for callers — currently only existing tests — that need this package's
+ * composed registry without the discovered module list itself. (Doctor and `modules:validate` are
+ * Core-owned and never call into `apps/api` at all; they call Core's own
+ * `composePlatformPermissionRegistry` directly over their own already-discovered module list.)
+ * Production `startApi` does not call this wrapper: it calls `prepareStartupModuleInventory`
+ * directly so it can hand the exact same discovered list to `startDiscoveredModuleRuntime`, rather
+ * than discarding it here and rediscovering modules a second time for runtime startup.
+ */
+export async function composeStartupPermissionRegistry(
+  options: ComposeStartupPermissionRegistryOptions = {},
+): Promise<PermissionRegistry> {
+  const inventory = await prepareStartupModuleInventory(options);
+  return inventory.permissionRegistry;
+}

apps/api/src/server.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,814 @@
+import type { Socket } from "node:net";
+import path from "node:path";
+import { pathToFileURL } from "node:url";
+import {
+  EMPTY_MODULE_SECRET_SOURCE,
+  type ModuleRuntimeServices,
+  type ModuleSecretSource,
+} from "@ekklesia/contracts";
+import {
+  createAuthorizationEvaluator,
+  createAuthorizationStore,
+} from "@ekklesia/core/authorization";
+import { createDashboardStore } from "@ekklesia/core/dashboard";
+import { createDeviceStore } from "@ekklesia/core/devices";
+import { type HostEnvironment, loadHostConfiguration } from "@ekklesia/core/host";
+import {
+  createIdentityNotifications,
+  createIdentityRuntime,
+  type IdentityNotificationReporter,
+  type IdentityRateLimitOverride,
+} from "@ekklesia/core/identity";
+import { createSmtpMailProvider, type MailProvider } from "@ekklesia/core/mail";
+import {
+  createModuleConfigurationStore,
+  createModuleLifecycleStore,
+  createModuleUiPublicationRegistry,
+  type DiscoveredModule,
+  type ModuleConfigurationSettings,
+  type ModuleEligibilityResolution,
+  resolveModuleEligibility,
+  type StartedModuleRuntime,
+  startDiscoveredModuleRuntime,
+} from "@ekklesia/core/modules";
+import {
+  createModuleStorageLookup,
+  createS3StorageProvider,
+  type StorageProvider,
+} from "@ekklesia/core/storage";
+import { type ServerType, serve } from "@hono/node-server";
+import type { Hono } from "hono";
+import { createApiApp } from "./app.js";
+import {
+  type ClientAddressResolver,
+  createClientAddressResolver,
+  wrapFetchWithClientAddress,
+} from "./client-address.js";
+import { type ApiRuntimeConfig, apiTrustedOrigins, createApiRuntimeConfig } from "./config.js";
+import { loadDashboardHostAssets } from "./dashboard-host-assets.js";
+import { type ApiDatabaseHandle, createApiDatabase } from "./database.js";
+import { withDevicePrincipals } from "./device-principal.js";
+import { loadDisplayHostAssets } from "./display-host-assets.js";
+import { READINESS_DATABASE_TIMEOUT_MS } from "./health-routes.js";
+import { prepareStartupModuleInventory } from "./platform-permissions.js";
+
+const connectionTimeoutMs = 10_000;
+const operationTimeoutMs = 10_000;
+
+export interface NodeServerTimeouts {
+  readonly headersTimeoutMs: number;
+  readonly requestTimeoutMs: number;
+  readonly keepAliveTimeoutMs: number;
+  /**
+   * How often Node re-scans open connections for a header/request timeout violation
+   * (`http.Server`'s `connectionsCheckingInterval`). This is not merely a performance knob: Node
+   * enforces `headersTimeout`/`requestTimeout` only when this periodic check runs, and its own
+   * default (30s) is verified (`node --version` 24.15.0, direct `http.createServer` reproduction)
+   * to let a violating connection sit for up to a full additional interval past its actual
+   * timeout before Node ever closes it — so leaving this at Node's default would silently widen
+   * both timeouts above by up to 30s in the worst case. Kept small relative to `headersTimeoutMs`
+   * so a violation is detected promptly after it actually elapses.
+   */
+  readonly connectionsCheckingIntervalMs: number;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Finite Node HTTP server timeouts for this JSON-only API. Node's own defaults
+ * (`headersTimeout`: 60s, `requestTimeout`: 300s) are generous enough to let a slow-header or
+ * slow-body connection hold a socket for minutes with no reverse proxy in front; these values bound
+ * that exposure while remaining comfortable for the small JSON payloads this API ever accepts (see
+ * `./body-limits.js`). `headersTimeoutMs` must not exceed `requestTimeoutMs` — Node validates this
+ * relationship itself at server construction — so headers alone may take up to 20s, and the
+ * complete request (headers plus body) up to 30s, before Node itself responds `408` and closes the
+ * connection without ever invoking a handler (subject to `connectionsCheckingIntervalMs`'s own
+ * detection latency, above). `keepAliveTimeoutMs` matches Node's own default (5s) made explicit and
+ * typed rather than left implicit; it bounds only the idle window between requests on a reused
+ * connection, never an in-flight one.
+ */
+const PRODUCTION_NODE_SERVER_TIMEOUTS: NodeServerTimeouts = Object.freeze({
+  connectionsCheckingIntervalMs: 5_000,
+  headersTimeoutMs: 20_000,
+  keepAliveTimeoutMs: 5_000,
+  requestTimeoutMs: 30_000,
+});
+
+/**
+ * The two fixed operational lines a transport-level client failure may produce. Neither ever
+ * carries the remote address, request path, query, headers, cookies, body, forwarding chain, the
+ * caught error's own message, or the malformed bytes that caused it — an attacker controls all of
+ * those, and a parse failure's message in particular is derived directly from the rejected input.
+ */
+const NODE_SERVER_TIMEOUT_LOG_MESSAGE =
+  "[server] A connection was closed for exceeding a configured header/request timeout.";
+const NODE_SERVER_CLIENT_ERROR_LOG_MESSAGE =
+  "[server] A connection was closed after a malformed or oversized client request.";
+
+/**
+ * Node's own documented default `clientError` responses, reproduced byte-for-byte (verified
+ * directly against the pinned Node 24 runtime by driving each case through a real socket with no
+ * listener attached). Registering *any* `clientError` listener suppresses that default entirely —
+ * `_http_server.js` only falls back when `server.emit("clientError", ...)` returns `false` — so a
+ * listener that merely observes would silently turn every 408/400/431 into a bare connection reset.
+ * Reproducing the exact bytes is what lets the platform log the event without changing what a
+ * caller actually receives.
+ */
+const NODE_CLIENT_ERROR_RESPONSES: Readonly<Record<string, string>> = Object.freeze({
+  ERR_HTTP_REQUEST_TIMEOUT: "HTTP/1.1 408 Request Timeout\r\nConnection: close\r\n\r\n",
+  HPE_HEADER_OVERFLOW: "HTTP/1.1 431 Request Header Fields Too Large\r\nConnection: close\r\n\r\n",
+});
+const NODE_CLIENT_ERROR_DEFAULT_RESPONSE = "HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request\r\nConnection: close\r\n\r\n";
+
+/**
+ * Mirrors Node's own `socketOnError` fallback exactly: write the code-appropriate response only
+ * when the socket is still writable *and* no response has already begun for the in-flight request,
+ * then destroy the socket. The `_httpMessage` guard is what prevents a second, corrupting status
+ * line when a handler already responded and only the (unread) request body subsequently timed out.
+ */
+function writeNodeClientErrorResponse(error: NodeJS.ErrnoException, socket: Socket): void {
+  const inFlightResponse = (socket as Socket & { _httpMessage?: { headersSent?: boolean } })
+    ._httpMessage;
+  const alreadyResponding = inFlightResponse?.headersSent === true;
+  if (socket.writable && !alreadyResponding) {
+    const code = typeof error.code === "string" ? error.code : "";
+    socket.write(NODE_CLIENT_ERROR_RESPONSES[code] ?? NODE_CLIENT_ERROR_DEFAULT_RESPONSE);
+  }
+  socket.destroy();
+}
+
+export interface RunningApi {
+  readonly app: Hono;
+  readonly server: ServerType;
+  shutdown(): Promise<void>;
+}
+
+export interface StartApiOptions {
+  /** Test-only escape hatch: never set by the executable entry point. See
+   * `IdentityRateLimitOverride` for why production must leave this unset. */
+  readonly rateLimitOverride?: IdentityRateLimitOverride;
+  /**
+   * Where a verification or reset message that could not be delivered is reported.
+   *
+   * Production composition leaves this unset and one fixed sanitized line is written. It exists as a
+   * seam because the *only* externally observable difference between "the relay is down" and "there
+   * is no such account" must be this report — every HTTP response is deliberately identical — so a
+   * test needs somewhere to observe the operational failure the user is never shown.
+   */
+  readonly reportNotificationFailure?: IdentityNotificationReporter;
+  /** Test-only escape hatch: overrides the directory module discovery scans. Never set by the
+   * executable entry point. See `prepareStartupModuleInventory`. */
+  readonly modulesDirectoryOverride?: string;
+  /** Test-only escape hatch: supplies an already-discovered module list directly, skipping
+   * filesystem discovery entirely — this exact list drives both permission composition and module
+   * runtime startup. Never set by the executable entry point. See
+   * `prepareStartupModuleInventory`. */
+  readonly discoveredModulesOverride?: readonly DiscoveredModule[];
+  /** Test-only escape hatch: narrows the Node header/request/keep-alive timeouts so a transport
+   * test can prove real timeout behavior deterministically without waiting out the production
+   * values. Never set by the executable entry point. */
+  readonly nodeServerTimeoutOverride?: Partial<NodeServerTimeouts>;
+  /** Test-only escape hatch: narrows the graceful HTTP drain deadline
+   * (`HTTP_DRAIN_TIMEOUT_MS`) so a forced close can be proven in milliseconds. Never set by the
+   * executable entry point. */
+  readonly drainTimeoutMsOverride?: number;
+  /** Test-only escape hatch: narrows the per-module stop/rollback hook deadline
+   * (`MODULE_STOP_HOOK_TIMEOUT_MS`). Never set by the executable entry point. */
+  readonly moduleHookTimeoutMsOverride?: number;
+  /**
+   * Where deployment-supplied module secrets come from (ADR 0029) — the one *production* dependency
+   * in this options object rather than a test-only escape hatch.
+   *
+   * It is a dependency rather than a field on `ApiRuntimeConfig` because it is a lookup, not a
+   * validated value, and because the set of secrets depends on which modules are discovered — which
+   * is not known when configuration is validated. The executable entry point supplies an
+   * environment-backed source; omitting it supplies nothing, so a module declaring a required secret
+   * is reported `secret_missing` rather than silently starting without it.
+   */
+  readonly moduleSecrets?: ModuleSecretSource;
+}
+
+async function safeCloseDatabase(handle: ApiDatabaseHandle): Promise<void> {
+  try {
+    await handle.close();
+  } catch {
+    // Cleanup failures are swallowed here deliberately: they must never mask a startup failure
+    // that is already propagating, and there is no raw driver detail safe to surface.
+  }
+}
+
+/** Same swallow-on-cleanup-path rule as `safeCloseDatabase`, for the mail provider's transport. */
+async function safeCloseMail(provider: MailProvider | undefined): Promise<void> {
+  if (!provider) {
+    return;
+  }
+  try {
+    await provider.close();
+  } catch {
+    // See safeCloseDatabase: never mask a failure that is already propagating.
+  }
+}
+
+/** Same swallow-on-cleanup-path rule as `safeCloseDatabase`, for the storage provider's own
+ * connection pool. */
+async function safeCloseStorage(provider: StorageProvider | undefined): Promise<void> {
+  if (!provider) {
+    return;
+  }
+  try {
+    await provider.close();
+  } catch {
+    // See safeCloseDatabase: never mask a failure that is already propagating.
+  }
+}
+
+/** Same swallow-on-cleanup-path rule as `safeCloseDatabase`, used only while unwinding a startup
+ * failure that already occurred after the module runtime started — never during normal shutdown,
+ * where a module stop failure remains an observable result instead (see `startApi`'s `shutdown`). */
+async function safeStopModuleRuntime(moduleRuntime: StartedModuleRuntime): Promise<void> {
+  try {
+    await moduleRuntime.stop();
+  } catch {
+    // See safeCloseDatabase: never mask the startup failure already propagating.
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * The platform's fixed graceful-drain deadline. In-flight HTTP work has this long to finish after
+ * the listener stops accepting new connections; after it, connections are closed so process
+ * shutdown stays bounded. Not configurable in this slice.
+ */
+export const HTTP_DRAIN_TIMEOUT_MS = 30_000;
+
+/**
+ * A shutdown that did not complete cleanly. Carries only fixed booleans and the already-sanitized
+ * module-runtime error — never a request, socket, URL, credential, SQL, or stack detail — so an
+ * operator can see *which* stages failed without any of it becoming a disclosure channel.
+ */
+export class ApiShutdownError extends Error {
+  readonly drainTimedOut: boolean;
+  readonly moduleStopFailed: boolean;
+  readonly moduleStopError: unknown;
+
+  constructor(drainTimedOut: boolean, moduleStopError: unknown) {
+    super("The API did not shut down cleanly.");
+    this.name = "ApiShutdownError";
+    this.drainTimedOut = drainTimedOut;
+    this.moduleStopFailed = moduleStopError !== undefined;
+    this.moduleStopError = moduleStopError;
+    this.stack = `${this.name}: ${this.message}`;
+    Object.freeze(this);
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Stops accepting new connections, then waits up to `timeoutMs` for existing HTTP work to finish.
+ *
+ * At the deadline it closes idle and then still-active connections using Node's own supported
+ * public `Server` APIs (`closeIdleConnections`/`closeAllConnections`, both called only after
+ * `server.close()`), and stops waiting for the close callback. No private socket or server field is
+ * touched.
+ *
+ * Force-closing a connection ends the transport. It does **not** prove that arbitrary in-process
+ * handler JavaScript was canceled — a handler promise may still be running and may still settle.
+ * What is guaranteed is that shutdown no longer waits for it, and that the pool closes afterwards,
+ * so its late database work fails.
+ */
+/** `ServerType` is a union that also covers HTTP/2 servers, which do not expose these two methods.
+ * `serve()` here always creates a plain `http.Server`, which does; narrowing with a real capability
+ * check keeps that honest instead of asserting a cast. */
+interface ConnectionClosingServer {
+  closeAllConnections(): void;
+  closeIdleConnections(): void;
+}
+
+function supportsConnectionClosing(
+  server: ServerType,
+): server is ServerType & ConnectionClosingServer {
+  const candidate = server as Partial<ConnectionClosingServer>;
+  return (
+    typeof candidate.closeIdleConnections === "function" &&
+    typeof candidate.closeAllConnections === "function"
+  );
+}
+
+async function drainHttpServer(
+  server: ServerType,
+  timeoutMs: number,
+): Promise<"drained" | "forced"> {
+  let timer: ReturnType<typeof setTimeout> | undefined;
+  const closed = new Promise<void>((resolve) => {
+    server.close(() => resolve());
+  });
+  try {
+    const outcome = await Promise.race([
+      closed.then(() => "drained" as const),
+      new Promise<"forced">((resolve) => {
+        timer = setTimeout(() => resolve("forced"), timeoutMs);
+      }),
+    ]);
+    if (outcome === "drained") {
+      return "drained";
+    }
+    if (supportsConnectionClosing(server)) {
+      server.closeIdleConnections();
+      server.closeAllConnections();
+    }
+    return "forced";
+  } finally {
+    clearTimeout(timer);
+    // The close callback may still fire later; nothing awaits it, and it carries no rejection.
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Binds the Node HTTP server. Two platform-owned transport concerns are applied at this exact
+ * boundary, below Hono entirely: `wrapFetchWithClientAddress` resolves and sanitizes the caller's
+ * address from the real socket peer before any route (including Better Auth's own rate limiter)
+ * ever sees the request (see `./client-address.js`), and `serverOptions` gives Node finite
+ * header/request/keep-alive timeouts so a slow-header or slow-body connection cannot hold a socket
+ * indefinitely. A connection Node itself closes for exceeding one of these timeouts never reaches
+ * `app.fetch` and never receives a second response — both are Node's own documented behavior for
+ * `headersTimeout`/`requestTimeout`, not something this function re-implements.
+ */
+function bindServer(
+  app: Hono,
+  host: string,
+  port: number,
+  clientAddressResolver: ClientAddressResolver,
+  timeouts: NodeServerTimeouts,
+): Promise<ServerType> {
+  return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
+    let settled = false;
+    const server = serve(
+      {
+        fetch: wrapFetchWithClientAddress(app.fetch, clientAddressResolver),
+        hostname: host,
+        port,
+        serverOptions: {
+          connectionsCheckingInterval: timeouts.connectionsCheckingIntervalMs,
+          headersTimeout: timeouts.headersTimeoutMs,
+          keepAliveTimeout: timeouts.keepAliveTimeoutMs,
+          requestTimeout: timeouts.requestTimeoutMs,
+        },
+      },
+      () => {
+        if (!settled) {
+          settled = true;
+          resolve(server);
+        }
+      },
+    );
+    // `headersTimeout`/`requestTimeout` do NOT surface as the server's general `'timeout'` event —
+    // that event only fires for `server.setTimeout()`'s idle-socket timer, which this server never
+    // arms. Verified directly against the pinned Node 24 runtime by driving a real slow-header and
+    // slow-body connection through a real socket: the only server-level event either produces is
+    // `'clientError'`, carrying `err.code === "ERR_HTTP_REQUEST_TIMEOUT"`. Observing the failure
+    // therefore has to happen here, and — because registering a listener suppresses Node's own
+    // default response — this handler must reproduce that default itself.
+    server.on("clientError", (error: NodeJS.ErrnoException, socket: Socket) => {
+      console.error(
+        error.code === "ERR_HTTP_REQUEST_TIMEOUT"
+          ? NODE_SERVER_TIMEOUT_LOG_MESSAGE
+          : NODE_SERVER_CLIENT_ERROR_LOG_MESSAGE,
+      );
+      writeNodeClientErrorResponse(error, socket);
+    });
+    server.once("error", () => {
+      if (!settled) {
+        settled = true;
+        reject(new Error("The API server failed to start listening."));
+      }
+    });
+  });
+}
+
+/**
+ * Explicit runtime composition, in a fixed order:
+ *
+ * 1. Discover every installed module's manifest exactly once and compose the one immutable
+ *    platform permission registry from Core's own declarations plus every module's
+ *    (`prepareStartupModuleInventory`, `./platform-permissions.js`).
+ * 2. Construct the one shared PostgreSQL pool (identity, authorization, and the module database
+ *    facade each get a typed Drizzle view over it — see `./database.js`).
+ * 3. Construct the frozen `ModuleRuntimeServices` (currently just `database`) from that same pool,
+ *    then the Core identity runtime, authorization store, and evaluator.
+ * 4. Read the stored module enablement configuration and resolve, from that exact same discovered
+ *    inventory, which modules are eligible to run (`resolveModuleEligibility`).
+ * 5. Start the module runtime from the eligible subset (`startDiscoveredModuleRuntime`) — never
+ *    rediscovering modules a second time — passing it the same services object every module's
+ *    `start`/`stop` hook receives.
+ * 6. Create the Hono application, mounting the started module runtime's published routes, publishing
+ *    UI for that same eligible set, and passing the exact same services object to every module HTTP
+ *    handler.
+ * 7. Bind the Node HTTP server.
+ *
+ * Discovery and permission composition happen before any pool, Better Auth instance, module
+ * entrypoint import, or HTTP server exists, so a discovery or composition failure — an invalid
+ * manifest, a dependency-graph problem, a module claiming the reserved `core.*` permission
+ * namespace, or a duplicate permission declaration — leaves nothing to close: it propagates
+ * directly, and startup never falls back to a Core-only registry. Core infrastructure (the pool,
+ * module database facade, identity, authorization) exists before any executable module lifecycle
+ * code runs, and every module route is published only after the entire module runtime has
+ * registered and started successfully, so no request can ever reach a module before every module
+ * has started. A module that is disabled, or blocked by a disabled required dependency, is never
+ * imported at all: no entrypoint evaluation, no lifecycle hook, no route, no capability, and no
+ * published UI artifact — there is no per-request "is this module enabled?" check anywhere, because
+ * there is nothing mounted to check.
+ *
+ * Step 4 makes startup depend on a reachable, migrated database. If the enablement configuration
+ * cannot be read, startup fails closed with Core's sanitized `MODULE_LIFECYCLE_READ_FAILED` rather
+ * than starting every discovered module: the platform cannot know what an administrator decided, and
+ * starting a module they disabled is worse than not starting at all.
+ *
+ * Returns a handle with an idempotent `shutdown()` so both the executable entry point and tests can
+ * stop the server, the module runtime, and the shared pool deterministically. Never applies
+ * migrations, generates schema, or issues a module database query merely because modules were
+ * discovered — the database must already be migrated through `pnpm migrations:apply`.
+ */
+export async function startApi(
+  config: ApiRuntimeConfig,
+  options: StartApiOptions = {},
+): Promise<RunningApi> {
+  const inventory = await prepareStartupModuleInventory({
+    ...(options.modulesDirectoryOverride === undefined
+      ? {}
+      : { modulesDirectoryOverride: options.modulesDirectoryOverride }),
+    ...(options.discoveredModulesOverride === undefined
+      ? {}
+      : { discoveredModulesOverride: options.discoveredModulesOverride }),
+  });
+
+  const databaseHandle = createApiDatabase(config.databaseUrl, {
+    connectionTimeoutMs,
+    operationTimeoutMs,
+    // The one validated transport policy reaches this runtime's single physical pool here; the
+    // identity, authorization, and module Drizzle views are all typed views over that same pool,
+    // so TLS never introduces a second connection.
+    transport: config.databaseTransport,
+  });
+
+  // Both host providers are constructed from validated configuration **before** anything that uses
+  // them, and neither touches the network while being built: an S3 client opens no connection and a
+  // Nodemailer transport opens no socket, so an unreachable relay or storage service can never stop
+  // the platform from booting (ADR 0030, ADR 0037). An installation with neither configured gets
+  // `undefined` for both, which is a complete, valid deployment.
+  const storageProvider = config.storage ? createS3StorageProvider(config.storage) : undefined;
+  const mailProvider = config.mail ? createSmtpMailProvider(config.mail) : undefined;
+
+  let services: ModuleRuntimeServices;
+  let runtime: ReturnType<typeof createIdentityRuntime>;
+  let authorizationStore: ReturnType<typeof createAuthorizationStore>;
+  let deviceStore: ReturnType<typeof createDeviceStore>;
+  try {
+    services = Object.freeze({ database: databaseHandle.module });
+    runtime = createIdentityRuntime({
+      config: config.identity,
+      db: databaseHandle.identity,
+      // Identity's two outbound messages, composed here — the one place that knows both the
+      // validated identity configuration and the host's mail provider. Core's identity code learns
+      // a recipient, a subject, and two bodies and nothing whatsoever about SMTP (ADR 0038).
+      notifications: createIdentityNotifications({
+        authBaseUrl: config.identity.baseUrl,
+        dashboardOrigin: config.identity.dashboardOrigin,
+        mail: mailProvider,
+        ...(options.reportNotificationFailure ? { report: options.reportNotificationFailure } : {}),
+      }),
+      ...(options.rateLimitOverride ? { rateLimitOverride: options.rateLimitOverride } : {}),
+    });
+    authorizationStore = createAuthorizationStore(databaseHandle.authorization);
+    deviceStore = createDeviceStore(databaseHandle.devices);
+  } catch (error) {
+    await safeCloseStorage(storageProvider);
+    await safeCloseMail(mailProvider);
+    await safeCloseDatabase(databaseHandle);
+    throw error;
+  }
+
+  const evaluator = createAuthorizationEvaluator({
+    // Device authority reaches the one evaluator here. There is no second decision point: a device
+    // is allowed or denied by the same function, with the same deny-by-default, as a person.
+    devices: deviceStore,
+    grants: authorizationStore,
+    platformOwners: authorizationStore,
+  });
+
+  // Read the administrator's enablement decisions and resolve which discovered modules may actually
+  // start, before a single module entrypoint is imported. A failure here fails startup rather than
+  // falling back to "start everything": the platform cannot know what it was told, and starting a
+  // module an administrator disabled is worse than not starting at all.
+  const moduleLifecycleStore = createModuleLifecycleStore(databaseHandle.moduleLifecycle);
+  const moduleConfigurationStore = createModuleConfigurationStore(
+    databaseHandle.moduleConfiguration,
+  );
+  const moduleSecrets = options.moduleSecrets ?? EMPTY_MODULE_SECRET_SOURCE;
+  let eligibility: ModuleEligibilityResolution;
+  let moduleConfigurationSettings: ModuleConfigurationSettings;
+  try {
+    // Both axes are read before a single module entrypoint is imported, and resolved together in
+    // one pass (ADR 0029): a module is eligible only if an administrator enabled it, its own
+    // required configuration is satisfiable, and every module it requires is eligible too. The pass
+    // also produces each eligible module's frozen configuration snapshot, so the configuration that
+    // made a module eligible is the identical object it later receives.
+    // Read sequentially rather than concurrently, deliberately: these are two tiny queries, and
+    // racing them would make the reported failure depend on which rejected first. An operator
+    // debugging a broken deployment must get the same error code every time.
+    const lifecycleConfiguration = await moduleLifecycleStore.readConfiguration();
+    const settings = await moduleConfigurationStore.readSettings();
+    moduleConfigurationSettings = settings;
+    eligibility = resolveModuleEligibility(
+      inventory.modules,
+      lifecycleConfiguration,
+      { secrets: moduleSecrets, settings },
+      { providerConfigured: storageProvider !== undefined },
+    );
+  } catch (error) {
+    await safeCloseStorage(storageProvider);
+    await safeCloseMail(mailProvider);
+    await safeCloseDatabase(databaseHandle);
+    throw error;
+  }
+
+  // One scoped facade per eligible module, over the exact buckets that module's own manifest
+  // declares. Built from the eligible set so a blocked module never receives storage at all.
+  const moduleStorages = createModuleStorageLookup(
+    storageProvider,
+    config.storage?.bucketPrefix ?? "",
+    eligibility.eligibleModules.map((module) => ({
+      logicalBucketIds: module.manifest.storage.buckets.map((bucket) => bucket.id),
+      moduleId: module.manifest.id,
+    })),
+  );
+
+  // This snapshot is inert metadata only: construction reads no artifact and executes no module.
+  // It lets the API prove that a display host build is available *before* importing any eligible
+  // module code. The snapshot is not exposed anywhere unless the complete runtime subsequently
+  // starts and application composition succeeds.
+  const moduleUi = createModuleUiPublicationRegistry(eligibility.eligibleModules);
+  let displayHostAssets: Awaited<ReturnType<typeof loadDisplayHostAssets>> | undefined;
+  let dashboardHostAssets: Awaited<ReturnType<typeof loadDashboardHostAssets>>;
+  try {
+    displayHostAssets =
+      moduleUi.listDisplays().length === 0 ? undefined : await loadDisplayHostAssets();
+    // Unconditional, unlike the display host: every installation serves its Dashboard (ADR 0044),
+    // so a missing shell build fails here, before any module code is imported.
+    // The page learns its API origin from the API that serves it, so one build serves either
+    // topology (ADR 0045).
+    dashboardHostAssets = await loadDashboardHostAssets(config.identity.baseUrl);
+  } catch (error) {
+    await safeCloseStorage(storageProvider);
+    await safeCloseMail(mailProvider);
+    await safeCloseDatabase(databaseHandle);
+    throw error;
+  }
+
+  // Module load/register/start failures use Core's own existing rollback (already-started
+  // modules are stopped, in reverse order, before this rejects) — there is no separate runtime
+  // handle to stop here, only the pool this failure leaves open.
+  //
+  // Only eligible modules are started, and startup remains all-or-nothing across *that* set: an
+  // ineligible module is never imported, so its `register`/`start` hooks never run, it publishes no
+  // routes and no capabilities, and it cannot take startup down. Eligibility filtering preserves
+  // discovery's topological order, so a started module's required dependencies still precede it.
+  let moduleRuntime: StartedModuleRuntime;
+  try {
+    moduleRuntime = await startDiscoveredModuleRuntime(eligibility.eligibleModules, services, {
+      configurations: eligibility.configurations,
+      storages: moduleStorages,
+      ...(options.moduleHookTimeoutMsOverride === undefined
+        ? {}
+        : { hookTimeoutMs: options.moduleHookTimeoutMsOverride }),
+    });
+  } catch (error) {
+    await safeCloseStorage(storageProvider);
+    await safeCloseMail(mailProvider);
+    await safeCloseDatabase(databaseHandle);
+    throw error;
+  }
+
+  // Set by the first `shutdown()` call, before anything is drained or stopped, so readiness turns
+  // `503` while the instance still finishes in-flight requests.
+  let shuttingDown = false;
+
+  let app: Hono;
+  try {
+    app = createApiApp({
+      authorization: {
+        evaluator,
+        registry: inventory.permissionRegistry,
+        store: authorizationStore,
+      },
+      moduleRoutes: moduleRuntime.routes,
+      moduleRealtime: moduleRuntime.realtime,
+      moduleServices: services,
+      // Built from the exact **eligible** set the runtime just started, never the raw discovered
+      // inventory, and exposed only after startup succeeded — so the published set is the running
+      // set. A disabled or dependency-blocked module therefore publishes no artifact, appears in no
+      // browser inventory, and appears in no resolved Dashboard navigation, by construction rather
+      // than by a filter somewhere downstream. Modules declaring no UI role are simply absent.
+      moduleUi,
+      ...(displayHostAssets === undefined ? {} : { displayHostAssets }),
+      moduleLifecycle: {
+        // The boot snapshot: what this process discovered, what it resolved, and what the runtime
+        // reports it actually started — read from the runtime rather than assumed equal to the
+        // eligible set.
+        snapshot: Object.freeze({
+          discoveredModules: inventory.modules,
+          eligibility: eligibility.entries,
+          startedModuleIds: Object.freeze(moduleRuntime.modules.map((module) => module.id)),
+        }),
+        store: moduleLifecycleStore,
+      },
+      moduleConfiguration: {
+        // The settings this process actually resolved from, so `restartRequired` is a comparison
+        // against what is running rather than a guess.
+        bootSettings: moduleConfigurationSettings,
+        discoveredModules: inventory.modules,
+        secrets: moduleSecrets,
+        snapshots: eligibility.configurations,
+        store: moduleConfigurationStore,
+      },
+      moduleStorage: {
+        providerConfigured: storageProvider !== undefined,
+        snapshots: moduleStorages,
+      },
+      // A typed view over the same single pool as identity, authorization, and the module facade.
+      dashboard: createDashboardStore(databaseHandle.dashboard),
+      dashboardHostAssets,
+      // The app is only composed after `startDiscoveredModuleRuntime` resolved, so module startup
+      // has completed whenever it can answer; it stops counting as complete once shutdown begins.
+      health: {
+        checkDatabase: () => databaseHandle.ping(READINESS_DATABASE_TIMEOUT_MS),
+        isModuleStartupComplete: () => !shuttingDown,
+      },
+      devices: {
+        // `Secure` follows the deployment's own scheme, read from the already-validated identity
+        // base URL rather than from any request. Production is https by configuration policy, so a
+        // real deployment always gets a Secure device cookie; a plaintext development origin would
+        // silently drop one.
+        secureCookies: config.identity.baseUrl.startsWith("https://"),
+        store: deviceStore,
+      },
+      // Principal resolution, extended with managed devices. A human session still wins, and this
+      // is the only place a device credential ever becomes a principal.
+      runtime: withDevicePrincipals({ devices: deviceStore, runtime }),
+      // The configured origins plus the API's own (ADR 0045).
+      trustedOrigins: apiTrustedOrigins(config.identity),
+    });
+  } catch (error) {
+    await safeStopModuleRuntime(moduleRuntime);
+    await safeCloseStorage(storageProvider);
+    await safeCloseMail(mailProvider);
+    await safeCloseDatabase(databaseHandle);
+    throw error;
+  }
+
+  const clientAddressResolver = createClientAddressResolver(config.clientAddress);
+  const timeouts: NodeServerTimeouts = {
+    ...PRODUCTION_NODE_SERVER_TIMEOUTS,
+    ...options.nodeServerTimeoutOverride,
+  };
+
+  let server: ServerType;
+  try {
+    server = await bindServer(app, config.host, config.port, clientAddressResolver, timeouts);
+  } catch (error) {
+    await safeStopModuleRuntime(moduleRuntime);
+    await safeCloseStorage(storageProvider);
+    await safeCloseMail(mailProvider);
+    await safeCloseDatabase(databaseHandle);
+    throw error;
+  }
+
+  // Memoizes one shared promise rather than a boolean flag: a boolean only prevents a *second*
+  // cleanup from starting, but a caller that arrives while the first cleanup is still in flight
+  // would previously get an already-resolved `undefined` immediately, before the listener had
+  // actually drained or the pool had actually closed. Storing the promise itself means every
+  // caller — concurrent or sequential — awaits the exact same drain-then-close operation and
+  // observes it complete (or fail) exactly once. Realtime subscriptions are closed *before* HTTP
+  // drain begins: they are intentionally long-lived HTTP responses and would otherwise keep every
+  // clean shutdown open until the forced-drain deadline. Order matters, and is now additionally
+  // load-bearing for the module database facade: the HTTP listener is drained and closed first so
+  // no new or in-flight request can reach a module handler while the module runtime is stopping;
+  // then the module runtime stops — its stop hooks may still use `services.database`, which is
+  // safe because the pool is not yet closed; only then does the shared pool close, so no module
+  // code can run against it afterward. Unlike the startup-cleanup paths above, a module-stop
+  // failure here is not swallowed — it is a genuine shutdown result a caller should observe — but
+  // database cleanup still always runs first, so a stop failure never leaves the pool open.
+  const drainTimeoutMs = options.drainTimeoutMsOverride ?? HTTP_DRAIN_TIMEOUT_MS;
+  let shutdownPromise: Promise<void> | undefined;
+  const shutdown = (): Promise<void> => {
+    if (!shutdownPromise) {
+      shuttingDown = true;
+      shutdownPromise = (async () => {
+        // Close long-lived streams so HTTP can drain, but leave publishers active until the drain
+        // completes: an in-flight module command may still commit and publish its resulting state.
+        // `moduleRuntime.stop()` deactivates publishers immediately before stop hooks run.
+        moduleRuntime.realtime.closeSubscriptions();
+        const drainOutcome = await drainHttpServer(server, drainTimeoutMs);
+        let moduleStopError: unknown;
+        try {
+          await moduleRuntime.stop();
+        } catch (error) {
+          moduleStopError = error;
+        }
+        // After the module runtime has stopped, so a `stop` hook may still use its storage
+        // facade, and before the pool closes, matching the existing ordering discipline exactly.
+        await safeCloseStorage(storageProvider);
+        await safeCloseMail(mailProvider);
+        await safeCloseDatabase(databaseHandle);
+        // Every stage above ran regardless of what the earlier ones did, so a drain timeout or a
+        // module-stop failure can never leave the pool open. Both failures are reported together,
+        // as fixed metadata: a forced drain is a genuine shutdown failure, not a success.
+        if (drainOutcome === "forced" || moduleStopError) {
+          throw new ApiShutdownError(
+            drainOutcome === "forced",
+            moduleStopError === undefined ? undefined : moduleStopError,
+          );
+        }
+      })();
+    }
+    return shutdownPromise;
+  };
+
+  return Object.freeze({ app, server, shutdown });
+}
+
+/**
+ * Wires `SIGINT`/`SIGTERM` to `running.shutdown()` and only then exits — extracted from `main()`
+ * so it can be exercised directly in tests with a fake `running`/`exit`, without sending a real
+ * process signal or invoking the real `process.exit` (which would terminate the test runner
+ * itself). Production composition (`main()`, below) calls this with real `process.exit`.
+ */
+export function installShutdownSignalHandlers(
+  running: Pick<RunningApi, "shutdown">,
+  exit: (code: number) => void = (code) => process.exit(code),
+): void {
+  let signalReceived = false;
+  const handleSignal = (): void => {
+    if (signalReceived) {
+      return;
+    }
+    signalReceived = true;
+    running
+      .shutdown()
+      .then(() => exit(0))
+      .catch(() => exit(1));
+  };
+  process.on("SIGINT", handleSignal);
+  process.on("SIGTERM", handleSignal);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Turns one deployment environment into this process's startup inputs.
+ *
+ * Every host infrastructure value comes from `loadHostConfiguration` — the same function
+ * `pnpm doctor` calls with the same environment — so the runtime and the diagnostic that reports on
+ * it can never disagree about what this deployment is configured to use. Only the two values that
+ * describe *this listener* rather than the host's infrastructure are read here.
+ */
+export function readConfigFromEnvironment(processEnvironment: HostEnvironment): {
+  readonly input: Parameters<typeof createApiRuntimeConfig>[0];
+  readonly environment: "development" | "production";
+  readonly moduleSecrets: ModuleSecretSource;
+} {
+  const host = loadHostConfiguration(processEnvironment);
+  return {
+    environment: host.environment,
+    input: {
+      clientAddress: host.clientAddress,
+      databaseTransport: host.databaseTransport,
+      databaseUrl: host.databaseUrl,
+      host: processEnvironment.EKKLESIA_API_HOST,
+      identity: host.identity,
+      mail: host.mail,
+      port: processEnvironment.EKKLESIA_API_PORT,
+      storage: host.storage,
+    },
+    moduleSecrets: host.moduleSecrets,
+  };
+}
+
+export async function main(): Promise<void> {
+  const { environment, input, moduleSecrets } = readConfigFromEnvironment(process.env);
+  const config = createApiRuntimeConfig(input, { environment });
+  const running = await startApi(config, { moduleSecrets });
+
+  const address = running.server.address();
+  const boundPort = address && typeof address === "object" ? address.port : config.port;
+  console.log(`Ekklesia API listening on ${config.host}:${boundPort}`);
+
+  installShutdownSignalHandlers(running);
+}
+
+function isDirectExecution(): boolean {
+  const entrypoint = process.argv[1];
+  return (
+    entrypoint !== undefined && import.meta.url === pathToFileURL(path.resolve(entrypoint)).href
+  );
+}
+
+if (isDirectExecution()) {
+  main().catch(() => {
+    console.error("Ekklesia API failed to start.");
+    process.exitCode = 1;
+  });
+}

apps/api/tests/authorization-middleware.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,351 @@
+import {
+  ANONYMOUS_PRINCIPAL,
+  createAuthenticatedPrincipal,
+  parsePermissionId,
+} from "@ekklesia/contracts";
+import {
+  type AuthorizationEvaluator,
+  createPermissionRegistry,
+} from "@ekklesia/core/authorization";
+import type { EkklesiaIdentityRuntime } from "@ekklesia/core/identity";
+import { Hono } from "hono";
+import { describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest";
+import {
+  type AuthorizationMiddlewareOptions,
+  getAuthorizedPrincipal,
+  requirePermission,
+  requireTrustedOrigin,
+} from "../src/authorization-middleware.js";
+
+const testPermission = parsePermissionId("core.test.restricted-thing");
+const unregisteredPermission = parsePermissionId("core.test.unregistered-thing");
+const registry = createPermissionRegistry([
+  { baseline: "restricted", description: "A restricted test permission.", id: testPermission },
+]);
+
+function fakeRuntime(overrides: Partial<EkklesiaIdentityRuntime> = {}): EkklesiaIdentityRuntime {
+  return {
+    handleAuthRequest: vi.fn(),
+    resolvePrincipal: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(ANONYMOUS_PRINCIPAL),
+    ...overrides,
+  };
+}
+
+function fakeEvaluator(overrides: Partial<AuthorizationEvaluator> = {}): AuthorizationEvaluator {
+  return {
+    authorize: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({ allowed: true }),
+    ...overrides,
+  };
+}
+
+function buildTestApp(options: Partial<AuthorizationMiddlewareOptions> = {}) {
+  const runtime = options.runtime ?? fakeRuntime();
+  const evaluator = options.evaluator ?? fakeEvaluator();
+  const middlewareOptions: AuthorizationMiddlewareOptions = { evaluator, registry, runtime };
+
+  const app = new Hono();
+  app.get("/protected", requirePermission(middlewareOptions, testPermission), (c) => {
+    const principal = getAuthorizedPrincipal(c);
+    return c.json({ principalKind: principal.kind });
+  });
+  app.get("/unregistered", requirePermission(middlewareOptions, unregisteredPermission), (c) =>
+    c.json({ ok: true }),
+  );
+  app.get("/unprotected", (c) => {
+    let threw = false;
+    try {
+      getAuthorizedPrincipal(c);
+    } catch {
+      threw = true;
+    }
+    return c.json({ threw });
+  });
+
+  return { app, evaluator, runtime };
+}
+
+describe("requirePermission", () => {
+  it("allows the request through and stores the resolved principal on context when the decision is allowed", async () => {
+    const runtime = fakeRuntime({
+      resolvePrincipal: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(createAuthenticatedPrincipal("user_1")),
+    });
+    const { app } = buildTestApp({ runtime });
+
+    const response = await app.request("/protected");
+
+    expect(response.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(await response.json()).toEqual({ principalKind: "authenticated" });
+  });
+
+  it("returns a sanitized 403 when the evaluator denies", async () => {
+    const evaluator = fakeEvaluator({ authorize: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({ allowed: false }) });
+    const { app } = buildTestApp({ evaluator });
+
+    const response = await app.request("/protected");
+
+    expect(response.status).toBe(403);
+    expect(await response.json()).toEqual({ code: "AUTHORIZATION_DENIED" });
+    expect(response.headers.get("cache-control")).toBe("no-store");
+  });
+
+  it("returns a sanitized 403 for an unregistered permission without ever resolving the principal", async () => {
+    const runtime = fakeRuntime();
+    const { app } = buildTestApp({ runtime });
+
+    const response = await app.request("/unregistered");
+
+    expect(response.status).toBe(403);
+    expect(await response.json()).toEqual({ code: "AUTHORIZATION_DENIED" });
+    expect(runtime.resolvePrincipal).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  it("returns a sanitized 503, not a 403, when principal resolution fails", async () => {
+    const runtime = fakeRuntime({
+      resolvePrincipal: vi.fn().mockRejectedValue(new Error("connection terminated")),
+    });
+    const { app } = buildTestApp({ runtime });
+
+    const response = await app.request("/protected");
+
+    expect(response.status).toBe(503);
+    expect(await response.json()).toEqual({ code: "PRINCIPAL_RESOLUTION_FAILED" });
+  });
+
+  it("returns a sanitized 503, not a 403, when evaluation itself fails", async () => {
+    const evaluator = fakeEvaluator({
+      authorize: vi.fn().mockRejectedValue(new Error("connection terminated")),
+    });
+    const { app } = buildTestApp({ evaluator });
+
+    const response = await app.request("/protected");
+
+    expect(response.status).toBe(503);
+    expect(await response.json()).toEqual({ code: "AUTHORIZATION_EVALUATION_FAILED" });
+  });
+
+  it("never leaks a raw infrastructure error message through either sanitized 503", async () => {
+    const hostileMessage = "password=hunter2 host=db.internal.example port=5432";
+    const evaluator = fakeEvaluator({
+      authorize: vi.fn().mockRejectedValue(new Error(hostileMessage)),
+    });
+    const { app } = buildTestApp({ evaluator });
+
+    const response = await app.request("/protected");
+    const text = await response.text();
+
+    expect(text).not.toContain("hunter2");
+    expect(text).not.toContain("db.internal.example");
+  });
+
+  it("passes the registry's own baseline and permission id to the evaluator, never a client-supplied value", async () => {
+    const evaluator = fakeEvaluator();
+    const { app } = buildTestApp({ evaluator });
+
+    // A hostile client cannot even express "use this baseline instead" — there is no request
+    // field the middleware reads for it — but sending an unrelated header proves it is ignored.
+    await app.request("/protected", { headers: { "x-baseline": "public" } });
+
+    expect(evaluator.authorize).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+      expect.objectContaining({ baseline: "restricted", permission: testPermission }),
+    );
+  });
+});
+
+describe("requirePermission with module-owned declarations", () => {
+  // requirePermission has no concept of "Core" versus "module" — it only ever consults whatever
+  // registry it is given. These declarations are shaped exactly like what
+  // composePlatformPermissionRegistry would contribute from a real installed module (an id
+  // namespaced under a module, not `core.*`), proving the shared enforcement mechanism works
+  // identically for module-owned permissions without any module-specific code path.
+  const modulePublicPermission = parsePermissionId("calendar.events.list");
+  const moduleAuthenticatedPermission = parsePermissionId("calendar.events.subscribe");
+  const moduleRestrictedPermission = parsePermissionId("calendar.events.read");
+  const moduleRegistry = createPermissionRegistry([
+    {
+      baseline: "public",
+      description: "List public calendar events.",
+      id: modulePublicPermission,
+    },
+    {
+      baseline: "authenticated",
+      description: "Subscribe to calendar event updates.",
+      id: moduleAuthenticatedPermission,
+    },
+    {
+      baseline: "restricted",
+      description: "Read calendar events.",
+      id: moduleRestrictedPermission,
+    },
+  ]);
+
+  function buildModuleApp(
+    permissionId: typeof modulePublicPermission,
+    options: Partial<AuthorizationMiddlewareOptions> = {},
+  ) {
+    const runtime = options.runtime ?? fakeRuntime();
+    const evaluator = options.evaluator ?? fakeEvaluator();
+    const middlewareOptions: AuthorizationMiddlewareOptions = {
+      evaluator,
+      registry: moduleRegistry,
+      runtime,
+    };
+    const app = new Hono();
+    app.get("/module-protected", requirePermission(middlewareOptions, permissionId), (c) =>
+      c.json({ ok: true }),
+    );
+    return { app, evaluator, runtime };
+  }
+
+  it("resolves a module public permission's trusted baseline and passes it to the evaluator unchanged", async () => {
+    const evaluator = fakeEvaluator();
+    const { app } = buildModuleApp(modulePublicPermission, { evaluator });
+
+    const response = await app.request("/module-protected");
+
+    expect(response.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(evaluator.authorize).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+      expect.objectContaining({ baseline: "public", permission: modulePublicPermission }),
+    );
+  });
+
+  it("resolves a module authenticated permission's trusted baseline and passes it to the evaluator unchanged", async () => {
+    const evaluator = fakeEvaluator();
+    const { app } = buildModuleApp(moduleAuthenticatedPermission, { evaluator });
+
+    await app.request("/module-protected");
+
+    expect(evaluator.authorize).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+      expect.objectContaining({
+        baseline: "authenticated",
+        permission: moduleAuthenticatedPermission,
+      }),
+    );
+  });
+
+  it("resolves a module restricted permission's trusted baseline and passes it to the evaluator unchanged", async () => {
+    const evaluator = fakeEvaluator();
+    const { app } = buildModuleApp(moduleRestrictedPermission, { evaluator });
+
+    await app.request("/module-protected");
+
+    expect(evaluator.authorize).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+      expect.objectContaining({
+        baseline: "restricted",
+        permission: moduleRestrictedPermission,
+      }),
+    );
+  });
+
+  it("allows an anonymous principal for a module permission the evaluator authorizes", async () => {
+    const runtime = fakeRuntime({
+      resolvePrincipal: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(ANONYMOUS_PRINCIPAL),
+    });
+    const { app } = buildModuleApp(modulePublicPermission, { runtime });
+
+    const response = await app.request("/module-protected");
+
+    expect(response.status).toBe(200);
+  });
+
+  it("allows an authenticated principal for a module permission the evaluator authorizes", async () => {
+    const runtime = fakeRuntime({
+      resolvePrincipal: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(createAuthenticatedPrincipal("user_1")),
+    });
+    const { app } = buildModuleApp(moduleRestrictedPermission, { runtime });
+
+    const response = await app.request("/module-protected");
+
+    expect(response.status).toBe(200);
+  });
+
+  it("denies a module permission the evaluator does not authorize", async () => {
+    const evaluator = fakeEvaluator({ authorize: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({ allowed: false }) });
+    const { app } = buildModuleApp(moduleRestrictedPermission, { evaluator });
+
+    const response = await app.request("/module-protected");
+
+    expect(response.status).toBe(403);
+    expect(await response.json()).toEqual({ code: "AUTHORIZATION_DENIED" });
+  });
+
+  it("denies a module permission absent from the registry before ever resolving the principal or consulting the evaluator", async () => {
+    const runtime = fakeRuntime();
+    const evaluator = fakeEvaluator();
+    const absentModulePermission = parsePermissionId("scheduler.jobs.read");
+    const { app } = buildModuleApp(absentModulePermission, { evaluator, runtime });
+
+    const response = await app.request("/module-protected");
+
+    expect(response.status).toBe(403);
+    expect(await response.json()).toEqual({ code: "AUTHORIZATION_DENIED" });
+    expect(runtime.resolvePrincipal).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    expect(evaluator.authorize).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  it("never lets a client-supplied baseline influence the decision for a module permission", async () => {
+    const evaluator = fakeEvaluator();
+    const { app } = buildModuleApp(moduleRestrictedPermission, { evaluator });
+
+    // A hostile client cannot make a restricted module permission behave as public — there is no
+    // request field the middleware reads for a baseline override.
+    await app.request("/module-protected", {
+      headers: { "x-baseline": "public", "x-permission-baseline": "public" },
+    });
+
+    expect(evaluator.authorize).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+      expect.objectContaining({ baseline: "restricted" }),
+    );
+  });
+});
+
+describe("getAuthorizedPrincipal", () => {
+  it("throws when called on a route requirePermission never protected", async () => {
+    const { app } = buildTestApp();
+
+    const response = await app.request("/unprotected");
+
+    expect(await response.json()).toEqual({ threw: true });
+  });
+});
+
+describe("requireTrustedOrigin", () => {
+  const trustedOrigins = new Set(["https://dashboard.example.test"]);
+
+  function buildOriginApp() {
+    const app = new Hono();
+    app.post("/mutate", requireTrustedOrigin(trustedOrigins), (c) => c.json({ ok: true }));
+    return app;
+  }
+
+  it("allows a request from a trusted origin", async () => {
+    const app = buildOriginApp();
+
+    const response = await app.request("/mutate", {
+      headers: { origin: "https://dashboard.example.test" },
+      method: "POST",
+    });
+
+    expect(response.status).toBe(200);
+  });
+
+  it("rejects a request with no Origin header at all", async () => {
+    const app = buildOriginApp();
+
+    const response = await app.request("/mutate", { method: "POST" });
+
+    expect(response.status).toBe(403);
+    expect(await response.json()).toEqual({ code: "UNTRUSTED_ORIGIN" });
+  });
+
+  it("rejects a request from an untrusted origin", async () => {
+    const app = buildOriginApp();
+
+    const response = await app.request("/mutate", {
+      headers: { origin: "https://evil.example.test" },
+      method: "POST",
+    });
+
+    expect(response.status).toBe(403);
+    expect(await response.json()).toEqual({ code: "UNTRUSTED_ORIGIN" });
+  });
+});

apps/api/tests/client-address.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
+import { TRUSTED_CLIENT_ADDRESS_HEADER } from "@ekklesia/core/identity";
+import { describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest";
+import {
+  CLIENT_ADDRESS_UNRESOLVED_LOG_MESSAGE,
+  createClientAddressResolver,
+  wrapFetchWithClientAddress,
+} from "../src/client-address.js";
+
+function fakeEnv(remoteAddress: string | undefined) {
+  return {
+    incoming: { socket: { remoteAddress } },
+    outgoing: {},
+  } as unknown as Parameters<typeof wrapFetchWithClientAddress>[0] extends (
+    request: Request,
+    env: infer Env,
+  ) => unknown
+    ? Env
+    : never;
+}
+
+describe("wrapFetchWithClientAddress", () => {
+  it("resolves the trusted address from the real socket peer and sets the internal header before calling the wrapped callback", async () => {
+    const resolver = createClientAddressResolver({ mode: "direct" });
+    const wrappedFetch = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(new Response("ok"));
+    const wrapped = wrapFetchWithClientAddress(wrappedFetch, resolver);
+
+    const request = new Request("https://example.test/api/auth/sign-in/email");
+    await wrapped(request, fakeEnv("203.0.113.9"));
+
+    expect(wrappedFetch).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+    const [forwardedRequest] = wrappedFetch.mock.calls[0] as [Request];
+    expect(forwardedRequest.headers.get(TRUSTED_CLIENT_ADDRESS_HEADER)).toBe("203.0.113.9");
+  });
+
+  it("overwrites — never appends to — a caller-supplied copy of the internal header", async () => {
+    const resolver = createClientAddressResolver({ mode: "direct" });
+    const wrappedFetch = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(new Response("ok"));
+    const wrapped = wrapFetchWithClientAddress(wrappedFetch, resolver);
+
+    const request = new Request("https://example.test/api/auth/sign-in/email", {
+      headers: { [TRUSTED_CLIENT_ADDRESS_HEADER]: "203.0.113.250" },
+    });
+    await wrapped(request, fakeEnv("192.0.2.1"));
+
+    const [forwardedRequest] = wrappedFetch.mock.calls[0] as [Request];
+    expect(forwardedRequest.headers.get(TRUSTED_CLIENT_ADDRESS_HEADER)).toBe("192.0.2.1");
+    // A single value, never a comma-joined "caller-value, resolved-value" — set(), not append().
+    expect(forwardedRequest.headers.get(TRUSTED_CLIENT_ADDRESS_HEADER)).not.toContain(",");
+  });
+
+  it("returns a sanitized 503 and never invokes the wrapped callback when resolution fails", async () => {
+    const resolver = createClientAddressResolver({ mode: "direct" });
+    const wrappedFetch = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(new Response("should not be reached"));
+    const wrapped = wrapFetchWithClientAddress(wrappedFetch, resolver);
+    const errorSpy = vi.spyOn(console, "error").mockImplementation(() => undefined);
+
+    try {
+      const response = await wrapped(
+        new Request("https://example.test/api/auth/sign-in/email"),
+        fakeEnv(undefined),
+      );
+
+      expect(response.status).toBe(503);
+      expect(await response.json()).toEqual({ code: "CLIENT_ADDRESS_UNRESOLVED" });
+      expect(response.headers.get("cache-control")).toBe("no-store");
+      expect(wrappedFetch).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+      expect(errorSpy).toHaveBeenCalledWith(CLIENT_ADDRESS_UNRESOLVED_LOG_MESSAGE);
+    } finally {
+      errorSpy.mockRestore();
+    }
+  });
+
+  it("never logs the peer address, headers, or request path on a resolution failure", async () => {
+    const resolver = createClientAddressResolver({ mode: "direct" });
+    const wrapped = wrapFetchWithClientAddress(vi.fn(), resolver);
+    const errorSpy = vi.spyOn(console, "error").mockImplementation(() => undefined);
+
+    try {
+      await wrapped(
+        new Request("https://example.test/api/auth/sign-in/email", {
+          headers: { cookie: "super-secret-session", "x-forwarded-for": "203.0.113.1" },
+        }),
+        fakeEnv("not-a-valid-ip"),
+      );
+
+      const emitted = errorSpy.mock.calls.flat().map(String).join("\n");
+      expect(emitted).not.toContain("super-secret-session");
+      expect(emitted).not.toContain("203.0.113.1");
+      expect(emitted).not.toContain("sign-in");
+      expect(emitted).not.toContain("not-a-valid-ip");
+    } finally {
+      errorSpy.mockRestore();
+    }
+  });
+
+  it("preserves the request method, body, and other headers unrelated to the internal address header", async () => {
+    const resolver = createClientAddressResolver({ mode: "direct" });
+    const wrappedFetch = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(new Response("ok"));
+    const wrapped = wrapFetchWithClientAddress(wrappedFetch, resolver);
+
+    const request = new Request("https://example.test/api/auth/sign-up/email", {
+      body: JSON.stringify({ email: "[email protected]" }),
+      headers: { "content-type": "application/json", origin: "https://dashboard.example.test" },
+      method: "POST",
+    });
+    await wrapped(request, fakeEnv("192.0.2.1"));
+
+    const [forwardedRequest] = wrappedFetch.mock.calls[0] as [Request];
+    expect(forwardedRequest.method).toBe("POST");
+    expect(forwardedRequest.headers.get("origin")).toBe("https://dashboard.example.test");
+    expect(await forwardedRequest.text()).toBe(JSON.stringify({ email: "[email protected]" }));
+  });
+});

apps/api/tests/config.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,360 @@
+import { describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
+import { ApiConfigError, apiTrustedOrigins, createApiRuntimeConfig } from "../src/config.js";
+
+const validSecret = "correct-horse-battery-staple-0123456789";
+
+function validInput() {
+  return {
+    databaseUrl: "postgresql://ekklesia:[email protected]:5432/ekklesia",
+    host: "127.0.0.1",
+    identity: {
+      baseUrl: "https://identity.example.test",
+      secret: validSecret,
+      trustedOrigins: ["https://identity.example.test"],
+    },
+    port: 3000,
+  };
+}
+
+describe("API runtime configuration", () => {
+  it("accepts valid API and identity configuration", () => {
+    const config = createApiRuntimeConfig(validInput(), { environment: "production" });
+
+    expect(config).toEqual({
+      clientAddress: { mode: "direct" },
+      // Production defaults to certificate-verified TLS with no configuration at all.
+      databaseTransport: { mode: "verify-full" },
+      databaseUrl: validInput().databaseUrl,
+      host: "127.0.0.1",
+      identity: {
+        baseUrl: "https://identity.example.test",
+        // Defaults to the identity base URL: the Dashboard and the API share one origin unless a
+        // deployment separates them (ADR 0038).
+        dashboardOrigin: "https://identity.example.test",
+        publicSignupEnabled: false,
+        secret: validSecret,
+        trustedOrigins: ["https://identity.example.test"],
+      },
+      port: 3000,
+    });
+    expect(Object.isFrozen(config)).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it("defaults host to loopback and port to 3000 when omitted", () => {
+    const { host: _host, port: _port, ...rest } = validInput();
+    const config = createApiRuntimeConfig(rest, { environment: "production" });
+
+    expect(config.host).toBe("127.0.0.1");
+    expect(config.port).toBe(3000);
+  });
+
+  it("permits an explicit non-loopback bind address", () => {
+    const config = createApiRuntimeConfig(
+      { ...validInput(), host: "0.0.0.0" },
+      { environment: "production" },
+    );
+
+    expect(config.host).toBe("0.0.0.0");
+  });
+
+  it("rejects a missing database URL", () => {
+    let captured: unknown;
+    try {
+      createApiRuntimeConfig({ ...validInput(), databaseUrl: undefined });
+    } catch (error) {
+      captured = error;
+    }
+    expect(captured).toBeInstanceOf(ApiConfigError);
+    expect(captured).toMatchObject({ code: "DATABASE_URL_MISSING" });
+  });
+
+  it("rejects an invalid database URL", () => {
+    for (const databaseUrl of ["", "not-a-url", "mysql://example.test/db", "http://example.test"]) {
+      let captured: unknown;
+      try {
+        createApiRuntimeConfig({ ...validInput(), databaseUrl });
+      } catch (error) {
+        captured = error;
+      }
+      expect(captured).toBeInstanceOf(ApiConfigError);
+    }
+  });
+
+  it("rejects an empty listen host", () => {
+    let captured: unknown;
+    try {
+      createApiRuntimeConfig({ ...validInput(), host: "" });
+    } catch (error) {
+      captured = error;
+    }
+    expect(captured).toMatchObject({ code: "HOST_INVALID" });
+  });
+
+  it("rejects an invalid listen port", () => {
+    for (const port of [-1, 1.5, 70_000, Number.NaN, "not-a-port"]) {
+      let captured: unknown;
+      try {
+        createApiRuntimeConfig({ ...validInput(), port });
+      } catch (error) {
+        captured = error;
+      }
+      expect(captured).toMatchObject({ code: "PORT_INVALID" });
+    }
+  });
+
+  it("accepts port 0 as an explicit request for an OS-assigned ephemeral port", () => {
+    const config = createApiRuntimeConfig({ ...validInput(), port: 0 });
+    expect(config.port).toBe(0);
+  });
+
+  it("delegates identity validation to Core's createIdentityConfig, rejecting a short secret", () => {
+    let captured: unknown;
+    try {
+      createApiRuntimeConfig({
+        ...validInput(),
+        identity: { ...validInput().identity, secret: "too-short" },
+      });
+    } catch (error) {
+      captured = error;
+    }
+    expect(captured).toMatchObject({ code: "SECRET_TOO_SHORT" });
+  });
+
+  it("explicitly allows local development origins only when environment is development", () => {
+    const config = createApiRuntimeConfig(
+      {
+        databaseUrl: validInput().databaseUrl,
+        host: "127.0.0.1",
+        identity: {
+          baseUrl: "http://localhost:3000",
+          secret: validSecret,
+          trustedOrigins: ["http://localhost:3000"],
+        },
+        port: 3000,
+      },
+      { environment: "development" },
+    );
+
+    expect(config.identity.baseUrl).toBe("http://localhost:3000");
+  });
+
+  it("defaults public signup to disabled and threads an explicit development enablement through to identity config", () => {
+    expect(createApiRuntimeConfig(validInput()).identity.publicSignupEnabled).toBe(false);
+    expect(
+      createApiRuntimeConfig(
+        {
+          ...validInput(),
+          identity: {
+            baseUrl: "http://localhost:3000",
+            publicSignupEnabled: true,
+            secret: validSecret,
+            trustedOrigins: ["http://localhost:3000"],
+          },
+        },
+        { environment: "development" },
+      ).identity.publicSignupEnabled,
+    ).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it("refuses a production runtime configuration that enables public signup, before any resource is constructed", () => {
+    let captured: unknown;
+    try {
+      createApiRuntimeConfig(
+        {
+          ...validInput(),
+          identity: { ...validInput().identity, publicSignupEnabled: true },
+        },
+        { environment: "production" },
+      );
+    } catch (error) {
+      captured = error;
+    }
+    expect(captured).toMatchObject({ code: "PUBLIC_SIGNUP_UNSUPPORTED_IN_PRODUCTION" });
+  });
+
+  it("defaults client-address configuration to direct mode and threads explicit trusted-proxy configuration through", () => {
+    expect(createApiRuntimeConfig(validInput()).clientAddress).toEqual({ mode: "direct" });
+
+    const config = createApiRuntimeConfig({
+      ...validInput(),
+      clientAddress: {
+        header: "x-forwarded-for",
+        mode: "trusted-proxy",
+        trustedProxies: ["10.0.0.1"],
+      },
+    });
+    expect(config.clientAddress).toEqual({
+      header: "x-forwarded-for",
+      mode: "trusted-proxy",
+      trustedProxies: ["10.0.0.1"],
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe("PostgreSQL transport policy", () => {
+    it("defaults to certificate-verified TLS in production and plaintext in development", () => {
+      expect(createApiRuntimeConfig(validInput()).databaseTransport).toEqual({
+        mode: "verify-full",
+      });
+      expect(
+        createApiRuntimeConfig(
+          {
+            ...validInput(),
+            identity: {
+              baseUrl: "http://localhost:3000",
+              secret: validSecret,
+              trustedOrigins: ["http://localhost:3000"],
+            },
+          },
+          { environment: "development" },
+        ).databaseTransport,
+      ).toEqual({ mode: "disable" });
+    });
+
+    it("refuses a production configuration that disables TLS", () => {
+      let captured: unknown;
+      try {
+        createApiRuntimeConfig(
+          { ...validInput(), databaseTransport: { mode: "disable" } },
+          { environment: "production" },
+        );
+      } catch (error) {
+        captured = error;
+      }
+      expect(captured).toMatchObject({ code: "DATABASE_TLS_REQUIRED_IN_PRODUCTION" });
+    });
+
+    it("rejects a malformed or loosely spelled TLS mode in every environment, without coercion", () => {
+      for (const mode of [
+        "VERIFY-FULL",
+        " verify-full ",
+        "require",
+        "verify-ca",
+        "prefer",
+        "no-verify",
+        "true",
+        true,
+        1,
+        "",
+      ]) {
+        for (const environment of ["production", "development"] as const) {
+          let captured: unknown;
+          try {
+            createApiRuntimeConfig(
+              {
+                ...validInput(),
+                databaseTransport: { mode },
+                ...(environment === "development"
+                  ? {
+                      identity: {
+                        baseUrl: "http://localhost:3000",
+                        secret: validSecret,
+                        trustedOrigins: ["http://localhost:3000"],
+                      },
+                    }
+                  : {}),
+              },
+              { environment },
+            );
+          } catch (error) {
+            captured = error;
+          }
+          expect(captured, `expected mode ${JSON.stringify(mode)} to be rejected`).toMatchObject({
+            code: "DATABASE_TLS_MODE_INVALID",
+          });
+        }
+      }
+    });
+
+    it("rejects a database URL carrying its own TLS parameters, which the pinned driver would let override the policy", () => {
+      for (const parameter of [
+        "sslmode=disable",
+        "sslmode=require",
+        "sslmode=verify-full",
+        "ssl=true",
+        "sslrootcert=/tmp/ca.crt",
+        "sslcert=/tmp/c.crt",
+        "sslkey=/tmp/c.key",
+        "uselibpqcompat=true",
+      ]) {
+        let captured: unknown;
+        try {
+          createApiRuntimeConfig(
+            {
+              ...validInput(),
+              databaseUrl: `postgresql://ekklesia:[email protected]:5432/ekklesia?${parameter}`,
+            },
+            { environment: "production" },
+          );
+        } catch (error) {
+          captured = error;
+        }
+        expect(captured, `expected ${parameter} to be rejected`).toMatchObject({
+          code: "DATABASE_TLS_CONNECTION_STRING_CONFLICT",
+        });
+      }
+    });
+
+    it("never leaks the database URL, credentials, host, or CA material through a transport error", () => {
+      let captured: unknown;
+      try {
+        createApiRuntimeConfig(
+          {
+            ...validInput(),
+            databaseTransport: { certificateAuthority: "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----SECRET" },
+            databaseUrl:
+              "postgresql://admin:[email protected]:5432/ekklesia?sslmode=disable",
+          },
+          { environment: "production" },
+        );
+      } catch (error) {
+        captured = error;
+      }
+      const publicText = `${String(captured)}\n${
+        captured instanceof Error ? (captured.stack ?? "") : ""
+      }\n${JSON.stringify(captured)}`;
+      expect(publicText).not.toContain("hunter2");
+      expect(publicText).not.toContain("db.internal.example");
+      expect(publicText).not.toContain("SECRET");
+      expect(publicText).not.toContain("sslmode");
+    });
+  });
+
+  it("never leaks the database URL, secret, or trusted origins through a thrown error", () => {
+    const hostileUrl = "postgresql://admin:[email protected]:5432/ekklesia";
+    let captured: unknown;
+    try {
+      createApiRuntimeConfig({ ...validInput(), databaseUrl: hostileUrl, port: -1 });
+    } catch (error) {
+      captured = error;
+    }
+
+    expect(captured).toBeInstanceOf(ApiConfigError);
+    const publicText = `${String(captured)}\n${
+      captured instanceof Error ? (captured.stack ?? "") : ""
+    }\n${JSON.stringify(captured)}`;
+    expect(publicText).not.toContain(hostileUrl);
+    expect(publicText).not.toContain("s3cr3t");
+    expect(publicText).not.toContain("db.internal.example");
+  });
+});
+
+describe("the API's trusted browser origins (ADR 0045)", () => {
+  it("adds the API's own origin to the configured ones, as Better Auth does", () => {
+    const origins = apiTrustedOrigins({
+      baseUrl: "https://api.example.test",
+      trustedOrigins: ["https://dash.example.test"],
+    });
+
+    expect(origins).toEqual(["https://dash.example.test", "https://api.example.test"]);
+    expect(Object.isFrozen(origins)).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it("does not duplicate an API origin already listed (the same-origin topology)", () => {
+    expect(
+      apiTrustedOrigins({
+        baseUrl: "https://ekklesia.example.test",
+        trustedOrigins: ["https://ekklesia.example.test"],
+      }),
+    ).toEqual(["https://ekklesia.example.test"]);
+  });
+});

apps/api/tests/dashboard-host-assets.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
+import { createHash } from "node:crypto";
+import { beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest";
+
+const readFileMock = vi.hoisted(() => vi.fn());
+
+vi.mock("node:fs/promises", () => ({ readFile: readFileMock }));
+vi.mock("@ekklesia/shell/dashboard-assets", () => ({
+  dashboardHostAssetUrls: Object.freeze({
+    html: "file:///surface/browser/index.html",
+    script: "file:///surface/browser/assets/ekklesia-dashboard/app.js",
+  }),
+}));
+
+import {
+  createDashboardHostAssets,
+  DASHBOARD_API_ORIGIN_PLACEHOLDER,
+  DashboardHostAssetError,
+  loadDashboardHostAssets,
+  renderDashboardPage,
+} from "../src/dashboard-host-assets.js";
+
+const API_ORIGIN = "https://api.example.test";
+
+function sha256Etag(text: string): string {
+  return `"${createHash("sha256").update(text).digest("base64url")}"`;
+}
+
+describe("Dashboard host asset loading", () => {
+  beforeEach(() => readFileMock.mockReset());
+
+  it("reads only the two declared file URLs in order and freezes one consistent snapshot", async () => {
+    const html = `<!doctype html>${DASHBOARD_API_ORIGIN_PLACEHOLDER}<div id="ekklesia-host"></div>`;
+    const script = "export const dashboardHost = true;\n";
+    readFileMock.mockResolvedValueOnce(html).mockResolvedValueOnce(script);
+
+    const assets = await loadDashboardHostAssets(API_ORIGIN);
+
+    expect(readFileMock.mock.calls).toEqual([
+      [new URL("file:///surface/browser/index.html"), "utf8"],
+      [new URL("file:///surface/browser/assets/ekklesia-dashboard/app.js"), "utf8"],
+    ]);
+    const rendered = `<!doctype html><meta content="${API_ORIGIN}" name="ekklesia-api-origin" /><div id="ekklesia-host"></div>`;
+    expect(assets).toEqual({
+      html: rendered,
+      htmlEtag: sha256Etag(rendered),
+      script,
+      scriptEtag: sha256Etag(script),
+    });
+    expect(Object.isFrozen(assets)).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it("fails deterministically without attempting a neighboring file or exposing the read error", async () => {
+    readFileMock.mockRejectedValueOnce(
+      new Error("ENOENT /home/operator/private/surface-build secret-token"),
+    );
+
+    const failure = await loadDashboardHostAssets(API_ORIGIN).catch((error: unknown) => error);
+
+    expect(readFileMock).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+    expect(failure).toBeInstanceOf(DashboardHostAssetError);
+    expect(failure).toMatchObject({
+      code: "DASHBOARD_HOST_ASSET_UNAVAILABLE",
+      message: "The Dashboard host browser assets are unavailable.",
+      name: "DashboardHostAssetError",
+    });
+    expect((failure as Error).stack).toBe(
+      "DashboardHostAssetError: The Dashboard host browser assets are unavailable.",
+    );
+    const publicText = `${String(failure)}\n${JSON.stringify(failure)}\n${(failure as Error).stack}`;
+    for (const secret of ["/home/", "operator", "ENOENT", "secret-token"]) {
+      expect(publicText).not.toContain(secret);
+    }
+  });
+
+  it("fails when the script is missing even though the page was read", async () => {
+    readFileMock
+      .mockResolvedValueOnce(`<!doctype html>${DASHBOARD_API_ORIGIN_PLACEHOLDER}`)
+      .mockRejectedValueOnce(new Error("ENOENT app.js"));
+
+    await expect(loadDashboardHostAssets(API_ORIGIN)).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(
+      DashboardHostAssetError,
+    );
+    expect(readFileMock).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2);
+  });
+
+  it("rejects an empty page or script as an unavailable shell build", () => {
+    for (const [html, script] of [
+      ["", "export {};"],
+      ["<html></html>", "   \n"],
+    ] as const) {
+      expect(() => createDashboardHostAssets(html, script)).toThrow(DashboardHostAssetError);
+    }
+  });
+
+  it("fails startup on a page without exactly one empty API-origin element (ADR 0045)", async () => {
+    for (const html of [
+      "<!doctype html>",
+      `<!doctype html>${DASHBOARD_API_ORIGIN_PLACEHOLDER}${DASHBOARD_API_ORIGIN_PLACEHOLDER}`,
+      '<!doctype html><meta content="https://elsewhere.test" name="ekklesia-api-origin" />',
+    ]) {
+      readFileMock.mockReset();
+      readFileMock.mockResolvedValueOnce(html).mockResolvedValueOnce("export {};\n");
+      await expect(loadDashboardHostAssets(API_ORIGIN)).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(
+        DashboardHostAssetError,
+      );
+    }
+  });
+});
+
+describe("Dashboard page API origin (ADR 0045)", () => {
+  const page = `<head>${DASHBOARD_API_ORIGIN_PLACEHOLDER}</head>`;
+
+  it("writes the API's origin into the one placeholder, in either topology", () => {
+    expect(renderDashboardPage(page, "https://api.example.test")).toBe(
+      '<head><meta content="https://api.example.test" name="ekklesia-api-origin" /></head>',
+    );
+    expect(renderDashboardPage(page, "http://127.0.0.1:3000")).toBe(
+      '<head><meta content="http://127.0.0.1:3000" name="ekklesia-api-origin" /></head>',
+    );
+  });
+
+  it.each([
+    "https://api.example.test/",
+    "https://api.example.test/api",
+    'https://api.example.test"><script>',
+    "javascript:alert(1)",
+    "",
+  ])("refuses a value that is not a canonical http(s) origin: %s", (origin) => {
+    expect(() => renderDashboardPage(page, origin)).toThrow(DashboardHostAssetError);
+  });
+});

apps/api/tests/dashboard-host-routes.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,347 @@
+import { createHash } from "node:crypto";
+import {
+  ANONYMOUS_PRINCIPAL,
+  type ModuleDatabase,
+  type ModuleRouteHandler,
+  type ModuleRuntimeServices,
+  parsePermissionId,
+  type RegisteredModuleHttpRoute,
+} from "@ekklesia/contracts";
+import {
+  type AuthorizationEvaluator,
+  type AuthorizationStore,
+  createPermissionRegistry,
+} from "@ekklesia/core/authorization";
+import type { EkklesiaIdentityRuntime } from "@ekklesia/core/identity";
+import {
+  createModuleUiPublicationRegistry,
+  EMPTY_MODULE_REALTIME_REGISTRY,
+} from "@ekklesia/core/modules";
+import { describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest";
+
+// Every byte these routes serve must come from the injected startup snapshot. Any filesystem read
+// while answering a request — the hallmark of a static directory — fails these tests.
+const readFileMock = vi.hoisted(() => vi.fn());
+vi.mock("node:fs/promises", () => ({ readFile: readFileMock }));
+
+import { createApiApp } from "../src/app.js";
+import {
+  createDashboardHostAssets,
+  type DashboardHostAssets,
+} from "../src/dashboard-host-assets.js";
+import {
+  DASHBOARD_HOST_PAGE_PATH,
+  DASHBOARD_HOST_SCRIPT_PATH,
+  DashboardHostConfigurationError,
+} from "../src/dashboard-host-routes.js";
+import { DISPLAY_HOST_SCRIPT_PATH } from "../src/module-display-routes.js";
+import { createInMemoryDashboardStore } from "./support/in-memory-dashboard-store.js";
+import { emptyModuleConfiguration } from "./support/in-memory-module-configuration.js";
+import { emptyModuleLifecycle } from "./support/in-memory-module-lifecycle.js";
+import { emptyModuleStorage } from "./support/in-memory-module-storage.js";
+import { readyHealth } from "./support/ready-health.js";
+
+const trustedOrigin = "https://dashboard.example.test";
+const modulePermission = parsePermissionId("dashboard.page.read");
+
+const PAGE_HTML =
+  '<!doctype html><html lang="en"><body><div id="ekklesia-host"></div><script src="/assets/ekklesia-dashboard/app.js" type="module"></script></body></html>\n';
+const SCRIPT = "export const dashboard = 'built shell';\n";
+
+function sha256Etag(text: string): string {
+  return `"${createHash("sha256").update(text).digest("base64url")}"`;
+}
+
+const PAGE_ETAG = sha256Etag(PAGE_HTML);
+const SCRIPT_ETAG = sha256Etag(SCRIPT);
+
+function fakeRuntime(): EkklesiaIdentityRuntime {
+  return {
+    handleAuthRequest: vi.fn(),
+    resolvePrincipal: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(ANONYMOUS_PRINCIPAL),
+  };
+}
+
+function fakeStore(): AuthorizationStore {
+  return {
+    createGrant: vi.fn(),
+    grantPlatformOwner: vi.fn(),
+    hasActiveGrant: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(false),
+    isPlatformOwner: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(false),
+    listGrantsForUser: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({ grants: [] }),
+    revokeGrant: vi.fn(),
+    revokePlatformOwner: vi.fn(),
+  };
+}
+
+function fakeModuleServices(): ModuleRuntimeServices {
+  return Object.freeze({ database: Object.freeze({}) as unknown as ModuleDatabase });
+}
+
+function buildApp(
+  options: {
+    readonly assets?: DashboardHostAssets;
+    readonly moduleRoutes?: readonly RegisteredModuleHttpRoute[];
+  } = {},
+) {
+  const evaluator: AuthorizationEvaluator = {
+    authorize: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({ allowed: true }),
+  };
+  const runtime = fakeRuntime();
+  const app = createApiApp({
+    authorization: {
+      evaluator,
+      registry: createPermissionRegistry([
+        { baseline: "public", description: "Test permission.", id: modulePermission },
+      ]),
+      store: fakeStore(),
+    },
+    moduleRoutes: options.moduleRoutes ?? Object.freeze([]),
+    moduleRealtime: EMPTY_MODULE_REALTIME_REGISTRY,
+    moduleServices: fakeModuleServices(),
+    moduleUi: createModuleUiPublicationRegistry([]),
+    moduleLifecycle: emptyModuleLifecycle(),
+    moduleConfiguration: emptyModuleConfiguration(),
+    moduleStorage: emptyModuleStorage(),
+    dashboard: createInMemoryDashboardStore(),
+    dashboardHostAssets: options.assets ?? createDashboardHostAssets(PAGE_HTML, SCRIPT),
+    health: readyHealth(),
+    runtime,
+    trustedOrigins: [trustedOrigin],
+  });
+  return { app, evaluator, runtime };
+}
+
+function expectPageSecurityHeaders(response: Response): void {
+  expect(response.headers.get("x-frame-options")).toBe("DENY");
+  expect(response.headers.get("content-security-policy")).toBe("frame-ancestors 'none'");
+  expect(response.headers.get("referrer-policy")).toBe("no-referrer");
+  expect(response.headers.get("x-content-type-options")).toBe("nosniff");
+}
+
+async function expectSanitizedNotFound(response: Response, label: string): Promise<void> {
+  expect(response.status, label).toBe(404);
+  expect(response.headers.get("content-type"), label).toMatch(/^application\/json/u);
+  expect(await response.json(), label).toEqual({ code: "NOT_FOUND" });
+}
+
+describe("GET / (the Dashboard page)", () => {
+  it("serves the exact startup HTML bytes with revalidation, a strong ETag, and the page security headers", async () => {
+    const { app } = buildApp();
+
+    const response = await app.request(DASHBOARD_HOST_PAGE_PATH);
+
+    expect(response.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(await response.text()).toBe(PAGE_HTML);
+    expect(response.headers.get("content-type")).toBe("text/html; charset=utf-8");
+    expect(response.headers.get("cache-control")).toBe("no-cache");
+    expect(response.headers.get("etag")).toBe(PAGE_ETAG);
+    expectPageSecurityHeaders(response);
+    // The one CSP directive is the only one: the full policy is a separate decision.
+    expect(response.headers.get("content-security-policy")).not.toContain(";");
+  });
+
+  it("serves the same page for an emailed-link landing, since the query never selects a file", async () => {
+    const { app } = buildApp();
+
+    const response = await app.request("/?ekklesia_auth=reset-password&token=abc123");
+
+    expect(response.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(await response.text()).toBe(PAGE_HTML);
+    expect(response.headers.get("etag")).toBe(PAGE_ETAG);
+  });
+
+  it("answers a matching If-None-Match with an empty 304 that keeps the validator and every page security header", async () => {
+    const { app } = buildApp();
+
+    for (const ifNoneMatch of [PAGE_ETAG, `W/${PAGE_ETAG}`, `"other", ${PAGE_ETAG}`, "*"]) {
+      const response = await app.request(DASHBOARD_HOST_PAGE_PATH, {
+        headers: { "If-None-Match": ifNoneMatch },
+      });
+
+      expect(response.status, ifNoneMatch).toBe(304);
+      expect(await response.text(), ifNoneMatch).toBe("");
+      expect(response.headers.get("etag")).toBe(PAGE_ETAG);
+      expect(response.headers.get("cache-control")).toBe("no-cache");
+      expectPageSecurityHeaders(response);
+    }
+  });
+
+  it("serves the full page again when the browser holds a different build's validator", async () => {
+    const { app } = buildApp();
+
+    const response = await app.request(DASHBOARD_HOST_PAGE_PATH, {
+      headers: { "If-None-Match": sha256Etag("an older build") },
+    });
+
+    expect(response.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(await response.text()).toBe(PAGE_HTML);
+  });
+
+  it("is unauthenticated and outside the API's CORS policy: it resolves no principal and reflects no origin", async () => {
+    const { app, evaluator, runtime } = buildApp();
+
+    const response = await app.request(DASHBOARD_HOST_PAGE_PATH, {
+      headers: { Cookie: "better-auth.session_token=anything", Origin: trustedOrigin },
+    });
+
+    expect(response.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(runtime.resolvePrincipal).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    expect(evaluator.authorize).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    expect(response.headers.get("access-control-allow-origin")).toBeNull();
+    expect(response.headers.get("set-cookie")).toBeNull();
+  });
+});
+
+describe("GET /assets/ekklesia-dashboard/app.js (the Dashboard script)", () => {
+  it("serves the exact startup script bytes as JavaScript with revalidation and a strong ETag", async () => {
+    const { app } = buildApp();
+
+    const response = await app.request(DASHBOARD_HOST_SCRIPT_PATH);
+
+    expect(response.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(await response.text()).toBe(SCRIPT);
+    expect(response.headers.get("content-type")).toBe("text/javascript; charset=utf-8");
+    expect(response.headers.get("cache-control")).toBe("no-cache");
+    expect(response.headers.get("etag")).toBe(SCRIPT_ETAG);
+    expect(response.headers.get("x-content-type-options")).toBe("nosniff");
+  });
+
+  it("answers a matching If-None-Match with an empty 304 carrying the script's own validator", async () => {
+    const { app } = buildApp();
+
+    const response = await app.request(DASHBOARD_HOST_SCRIPT_PATH, {
+      headers: { "If-None-Match": SCRIPT_ETAG },
+    });
+
+    expect(response.status).toBe(304);
+    expect(await response.text()).toBe("");
+    expect(response.headers.get("etag")).toBe(SCRIPT_ETAG);
+    expect(response.headers.get("cache-control")).toBe("no-cache");
+  });
+
+  it("does not accept the page's validator as the script's", async () => {
+    const { app } = buildApp();
+
+    const response = await app.request(DASHBOARD_HOST_SCRIPT_PATH, {
+      headers: { "If-None-Match": PAGE_ETAG },
+    });
+
+    expect(response.status).toBe(200);
+  });
+});
+
+describe("Dashboard host boundaries", () => {
+  it("serves nothing but its two exact paths, answering every other spelling with the sanitized 404", async () => {
+    const { app } = buildApp();
+
+    for (const path of [
+      "/index.html",
+      "/app.js",
+      "/app.js.map",
+      "/assets/ekklesia-dashboard/app.js.map",
+      "/assets/ekklesia-dashboard/",
+      "/assets/ekklesia-dashboard",
+      "/assets/ekklesia-dashboard/app.js/",
+      "/assets/ekklesia-dashboard/index.html",
+      "/assets/",
+      "/assets/ekklesia-dashboard/APP.JS",
+      "/dashboard",
+      "/login",
+    ]) {
+      await expectSanitizedNotFound(await app.request(path), path);
+    }
+  });
+
+  it("cannot be walked out of: encoded traversal, separators, and double slashes reach no file", async () => {
+    const { app } = buildApp();
+
+    for (const path of [
+      "/assets/ekklesia-dashboard/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/package.json",
+      "/assets/ekklesia-dashboard/..%2fapp.js.map",
+      "/assets/ekklesia-dashboard/%2e%2e%2fapp.js.map",
+      "/assets/ekklesia-dashboard/app.js%2f..%2f..%2fpackage.json",
+      "/assets/ekklesia-dashboard/..%5c..%5cpackage.json",
+      "/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/etc/passwd",
+      "/../../etc/passwd",
+      "//assets/ekklesia-dashboard/app.js",
+      "/assets//ekklesia-dashboard/app.js",
+      "/assets/ekklesia-dashboard/app.js%00.map",
+    ]) {
+      const response = await app.request(path);
+      expect(await response.text(), path).not.toContain(SCRIPT);
+      expect(response.status, path).toBe(404);
+    }
+    expect(readFileMock).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  it("never touches the filesystem while answering, even across every served path", async () => {
+    const { app } = buildApp();
+
+    await app.request(DASHBOARD_HOST_PAGE_PATH);
+    await app.request(DASHBOARD_HOST_SCRIPT_PATH);
+    await app.request("/assets/ekklesia-dashboard/app.js.map");
+
+    expect(readFileMock).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  it("serves GET (and Hono's implicit HEAD) only; every other method is the ordinary 404", async () => {
+    const { app } = buildApp();
+
+    const head = await app.request(DASHBOARD_HOST_PAGE_PATH, { method: "HEAD" });
+    expect(head.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(head.headers.get("etag")).toBe(PAGE_ETAG);
+    expect(await head.text()).toBe("");
+
+    for (const path of [DASHBOARD_HOST_PAGE_PATH, DASHBOARD_HOST_SCRIPT_PATH]) {
+      for (const method of ["POST", "PUT", "PATCH", "DELETE"]) {
+        await expectSanitizedNotFound(await app.request(path, { method }), `${method} ${path}`);
+      }
+    }
+  });
+
+  it("leaves the API, the display host's namespace, and module routes exactly where they were", async () => {
+    const moduleHandler = vi.fn<ModuleRouteHandler>(
+      async () => new Response("module", { status: 200 }),
+    );
+    const { app } = buildApp({
+      moduleRoutes: [
+        Object.freeze({
+          bodyMode: "buffered",
+          handler: moduleHandler,
+          maxBodyBytes: 1024,
+          method: "GET",
+          moduleId: "dashboard",
+          path: "/",
+          permission: modulePermission,
+        }) as RegisteredModuleHttpRoute,
+      ],
+    });
+
+    expect(await (await app.request("/api/v1/principal")).json()).toEqual({ kind: "anonymous" });
+    expect(await (await app.request("/api/v1/health/live")).json()).toEqual({ status: "live" });
+    expect(await (await app.request("/api/v1/modules/dashboard")).text()).toBe("module");
+    await expectSanitizedNotFound(await app.request("/api/v1/unknown"), "/api/v1/unknown");
+    // No display is published here, so the display host's script is absent rather than answered
+    // by the Dashboard's.
+    await expectSanitizedNotFound(
+      await app.request(DISPLAY_HOST_SCRIPT_PATH),
+      DISPLAY_HOST_SCRIPT_PATH,
+    );
+    expect(DASHBOARD_HOST_SCRIPT_PATH.startsWith("/assets/ekklesia-display/")).toBe(false);
+    expect(await (await app.request(DASHBOARD_HOST_PAGE_PATH)).text()).toBe(PAGE_HTML);
+    expect(moduleHandler).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+  });
+
+  it("refuses at composition a snapshot whose validator does not match its bytes, or empty bytes", () => {
+    const consistent = createDashboardHostAssets(PAGE_HTML, SCRIPT);
+
+    for (const assets of [
+      { ...consistent, html: `${PAGE_HTML}<!-- tampered -->` },
+      { ...consistent, scriptEtag: PAGE_ETAG },
+      { html: "", htmlEtag: sha256Etag(""), script: SCRIPT, scriptEtag: SCRIPT_ETAG },
+    ]) {
+      expect(() => buildApp({ assets })).toThrow(DashboardHostConfigurationError);
+    }
+  });
+});

apps/api/tests/dashboard-routes.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,642 @@
+import { mkdir, mkdtemp, rm, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises";
+import { tmpdir } from "node:os";
+import path from "node:path";
+import {
+  ANONYMOUS_PRINCIPAL,
+  createAuthenticatedPrincipal,
+  type EkklesiaPrincipal,
+  type ModuleDatabase,
+  type ModuleRuntimeServices,
+  parseEkklesiaUserId,
+} from "@ekklesia/contracts";
+import {
+  type AuthorizationStore,
+  createAuthorizationEvaluator,
+} from "@ekklesia/core/authorization";
+import type { DashboardConfiguration } from "@ekklesia/core/dashboard";
+import type { EkklesiaIdentityRuntime } from "@ekklesia/core/identity";
+import {
+  composePlatformPermissionRegistry,
+  createModuleUiPublicationRegistry,
+  discoverModules,
+  EMPTY_MODULE_REALTIME_REGISTRY,
+} from "@ekklesia/core/modules";
+import type { Hono } from "hono";
+import { afterEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest";
+import { createApiApp } from "../src/app.js";
+import { DASHBOARD_NAVIGATION_PATH } from "../src/dashboard-routes.js";
+import { MODULE_UI_INVENTORY_PATH } from "../src/module-ui-inventory.js";
+import { createInMemoryDashboardStore } from "./support/in-memory-dashboard-store.js";
+import { testDashboardHostAssets } from "./support/dashboard-host-assets.js";
+import { readyHealth } from "./support/ready-health.js";
+import {
+  createInMemoryModuleLifecycleStore,
+  moduleLifecycleSnapshotFor,
+} from "./support/in-memory-module-lifecycle.js";
+import { moduleConfigurationOptionFor } from "./support/in-memory-module-configuration.js";
+import { moduleStorageOptionFor } from "./support/in-memory-module-storage.js";
+
+const trustedOrigin = "https://dashboard.example.test";
+const untrustedOrigin = "https://evil.example.test";
+const viewerId = parseEkklesiaUserId("33333333-3333-4333-8333-333333333333");
+
+const temporaryDirectories: string[] = [];
+
+afterEach(async () => {
+  await Promise.all(
+    temporaryDirectories
+      .splice(0)
+      .map((directory) => rm(directory, { force: true, recursive: true })),
+  );
+});
+
+interface ModuleFixture {
+  readonly id: string;
+  readonly name: string;
+  readonly withUi?: boolean;
+}
+
+async function createModule(modulesDirectory: string, fixture: ModuleFixture): Promise<void> {
+  const moduleDirectory = path.join(modulesDirectory, fixture.id);
+  await mkdir(path.join(moduleDirectory, "dist/server"), { recursive: true });
+  await writeFile(
+    path.join(moduleDirectory, "package.json"),
+    JSON.stringify({
+      ekklesia: { layer: "module" },
+      name: `@test/module-${fixture.id}`,
+      type: "module",
+      version: "1.0.0",
+    }),
+  );
+  await writeFile(
+    path.join(moduleDirectory, "ekklesia.module.json"),
+    JSON.stringify({
+      compatibility: { moduleSdk: "^0.1.0", platform: "^0.1.0" },
+      entrypoints: {
+        server: "./dist/server/index.js",
+        ...(fixture.withUi === false ? {} : { ui: "./dist/ui/index.js" }),
+      },
+      id: fixture.id,
+      manifestVersion: 7,
+      name: fixture.name,
+      version: "1.0.0",
+    }),
+  );
+  await writeFile(
+    path.join(moduleDirectory, "dist/server/index.js"),
+    `export default { id: ${JSON.stringify(fixture.id)}, version: "1.0.0" };`,
+  );
+  if (fixture.withUi !== false) {
+    await mkdir(path.join(moduleDirectory, "dist/ui"), { recursive: true });
+    await writeFile(
+      path.join(moduleDirectory, "dist/ui/index.js"),
+      `export default { id: ${JSON.stringify(fixture.id)}, version: "1.0.0", mount() {} };\n`,
+    );
+  }
+}
+
+interface InstallOptions {
+  readonly fixtures?: readonly ModuleFixture[];
+  readonly principal?: EkklesiaPrincipal;
+  readonly platformOwner?: boolean;
+  readonly configuration?: Partial<DashboardConfiguration>;
+}
+
+const defaultFixtures: readonly ModuleFixture[] = [
+  { id: "video", name: "Video" },
+  { id: "livestream", name: "Livestream" },
+  { id: "calendar", name: "Calendar" },
+];
+
+async function install(options: InstallOptions = {}): Promise<{ app: Hono }> {
+  const modulesDirectory = await mkdtemp(path.join(tmpdir(), "ekklesia-dashboard-routes-"));
+  temporaryDirectories.push(modulesDirectory);
+  for (const fixture of options.fixtures ?? defaultFixtures) {
+    await createModule(modulesDirectory, fixture);
+  }
+  const modules = await discoverModules({
+    moduleSdkVersion: "0.1.0",
+    modulesDirectory,
+    platformVersion: "0.1.0",
+  });
+
+  const evaluator = createAuthorizationEvaluator({
+    grants: { hasActiveGrant: async () => false },
+    platformOwners: { isPlatformOwner: async () => options.platformOwner === true },
+  });
+  const runtime: EkklesiaIdentityRuntime = {
+    handleAuthRequest: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(new Response(null, { status: 200 })),
+    resolvePrincipal: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(options.principal ?? ANONYMOUS_PRINCIPAL),
+  };
+  const store = {
+    createGrant: vi.fn(),
+    grantPlatformOwner: vi.fn(),
+    hasActiveGrant: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(false),
+    isPlatformOwner: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(false),
+    listGrantsForUser: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({ grants: [] }),
+    revokeGrant: vi.fn(),
+    revokePlatformOwner: vi.fn(),
+  } as unknown as AuthorizationStore;
+
+  const app = createApiApp({
+    authorization: { evaluator, registry: composePlatformPermissionRegistry(modules), store },
+    dashboard: createInMemoryDashboardStore(options.configuration ?? {}),
+    dashboardHostAssets: testDashboardHostAssets(),
+    health: readyHealth(),
+    moduleRoutes: Object.freeze([]),
+    moduleRealtime: EMPTY_MODULE_REALTIME_REGISTRY,
+    moduleServices: Object.freeze({
+      database: Object.freeze({}) as unknown as ModuleDatabase,
+    }) as ModuleRuntimeServices,
+    moduleUi: createModuleUiPublicationRegistry(modules),
+    moduleLifecycle: {
+      snapshot: moduleLifecycleSnapshotFor(modules),
+      store: createInMemoryModuleLifecycleStore(),
+    },
+    moduleConfiguration: moduleConfigurationOptionFor(modules),
+    moduleStorage: moduleStorageOptionFor(modules),
+    runtime,
+    trustedOrigins: [trustedOrigin],
+  });
+
+  return { app };
+}
+
+function signedIn(): EkklesiaPrincipal {
+  return createAuthenticatedPrincipal(viewerId);
+}
+
+interface NavigationEntry {
+  readonly name: string;
+  readonly module: {
+    readonly id: string;
+    readonly version: string;
+    readonly ui: { readonly url: string };
+    readonly api: { readonly baseUrl: string };
+    readonly permissions: readonly string[];
+  };
+}
+
+interface NavigationBody {
+  readonly groups: ReadonlyArray<{
+    readonly id: string;
+    readonly label: string;
+    readonly order: number;
+    readonly modules: readonly NavigationEntry[];
+  }>;
+  readonly ungrouped: readonly NavigationEntry[];
+}
+
+async function navigationOf(app: Hono): Promise<NavigationBody> {
+  const response = await app.request(DASHBOARD_NAVIGATION_PATH);
+  expect(response.status).toBe(200);
+  return (await response.json()) as NavigationBody;
+}
+
+/** An administrator: a platform owner, who passes the evaluator's owner bypass for the restricted
+ * manage permission exactly as in production. */
+async function administrator(configuration: Partial<DashboardConfiguration> = {}) {
+  return install({ configuration, platformOwner: true, principal: signedIn() });
+}
+
+function mutate(app: Hono, method: "PUT" | "DELETE", url: string, body?: unknown) {
+  return app.request(url, {
+    ...(body === undefined
+      ? {}
+      : { body: JSON.stringify(body), headers: { "content-type": "application/json" } }),
+    headers: {
+      origin: trustedOrigin,
+      ...(body === undefined ? {} : { "content-type": "application/json" }),
+    },
+    method,
+  });
+}
+
+describe("Dashboard navigation — reading", () => {
+  it("shows every mountable module as ungrouped when nothing is configured", async () => {
+    const { app } = await install({ principal: signedIn() });
+
+    const navigation = await navigationOf(app);
+
+    expect(navigation.groups).toEqual([]);
+    // A fresh installation is immediately usable: no initialization write, no manual database edit.
+    expect(navigation.ungrouped.map((entry) => entry.name)).toEqual([
+      "Calendar",
+      "Livestream",
+      "Video",
+    ]);
+  });
+
+  it("renders the module's own manifest name, never its id", async () => {
+    const { app } = await install({ principal: signedIn() });
+
+    const navigation = await navigationOf(app);
+
+    expect(navigation.ungrouped.map((entry) => entry.name)).not.toContain("livestream");
+    expect(navigation.ungrouped.find((entry) => entry.module.id === "livestream")?.name).toBe(
+      "Livestream",
+    );
+  });
+
+  it("groups and orders exactly as the stored configuration says", async () => {
+    const { app } = await install({
+      configuration: {
+        groups: [
+          { id: "planning", label: "Planning", sortOrder: 20 },
+          { id: "media", label: "Media", sortOrder: 10 },
+        ],
+        placements: [
+          { groupId: "media", moduleId: "livestream", sortOrder: 20 },
+          { groupId: "media", moduleId: "video", sortOrder: 10 },
+          { groupId: "planning", moduleId: "calendar", sortOrder: 10 },
+        ],
+      },
+      principal: signedIn(),
+    });
+
+    const navigation = await navigationOf(app);
+
+    expect(
+      navigation.groups.map((group) => [group.label, group.modules.map((entry) => entry.name)]),
+    ).toEqual([
+      ["Media", ["Video", "Livestream"]],
+      ["Planning", ["Calendar"]],
+    ]);
+    expect(navigation.ungrouped).toEqual([]);
+  });
+
+  it("embeds the generic mount descriptor unchanged inside each entry", async () => {
+    const { app } = await install({ principal: signedIn() });
+
+    const navigation = await navigationOf(app);
+    const livestream = navigation.ungrouped.find((entry) => entry.module.id === "livestream");
+
+    // Presentation wraps the host-neutral descriptor; it never rewrites it.
+    expect(livestream?.module).toEqual({
+      contributions: [],
+      api: { baseUrl: "/api/v1/modules/livestream" },
+      display: null,
+      id: "livestream",
+      permissions: [],
+      realtime: { baseUrl: "/api/v1/module-realtime/livestream" },
+      ui: { url: "/api/v1/module-ui/livestream/1.0.0" },
+      version: "1.0.0",
+    });
+    expect(Object.keys(livestream ?? {}).sort()).toEqual(["module", "name"]);
+  });
+
+  it("agrees exactly with the generic inventory about what is mountable", async () => {
+    const { app } = await install({
+      configuration: {
+        groups: [{ id: "media", label: "Media", sortOrder: 10 }],
+        placements: [{ groupId: "media", moduleId: "video", sortOrder: 10 }],
+      },
+      principal: signedIn(),
+    });
+
+    const navigation = await navigationOf(app);
+    const inventory = (await (await app.request(MODULE_UI_INVENTORY_PATH)).json()) as {
+      modules: ReadonlyArray<{ id: string }>;
+    };
+
+    const navigationModules = [
+      ...navigation.groups.flatMap((group) => group.modules),
+      ...navigation.ungrouped,
+    ].map((entry) => entry.module);
+    // Both derive from one publication registry through one shared description, so they cannot
+    // disagree about what exists or about any URL.
+    expect(navigationModules.map((module) => module.id).sort()).toEqual(
+      inventory.modules.map((module) => module.id).sort(),
+    );
+  });
+
+  it("keeps the generic inventory free of presentation metadata", async () => {
+    const { app } = await install({ principal: signedIn() });
+
+    const body = await (await app.request(MODULE_UI_INVENTORY_PATH)).text();
+
+    // The host-neutral contract a standalone host consumes must not learn Ekklesia has folders or
+    // display names. That layering is the whole reason navigation is a separate route.
+    for (const field of ["name", "label", "group", "order", "ungrouped"]) {
+      expect(body, field).not.toContain(`"${field}"`);
+    }
+  });
+
+  it("omits a module that is no longer installed, without breaking navigation", async () => {
+    const { app } = await install({
+      configuration: {
+        groups: [{ id: "media", label: "Media", sortOrder: 10 }],
+        placements: [
+          { groupId: "media", moduleId: "video", sortOrder: 10 },
+          { groupId: "media", moduleId: "removed-module", sortOrder: 20 },
+        ],
+      },
+      fixtures: [{ id: "video", name: "Video" }],
+      principal: signedIn(),
+    });
+
+    const navigation = await navigationOf(app);
+
+    expect(navigation.groups[0]?.modules.map((entry) => entry.module.id)).toEqual(["video"]);
+    expect(JSON.stringify(navigation)).not.toContain("removed-module");
+  });
+
+  it("keeps a newly installed module visible alongside an existing arrangement", async () => {
+    const { app } = await install({
+      configuration: {
+        groups: [{ id: "media", label: "Media", sortOrder: 10 }],
+        placements: [{ groupId: "media", moduleId: "video", sortOrder: 10 }],
+      },
+      principal: signedIn(),
+    });
+
+    const navigation = await navigationOf(app);
+
+    expect(navigation.groups[0]?.modules.map((entry) => entry.name)).toEqual(["Video"]);
+    // Calendar and Livestream were never configured and are still reachable.
+    expect(navigation.ungrouped.map((entry) => entry.name)).toEqual(["Calendar", "Livestream"]);
+  });
+
+  it("excludes a module that ships no UI, exactly like the inventory does", async () => {
+    const { app } = await install({
+      fixtures: [
+        { id: "video", name: "Video" },
+        { id: "roster", name: "Roster", withUi: false },
+      ],
+      principal: signedIn(),
+    });
+
+    const navigation = await navigationOf(app);
+
+    expect(JSON.stringify(navigation)).not.toContain("Roster");
+  });
+
+  it("leaks no filesystem path, package root, or manifest internal", async () => {
+    const { app } = await install({ principal: signedIn() });
+
+    const body = await (await app.request(DASHBOARD_NAVIGATION_PATH)).text();
+
+    expect(body).not.toContain(tmpdir());
+    expect(body).not.toContain("dist");
+    expect(body).not.toContain("@test/module-");
+    expect(body).not.toContain("ekklesia.module.json");
+    expect(body).not.toContain("entrypoints");
+    expect(body).not.toContain("manifestVersion");
+  });
+
+  it("is per-principal, uncached, and refused to anonymous callers", async () => {
+    const { app: anonymous } = await install();
+    const { app } = await install({ principal: signedIn() });
+
+    const denied = await anonymous.request(DASHBOARD_NAVIGATION_PATH);
+    const allowed = await app.request(DASHBOARD_NAVIGATION_PATH, {
+      headers: { origin: trustedOrigin },
+    });
+
+    expect(denied.status).toBe(403);
+    expect(await denied.text()).not.toContain("Livestream");
+    expect(allowed.headers.get("cache-control")).toBe("no-store");
+    const vary = allowed.headers.get("vary")?.toLowerCase() ?? "";
+    expect(vary).toContain("origin");
+    expect(vary).toContain("cookie");
+  });
+});
+
+describe("Dashboard navigation — organizing", () => {
+  it("creates a group and places a module, and both persist into the resolved view", async () => {
+    const { app } = await administrator();
+
+    expect(
+      (
+        await mutate(app, "PUT", `${DASHBOARD_NAVIGATION_PATH}/groups/media`, {
+          label: "Media",
+          order: 10,
+        })
+      ).status,
+    ).toBe(200);
+    expect(
+      (
+        await mutate(app, "PUT", `${DASHBOARD_NAVIGATION_PATH}/placements/livestream`, {
+          groupId: "media",
+          order: 10,
+        })
+      ).status,
+    ).toBe(200);
+
+    const navigation = await navigationOf(app);
+
+    expect(navigation.groups.map((group) => group.label)).toEqual(["Media"]);
+    expect(navigation.groups[0]?.modules.map((entry) => entry.name)).toEqual(["Livestream"]);
+    expect(navigation.ungrouped.map((entry) => entry.name)).toEqual(["Calendar", "Video"]);
+  });
+
+  it("renames a group without moving anything", async () => {
+    const { app } = await administrator({
+      groups: [{ id: "media", label: "Media", sortOrder: 10 }],
+      placements: [{ groupId: "media", moduleId: "livestream", sortOrder: 10 }],
+    });
+
+    await mutate(app, "PUT", `${DASHBOARD_NAVIGATION_PATH}/groups/media`, {
+      label: "Sunday Production",
+      order: 10,
+    });
+    const navigation = await navigationOf(app);
+
+    expect(navigation.groups[0]).toMatchObject({ id: "media", label: "Sunday Production" });
+    expect(navigation.groups[0]?.modules.map((entry) => entry.name)).toEqual(["Livestream"]);
+  });
+
+  it("moves a module between groups and changes only its placement", async () => {
+    const { app } = await administrator({
+      groups: [
+        { id: "media", label: "Media", sortOrder: 10 },
+        { id: "sunday-production", label: "Sunday Production", sortOrder: 5 },
+      ],
+      placements: [
+        { groupId: "media", moduleId: "livestream", sortOrder: 10 },
+        { groupId: "media", moduleId: "video", sortOrder: 20 },
+      ],
+    });
+    const before = await navigationOf(app);
+    const livestreamBefore = before.groups
+      .flatMap((group) => group.modules)
+      .find((entry) => entry.module.id === "livestream");
+
+    await mutate(app, "PUT", `${DASHBOARD_NAVIGATION_PATH}/placements/livestream`, {
+      groupId: "sunday-production",
+      order: 10,
+    });
+    const after = await navigationOf(app);
+    const livestreamAfter = after.groups
+      .flatMap((group) => group.modules)
+      .find((entry) => entry.module.id === "livestream");
+
+    // The one property this whole pass exists to guarantee: the module — its artifact URL, its API
+    // root, its permissions, its version, its name — is byte-identical across the move.
+    expect(livestreamAfter).toEqual(livestreamBefore);
+    expect(
+      after.groups.find((group) => group.id === "sunday-production")?.modules.map((e) => e.name),
+    ).toEqual(["Livestream"]);
+    expect(after.groups.find((group) => group.id === "media")?.modules.map((e) => e.name)).toEqual([
+      "Video",
+    ]);
+  });
+
+  it("ungroups a module deliberately", async () => {
+    const { app } = await administrator({
+      groups: [{ id: "media", label: "Media", sortOrder: 10 }],
+      placements: [{ groupId: "media", moduleId: "video", sortOrder: 10 }],
+    });
+
+    await mutate(app, "PUT", `${DASHBOARD_NAVIGATION_PATH}/placements/video`, {
+      groupId: null,
+      order: 5,
+    });
+    const navigation = await navigationOf(app);
+
+    expect(navigation.groups[0]?.modules).toEqual([]);
+    expect(navigation.ungrouped.map((entry) => entry.name)).toEqual([
+      "Video",
+      "Calendar",
+      "Livestream",
+    ]);
+  });
+
+  it("ungroups a deleted group's modules rather than losing them", async () => {
+    const { app } = await administrator({
+      groups: [{ id: "media", label: "Media", sortOrder: 10 }],
+      placements: [{ groupId: "media", moduleId: "video", sortOrder: 10 }],
+    });
+
+    const deleted = await mutate(app, "DELETE", `${DASHBOARD_NAVIGATION_PATH}/groups/media`);
+    const navigation = await navigationOf(app);
+
+    expect(deleted.status).toBe(204);
+    expect(navigation.groups).toEqual([]);
+    expect(navigation.ungrouped.map((entry) => entry.name)).toEqual([
+      "Video",
+      "Calendar",
+      "Livestream",
+    ]);
+  });
+
+  it("refuses a placement naming a group that does not exist", async () => {
+    const { app } = await administrator();
+
+    const response = await mutate(app, "PUT", `${DASHBOARD_NAVIGATION_PATH}/placements/video`, {
+      groupId: "not-a-group",
+      order: 10,
+    });
+
+    expect(response.status).toBe(404);
+    expect(await response.json()).toEqual({ code: "DASHBOARD_GROUP_NOT_FOUND" });
+  });
+
+  it("refuses a body carrying anything beyond the declared fields", async () => {
+    const { app } = await administrator();
+
+    const bodies: readonly unknown[] = [
+      { label: "Media", order: 10, parentGroupId: "root" },
+      { label: "Media", order: 10, ownerModuleId: "video" },
+      { label: "Media" },
+      { label: "", order: 10 },
+      { label: "Media", order: -1 },
+      { label: "Media", order: 1.5 },
+      { label: 42, order: 10 },
+      [],
+      null,
+    ];
+    for (const body of bodies) {
+      const response = await mutate(app, "PUT", `${DASHBOARD_NAVIGATION_PATH}/groups/media`, body);
+      expect(response.status, JSON.stringify(body)).toBe(400);
+      expect(await response.json(), JSON.stringify(body)).toEqual({ code: "INVALID_REQUEST" });
+    }
+  });
+
+  it("refuses a malformed group identifier in the path", async () => {
+    const { app } = await administrator();
+
+    const response = await mutate(app, "PUT", `${DASHBOARD_NAVIGATION_PATH}/groups/Not%20Valid`, {
+      label: "Media",
+      order: 10,
+    });
+
+    expect(response.status).toBe(400);
+  });
+});
+
+describe("Dashboard navigation — authority", () => {
+  it("refuses organizing to a signed-in user without the manage permission", async () => {
+    // Reading works for any signed-in user; organizing does not.
+    const { app } = await install({ principal: signedIn() });
+
+    expect((await app.request(DASHBOARD_NAVIGATION_PATH)).status).toBe(200);
+    const response = await mutate(app, "PUT", `${DASHBOARD_NAVIGATION_PATH}/groups/media`, {
+      label: "Media",
+      order: 10,
+    });
+
+    expect(response.status).toBe(403);
+    expect(await response.json()).toEqual({ code: "AUTHORIZATION_DENIED" });
+  });
+
+  it("refuses organizing from an untrusted origin, before authorization even runs", async () => {
+    const { app } = await administrator();
+
+    const response = await app.request(`${DASHBOARD_NAVIGATION_PATH}/groups/media`, {
+      body: JSON.stringify({ label: "Media", order: 10 }),
+      headers: { "content-type": "application/json", origin: untrustedOrigin },
+      method: "PUT",
+    });
+
+    expect(response.status).toBe(403);
+    expect(await response.json()).toEqual({ code: "UNTRUSTED_ORIGIN" });
+  });
+
+  it("refuses organizing to an anonymous caller", async () => {
+    const { app } = await install();
+
+    for (const [method, url, body] of [
+      ["PUT", `${DASHBOARD_NAVIGATION_PATH}/groups/media`, { label: "Media", order: 10 }],
+      ["DELETE", `${DASHBOARD_NAVIGATION_PATH}/groups/media`, undefined],
+      ["PUT", `${DASHBOARD_NAVIGATION_PATH}/placements/video`, { groupId: null, order: 0 }],
+    ] as const) {
+      const response = await mutate(app, method, url, body);
+      expect(response.status, `${method} ${url}`).toBe(403);
+    }
+  });
+
+  it("grants no module authority to an administrator who reorganizes the Dashboard", async () => {
+    // The platform owner holds `core.dashboard.navigation.manage` through the owner bypass. That
+    // says nothing about any module: the hints in the navigation view are still evaluated per
+    // module permission, and every module route stays enforced on its own.
+    const { app } = await administrator();
+
+    await mutate(app, "PUT", `${DASHBOARD_NAVIGATION_PATH}/groups/media`, {
+      label: "Media",
+      order: 10,
+    });
+    await mutate(app, "PUT", `${DASHBOARD_NAVIGATION_PATH}/placements/livestream`, {
+      groupId: "media",
+      order: 10,
+    });
+    const navigation = await navigationOf(app);
+
+    const livestream = navigation.groups[0]?.modules[0];
+    // The fixture modules declare no permissions at all, so an owner still holds none for them:
+    // moving a module into a folder cannot manufacture a permission hint, let alone a grant.
+    expect(livestream?.module.permissions).toEqual([]);
+  });
+
+  it("routes no method the navigation contract does not define", async () => {
+    const { app } = await administrator();
+
+    for (const method of ["POST", "PATCH"] as const) {
+      const response = await app.request(DASHBOARD_NAVIGATION_PATH, {
+        headers: { origin: trustedOrigin },
+        method,
+      });
+      expect(response.status, method).toBe(404);
+    }
+  });
+});

apps/api/tests/device-pairing.integration.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,810 @@
+import { randomBytes } from "node:crypto";
+import { mkdir, mkdtemp, rm, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises";
+import { tmpdir } from "node:os";
+import path from "node:path";
+import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
+import {
+  createAuthorizationDrizzleDatabase,
+  createInitialPlatformOwner,
+} from "@ekklesia/core/authorization";
+import {
+  createBootstrapIdentityCreator,
+  createIdentityDrizzleDatabase,
+} from "@ekklesia/core/identity";
+import {
+  applyModuleMigrations,
+  createPostgresMigrationDatabase,
+  discoverAllMigrations,
+} from "@ekklesia/core/migrations";
+import { Client, type QueryResultRow } from "pg";
+import { afterAll, describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
+import { createApiRuntimeConfig } from "../src/config.js";
+import { type RunningApi, startApi } from "../src/server.js";
+
+/**
+ * Device pairing end to end, against real PostgreSQL and the real HTTP transport (ADR 0036).
+ *
+ * The whole point is that none of this is mocked. A screen with no identity asks to be paired, a
+ * real administrator signs in through the real login transport and approves it, the host issues a
+ * credential in a real `Set-Cookie`, and the resulting device opens a real display descriptor and a
+ * real realtime stream — and is then revoked and loses all of it. Anything short of that would
+ * prove that rows were written, not that a television in a foyer works.
+ */
+const integrationDatabaseUrlEnvironment = "EKKLESIA_MIGRATION_TEST_DATABASE_URL";
+const repositoryRoot = path.join(path.dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)), "..", "..", "..");
+const coreMigrationsDirectory = path.join(repositoryRoot, "core", "drizzle");
+const trackedDatabases = new Set<string>();
+const trackedDirectories: string[] = [];
+let databaseCounter = 0;
+
+const identityBaseUrl = "https://identity.example.test";
+const dashboardOrigin = "https://dashboard.example.test";
+const untrustedOrigin = "https://evil.example.test";
+const ownerPassword = "correct horse battery staple";
+const displayPermission = "announcements.slideshow.view";
+
+class IntegrationHarnessError extends Error {
+  constructor(message: string) {
+    super(message);
+    this.name = "IntegrationHarnessError";
+    this.stack = `${this.name}: ${this.message}`;
+  }
+}
+
+function baseDatabaseUrl(): string {
+  const url = process.env[integrationDatabaseUrlEnvironment];
+  if (typeof url !== "string" || url.trim() === "") {
+    throw new IntegrationHarnessError("The integration database URL is not configured.");
+  }
+  return url;
+}
+
+function databaseUrl(name: string): string {
+  const url = new URL(baseDatabaseUrl());
+  url.pathname = `/${name}`;
+  return url.toString();
+}
+
+async function openAdministrativeClient(): Promise<Client> {
+  const client = new Client({ connectionString: baseDatabaseUrl() });
+  await client.connect();
+  return client;
+}
+
+async function safeQuery<T extends QueryResultRow>(
+  client: Client,
+  text: string,
+  values: readonly unknown[] = [],
+): Promise<T[]> {
+  try {
+    return (await client.query<T>(text, [...values])).rows;
+  } catch {
+    throw new IntegrationHarnessError("An integration database statement failed.");
+  }
+}
+
+async function query<T extends QueryResultRow>(
+  url: string,
+  text: string,
+  values: readonly unknown[] = [],
+): Promise<T[]> {
+  const client = new Client({ connectionString: url });
+  await client.connect();
+  try {
+    return await safeQuery<T>(client, text, values);
+  } finally {
+    await client.end().catch(() => undefined);
+  }
+}
+
+/** A display-capable module: one display entrypoint, one restricted permission protecting it, and
+ * one realtime channel gated by that same permission. */
+async function createDisplayModuleDirectory(): Promise<string> {
+  const directory = await mkdtemp(path.join(tmpdir(), "ekklesia-device-pairing-"));
+  trackedDirectories.push(directory);
+  const moduleDirectory = path.join(directory, "announcements");
+  await mkdir(path.join(moduleDirectory, "dist/server"), { recursive: true });
+  await mkdir(path.join(moduleDirectory, "dist/ui"), { recursive: true });
+  await Promise.all([
+    writeFile(
+      path.join(moduleDirectory, "package.json"),
+      JSON.stringify({
+        ekklesia: { layer: "module" },
+        name: "@test/module-announcements",
+        type: "module",
+        version: "1.0.0",
+      }),
+    ),
+    writeFile(
+      path.join(moduleDirectory, "ekklesia.module.json"),
+      JSON.stringify({
+        compatibility: { moduleSdk: "^0.1.0", platform: "^0.1.0" },
+        entrypoints: {
+          display: { artifact: "./dist/ui/display.js", permission: displayPermission },
+          server: "./dist/server/index.js",
+        },
+        id: "announcements",
+        manifestVersion: 7,
+        name: "Announcements fixture",
+        permissions: [
+          {
+            baseline: "restricted",
+            description: "View the announcement slideshow.",
+            id: displayPermission,
+          },
+        ],
+        version: "1.0.0",
+      }),
+    ),
+    writeFile(
+      path.join(moduleDirectory, "dist/server/index.js"),
+      `export default {
+        id: "announcements",
+        version: "1.0.0",
+        register({ realtime }) {
+          realtime.channel({ channel: "state", permission: ${JSON.stringify(displayPermission)} });
+        },
+        start({ realtime }) {
+          realtime.publish("state", { slides: [] });
+        },
+        stop() {},
+      };\n`,
+    ),
+    writeFile(path.join(moduleDirectory, "dist/ui/display.js"), "export function mount() {}\n"),
+  ]);
+  return directory;
+}
+
+async function createMigratedDatabase(label: string): Promise<string> {
+  databaseCounter += 1;
+  const name =
+    `ekk_device_${label}_${databaseCounter}_${randomBytes(4).toString("hex")}`.toLowerCase();
+  const admin = await openAdministrativeClient();
+  try {
+    await safeQuery(admin, `create database "${name}"`);
+  } finally {
+    await admin.end().catch(() => undefined);
+  }
+  trackedDatabases.add(name);
+  const url = databaseUrl(name);
+  const emptyModules = await mkdtemp(path.join(tmpdir(), "ekklesia-device-no-modules-"));
+  try {
+    const aggregate = await discoverAllMigrations({
+      coreMigrationsDirectory,
+      moduleDiscovery: {
+        moduleSdkVersion: "0.1.0",
+        modulesDirectory: emptyModules,
+        platformVersion: "0.1.0",
+      },
+    });
+    await applyModuleMigrations({ aggregate, database: createPostgresMigrationDatabase(url) });
+  } finally {
+    await rm(emptyModules, { force: true, recursive: true });
+  }
+  return url;
+}
+
+async function startPlatform(url: string, modulesDirectory: string): Promise<RunningApi> {
+  const config = createApiRuntimeConfig(
+    {
+      databaseUrl: url,
+      host: "127.0.0.1",
+      identity: {
+        baseUrl: identityBaseUrl,
+        // The production posture: no public signup anywhere in this suite.
+        publicSignupEnabled: false,
+        secret: "integration-test-secret-0123456789abcdefgh",
+        trustedOrigins: [identityBaseUrl, dashboardOrigin],
+      },
+      port: 0,
+    },
+    { environment: "development" },
+  );
+  return startApi(config, {
+    modulesDirectoryOverride: modulesDirectory,
+    rateLimitOverride: { max: 1000, window: 1 },
+  });
+}
+
+function apiOrigin(running: RunningApi): string {
+  const address = running.server.address();
+  if (!address || typeof address !== "object") {
+    throw new IntegrationHarnessError("The API integration server has no bound address.");
+  }
+  return `http://127.0.0.1:${address.port}`;
+}
+
+/** Matches a cookie by suffix, because Better Auth prefixes its session cookie with `__Secure-`
+ * whenever the configured base URL is https — which this harness's is. */
+function cookiePair(response: Response, name: string): string | undefined {
+  for (const header of response.headers.getSetCookie()) {
+    const pair = header.split(";")[0]?.trim() ?? "";
+    const cookieName = pair.slice(0, Math.max(0, pair.indexOf("=")));
+    if (cookieName === name || cookieName.endsWith(name)) {
+      return pair;
+    }
+  }
+  return undefined;
+}
+
+function setCookieFor(response: Response, name: string): string | undefined {
+  return response.headers.getSetCookie().find((header) => header.startsWith(`${name}=`));
+}
+
+async function createOwner(url: string, origin: string): Promise<string> {
+  const email = `owner-${randomBytes(4).toString("hex")}@example.test`;
+  const authorization = createAuthorizationDrizzleDatabase(url);
+  const identity = createIdentityDrizzleDatabase(url, {});
+  try {
+    await createInitialPlatformOwner(
+      {
+        authorizationDb: authorization.db,
+        createIdentity: createBootstrapIdentityCreator(identity.db),
+        identityDb: identity.db,
+      },
+      { email, name: "Platform Owner", password: ownerPassword },
+    );
+  } finally {
+    await Promise.all([authorization.close(), identity.close()]);
+  }
+  const signIn = await fetch(`${origin}/api/auth/sign-in/email`, {
+    body: JSON.stringify({ email, password: ownerPassword }),
+    headers: { "content-type": "application/json", origin: dashboardOrigin },
+    method: "POST",
+  });
+  const cookie = cookiePair(signIn, "better-auth.session_token");
+  if (signIn.status !== 200 || cookie === undefined) {
+    throw new IntegrationHarnessError("The platform owner could not sign in.");
+  }
+  return cookie;
+}
+
+interface Platform {
+  readonly api: RunningApi;
+  readonly origin: string;
+  readonly url: string;
+  readonly ownerCookie: string;
+  readonly close: () => Promise<void>;
+}
+
+async function platform(label: string): Promise<Platform> {
+  const url = await createMigratedDatabase(label);
+  const modulesDirectory = await createDisplayModuleDirectory();
+  const api = await startPlatform(url, modulesDirectory);
+  const origin = apiOrigin(api);
+  const ownerCookie = await createOwner(url, origin);
+  return {
+    api,
+    close: async () => {
+      await api.shutdown();
+    },
+    origin,
+    ownerCookie,
+    url,
+  };
+}
+
+/** The device's own browser: no human session, only whatever cookies the host has set on it. */
+class DeviceBrowser {
+  #cookies = new Map<string, string>();
+
+  constructor(private readonly origin: string) {}
+
+  absorb(response: Response): void {
+    for (const header of response.headers.getSetCookie()) {
+      const pair = header.split(";")[0] ?? "";
+      const separator = pair.indexOf("=");
+      if (separator === -1) {
+        continue;
+      }
+      const name = pair.slice(0, separator).trim();
+      const value = pair.slice(separator + 1).trim();
+      if (value.length === 0 || /max-age=0/iu.test(header)) {
+        this.#cookies.delete(name);
+      } else {
+        this.#cookies.set(name, value);
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  header(): string {
+    return [...this.#cookies].map(([name, value]) => `${name}=${value}`).join("; ");
+  }
+
+  has(name: string): boolean {
+    return this.#cookies.has(name);
+  }
+
+  overwrite(name: string, value: string): void {
+    this.#cookies.set(name, value);
+  }
+
+  async request(path: string, init: RequestInit = {}): Promise<Response> {
+    const cookie = this.header();
+    const response = await fetch(`${this.origin}${path}`, {
+      ...init,
+      headers: {
+        origin: dashboardOrigin,
+        ...(cookie.length > 0 ? { cookie } : {}),
+        ...(init.headers as Record<string, string> | undefined),
+      },
+    });
+    this.absorb(response);
+    return response;
+  }
+
+  post(path: string, body: unknown): Promise<Response> {
+    return this.request(path, {
+      body: JSON.stringify(body),
+      headers: { "content-type": "application/json" },
+      method: "POST",
+    });
+  }
+}
+
+function adminRequest(
+  origin: string,
+  cookie: string,
+  path: string,
+  body?: unknown,
+  overrides: RequestInit = {},
+): Promise<Response> {
+  return fetch(`${origin}${path}`, {
+    ...(body === undefined ? {} : { body: JSON.stringify(body) }),
+    headers: {
+      cookie,
+      origin: dashboardOrigin,
+      ...(body === undefined ? {} : { "content-type": "application/json" }),
+      ...(overrides.headers as Record<string, string> | undefined),
+    },
+    method: body === undefined ? "GET" : "POST",
+    ...overrides,
+  });
+}
+
+/** Drives a screen from "nobody has paired me" to "I hold a device session". */
+async function pairDevice(
+  platform: Platform,
+  device: DeviceBrowser,
+  deviceName = "Foyer TV",
+): Promise<{ readonly code: string }> {
+  const requested = await device.post("/api/v1/device-pairing/requests", {
+    moduleId: "announcements",
+  });
+  if (requested.status !== 201) {
+    throw new IntegrationHarnessError("The pairing request was refused.");
+  }
+  const { code } = (await requested.json()) as { code: string };
+  const approved = await adminRequest(
+    platform.origin,
+    platform.ownerCookie,
+    "/api/v1/device-pairing/approvals",
+    { code, deviceName },
+  );
+  if (approved.status !== 200) {
+    throw new IntegrationHarnessError("The pairing approval was refused.");
+  }
+  const claimed = await device.post("/api/v1/device-pairing/claims", {});
+  if (((await claimed.json()) as { status: string }).status !== "paired") {
+    throw new IntegrationHarnessError("The device was not issued a session.");
+  }
+  return { code };
+}
+
+afterAll(async () => {
+  const admin = await openAdministrativeClient().catch(() => undefined);
+  if (admin) {
+    try {
+      for (const name of trackedDatabases) {
+        await safeQuery(admin, `drop database if exists "${name}" with (force)`).catch(
+          () => undefined,
+        );
+      }
+    } finally {
+      await admin.end().catch(() => undefined);
+    }
+  }
+  for (const directory of trackedDirectories.splice(0)) {
+    await rm(directory, { force: true, recursive: true }).catch(() => undefined);
+  }
+});
+
+describe.sequential("display device pairing, end to end", () => {
+  it("takes an unpaired screen all the way to a working display, and back off again", async () => {
+    const running = await platform("e2e");
+    const device = new DeviceBrowser(running.origin);
+    try {
+      // 1. The screen loads. It has no identity, so the descriptor refuses it — but the page it
+      //    needs in order to show a code is served.
+      expect((await device.request("/display/announcements")).status).toBe(200);
+      expect((await device.request("/api/v1/module-displays/announcements")).status).toBe(403);
+
+      // 2. It asks to be paired and receives a code plus an HttpOnly claim cookie.
+      const requested = await device.post("/api/v1/device-pairing/requests", {
+        moduleId: "announcements",
+      });
+      expect(requested.status).toBe(201);
+      const body = (await requested.json()) as Record<string, unknown>;
+      expect(body.code).toMatch(/^[0-9]{6}$/u);
+      // The claim secret is never in the body — only in a cookie script cannot read.
+      expect(JSON.stringify(body)).not.toContain("claim");
+      const claimCookie = setCookieFor(requested, "ekklesia_device_pairing");
+      expect(claimCookie).toMatch(/HttpOnly/iu);
+
+      // 3. Nothing has happened yet: polling says pending, and the display is still refused.
+      expect(
+        (
+          (await (await device.post("/api/v1/device-pairing/claims", {})).json()) as {
+            status: string;
+          }
+        ).status,
+      ).toBe("pending");
+
+      // 4. The administrator looks the code up, sees what it wants, and approves it by name.
+      const lookup = await adminRequest(
+        running.origin,
+        running.ownerCookie,
+        "/api/v1/device-pairing/lookups",
+        { code: body.code },
+      );
+      expect(lookup.status).toBe(200);
+      expect(await lookup.json()).toMatchObject({
+        moduleId: "announcements",
+        permissionId: displayPermission,
+      });
+      expect(
+        (
+          await adminRequest(
+            running.origin,
+            running.ownerCookie,
+            "/api/v1/device-pairing/approvals",
+            { code: body.code, deviceName: "Foyer TV" },
+          )
+        ).status,
+      ).toBe(200);
+
+      // 5. The screen collects its credential — through Set-Cookie, never through JSON.
+      const claimed = await device.post("/api/v1/device-pairing/claims", {});
+      expect(await claimed.json()).toEqual({ status: "paired" });
+      const sessionCookie = setCookieFor(claimed, "ekklesia_device_session");
+      expect(sessionCookie).toMatch(/HttpOnly/iu);
+      expect(sessionCookie).toMatch(/SameSite=Strict/iu);
+      expect(sessionCookie).toMatch(/Path=\//u);
+      expect(sessionCookie).not.toMatch(/Domain=/iu);
+      // The spent pairing cookie is cleared rather than left on the device.
+      expect(device.has("ekklesia_device_pairing")).toBe(false);
+      expect(device.has("ekklesia_device_session")).toBe(true);
+
+      // 6. The display now works, and reports the device as its viewer.
+      const descriptor = await device.request("/api/v1/module-displays/announcements");
+      expect(descriptor.status).toBe(200);
+      const descriptorBody = (await descriptor.json()) as {
+        viewer: { kind: string; deviceId?: string };
+        module: { permissions: string[] };
+      };
+      expect(descriptorBody.viewer.kind).toBe("device");
+      expect(descriptorBody.viewer.deviceId).toMatch(/^[0-9a-f-]{36}$/u);
+      // Exactly the one permission it was paired for.
+      expect(descriptorBody.module.permissions).toEqual([displayPermission]);
+
+      // 7. Realtime, through the ordinary permission-gated channel.
+      const stream = await device.request("/api/v1/module-realtime/announcements/state", {
+        headers: { accept: "text/event-stream" },
+      });
+      expect(stream.status).toBe(200);
+      expect(stream.headers.get("content-type")).toContain("text/event-stream");
+      await stream.body?.cancel();
+
+      // 8. The device is still nobody as far as the Dashboard is concerned.
+      expect(await (await device.request("/api/v1/principal")).json()).toEqual({
+        kind: "anonymous",
+      });
+      expect((await device.request("/api/v1/dashboard/navigation")).status).toBe(403);
+      expect((await device.request("/api/v1/devices")).status).toBe(403);
+
+      // 9. The administrator revokes it.
+      const devices = (await (
+        await adminRequest(running.origin, running.ownerCookie, "/api/v1/devices")
+      ).json()) as { devices: Array<{ id: string; name: string; permissions: string[] }> };
+      expect(devices.devices).toHaveLength(1);
+      expect(devices.devices[0]?.name).toBe("Foyer TV");
+      expect(devices.devices[0]?.permissions).toEqual([displayPermission]);
+      const revoked = await adminRequest(
+        running.origin,
+        running.ownerCookie,
+        `/api/v1/devices/${devices.devices[0]?.id}/revoke`,
+        {},
+      );
+      expect(revoked.status).toBe(204);
+
+      // 10. Everything it could do, it can no longer do — while still holding its cookie.
+      expect(device.has("ekklesia_device_session")).toBe(true);
+      expect((await device.request("/api/v1/module-displays/announcements")).status).toBe(403);
+      expect(
+        (
+          await device.request("/api/v1/module-realtime/announcements/state", {
+            headers: { accept: "text/event-stream" },
+          })
+        ).status,
+      ).toBe(403);
+      // And the screen can start over: the page it needs for a new code is still served.
+      expect((await device.request("/display/announcements")).status).toBe(200);
+    } finally {
+      await running.close();
+    }
+  });
+
+  it("stores no usable credential, and puts none in any response body", async () => {
+    const running = await platform("secrets");
+    const device = new DeviceBrowser(running.origin);
+    try {
+      await pairDevice(running, device);
+      const credential = device.header().replace(/^.*ekklesia_device_session=/u, "");
+      expect(credential.length).toBeGreaterThan(20);
+
+      const stored = await query<{ credential_hash: string; name: string }>(
+        running.url,
+        `select credential_hash, name from ekklesia_core_device`,
+      );
+      expect(stored).toHaveLength(1);
+      // The raw credential is nowhere in the database — only an irreversible digest of it.
+      expect(stored[0]?.credential_hash).not.toContain(credential);
+      expect(stored[0]?.credential_hash).toMatch(/^[0-9a-f]{64}$/u);
+
+      const everything = JSON.stringify(
+        await query(running.url, `select * from ekklesia_core_device_pairing_request`),
+      );
+      expect(everything).not.toContain(credential);
+
+      // The descriptor a module's UI can read carries no credential either.
+      const descriptor = await device.request("/api/v1/module-displays/announcements");
+      expect(await descriptor.text()).not.toContain(credential);
+    } finally {
+      await running.close();
+    }
+  });
+
+  describe("pairing cannot be talked into anything", () => {
+    it("derives the permission from the display, never from the request", async () => {
+      const running = await platform("derive");
+      const device = new DeviceBrowser(running.origin);
+      try {
+        // The browser tries to name its own permission and its own module.
+        const requested = await device.post("/api/v1/device-pairing/requests", {
+          moduleId: "announcements",
+          permission: "core.devices.manage",
+          permissionId: "core.devices.manage",
+        });
+        expect(requested.status).toBe(201);
+        const { code } = (await requested.json()) as { code: string };
+
+        const lookup = await adminRequest(
+          running.origin,
+          running.ownerCookie,
+          "/api/v1/device-pairing/lookups",
+          { code },
+        );
+        // The host recorded the display's own declared permission and ignored the rest.
+        expect(await lookup.json()).toMatchObject({ permissionId: displayPermission });
+
+        const stored = await query<{ permission_id: string }>(
+          running.url,
+          `select permission_id from ekklesia_core_device_pairing_request`,
+        );
+        expect(stored.map((row) => row.permission_id)).toEqual([displayPermission]);
+      } finally {
+        await running.close();
+      }
+    });
+
+    it("refuses to start pairing for a module that has no display", async () => {
+      const running = await platform("nodisplay");
+      const device = new DeviceBrowser(running.origin);
+      try {
+        for (const moduleId of ["calendar", "core", "../announcements", ""]) {
+          const response = await device.post("/api/v1/device-pairing/requests", { moduleId });
+          expect(response.status, moduleId).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(400);
+        }
+        expect(
+          await query(running.url, `select id from ekklesia_core_device_pairing_request`),
+        ).toHaveLength(0);
+      } finally {
+        await running.close();
+      }
+    });
+
+    it("issues nothing to someone who knows only the code", async () => {
+      const running = await platform("codeonly");
+      const device = new DeviceBrowser(running.origin);
+      const onlooker = new DeviceBrowser(running.origin);
+      try {
+        const requested = await device.post("/api/v1/device-pairing/requests", {
+          moduleId: "announcements",
+        });
+        const { code } = (await requested.json()) as { code: string };
+        await adminRequest(
+          running.origin,
+          running.ownerCookie,
+          "/api/v1/device-pairing/approvals",
+          {
+            code,
+            deviceName: "Foyer TV",
+          },
+        );
+
+        // Someone who read the code off the television — and even guessed the request exists —
+        // holds no claim cookie, so there is nothing for them to collect.
+        const stolen = await onlooker.post("/api/v1/device-pairing/claims", {});
+        expect(stolen.status).toBe(400);
+        expect(onlooker.has("ekklesia_device_session")).toBe(false);
+
+        // The real screen still gets its credential.
+        const claimed = await device.post("/api/v1/device-pairing/claims", {});
+        expect(await claimed.json()).toEqual({ status: "paired" });
+      } finally {
+        await running.close();
+      }
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe("approval is an administrator's act", () => {
+    it("refuses an anonymous or unauthorized caller, and enforces a trusted origin", async () => {
+      const running = await platform("approve");
+      const device = new DeviceBrowser(running.origin);
+      try {
+        const requested = await device.post("/api/v1/device-pairing/requests", {
+          moduleId: "announcements",
+        });
+        const { code } = (await requested.json()) as { code: string };
+
+        // Anonymous.
+        const anonymous = await fetch(`${running.origin}/api/v1/device-pairing/approvals`, {
+          body: JSON.stringify({ code, deviceName: "Intruder TV" }),
+          headers: { "content-type": "application/json", origin: dashboardOrigin },
+          method: "POST",
+        });
+        expect(anonymous.status).toBe(403);
+
+        // The paired-device cookie is not an administrator either — a device can never approve
+        // another device, or itself.
+        const selfApproval = await device.post("/api/v1/device-pairing/approvals", {
+          code,
+          deviceName: "Self TV",
+        });
+        expect(selfApproval.status).toBe(403);
+
+        // A real administrator from an untrusted origin: CSRF policy applies before anything else.
+        const crossOrigin = await adminRequest(
+          running.origin,
+          running.ownerCookie,
+          "/api/v1/device-pairing/approvals",
+          { code, deviceName: "Foyer TV" },
+          { headers: { origin: untrustedOrigin } },
+        );
+        expect(crossOrigin.status).toBe(403);
+
+        // Nothing was approved by any of that.
+        expect(
+          (
+            (await (await device.post("/api/v1/device-pairing/claims", {})).json()) as {
+              status: string;
+            }
+          ).status,
+        ).toBe("pending");
+      } finally {
+        await running.close();
+      }
+    });
+
+    it("cannot approve the same code twice, and cannot mint two credentials from one", async () => {
+      const running = await platform("single");
+      const device = new DeviceBrowser(running.origin);
+      try {
+        const requested = await device.post("/api/v1/device-pairing/requests", {
+          moduleId: "announcements",
+        });
+        const { code } = (await requested.json()) as { code: string };
+        expect(
+          (
+            await adminRequest(
+              running.origin,
+              running.ownerCookie,
+              "/api/v1/device-pairing/approvals",
+              { code, deviceName: "Foyer TV" },
+            )
+          ).status,
+        ).toBe(200);
+        // A second approval of the same code finds nothing pending.
+        expect(
+          (
+            await adminRequest(
+              running.origin,
+              running.ownerCookie,
+              "/api/v1/device-pairing/approvals",
+              { code, deviceName: "Second TV" },
+            )
+          ).status,
+        ).toBe(404);
+
+        // Two claims race for one approved request; exactly one credential may exist.
+        const [first, second] = await Promise.all([
+          device.post("/api/v1/device-pairing/claims", {}),
+          device.post("/api/v1/device-pairing/claims", {}),
+        ]);
+        const statuses = [
+          ((await first.json()) as { status: string }).status,
+          ((await second.json()) as { status: string }).status,
+        ];
+        expect(statuses.filter((status) => status === "paired")).toHaveLength(1);
+        expect(await query(running.url, `select id from ekklesia_core_device`)).toHaveLength(1);
+      } finally {
+        await running.close();
+      }
+    });
+  });
+
+  it("re-pairs a revoked screen into a fresh identity, leaving the old credential dead", async () => {
+    const running = await platform("repair");
+    const device = new DeviceBrowser(running.origin);
+    try {
+      await pairDevice(running, device, "Foyer TV");
+      const firstCredential = device.header().replace(/^.*ekklesia_device_session=/u, "");
+      const listed = (await (
+        await adminRequest(running.origin, running.ownerCookie, "/api/v1/devices")
+      ).json()) as { devices: Array<{ id: string }> };
+      await adminRequest(
+        running.origin,
+        running.ownerCookie,
+        `/api/v1/devices/${listed.devices[0]?.id}/revoke`,
+        {},
+      );
+
+      await pairDevice(running, device, "Foyer TV (replaced)");
+      const secondCredential = device.header().replace(/^.*ekklesia_device_session=/u, "");
+      expect(secondCredential).not.toBe(firstCredential);
+      expect((await device.request("/api/v1/module-displays/announcements")).status).toBe(200);
+
+      // Re-pairing creates a new identity rather than reviving the revoked one, so the old
+      // credential can never come back — presenting it again is simply anonymous.
+      const revokedBrowser = new DeviceBrowser(running.origin);
+      revokedBrowser.overwrite("ekklesia_device_session", firstCredential);
+      expect((await revokedBrowser.request("/api/v1/module-displays/announcements")).status).toBe(
+        403,
+      );
+
+      const devices = (await (
+        await adminRequest(running.origin, running.ownerCookie, "/api/v1/devices")
+      ).json()) as { devices: Array<{ revoked: boolean }> };
+      expect(devices.devices).toHaveLength(2);
+      expect(devices.devices.filter((entry) => entry.revoked)).toHaveLength(1);
+    } finally {
+      await running.close();
+    }
+  });
+
+  it("keeps a human administrator's own session unaffected by a device cookie", async () => {
+    const running = await platform("mixed");
+    const device = new DeviceBrowser(running.origin);
+    try {
+      await pairDevice(running, device);
+      const deviceCredential = device.header();
+
+      // A browser presenting both: the person still wins, and stays a person.
+      const both = await fetch(`${running.origin}/api/v1/principal`, {
+        headers: { cookie: `${running.ownerCookie}; ${deviceCredential}` },
+      });
+      expect(((await both.json()) as { kind: string }).kind).toBe("authenticated");
+
+      // And that administrator can still open the display for testing, as a human.
+      const descriptor = await fetch(`${running.origin}/api/v1/module-displays/announcements`, {
+        headers: { cookie: `${running.ownerCookie}; ${deviceCredential}` },
+      });
+      expect(descriptor.status).toBe(200);
+      expect(((await descriptor.json()) as { viewer: { kind: string } }).viewer.kind).toBe(
+        "authenticated",
+      );
+    } finally {
+      await running.close();
+    }
+  });
+});

apps/api/tests/display-host-assets.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+import { createHash } from "node:crypto";
+import { beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest";
+
+const readFileMock = vi.hoisted(() => vi.fn());
+
+vi.mock("node:fs/promises", () => ({ readFile: readFileMock }));
+vi.mock("@ekklesia/shell/display-assets", () => ({
+  displayHostAssetUrls: Object.freeze({
+    html: "file:///surface/browser/display/index.html",
+    script: "file:///surface/browser/display/app.js",
+    serviceWorker: "file:///surface/browser/display/sw.js",
+  }),
+}));
+
+import {
+  createDisplayHostAssets,
+  DisplayHostAssetError,
+  loadDisplayHostAssets,
+} from "../src/display-host-assets.js";
+
+describe("display host asset loading", () => {
+  beforeEach(() => readFileMock.mockReset());
+
+  it("reads only the three declared file URLs in order and freezes one consistent snapshot", async () => {
+    const html = '<!doctype html><div id="ekklesia-display"></div>';
+    const script = "export const displayHost = true;\n";
+    const serviceWorker = "export const displayWorker = true;\n";
+    readFileMock
+      .mockResolvedValueOnce(html)
+      .mockResolvedValueOnce(script)
+      .mockResolvedValueOnce(serviceWorker);
+
+    const assets = await loadDisplayHostAssets();
+
+    expect(readFileMock.mock.calls).toEqual([
+      [new URL("file:///surface/browser/display/index.html"), "utf8"],
+      [new URL("file:///surface/browser/display/app.js"), "utf8"],
+      [new URL("file:///surface/browser/display/sw.js"), "utf8"],
+    ]);
+    expect(assets).toEqual({
+      html,
+      script,
+      scriptEtag: `"${createHash("sha256").update(script).digest("base64url")}"`,
+      serviceWorker,
+      serviceWorkerEtag: `"${createHash("sha256").update(serviceWorker).digest("base64url")}"`,
+    });
+    expect(Object.isFrozen(assets)).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it("fails deterministically without attempting a neighboring file or exposing the read error", async () => {
+    readFileMock.mockRejectedValueOnce(
+      new Error("ENOENT /home/operator/private/surface-build secret-token"),
+    );
+
+    const failure = await loadDisplayHostAssets().catch((error: unknown) => error);
+
+    expect(readFileMock).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+    expect(failure).toBeInstanceOf(DisplayHostAssetError);
+    expect(failure).toMatchObject({
+      code: "DISPLAY_HOST_ASSET_UNAVAILABLE",
+      message: "The display host browser assets are unavailable.",
+      name: "DisplayHostAssetError",
+    });
+    expect((failure as Error).stack).toBe(
+      "DisplayHostAssetError: The display host browser assets are unavailable.",
+    );
+    const publicText = `${String(failure)}\n${JSON.stringify(failure)}\n${(failure as Error).stack}`;
+    for (const secret of ["/home/", "operator", "ENOENT", "secret-token"]) {
+      expect(publicText).not.toContain(secret);
+    }
+  });
+
+  it("rejects an empty page, script, or service worker as an unavailable host build", () => {
+    for (const [html, script, serviceWorker] of [
+      ["", "export {};", "export {};"],
+      ["<html></html>", "   \n", "export {};"],
+      ["<html></html>", "export {};", "  \n"],
+    ] as const) {
+      expect(() => createDisplayHostAssets(html, script, serviceWorker)).toThrow(
+        DisplayHostAssetError,
+      );
+    }
+  });
+});

apps/api/tests/email-verification.integration.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,816 @@
+import { createHmac, randomBytes } from "node:crypto";
+import { mkdtemp, rm } from "node:fs/promises";
+import type { AddressInfo } from "node:net";
+import { tmpdir } from "node:os";
+import path from "node:path";
+import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
+import {
+  createBootstrapIdentityCreator,
+  createIdentityDrizzleDatabase,
+  type IdentityNotificationFailure,
+} from "@ekklesia/core/identity";
+import {
+  applyModuleMigrations,
+  createPostgresMigrationDatabase,
+  discoverAllMigrations,
+} from "@ekklesia/core/migrations";
+import { Client, type QueryResultRow } from "pg";
+import { SMTPServer } from "smtp-server";
+import { afterAll, afterEach, describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
+import { createApiRuntimeConfig } from "../src/config.js";
+import { type RunningApi, startApi } from "../src/server.js";
+
+/**
+ * Email verification and password recovery, end to end (ADR 0038).
+ *
+ * Everything here is real: a disposable PostgreSQL, the actual HTTP transport, the actual Better
+ * Auth endpoints, the actual SMTP provider, and an actual SMTP server accepting the message. The
+ * verification and reset links are **extracted from the delivered message** and then followed, which
+ * is the only way to prove the whole path rather than the pieces — a fake mail function would prove
+ * that a callback was invoked and nothing about whether the resulting link works.
+ *
+ * `smtp-server` runs in-process and is never given a live credential, so nothing here reaches the
+ * internet and no real email is ever sent.
+ *
+ * Public signup is disabled in every scenario, matching production. Accounts that are not the
+ * bootstrap owner are created through the same trusted server-side creator the bootstrap CLI uses,
+ * which is deliberately not reachable over HTTP.
+ */
+const integrationDatabaseUrlEnvironment = "EKKLESIA_MIGRATION_TEST_DATABASE_URL";
+const repositoryRoot = path.join(path.dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)), "..", "..", "..");
+const coreMigrationsDirectory = path.join(repositoryRoot, "core", "drizzle");
+const trackedDatabases = new Set<string>();
+let databaseCounter = 0;
+
+const dashboardOrigin = "http://dashboard.localhost:5173";
+const integrationSecret = "integration-test-secret-0123456789abcdefgh";
+const initialPassword = "correct horse battery staple";
+const replacementPassword = "an entirely different passphrase";
+
+class IntegrationHarnessError extends Error {
+  constructor(message: string) {
+    super(message);
+    this.name = "IntegrationHarnessError";
+    this.stack = `${this.name}: ${this.message}`;
+  }
+}
+
+function baseDatabaseUrl(): string {
+  const url = process.env[integrationDatabaseUrlEnvironment];
+  if (typeof url !== "string" || url.trim() === "") {
+    throw new IntegrationHarnessError("The integration database URL is not configured.");
+  }
+  return url;
+}
+
+function databaseUrl(name: string): string {
+  const url = new URL(baseDatabaseUrl());
+  url.pathname = `/${name}`;
+  return url.toString();
+}
+
+async function openAdministrativeClient(): Promise<Client> {
+  const client = new Client({ connectionString: baseDatabaseUrl() });
+  await client.connect();
+  return client;
+}
+
+async function safeQuery<T extends QueryResultRow>(
+  client: Client,
+  text: string,
+  values: readonly unknown[] = [],
+): Promise<T[]> {
+  try {
+    const result = await client.query<T>(text, [...values]);
+    return result.rows;
+  } catch {
+    // Never rethrows the driver error: it can carry SQL, a connection string, and a host.
+    throw new IntegrationHarnessError("An integration database statement failed.");
+  }
+}
+
+async function applyCoreMigrations(url: string): Promise<void> {
+  const emptyModules = await mkdtemp(path.join(tmpdir(), "ekklesia-verify-no-modules-"));
+  try {
+    const aggregate = await discoverAllMigrations({
+      coreMigrationsDirectory,
+      moduleDiscovery: {
+        moduleSdkVersion: "0.1.0",
+        modulesDirectory: emptyModules,
+        platformVersion: "0.1.0",
+      },
+    });
+    await applyModuleMigrations({ aggregate, database: createPostgresMigrationDatabase(url) });
+  } finally {
+    await rm(emptyModules, { force: true, recursive: true });
+  }
+}
+
+async function freshInstallation(label: string): Promise<string> {
+  databaseCounter += 1;
+  const name =
+    `ekk_verify_${label}_${databaseCounter}_${randomBytes(4).toString("hex")}`.toLowerCase();
+  const admin = await openAdministrativeClient();
+  try {
+    await safeQuery(admin, `create database "${name}"`);
+  } finally {
+    await admin.end().catch(() => undefined);
+  }
+  trackedDatabases.add(name);
+  const url = databaseUrl(name);
+  await applyCoreMigrations(url);
+  return url;
+}
+
+/** A delivered message, as the SMTP server actually received it. */
+interface DeliveredMessage {
+  readonly to: readonly string[];
+  readonly data: string;
+}
+
+interface MailHarness {
+  readonly port: number;
+  readonly delivered: DeliveredMessage[];
+  readonly close: () => Promise<void>;
+}
+
+const openResources: Array<() => Promise<void>> = [];
+
+afterEach(async () => {
+  for (const close of openResources.splice(0).reverse()) {
+    await close().catch(() => undefined);
+  }
+});
+
+/**
+ * Picks a free port before the API is configured.
+ *
+ * The identity base URL is what the emailed link is built from, so it has to be known *before*
+ * `startApi` binds. Without this the test could only assert the link's shape and would have to
+ * rewrite its host before following it — which is exactly the part worth proving. Reserving and
+ * releasing a port leaves a theoretical race, but nothing else on the loopback interface is
+ * competing for ephemeral ports inside this suite.
+ */
+async function reservePort(): Promise<number> {
+  const { createServer } = await import("node:net");
+  const server = createServer();
+  const port = await new Promise<number>((resolve, reject) => {
+    server.once("error", reject);
+    server.listen(0, "127.0.0.1", () => {
+      const address = server.address() as AddressInfo;
+      resolve(address.port);
+    });
+  });
+  await new Promise<void>((resolve) => server.close(() => resolve()));
+  return port;
+}
+
+async function startMailServer(): Promise<MailHarness> {
+  const delivered: DeliveredMessage[] = [];
+  const server = new SMTPServer({
+    authOptional: true,
+    disabledCommands: ["STARTTLS"],
+    onData(stream, session, callback) {
+      let data = "";
+      stream.on("data", (chunk: Buffer) => {
+        data += chunk.toString("utf8");
+      });
+      stream.on("end", () => {
+        delivered.push({
+          data,
+          to: session.envelope.rcptTo.map((recipient) => recipient.address),
+        });
+        callback();
+      });
+    },
+  });
+  await new Promise<void>((resolve, reject) => {
+    server.once("error", reject);
+    server.listen(0, "127.0.0.1", () => resolve());
+  });
+  const address = server.server.address() as AddressInfo;
+  const harness: MailHarness = {
+    close: async () =>
+      await new Promise<void>((resolve) => {
+        server.close(() => resolve());
+      }),
+    delivered,
+    port: address.port,
+  };
+  openResources.push(harness.close);
+  return harness;
+}
+
+interface Installation {
+  readonly url: string;
+  readonly api: RunningApi;
+  readonly origin: string;
+  readonly mail: MailHarness | undefined;
+  readonly notificationFailures: IdentityNotificationFailure[];
+  readonly createIdentity: (input: {
+    readonly email: string;
+    readonly password: string;
+    readonly name: string;
+  }) => Promise<void>;
+}
+
+/**
+ * A migrated installation with the API running, optionally with a working SMTP relay.
+ *
+ * `plaintext` SMTP and an `http` Dashboard origin are only acceptable because this is explicitly the
+ * development environment; production configuration refuses both, which `identity-config` and
+ * `mail-contract` assert separately.
+ */
+async function installation(
+  label: string,
+  options: { readonly mail?: boolean } = {},
+): Promise<Installation> {
+  const url = await freshInstallation(label);
+  const mail = options.mail === false ? undefined : await startMailServer();
+  const notificationFailures: IdentityNotificationFailure[] = [];
+  const identity = createIdentityDrizzleDatabase(url, {});
+  openResources.push(async () => {
+    await identity.close().catch(() => undefined);
+  });
+
+  const apiPort = await reservePort();
+  const identityBaseUrl = `http://127.0.0.1:${apiPort}`;
+  const config = createApiRuntimeConfig(
+    {
+      databaseUrl: url,
+      host: "127.0.0.1",
+      identity: {
+        baseUrl: identityBaseUrl,
+        dashboardOrigin,
+        publicSignupEnabled: false,
+        secret: integrationSecret,
+        trustedOrigins: [dashboardOrigin],
+      },
+      ...(mail
+        ? {
+            mail: {
+              fromAddress: "[email protected]",
+              fromName: "Ekklesia",
+              host: "127.0.0.1",
+              port: String(mail.port),
+              security: "plaintext",
+            },
+          }
+        : {}),
+      port: apiPort,
+    },
+    { environment: "development" },
+  );
+  const api = await startApi(config, {
+    rateLimitOverride: { max: 1000, window: 1 },
+    reportNotificationFailure: (failure) => notificationFailures.push(failure),
+  });
+  openResources.push(async () => {
+    await api.shutdown().catch(() => undefined);
+  });
+
+  const address = api.server.address();
+  if (!address || typeof address !== "object" || address.port !== apiPort) {
+    throw new IntegrationHarnessError("The API integration server did not bind the reserved port.");
+  }
+  return {
+    api,
+    createIdentity: createBootstrapIdentityCreator(identity.db),
+    mail,
+    notificationFailures,
+    origin: identityBaseUrl,
+    url,
+  };
+}
+
+async function post(
+  origin: string,
+  path: string,
+  body: unknown,
+  headers: Readonly<Record<string, string>> = {},
+): Promise<Response> {
+  return await fetch(`${origin}${path}`, {
+    body: JSON.stringify(body),
+    headers: { "content-type": "application/json", origin: dashboardOrigin, ...headers },
+    method: "POST",
+    redirect: "manual",
+  });
+}
+
+function firstCookiePair(response: Response): string | undefined {
+  const setCookie = response.headers.get("set-cookie");
+  return setCookie === null ? undefined : setCookie.split(",")[0]?.split(";")[0]?.trim();
+}
+
+async function signIn(
+  origin: string,
+  email: string,
+  password: string,
+): Promise<{ readonly response: Response; readonly cookiePair: string | undefined }> {
+  const response = await post(origin, "/api/auth/sign-in/email", { email, password });
+  return { cookiePair: firstCookiePair(response), response };
+}
+
+async function principalKind(origin: string, cookiePair: string | undefined): Promise<string> {
+  const response = await fetch(`${origin}/api/v1/principal`, {
+    headers: cookiePair ? { cookie: cookiePair } : {},
+  });
+  const body = (await response.json()) as { readonly kind?: unknown };
+  return String(body.kind);
+}
+
+/**
+ * The one place a test reads a token, and only ever out of a message this suite's own SMTP server
+ * received. Nothing in the platform exposes one.
+ *
+ * Quoted-printable soft line breaks are undone first: a URL longer than 76 characters is split by
+ * the encoder, and reassembling it here is what makes the extracted link the one a mail client would
+ * actually resolve.
+ */
+function extractLink(message: DeliveredMessage, contains: string): URL {
+  const unwrapped = message.data.replaceAll("=\r\n", "").replaceAll("=\n", "");
+  const decoded = unwrapped.replaceAll(/=([0-9A-F]{2})/gu, (_match, hex: string) =>
+    String.fromCharCode(Number.parseInt(hex, 16)),
+  );
+  const match = decoded.match(/https?:\/\/[^\s"<>]+/gu)?.find((url) => url.includes(contains));
+  if (!match) {
+    throw new IntegrationHarnessError(`No ${contains} link was delivered.`);
+  }
+  return new URL(match);
+}
+
+function lastMessage(mail: MailHarness): DeliveredMessage {
+  const message = mail.delivered.at(-1);
+  if (!message) {
+    throw new IntegrationHarnessError("No message was delivered.");
+  }
+  return message;
+}
+
+async function emailVerifiedFlag(url: string, email: string): Promise<boolean | undefined> {
+  const client = new Client({ connectionString: url });
+  await client.connect();
+  try {
+    const rows = await safeQuery<{ email_verified: boolean }>(
+      client,
+      'select "email_verified" from "ekklesia_core_user" where lower("email") = $1',
+      [email.toLowerCase()],
+    );
+    return rows[0]?.email_verified;
+  } finally {
+    await client.end().catch(() => undefined);
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * An account that has completed the real verification round trip.
+ *
+ * Recovery is only meaningful for a verified account, and building one through the actual flow —
+ * rather than by writing `email_verified` directly — keeps every recovery test standing on a
+ * verification path that genuinely works.
+ */
+async function verifiedAccountFor(install: Installation, email: string): Promise<void> {
+  await install.createIdentity({ email, name: "Member", password: initialPassword });
+  await signIn(install.origin, email, initialPassword);
+  const link = extractLink(lastMessage(install.mail as MailHarness), "/verify-email");
+  await fetch(link, { redirect: "manual" });
+  (install.mail as MailHarness).delivered.length = 0;
+}
+
+afterAll(async () => {
+  const admin = await openAdministrativeClient().catch(() => undefined);
+  if (!admin) {
+    return;
+  }
+  try {
+    for (const name of trackedDatabases) {
+      await safeQuery(admin, `drop database if exists "${name}" with (force)`).catch(
+        () => undefined,
+      );
+    }
+  } finally {
+    await admin.end().catch(() => undefined);
+  }
+});
+
+/**
+ * Forges a verification token that is structurally valid but already expired.
+ *
+ * Better Auth's verification token is a plain HS256 JWS over the auth secret (`signJWT`, pinned
+ * release) — not a database row — so an expired one can be produced here from the same secret this
+ * suite configured, with no library internals and no waiting an hour. This is the only place any
+ * test constructs a token rather than reading one out of a delivered message.
+ */
+function forgeExpiredVerificationToken(email: string): string {
+  const encode = (value: object): string =>
+    Buffer.from(JSON.stringify(value)).toString("base64url");
+  const issued = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000) - 7200;
+  const signingInput = `${encode({ alg: "HS256", typ: "JWT" })}.${encode({
+    email: email.toLowerCase(),
+    exp: issued + 3600,
+    iat: issued,
+  })}`;
+  const signature = createHmac("sha256", integrationSecret)
+    .update(signingInput)
+    .digest("base64url");
+  return `${signingInput}.${signature}`;
+}
+
+describe("email verification, end to end", () => {
+  it("takes a new human account from unverified to signed in through a real emailed link", async () => {
+    const install = await installation("flow");
+    const email = "[email protected]";
+    await install.createIdentity({ email, name: "Member", password: initialPassword });
+
+    // 1. Unverified. A correct password does not produce a session — the identity system refuses
+    //    before creating one, so there is no half-authenticated state anywhere (ADR 0038).
+    expect(await emailVerifiedFlag(install.url, email)).toBe(false);
+    const refused = await signIn(install.origin, email, initialPassword);
+    expect(refused.response.status).toBe(403);
+    expect(await refused.response.clone().json()).toMatchObject({ code: "EMAIL_NOT_VERIFIED" });
+    expect(refused.cookiePair).toBeUndefined();
+    expect(await principalKind(install.origin, refused.cookiePair)).toBe("anonymous");
+
+    // 2. That attempt delivered a verification message through the real SMTP provider.
+    const mail = install.mail as MailHarness;
+    expect(mail.delivered).toHaveLength(1);
+    expect(lastMessage(mail).to).toEqual([email]);
+    expect(lastMessage(mail).data).toContain("Verify your Ekklesia email address");
+
+    // 3. Follow the link exactly as it was delivered. Nothing rewrites it.
+    const link = extractLink(lastMessage(mail), "/verify-email");
+    expect(link.origin).toBe(install.origin);
+    const verified = await fetch(link, { redirect: "manual" });
+
+    // 4. Better Auth redirects to the Dashboard landing this deployment configured — never to the
+    //    API origin, and never to anything a request supplied.
+    expect(verified.status).toBe(302);
+    const landing = new URL(verified.headers.get("location") ?? "");
+    expect(landing.origin).toBe(dashboardOrigin);
+    expect(landing.searchParams.get("ekklesia_auth")).toBe("verify-email");
+    expect(landing.searchParams.get("error")).toBeNull();
+    // No session was minted by following an emailed link.
+    expect(verified.headers.get("set-cookie")).toBeNull();
+    expect(await emailVerifiedFlag(install.url, email)).toBe(true);
+
+    // 5. The same credentials now work, and the principal is a fully authenticated human.
+    const accepted = await signIn(install.origin, email, initialPassword);
+    expect(accepted.response.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(accepted.cookiePair).toBeDefined();
+    expect(await principalKind(install.origin, accepted.cookiePair)).toBe("authenticated");
+  });
+
+  it("refuses a malformed token and an expired token, each with its own reason", async () => {
+    const install = await installation("bad-token");
+    const email = "[email protected]";
+    await install.createIdentity({ email, name: "Expired", password: initialPassword });
+    const callback = encodeURIComponent(`${dashboardOrigin}/?ekklesia_auth=verify-email`);
+
+    for (const [token, reason] of [
+      ["not-a-jwt", "INVALID_TOKEN"],
+      [forgeExpiredVerificationToken(email), "TOKEN_EXPIRED"],
+    ] as const) {
+      const response = await fetch(
+        `${install.origin}/api/auth/verify-email?token=${encodeURIComponent(token)}&callbackURL=${callback}`,
+        { redirect: "manual" },
+      );
+      expect(response.status).toBe(302);
+      const landing = new URL(response.headers.get("location") ?? "");
+      // The failure still lands on the host's own screen rather than a raw JSON error page.
+      expect(landing.origin).toBe(dashboardOrigin);
+      expect(landing.searchParams.get("error")).toBe(reason);
+      expect(await emailVerifiedFlag(install.url, email)).toBe(false);
+    }
+  });
+
+  it("is idempotent when a link is followed twice, because the token is a signed claim", async () => {
+    const install = await installation("replay");
+    const email = "[email protected]";
+    await install.createIdentity({ email, name: "Replay", password: initialPassword });
+    await signIn(install.origin, email, initialPassword);
+    const link = extractLink(lastMessage(install.mail as MailHarness), "/verify-email");
+
+    const first = await fetch(link, { redirect: "manual" });
+    const second = await fetch(link, { redirect: "manual" });
+
+    // Documented honestly (ADR 0038): the verification token is a signed JWT, not a consumed
+    // database row, so it is **not** single-use — it is valid until it expires. Replaying it is a
+    // no-op on an already-verified address and mints no session, which is what makes that safe.
+    // Mail scanners and prefetchers dereference links, so idempotence is a requirement here.
+    expect(first.status).toBe(302);
+    expect(second.status).toBe(302);
+    expect(second.headers.get("set-cookie")).toBeNull();
+    expect(await emailVerifiedFlag(install.url, email)).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it("resends on request without revealing whether the address has an account", async () => {
+    const install = await installation("resend");
+    const email = "[email protected]";
+    await install.createIdentity({ email, name: "Resend", password: initialPassword });
+    const mail = install.mail as MailHarness;
+
+    const known = await post(install.origin, "/api/auth/send-verification-email", { email });
+    const unknown = await post(install.origin, "/api/auth/send-verification-email", {
+      email: "[email protected]",
+    });
+    const verifiedAlready = await post(install.origin, "/api/auth/send-verification-email", {
+      email: "[email protected]",
+    });
+
+    // Identical answers. The only difference anywhere is that a message was delivered, which the
+    // requester cannot observe.
+    expect(known.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(unknown.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(verifiedAlready.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(await known.clone().json()).toEqual(await unknown.clone().json());
+    expect(mail.delivered.map((message) => message.to)).toEqual([[email]]);
+  });
+});
+
+describe("password recovery, end to end", () => {
+  it("replaces the password through a real emailed link and invalidates the old one", async () => {
+    const install = await installation("reset");
+    const email = "[email protected]";
+    await verifiedAccountFor(install, email);
+    const mail = install.mail as MailHarness;
+
+    const requested = await post(install.origin, "/api/auth/request-password-reset", { email });
+    expect(requested.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(mail.delivered).toHaveLength(1);
+    expect(lastMessage(mail).to).toEqual([email]);
+    expect(lastMessage(mail).data).toContain("Reset your Ekklesia password");
+
+    // Follow the emailed link. Better Auth validates the token and hands the browser on to the
+    // Dashboard landing with it attached — which is where the host's reset form picks it up.
+    const link = extractLink(lastMessage(mail), "/reset-password/");
+    expect(link.origin).toBe(install.origin);
+    const handoff = await fetch(link, { redirect: "manual" });
+    expect(handoff.status).toBe(302);
+    const landing = new URL(handoff.headers.get("location") ?? "");
+    expect(landing.origin).toBe(dashboardOrigin);
+    expect(landing.searchParams.get("ekklesia_auth")).toBe("reset-password");
+    const token = landing.searchParams.get("token") ?? "";
+    expect(token).not.toBe("");
+
+    const completed = await post(install.origin, "/api/auth/reset-password", {
+      newPassword: replacementPassword,
+      token,
+    });
+    expect(completed.status).toBe(200);
+
+    const oldCredential = await signIn(install.origin, email, initialPassword);
+    expect(oldCredential.response.status).toBe(401);
+    const newCredential = await signIn(install.origin, email, replacementPassword);
+    expect(newCredential.response.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(await principalKind(install.origin, newCredential.cookiePair)).toBe("authenticated");
+  });
+
+  it("consumes the reset token, so a captured link cannot be replayed", async () => {
+    const install = await installation("reset-replay");
+    const email = "[email protected]";
+    await verifiedAccountFor(install, email);
+    await post(install.origin, "/api/auth/request-password-reset", { email });
+    const link = extractLink(lastMessage(install.mail as MailHarness), "/reset-password/");
+    const handoff = await fetch(link, { redirect: "manual" });
+    const token = new URL(handoff.headers.get("location") ?? "").searchParams.get("token") ?? "";
+
+    const first = await post(install.origin, "/api/auth/reset-password", {
+      newPassword: replacementPassword,
+      token,
+    });
+    const second = await post(install.origin, "/api/auth/reset-password", {
+      newPassword: "yet another different passphrase",
+      token,
+    });
+
+    // Unlike the verification token, this one is a database row Better Auth consumes.
+    expect(first.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(second.status).toBe(400);
+    expect(await second.json()).toMatchObject({ code: "INVALID_TOKEN" });
+    expect((await signIn(install.origin, email, replacementPassword)).response.status).toBe(200);
+  });
+
+  it("signs out every existing session for that account", async () => {
+    const install = await installation("reset-sessions");
+    const email = "[email protected]";
+    await verifiedAccountFor(install, email);
+    const before = await signIn(install.origin, email, initialPassword);
+    expect(await principalKind(install.origin, before.cookiePair)).toBe("authenticated");
+
+    await post(install.origin, "/api/auth/request-password-reset", { email });
+    const link = extractLink(lastMessage(install.mail as MailHarness), "/reset-password/");
+    const handoff = await fetch(link, { redirect: "manual" });
+    const token = new URL(handoff.headers.get("location") ?? "").searchParams.get("token") ?? "";
+    await post(install.origin, "/api/auth/reset-password", {
+      newPassword: replacementPassword,
+      token,
+    });
+
+    // The whole point of recovery is that it works when the credential is already compromised, so
+    // an attacker's existing session must not survive it (`revokeSessionsOnPasswordReset`).
+    expect(await principalKind(install.origin, before.cookiePair)).toBe("anonymous");
+  });
+
+  it("enforces the identity system's own password policy, with no reset-specific rule", async () => {
+    const install = await installation("reset-policy");
+    const email = "[email protected]";
+    await verifiedAccountFor(install, email);
+    await post(install.origin, "/api/auth/request-password-reset", { email });
+    const link = extractLink(lastMessage(install.mail as MailHarness), "/reset-password/");
+    const handoff = await fetch(link, { redirect: "manual" });
+    const token = new URL(handoff.headers.get("location") ?? "").searchParams.get("token") ?? "";
+
+    const tooShort = await post(install.origin, "/api/auth/reset-password", {
+      newPassword: "short",
+      token,
+    });
+
+    expect(tooShort.status).toBe(400);
+    expect(await tooShort.json()).toMatchObject({ code: "PASSWORD_TOO_SHORT" });
+    // The old password still works: a rejected reset changes nothing.
+    expect((await signIn(install.origin, email, initialPassword)).response.status).toBe(200);
+  });
+
+  it("answers a request for an address with no account exactly as it answers a real one", async () => {
+    const install = await installation("enumeration");
+    const email = "[email protected]";
+    await verifiedAccountFor(install, email);
+    const mail = install.mail as MailHarness;
+
+    const known = await post(install.origin, "/api/auth/request-password-reset", { email });
+    const unknown = await post(install.origin, "/api/auth/request-password-reset", {
+      email: "[email protected]",
+    });
+
+    expect(known.status).toBe(unknown.status);
+    expect(await known.clone().json()).toEqual(await unknown.clone().json());
+    expect(JSON.stringify(await unknown.json())).not.toContain("stranger");
+    // Only the real account received anything.
+    expect(mail.delivered.map((message) => message.to)).toEqual([[email]]);
+  });
+});
+
+describe("recovery when the installation has no outbound email", () => {
+  it("answers identically and records the operational failure out of band", async () => {
+    const install = await installation("no-mail", { mail: false });
+    const email = "[email protected]";
+    await install.createIdentity({ email, name: "No Mail", password: initialPassword });
+
+    const reset = await post(install.origin, "/api/auth/request-password-reset", { email });
+    const resend = await post(install.origin, "/api/auth/send-verification-email", { email });
+
+    // The user-facing answer must not change: "we could not send it" for a real address and a
+    // generic success for an unknown one is an enumeration oracle that appears when SMTP breaks.
+    expect(reset.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(resend.status).toBe(200);
+    // The operator still learns about it, with a sanitized code and no address or token.
+    expect(install.notificationFailures).toEqual([
+      { kind: "password-reset", reason: "MAIL_NOT_CONFIGURED" },
+      { kind: "email-verification", reason: "MAIL_NOT_CONFIGURED" },
+    ]);
+    expect(JSON.stringify(install.notificationFailures)).not.toContain("[email protected]");
+  });
+
+  it("still starts, serves the API, and refuses an unverified sign-in", async () => {
+    const install = await installation("no-mail-runs", { mail: false });
+    const email = "[email protected]";
+    await install.createIdentity({ email, name: "No Mail", password: initialPassword });
+
+    // Absent mail is a complete deployment (ADR 0037) and does **not** relax the verification
+    // policy — which is exactly why the initial owner is created already verified.
+    expect((await fetch(`${install.origin}/api/v1/principal`)).status).toBe(200);
+    expect((await signIn(install.origin, email, initialPassword)).response.status).toBe(403);
+  });
+});
+
+describe("recovery cannot be turned into a redirect or an account factory", () => {
+  it("refuses an attacker-supplied reset destination", async () => {
+    const install = await installation("redirect");
+    const email = "[email protected]";
+    await install.createIdentity({ email, name: "Redirect", password: initialPassword });
+
+    const external = await post(install.origin, "/api/auth/request-password-reset", {
+      email,
+      redirectTo: "https://evil.example.test/steal",
+    });
+
+    expect(external.status).toBe(403);
+    expect(await external.json()).toMatchObject({ code: "INVALID_REDIRECT_URL" });
+    expect((install.mail as MailHarness).delivered).toHaveLength(0);
+  });
+
+  it("refuses an attacker-supplied verification destination", async () => {
+    const install = await installation("redirect-verify");
+
+    for (const callbackURL of [
+      "https://evil.example.test",
+      "//evil.example.test",
+      "/\\evil.example.test",
+      "javascript:alert(1)",
+    ]) {
+      const response = await fetch(
+        `${install.origin}/api/auth/verify-email?token=x&callbackURL=${encodeURIComponent(callbackURL)}`,
+        { redirect: "manual" },
+      );
+      expect(response.status).toBe(403);
+      expect(response.headers.get("location")).toBeNull();
+    }
+  });
+
+  it("ignores a supplied destination even where one is accepted, because the link is rebuilt", async () => {
+    const install = await installation("redirect-ignored");
+    const email = "[email protected]";
+    await verifiedAccountFor(install, email);
+
+    // A *trusted* origin passes Better Auth's own check, so this is the case where the emailed
+    // link's destination would otherwise be caller-chosen. It is not: the message is built from
+    // configuration and the supplied value never reaches it.
+    await post(install.origin, "/api/auth/request-password-reset", {
+      email,
+      redirectTo: `${dashboardOrigin}/somewhere-else`,
+    });
+
+    const link = extractLink(lastMessage(install.mail as MailHarness), "/reset-password/");
+    const callback = new URL(link.searchParams.get("callbackURL") ?? "");
+    expect(callback.origin).toBe(dashboardOrigin);
+    expect(callback.pathname).toBe("/");
+    expect(callback.searchParams.get("ekklesia_auth")).toBe("reset-password");
+    expect(link.href).not.toContain("somewhere-else");
+  });
+
+  it("keeps public signup disabled now that verification exists", async () => {
+    const install = await installation("signup");
+
+    const response = await post(install.origin, "/api/auth/sign-up/email", {
+      email: "[email protected]",
+      name: "Intruder",
+      password: initialPassword,
+    });
+
+    // Email verification is not a licence to self-register. Future accounts arrive through
+    // deliberate administration, which this pass does not build.
+    expect(response.status).toBe(400);
+    expect(await response.json()).toMatchObject({ code: "EMAIL_PASSWORD_SIGN_UP_DISABLED" });
+    expect(await emailVerifiedFlag(install.url, "[email protected]")).toBeUndefined();
+  });
+});
+
+describe("managed devices are untouched by human email identity", () => {
+  it("leaves a paired device intact across a human password reset", async () => {
+    const install = await installation("devices");
+    const email = "[email protected]";
+    await verifiedAccountFor(install, email);
+
+    // A device is a row with a credential digest and no email, no password, and no verification
+    // state (ADR 0036). It is inserted directly here because pairing it through HTTP would prove
+    // something this test is not about.
+    const client = new Client({ connectionString: install.url });
+    await client.connect();
+    try {
+      await safeQuery(
+        client,
+        'insert into "ekklesia_core_device" ("name", "credential_hash") values ($1, $2)',
+        ["Sanctuary display", "a".repeat(64)],
+      );
+
+      await post(install.origin, "/api/auth/request-password-reset", { email });
+      const link = extractLink(lastMessage(install.mail as MailHarness), "/reset-password/");
+      const handoff = await fetch(link, { redirect: "manual" });
+      const token = new URL(handoff.headers.get("location") ?? "").searchParams.get("token") ?? "";
+      await post(install.origin, "/api/auth/reset-password", {
+        newPassword: replacementPassword,
+        token,
+      });
+
+      const devices = await safeQuery<{ credential_hash: string; revoked_at: Date | null }>(
+        client,
+        'select "credential_hash", "revoked_at" from "ekklesia_core_device"',
+      );
+      expect(devices).toEqual([{ credential_hash: "a".repeat(64), revoked_at: null }]);
+
+      // The device table has no email or verification concept for a human flow to reach.
+      const columns = await safeQuery<{ column_name: string }>(
+        client,
+        "select column_name from information_schema.columns where table_name = 'ekklesia_core_device'",
+      );
+      const names = columns.map((column) => column.column_name).join(" ");
+      expect(names).not.toContain("email");
+      expect(names).not.toContain("verified");
+      expect(names).not.toContain("password");
+    } finally {
+      await client.end().catch(() => undefined);
+    }
+  });
+
+  it("sends a device no mail, because a device has no address to send to", async () => {
+    const install = await installation("devices-mail");
+
+    await post(install.origin, "/api/auth/request-password-reset", {
+      email: "[email protected]",
+    });
+
+    // Nothing about device identity participates in either flow.
+    expect((install.mail as MailHarness).delivered).toHaveLength(0);
+    expect(install.notificationFailures).toEqual([]);
+  });
+});

apps/api/tests/grants-routes.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,881 @@
+import {
+  createAuthenticatedPrincipal,
+  parseEkklesiaUserId,
+  parseGrantId,
+  parsePermissionId,
+} from "@ekklesia/contracts";
+import {
+  type AuthorizationEvaluator,
+  type AuthorizationStore,
+  AuthorizationStoreError,
+  CORE_AUTHORIZATION_GRANTS_MANAGE,
+  CORE_PERMISSION_REGISTRY,
+} from "@ekklesia/core/authorization";
+import type { EkklesiaIdentityRuntime } from "@ekklesia/core/identity";
+import { Hono } from "hono";
+import { describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest";
+import { CORE_MUTATION_MAX_BODY_BYTES } from "../src/body-limits.js";
+import { createGrantsRoutes } from "../src/grants-routes.js";
+
+const trustedOrigin = "https://dashboard.example.test";
+const untrustedOrigin = "https://evil.example.test";
+const manager = createAuthenticatedPrincipal("manager_1");
+const subjectUserId = parseEkklesiaUserId("subject_1");
+// Well-formed but never declared in `CORE_PERMISSION_REGISTRY` — used to prove the routes reject
+// (or, for listing, still return) an unregistered permission id rather than assuming registration.
+const permission = parsePermissionId("calendar.events.read");
+// A permission `CORE_PERMISSION_REGISTRY` actually declares, so tests that must reach
+// `store.createGrant`/`store.revokeGrant` can do so. This suite exercises `createGrantsRoutes` in
+// isolation and intentionally injects `CORE_PERMISSION_REGISTRY` directly rather than a composed
+// platform registry — the routes have no notion of "Core" versus "module" permissions, they only
+// ever consult whichever registry they are given. Coverage proving a module-declared permission
+// works through the exact same route code lives in
+// `apps/api/tests/authorization-middleware.test.ts` (unit) and the "installed module permission
+// end-to-end" scenario in `apps/api/tests/api-http.integration.ts` (live).
+const registeredPermission = CORE_AUTHORIZATION_GRANTS_MANAGE;
+const grantId = parseGrantId("11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111");
+
+function fakeRuntime(overrides: Partial<EkklesiaIdentityRuntime> = {}): EkklesiaIdentityRuntime {
+  return {
+    handleAuthRequest: vi.fn(),
+    resolvePrincipal: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(manager),
+    ...overrides,
+  };
+}
+
+function fakeStore(overrides: Partial<AuthorizationStore> = {}): AuthorizationStore {
+  return {
+    createGrant: vi.fn(),
+    grantPlatformOwner: vi.fn(),
+    hasActiveGrant: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(false),
+    isPlatformOwner: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(false),
+    listGrantsForUser: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({ grants: [] }),
+    revokeGrant: vi.fn(),
+    revokePlatformOwner: vi.fn(),
+    ...overrides,
+  };
+}
+
+function buildApp(options: {
+  readonly allowed?: boolean;
+  readonly now?: () => Date;
+  readonly runtime?: EkklesiaIdentityRuntime;
+  readonly store?: AuthorizationStore;
+}) {
+  const evaluator: AuthorizationEvaluator = {
+    authorize: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({ allowed: options.allowed ?? true }),
+  };
+  const runtime = options.runtime ?? fakeRuntime();
+  const store = options.store ?? fakeStore();
+  const app = new Hono();
+  app.route(
+    "/",
+    createGrantsRoutes({
+      evaluator,
+      ...(options.now === undefined ? {} : { now: options.now }),
+      registry: CORE_PERMISSION_REGISTRY,
+      runtime,
+      store,
+      trustedOrigins: new Set([trustedOrigin]),
+    }),
+  );
+  return { app, evaluator, runtime, store };
+}
+
+describe("GET /api/v1/grants", () => {
+  it("denies an anonymous or non-manager authenticated caller (evaluator says no)", async () => {
+    const { app, evaluator } = buildApp({ allowed: false });
+
+    const response = await app.request(`/api/v1/grants?userId=${subjectUserId}`);
+
+    expect(response.status).toBe(403);
+    expect(evaluator.authorize).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+      expect.objectContaining({ baseline: "restricted" }),
+    );
+  });
+
+  it("allows a caller the evaluator authorizes — whether by platform ownership or a delegated grants.manage grant, the route cannot tell and does not need to (see core/tests/authorization-evaluator.test.ts for that distinction)", async () => {
+    const grants = [
+      {
+        createdAt: new Date("2026-01-01T00:00:00.000Z"),
+        id: grantId,
+        permission,
+        sourceKind: "explicit" as const,
+        userId: subjectUserId,
+      },
+    ];
+    const store = fakeStore({ listGrantsForUser: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({ grants }) });
+    const { app } = buildApp({ store });
+
+    const response = await app.request(`/api/v1/grants?userId=${subjectUserId}`);
+    const body = (await response.json()) as { grants: unknown[]; nextCursor: string | null };
+
+    expect(response.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(body.grants).toHaveLength(1);
+    expect(body.nextCursor).toBeNull();
+    // The default page size is applied server-side; `sourceKind` filtering stays server-side too.
+    expect(store.listGrantsForUser).toHaveBeenCalledWith(subjectUserId, {
+      limit: 50,
+      sourceKind: "explicit",
+    });
+  });
+
+  it("rejects a missing or malformed userId query parameter", async () => {
+    const { app, store } = buildApp({});
+
+    const response = await app.request("/api/v1/grants?userId=");
+
+    expect(response.status).toBe(400);
+    expect(store.listGrantsForUser).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  it("maps a store infrastructure failure to a sanitized 503", async () => {
+    const store = fakeStore({
+      listGrantsForUser: vi
+        .fn()
+        .mockRejectedValue(new AuthorizationStoreError("AUTHORIZATION_GRANT_LIST_FAILED")),
+    });
+    const { app } = buildApp({ store });
+
+    const response = await app.request(`/api/v1/grants?userId=${subjectUserId}`);
+
+    expect(response.status).toBe(503);
+    expect(await response.json()).toEqual({ code: "AUTHORIZATION_GRANT_LIST_FAILED" });
+  });
+});
+
+describe("POST /api/v1/grants", () => {
+  it("rejects a request with no trusted Origin header before ever checking permission", async () => {
+    const { app, evaluator } = buildApp({});
+
+    const response = await app.request("/api/v1/grants", {
+      body: JSON.stringify({ permission, subjectUserId }),
+      headers: { "content-type": "application/json" },
+      method: "POST",
+    });
+
+    expect(response.status).toBe(403);
+    expect(await response.json()).toEqual({ code: "UNTRUSTED_ORIGIN" });
+    expect(evaluator.authorize).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  it("rejects an untrusted Origin header the same way", async () => {
+    const { app } = buildApp({});
+
+    const response = await app.request("/api/v1/grants", {
+      body: JSON.stringify({ permission, subjectUserId }),
+      headers: { "content-type": "application/json", origin: untrustedOrigin },
+      method: "POST",
+    });
+
+    expect(response.status).toBe(403);
+    expect(await response.json()).toEqual({ code: "UNTRUSTED_ORIGIN" });
+  });
+
+  it("denies a caller the evaluator does not authorize", async () => {
+    const { app, store } = buildApp({ allowed: false });
+
+    const response = await app.request("/api/v1/grants", {
+      body: JSON.stringify({ permission, subjectUserId }),
+      headers: { "content-type": "application/json", origin: trustedOrigin },
+      method: "POST",
+    });
+
+    expect(response.status).toBe(403);
+    expect(store.createGrant).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  it("creates an explicit grant, deriving sourceKind and actor server-side from the authenticated principal, never from the request body", async () => {
+    const createdGrant = {
+      createdAt: new Date("2026-01-01T00:00:00.000Z"),
+      id: grantId,
+      permission: registeredPermission,
+      sourceKind: "explicit" as const,
+      userId: subjectUserId,
+    };
+    const store = fakeStore({ createGrant: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(createdGrant) });
+    const { app } = buildApp({ store });
+
+    const response = await app.request("/api/v1/grants", {
+      body: JSON.stringify({ permission: registeredPermission, subjectUserId }),
+      headers: { "content-type": "application/json", origin: trustedOrigin },
+      method: "POST",
+    });
+    const body = (await response.json()) as { grant: { id: string } };
+
+    expect(response.status).toBe(201);
+    expect(body.grant.id).toBe(grantId);
+    expect(store.createGrant).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+      expect.objectContaining({
+        actor: { type: "user", userId: manager.userId },
+        permission: registeredPermission,
+        sourceKind: "explicit",
+        userId: subjectUserId,
+      }),
+    );
+    // The generic HTTP surface creates unscoped explicit grants only.
+    expect(store.createGrant).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+      expect.not.objectContaining({ scope: expect.anything() }),
+    );
+  });
+
+  it("rejects a well-formed but unregistered permission with the same sanitized denial as an unauthorized caller, and never calls the store", async () => {
+    const { app, store } = buildApp({});
+
+    const response = await app.request("/api/v1/grants", {
+      body: JSON.stringify({ permission, subjectUserId }),
+      headers: { "content-type": "application/json", origin: trustedOrigin },
+      method: "POST",
+    });
+
+    expect(response.status).toBe(403);
+    expect(await response.json()).toEqual({ code: "AUTHORIZATION_DENIED" });
+    expect(store.createGrant).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  it.each([
+    "actor",
+    "owner",
+    "isOwner",
+    "sourceKind",
+    "sourceRef",
+    "id",
+    "grantId",
+    "createdAt",
+    "revokedAt",
+    "createdByActorId",
+    "effectivePermissions",
+  ])("rejects a request body carrying a disallowed field (%s), even alongside otherwise-valid fields", async (field) => {
+    const { app, store } = buildApp({});
+
+    const response = await app.request("/api/v1/grants", {
+      body: JSON.stringify({ [field]: "hostile-value", permission, subjectUserId }),
+      headers: { "content-type": "application/json", origin: trustedOrigin },
+      method: "POST",
+    });
+
+    expect(response.status).toBe(400);
+    expect(store.createGrant).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  it("rejects a malformed permission, subject id, scope, or expiresAt", async () => {
+    const { app, store } = buildApp({});
+
+    const responses = await Promise.all(
+      [
+        { permission: "not-namespaced", subjectUserId },
+        { permission, subjectUserId: "" },
+        { permission, scope: "", subjectUserId },
+        { expiresAt: "not-a-date", permission, subjectUserId },
+      ].map((body) =>
+        app.request("/api/v1/grants", {
+          body: JSON.stringify(body),
+          headers: { "content-type": "application/json", origin: trustedOrigin },
+          method: "POST",
+        }),
+      ),
+    );
+
+    for (const response of responses) {
+      expect(response.status).toBe(400);
+    }
+    expect(store.createGrant).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  it("maps a store infrastructure failure to a sanitized 503", async () => {
+    const store = fakeStore({
+      createGrant: vi
+        .fn()
+        .mockRejectedValue(new AuthorizationStoreError("AUTHORIZATION_GRANT_CREATE_FAILED")),
+    });
+    const { app } = buildApp({ store });
+
+    const response = await app.request("/api/v1/grants", {
+      body: JSON.stringify({ permission: registeredPermission, subjectUserId }),
+      headers: { "content-type": "application/json", origin: trustedOrigin },
+      method: "POST",
+    });
+
+    expect(response.status).toBe(503);
+    expect(await response.json()).toEqual({ code: "AUTHORIZATION_GRANT_CREATE_FAILED" });
+  });
+});
+
+describe("POST /api/v1/grants/:grantId/revoke", () => {
+  it("rejects a request with no trusted Origin header before ever checking permission", async () => {
+    const { app, evaluator } = buildApp({});
+
+    const response = await app.request(`/api/v1/grants/${grantId}/revoke`, { method: "POST" });
+
+    expect(response.status).toBe(403);
+    expect(await response.json()).toEqual({ code: "UNTRUSTED_ORIGIN" });
+    expect(evaluator.authorize).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  it("revokes an explicit grant, deriving the actor server-side from the authenticated principal", async () => {
+    const store = fakeStore({ revokeGrant: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined) });
+    const { app } = buildApp({ store });
+
+    const response = await app.request(`/api/v1/grants/${grantId}/revoke`, {
+      headers: { origin: trustedOrigin },
+      method: "POST",
+    });
+
+    expect(response.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(await response.json()).toEqual({ success: true });
+    expect(store.revokeGrant).toHaveBeenCalledWith({
+      actor: { type: "user", userId: manager.userId },
+      grantId,
+      sourceKind: "explicit",
+    });
+  });
+
+  it("always constrains revocation to sourceKind explicit, so a relationship-derived grant can never be targeted by id", async () => {
+    // The store itself enforces this by treating a sourceKind mismatch exactly like a missing
+    // grant; this test proves the route always asks for that constraint, and correctly surfaces
+    // the resulting "not found" as 404 rather than leaking that the grant exists but is the wrong
+    // kind.
+    const store = fakeStore({
+      revokeGrant: vi
+        .fn()
+        .mockRejectedValue(new AuthorizationStoreError("AUTHORIZATION_GRANT_NOT_FOUND")),
+    });
+    const { app } = buildApp({ store });
+
+    const response = await app.request(`/api/v1/grants/${grantId}/revoke`, {
+      headers: { origin: trustedOrigin },
+      method: "POST",
+    });
+
+    expect(response.status).toBe(404);
+    expect(await response.json()).toEqual({ code: "AUTHORIZATION_GRANT_NOT_FOUND" });
+    expect(store.revokeGrant).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+      expect.objectContaining({ sourceKind: "explicit" }),
+    );
+  });
+
+  it("rejects a malformed grant id", async () => {
+    const { app, store } = buildApp({});
+
+    const response = await app.request("/api/v1/grants/%20/revoke", {
+      headers: { origin: trustedOrigin },
+      method: "POST",
+    });
+
+    expect(response.status).toBe(400);
+    expect(store.revokeGrant).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  it("maps a store infrastructure failure to a sanitized 503", async () => {
+    const store = fakeStore({
+      revokeGrant: vi
+        .fn()
+        .mockRejectedValue(new AuthorizationStoreError("AUTHORIZATION_GRANT_REVOKE_FAILED")),
+    });
+    const { app } = buildApp({ store });
+
+    const response = await app.request(`/api/v1/grants/${grantId}/revoke`, {
+      headers: { origin: trustedOrigin },
+      method: "POST",
+    });
+
+    expect(response.status).toBe(503);
+    expect(await response.json()).toEqual({ code: "AUTHORIZATION_GRANT_REVOKE_FAILED" });
+  });
+});
+
+describe("Core grant mutation request body limit", () => {
+  it("accepts a comfortably-under-limit grant-creation body and rejects one byte over the exact limit", async () => {
+    const store = fakeStore();
+    const { app } = buildApp({ store });
+
+    const overSizedBody = "a".repeat(CORE_MUTATION_MAX_BODY_BYTES + 1);
+    const overResponse = await app.request("/api/v1/grants", {
+      body: overSizedBody,
+      headers: {
+        "content-length": String(overSizedBody.length),
+        "content-type": "application/json",
+        origin: trustedOrigin,
+      },
+      method: "POST",
+    });
+    expect(overResponse.status).toBe(413);
+    expect(await overResponse.json()).toEqual({ code: "REQUEST_BODY_TOO_LARGE" });
+    expect(store.createGrant).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+
+    // A well-formed, comfortably-under-limit payload still succeeds through the same route.
+    const underResponse = await app.request("/api/v1/grants", {
+      body: JSON.stringify({ permission: registeredPermission, subjectUserId }),
+      headers: { "content-type": "application/json", origin: trustedOrigin },
+      method: "POST",
+    });
+    expect(underResponse.status).not.toBe(413);
+  });
+
+  it("rejects an oversized declared Content-Length on grant creation without invoking permission evaluation", async () => {
+    const evaluatorAuthorize = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({ allowed: true });
+    const evaluator: AuthorizationEvaluator = { authorize: evaluatorAuthorize };
+    const store = fakeStore();
+    const app = new Hono();
+    app.route(
+      "/",
+      createGrantsRoutes({
+        evaluator,
+        registry: CORE_PERMISSION_REGISTRY,
+        runtime: fakeRuntime(),
+        store,
+        trustedOrigins: new Set([trustedOrigin]),
+      }),
+    );
+
+    const response = await app.request("/api/v1/grants", {
+      body: "a",
+      headers: {
+        "content-length": String(CORE_MUTATION_MAX_BODY_BYTES * 10),
+        "content-type": "application/json",
+        origin: trustedOrigin,
+      },
+      method: "POST",
+    });
+
+    expect(response.status).toBe(413);
+    expect(evaluatorAuthorize).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    expect(store.createGrant).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  it("rejects an oversized streamed grant-creation body with no declared Content-Length", async () => {
+    const store = fakeStore();
+    const { app } = buildApp({ store });
+    const chunk = new Uint8Array(1024).fill(97);
+    let enqueued = 0;
+    const stream = new ReadableStream<Uint8Array>({
+      pull(controller) {
+        if (enqueued > CORE_MUTATION_MAX_BODY_BYTES) {
+          controller.close();
+          return;
+        }
+        enqueued += chunk.length;
+        controller.enqueue(chunk);
+      },
+    });
+
+    const response = await app.request("/api/v1/grants", {
+      body: stream,
+      duplex: "half",
+      headers: { "content-type": "application/json", origin: trustedOrigin },
+      method: "POST",
+    } as RequestInit);
+
+    expect(response.status).toBe(413);
+    expect(await response.json()).toEqual({ code: "REQUEST_BODY_TOO_LARGE" });
+    expect(store.createGrant).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  it("does not read an oversized body from an untrusted Origin: the trusted-origin rejection wins first", async () => {
+    const store = fakeStore();
+    const { app } = buildApp({ store });
+    const chunk = new Uint8Array(1024).fill(97);
+    let pullCount = 0;
+    const stream = new ReadableStream<Uint8Array>({
+      pull(controller) {
+        pullCount += 1;
+        if (pullCount > 3) {
+          controller.close();
+          return;
+        }
+        controller.enqueue(chunk);
+      },
+    });
+
+    const response = await app.request("/api/v1/grants", {
+      body: stream,
+      duplex: "half",
+      headers: { "content-type": "application/json", origin: untrustedOrigin },
+      method: "POST",
+    } as RequestInit);
+
+    expect(response.status).toBe(403);
+    expect(await response.json()).toEqual({ code: "UNTRUSTED_ORIGIN" });
+    expect(store.createGrant).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  it("also bounds the revoke mutation body", async () => {
+    const store = fakeStore();
+    const { app } = buildApp({ store });
+
+    const response = await app.request(`/api/v1/grants/${grantId}/revoke`, {
+      body: "a".repeat(CORE_MUTATION_MAX_BODY_BYTES + 1),
+      headers: {
+        "content-length": String(CORE_MUTATION_MAX_BODY_BYTES + 1),
+        origin: trustedOrigin,
+      },
+      method: "POST",
+    });
+
+    expect(response.status).toBe(413);
+    expect(store.revokeGrant).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+});
+
+/**
+ * Pass 3 request-contract regressions. Every case here asserts both the sanitized public response
+ * *and* that the store was never reached, because the point of each fix is that a malformed or
+ * unsupported request is decided at the request boundary rather than turning into database work or
+ * an indistinguishable infrastructure failure.
+ */
+describe("explicit-grant request invariants", () => {
+  const validExpiry = "2099-01-01T00:00:00.000Z";
+
+  async function post(app: Hono, body: unknown) {
+    return await app.request("/api/v1/grants", {
+      body: JSON.stringify(body),
+      headers: { "content-type": "application/json", origin: trustedOrigin },
+      method: "POST",
+    });
+  }
+
+  it("rejects a scope field in any form, before any store mutation", async () => {
+    // Core keeps scoped-grant semantics for trusted internal callers, but no HTTP middleware
+    // supplies a scope to the evaluator, so a scope accepted here could never authorize anything.
+    for (const scope of ["calendar-event:123", "", "   ", null, 42, {}, []]) {
+      const { app, store } = buildApp({});
+      const response = await post(app, { permission: registeredPermission, scope, subjectUserId });
+
+      expect(response.status, `scope ${JSON.stringify(scope)}`).toBe(400);
+      expect(await response.json()).toEqual({ code: "INVALID_REQUEST" });
+      expect(response.headers.get("cache-control")).toBe("no-store");
+      expect(store.createGrant).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    }
+  });
+
+  it("accepts exactly one canonical expiration representation", async () => {
+    const createdGrant = {
+      createdAt: new Date("2026-01-01T00:00:00.000Z"),
+      expiresAt: new Date(validExpiry),
+      id: grantId,
+      permission: registeredPermission,
+      sourceKind: "explicit" as const,
+      userId: subjectUserId,
+    };
+    const store = fakeStore({ createGrant: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(createdGrant) });
+    const { app } = buildApp({ store });
+
+    const response = await post(app, {
+      expiresAt: validExpiry,
+      permission: registeredPermission,
+      subjectUserId,
+    });
+
+    expect(response.status).toBe(201);
+    expect(store.createGrant).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+      expect.objectContaining({ expiresAt: new Date(validExpiry) }),
+    );
+  });
+
+  it("rejects normalized-impossible, locale, offset, imprecise, padded, and past expirations", async () => {
+    const now = new Date("2026-07-26T12:00:00.000Z");
+    for (const expiresAt of [
+      // Normalized impossible date: `new Date` silently rewrote this to March 3rd.
+      "2026-02-31T00:00:00.000Z",
+      "2026-13-01T00:00:00.000Z",
+      // Locale-shaped and date-only forms.
+      "March 5, 2027",
+      "2027-01-01",
+      // Missing milliseconds, excess fractional precision, offsets, lowercase separators.
+      "2027-01-01T00:00:00Z",
+      "2027-01-01T00:00:00.123456Z",
+      "2027-01-01T00:00:00.000+02:00",
+      "2027-01-01t00:00:00.000z",
+      "2027-01-01T00:00:00.000+00:00",
+      // Whitespace padding and trailing text.
+      " 2027-01-01T00:00:00.000Z",
+      "2027-01-01T00:00:00.000Z ",
+      "2027-01-01T00:00:00.000Z extra",
+      // Past and exactly-now are both dead on arrival.
+      "2020-01-01T00:00:00.000Z",
+      "2026-07-26T12:00:00.000Z",
+      // Non-strings.
+      42,
+      null,
+      true,
+    ]) {
+      const { app, store } = buildApp({ now: () => now });
+      const response = await post(app, {
+        expiresAt,
+        permission: registeredPermission,
+        subjectUserId,
+      });
+
+      expect(response.status, `expiresAt ${JSON.stringify(expiresAt)}`).toBe(400);
+      expect(await response.json()).toEqual({ code: "INVALID_REQUEST" });
+      expect(store.createGrant).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    }
+  });
+
+  it("returns a sanitized 409 for an equivalent grant that is already effective", async () => {
+    const store = fakeStore({
+      createGrant: vi
+        .fn()
+        .mockRejectedValue(new AuthorizationStoreError("AUTHORIZATION_GRANT_ALREADY_EXISTS")),
+    });
+    const { app } = buildApp({ store });
+
+    const response = await post(app, { permission: registeredPermission, subjectUserId });
+    const raw = await response.text();
+
+    expect(response.status).toBe(409);
+    expect(JSON.parse(raw)).toEqual({ code: "AUTHORIZATION_GRANT_ALREADY_EXISTS" });
+    expect(response.headers.get("cache-control")).toBe("no-store");
+    // The body is the stable code and nothing else — no existing grant id, actor, scope, source
+    // reference, expiry, SQL, constraint name, or driver text.
+    expect(Object.keys(JSON.parse(raw))).toEqual(["code"]);
+    for (const leaked of [
+      grantId,
+      manager.userId,
+      subjectUserId,
+      "calendar-event",
+      "constraint",
+      "select ",
+      "insert ",
+      "ekklesia_core_grant",
+      "Error",
+      "at ",
+    ]) {
+      expect(raw, `must not leak ${leaked}`).not.toContain(leaked);
+    }
+  });
+
+  it("rejects a non-canonical grant id on revoke without ever calling the store", async () => {
+    for (const raw of [
+      "not-a-uuid",
+      "0B36B1B6-9A29-4C4E-9E2D-4C0E4C5E6F70",
+      "%200b36b1b6-9a29-4c4e-9e2d-4c0e4c5e6f70",
+      "0b36b1b6-9a29-4c4e-9e2d-4c0e4c5e6f7",
+      "0b36b1b6-9a29-4c4e-9e2d-4c0e4c5e6f700",
+      "0b36b1b69a294c4e9e2d4c0e4c5e6f70",
+    ]) {
+      const { app, store } = buildApp({});
+      const response = await app.request(`/api/v1/grants/${raw}/revoke`, {
+        headers: { origin: trustedOrigin },
+        method: "POST",
+      });
+
+      expect(response.status, `grantId ${raw}`).toBe(400);
+      expect(await response.json()).toEqual({ code: "INVALID_REQUEST" });
+      expect(response.headers.get("cache-control")).toBe("no-store");
+      expect(store.revokeGrant).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    }
+  });
+
+  it("still returns the sanitized 404 for a canonical but unknown grant id", async () => {
+    const store = fakeStore({
+      revokeGrant: vi
+        .fn()
+        .mockRejectedValue(new AuthorizationStoreError("AUTHORIZATION_GRANT_NOT_FOUND")),
+    });
+    const { app } = buildApp({ store });
+
+    const response = await app.request(`/api/v1/grants/${grantId}/revoke`, {
+      headers: { origin: trustedOrigin },
+      method: "POST",
+    });
+
+    expect(response.status).toBe(404);
+    expect(await response.json()).toEqual({ code: "AUTHORIZATION_GRANT_NOT_FOUND" });
+    expect(store.revokeGrant).toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+});
+
+describe("explicit-grant listing pagination", () => {
+  function grantAt(index: number, iso: string) {
+    return {
+      createdAt: new Date(iso),
+      id: parseGrantId(`00000000-0000-4000-8000-${String(index).padStart(12, "0")}`),
+      permission: registeredPermission,
+      sourceKind: "explicit" as const,
+      userId: subjectUserId,
+    };
+  }
+
+  it("applies the default limit of 50 and accepts the 1 and 100 boundaries", async () => {
+    for (const [query, expected] of [
+      ["", 50],
+      ["&limit=1", 1],
+      ["&limit=50", 50],
+      ["&limit=100", 100],
+    ] as const) {
+      const { app, store } = buildApp({});
+      const response = await app.request(`/api/v1/grants?userId=${subjectUserId}${query}`);
+
+      expect(response.status, query).toBe(200);
+      expect(store.listGrantsForUser).toHaveBeenCalledWith(subjectUserId, {
+        limit: expected,
+        sourceKind: "explicit",
+      });
+    }
+  });
+
+  it("rejects every non-canonical or out-of-range limit before any store work", async () => {
+    for (const limit of [
+      "0",
+      "101",
+      "-1",
+      "+5",
+      "1.0",
+      "1.5",
+      "01",
+      "005",
+      " 5",
+      "5 ",
+      "1e2",
+      "",
+      "abc",
+      "0x10",
+      "Infinity",
+      "NaN",
+    ]) {
+      const { app, store } = buildApp({});
+      const response = await app.request(
+        `/api/v1/grants?userId=${subjectUserId}&limit=${encodeURIComponent(limit)}`,
+      );
+
+      expect(response.status, `limit ${JSON.stringify(limit)}`).toBe(400);
+      expect(await response.json()).toEqual({ code: "INVALID_REQUEST" });
+      expect(response.headers.get("cache-control")).toBe("no-store");
+      expect(store.listGrantsForUser).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    }
+  });
+
+  it("rejects unknown and duplicated query keys", async () => {
+    for (const query of [
+      `userId=${subjectUserId}&sort=asc`,
+      `userId=${subjectUserId}&offset=10`,
+      `userId=${subjectUserId}&sourceKind=relationship`,
+      `userId=${subjectUserId}&userId=${subjectUserId}`,
+      `userId=${subjectUserId}&limit=5&limit=6`,
+      `userId=${subjectUserId}&cursor=a&cursor=b`,
+      `userId=${subjectUserId}&cursor=`,
+    ]) {
+      const { app, store } = buildApp({});
+      const response = await app.request(`/api/v1/grants?${query}`);
+
+      expect(response.status, query).toBe(400);
+      expect(store.listGrantsForUser).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    }
+  });
+
+  it("emits a cursor only when another page exists, and traverses without duplicates or omissions", async () => {
+    // Three rows sharing one `created_at`, which is exactly the case a timestamp-only keyset
+    // boundary would skip or repeat.
+    const sameInstant = "2026-01-01T00:00:00.000Z";
+    const all = [grantAt(3, sameInstant), grantAt(2, sameInstant), grantAt(1, sameInstant)];
+
+    const seen: string[] = [];
+    let cursor: string | null = null;
+    let pages = 0;
+    do {
+      const store = fakeStore({
+        listGrantsForUser: vi.fn().mockImplementation((_userId, listOptions) => {
+          const startIndex =
+            listOptions.after === undefined
+              ? 0
+              : all.findIndex((grant) => grant.id === listOptions.after.id) + 1;
+          const slice = all.slice(startIndex, startIndex + listOptions.limit);
+          const more = startIndex + listOptions.limit < all.length;
+          const last = slice.at(-1);
+          return Promise.resolve({
+            grants: slice,
+            ...(more && last ? { nextBoundary: { createdAt: last.createdAt, id: last.id } } : {}),
+          });
+        }),
+      });
+      const { app } = buildApp({ store });
+      const url: string = `/api/v1/grants?userId=${subjectUserId}&limit=1${
+        cursor === null ? "" : `&cursor=${encodeURIComponent(cursor)}`
+      }`;
+      const response = await app.request(url);
+      const body = (await response.json()) as {
+        grants: { id: string }[];
+        nextCursor: string | null;
+      };
+
+      expect(response.status).toBe(200);
+      expect(response.headers.get("cache-control")).toBe("no-store");
+      expect(body.grants).toHaveLength(1);
+      seen.push(body.grants[0]?.id as string);
+      cursor = body.nextCursor;
+      pages += 1;
+    } while (cursor !== null && pages < 10);
+
+    expect(pages).toBe(3);
+    expect(seen).toEqual(all.map((grant) => grant.id));
+    expect(new Set(seen).size).toBe(3);
+    // The final page ends the traversal explicitly.
+    expect(cursor).toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  it("refuses a cursor issued for a different subject, and every malformed encoding", async () => {
+    const boundary = { createdAt: new Date("2026-01-01T00:00:00.000Z"), id: grantId };
+    const store = fakeStore({
+      listGrantsForUser: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({
+        grants: [grantAt(1, boundary.createdAt.toISOString())],
+        nextBoundary: boundary,
+      }),
+    });
+    const { app: issuingApp } = buildApp({ store });
+    const issued = (await (
+      await issuingApp.request(`/api/v1/grants?userId=${subjectUserId}&limit=1`)
+    ).json()) as { nextCursor: string };
+    expect(issued.nextCursor).toMatch(/^[A-Za-z0-9_-]+$/u);
+
+    const encode = (payload: unknown) =>
+      Buffer.from(JSON.stringify(payload), "utf8").toString("base64url");
+    const canonical = {
+      g: grantId,
+      t: "2026-01-01T00:00:00.000Z",
+      u: subjectUserId,
+      v: 1,
+    };
+
+    for (const [label, cursor] of [
+      // A cursor minted for a different subject must not be replayable against this one.
+      ["other subject", encode({ ...canonical, u: "someone_else_1" })],
+      ["wrong version", encode({ ...canonical, v: 2 })],
+      ["extra field", encode({ ...canonical, extra: "x" })],
+      ["missing field", encode({ g: canonical.g, t: canonical.t, u: canonical.u })],
+      ["invalid timestamp", encode({ ...canonical, t: "2026-01-01" })],
+      ["non-canonical timestamp", encode({ ...canonical, t: "2026-01-01T00:00:00Z" })],
+      ["invalid grant id", encode({ ...canonical, g: "not-a-uuid" })],
+      ["array payload", encode([canonical])],
+      ["not json", Buffer.from("nonsense", "utf8").toString("base64url")],
+      ["padded base64", `${Buffer.from(JSON.stringify(canonical), "utf8").toString("base64")}`],
+      ["malformed base64url", "!!!not-base64!!!"],
+      ["trailing data", `${encode(canonical)}AA`],
+    ] as const) {
+      const { app, store: pagedStore } = buildApp({});
+      const response = await app.request(
+        `/api/v1/grants?userId=${subjectUserId}&cursor=${encodeURIComponent(cursor)}`,
+      );
+      const raw = await response.text();
+
+      expect(response.status, label).toBe(400);
+      expect(JSON.parse(raw)).toEqual({ code: "INVALID_REQUEST" });
+      // A rejected cursor reveals nothing it decoded, and does zero store/database work.
+      expect(raw).not.toContain(grantId);
+      expect(raw).not.toContain("someone_else_1");
+      expect(pagedStore.listGrantsForUser).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    }
+
+    // The cursor the API itself issued is accepted.
+    const { app: acceptingApp, store: acceptingStore } = buildApp({});
+    const accepted = await acceptingApp.request(
+      `/api/v1/grants?userId=${subjectUserId}&cursor=${encodeURIComponent(issued.nextCursor)}`,
+    );
+    expect(accepted.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(acceptingStore.listGrantsForUser).toHaveBeenCalledWith(subjectUserId, {
+      after: boundary,
+      limit: 50,
+      sourceKind: "explicit",
+    });
+  });
+});

apps/api/tests/health-routes.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,373 @@
+import {
+  ANONYMOUS_PRINCIPAL,
+  type ModuleDatabase,
+  type ModuleRouteHandler,
+  type ModuleRuntimeServices,
+  parsePermissionId,
+  type RegisteredModuleHttpRoute,
+} from "@ekklesia/contracts";
+import {
+  type AuthorizationEvaluator,
+  type AuthorizationStore,
+  createPermissionRegistry,
+} from "@ekklesia/core/authorization";
+import type { EkklesiaIdentityRuntime } from "@ekklesia/core/identity";
+import {
+  createModuleUiPublicationRegistry,
+  EMPTY_MODULE_REALTIME_REGISTRY,
+} from "@ekklesia/core/modules";
+import { afterEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest";
+import { createApiApp } from "../src/app.js";
+import {
+  type ApiHealthOptions,
+  HEALTH_LIVE_PATH,
+  HEALTH_READY_PATH,
+  READINESS_DATABASE_TIMEOUT_MS,
+} from "../src/health-routes.js";
+import { createInMemoryDashboardStore } from "./support/in-memory-dashboard-store.js";
+import { testDashboardHostAssets } from "./support/dashboard-host-assets.js";
+import { emptyModuleConfiguration } from "./support/in-memory-module-configuration.js";
+import { emptyModuleLifecycle } from "./support/in-memory-module-lifecycle.js";
+import { emptyModuleStorage } from "./support/in-memory-module-storage.js";
+
+const trustedOrigin = "https://dashboard.example.test";
+const modulePermission = parsePermissionId("health.status.read");
+
+/** What a real driver failure can carry, and what must therefore never reach a response. */
+const DRIVER_FAILURE_DETAIL =
+  "connect ECONNREFUSED postgresql://ekklesia:[email protected]:5432/ekklesia SELECT 1";
+
+function fakeRuntime(): EkklesiaIdentityRuntime {
+  return {
+    handleAuthRequest: vi.fn(),
+    resolvePrincipal: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(ANONYMOUS_PRINCIPAL),
+  };
+}
+
+function fakeStore(): AuthorizationStore {
+  return {
+    createGrant: vi.fn(),
+    grantPlatformOwner: vi.fn(),
+    hasActiveGrant: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(false),
+    isPlatformOwner: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(false),
+    listGrantsForUser: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({ grants: [] }),
+    revokeGrant: vi.fn(),
+    revokePlatformOwner: vi.fn(),
+  };
+}
+
+function fakeModuleServices(): ModuleRuntimeServices {
+  return Object.freeze({ database: Object.freeze({}) as unknown as ModuleDatabase });
+}
+
+function healthOptions(overrides: Partial<ApiHealthOptions> = {}) {
+  return {
+    checkDatabase: vi.fn<() => Promise<void>>().mockResolvedValue(undefined),
+    isModuleStartupComplete: vi.fn<() => boolean>().mockReturnValue(true),
+    ...overrides,
+  };
+}
+
+function buildApp(
+  health: ApiHealthOptions,
+  moduleRoutes: readonly RegisteredModuleHttpRoute[] = Object.freeze([]),
+) {
+  const evaluator: AuthorizationEvaluator = {
+    authorize: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({ allowed: true }),
+  };
+  const runtime = fakeRuntime();
+  const app = createApiApp({
+    authorization: {
+      evaluator,
+      registry: createPermissionRegistry([
+        { baseline: "public", description: "Test permission.", id: modulePermission },
+      ]),
+      store: fakeStore(),
+    },
+    moduleRoutes,
+    moduleRealtime: EMPTY_MODULE_REALTIME_REGISTRY,
+    moduleServices: fakeModuleServices(),
+    moduleUi: createModuleUiPublicationRegistry([]),
+    moduleLifecycle: emptyModuleLifecycle(),
+    moduleConfiguration: emptyModuleConfiguration(),
+    moduleStorage: emptyModuleStorage(),
+    dashboard: createInMemoryDashboardStore(),
+    dashboardHostAssets: testDashboardHostAssets(),
+    health,
+    runtime,
+    trustedOrigins: [trustedOrigin],
+  });
+  return { app, evaluator, runtime };
+}
+
+/** Resolves once every already-queued microtask has run, using the real `setImmediate` — the only
+ * timer functions these tests fake are `setTimeout` and `clearTimeout`. */
+function drainMicrotasks(): Promise<void> {
+  return new Promise((resolve) => setImmediate(resolve));
+}
+
+/** Whether `promise` settled with no fake time advanced at all: "promptly", made exact. */
+async function settlesWithoutWaiting(promise: Response | Promise<Response>): Promise<boolean> {
+  let settled = false;
+  void Promise.resolve(promise).then(
+    () => {
+      settled = true;
+    },
+    () => {
+      settled = true;
+    },
+  );
+  await drainMicrotasks();
+  return settled;
+}
+
+async function expectNotReady(response: Response): Promise<void> {
+  expect(response.status).toBe(503);
+  expect(response.headers.get("cache-control")).toBe("no-store");
+  expect(await response.json()).toEqual({ code: "NOT_READY" });
+}
+
+afterEach(() => {
+  vi.useRealTimers();
+});
+
+describe("GET /api/v1/health/live", () => {
+  it("returns 200 with a fixed body and Cache-Control: no-store", async () => {
+    const health = healthOptions();
+    const { app } = buildApp(health);
+
+    const response = await app.request(HEALTH_LIVE_PATH);
+
+    expect(response.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(response.headers.get("cache-control")).toBe("no-store");
+    expect(response.headers.get("content-type")).toMatch(/^application\/json/u);
+    expect(await response.json()).toEqual({ status: "live" });
+  });
+
+  it("does not consult the database or module startup, so it stays 200 while readiness is 503", async () => {
+    const health = healthOptions({
+      checkDatabase: vi.fn().mockRejectedValue(new Error(DRIVER_FAILURE_DETAIL)),
+      isModuleStartupComplete: vi.fn().mockReturnValue(false),
+    });
+    const { app } = buildApp(health);
+
+    const response = await app.request(HEALTH_LIVE_PATH);
+
+    expect(response.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(health.checkDatabase).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    expect(health.isModuleStartupComplete).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+});
+
+describe("GET /api/v1/health/ready", () => {
+  it("returns 200 with a fixed body when the database answers and module startup completed", async () => {
+    const health = healthOptions();
+    const { app } = buildApp(health);
+
+    const response = await app.request(HEALTH_READY_PATH);
+
+    expect(response.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(response.headers.get("cache-control")).toBe("no-store");
+    expect(await response.json()).toEqual({ status: "ready" });
+    expect(health.checkDatabase).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+  });
+
+  it("returns a fixed 503 when the database query fails, carrying nothing from the failure", async () => {
+    const health = healthOptions({
+      checkDatabase: vi.fn().mockRejectedValue(new Error(DRIVER_FAILURE_DETAIL)),
+    });
+    const { app } = buildApp(health);
+
+    const response = await app.request(HEALTH_READY_PATH);
+    const text = await response.clone().text();
+
+    await expectNotReady(response);
+    for (const fragment of ["ECONNREFUSED", "hunter2", "db.internal", "SELECT", "Error"]) {
+      expect(text).not.toContain(fragment);
+    }
+  });
+
+  it("treats a check that throws synchronously exactly like one that rejects", async () => {
+    const health = healthOptions({
+      checkDatabase: vi.fn(() => {
+        throw new Error(DRIVER_FAILURE_DETAIL);
+      }),
+    });
+    const { app } = buildApp(health);
+
+    await expectNotReady(await app.request(HEALTH_READY_PATH));
+  });
+
+  it("returns 503 without touching the database before module startup completed", async () => {
+    const health = healthOptions({ isModuleStartupComplete: vi.fn().mockReturnValue(false) });
+    const { app } = buildApp(health);
+
+    await expectNotReady(await app.request(HEALTH_READY_PATH));
+    expect(health.checkDatabase).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  it("returns 503 when shutdown began while the database query was in flight", async () => {
+    let startupComplete = true;
+    const health = healthOptions({
+      checkDatabase: vi.fn(async () => {
+        startupComplete = false;
+      }),
+      isModuleStartupComplete: () => startupComplete,
+    });
+    const { app } = buildApp(health);
+
+    await expectNotReady(await app.request(HEALTH_READY_PATH));
+  });
+
+  it("starts a fresh check for each sequential probe rather than caching a success", async () => {
+    const health = healthOptions();
+    const { app } = buildApp(health);
+
+    await app.request(HEALTH_READY_PATH);
+    await app.request(HEALTH_READY_PATH);
+
+    expect(health.checkDatabase).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2);
+  });
+
+  it("reports ready for a slow query that still answers inside the bound", async () => {
+    vi.useFakeTimers({ toFake: ["setTimeout", "clearTimeout"] });
+    let answer: () => void = () => undefined;
+    const health = healthOptions({
+      checkDatabase: vi.fn(
+        () =>
+          new Promise<void>((resolve) => {
+            answer = resolve;
+          }),
+      ),
+    });
+    const { app } = buildApp(health);
+
+    const pending = app.request(HEALTH_READY_PATH);
+    await vi.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(READINESS_DATABASE_TIMEOUT_MS - 1);
+    answer();
+
+    expect((await pending).status).toBe(200);
+  });
+});
+
+describe("readiness never piles up database checks", () => {
+  it("keeps exactly one check in flight for a query that never settles, while every probe answers 503 promptly", async () => {
+    vi.useFakeTimers({ toFake: ["setTimeout", "clearTimeout"] });
+    const health = healthOptions({
+      checkDatabase: vi.fn(() => new Promise<void>(() => undefined)),
+    });
+    const { app } = buildApp(health);
+
+    // Probes arriving inside the first check's window share it and its single deadline.
+    const first = app.request(HEALTH_READY_PATH);
+    const concurrent = app.request(HEALTH_READY_PATH);
+    await drainMicrotasks();
+    expect(health.checkDatabase).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+
+    await vi.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(READINESS_DATABASE_TIMEOUT_MS);
+    await expectNotReady(await first);
+    await expectNotReady(await concurrent);
+
+    // After the deadline the query is still unsettled: no new check starts, and each probe answers
+    // without waiting out another bound.
+    for (let probe = 0; probe < 20; probe += 1) {
+      const pending = app.request(HEALTH_READY_PATH);
+      expect(await settlesWithoutWaiting(pending)).toBe(true);
+      await expectNotReady(await pending);
+    }
+    expect(health.checkDatabase).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+  });
+
+  it("starts a new check only once the timed-out query has actually settled", async () => {
+    vi.useFakeTimers({ toFake: ["setTimeout", "clearTimeout"] });
+    let settleHungQuery: (error: Error) => void = () => undefined;
+    const checkDatabase = vi
+      .fn<() => Promise<void>>()
+      .mockImplementationOnce(
+        () =>
+          new Promise<void>((_resolve, reject) => {
+            settleHungQuery = reject;
+          }),
+      )
+      .mockResolvedValue(undefined);
+    const { app } = buildApp(healthOptions({ checkDatabase }));
+
+    const first = app.request(HEALTH_READY_PATH);
+    await vi.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(READINESS_DATABASE_TIMEOUT_MS);
+    await expectNotReady(await first);
+    await expectNotReady(await app.request(HEALTH_READY_PATH));
+    expect(checkDatabase).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+
+    // The database cancels the abandoned statement; the next probe may finally ask again.
+    settleHungQuery(new Error(DRIVER_FAILURE_DETAIL));
+    await drainMicrotasks();
+
+    const recovered = await app.request(HEALTH_READY_PATH);
+    expect(recovered.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(checkDatabase).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2);
+  });
+});
+
+describe("health route boundaries", () => {
+  it.each([
+    HEALTH_LIVE_PATH,
+    HEALTH_READY_PATH,
+  ])("%s accepts GET only, answering every other method with a fixed 405 and never checking readiness", async (path) => {
+    const health = healthOptions();
+    const { app } = buildApp(health);
+
+    for (const method of ["HEAD", "POST", "PUT", "PATCH", "DELETE"]) {
+      const response = await app.request(path, { method });
+      expect(response.status, method).toBe(405);
+      expect(response.headers.get("allow")).toBe("GET");
+      expect(response.headers.get("cache-control")).toBe("no-store");
+      expect(await response.text()).toBe("");
+    }
+    expect(health.checkDatabase).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    expect(health.isModuleStartupComplete).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  it.each([
+    HEALTH_LIVE_PATH,
+    HEALTH_READY_PATH,
+  ])("%s is unauthenticated: it never resolves a principal or evaluates authorization, even with a cookie", async (path) => {
+    const { app, evaluator, runtime } = buildApp(healthOptions());
+
+    const response = await app.request(path, {
+      headers: { Cookie: "better-auth.session_token=anything", Origin: trustedOrigin },
+    });
+
+    expect(response.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(runtime.resolvePrincipal).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    expect(runtime.handleAuthRequest).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    expect(evaluator.authorize).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  it('cannot be shadowed by a module, even one whose id is "health"', async () => {
+    const moduleHandler = vi.fn<ModuleRouteHandler>(
+      async () => new Response("module", { status: 200 }),
+    );
+    const moduleRoutes = ["/live", "/ready"].map(
+      (path) =>
+        Object.freeze({
+          bodyMode: "buffered",
+          handler: moduleHandler,
+          maxBodyBytes: 1024,
+          method: "GET",
+          moduleId: "health",
+          path,
+          permission: modulePermission,
+        }) as RegisteredModuleHttpRoute,
+    );
+    const { app } = buildApp(healthOptions(), moduleRoutes);
+
+    expect(await (await app.request(HEALTH_LIVE_PATH)).json()).toEqual({ status: "live" });
+    expect(await (await app.request(HEALTH_READY_PATH)).json()).toEqual({ status: "ready" });
+    expect(moduleHandler).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+
+    // The module's own routes still live where every module route lives, and only there.
+    const moduleResponse = await app.request("/api/v1/modules/health/ready");
+    expect(await moduleResponse.text()).toBe("module");
+    expect(moduleHandler).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+  });
+});

apps/api/tests/host-configuration-parity.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,177 @@
+import { loadHostConfiguration } from "@ekklesia/core/host";
+import { createMailProviderConfig } from "@ekklesia/core/mail";
+import { createStorageProviderConfig } from "@ekklesia/core/storage";
+import { describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
+import { createApiRuntimeConfig } from "../src/config.js";
+import { readConfigFromEnvironment } from "../src/server.js";
+
+/**
+ * `pnpm doctor` and `startApi` must reach the same conclusions from the same environment. They
+ * previously could not: each executable read its own subset of the variables, and Doctor's subset
+ * omitted `S3_*` and the module secrets entirely.
+ *
+ * These tests assert the property directly — the API's startup inputs and the inputs Doctor
+ * validates come from one `loadHostConfiguration` call and produce identical validated
+ * configuration, including every default.
+ */
+
+const secretKey = "sk-example-secret-material";
+const smtpPassword = "sup3r-secret-relay-password";
+
+function environment(
+  overrides: Readonly<Record<string, string | undefined>> = {},
+): Readonly<Record<string, string | undefined>> {
+  return {
+    DATABASE_URL: "postgres://[email protected]:5432/ekklesia",
+    EKKLESIA_IDENTITY_BASE_URL: "https://ekklesia.example.org",
+    EKKLESIA_IDENTITY_SECRET: "b7QwZ2rTn4Xs9LmVpKdF6yHc3JgEuNaW",
+    EKKLESIA_IDENTITY_TRUSTED_ORIGINS: "https://ekklesia.example.org",
+    NODE_ENV: "production",
+    ...overrides,
+  };
+}
+
+const configuredInfrastructure = Object.freeze({
+  EKKLESIA_SMTP_FROM_ADDRESS: "[email protected]",
+  EKKLESIA_SMTP_HELO_NAME: "mail.example.org",
+  EKKLESIA_SMTP_HOST: "smtp.example.org",
+  EKKLESIA_SMTP_PASSWORD: smtpPassword,
+  EKKLESIA_SMTP_USERNAME: "[email protected]",
+  S3_ACCESS_KEY: "AKIAEXAMPLEACCESSID",
+  S3_ENDPOINT: "https://storage.example.org",
+  S3_SECRET_KEY: secretKey,
+});
+
+/** Exactly what Doctor validates, from exactly the same load the API performs. */
+function doctorView(env: Readonly<Record<string, string | undefined>>) {
+  const host = loadHostConfiguration(env);
+  return {
+    mail: createMailProviderConfig(host.mail, { environment: host.environment }),
+    storage: createStorageProviderConfig(host.storage, { environment: host.environment }),
+  };
+}
+
+function apiView(env: Readonly<Record<string, string | undefined>>) {
+  const { environment: resolved, input } = readConfigFromEnvironment(env);
+  return createApiRuntimeConfig(input, { environment: resolved });
+}
+
+describe("host configuration parity between startApi and Doctor", () => {
+  it("derives identical object-storage configuration, defaults included", () => {
+    const env = environment(configuredInfrastructure);
+
+    expect(apiView(env).storage).toEqual(doctorView(env).storage);
+    // Named explicitly rather than only compared, so a change to either default fails here loudly.
+    expect(apiView(env).storage).toEqual({
+      accessKey: "AKIAEXAMPLEACCESSID",
+      bucketPrefix: "ekklesia",
+      deliveryEndpoint: "https://storage.example.org",
+      endpoint: "https://storage.example.org",
+      forcePathStyle: true,
+      region: "us-east-1",
+      secretKey,
+    });
+  });
+
+  it("derives identical outbound-email configuration, defaults included", () => {
+    const env = environment(configuredInfrastructure);
+
+    expect(apiView(env).mail).toEqual(doctorView(env).mail);
+    expect(apiView(env).mail).toMatchObject({
+      // The SMTP client identity is part of that equivalence: a relay that refuses the greeting
+      // must fail in Doctor for the same reason it fails at runtime.
+      heloName: "mail.example.org",
+      host: "smtp.example.org",
+      port: 587,
+      security: "starttls",
+    });
+  });
+
+  it("agrees that an installation with neither service is complete", () => {
+    const env = environment();
+
+    expect(apiView(env).storage).toBeUndefined();
+    expect(doctorView(env).storage).toBeUndefined();
+    expect(apiView(env).mail).toBeUndefined();
+    expect(doctorView(env).mail).toBeUndefined();
+  });
+
+  it("carries every storage field the direct-delivery pass established", () => {
+    const env = environment({
+      ...configuredInfrastructure,
+      S3_BUCKET_PREFIX: "rogc",
+      S3_DELIVERY_ENDPOINT: "https://files.example.org",
+      S3_FORCE_PATH_STYLE: "false",
+      S3_REGION: "eu-west-1",
+    });
+
+    expect(apiView(env).storage).toEqual(doctorView(env).storage);
+    expect(apiView(env).storage).toMatchObject({
+      bucketPrefix: "rogc",
+      deliveryEndpoint: "https://files.example.org",
+      forcePathStyle: false,
+      region: "eu-west-1",
+    });
+  });
+
+  it("rejects the same malformed environment with the same sanitized code", () => {
+    for (const [overrides, code] of [
+      [{ S3_ENDPOINT: "https://storage.example.org" }, "STORAGE_ACCESS_KEY_MISSING"],
+      [{ ...configuredInfrastructure, S3_ENDPOINT: "not-a-url" }, "STORAGE_ENDPOINT_INVALID"],
+      [
+        { ...configuredInfrastructure, S3_ENDPOINT: "http://storage.example.org" },
+        "STORAGE_ENDPOINT_INSECURE_IN_PRODUCTION",
+      ],
+      [
+        { ...configuredInfrastructure, EKKLESIA_SMTP_PASSWORD: undefined },
+        "MAIL_USERNAME_WITHOUT_PASSWORD",
+      ],
+      [{ ...configuredInfrastructure, EKKLESIA_SMTP_PORT: "70000" }, "MAIL_PORT_INVALID"],
+      [
+        { ...configuredInfrastructure, EKKLESIA_SMTP_HELO_NAME: "localhost" },
+        "MAIL_HELO_NAME_INVALID",
+      ],
+    ] as const) {
+      const env = environment(overrides);
+      expect(() => apiView(env)).toThrowError(expect.objectContaining({ code }));
+      expect(() => doctorView(env)).toThrowError(expect.objectContaining({ code }));
+    }
+  });
+
+  it("resolves module secrets from the same source the runtime is given", () => {
+    const env = environment({
+      EKKLESIA_MODULE_SECRET__ANNOUNCEMENTS__STORAGE_CREDENTIAL: "module-secret-material",
+    });
+
+    expect(
+      readConfigFromEnvironment(env).moduleSecrets.get("announcements", "storageCredential"),
+    ).toBe("module-secret-material");
+    expect(loadHostConfiguration(env).moduleSecrets.get("announcements", "storageCredential")).toBe(
+      "module-secret-material",
+    );
+  });
+
+  it("reads only this listener's own address and port outside the shared loader", () => {
+    const config = apiView(
+      environment({ EKKLESIA_API_HOST: "0.0.0.0", EKKLESIA_API_PORT: "8080" }),
+    );
+
+    expect(config.host).toBe("0.0.0.0");
+    expect(config.port).toBe(8080);
+    // Defaults, when unset, stay where they always were.
+    const defaults = apiView(environment());
+    expect(defaults.host).toBe("127.0.0.1");
+    expect(defaults.port).toBe(3000);
+  });
+
+  it("interprets a set-but-empty flag identically instead of one side ignoring it", () => {
+    // Doctor used to drop any falsy identity value before validating, so `startApi` refused to
+    // start on `EKKLESIA_PUBLIC_SIGNUP_ENABLED=` while Doctor reported the deployment ready.
+    const env = environment({ EKKLESIA_PUBLIC_SIGNUP_ENABLED: "" });
+
+    expect(loadHostConfiguration(env).identity.publicSignupEnabled).toBe("");
+    expect(() => apiView(env)).toThrowError(
+      expect.objectContaining({ code: "PUBLIC_SIGNUP_ENABLED_INVALID" }),
+    );
+  });
+});

apps/api/tests/initial-owner.integration.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,848 @@
+import { execFile } from "node:child_process";
+import { randomBytes } from "node:crypto";
+import { mkdtemp, rm } from "node:fs/promises";
+import { tmpdir } from "node:os";
+import path from "node:path";
+import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
+import { promisify } from "node:util";
+import {
+  createAuthorizationDrizzleDatabase,
+  createInitialPlatformOwner,
+  InitialPlatformOwnerError,
+} from "@ekklesia/core/authorization";
+import {
+  createBootstrapIdentityCreator,
+  createIdentityDrizzleDatabase,
+} from "@ekklesia/core/identity";
+import {
+  applyModuleMigrations,
+  createPostgresMigrationDatabase,
+  discoverAllMigrations,
+} from "@ekklesia/core/migrations";
+import { Client, type QueryResultRow } from "pg";
+import { afterAll, describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
+import { createApiRuntimeConfig } from "../src/config.js";
+import { type RunningApi, startApi } from "../src/server.js";
+
+/**
+ * The initial platform-owner bootstrap, against a real PostgreSQL and the real HTTP transport
+ * (ADR 0035).
+ *
+ * The point of this suite is that it does **not** stop at asserting rows. A fresh installation is
+ * bootstrapped and then the resulting account is signed in through the exact browser-facing login
+ * transport Phase 7B Pass 1 established, its principal is read back, and it is used to reach a
+ * platform-owner-protected resource. Anything less would prove the command wrote a user, not that
+ * an operator can actually get into their dashboard — which is the only thing this pass is for.
+ *
+ * Every scenario runs with `publicSignupEnabled: false`, the production posture, so nothing here
+ * can accidentally depend on the signup route the real deployment does not have.
+ */
+const integrationDatabaseUrlEnvironment = "EKKLESIA_MIGRATION_TEST_DATABASE_URL";
+const repositoryRoot = path.join(path.dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)), "..", "..", "..");
+const coreMigrationsDirectory = path.join(repositoryRoot, "core", "drizzle");
+const bootstrapCliPath = path.join(
+  repositoryRoot,
+  "core",
+  "dist",
+  "cli",
+  "create-initial-owner.js",
+);
+const trackedDatabases = new Set<string>();
+let databaseCounter = 0;
+
+const identityBaseUrl = "https://identity.example.test";
+const dashboardOrigin = "https://dashboard.example.test";
+const ownerPassword = "correct horse battery staple";
+
+class IntegrationHarnessError extends Error {
+  constructor(message: string) {
+    super(message);
+    this.name = "IntegrationHarnessError";
+    this.stack = `${this.name}: ${this.message}`;
+  }
+}
+
+function baseDatabaseUrl(): string {
+  const url = process.env[integrationDatabaseUrlEnvironment];
+  if (typeof url !== "string" || url.trim() === "") {
+    throw new IntegrationHarnessError("The integration database URL is not configured.");
+  }
+  return url;
+}
+
+function databaseUrl(name: string): string {
+  const url = new URL(baseDatabaseUrl());
+  url.pathname = `/${name}`;
+  return url.toString();
+}
+
+function makeDatabaseName(label: string): string {
+  databaseCounter += 1;
+  return `ekk_owner_${label}_${databaseCounter}_${randomBytes(4).toString("hex")}`.toLowerCase();
+}
+
+async function openAdministrativeClient(): Promise<Client> {
+  const client = new Client({ connectionString: baseDatabaseUrl() });
+  await client.connect();
+  return client;
+}
+
+async function safeQuery<T extends QueryResultRow>(
+  client: Client,
+  text: string,
+  values: readonly unknown[] = [],
+): Promise<T[]> {
+  try {
+    const result = await client.query<T>(text, [...values]);
+    return result.rows;
+  } catch {
+    // Never rethrows the driver error: it can carry SQL, a connection string, and a host.
+    throw new IntegrationHarnessError("An integration database statement failed.");
+  }
+}
+
+async function createDisposableDatabase(label: string): Promise<string> {
+  const name = makeDatabaseName(label);
+  const admin = await openAdministrativeClient();
+  try {
+    await safeQuery(admin, `create database "${name}"`);
+  } finally {
+    await admin.end().catch(() => undefined);
+  }
+  trackedDatabases.add(name);
+  return databaseUrl(name);
+}
+
+async function applyCoreMigrations(url: string): Promise<void> {
+  const emptyModules = await mkdtemp(path.join(tmpdir(), "ekklesia-owner-no-modules-"));
+  try {
+    const aggregate = await discoverAllMigrations({
+      coreMigrationsDirectory,
+      moduleDiscovery: {
+        moduleSdkVersion: "0.1.0",
+        modulesDirectory: emptyModules,
+        platformVersion: "0.1.0",
+      },
+    });
+    await applyModuleMigrations({ aggregate, database: createPostgresMigrationDatabase(url) });
+  } finally {
+    await rm(emptyModules, { force: true, recursive: true });
+  }
+}
+
+/** A fresh, migrated installation with no identity and no owner — exactly what an operator has
+ * after `docker compose up` and `pnpm migrations:apply`. */
+async function freshInstallation(label: string): Promise<string> {
+  const url = await createDisposableDatabase(label);
+  await applyCoreMigrations(url);
+  return url;
+}
+
+interface BootstrapHandles {
+  readonly run: (
+    email: string,
+    password?: string,
+    name?: string,
+  ) => ReturnType<typeof createInitialPlatformOwner>;
+  readonly close: () => Promise<void>;
+}
+
+/** Drives the same operation the CLI drives, with the same production composition. */
+function bootstrapAgainst(url: string): BootstrapHandles {
+  const authorization = createAuthorizationDrizzleDatabase(url);
+  const identity = createIdentityDrizzleDatabase(url, {});
+  return {
+    close: async () => {
+      await Promise.all([
+        authorization.close().catch(() => undefined),
+        identity.close().catch(() => undefined),
+      ]);
+    },
+    run: (email, password = ownerPassword, name = "Platform Owner") =>
+      createInitialPlatformOwner(
+        {
+          authorizationDb: authorization.db,
+          createIdentity: createBootstrapIdentityCreator(identity.db),
+          identityDb: identity.db,
+        },
+        { email, name, password },
+      ),
+  };
+}
+
+/**
+ * The production posture: public signup disabled, exactly as a real deployment must run — and, just
+ * as deliberately, **no outbound email configured at all**. A fresh installation has no relay yet,
+ * which is the whole reason the initial owner is created already verified (ADR 0038).
+ */
+function ownerApiConfig(url: string): ReturnType<typeof createApiRuntimeConfig> {
+  return createApiRuntimeConfig(
+    {
+      databaseUrl: url,
+      host: "127.0.0.1",
+      identity: {
+        baseUrl: identityBaseUrl,
+        publicSignupEnabled: false,
+        secret: "integration-test-secret-0123456789abcdefgh",
+        trustedOrigins: [identityBaseUrl, dashboardOrigin],
+      },
+      port: 0,
+    },
+    { environment: "development" },
+  );
+}
+
+async function startApiWithoutSignup(url: string): Promise<RunningApi> {
+  return startApi(ownerApiConfig(url), { rateLimitOverride: { max: 1000, window: 1 } });
+}
+
+function apiOrigin(running: RunningApi): string {
+  const address = running.server.address();
+  if (!address || typeof address !== "object") {
+    throw new IntegrationHarnessError("The API integration server has no bound address.");
+  }
+  return `http://127.0.0.1:${address.port}`;
+}
+
+function firstCookiePair(setCookieHeader: string): string {
+  return setCookieHeader.split(",")[0]?.split(";")[0]?.trim() ?? "";
+}
+
+async function signIn(
+  origin: string,
+  email: string,
+  password: string,
+): Promise<{ cookiePair?: string; response: Response }> {
+  const response = await fetch(`${origin}/api/auth/sign-in/email`, {
+    body: JSON.stringify({ email, password }),
+    headers: { "content-type": "application/json", origin: dashboardOrigin },
+    method: "POST",
+  });
+  const setCookie = response.headers.get("set-cookie");
+  return setCookie === null ? { response } : { cookiePair: firstCookiePair(setCookie), response };
+}
+
+const execFileAsync = promisify(execFile);
+
+interface CliOutcome {
+  readonly code: number;
+  readonly stdout: string;
+  readonly stderr: string;
+}
+
+/** Runs the real compiled CLI as a real child process, with the password on stdin and never in
+ * `argv`. */
+async function runBootstrapCli(
+  databaseUrl: string | undefined,
+  args: readonly string[],
+  password: string | undefined,
+): Promise<CliOutcome> {
+  const environment: Record<string, string> = {
+    ...(process.env as Record<string, string>),
+    NODE_ENV: "development",
+  };
+  if (databaseUrl === undefined) {
+    delete environment.DATABASE_URL;
+  } else {
+    environment.DATABASE_URL = databaseUrl;
+  }
+  const child = execFileAsync(process.execPath, [bootstrapCliPath, ...args], {
+    env: environment,
+  });
+  child.child.stdin?.end(password ?? "");
+  try {
+    const { stdout, stderr } = await child;
+    return { code: 0, stderr, stdout };
+  } catch (error) {
+    const failure = error as { code?: number; stdout?: string; stderr?: string };
+    return {
+      code: typeof failure.code === "number" ? failure.code : 1,
+      stderr: failure.stderr ?? "",
+      stdout: failure.stdout ?? "",
+    };
+  }
+}
+
+async function countRows(url: string, table: string): Promise<number> {
+  const client = new Client({ connectionString: url });
+  await client.connect();
+  try {
+    const rows = await safeQuery<{ count: string }>(
+      client,
+      `select count(*)::text from "${table}"`,
+    );
+    return Number(rows[0]?.count ?? "0");
+  } finally {
+    await client.end().catch(() => undefined);
+  }
+}
+
+/** Better Auth's own `emailVerified` column — the same value its `/verify-email` endpoint writes. */
+async function emailVerifiedFlag(url: string, email: string): Promise<boolean | undefined> {
+  const client = new Client({ connectionString: url });
+  await client.connect();
+  try {
+    const rows = await safeQuery<{ email_verified: boolean }>(
+      client,
+      'select "email_verified" from "ekklesia_core_user" where lower("email") = $1',
+      [email.trim().toLowerCase()],
+    );
+    return rows[0]?.email_verified;
+  } finally {
+    await client.end().catch(() => undefined);
+  }
+}
+
+afterAll(async () => {
+  const admin = await openAdministrativeClient().catch(() => undefined);
+  if (!admin) {
+    return;
+  }
+  try {
+    for (const name of trackedDatabases) {
+      await safeQuery(admin, `drop database if exists "${name}" with (force)`).catch(
+        () => undefined,
+      );
+    }
+  } finally {
+    await admin.end().catch(() => undefined);
+  }
+});
+
+describe.sequential("initial platform-owner bootstrap", () => {
+  it("takes a fresh installation all the way to an authenticated owner in the browser", async () => {
+    const url = await freshInstallation("browserproof");
+    const email = `owner-${randomBytes(4).toString("hex")}@example.test`;
+
+    const bootstrap = bootstrapAgainst(url);
+    let created: Awaited<ReturnType<typeof createInitialPlatformOwner>>;
+    try {
+      created = await bootstrap.run(email);
+    } finally {
+      await bootstrap.close();
+    }
+    expect(created.identity).toBe("created");
+    expect(created.email).toBe(email.toLowerCase());
+
+    const api = await startApiWithoutSignup(url);
+    try {
+      const origin = apiOrigin(api);
+
+      // 1. The exact browser-facing login transport, on a deployment where signup does not exist.
+      const session = await signIn(origin, email, ownerPassword);
+      expect(session.response.status).toBe(200);
+      expect(session.cookiePair).toBeDefined();
+      const cookie = session.cookiePair as string;
+
+      // 2. The principal the browser bootstrap reads.
+      const principalResponse = await fetch(`${origin}/api/v1/principal`, { headers: { cookie } });
+      expect(principalResponse.status).toBe(200);
+      const principal = (await principalResponse.json()) as {
+        kind: string;
+        userId?: string;
+      };
+      expect(principal.kind).toBe("authenticated");
+      expect(principal.userId).toBe(created.userId);
+
+      // 3. A platform-owner-protected resource actually opens for them. This is the assertion that
+      //    separates "a row was written" from "the operator can run their platform".
+      const grants = await fetch(`${origin}/api/v1/grants?userId=${created.userId}`, {
+        headers: { cookie },
+      });
+      expect(grants.status).toBe(200);
+
+      // 4. And the same resource is still closed to everyone else.
+      const anonymous = await fetch(`${origin}/api/v1/grants?userId=${created.userId}`);
+      expect(anonymous.status).toBe(403);
+    } finally {
+      await api.shutdown();
+    }
+  });
+
+  it("leaves public signup disabled — the owner exists without a signup route existing", async () => {
+    const url = await freshInstallation("nosignup");
+    const email = `owner-${randomBytes(4).toString("hex")}@example.test`;
+    const bootstrap = bootstrapAgainst(url);
+    try {
+      await bootstrap.run(email);
+    } finally {
+      await bootstrap.close();
+    }
+
+    const api = await startApiWithoutSignup(url);
+    try {
+      const origin = apiOrigin(api);
+      const attempted = await fetch(`${origin}/api/auth/sign-up/email`, {
+        body: JSON.stringify({
+          email: `intruder-${randomBytes(4).toString("hex")}@example.test`,
+          name: "Intruder",
+          password: ownerPassword,
+        }),
+        headers: { "content-type": "application/json", origin: dashboardOrigin },
+        method: "POST",
+      });
+
+      // The bootstrap command created an account; it did not open a door for anyone else to.
+      expect(attempted.status).toBe(400);
+      expect(await attempted.text()).toContain("EMAIL_PASSWORD_SIGN_UP_DISABLED");
+      expect(await countRows(url, "ekklesia_core_user")).toBe(1);
+
+      // And the owner can still sign in, so disabling signup did not disable the account.
+      expect((await signIn(origin, email, ownerPassword)).response.status).toBe(200);
+    } finally {
+      await api.shutdown();
+    }
+  });
+
+  describe("the guard", () => {
+    it("refuses a second bootstrap, changes no password, and creates no second owner", async () => {
+      const url = await freshInstallation("guard");
+      const email = `owner-${randomBytes(4).toString("hex")}@example.test`;
+      const bootstrap = bootstrapAgainst(url);
+      try {
+        await bootstrap.run(email);
+
+        // Same address, different password: must not become a password reset.
+        await expect(bootstrap.run(email, "an entirely different password")).rejects.toMatchObject({
+          code: "INITIAL_OWNER_ALREADY_COMPLETED",
+        });
+        // A different address must not become a second owner.
+        await expect(
+          bootstrap.run(`second-${randomBytes(4).toString("hex")}@example.test`),
+        ).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: "INITIAL_OWNER_ALREADY_COMPLETED" });
+      } finally {
+        await bootstrap.close();
+      }
+
+      expect(await countRows(url, "ekklesia_core_platform_owner")).toBe(1);
+      // The refused second attempt with a new address created no stray identity: the sentinel is
+      // checked before anything is created, not after.
+      expect(await countRows(url, "ekklesia_core_user")).toBe(1);
+
+      const api = await startApiWithoutSignup(url);
+      try {
+        const origin = apiOrigin(api);
+        expect((await signIn(origin, email, ownerPassword)).response.status).toBe(200);
+        expect(
+          (await signIn(origin, email, "an entirely different password")).response.status,
+        ).not.toBe(200);
+      } finally {
+        await api.shutdown();
+      }
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe("validation reuses the identity system's own policy", () => {
+    it("rejects an invalid email, and a password outside the 8–128 bound", async () => {
+      const url = await freshInstallation("validation");
+      const bootstrap = bootstrapAgainst(url);
+      try {
+        await expect(bootstrap.run("not-an-email-address")).rejects.toMatchObject({
+          code: "INITIAL_OWNER_EMAIL_INVALID",
+        });
+        await expect(
+          bootstrap.run(`short-${randomBytes(4).toString("hex")}@example.test`, "1234567"),
+        ).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: "INITIAL_OWNER_PASSWORD_TOO_SHORT" });
+        await expect(
+          bootstrap.run(`long-${randomBytes(4).toString("hex")}@example.test`, "x".repeat(129)),
+        ).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: "INITIAL_OWNER_PASSWORD_TOO_LONG" });
+
+        // Exactly the boundary the browser accepts, so the two can never diverge.
+        await expect(
+          bootstrap.run(`edge-${randomBytes(4).toString("hex")}@example.test`, "x".repeat(128)),
+        ).resolves.toMatchObject({ identity: "created" });
+      } finally {
+        await bootstrap.close();
+      }
+
+      // Every rejection happened before anything was written, and the one success is the only row.
+      expect(await countRows(url, "ekklesia_core_user")).toBe(1);
+    });
+
+    it("never puts the password into an error", async () => {
+      const url = await freshInstallation("nosecrets");
+      const secret = "sup3rSecretBootstrapPassword!";
+      const bootstrap = bootstrapAgainst(url);
+      try {
+        let caught: unknown;
+        try {
+          await bootstrap.run("not-an-email-address", secret);
+        } catch (error) {
+          caught = error;
+        }
+        expect(caught).toBeInstanceOf(InitialPlatformOwnerError);
+        const rendered = `${String(caught)} ${JSON.stringify(caught)} ${(caught as Error).stack ?? ""}`;
+        expect(rendered).not.toContain(secret);
+        expect(rendered).not.toContain("postgres");
+        expect(rendered).not.toContain("select");
+      } finally {
+        await bootstrap.close();
+      }
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe("an identity that already exists", () => {
+    it("adopts a usable account and leaves its password untouched", async () => {
+      const url = await freshInstallation("adopt");
+      const email = `owner-${randomBytes(4).toString("hex")}@example.test`;
+
+      // Exactly the partial failure this guards: the identity committed, the grant never ran.
+      const identity = createIdentityDrizzleDatabase(url, {});
+      try {
+        await createBootstrapIdentityCreator(identity.db)({
+          email,
+          name: "Half Finished",
+          password: ownerPassword,
+        });
+      } finally {
+        await identity.close();
+      }
+      expect(await countRows(url, "ekklesia_core_platform_owner")).toBe(0);
+
+      const bootstrap = bootstrapAgainst(url);
+      try {
+        const result = await bootstrap.run(email, "a different password than before");
+        expect(result.identity).toBe("adopted");
+      } finally {
+        await bootstrap.close();
+      }
+      expect(await countRows(url, "ekklesia_core_platform_owner")).toBe(1);
+      expect(await countRows(url, "ekklesia_core_user")).toBe(1);
+
+      const api = await startApiWithoutSignup(url);
+      try {
+        const origin = apiOrigin(api);
+        // Adoption granted ownership. It did not take the account over: the original password still
+        // works and the one supplied to the rerun does not.
+        expect((await signIn(origin, email, ownerPassword)).response.status).toBe(200);
+        expect(
+          (await signIn(origin, email, "a different password than before")).response.status,
+        ).not.toBe(200);
+      } finally {
+        await api.shutdown();
+      }
+    });
+
+    it("refuses a credential-less row rather than consuming bootstrap on an unusable owner", async () => {
+      const url = await freshInstallation("unusable");
+      const client = new Client({ connectionString: url });
+      await client.connect();
+      try {
+        await safeQuery(
+          client,
+          `insert into "ekklesia_core_user" (id, name, email, email_verified, created_at, updated_at)
+           values ($1, $2, $3, false, now(), now())`,
+          ["aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa", "Shell Row", "[email protected]"],
+        );
+      } finally {
+        await client.end().catch(() => undefined);
+      }
+
+      const bootstrap = bootstrapAgainst(url);
+      try {
+        await expect(bootstrap.run("[email protected]")).rejects.toMatchObject({
+          code: "INITIAL_OWNER_IDENTITY_UNUSABLE",
+        });
+      } finally {
+        await bootstrap.close();
+      }
+
+      // The decisive part: bootstrap is still available. Granting ownership to a row nobody can
+      // authenticate as would have consumed the single use and left the installation unusable with
+      // no second chance.
+      expect(await countRows(url, "ekklesia_core_platform_owner_bootstrap")).toBe(0);
+      expect(await countRows(url, "ekklesia_core_platform_owner")).toBe(0);
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe("partial failure", () => {
+    it("reports a failed grant honestly and stays recoverable by rerunning", async () => {
+      const url = await freshInstallation("partial");
+      const email = `owner-${randomBytes(4).toString("hex")}@example.test`;
+
+      const authorization = createAuthorizationDrizzleDatabase(url);
+      const identity = createIdentityDrizzleDatabase(url, {});
+      try {
+        await expect(
+          createInitialPlatformOwner(
+            {
+              authorizationDb: authorization.db,
+              createIdentity: createBootstrapIdentityCreator(identity.db),
+              grantOwnership: () => {
+                throw new Error("the grant failed after the identity committed");
+              },
+              identityDb: identity.db,
+            },
+            { email, name: "Owner", password: ownerPassword },
+          ),
+        ).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: "INITIAL_OWNER_OWNERSHIP_GRANT_FAILED" });
+      } finally {
+        await Promise.all([authorization.close(), identity.close()]);
+      }
+
+      // The identity committed; the grant did not; the single-use sentinel was never consumed.
+      expect(await countRows(url, "ekklesia_core_user")).toBe(1);
+      expect(await countRows(url, "ekklesia_core_platform_owner")).toBe(0);
+      expect(await countRows(url, "ekklesia_core_platform_owner_bootstrap")).toBe(0);
+
+      // Rerunning the identical command finishes the job, which is the whole recovery story.
+      const retry = bootstrapAgainst(url);
+      try {
+        await expect(retry.run(email)).resolves.toMatchObject({ identity: "adopted" });
+      } finally {
+        await retry.close();
+      }
+      expect(await countRows(url, "ekklesia_core_platform_owner")).toBe(1);
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe("concurrency", () => {
+    it("gives exactly one owner when several bootstraps race", async () => {
+      const url = await freshInstallation("race");
+      const attempts = 5;
+      const handles = Array.from({ length: attempts }, () => bootstrapAgainst(url));
+      try {
+        const outcomes = await Promise.allSettled(
+          handles.map((handle, index) =>
+            handle.run(`racer-${index}-${randomBytes(3).toString("hex")}@example.test`),
+          ),
+        );
+        const fulfilled = outcomes.filter((outcome) => outcome.status === "fulfilled");
+        expect(fulfilled).toHaveLength(1);
+        for (const outcome of outcomes.filter((candidate) => candidate.status === "rejected")) {
+          expect((outcome as PromiseRejectedResult).reason).toMatchObject({
+            code: "INITIAL_OWNER_ALREADY_COMPLETED",
+          });
+        }
+      } finally {
+        await Promise.all(handles.map((handle) => handle.close()));
+      }
+
+      expect(await countRows(url, "ekklesia_core_platform_owner")).toBe(1);
+      expect(await countRows(url, "ekklesia_core_platform_owner_bootstrap")).toBe(1);
+      // The losers created nothing at all. Serializing whole invocations — not just the grant — is
+      // what keeps a race from leaving signable-in accounts that own nothing behind.
+      expect(await countRows(url, "ekklesia_core_user")).toBe(1);
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe("the command itself", () => {
+    it("succeeds, prints something useful, and leaks nothing", async () => {
+      const url = await freshInstallation("cli");
+      const email = `owner-${randomBytes(4).toString("hex")}@example.test`;
+      const result = await runBootstrapCli(url, ["--email", email], ownerPassword);
+
+      expect(result.code).toBe(0);
+      expect(result.stdout).toContain("Initial platform owner created successfully.");
+      expect(result.stdout).toContain(email.toLowerCase());
+      const everything = `${result.stdout} ${result.stderr}`;
+      expect(everything).not.toContain(ownerPassword);
+      expect(everything).not.toContain("postgresql://");
+      expect(everything).not.toContain("password");
+
+      const api = await startApiWithoutSignup(url);
+      try {
+        // The command's real product: an operator who can now sign in.
+        expect((await signIn(apiOrigin(api), email, ownerPassword)).response.status).toBe(200);
+      } finally {
+        await api.shutdown();
+      }
+    });
+
+    it("refuses a password supplied on the command line", async () => {
+      const url = await freshInstallation("argv");
+      const result = await runBootstrapCli(
+        url,
+        ["--email", "[email protected]", "--password", "hunter2hunter2"],
+        undefined,
+      );
+
+      expect(result.code).toBe(1);
+      expect(result.stderr).toContain("--password is not supported");
+      expect(await countRows(url, "ekklesia_core_user")).toBe(0);
+    });
+
+    it("fails clearly without a database, and refuses to migrate one itself", async () => {
+      const missing = await runBootstrapCli(
+        undefined,
+        ["--email", "[email protected]"],
+        "whatever",
+      );
+      expect(missing.code).toBe(1);
+      expect(missing.stderr).toContain("DATABASE_URL is required.");
+
+      // A database that exists but was never migrated is a deployment step that has not happened,
+      // and this command says so rather than quietly running migrations for a production operator.
+      const unmigrated = await createDisposableDatabase("unmigrated");
+      const result = await runBootstrapCli(
+        unmigrated,
+        ["--email", "[email protected]"],
+        ownerPassword,
+      );
+      expect(result.code).toBe(1);
+      expect(result.stderr).toContain("INITIAL_OWNER_SCHEMA_UNAVAILABLE");
+
+      const client = new Client({ connectionString: unmigrated });
+      await client.connect();
+      try {
+        const tables = await safeQuery<{ count: string }>(
+          client,
+          `select count(*)::text from information_schema.tables where table_schema = 'public'`,
+        );
+        expect(Number(tables[0]?.count ?? "0")).toBe(0);
+      } finally {
+        await client.end().catch(() => undefined);
+      }
+    });
+
+    it("refuses a second run at the command level too", async () => {
+      const url = await freshInstallation("clirerun");
+      const email = `owner-${randomBytes(4).toString("hex")}@example.test`;
+      expect((await runBootstrapCli(url, ["--email", email], ownerPassword)).code).toBe(0);
+
+      const second = await runBootstrapCli(url, ["--email", email], "a different password");
+      expect(second.code).toBe(1);
+      expect(second.stderr).toContain("INITIAL_OWNER_ALREADY_COMPLETED");
+      expect(second.stderr).not.toContain("a different password");
+      expect(await countRows(url, "ekklesia_core_platform_owner")).toBe(1);
+    });
+  });
+});
+
+describe.sequential("initial platform-owner bootstrap and email verification", () => {
+  /**
+   * The trusted-bootstrap verification exception (ADR 0038).
+   *
+   * A verified address became a precondition for holding a session in Phase 7C Pass 2. The initial
+   * owner is created on a freshly provisioned server, by an operator holding the database
+   * credentials, at a moment when SMTP may not exist — so requiring an email round trip here would
+   * produce a working installation nobody can ever sign in to. These scenarios exist to prove that
+   * the exception is real, that it is narrow, and that mail remains genuinely absent throughout.
+   */
+  it("creates the owner already verified, proven in the database and in the browser", async () => {
+    const url = await freshInstallation("verifiedowner");
+    const email = `owner-${randomBytes(4).toString("hex")}@example.test`;
+
+    const bootstrap = bootstrapAgainst(url);
+    try {
+      await bootstrap.run(email);
+    } finally {
+      await bootstrap.close();
+    }
+
+    // Database state: the exact column Better Auth's own verification endpoint writes, so the row
+    // is indistinguishable from one that verified normally.
+    expect(await emailVerifiedFlag(url, email)).toBe(true);
+
+    // ...and the browser-facing consequence, which is the only thing that actually matters.
+    const api = await startApiWithoutSignup(url);
+    try {
+      const origin = apiOrigin(api);
+      const session = await signIn(origin, email, ownerPassword);
+      expect(session.response.status).toBe(200);
+      expect(session.cookiePair).toBeDefined();
+    } finally {
+      await api.shutdown();
+    }
+  });
+
+  it("needs no outbound email configured, at bootstrap or at sign-in", async () => {
+    const url = await freshInstallation("nomailowner");
+    const email = `owner-${randomBytes(4).toString("hex")}@example.test`;
+
+    const bootstrap = bootstrapAgainst(url);
+    try {
+      // No SMTP host, no relay, no network: `createBootstrapIdentityCreator` constructs its own
+      // Better Auth instance with no `emailVerification` configuration at all.
+      await bootstrap.run(email);
+    } finally {
+      await bootstrap.close();
+    }
+
+    const api = await startApiWithoutSignup(url);
+    try {
+      // The API this suite starts configures no mail either, so nothing in this scenario could have
+      // sent or received a message.
+      expect(ownerApiConfig(url).mail).toBeUndefined();
+      expect((await signIn(apiOrigin(api), email, ownerPassword)).response.status).toBe(200);
+    } finally {
+      await api.shutdown();
+    }
+  });
+
+  it("marks an adopted identity verified too, so bootstrap never yields an owner who cannot sign in", async () => {
+    const url = await freshInstallation("adoptverified");
+    const email = `owner-${randomBytes(4).toString("hex")}@example.test`;
+
+    // An identity that exists before bootstrap runs — created here through the same trusted creator,
+    // which always writes `emailVerified: false`.
+    const first = bootstrapAgainst(url);
+    try {
+      await first.run(email);
+    } finally {
+      await first.close();
+    }
+    const client = new Client({ connectionString: url });
+    await client.connect();
+    try {
+      await safeQuery(client, 'update "ekklesia_core_user" set "email_verified" = false');
+      await safeQuery(client, 'delete from "ekklesia_core_platform_owner_bootstrap"');
+      await safeQuery(client, 'delete from "ekklesia_core_platform_owner"');
+    } finally {
+      await client.end().catch(() => undefined);
+    }
+    expect(await emailVerifiedFlag(url, email)).toBe(false);
+
+    const second = bootstrapAgainst(url);
+    let adopted: Awaited<ReturnType<typeof createInitialPlatformOwner>>;
+    try {
+      adopted = await second.run(email);
+    } finally {
+      await second.close();
+    }
+
+    expect(adopted.identity).toBe("adopted");
+    expect(await emailVerifiedFlag(url, email)).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it("verifies only the owner, leaving every other account subject to the normal policy", async () => {
+    const url = await freshInstallation("narrowexception");
+    const ownerEmail = `owner-${randomBytes(4).toString("hex")}@example.test`;
+    const otherEmail = `member-${randomBytes(4).toString("hex")}@example.test`;
+
+    const bootstrap = bootstrapAgainst(url);
+    try {
+      await bootstrap.run(ownerEmail);
+      // A second identity created through the identical trusted creator, but never bootstrapped.
+      const identity = createIdentityDrizzleDatabase(url, {});
+      try {
+        await createBootstrapIdentityCreator(identity.db)({
+          email: otherEmail,
+          name: "Ordinary Member",
+          password: ownerPassword,
+        });
+      } finally {
+        await identity.close().catch(() => undefined);
+      }
+    } finally {
+      await bootstrap.close();
+    }
+
+    expect(await emailVerifiedFlag(url, ownerEmail)).toBe(true);
+    expect(await emailVerifiedFlag(url, otherEmail)).toBe(false);
+
+    const api = await startApiWithoutSignup(url);
+    try {
+      const origin = apiOrigin(api);
+      expect((await signIn(origin, ownerEmail, ownerPassword)).response.status).toBe(200);
+      // The exception did not widen: an ordinary account still has to verify, and on this
+      // mail-less installation it simply cannot sign in yet.
+      const refused = await signIn(origin, otherEmail, ownerPassword);
+      expect(refused.response.status).toBe(403);
+      expect(await refused.response.json()).toMatchObject({ code: "EMAIL_NOT_VERIFIED" });
+      expect(refused.cookiePair).toBeUndefined();
+    } finally {
+      await api.shutdown();
+    }
+  });
+});

apps/api/tests/module-configuration-routes.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,804 @@
+import { mkdir, mkdtemp, rm, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises";
+import { tmpdir } from "node:os";
+import path from "node:path";
+import {
+  ANONYMOUS_PRINCIPAL,
+  createAuthenticatedPrincipal,
+  type EkklesiaPrincipal,
+  type ModuleConfigurationDeclarationInput,
+  type ModuleDatabase,
+  type ModuleRuntimeServices,
+  parseEkklesiaUserId,
+} from "@ekklesia/contracts";
+import {
+  type AuthorizationStore,
+  CORE_MODULES_CONFIGURATION_MANAGE,
+  CORE_MODULES_LIFECYCLE_MANAGE,
+  createAuthorizationEvaluator,
+} from "@ekklesia/core/authorization";
+import type { EkklesiaIdentityRuntime } from "@ekklesia/core/identity";
+import {
+  composePlatformPermissionRegistry,
+  createModuleUiPublicationRegistry,
+  type DiscoveredModule,
+  discoverModules,
+  type ModuleConfigurationRecord,
+  type ModuleConfigurationStore,
+  ModuleConfigurationStoreError,
+  EMPTY_MODULE_REALTIME_REGISTRY,
+  resolveModuleEligibility,
+} from "@ekklesia/core/modules";
+import type { Hono } from "hono";
+import { afterEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest";
+import { createApiApp } from "../src/app.js";
+import { CORE_MUTATION_MAX_BODY_BYTES } from "../src/body-limits.js";
+import { MODULE_CONFIGURATION_PATH } from "../src/module-configuration-routes.js";
+import { MODULE_LIFECYCLE_PATH } from "../src/module-lifecycle-routes.js";
+import { createInMemoryDashboardStore } from "./support/in-memory-dashboard-store.js";
+import { testDashboardHostAssets } from "./support/dashboard-host-assets.js";
+import { readyHealth } from "./support/ready-health.js";
+import {
+  createFakeModuleSecretSource,
+  createInMemoryModuleConfigurationStore,
+} from "./support/in-memory-module-configuration.js";
+import { createInMemoryModuleLifecycleStore } from "./support/in-memory-module-lifecycle.js";
+import { moduleStorageOptionFor } from "./support/in-memory-module-storage.js";
+
+const trustedOrigin = "https://dashboard.example.test";
+const untrustedOrigin = "https://evil.example.test";
+const viewerId = parseEkklesiaUserId("55555555-5555-4555-8555-555555555555");
+
+const temporaryDirectories: string[] = [];
+
+afterEach(async () => {
+  await Promise.all(
+    temporaryDirectories
+      .splice(0)
+      .map((directory) => rm(directory, { force: true, recursive: true })),
+  );
+});
+
+/**
+ * The configuration shape the real Announcements product would need as an Ekklesia module: a slide
+ * duration and poll interval with defaults, a bucket name it must be told, and a deployment-supplied
+ * storage credential.
+ *
+ * Modelled from the reference repository, never imported from it. Nothing Announcements-specific
+ * exists in Core or in `apps/api`; this fixture exists to prove a real product's settings survive
+ * the whole path — manifest, validation, storage, API, snapshot — without the module reaching any
+ * platform infrastructure.
+ */
+const announcementsConfiguration: readonly ModuleConfigurationDeclarationInput[] = [
+  {
+    key: "slideSeconds",
+    type: "integer",
+    default: 7,
+    minimum: 1,
+    maximum: 600,
+    description: "How long each slide is shown.",
+  },
+  { key: "pollIntervalSeconds", type: "integer", default: 30, minimum: 5, maximum: 3600 },
+  { key: "bucket", type: "string", required: true, minLength: 1, maxLength: 63 },
+  { key: "fit", type: "enum", values: ["contain", "cover"], default: "contain" },
+  { key: "storageCredential", type: "secret", required: true },
+];
+
+interface ModuleFixture {
+  readonly id: string;
+  readonly configuration?: readonly ModuleConfigurationDeclarationInput[];
+}
+
+async function createModule(modulesDirectory: string, fixture: ModuleFixture): Promise<void> {
+  const moduleDirectory = path.join(modulesDirectory, fixture.id);
+  await mkdir(path.join(moduleDirectory, "dist/server"), { recursive: true });
+  await Promise.all([
+    writeFile(
+      path.join(moduleDirectory, "package.json"),
+      JSON.stringify({
+        ekklesia: { layer: "module" },
+        name: `@test/module-${fixture.id}`,
+        type: "module",
+        version: "1.0.0",
+      }),
+    ),
+    writeFile(
+      path.join(moduleDirectory, "ekklesia.module.json"),
+      JSON.stringify({
+        compatibility: { moduleSdk: "^0.1.0", platform: "^0.1.0" },
+        configuration: fixture.configuration ?? [],
+        entrypoints: { server: "./dist/server/index.js" },
+        id: fixture.id,
+        manifestVersion: 7,
+        name: `${fixture.id} module`,
+        version: "1.0.0",
+      }),
+    ),
+    writeFile(
+      path.join(moduleDirectory, "dist/server/index.js"),
+      `export default { id: ${JSON.stringify(fixture.id)}, version: "1.0.0" };`,
+    ),
+  ]);
+}
+
+interface InstallOptions {
+  readonly fixtures?: readonly ModuleFixture[];
+  readonly principal?: EkklesiaPrincipal;
+  readonly platformOwner?: boolean;
+  readonly grants?: readonly string[];
+  readonly records?: readonly ModuleConfigurationRecord[];
+  readonly secrets?: Readonly<Record<string, Readonly<Record<string, string>>>>;
+  readonly store?: ModuleConfigurationStore;
+}
+
+interface Installation {
+  readonly app: Hono;
+  readonly modules: readonly DiscoveredModule[];
+  readonly store: ModuleConfigurationStore;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Composes the real application over a real discovered inventory, reproducing `startApi`'s own
+ * composition: read the stored settings, resolve eligibility and configuration in one pass, then
+ * build the UI registry and every option from that same resolution. Doing it the same way here is
+ * what makes these assertions evidence about production composition rather than a bespoke wiring.
+ */
+async function install(options: InstallOptions = {}): Promise<Installation> {
+  const modulesDirectory = await mkdtemp(path.join(tmpdir(), "ekklesia-module-config-"));
+  temporaryDirectories.push(modulesDirectory);
+  for (const fixture of options.fixtures ?? [
+    { configuration: announcementsConfiguration, id: "announcements" },
+  ]) {
+    await createModule(modulesDirectory, fixture);
+  }
+  const modules = await discoverModules({
+    moduleSdkVersion: "0.1.0",
+    modulesDirectory,
+    platformVersion: "0.1.0",
+  });
+
+  const store = options.store ?? createInMemoryModuleConfigurationStore(options.records ?? []);
+  const secrets = createFakeModuleSecretSource(options.secrets ?? {});
+  const lifecycleStore = createInMemoryModuleLifecycleStore();
+  const bootSettings = await store.readSettings();
+  const eligibility = resolveModuleEligibility(modules, await lifecycleStore.readConfiguration(), {
+    secrets,
+    settings: bootSettings,
+  });
+
+  const held = new Set(options.grants ?? []);
+  const evaluator = createAuthorizationEvaluator({
+    grants: { hasActiveGrant: async (query) => held.has(String(query.permission)) },
+    platformOwners: { isPlatformOwner: async () => options.platformOwner === true },
+  });
+  const runtime: EkklesiaIdentityRuntime = {
+    handleAuthRequest: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(new Response(null, { status: 200 })),
+    resolvePrincipal: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(options.principal ?? ANONYMOUS_PRINCIPAL),
+  };
+  const authorizationStore = {
+    createGrant: vi.fn(),
+    grantPlatformOwner: vi.fn(),
+    hasActiveGrant: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(false),
+    isPlatformOwner: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(false),
+    listGrantsForUser: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({ grants: [] }),
+    revokeGrant: vi.fn(),
+    revokePlatformOwner: vi.fn(),
+  } as unknown as AuthorizationStore;
+
+  const app = createApiApp({
+    authorization: {
+      evaluator,
+      registry: composePlatformPermissionRegistry(modules),
+      store: authorizationStore,
+    },
+    dashboard: createInMemoryDashboardStore(),
+    dashboardHostAssets: testDashboardHostAssets(),
+    health: readyHealth(),
+    moduleConfiguration: {
+      bootSettings,
+      discoveredModules: modules,
+      secrets,
+      snapshots: eligibility.configurations,
+      store,
+    },
+    moduleStorage: moduleStorageOptionFor(modules),
+    moduleLifecycle: {
+      snapshot: {
+        discoveredModules: modules,
+        eligibility: eligibility.entries,
+        startedModuleIds: eligibility.eligibleModules.map((module) => module.manifest.id),
+      },
+      store: lifecycleStore,
+    },
+    moduleRoutes: Object.freeze([]),
+    moduleRealtime: EMPTY_MODULE_REALTIME_REGISTRY,
+    moduleServices: Object.freeze({
+      database: Object.freeze({}) as unknown as ModuleDatabase,
+    }) as ModuleRuntimeServices,
+    moduleUi: createModuleUiPublicationRegistry(eligibility.eligibleModules),
+    runtime,
+    trustedOrigins: [trustedOrigin],
+  });
+
+  return { app, modules, store };
+}
+
+function owner(): InstallOptions {
+  return { platformOwner: true, principal: createAuthenticatedPrincipal(viewerId) };
+}
+
+interface ConfigurationBody {
+  readonly moduleId: string;
+  readonly version: string;
+  readonly keys: readonly {
+    readonly key: string;
+    readonly type: string;
+    readonly required: boolean;
+    readonly description?: string;
+    readonly default?: string | number | boolean;
+    readonly values?: readonly string[];
+    readonly value?: string;
+    readonly configured: boolean;
+  }[];
+  readonly unknownKeys: readonly string[];
+  readonly restartRequired: boolean;
+}
+
+async function readConfiguration(
+  app: Hono,
+  moduleId = "announcements",
+): Promise<ConfigurationBody> {
+  const response = await app.request(`${MODULE_CONFIGURATION_PATH}/${moduleId}`, {
+    headers: { origin: trustedOrigin },
+  });
+  expect(response.status).toBe(200);
+  return (await response.json()) as ConfigurationBody;
+}
+
+function putConfiguration(
+  app: Hono,
+  values: unknown,
+  moduleId = "announcements",
+  origin = trustedOrigin,
+) {
+  return app.request(`${MODULE_CONFIGURATION_PATH}/${moduleId}`, {
+    body: JSON.stringify({ values }),
+    headers: { "content-type": "application/json", origin },
+    method: "PUT",
+  });
+}
+
+describe("GET /api/v1/module-configuration/:moduleId", () => {
+  it("returns the module's declared schema with defaults and stored values", async () => {
+    const { app } = await install({
+      ...owner(),
+      records: [{ key: "bucket", moduleId: "announcements", value: "slides" }],
+      secrets: { announcements: { storageCredential: "s3cret" } },
+    });
+
+    const body = await readConfiguration(app);
+
+    expect(body.moduleId).toBe("announcements");
+    expect(body.keys.map((entry) => entry.key)).toEqual([
+      "slideSeconds",
+      "pollIntervalSeconds",
+      "bucket",
+      "fit",
+      "storageCredential",
+    ]);
+    expect(body.keys[0]).toEqual({
+      configured: false,
+      default: 7,
+      description: "How long each slide is shown.",
+      key: "slideSeconds",
+      required: false,
+      type: "integer",
+    });
+    expect(body.keys.find((entry) => entry.key === "bucket")).toMatchObject({
+      configured: true,
+      required: true,
+      value: "slides",
+    });
+    expect(body.keys.find((entry) => entry.key === "fit")?.values).toEqual(["contain", "cover"]);
+  });
+
+  it("never returns a secret value, only whether the deployment supplies one", async () => {
+    const configured = await install({
+      ...owner(),
+      secrets: { announcements: { storageCredential: "s3cret" } },
+    });
+    const body = await readConfiguration(configured.app);
+    const secretEntry = body.keys.find((entry) => entry.key === "storageCredential");
+
+    expect(secretEntry).toEqual({
+      configured: true,
+      key: "storageCredential",
+      required: true,
+      type: "secret",
+    });
+    // Not redacted, not null, not a placeholder — the field is absent entirely, and the secret
+    // string appears nowhere in the payload.
+    expect(secretEntry).not.toHaveProperty("value");
+    expect(secretEntry).not.toHaveProperty("default");
+    expect(JSON.stringify(body)).not.toContain("s3cret");
+  });
+
+  it("reports an unsupplied secret as not configured, still without a value field", async () => {
+    const { app } = await install(owner());
+    const body = await readConfiguration(app);
+
+    expect(body.keys.find((entry) => entry.key === "storageCredential")).toEqual({
+      configured: false,
+      key: "storageCredential",
+      required: true,
+      type: "secret",
+    });
+  });
+
+  it("lists stored keys the current manifest no longer declares, without failing", async () => {
+    const { app } = await install({
+      ...owner(),
+      records: [
+        { key: "bucket", moduleId: "announcements", value: "slides" },
+        { key: "removedInThisVersion", moduleId: "announcements", value: "kept" },
+      ],
+    });
+
+    const body = await readConfiguration(app);
+
+    expect(body.unknownKeys).toEqual(["removedInThisVersion"]);
+    expect(body.keys.map((entry) => entry.key)).not.toContain("removedInThisVersion");
+  });
+
+  it("returns a module declaring no configuration as an empty, valid document", async () => {
+    const { app } = await install({ ...owner(), fixtures: [{ id: "calendar" }] });
+    const body = await readConfiguration(app, "calendar");
+
+    expect(body.keys).toEqual([]);
+    expect(body.unknownKeys).toEqual([]);
+    expect(body.restartRequired).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it("refuses a module this process did not discover", async () => {
+    const { app } = await install(owner());
+    const response = await app.request(`${MODULE_CONFIGURATION_PATH}/not-installed`, {
+      headers: { origin: trustedOrigin },
+    });
+
+    expect(response.status).toBe(404);
+    expect(await response.json()).toEqual({ code: "MODULE_NOT_INSTALLED" });
+  });
+
+  it("is not cached and varies on origin and cookie", async () => {
+    const { app } = await install(owner());
+    const response = await app.request(`${MODULE_CONFIGURATION_PATH}/announcements`, {
+      headers: { origin: trustedOrigin },
+    });
+
+    expect(response.headers.get("Cache-Control")).toBe("no-store");
+    expect(response.headers.get("Vary")).toContain("Cookie");
+  });
+
+  it("reports a sanitized 503 when the store cannot be read, with no value or driver detail", async () => {
+    const failing: ModuleConfigurationStore = {
+      readSettings: async () => {
+        throw new ModuleConfigurationStoreError("MODULE_CONFIGURATION_READ_FAILED");
+      },
+      replace: async () => {
+        throw new ModuleConfigurationStoreError("MODULE_CONFIGURATION_WRITE_FAILED");
+      },
+    };
+    let bootRead = false;
+    const { app } = await install({
+      ...owner(),
+      store: {
+        readSettings: async () => {
+          if (!bootRead) {
+            bootRead = true;
+            return { records: [] };
+          }
+          return failing.readSettings();
+        },
+        replace: (input) => failing.replace(input),
+      },
+    });
+
+    const response = await app.request(`${MODULE_CONFIGURATION_PATH}/announcements`, {
+      headers: { origin: trustedOrigin },
+    });
+
+    expect(response.status).toBe(503);
+    expect(await response.json()).toEqual({ code: "MODULE_CONFIGURATION_READ_FAILED" });
+  });
+});
+
+describe("PUT /api/v1/module-configuration/:moduleId", () => {
+  it("stores values and reports that a restart is required", async () => {
+    const { app, store } = await install({
+      ...owner(),
+      records: [{ key: "bucket", moduleId: "announcements", value: "slides" }],
+    });
+
+    const response = await putConfiguration(app, { bucket: "slides", slideSeconds: 12 });
+
+    expect(response.status).toBe(200);
+    const body = (await response.json()) as ConfigurationBody;
+    expect(body.keys.find((entry) => entry.key === "slideSeconds")).toMatchObject({
+      configured: true,
+      value: "12",
+    });
+    // The running process still holds the boot snapshot; claiming otherwise would be a lie.
+    expect(body.restartRequired).toBe(true);
+    expect((await store.readSettings()).records).toEqual([
+      { key: "bucket", moduleId: "announcements", value: "slides" },
+      { key: "slideSeconds", moduleId: "announcements", value: "12" },
+    ]);
+  });
+
+  it("reports no pending restart when the submitted document matches what booted", async () => {
+    const { app } = await install({
+      ...owner(),
+      records: [{ key: "bucket", moduleId: "announcements", value: "slides" }],
+    });
+
+    const response = await putConfiguration(app, { bucket: "slides" });
+
+    expect(((await response.json()) as ConfigurationBody).restartRequired).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it("replaces the whole document, so an omitted key is cleared", async () => {
+    const { app, store } = await install({
+      ...owner(),
+      records: [
+        { key: "bucket", moduleId: "announcements", value: "slides" },
+        { key: "slideSeconds", moduleId: "announcements", value: "12" },
+      ],
+    });
+
+    await putConfiguration(app, { bucket: "slides" });
+
+    expect((await store.readSettings()).records.map((record) => record.key)).toEqual(["bucket"]);
+  });
+
+  it("never touches another module's stored values", async () => {
+    const { app, store } = await install({
+      ...owner(),
+      fixtures: [
+        { configuration: announcementsConfiguration, id: "announcements" },
+        { configuration: [{ key: "bucket", type: "string" }], id: "calendar" },
+      ],
+      records: [
+        { key: "bucket", moduleId: "announcements", value: "slides" },
+        { key: "bucket", moduleId: "calendar", value: "events" },
+      ],
+    });
+
+    await putConfiguration(app, { bucket: "renamed" });
+
+    expect((await store.readSettings()).records).toEqual([
+      { key: "bucket", moduleId: "announcements", value: "renamed" },
+      { key: "bucket", moduleId: "calendar", value: "events" },
+    ]);
+  });
+
+  it("refuses to accept secret material over HTTP", async () => {
+    const { app, store } = await install(owner());
+
+    const response = await putConfiguration(app, {
+      bucket: "slides",
+      storageCredential: "s3cret",
+    });
+
+    expect(response.status).toBe(400);
+    expect(await response.json()).toEqual({ code: "CONFIGURATION_SECRET_NOT_WRITABLE" });
+    // Nothing was written at all — not the secret, and not the valid key beside it.
+    expect((await store.readSettings()).records).toEqual([]);
+  });
+
+  it("rejects a key the module does not declare", async () => {
+    const { app, store } = await install(owner());
+
+    const response = await putConfiguration(app, { bucket: "slides", mqttEndpoint: "mqtt://x" });
+
+    expect(response.status).toBe(400);
+    expect(await response.json()).toEqual({ code: "CONFIGURATION_KEY_UNDECLARED" });
+    expect((await store.readSettings()).records).toEqual([]);
+  });
+
+  it.each([
+    ["a string for an integer", { bucket: "slides", slideSeconds: "12" }],
+    ["a float for an integer", { bucket: "slides", slideSeconds: 12.5 }],
+    ["an integer below its declared minimum", { bucket: "slides", slideSeconds: 0 }],
+    ["an integer above its declared maximum", { bucket: "slides", slideSeconds: 100000 }],
+    ["a value outside a declared enum", { bucket: "slides", fit: "stretch" }],
+    ["a string shorter than its declared minLength", { bucket: "" }],
+    ["a nested object", { bucket: { name: "slides" } }],
+    ["an array", { bucket: ["slides"] }],
+    ["null", { bucket: null }],
+  ])("rejects %s without storing anything", async (_label, values) => {
+    const { app, store } = await install(owner());
+
+    const response = await putConfiguration(app, values);
+
+    expect(response.status).toBe(400);
+    expect((await store.readSettings()).records).toEqual([]);
+  });
+
+  it.each([
+    ["a body with an unexpected top-level key", { values: {}, force: true }],
+    ["a body with no values object", {}],
+    ["a bare array body", []],
+    ["a bare string body", "bucket=slides"],
+  ])("rejects %s with a closed, structured validation failure", async (_label, body) => {
+    const { app } = await install(owner());
+    const response = await app.request(`${MODULE_CONFIGURATION_PATH}/announcements`, {
+      body: JSON.stringify(body),
+      headers: { "content-type": "application/json", origin: trustedOrigin },
+      method: "PUT",
+    });
+
+    expect(response.status).toBe(400);
+    expect(await response.json()).toEqual({ code: "INVALID_REQUEST" });
+  });
+
+  it.each([
+    "__proto__",
+    "constructor",
+    "prototype",
+  ])("rejects the reserved property name %s as a submitted key", async (key) => {
+    const { app, store } = await install(owner());
+    const response = await app.request(`${MODULE_CONFIGURATION_PATH}/announcements`, {
+      body: `{"values":{${JSON.stringify(key)}:"polluted"}}`,
+      headers: { "content-type": "application/json", origin: trustedOrigin },
+      method: "PUT",
+    });
+
+    expect(response.status).toBe(400);
+    expect((await store.readSettings()).records).toEqual([]);
+    // Nothing about the request reached `Object.prototype`.
+    expect(({} as Record<string, unknown>).polluted).toBeUndefined();
+  });
+
+  it("accepts an incomplete document, leaving the module blocked rather than refusing the save", async () => {
+    const { app, store } = await install(owner());
+
+    // `bucket` is required and absent: an operator may save partial work.
+    const response = await putConfiguration(app, { slideSeconds: 12 });
+
+    expect(response.status).toBe(200);
+    expect((await store.readSettings()).records).toEqual([
+      { key: "slideSeconds", moduleId: "announcements", value: "12" },
+    ]);
+  });
+
+  it("rejects an untrusted origin before authorization or the store runs", async () => {
+    const { app, store } = await install(owner());
+
+    const response = await putConfiguration(
+      app,
+      { bucket: "slides" },
+      "announcements",
+      untrustedOrigin,
+    );
+
+    expect(response.status).toBe(403);
+    expect(await response.json()).toEqual({ code: "UNTRUSTED_ORIGIN" });
+    expect((await store.readSettings()).records).toEqual([]);
+  });
+
+  it("rejects a missing origin", async () => {
+    const { app } = await install(owner());
+    const response = await app.request(`${MODULE_CONFIGURATION_PATH}/announcements`, {
+      body: JSON.stringify({ values: { bucket: "slides" } }),
+      headers: { "content-type": "application/json" },
+      method: "PUT",
+    });
+
+    expect(response.status).toBe(403);
+    expect(await response.json()).toEqual({ code: "UNTRUSTED_ORIGIN" });
+  });
+
+  it("enforces the platform body limit with the one sanitized 413 contract", async () => {
+    const { app } = await install(owner());
+    const oversized = JSON.stringify({
+      values: { bucket: "x".repeat(CORE_MUTATION_MAX_BODY_BYTES + 1024) },
+    });
+    const response = await app.request(`${MODULE_CONFIGURATION_PATH}/announcements`, {
+      body: oversized,
+      headers: { "content-type": "application/json", origin: trustedOrigin },
+      method: "PUT",
+    });
+
+    expect(response.status).toBe(413);
+    expect(await response.json()).toEqual({ code: "REQUEST_BODY_TOO_LARGE" });
+  });
+});
+
+describe("module configuration authority", () => {
+  it("refuses an anonymous caller on both verbs", async () => {
+    const { app } = await install();
+
+    expect((await app.request(`${MODULE_CONFIGURATION_PATH}/announcements`)).status).toBe(403);
+    expect((await putConfiguration(app, { bucket: "slides" })).status).toBe(403);
+  });
+
+  it("refuses an ordinary authenticated user who holds no configuration permission", async () => {
+    const { app } = await install({ principal: createAuthenticatedPrincipal(viewerId) });
+
+    expect((await app.request(`${MODULE_CONFIGURATION_PATH}/announcements`)).status).toBe(403);
+  });
+
+  it("admits a non-owner holding exactly core.modules.configuration.manage", async () => {
+    const { app } = await install({
+      grants: [String(CORE_MODULES_CONFIGURATION_MANAGE)],
+      principal: createAuthenticatedPrincipal(viewerId),
+    });
+
+    expect((await app.request(`${MODULE_CONFIGURATION_PATH}/announcements`)).status).toBe(200);
+  });
+
+  it("does not let the lifecycle permission configure a module, or the reverse", async () => {
+    // The two authorities are deliberately separate: tuning how a module behaves and deciding
+    // whether it runs at all are different decisions (ADR 0029).
+    const lifecycleOnly = await install({
+      grants: [String(CORE_MODULES_LIFECYCLE_MANAGE)],
+      principal: createAuthenticatedPrincipal(viewerId),
+    });
+    expect(
+      (await lifecycleOnly.app.request(`${MODULE_CONFIGURATION_PATH}/announcements`)).status,
+    ).toBe(403);
+    expect((await lifecycleOnly.app.request(MODULE_LIFECYCLE_PATH)).status).toBe(200);
+
+    const configurationOnly = await install({
+      grants: [String(CORE_MODULES_CONFIGURATION_MANAGE)],
+      principal: createAuthenticatedPrincipal(viewerId),
+    });
+    expect((await configurationOnly.app.request(MODULE_LIFECYCLE_PATH)).status).toBe(403);
+    expect(
+      (await configurationOnly.app.request(`${MODULE_CONFIGURATION_PATH}/announcements`)).status,
+    ).toBe(200);
+  });
+});
+
+describe("configuration state is visible through the lifecycle resource", () => {
+  it("reports a module blocked by missing required configuration, naming the key not the value", async () => {
+    const { app } = await install({
+      ...owner(),
+      secrets: { announcements: { storageCredential: "s3cret" } },
+    });
+
+    const response = await app.request(MODULE_LIFECYCLE_PATH, {
+      headers: { origin: trustedOrigin },
+    });
+    const body = (await response.json()) as {
+      readonly modules: readonly {
+        readonly id: string;
+        readonly runtime: {
+          readonly state: string;
+          readonly reason?: string;
+          readonly configurationKey?: string;
+        };
+      }[];
+    };
+
+    expect(body.modules[0]?.runtime).toEqual({
+      configurationKey: "bucket",
+      reason: "configuration_missing",
+      state: "blocked",
+    });
+  });
+
+  it("reports a module blocked by a missing secret, without naming the secret's value", async () => {
+    const { app } = await install({
+      ...owner(),
+      records: [{ key: "bucket", moduleId: "announcements", value: "slides" }],
+    });
+
+    const response = await app.request(MODULE_LIFECYCLE_PATH, {
+      headers: { origin: trustedOrigin },
+    });
+    const raw = await response.text();
+
+    expect(raw).toContain("secret_missing");
+    expect(raw).toContain("storageCredential");
+  });
+
+  it("keeps a configuration-blocked module out of the mountable UI inventory", async () => {
+    const { app } = await install({
+      ...owner(),
+      fixtures: [
+        { configuration: [{ key: "bucket", type: "string", required: true }], id: "announcements" },
+      ],
+    });
+
+    const inventory = (await (await app.request("/api/v1/module-ui")).json()) as {
+      readonly modules: readonly { readonly id: string }[];
+    };
+
+    // Blocked by its own configuration behaves exactly like blocked by a disabled dependency: it is
+    // not eligible, so it is not published.
+    expect(inventory.modules).toEqual([]);
+  });
+});
+
+describe("no secret or configuration value leaks through any surface", () => {
+  it("keeps secret material out of every response body this resource produces", async () => {
+    const { app } = await install({
+      ...owner(),
+      records: [{ key: "bucket", moduleId: "announcements", value: "slides" }],
+      secrets: { announcements: { storageCredential: "super-secret-value" } },
+    });
+
+    const listed = await (
+      await app.request(`${MODULE_CONFIGURATION_PATH}/announcements`, {
+        headers: { origin: trustedOrigin },
+      })
+    ).text();
+    const mutated = await (await putConfiguration(app, { bucket: "slides" })).text();
+    const lifecycle = await (
+      await app.request(MODULE_LIFECYCLE_PATH, { headers: { origin: trustedOrigin } })
+    ).text();
+
+    for (const payload of [listed, mutated, lifecycle]) {
+      expect(payload).not.toContain("super-secret-value");
+    }
+  });
+
+  it("does not serve a secret value even if a row for that key somehow exists in storage", async () => {
+    // Unreachable through the API, which refuses to write a secret key, and unreachable through the
+    // resolver, which never reads one. This plants the row directly to prove the *serialization*
+    // boundary holds independently: a secret's `value` is omitted by construction, not filtered by a
+    // branch someone could remove.
+    const { app } = await install({
+      ...owner(),
+      records: [
+        { key: "bucket", moduleId: "announcements", value: "slides" },
+        { key: "storageCredential", moduleId: "announcements", value: "planted-in-the-database" },
+      ],
+    });
+
+    const body = await readConfiguration(app);
+    const secretEntry = body.keys.find((entry) => entry.key === "storageCredential");
+
+    expect(secretEntry).not.toHaveProperty("value");
+    expect(secretEntry?.configured).toBe(false);
+    expect(JSON.stringify(body)).not.toContain("planted-in-the-database");
+  });
+
+  it("never leaks a filesystem path, package name, or manifest path", async () => {
+    const { app } = await install({
+      ...owner(),
+      records: [{ key: "bucket", moduleId: "announcements", value: "slides" }],
+    });
+
+    const listed = await (
+      await app.request(`${MODULE_CONFIGURATION_PATH}/announcements`, {
+        headers: { origin: trustedOrigin },
+      })
+    ).text();
+
+    expect(listed).not.toContain("/tmp");
+    expect(listed).not.toContain("@test/module-");
+    expect(listed).not.toContain("ekklesia.module.json");
+    expect(listed).not.toContain("dist/");
+  });
+});
+
+describe("the configuration prefix is a sibling of the module route namespace", () => {
+  it("does not sit under /api/v1/modules/, where an installed module could collide with it", async () => {
+    // `config` and `configuration` are ordinary lowercase static segments under
+    // `moduleRoutePathSchema`, so a module could legitimately register `PUT /config` and land on
+    // `/api/v1/modules/announcements/config`. A sibling prefix cannot collide.
+    expect(MODULE_CONFIGURATION_PATH.startsWith("/api/v1/modules/")).toBe(false);
+    expect(MODULE_CONFIGURATION_PATH).toBe("/api/v1/module-configuration");
+
+    const { app } = await install(owner());
+    const collision = await app.request("/api/v1/modules/announcements/config", {
+      body: JSON.stringify({ values: {} }),
+      headers: { "content-type": "application/json", origin: trustedOrigin },
+      method: "PUT",
+    });
+
+    expect(collision.status).toBe(404);
+    expect(await collision.json()).toEqual({ code: "NOT_FOUND" });
+  });
+});

apps/api/tests/module-database.integration.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,780 @@
+import { randomUUID } from "node:crypto";
+import { mkdtemp, rm } from "node:fs/promises";
+import { tmpdir } from "node:os";
+import path from "node:path";
+import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
+import {
+  applyModuleMigrations,
+  createPostgresMigrationDatabase,
+  discoverAllMigrations,
+} from "@ekklesia/core/migrations";
+import { Client, type QueryResultRow } from "pg";
+import { afterAll, describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
+import { createApiRuntimeConfig } from "../src/config.js";
+import { createApiDatabase } from "../src/database.js";
+import { type RunningApi, startApi } from "../src/server.js";
+
+/**
+ * Proves `ModuleRuntimeServices.database` against real PostgreSQL: an installed test module
+ * (`core/tests/fixtures/module-database-integration/db-facade/`) whose lifecycle hooks and
+ * permissioned HTTP handlers perform real typed Drizzle operations — insert, select, update,
+ * transaction, execute — against its own migrated table, exclusively through the facade the
+ * platform hands it. Follows the exact harness conventions `apps/api/tests/api-http.integration.ts`
+ * and `core/tests/postgres-migration.integration.ts` already establish (self-contained per-file
+ * helpers, one disposable PostgreSQL database per scenario, `describe.sequential` blocks sharing a
+ * running API across related assertions) rather than introducing a second integration-test
+ * framework or Docker orchestration path.
+ *
+ * The fixture module is committed under `core/tests/fixtures/...`, not `apps/api/tests/fixtures/`,
+ * for one concrete reason: its schema imports `drizzle-orm/pg-core` and `@ekklesia/contracts`,
+ * neither of which `@ekklesia/api` declares as a direct dependency (pnpm's strict linker will not
+ * resolve them from anywhere under `apps/api/`), while `@ekklesia/core` already depends on both
+ * directly, so any file physically located under `core/`'s directory tree resolves them correctly
+ * regardless of which package's test actually points discovery at it. It is never registered as a
+ * pnpm workspace package (it matches none of `pnpm-workspace.yaml`'s glob patterns), never sits in
+ * the repository's live `modules/` directory, and is only ever discovered when this file explicitly
+ * passes its directory as `modulesDirectoryOverride` — normal production startup, Doctor, and
+ * `pnpm modules:validate` never see it.
+ */
+
+const integrationDatabaseUrlEnvironment = "EKKLESIA_MIGRATION_TEST_DATABASE_URL";
+const thisDirectory = path.dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url));
+const coreMigrationsDirectory = path.join(thisDirectory, "..", "..", "..", "core", "drizzle");
+const fixtureModulesDirectory = path.join(
+  thisDirectory,
+  "..",
+  "..",
+  "..",
+  "core",
+  "tests",
+  "fixtures",
+  "module-database-integration",
+);
+
+const RECORDS_TABLE = "db_facade_records";
+const RECORDER_GLOBAL_KEY = "ekklesia.integration.db-facade.recorder";
+// Must match `STARTUP_RECORD_ID` in the fixture's `server/index.js` exactly.
+const STARTUP_RECORD_ID = "11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111";
+
+const identityBaseUrl = "https://identity.example.test";
+const dashboardOrigin = "https://dashboard.example.test";
+const untrustedOrigin = "https://evil.example.test";
+
+class IntegrationHarnessError extends Error {
+  constructor(message: string) {
+    super(message);
+    this.name = "IntegrationHarnessError";
+    this.stack = `${this.name}: ${this.message}`;
+  }
+}
+
+function harnessError(message: string): IntegrationHarnessError {
+  return new IntegrationHarnessError(message);
+}
+
+function baseDatabaseUrl(): string {
+  const value = process.env[integrationDatabaseUrlEnvironment];
+  if (typeof value !== "string" || value.trim() === "") {
+    throw harnessError("The module database integration database is not configured.");
+  }
+  try {
+    const parsed = new URL(value);
+    if (parsed.protocol !== "postgres:" && parsed.protocol !== "postgresql:") {
+      throw new TypeError("Unsupported protocol.");
+    }
+  } catch {
+    throw harnessError("The module database integration database configuration is invalid.");
+  }
+  return value;
+}
+
+function quoteDatabaseName(databaseName: string): string {
+  if (!/^[a-z][a-z0-9_]{0,62}$/u.test(databaseName)) {
+    throw harnessError("The generated integration database name is invalid.");
+  }
+  return `"${databaseName}"`;
+}
+
+let databaseCounter = 0;
+
+function makeDatabaseName(label: string): string {
+  const safeLabel = label
+    .toLowerCase()
+    .replaceAll(/[^a-z0-9]+/gu, "_")
+    .replaceAll(/^_+|_+$/gu, "")
+    .slice(0, 14);
+  databaseCounter += 1;
+  return `ekk_dbf_${process.pid}_${databaseCounter}_${safeLabel || "scenario"}_${randomUUID().slice(0, 8)}`;
+}
+
+function databaseUrl(databaseName: string): string {
+  const parsed = new URL(baseDatabaseUrl());
+  parsed.pathname = `/${databaseName}`;
+  parsed.searchParams.delete("application_name");
+  return parsed.toString();
+}
+
+async function openAdministrativeClient(connectionString: string): Promise<Client> {
+  const client = new Client({ connectionString });
+  client.on("error", () => undefined);
+  try {
+    await client.connect();
+    return client;
+  } catch {
+    try {
+      await client.end();
+    } catch {
+      // The public harness failure remains static when connection cleanup also fails.
+    }
+    throw harnessError("The module database integration connection failed.");
+  }
+}
+
+async function safeQuery<Row extends QueryResultRow>(
+  client: Client,
+  text: string,
+  values: unknown[] = [],
+): Promise<readonly Row[]> {
+  try {
+    const result = await client.query<Row>(text, values);
+    return result.rows;
+  } catch {
+    throw harnessError("An integration database administration operation failed.");
+  }
+}
+
+async function safeEnd(client: Client): Promise<void> {
+  try {
+    await client.end();
+  } catch {
+    throw harnessError("An integration database connection could not be closed.");
+  }
+}
+
+const trackedDatabases = new Set<string>();
+
+async function createDatabase(databaseName: string): Promise<void> {
+  const admin = await openAdministrativeClient(baseDatabaseUrl());
+  try {
+    await safeQuery(admin, `CREATE DATABASE ${quoteDatabaseName(databaseName)} TEMPLATE template0`);
+  } finally {
+    await safeEnd(admin);
+  }
+}
+
+async function dropDatabase(databaseName: string): Promise<void> {
+  const admin = await openAdministrativeClient(baseDatabaseUrl());
+  try {
+    await safeQuery(
+      admin,
+      "SELECT pg_terminate_backend(pid) FROM pg_stat_activity WHERE datname = $1 AND pid <> pg_backend_pid()",
+      [databaseName],
+    );
+    await safeQuery(
+      admin,
+      `DROP DATABASE IF EXISTS ${quoteDatabaseName(databaseName)} WITH (FORCE)`,
+    );
+    trackedDatabases.delete(databaseName);
+  } finally {
+    await safeEnd(admin);
+  }
+}
+
+async function activeConnectionCount(databaseName: string): Promise<number> {
+  const admin = await openAdministrativeClient(baseDatabaseUrl());
+  try {
+    const rows = await safeQuery<{ count: string }>(
+      admin,
+      "SELECT count(*)::text AS count FROM pg_stat_activity WHERE datname = $1",
+      [databaseName],
+    );
+    return Number(rows[0]?.count ?? "0");
+  } finally {
+    await safeEnd(admin);
+  }
+}
+
+async function createDisposableDatabase(label: string): Promise<{ name: string; url: string }> {
+  const name = makeDatabaseName(label);
+  await createDatabase(name);
+  trackedDatabases.add(name);
+  return { name, url: databaseUrl(name) };
+}
+
+/** Applies only Core's own migrations, against an empty modules directory — the module fixture's
+ * migration is deliberately absent, used only by the "no auto-migration" negative scenario below. */
+async function applyCoreMigrations(url: string): Promise<void> {
+  const emptyModulesDirectory = await mkdtemp(
+    path.join(tmpdir(), "ekklesia-db-facade-no-modules-"),
+  );
+  try {
+    const aggregate = await discoverAllMigrations({
+      coreMigrationsDirectory,
+      moduleDiscovery: {
+        moduleSdkVersion: "0.1.0",
+        modulesDirectory: emptyModulesDirectory,
+        platformVersion: "0.1.0",
+      },
+    });
+    expect(aggregate.migrations.map((entry) => entry.identity)).toEqual([
+      "core:0000_identity_core_tables",
+      "core:0001_authorization_core_tables",
+      "core:0002_authorization_integrity",
+      "core:0003_dashboard_navigation_tables",
+      "core:0004_module_lifecycle_state",
+      "core:0005_module_configuration",
+      "core:0006_device_identity",
+      "core:0007_verified_bootstrap_owners",
+    ]);
+    await applyModuleMigrations({ aggregate, database: createPostgresMigrationDatabase(url) });
+  } finally {
+    await rm(emptyModulesDirectory, { recursive: true, force: true });
+  }
+}
+
+/** Applies Core's migrations plus the `db-facade` fixture module's own migration — explicitly,
+ * before any module runtime exists — proving the platform never infers or auto-generates this
+ * table. Pass-1's committed core migrations and checksums must not have drifted while this pass
+ * was built. */
+async function applyMigrationsWithModule(url: string): Promise<void> {
+  const aggregate = await discoverAllMigrations({
+    coreMigrationsDirectory,
+    moduleDiscovery: {
+      moduleSdkVersion: "0.1.0",
+      modulesDirectory: fixtureModulesDirectory,
+      platformVersion: "0.1.0",
+    },
+  });
+  // Core migrations aggregate first, exactly once each, and always before any module migration.
+  expect(aggregate.migrations.map((entry) => entry.identity)).toEqual([
+    "core:0000_identity_core_tables",
+    "core:0001_authorization_core_tables",
+    "core:0002_authorization_integrity",
+    "core:0003_dashboard_navigation_tables",
+    "core:0004_module_lifecycle_state",
+    "core:0005_module_configuration",
+    "core:0006_device_identity",
+    "core:0007_verified_bootstrap_owners",
+    "db-facade:0000_initial",
+  ]);
+  expect(aggregate.migrations[0]?.checksum).toBe(
+    "f8f2086ef06f7a6943e8ffc4350bb010b37aed04c0a72030d2b153c986b1325f",
+  );
+  expect(aggregate.migrations[1]?.checksum).toBe(
+    "830e1fbc26d05af08df8d8710c3d10e1f3016d32c41b8363cb661c49afcbe81e",
+  );
+  expect(aggregate.migrations[2]?.checksum).toBe(
+    "63429473118065dfe3877a1baec61b8f61663b88127d9cb17707c859f27f6036",
+  );
+  await applyModuleMigrations({ aggregate, database: createPostgresMigrationDatabase(url) });
+}
+
+async function startMigratedApi(
+  url: string,
+  modulesDirectoryOverride?: string,
+): Promise<RunningApi> {
+  const config = createApiRuntimeConfig(
+    {
+      databaseUrl: url,
+      host: "127.0.0.1",
+      identity: {
+        baseUrl: identityBaseUrl,
+        publicSignupEnabled: true,
+        secret: "integration-test-secret-0123456789abcdefgh",
+        trustedOrigins: [identityBaseUrl, dashboardOrigin],
+      },
+      port: 0,
+    },
+    // Development validation: this suite signs an owner account up over HTTP to exercise real
+    // authorized module database access, and production configuration refuses to enable public
+    // signup at all until durable abuse controls exist
+    // (`PUBLIC_SIGNUP_UNSUPPORTED_IN_PRODUCTION`, `core/src/identity/config.ts`). `environment`
+    // affects only Ekklesia's own config validation — it never reaches Better Auth — and the base
+    // URL and trusted origins here are identical either way.
+    { environment: "development" },
+  );
+  return startApi(config, {
+    rateLimitOverride: { max: 1000, window: 1 },
+    ...(modulesDirectoryOverride === undefined ? {} : { modulesDirectoryOverride }),
+  });
+}
+
+function apiOrigin(running: RunningApi): string {
+  const address = running.server.address();
+  if (!address || typeof address !== "object") {
+    throw harnessError("The API integration server has no bound address.");
+  }
+  return `http://127.0.0.1:${address.port}`;
+}
+
+interface SignUpResult {
+  readonly userId: string;
+}
+
+async function signUp(origin: string, email: string, password: string): Promise<SignUpResult> {
+  const response = await fetch(`${origin}/api/auth/sign-up/email`, {
+    body: JSON.stringify({ email, name: "Integration Test User", password }),
+    headers: { "content-type": "application/json", origin: dashboardOrigin },
+    method: "POST",
+  });
+  const body = (await response.json()) as { user: { id: string } };
+  return { userId: body.user.id };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Marks an address verified out of band, the same trusted step the initial-owner bootstrap performs.
+ *
+ * A verified address is a precondition for holding a session (ADR 0038), and this suite is about
+ * module database access rather than identity, so it completes that step directly rather than
+ * standing up an SMTP server. That the policy is genuinely enforced is asserted in
+ * `email-verification.integration.ts`.
+ */
+async function markEmailVerified(url: string, email: string): Promise<void> {
+  const client = new Client({ connectionString: url });
+  await client.connect();
+  try {
+    await client.query(
+      'update "ekklesia_core_user" set "email_verified" = true where lower("email") = $1',
+      [email.trim().toLowerCase()],
+    );
+  } finally {
+    await client.end().catch(() => undefined);
+  }
+}
+
+async function signIn(origin: string, email: string, password: string): Promise<string> {
+  const response = await fetch(`${origin}/api/auth/sign-in/email`, {
+    body: JSON.stringify({ email, password }),
+    headers: { "content-type": "application/json", origin: dashboardOrigin },
+    method: "POST",
+  });
+  const setCookie = response.headers.get("set-cookie");
+  if (!setCookie) {
+    throw harnessError("Sign-in did not return a session cookie.");
+  }
+  return setCookie.split(",")[0]?.split(";")[0]?.trim() ?? "";
+}
+
+interface RecordedEvent {
+  readonly type: "register" | "start" | "stop" | "handler";
+  readonly services?: { readonly database: unknown };
+  readonly route?: string;
+  readonly contextKeys?: readonly string[];
+}
+
+function globalRecord(): Record<string, unknown> {
+  return globalThis as unknown as Record<string, unknown>;
+}
+
+function resetRecorder(): void {
+  globalRecord()[RECORDER_GLOBAL_KEY] = [];
+}
+
+function readRecorder(): RecordedEvent[] {
+  return (globalRecord()[RECORDER_GLOBAL_KEY] as RecordedEvent[] | undefined) ?? [];
+}
+
+async function tableExists(url: string): Promise<boolean> {
+  const admin = await openAdministrativeClient(url);
+  try {
+    const rows = await safeQuery<{ exists: boolean }>(
+      admin,
+      "select exists (select 1 from information_schema.tables where table_schema = 'public' and table_name = $1) as exists",
+      [RECORDS_TABLE],
+    );
+    return rows[0]?.exists ?? false;
+  } finally {
+    await safeEnd(admin);
+  }
+}
+
+async function fetchRecordRow(
+  url: string,
+  id: string,
+): Promise<{ id: string; value: string } | undefined> {
+  const admin = await openAdministrativeClient(url);
+  try {
+    const rows = await safeQuery<{ id: string; value: string }>(
+      admin,
+      `select id, value from "${RECORDS_TABLE}" where id = $1`,
+      [id],
+    );
+    return rows[0];
+  } finally {
+    await safeEnd(admin);
+  }
+}
+
+async function recordExists(url: string, id: string): Promise<boolean> {
+  return (await fetchRecordRow(url, id)) !== undefined;
+}
+
+async function migrationHistoryCount(url: string, identity: string): Promise<number> {
+  const admin = await openAdministrativeClient(url);
+  try {
+    const rows = await safeQuery<{ count: string }>(
+      admin,
+      `select count(*)::text as count from "ekklesia_core_migrations" where identity = $1`,
+      [identity],
+    );
+    return Number(rows[0]?.count ?? "0");
+  } finally {
+    await safeEnd(admin);
+  }
+}
+
+afterAll(async () => {
+  delete globalRecord()[RECORDER_GLOBAL_KEY];
+  for (const databaseName of [...trackedDatabases]) {
+    await dropDatabase(databaseName).catch(() => undefined);
+  }
+});
+
+describe.sequential("live API — module database explicit migration ownership", () => {
+  it("creates no table merely by applying core migrations or constructing the pool and facade — only an explicit module migration does", async () => {
+    const database = await createDisposableDatabase("mig_absent");
+    try {
+      expect(await tableExists(database.url)).toBe(false);
+
+      await applyCoreMigrations(database.url);
+      expect(await tableExists(database.url)).toBe(false);
+
+      const handle = createApiDatabase(database.url);
+      expect(handle.module).toBeDefined();
+      await handle.close();
+      expect(await tableExists(database.url)).toBe(false);
+
+      await applyMigrationsWithModule(database.url);
+      expect(await tableExists(database.url)).toBe(true);
+    } finally {
+      await dropDatabase(database.name);
+    }
+  });
+
+  it("applies the module's migration exactly once, never regenerating or reapplying it across repeated startups", async () => {
+    const database = await createDisposableDatabase("mig_once");
+    try {
+      await applyMigrationsWithModule(database.url);
+      expect(await migrationHistoryCount(database.url, "db-facade:0000_initial")).toBe(1);
+
+      const first = await startMigratedApi(database.url, fixtureModulesDirectory);
+      await first.shutdown();
+      const second = await startMigratedApi(database.url, fixtureModulesDirectory);
+      await second.shutdown();
+
+      expect(await migrationHistoryCount(database.url, "db-facade:0000_initial")).toBe(1);
+      expect(await migrationHistoryCount(database.url, "core:0000_identity_core_tables")).toBe(1);
+      expect(await migrationHistoryCount(database.url, "core:0001_authorization_core_tables")).toBe(
+        1,
+      );
+      expect(await migrationHistoryCount(database.url, "core:0002_authorization_integrity")).toBe(
+        1,
+      );
+      expect(
+        await migrationHistoryCount(database.url, "core:0003_dashboard_navigation_tables"),
+      ).toBe(1);
+      expect(await migrationHistoryCount(database.url, "core:0004_module_lifecycle_state")).toBe(1);
+    } finally {
+      await dropDatabase(database.name);
+    }
+  });
+
+  it("fails module startup rather than silently creating the table when the module's own migration was never applied", async () => {
+    const database = await createDisposableDatabase("mig_skip");
+    try {
+      await applyCoreMigrations(database.url);
+      resetRecorder();
+
+      // The module whose `start` failed is now rolled back through its own `stop` hook first. That
+      // hook also writes to the table its missing migration would have created, so it fails too —
+      // which is exactly the documented reason a `stop` hook must tolerate partial initialization.
+      // Both outcomes are reported, in order, and neither is swallowed.
+      await expect(startMigratedApi(database.url, fixtureModulesDirectory)).rejects.toMatchObject({
+        issues: [
+          expect.objectContaining({ code: "MODULE_START_FAILED", moduleId: "db-facade" }),
+          expect.objectContaining({ code: "MODULE_ROLLBACK_FAILED", moduleId: "db-facade" }),
+        ],
+      });
+
+      // No schema inference, no automatic table creation as a side effect of the failed attempt.
+      expect(await tableExists(database.url)).toBe(false);
+    } finally {
+      await dropDatabase(database.name);
+    }
+  });
+});
+
+describe.sequential("live API — module database access through ModuleRuntimeServices", () => {
+  let database: { name: string; url: string };
+  let running: RunningApi;
+  let origin: string;
+  let ownerCookie: string;
+
+  it("starts a freshly migrated API; register receives no services; start writes the startup record through the real facade", async () => {
+    database = await createDisposableDatabase("db_facade");
+    await applyMigrationsWithModule(database.url);
+    resetRecorder();
+
+    running = await startMigratedApi(database.url, fixtureModulesDirectory);
+    origin = apiOrigin(running);
+
+    const events = readRecorder();
+    const registerEvents = events.filter((event) => event.type === "register");
+    const startEvents = events.filter((event) => event.type === "start");
+    expect(registerEvents).toHaveLength(1);
+    expect(registerEvents[0]?.services).toBeUndefined();
+    expect(startEvents).toHaveLength(1);
+    expect(startEvents[0]?.services?.database).toBeDefined();
+
+    const startupRow = await fetchRecordRow(database.url, STARTUP_RECORD_ID);
+    expect(startupRow).toEqual({ id: STARTUP_RECORD_ID, value: "startup-value" });
+
+    const signedUp = await signUp(origin, "[email protected]", "correct horse battery");
+    await markEmailVerified(database.url, "[email protected]");
+    ownerCookie = await signIn(origin, "[email protected]", "correct horse battery");
+    expect(signedUp.userId).toBeDefined();
+  });
+
+  it("authorized read reflects real PostgreSQL state, exposes the exact scoped handler context, and the handler's database is reference-equal to start's", async () => {
+    const response = await fetch(`${origin}/api/v1/modules/db-facade/records/${STARTUP_RECORD_ID}`);
+    expect(response.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(await response.json()).toEqual({ id: STARTUP_RECORD_ID, value: "startup-value" });
+
+    const events = readRecorder();
+    const startEvent = events.find((event) => event.type === "start");
+    const readHandlerEvent = [...events]
+      .reverse()
+      .find((event) => event.type === "handler" && event.route === "GET /records/:id");
+    // The complete handler-context surface, asserted exactly so a new field is a deliberate change
+    // here rather than an unnoticed one: `config` (ADR 0029), `storage` (ADR 0030), and `realtime`
+    // (ADR 0032) are scoped, per-module additions; everything else a module might want — a Hono
+    // Context, the authorization store, raw PostgreSQL, the storage provider, an endpoint or
+    // credential — remains unreachable.
+    expect(readHandlerEvent?.contextKeys).toEqual([
+      "config",
+      "moduleId",
+      "params",
+      "principal",
+      "realtime",
+      "services",
+      "storage",
+    ]);
+    expect(readHandlerEvent?.services).toBeDefined();
+    expect(readHandlerEvent?.services?.database).toBe(startEvent?.services?.database);
+  });
+
+  it("requires a trusted Origin for the module's mutating route, performs a real insert, and a later read observes it", async () => {
+    const id = randomUUID();
+    const noOrigin = await fetch(`${origin}/api/v1/modules/db-facade/records`, {
+      body: JSON.stringify({ id, value: "no-origin" }),
+      headers: { "content-type": "application/json", cookie: ownerCookie },
+      method: "POST",
+    });
+    expect(noOrigin.status).toBe(403);
+    expect(await noOrigin.json()).toEqual({ code: "UNTRUSTED_ORIGIN" });
+    expect(await recordExists(database.url, id)).toBe(false);
+
+    const created = await fetch(`${origin}/api/v1/modules/db-facade/records`, {
+      body: JSON.stringify({ id, value: "created-value" }),
+      headers: {
+        "content-type": "application/json",
+        cookie: ownerCookie,
+        origin: dashboardOrigin,
+      },
+      method: "POST",
+    });
+    expect(created.status).toBe(201);
+    expect(await created.json()).toEqual({ id, value: "created-value" });
+
+    const readBack = await fetch(`${origin}/api/v1/modules/db-facade/records/${id}`);
+    expect(readBack.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(await readBack.json()).toEqual({ id, value: "created-value" });
+
+    const patched = await fetch(`${origin}/api/v1/modules/db-facade/records/${id}`, {
+      body: JSON.stringify({ value: "patched-value" }),
+      headers: {
+        "content-type": "application/json",
+        cookie: ownerCookie,
+        origin: dashboardOrigin,
+      },
+      method: "PATCH",
+    });
+    expect(patched.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(await patched.json()).toEqual({ id, value: "patched-value" });
+    expect(await fetchRecordRow(database.url, id)).toEqual({ id, value: "patched-value" });
+  });
+
+  it("denies the mutating route to an unauthenticated caller, invoking neither the handler nor a database mutation", async () => {
+    const id = randomUUID();
+    const eventsBefore = readRecorder().length;
+
+    const response = await fetch(`${origin}/api/v1/modules/db-facade/records`, {
+      body: JSON.stringify({ id, value: "should-not-persist" }),
+      headers: {
+        "content-type": "application/json",
+        origin: dashboardOrigin,
+      },
+      method: "POST",
+    });
+
+    expect(response.status).toBe(403);
+    expect(await response.json()).toEqual({ code: "AUTHORIZATION_DENIED" });
+    expect(readRecorder().length).toBe(eventsBefore);
+    expect(await recordExists(database.url, id)).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it("rejects an untrusted-Origin mutation before principal resolution, invoking neither the handler nor a database mutation", async () => {
+    const id = randomUUID();
+    const eventsBefore = readRecorder().length;
+
+    const response = await fetch(`${origin}/api/v1/modules/db-facade/records`, {
+      body: JSON.stringify({ id, value: "should-not-persist" }),
+      headers: {
+        "content-type": "application/json",
+        cookie: ownerCookie,
+        origin: untrustedOrigin,
+      },
+      method: "POST",
+    });
+
+    expect(response.status).toBe(403);
+    expect(await response.json()).toEqual({ code: "UNTRUSTED_ORIGIN" });
+    expect(readRecorder().length).toBe(eventsBefore);
+    expect(await recordExists(database.url, id)).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it("keeps OPTIONS platform-owned: never invokes module code, never mutates the table, and returns correct final CORS/Vary", async () => {
+    const id = randomUUID();
+    const eventsBefore = readRecorder().length;
+
+    const response = await fetch(`${origin}/api/v1/modules/db-facade/records`, {
+      headers: {
+        "access-control-request-method": "POST",
+        origin: dashboardOrigin,
+      },
+      method: "OPTIONS",
+    });
+
+    expect(response.status).toBe(204);
+    expect(response.headers.get("access-control-allow-origin")).toBe(dashboardOrigin);
+    const vary = (response.headers.get("vary") ?? "").split(",").map((token) => token.trim());
+    expect(vary.filter((token) => token.toLowerCase() === "origin")).toHaveLength(1);
+    expect(readRecorder().length).toBe(eventsBefore);
+    expect(await recordExists(database.url, id)).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it("cannot let HEAD bypass the authorized GET chain, and creates no mutation", async () => {
+    const anonymousHead = await fetch(`${origin}/api/v1/modules/db-facade/records-count`, {
+      method: "HEAD",
+    });
+    expect(anonymousHead.status).toBe(403);
+    expect(await anonymousHead.text()).toBe("");
+
+    const authorizedHead = await fetch(`${origin}/api/v1/modules/db-facade/records-count`, {
+      headers: { cookie: ownerCookie },
+      method: "HEAD",
+    });
+    expect(authorizedHead.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(await authorizedHead.text()).toBe("");
+
+    const countBefore = await countRecordRowsViaGet(origin, ownerCookie);
+    const countAfter = await countRecordRowsViaGet(origin, ownerCookie);
+    expect(countAfter).toBe(countBefore);
+  });
+
+  it("commits a real transaction and persists its result", async () => {
+    const id = randomUUID();
+    const response = await fetch(`${origin}/api/v1/modules/db-facade/records/transactional`, {
+      body: JSON.stringify({ id, value: "committed-value" }),
+      headers: {
+        "content-type": "application/json",
+        cookie: ownerCookie,
+        origin: dashboardOrigin,
+      },
+      method: "POST",
+    });
+    expect(response.status).toBe(201);
+    expect(await response.json()).toEqual({ committed: true });
+    expect(await fetchRecordRow(database.url, id)).toEqual({ id, value: "committed-value" });
+  });
+
+  it("rolls back a real transaction on a unique-constraint failure, leaving no partial mutation", async () => {
+    const id = randomUUID();
+    const conflictId = randomUUID();
+    const response = await fetch(`${origin}/api/v1/modules/db-facade/records/transactional`, {
+      body: JSON.stringify({ id, value: "should-roll-back", conflictId }),
+      headers: {
+        "content-type": "application/json",
+        cookie: ownerCookie,
+        origin: dashboardOrigin,
+      },
+      method: "POST",
+    });
+    expect(response.status).toBe(409);
+    expect(await response.json()).toEqual({ committed: false });
+
+    // The whole transaction rolled back atomically — including the first, otherwise-valid insert.
+    expect(await recordExists(database.url, id)).toBe(false);
+    expect(await recordExists(database.url, conflictId)).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it("preserves a module's own sanitized response for a database failure it deliberately catches", async () => {
+    const response = await fetch(`${origin}/api/v1/modules/db-facade/safe-boom`);
+    expect(response.status).toBe(409);
+    expect(await response.json()).toEqual({ code: "BOOM_HANDLED" });
+  });
+
+  it("sanitizes an uncaught real PostgreSQL failure to the existing MODULE_HANDLER_FAILED boundary, leaking no detail", async () => {
+    const response = await fetch(`${origin}/api/v1/modules/db-facade/boom`);
+    const text = await response.text();
+
+    expect(response.status).toBe(500);
+    expect(text).toBe(JSON.stringify({ code: "MODULE_HANDLER_FAILED" }));
+    expect(response.headers.get("cache-control")).toBe("no-store");
+
+    const lowered = text.toLowerCase();
+    for (const forbidden of [
+      "division",
+      "sql",
+      "postgres",
+      "22012",
+      "select",
+      "relation",
+      "stack",
+      "node_modules",
+      fixtureModulesDirectory.toLowerCase(),
+    ]) {
+      expect(lowered).not.toContain(forbidden);
+    }
+  });
+
+  it("stops cleanly: stop receives the same services and database as start, its write completes before the pool closes, and the API shuts down", async () => {
+    const events = readRecorder();
+    const startEvent = events.find((event) => event.type === "start");
+
+    await running.shutdown();
+
+    const remainingConnections = await activeConnectionCount(database.name);
+    expect(remainingConnections).toBe(0);
+
+    const eventsAfterShutdown = readRecorder();
+    const stopEvents = eventsAfterShutdown.filter((event) => event.type === "stop");
+    expect(stopEvents).toHaveLength(1);
+    expect(stopEvents[0]?.services?.database).toBe(startEvent?.services?.database);
+
+    // Read via a separate administrative connection, entirely independent of the API's own
+    // (now-closed) pool — proving the stop write completed and persisted before that pool closed.
+    const stoppedRow = await fetchRecordRow(database.url, STARTUP_RECORD_ID);
+    expect(stoppedRow).toEqual({ id: STARTUP_RECORD_ID, value: "stopped-by-shutdown" });
+
+    await dropDatabase(database.name);
+  });
+});
+
+async function countRecordRowsViaGet(origin: string, cookie: string): Promise<number> {
+  const response = await fetch(`${origin}/api/v1/modules/db-facade/records-count`, {
+    headers: { cookie },
+  });
+  const body = (await response.json()) as { count: number };
+  return body.count;
+}

apps/api/tests/module-display-routes.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,568 @@
+import { mkdir, mkdtemp, rm, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises";
+import { tmpdir } from "node:os";
+import path from "node:path";
+import {
+  ANONYMOUS_PRINCIPAL,
+  createAuthenticatedPrincipal,
+  type EkklesiaPrincipal,
+  type ModuleDatabase,
+  type ModuleRuntimeServices,
+  parseEkklesiaUserId,
+} from "@ekklesia/contracts";
+import {
+  type AuthorizationEvaluator,
+  type AuthorizationStore,
+  createAuthorizationEvaluator,
+} from "@ekklesia/core/authorization";
+import type { EkklesiaIdentityRuntime } from "@ekklesia/core/identity";
+import {
+  composePlatformPermissionRegistry,
+  createModuleUiPublicationRegistry,
+  type DiscoveredModule,
+  discoverModules,
+  EMPTY_MODULE_REALTIME_REGISTRY,
+} from "@ekklesia/core/modules";
+import type { Hono } from "hono";
+import { afterEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest";
+import { createApiApp } from "../src/app.js";
+import { createDisplayHostAssets, type DisplayHostAssets } from "../src/display-host-assets.js";
+import {
+  DISPLAY_HOST_SCRIPT_PATH,
+  DISPLAY_SERVICE_WORKER_PATH,
+  ModuleDisplayConfigurationError,
+  moduleDisplayDescriptorUrl,
+  moduleDisplayPageUrl,
+} from "../src/module-display-routes.js";
+import { moduleApiBaseUrl } from "../src/module-http-routes.js";
+import { moduleRealtimeBaseUrl } from "../src/module-realtime-routes.js";
+import { MODULE_UI_INVENTORY_PATH } from "../src/module-ui-inventory.js";
+import { moduleDisplayUiArtifactUrl } from "../src/module-ui-routes.js";
+import { createInMemoryDashboardStore } from "./support/in-memory-dashboard-store.js";
+import { testDashboardHostAssets } from "./support/dashboard-host-assets.js";
+import { readyHealth } from "./support/ready-health.js";
+import { moduleConfigurationOptionFor } from "./support/in-memory-module-configuration.js";
+import {
+  createInMemoryModuleLifecycleStore,
+  moduleLifecycleSnapshotFor,
+} from "./support/in-memory-module-lifecycle.js";
+import { moduleStorageOptionFor } from "./support/in-memory-module-storage.js";
+
+const viewerId = parseEkklesiaUserId("11111111-1111-4111-8111-111111111111");
+const trustedOrigin = "https://dashboard.example.test";
+const displayPermission = "announcements.display.view";
+
+const displayHostAssets: DisplayHostAssets = createDisplayHostAssets(
+  `<!doctype html><html><body><div id="ekklesia-display"></div><script type="module" src="${DISPLAY_HOST_SCRIPT_PATH}"></script></body></html>`,
+  "globalThis.__ekklesiaDisplayHostLoaded = true;\n",
+  "globalThis.__ekklesiaDisplayWorkerLoaded = true;\n",
+);
+
+const temporaryDirectories: string[] = [];
+
+afterEach(async () => {
+  await Promise.all(
+    temporaryDirectories
+      .splice(0)
+      .map((directory) => rm(directory, { force: true, recursive: true })),
+  );
+});
+
+interface ModuleFixture {
+  readonly display?: boolean;
+  readonly id?: string;
+  readonly ui?: boolean;
+  readonly version?: string;
+}
+
+async function createModule(modulesDirectory: string, fixture: ModuleFixture = {}): Promise<void> {
+  const id = fixture.id ?? "announcements";
+  const version = fixture.version ?? "1.4.2";
+  const moduleDirectory = path.join(modulesDirectory, id);
+  await mkdir(path.join(moduleDirectory, "dist/server"), { recursive: true });
+  await writeFile(
+    path.join(moduleDirectory, "package.json"),
+    JSON.stringify({
+      ekklesia: { layer: "module" },
+      name: `@test/module-${id}`,
+      type: "module",
+      version,
+    }),
+  );
+  await writeFile(
+    path.join(moduleDirectory, "ekklesia.module.json"),
+    JSON.stringify({
+      compatibility: { moduleSdk: "^0.1.0", platform: "^0.1.0" },
+      entrypoints: {
+        server: "./dist/server/index.js",
+        ...(fixture.ui ? { ui: "./dist/ui/index.js" } : {}),
+        ...(fixture.display
+          ? {
+              display: {
+                artifact: "./dist/display/index.js",
+                permission: `${id}.display.view`,
+              },
+            }
+          : {}),
+      },
+      id,
+      manifestVersion: 7,
+      name: `${id} module`,
+      permissions: fixture.display
+        ? [
+            {
+              baseline: "restricted",
+              description: `View the ${id} display.`,
+              id: `${id}.display.view`,
+            },
+          ]
+        : [],
+      version,
+    }),
+  );
+  await writeFile(
+    path.join(moduleDirectory, "dist/server/index.js"),
+    `export default { id: ${JSON.stringify(id)}, version: ${JSON.stringify(version)} };\n`,
+  );
+  if (fixture.ui) {
+    await mkdir(path.join(moduleDirectory, "dist/ui"), { recursive: true });
+    await writeFile(
+      path.join(moduleDirectory, "dist/ui/index.js"),
+      `export default { id: ${JSON.stringify(id)}, version: ${JSON.stringify(version)}, mount() {} };\n`,
+    );
+  }
+  if (fixture.display) {
+    await mkdir(path.join(moduleDirectory, "dist/display"), { recursive: true });
+    await writeFile(
+      path.join(moduleDirectory, "dist/display/index.js"),
+      `export default { id: ${JSON.stringify(id)}, version: ${JSON.stringify(version)}, mount(container, context) { container.textContent = context.moduleId + ":slideshow"; } };\n`,
+    );
+  }
+}
+
+interface InstallOptions extends ModuleFixture {
+  readonly assets?: DisplayHostAssets;
+  readonly evaluator?: AuthorizationEvaluator;
+  readonly granted?: readonly string[];
+  readonly principal?: EkklesiaPrincipal;
+  /** The API builds publication from the eligible/running set. `false` models a module that was
+   * discovered but disabled or dependency-blocked before runtime startup. */
+  readonly published?: boolean;
+  readonly withAssets?: boolean;
+}
+
+interface Installation {
+  readonly app: Hono;
+  readonly modules: readonly DiscoveredModule[];
+}
+
+function fakeServices(): ModuleRuntimeServices {
+  return Object.freeze({ database: Object.freeze({}) as unknown as ModuleDatabase });
+}
+
+function fakeAuthorizationStore(): AuthorizationStore {
+  return {
+    createGrant: vi.fn(),
+    grantPlatformOwner: vi.fn(),
+    hasActiveGrant: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(false),
+    isPlatformOwner: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(false),
+    listGrantsForUser: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({ grants: [] }),
+    revokeGrant: vi.fn(),
+    revokePlatformOwner: vi.fn(),
+  } as unknown as AuthorizationStore;
+}
+
+async function install(options: InstallOptions): Promise<Installation> {
+  const modulesDirectory = await mkdtemp(path.join(tmpdir(), "ekklesia-api-display-"));
+  temporaryDirectories.push(modulesDirectory);
+  await createModule(modulesDirectory, options);
+  const modules = await discoverModules({
+    moduleSdkVersion: "0.1.0",
+    modulesDirectory,
+    platformVersion: "0.1.0",
+  });
+  const granted = new Set(options.granted ?? []);
+  const evaluator =
+    options.evaluator ??
+    createAuthorizationEvaluator({
+      grants: { hasActiveGrant: async (query) => granted.has(query.permission) },
+      platformOwners: { isPlatformOwner: async () => false },
+    });
+  const runtime: EkklesiaIdentityRuntime = {
+    handleAuthRequest: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(new Response(null, { status: 200 })),
+    resolvePrincipal: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(options.principal ?? ANONYMOUS_PRINCIPAL),
+  };
+  const publishedModules = options.published === false ? [] : modules;
+  const moduleUi = createModuleUiPublicationRegistry(publishedModules);
+  const app = createApiApp({
+    authorization: {
+      evaluator,
+      registry: composePlatformPermissionRegistry(modules),
+      store: fakeAuthorizationStore(),
+    },
+    dashboard: createInMemoryDashboardStore(),
+    dashboardHostAssets: testDashboardHostAssets(),
+    health: readyHealth(),
+    ...(moduleUi.listDisplays().length > 0 && options.withAssets !== false
+      ? { displayHostAssets: options.assets ?? displayHostAssets }
+      : {}),
+    moduleConfiguration: moduleConfigurationOptionFor(modules),
+    moduleLifecycle: {
+      snapshot: moduleLifecycleSnapshotFor(modules),
+      store: createInMemoryModuleLifecycleStore(),
+    },
+    moduleRealtime: EMPTY_MODULE_REALTIME_REGISTRY,
+    moduleRoutes: Object.freeze([]),
+    moduleServices: fakeServices(),
+    moduleStorage: moduleStorageOptionFor(modules),
+    moduleUi,
+    runtime,
+    trustedOrigins: [trustedOrigin],
+  });
+  return { app, modules };
+}
+
+function signedIn(): EkklesiaPrincipal {
+  return createAuthenticatedPrincipal(viewerId);
+}
+
+describe("module display routes — authorization and descriptor", () => {
+  it("gives an unpaired viewer the inert shell but never the descriptor", async () => {
+    const { app } = await install({ display: true });
+
+    const [page, descriptor] = await Promise.all([
+      app.request(moduleDisplayPageUrl("announcements")),
+      app.request(moduleDisplayDescriptorUrl("announcements")),
+    ]);
+
+    // The page is deliberately open: a television nobody has paired has no identity to present, and
+    // a 403 here would leave it nowhere to show a pairing code (ADR 0036). It carries nothing —
+    // the same module-agnostic bytes every display gets, with no module id and no data.
+    expect(page.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(await page.text()).toBe(displayHostAssets.html);
+
+    // Authorization is entirely in the descriptor, and it has not moved.
+    expect(descriptor.status).toBe(403);
+    expect(descriptor.headers.get("cache-control")).toBe("no-store");
+    expect(await descriptor.json()).toEqual({ code: "AUTHORIZATION_DENIED" });
+  });
+
+  it("requires the declared display permission, not merely an authenticated principal", async () => {
+    const { app } = await install({ display: true, principal: signedIn() });
+
+    // Being signed in is not being permitted, and the descriptor is where that is decided.
+    expect((await app.request(moduleDisplayDescriptorUrl("announcements"))).status).toBe(403);
+  });
+
+  it("serves the stable shell and current versioned descriptor to a permitted principal", async () => {
+    const { app } = await install({
+      display: true,
+      granted: [displayPermission],
+      principal: signedIn(),
+      version: "1.4.2",
+    });
+
+    const page = await app.request(moduleDisplayPageUrl("announcements"));
+    const descriptor = await app.request(moduleDisplayDescriptorUrl("announcements"));
+
+    expect(page.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(page.headers.get("content-type")).toBe("text/html; charset=utf-8");
+    expect(page.headers.get("cache-control")).toBe("no-store");
+    expect(page.headers.get("x-content-type-options")).toBe("nosniff");
+    expect(await page.text()).toBe(displayHostAssets.html);
+    expect(await descriptor.json()).toEqual({
+      viewer: { kind: "authenticated", userId: viewerId },
+      module: {
+        contributions: [],
+        api: { baseUrl: moduleApiBaseUrl("announcements") },
+        display: {
+          url: moduleDisplayUiArtifactUrl({ moduleId: "announcements", version: "1.4.2" }),
+        },
+        id: "announcements",
+        page: { url: moduleDisplayPageUrl("announcements") },
+        permissions: [displayPermission],
+        realtime: { baseUrl: moduleRealtimeBaseUrl("announcements") },
+        version: "1.4.2",
+      },
+    });
+    expect(descriptor.headers.get("cache-control")).toBe("no-store");
+    expect(descriptor.headers.get("content-type")).toContain("application/json");
+    expect(descriptor.headers.get("vary")).toContain("Origin");
+    expect(descriptor.headers.get("vary")).toContain("Cookie");
+  });
+
+  it("sanitizes a permission-hint evaluation failure after route authorization succeeds", async () => {
+    const authorize = vi
+      .fn()
+      .mockResolvedValueOnce({ allowed: true })
+      .mockRejectedValueOnce(new Error("postgresql://[email protected] /srv/modules/announcements"));
+    const evaluator: AuthorizationEvaluator = { authorize };
+    const { app } = await install({ display: true, evaluator, principal: signedIn() });
+
+    const response = await app.request(moduleDisplayDescriptorUrl("announcements"));
+    const body = await response.text();
+
+    expect(authorize).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2);
+    expect(response.status).toBe(503);
+    expect(JSON.parse(body)).toEqual({ code: "AUTHORIZATION_EVALUATION_FAILED" });
+    expect(response.headers.get("cache-control")).toBe("no-store");
+    expect(response.headers.get("vary")).toContain("Origin");
+    expect(response.headers.get("vary")).toContain("Cookie");
+    for (const secret of ["postgresql", "127.0.0.1", "/srv/", "announcements"]) {
+      expect(body).not.toContain(secret);
+    }
+  });
+
+  it("keeps the outer page stable when the internal artifact version changes", () => {
+    expect(moduleDisplayPageUrl("announcements")).toBe("/display/announcements");
+    expect(moduleDisplayUiArtifactUrl({ moduleId: "announcements", version: "1.0.0" })).not.toBe(
+      moduleDisplayUiArtifactUrl({ moduleId: "announcements", version: "2.0.0" }),
+    );
+  });
+});
+
+describe("module display routes — role and lifecycle separation", () => {
+  it("keeps a display-only module out of the primary UI inventory", async () => {
+    const { app } = await install({
+      display: true,
+      granted: [displayPermission],
+      principal: signedIn(),
+    });
+
+    expect((await app.request(moduleDisplayPageUrl("announcements"))).status).toBe(200);
+    const inventory = await app.request(MODULE_UI_INVENTORY_PATH);
+    expect(inventory.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(await inventory.json()).toEqual({ modules: [] });
+  });
+
+  it("does not give a dashboard-only module a display route", async () => {
+    const { app } = await install({ principal: signedIn(), ui: true });
+
+    expect((await app.request(moduleDisplayPageUrl("announcements"))).status).toBe(404);
+    const inventory = await app.request(MODULE_UI_INVENTORY_PATH);
+    expect(inventory.status).toBe(200);
+    expect((await inventory.json()) as { modules: unknown[] }).toMatchObject({
+      modules: [{ id: "announcements" }],
+    });
+  });
+
+  it("publishes both roles independently when a module declares both", async () => {
+    const { app } = await install({
+      display: true,
+      granted: [displayPermission],
+      principal: signedIn(),
+      ui: true,
+    });
+
+    expect((await app.request(moduleDisplayPageUrl("announcements"))).status).toBe(200);
+    expect((await app.request(MODULE_UI_INVENTORY_PATH)).status).toBe(200);
+    expect(
+      (
+        (await (await app.request(MODULE_UI_INVENTORY_PATH)).json()) as {
+          modules: Array<{ display: { url: string } | null }>;
+        }
+      ).modules,
+    ).toEqual([
+      expect.objectContaining({ display: { url: moduleDisplayPageUrl("announcements") } }),
+    ]);
+  });
+
+  it("has no display page, descriptor, or artifact when the module is outside the eligible set", async () => {
+    const { app } = await install({
+      display: true,
+      granted: [displayPermission],
+      principal: signedIn(),
+      published: false,
+    });
+
+    expect((await app.request(moduleDisplayPageUrl("announcements"))).status).toBe(404);
+    expect((await app.request(moduleDisplayDescriptorUrl("announcements"))).status).toBe(404);
+    expect(
+      (
+        await app.request(
+          moduleDisplayUiArtifactUrl({ moduleId: "announcements", version: "1.4.2" }),
+        )
+      ).status,
+    ).toBe(404);
+    expect((await app.request(DISPLAY_HOST_SCRIPT_PATH)).status).toBe(404);
+  });
+
+  it("registers only the exact stable page and descriptor paths", async () => {
+    const { app } = await install({
+      display: true,
+      granted: [displayPermission],
+      principal: signedIn(),
+    });
+
+    for (const route of [
+      "/display",
+      "/display/announcements/",
+      "/display/announcements/settings",
+      "/api/v1/module-displays",
+      "/api/v1/module-displays/announcements/",
+      "/api/v1/module-displays/announcements/settings",
+    ]) {
+      expect((await app.request(route)).status, route).toBe(404);
+    }
+  });
+
+  it("fails composition when a display exists but its host assets were not supplied", async () => {
+    await expect(install({ display: true, withAssets: false })).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(
+      ModuleDisplayConfigurationError,
+    );
+  });
+});
+
+describe("module display host asset publication", () => {
+  it("serves only the fixed script with JavaScript and revalidation headers", async () => {
+    const { app } = await install({ display: true });
+
+    const response = await app.request(DISPLAY_HOST_SCRIPT_PATH);
+    expect(response.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(await response.text()).toBe(displayHostAssets.script);
+    expect(response.headers.get("content-type")).toBe("text/javascript; charset=utf-8");
+    expect(response.headers.get("cache-control")).toBe("no-cache");
+    expect(response.headers.get("x-content-type-options")).toBe("nosniff");
+
+    const notModified = await app.request(DISPLAY_HOST_SCRIPT_PATH, {
+      headers: { "if-none-match": displayHostAssets.scriptEtag },
+    });
+    expect(notModified.status).toBe(304);
+    expect(await notModified.text()).toBe("");
+    expect(notModified.headers.get("etag")).toBe(displayHostAssets.scriptEtag);
+    expect(notModified.headers.get("cache-control")).toBe("no-cache");
+
+    for (const header of [
+      `W/${displayHostAssets.scriptEtag}`,
+      "*",
+      `"stale", ${displayHostAssets.scriptEtag}`,
+    ]) {
+      expect(
+        (
+          await app.request(DISPLAY_HOST_SCRIPT_PATH, {
+            headers: { "if-none-match": header },
+          })
+        ).status,
+        header,
+      ).toBe(304);
+    }
+    expect(
+      (
+        await app.request(DISPLAY_HOST_SCRIPT_PATH, {
+          headers: { "if-none-match": '"stale"' },
+        })
+      ).status,
+    ).toBe(200);
+  });
+
+  it("exposes no source map, neighboring file, arbitrary role, or request-selected path", async () => {
+    const { app } = await install({ display: true });
+
+    for (const candidate of [
+      `${DISPLAY_HOST_SCRIPT_PATH}.map`,
+      "/assets/ekklesia-display/index.html",
+      "/assets/ekklesia-display/secret.txt",
+      "/assets/ekklesia-display/../secret.txt",
+      "/api/v1/module-ui/announcements/1.4.2/management",
+    ]) {
+      expect((await app.request(candidate)).status, candidate).toBe(404);
+    }
+  });
+
+  it("uses identical non-interpolated HTML for every eligible module", async () => {
+    const first = await install({
+      display: true,
+      granted: [displayPermission],
+      principal: signedIn(),
+    });
+    const second = await install({
+      display: true,
+      granted: ["signage.display.view"],
+      id: "signage",
+      principal: signedIn(),
+    });
+
+    const firstHtml = await (await first.app.request(moduleDisplayPageUrl("announcements"))).text();
+    const secondHtml = await (await second.app.request(moduleDisplayPageUrl("signage"))).text();
+    expect(firstHtml).toBe(secondHtml);
+    expect(firstHtml).not.toContain("announcements");
+    expect(secondHtml).not.toContain("signage");
+  });
+
+  it("snapshots injected assets and rejects a validator that does not describe its script", async () => {
+    const source = createDisplayHostAssets(
+      "<html>display host</html>",
+      "export const host = 1;\n",
+      "export const worker = 1;\n",
+    );
+    const mutable = { ...source };
+    const { app } = await install({ assets: mutable, display: true });
+    mutable.html = "<html>mutated secret</html>";
+    mutable.script = "throw new Error('mutated secret');";
+
+    expect(await (await app.request(DISPLAY_HOST_SCRIPT_PATH)).text()).toBe(source.script);
+
+    await expect(
+      install({
+        assets: { ...source, scriptEtag: '"stale-validator"' },
+        display: true,
+      }),
+    ).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(ModuleDisplayConfigurationError);
+  });
+
+  it("does not publish the generic host script when no eligible display uses it", async () => {
+    const { app } = await install({ ui: true, withAssets: false });
+
+    expect((await app.request(DISPLAY_HOST_SCRIPT_PATH)).status).toBe(404);
+  });
+
+  it("serves the offline service worker from the path whose directory is its scope", async () => {
+    const { app } = await install({ display: true });
+
+    const response = await app.request(DISPLAY_SERVICE_WORKER_PATH);
+
+    // `/display/sw.js`, so the worker's default scope is `/display/` — display pages and nothing
+    // else. The Dashboard is never controlled by it (ADR 0043).
+    expect(DISPLAY_SERVICE_WORKER_PATH).toBe("/display/sw.js");
+    expect(response.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(await response.text()).toBe(displayHostAssets.serviceWorker);
+    expect(response.headers.get("content-type")).toBe("text/javascript; charset=utf-8");
+    // `no-cache` with a strong validator, exactly like the host script: a browser re-checks the
+    // worker on its own schedule, which is how a screen avoids being trapped on an obsolete one.
+    expect(response.headers.get("cache-control")).toBe("no-cache");
+    expect(response.headers.get("etag")).toBe(displayHostAssets.serviceWorkerEtag);
+    expect(response.headers.get("x-content-type-options")).toBe("nosniff");
+  });
+
+  it("revalidates the service worker with its own validator, never the host script's", async () => {
+    const { app } = await install({ display: true });
+
+    const notModified = await app.request(DISPLAY_SERVICE_WORKER_PATH, {
+      headers: { "if-none-match": displayHostAssets.serviceWorkerEtag },
+    });
+    expect(notModified.status).toBe(304);
+
+    const wrongValidator = await app.request(DISPLAY_SERVICE_WORKER_PATH, {
+      headers: { "if-none-match": displayHostAssets.scriptEtag },
+    });
+    expect(wrongValidator.status).toBe(200);
+  });
+
+  it("does not publish the service worker when no eligible display uses it", async () => {
+    const { app } = await install({ ui: true, withAssets: false });
+
+    expect((await app.request(DISPLAY_SERVICE_WORKER_PATH)).status).toBe(404);
+  });
+
+  it("cannot be reached through a neighbouring or request-selected path", async () => {
+    const { app } = await install({ display: true });
+
+    for (const candidate of [
+      `${DISPLAY_SERVICE_WORKER_PATH}.map`,
+      "/display/sw.js/",
+      "/sw.js",
+      "/assets/ekklesia-display/sw.js",
+    ]) {
+      expect((await app.request(candidate)).status, candidate).toBe(404);
+    }
+  });
+});

apps/api/tests/module-lifecycle-routes.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,582 @@
+import { mkdir, mkdtemp, rm, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises";
+import { tmpdir } from "node:os";
+import path from "node:path";
+import {
+  ANONYMOUS_PRINCIPAL,
+  createAuthenticatedPrincipal,
+  type EkklesiaPrincipal,
+  type ModuleDatabase,
+  type ModuleRuntimeServices,
+  parseEkklesiaUserId,
+} from "@ekklesia/contracts";
+import {
+  type AuthorizationStore,
+  CORE_MODULES_LIFECYCLE_MANAGE,
+  createAuthorizationEvaluator,
+} from "@ekklesia/core/authorization";
+import type { EkklesiaIdentityRuntime } from "@ekklesia/core/identity";
+import {
+  composePlatformPermissionRegistry,
+  createModuleUiPublicationRegistry,
+  type DiscoveredModule,
+  discoverModules,
+  type ModuleLifecycleStore,
+  ModuleLifecycleStoreError,
+  EMPTY_MODULE_REALTIME_REGISTRY,
+  resolveModuleEligibility,
+} from "@ekklesia/core/modules";
+import type { Hono } from "hono";
+import { afterEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest";
+import { createApiApp } from "../src/app.js";
+import { DASHBOARD_NAVIGATION_PATH } from "../src/dashboard-routes.js";
+import { CORE_MUTATION_MAX_BODY_BYTES } from "../src/body-limits.js";
+import { MODULE_LIFECYCLE_PATH } from "../src/module-lifecycle-routes.js";
+import { MODULE_UI_INVENTORY_PATH } from "../src/module-ui-inventory.js";
+import { createInMemoryDashboardStore } from "./support/in-memory-dashboard-store.js";
+import { testDashboardHostAssets } from "./support/dashboard-host-assets.js";
+import { readyHealth } from "./support/ready-health.js";
+import { createInMemoryModuleLifecycleStore } from "./support/in-memory-module-lifecycle.js";
+import { moduleConfigurationOptionFor } from "./support/in-memory-module-configuration.js";
+import { moduleStorageOptionFor } from "./support/in-memory-module-storage.js";
+
+const trustedOrigin = "https://dashboard.example.test";
+const untrustedOrigin = "https://evil.example.test";
+const viewerId = parseEkklesiaUserId("44444444-4444-4444-8444-444444444444");
+
+const temporaryDirectories: string[] = [];
+
+afterEach(async () => {
+  await Promise.all(
+    temporaryDirectories
+      .splice(0)
+      .map((directory) => rm(directory, { force: true, recursive: true })),
+  );
+});
+
+interface ModuleFixture {
+  readonly id: string;
+  readonly dependencies?: Record<string, unknown>;
+}
+
+async function createModule(modulesDirectory: string, fixture: ModuleFixture): Promise<void> {
+  const moduleDirectory = path.join(modulesDirectory, fixture.id);
+  await mkdir(path.join(moduleDirectory, "dist/server"), { recursive: true });
+  await mkdir(path.join(moduleDirectory, "dist/ui"), { recursive: true });
+  await Promise.all([
+    writeFile(
+      path.join(moduleDirectory, "package.json"),
+      JSON.stringify({
+        ekklesia: { layer: "module" },
+        name: `@test/module-${fixture.id}`,
+        type: "module",
+        version: "1.0.0",
+      }),
+    ),
+    writeFile(
+      path.join(moduleDirectory, "ekklesia.module.json"),
+      JSON.stringify({
+        compatibility: { moduleSdk: "^0.1.0", platform: "^0.1.0" },
+        ...(fixture.dependencies ? { dependencies: fixture.dependencies } : {}),
+        entrypoints: { server: "./dist/server/index.js", ui: "./dist/ui/index.js" },
+        id: fixture.id,
+        manifestVersion: 7,
+        name: `${fixture.id} module`,
+        version: "1.0.0",
+      }),
+    ),
+    writeFile(
+      path.join(moduleDirectory, "dist/server/index.js"),
+      `export default { id: ${JSON.stringify(fixture.id)}, version: "1.0.0" };`,
+    ),
+    writeFile(
+      path.join(moduleDirectory, "dist/ui/index.js"),
+      `export default { id: ${JSON.stringify(fixture.id)}, version: "1.0.0", mount() {} };\n`,
+    ),
+  ]);
+}
+
+const defaultFixtures: readonly ModuleFixture[] = [
+  { id: "storage" },
+  { id: "announcements", dependencies: { modules: { required: { storage: "^1.0.0" } } } },
+];
+
+interface InstallOptions {
+  readonly fixtures?: readonly ModuleFixture[];
+  readonly principal?: EkklesiaPrincipal;
+  readonly platformOwner?: boolean;
+  readonly bootDisabled?: readonly string[];
+  readonly store?: ModuleLifecycleStore;
+  /** Permissions this principal actually holds through a grant, evaluated by Core's real evaluator
+   * — never a bypass, so a delegated holder is exercised the same way a real one would be. */
+  readonly grants?: readonly string[];
+}
+
+interface Installation {
+  readonly app: Hono;
+  readonly modules: readonly DiscoveredModule[];
+  readonly store: ModuleLifecycleStore;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Composes the real application over a real discovered inventory, reproducing `startApi`'s own
+ * composition: resolve eligibility from the stored configuration, then build the UI publication
+ * registry and the boot snapshot from the **eligible** list rather than the discovered one. Doing it
+ * the same way here is what makes these assertions evidence about production composition rather than
+ * about a bespoke test wiring.
+ */
+async function install(options: InstallOptions = {}): Promise<Installation> {
+  const modulesDirectory = await mkdtemp(path.join(tmpdir(), "ekklesia-module-lifecycle-"));
+  temporaryDirectories.push(modulesDirectory);
+  for (const fixture of options.fixtures ?? defaultFixtures) {
+    await createModule(modulesDirectory, fixture);
+  }
+  const modules = await discoverModules({
+    moduleSdkVersion: "0.1.0",
+    modulesDirectory,
+    platformVersion: "0.1.0",
+  });
+
+  const store =
+    options.store ??
+    createInMemoryModuleLifecycleStore(
+      (options.bootDisabled ?? []).map((moduleId) => ({ enabled: false, moduleId })),
+    );
+  const bootConfiguration = await store.readConfiguration();
+  const eligibility = resolveModuleEligibility(modules, bootConfiguration);
+
+  const held = new Set(options.grants ?? []);
+  const evaluator = createAuthorizationEvaluator({
+    grants: { hasActiveGrant: async (query) => held.has(String(query.permission)) },
+    platformOwners: { isPlatformOwner: async () => options.platformOwner === true },
+  });
+  const runtime: EkklesiaIdentityRuntime = {
+    handleAuthRequest: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(new Response(null, { status: 200 })),
+    resolvePrincipal: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(options.principal ?? ANONYMOUS_PRINCIPAL),
+  };
+  const authorizationStore = {
+    createGrant: vi.fn(),
+    grantPlatformOwner: vi.fn(),
+    hasActiveGrant: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(false),
+    isPlatformOwner: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(false),
+    listGrantsForUser: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({ grants: [] }),
+    revokeGrant: vi.fn(),
+    revokePlatformOwner: vi.fn(),
+  } as unknown as AuthorizationStore;
+
+  const app = createApiApp({
+    authorization: {
+      evaluator,
+      // Permission composition still runs over the whole discovered inventory, unchanged: a
+      // disabled module's permissions stay registered and grantable, and nothing enforces them
+      // because it mounts no routes.
+      registry: composePlatformPermissionRegistry(modules),
+      store: authorizationStore,
+    },
+    dashboard: createInMemoryDashboardStore(),
+    dashboardHostAssets: testDashboardHostAssets(),
+    health: readyHealth(),
+    moduleConfiguration: moduleConfigurationOptionFor(modules),
+    moduleStorage: moduleStorageOptionFor(modules),
+    moduleLifecycle: {
+      snapshot: {
+        discoveredModules: modules,
+        eligibility: eligibility.entries,
+        startedModuleIds: eligibility.eligibleModules.map((module) => module.manifest.id),
+      },
+      store,
+    },
+    moduleRoutes: Object.freeze([]),
+    moduleRealtime: EMPTY_MODULE_REALTIME_REGISTRY,
+    moduleServices: Object.freeze({
+      database: Object.freeze({}) as unknown as ModuleDatabase,
+    }) as ModuleRuntimeServices,
+    moduleUi: createModuleUiPublicationRegistry(eligibility.eligibleModules),
+    runtime,
+    trustedOrigins: [trustedOrigin],
+  });
+
+  return { app, modules, store };
+}
+
+function owner(): InstallOptions {
+  return { platformOwner: true, principal: createAuthenticatedPrincipal(viewerId) };
+}
+
+interface LifecycleEntry {
+  readonly id: string;
+  readonly version: string;
+  readonly configured: { readonly enabled: boolean; readonly explicit: boolean };
+  readonly runtime: {
+    readonly state: string;
+    readonly reason?: string;
+    readonly dependency?: { readonly kind: string; readonly moduleId: string };
+  };
+  readonly restartRequired: boolean;
+}
+
+async function readLifecycle(app: Hono): Promise<readonly LifecycleEntry[]> {
+  const response = await app.request(MODULE_LIFECYCLE_PATH, {
+    headers: { origin: trustedOrigin },
+  });
+  expect(response.status).toBe(200);
+  const body = (await response.json()) as { readonly modules: readonly LifecycleEntry[] };
+  return body.modules;
+}
+
+function setEnabled(app: Hono, moduleId: string, enabled: boolean, origin = trustedOrigin) {
+  return app.request(`${MODULE_LIFECYCLE_PATH}/${moduleId}/enabled`, {
+    body: JSON.stringify({ enabled }),
+    headers: { "content-type": "application/json", origin },
+    method: "PUT",
+  });
+}
+
+describe("GET /api/v1/module-lifecycle", () => {
+  it("reports every discovered module with both axes separated", async () => {
+    const { app } = await install(owner());
+
+    expect(await readLifecycle(app)).toEqual([
+      {
+        configured: { enabled: true, explicit: false },
+        id: "storage",
+        restartRequired: false,
+        runtime: { state: "running" },
+        version: "1.0.0",
+      },
+      {
+        configured: { enabled: true, explicit: false },
+        id: "announcements",
+        restartRequired: false,
+        runtime: { state: "running" },
+        version: "1.0.0",
+      },
+    ]);
+  });
+
+  it("explains a disabled module and the dependent it blocks, with a structured reason", async () => {
+    const { app } = await install({ ...owner(), bootDisabled: ["storage"] });
+
+    expect(await readLifecycle(app)).toEqual([
+      {
+        configured: { enabled: false, explicit: true },
+        id: "storage",
+        restartRequired: false,
+        runtime: { state: "disabled" },
+        version: "1.0.0",
+      },
+      {
+        configured: { enabled: true, explicit: false },
+        id: "announcements",
+        restartRequired: false,
+        runtime: {
+          dependency: { kind: "module", moduleId: "storage" },
+          reason: "required_dependency_disabled",
+          state: "blocked",
+        },
+        version: "1.0.0",
+      },
+    ]);
+  });
+
+  it("is not cached and varies on origin and cookie", async () => {
+    const { app } = await install(owner());
+    const response = await app.request(MODULE_LIFECYCLE_PATH, {
+      headers: { origin: trustedOrigin },
+    });
+
+    expect(response.headers.get("Cache-Control")).toBe("no-store");
+    expect(response.headers.get("Vary")).toContain("Cookie");
+  });
+
+  it("refuses an anonymous caller", async () => {
+    const { app } = await install();
+    const response = await app.request(MODULE_LIFECYCLE_PATH);
+
+    expect(response.status).toBe(403);
+    expect(await response.json()).toEqual({ code: "AUTHORIZATION_DENIED" });
+  });
+
+  it("refuses an ordinary authenticated user who holds no lifecycle permission", async () => {
+    // The same principal that `core.modules.ui.read` (baseline `authenticated`) would admit: this
+    // resource is deliberately restricted, because it is the only place a disabled module is
+    // visible at all.
+    const { app } = await install({ principal: createAuthenticatedPrincipal(viewerId) });
+    const inventory = await app.request(MODULE_UI_INVENTORY_PATH);
+    const lifecycle = await app.request(MODULE_LIFECYCLE_PATH);
+
+    expect(inventory.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(lifecycle.status).toBe(403);
+  });
+
+  it("admits a non-owner holding exactly core.modules.lifecycle.manage through a real grant", async () => {
+    const { app } = await install({
+      grants: [String(CORE_MODULES_LIFECYCLE_MANAGE)],
+      principal: createAuthenticatedPrincipal(viewerId),
+    });
+
+    expect((await app.request(MODULE_LIFECYCLE_PATH)).status).toBe(200);
+    // Holding it confers no module authority: the Dashboard's own manage permission is untouched by
+    // this grant, so a lifecycle administrator cannot reorganize navigation.
+    const reorganize = await app.request(`${DASHBOARD_NAVIGATION_PATH}/groups/media`, {
+      body: JSON.stringify({ label: "Media", order: 10 }),
+      headers: { "content-type": "application/json", origin: trustedOrigin },
+      method: "PUT",
+    });
+    expect(reorganize.status).toBe(403);
+  });
+
+  it("reports a sanitized 503 when the configuration cannot be read, never a driver detail", async () => {
+    const failing: ModuleLifecycleStore = {
+      readConfiguration: async () => {
+        throw new ModuleLifecycleStoreError("MODULE_LIFECYCLE_READ_FAILED");
+      },
+      setEnabled: async () => {
+        throw new ModuleLifecycleStoreError("MODULE_LIFECYCLE_WRITE_FAILED");
+      },
+    };
+    // Boot with a working store, then swap in the failing one for the request path only.
+    const { app } = await install({ ...owner(), store: failingAfterBoot(failing) });
+    const response = await app.request(MODULE_LIFECYCLE_PATH, {
+      headers: { origin: trustedOrigin },
+    });
+
+    expect(response.status).toBe(503);
+    expect(await response.json()).toEqual({ code: "MODULE_LIFECYCLE_READ_FAILED" });
+  });
+});
+
+/** Answers the one boot-time read with an empty configuration, then fails every later call — so a
+ * request-path failure can be exercised without making startup composition itself impossible. */
+function failingAfterBoot(failing: ModuleLifecycleStore): ModuleLifecycleStore {
+  let bootRead = false;
+  return {
+    async readConfiguration() {
+      if (!bootRead) {
+        bootRead = true;
+        return { modules: [] };
+      }
+      return failing.readConfiguration();
+    },
+    setEnabled: (input) => failing.setEnabled(input),
+  };
+}
+
+describe("PUT /api/v1/module-lifecycle/:moduleId/enabled", () => {
+  it("persists a decision and reports honestly that the running process has not changed", async () => {
+    const { app } = await install(owner());
+
+    const response = await setEnabled(app, "announcements", false);
+
+    expect(response.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(await response.json()).toEqual({
+      configured: { enabled: false, explicit: true },
+      id: "announcements",
+      // Not `disabled`: this process is still serving that module. Claiming otherwise would be a
+      // lie about a module that is still running.
+      restartRequired: true,
+      runtime: { state: "running" },
+      version: "1.0.0",
+    });
+  });
+
+  it("marks the dependents of a newly disabled module as restart-pending too", async () => {
+    const { app } = await install(owner());
+
+    await setEnabled(app, "storage", false);
+
+    expect((await readLifecycle(app)).map((entry) => [entry.id, entry.restartRequired])).toEqual([
+      ["storage", true],
+      ["announcements", true],
+    ]);
+  });
+
+  it("is idempotent, and re-enabling clears the pending restart", async () => {
+    const { app } = await install(owner());
+
+    await setEnabled(app, "announcements", false);
+    await setEnabled(app, "announcements", false);
+    const reEnabled = await setEnabled(app, "announcements", true);
+
+    expect(await reEnabled.json()).toEqual({
+      configured: { enabled: true, explicit: true },
+      id: "announcements",
+      restartRequired: false,
+      runtime: { state: "running" },
+      version: "1.0.0",
+    });
+  });
+
+  it("refuses a module this process cannot see, rather than storing an unverifiable record", async () => {
+    const { app, store } = await install(owner());
+
+    const response = await setEnabled(app, "not-installed", false);
+
+    expect(response.status).toBe(404);
+    expect(await response.json()).toEqual({ code: "MODULE_NOT_INSTALLED" });
+    expect((await store.readConfiguration()).modules).toEqual([]);
+  });
+
+  it("refuses a malformed module identifier without reaching the store", async () => {
+    const { app, store } = await install(owner());
+
+    const response = await setEnabled(app, "Not%20A%20Module", false);
+
+    expect(response.status).toBe(404);
+    expect((await store.readConfiguration()).modules).toEqual([]);
+  });
+
+  it("rejects an untrusted origin before authorization or the store runs", async () => {
+    const { app, store } = await install(owner());
+
+    const response = await setEnabled(app, "announcements", false, untrustedOrigin);
+
+    expect(response.status).toBe(403);
+    expect(await response.json()).toEqual({ code: "UNTRUSTED_ORIGIN" });
+    expect((await store.readConfiguration()).modules).toEqual([]);
+  });
+
+  it("rejects a missing origin", async () => {
+    const { app } = await install(owner());
+    const response = await app.request(`${MODULE_LIFECYCLE_PATH}/announcements/enabled`, {
+      body: JSON.stringify({ enabled: false }),
+      headers: { "content-type": "application/json" },
+      method: "PUT",
+    });
+
+    expect(response.status).toBe(403);
+    expect(await response.json()).toEqual({ code: "UNTRUSTED_ORIGIN" });
+  });
+
+  it("refuses an authenticated caller without the restricted permission", async () => {
+    const { app, store } = await install({ principal: createAuthenticatedPrincipal(viewerId) });
+
+    const response = await setEnabled(app, "announcements", false);
+
+    expect(response.status).toBe(403);
+    expect((await store.readConfiguration()).modules).toEqual([]);
+  });
+
+  it.each([
+    ["a non-boolean value", { enabled: "false" }],
+    ["a missing field", {}],
+    ["an unexpected key alongside a valid one", { enabled: false, force: true }],
+    ["an array", []],
+    ["a bare string", "disabled"],
+  ])("rejects %s with a closed, structured validation failure", async (_label, body) => {
+    const { app, store } = await install(owner());
+    const response = await app.request(`${MODULE_LIFECYCLE_PATH}/announcements/enabled`, {
+      body: JSON.stringify(body),
+      headers: { "content-type": "application/json", origin: trustedOrigin },
+      method: "PUT",
+    });
+
+    expect(response.status).toBe(400);
+    expect(await response.json()).toEqual({ code: "INVALID_REQUEST" });
+    expect((await store.readConfiguration()).modules).toEqual([]);
+  });
+
+  it("enforces the platform body limit with the one sanitized 413 contract", async () => {
+    const { app } = await install(owner());
+    const oversized = JSON.stringify({ enabled: "x".repeat(CORE_MUTATION_MAX_BODY_BYTES + 1024) });
+    const response = await app.request(`${MODULE_LIFECYCLE_PATH}/announcements/enabled`, {
+      body: oversized,
+      headers: { "content-type": "application/json", origin: trustedOrigin },
+      method: "PUT",
+    });
+
+    expect(response.status).toBe(413);
+    expect(await response.json()).toEqual({ code: "REQUEST_BODY_TOO_LARGE" });
+  });
+
+  it("never leaks a filesystem path, package name, or manifest path through either verb", async () => {
+    const { app } = await install(owner());
+    const listed = await (
+      await app.request(MODULE_LIFECYCLE_PATH, { headers: { origin: trustedOrigin } })
+    ).text();
+    const mutated = await (await setEnabled(app, "announcements", false)).text();
+
+    for (const payload of [listed, mutated]) {
+      expect(payload).not.toContain("/tmp");
+      expect(payload).not.toContain("@test/module-");
+      expect(payload).not.toContain("ekklesia.module.json");
+      expect(payload).not.toContain("dist/");
+      expect(payload).not.toContain("entrypoint");
+    }
+  });
+});
+
+describe("lifecycle state governs module UI exposure", () => {
+  it("keeps a disabled module out of the mountable inventory and out of Dashboard navigation", async () => {
+    const { app } = await install({
+      bootDisabled: ["announcements"],
+      platformOwner: true,
+      principal: createAuthenticatedPrincipal(viewerId),
+    });
+
+    const inventory = (await (await app.request(MODULE_UI_INVENTORY_PATH)).json()) as {
+      readonly modules: readonly { readonly id: string }[];
+    };
+    const navigation = (await (await app.request(DASHBOARD_NAVIGATION_PATH)).json()) as {
+      readonly groups: readonly { readonly modules: readonly { readonly name: string }[] }[];
+      readonly ungrouped: readonly { readonly module: { readonly id: string } }[];
+    };
+
+    // Discovered, validated, and declaring a real compiled UI artifact — and still absent, because
+    // publication is built from the eligible set rather than the discovered one.
+    expect(inventory.modules.map((entry) => entry.id)).toEqual(["storage"]);
+    expect(navigation.ungrouped.map((entry) => entry.module.id)).toEqual(["storage"]);
+    expect(navigation.groups).toEqual([]);
+  });
+
+  it("keeps a dependency-blocked module out of both, exactly like an explicitly disabled one", async () => {
+    const { app } = await install({
+      bootDisabled: ["storage"],
+      platformOwner: true,
+      principal: createAuthenticatedPrincipal(viewerId),
+    });
+
+    const inventory = (await (await app.request(MODULE_UI_INVENTORY_PATH)).json()) as {
+      readonly modules: readonly { readonly id: string }[];
+    };
+
+    expect(inventory.modules).toEqual([]);
+  });
+
+  it("does not remove a module from navigation merely because a restart is pending", async () => {
+    const { app } = await install({
+      platformOwner: true,
+      principal: createAuthenticatedPrincipal(viewerId),
+    });
+
+    await setEnabled(app, "announcements", false);
+    const inventory = (await (await app.request(MODULE_UI_INVENTORY_PATH)).json()) as {
+      readonly modules: readonly { readonly id: string }[];
+    };
+
+    // The module really is still mounted and still serving; hiding its UI now would break a viewer
+    // mid-session for a change that has not taken effect. `restartRequired` is where that pending
+    // change is reported.
+    expect(inventory.modules.map((entry) => entry.id)).toEqual(["storage", "announcements"]);
+  });
+});
+
+describe("the lifecycle prefix is a sibling of the module route namespace", () => {
+  it("does not sit under /api/v1/modules/, where an installed module could collide with it", async () => {
+    // `moduleRoutePathSchema` accepts `enabled` as an ordinary static segment, so a module named
+    // `announcements` may legitimately register `PUT /enabled` — mounted at exactly
+    // `/api/v1/modules/announcements/enabled`. If the platform published its lifecycle mutation
+    // there, registration order would decide which one answers.
+    expect(MODULE_LIFECYCLE_PATH.startsWith("/api/v1/modules/")).toBe(false);
+    expect(MODULE_LIFECYCLE_PATH).toBe("/api/v1/module-lifecycle");
+
+    const { app } = await install(owner());
+    const collision = await app.request("/api/v1/modules/announcements/enabled", {
+      body: JSON.stringify({ enabled: false }),
+      headers: { "content-type": "application/json", origin: trustedOrigin },
+      method: "PUT",
+    });
+
+    expect(collision.status).toBe(404);
+    expect(await collision.json()).toEqual({ code: "NOT_FOUND" });
+  });
+});

apps/api/tests/module-realtime-live.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,528 @@
+import { mkdir, mkdtemp, rm, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises";
+import { tmpdir } from "node:os";
+import path from "node:path";
+import {
+  ANONYMOUS_PRINCIPAL,
+  createAuthenticatedPrincipal,
+  type ModuleDatabase,
+  type ModuleRealtimePublisher,
+  type ModuleRuntimeServices,
+  parseEkklesiaUserId,
+} from "@ekklesia/contracts";
+import {
+  createAuthorizationEvaluator,
+  type AuthorizationEvaluator,
+  type PermissionRegistry,
+} from "@ekklesia/core/authorization";
+import type { EkklesiaIdentityRuntime } from "@ekklesia/core/identity";
+import {
+  composePlatformPermissionRegistry,
+  discoverModules,
+  type ModuleRealtimeRegistry,
+  type ModuleRealtimeSubscription,
+  startDiscoveredModuleRuntime,
+  type StartedModuleRuntime,
+} from "@ekklesia/core/modules";
+import { type ServerType, serve } from "@hono/node-server";
+import { Hono } from "hono";
+import { describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest";
+import { mountModuleRealtimeRoutes } from "../src/module-realtime-routes.js";
+
+const allowedUserId = parseEkklesiaUserId("99999999-9999-4999-8999-999999999999");
+const deniedUserId = parseEkklesiaUserId("77777777-7777-4777-8777-777777777777");
+const stableDeliveryUrl =
+  "https://objects.example.test/announcements/slides/welcome.png?X-Amz-Signature=stable";
+const TRANSPORT_DEADLINE_MS = 2_000;
+
+async function withinTransportDeadline<Value>(
+  operation: Promise<Value>,
+  message: string,
+  onTimeout: () => void = () => undefined,
+): Promise<Value> {
+  let timer: ReturnType<typeof setTimeout> | undefined;
+  try {
+    return await Promise.race([
+      operation,
+      new Promise<never>((_, reject) => {
+        timer = setTimeout(() => {
+          onTimeout();
+          reject(new Error(message));
+        }, TRANSPORT_DEADLINE_MS);
+      }),
+    ]);
+  } finally {
+    clearTimeout(timer);
+  }
+}
+
+async function waitForTransportCondition(predicate: () => boolean, message: string): Promise<void> {
+  let cancelled = false;
+  await withinTransportDeadline(
+    new Promise<void>((resolve) => {
+      const inspect = (): void => {
+        if (cancelled) {
+          return;
+        }
+        if (predicate()) {
+          resolve();
+          return;
+        }
+        setTimeout(inspect, 5);
+      };
+      inspect();
+    }),
+    message,
+    () => {
+      cancelled = true;
+    },
+  );
+}
+
+interface FixtureControl {
+  readonly events: string[];
+  publisher?: ModuleRealtimePublisher;
+}
+
+interface LiveEvent {
+  readonly event: "snapshot" | "update";
+  readonly payload: unknown;
+  readonly sequence: number;
+}
+
+class LiveSseConnection {
+  readonly #abort: AbortController;
+  readonly #reader: ReadableStreamDefaultReader<Uint8Array>;
+  #buffer = "";
+
+  constructor(response: Response, abort: AbortController) {
+    if (!response.body) {
+      throw new Error("Realtime integration response had no body.");
+    }
+    this.#abort = abort;
+    this.#reader = response.body.getReader();
+  }
+
+  async readEvent(): Promise<LiveEvent> {
+    for (;;) {
+      const boundary = this.#buffer.indexOf("\n\n");
+      if (boundary >= 0) {
+        const block = this.#buffer.slice(0, boundary);
+        this.#buffer = this.#buffer.slice(boundary + 2);
+        if (block.startsWith(":")) {
+          continue;
+        }
+        const event = block
+          .split("\n")
+          .find((line) => line.startsWith("event: "))
+          ?.slice("event: ".length);
+        const data = block
+          .split("\n")
+          .find((line) => line.startsWith("data: "))
+          ?.slice("data: ".length);
+        if ((event !== "snapshot" && event !== "update") || data === undefined) {
+          throw new Error("Realtime integration received an invalid event.");
+        }
+        const envelope = JSON.parse(data) as { payload?: unknown; sequence?: unknown };
+        if (!Number.isSafeInteger(envelope.sequence) || (envelope.sequence as number) <= 0) {
+          throw new Error("Realtime integration received an invalid sequence.");
+        }
+        return { event, payload: envelope.payload, sequence: envelope.sequence as number };
+      }
+
+      const result = await this.#readWithinDeadline();
+      if (result.done) {
+        throw new Error("Realtime integration stream closed before the expected event.");
+      }
+      this.#buffer += new TextDecoder().decode(result.value, { stream: true });
+    }
+  }
+
+  async expectClosed(): Promise<void> {
+    const result = await this.#readWithinDeadline();
+    expect(result.done).toBe(true);
+  }
+
+  async close(): Promise<void> {
+    this.#abort.abort();
+    await withinTransportDeadline(
+      // Abort and cancel race by design; a rejection means one of them already released the
+      // transport. A deadline still propagates and fails the test.
+      this.#reader.cancel().catch(() => undefined),
+      "Realtime integration client cancellation timed out.",
+    );
+  }
+
+  async #readWithinDeadline() {
+    return withinTransportDeadline(
+      this.#reader.read(),
+      "Realtime integration read timed out.",
+      () => this.#abort.abort(),
+    );
+  }
+}
+
+async function createFixtureModule(control: FixtureControl): Promise<{
+  readonly directory: string;
+  readonly symbol: symbol;
+}> {
+  const directory = await mkdtemp(path.join(tmpdir(), "ekklesia-native-realtime-"));
+  const moduleDirectory = path.join(directory, "announcements");
+  await mkdir(path.join(moduleDirectory, "dist/server"), { recursive: true });
+  const symbol = Symbol.for(`ekklesia.native-realtime.${Date.now()}.${Math.random()}`);
+  (globalThis as unknown as Record<PropertyKey, unknown>)[symbol] = control;
+  const expression = `globalThis[Symbol.for(${JSON.stringify(Symbol.keyFor(symbol))})]`;
+
+  await Promise.all([
+    writeFile(
+      path.join(moduleDirectory, "package.json"),
+      JSON.stringify({
+        ekklesia: { layer: "module" },
+        name: "@test/module-announcements",
+        type: "module",
+        version: "0.1.0",
+      }),
+    ),
+    writeFile(
+      path.join(moduleDirectory, "ekklesia.module.json"),
+      JSON.stringify({
+        compatibility: { moduleSdk: "^0.1.0", platform: "^0.1.0" },
+        entrypoints: { server: "./dist/server/index.js" },
+        id: "announcements",
+        manifestVersion: 7,
+        name: "Announcements fixture",
+        permissions: [
+          {
+            baseline: "restricted",
+            description: "View the announcement slideshow.",
+            id: "announcements.slideshow.view",
+          },
+        ],
+        version: "0.1.0",
+      }),
+    ),
+    writeFile(
+      path.join(moduleDirectory, "dist/server/index.js"),
+      `export default {
+        id: "announcements",
+        version: "0.1.0",
+        register({ realtime }) {
+          realtime.channel({ channel: "state", permission: "announcements.slideshow.view" });
+          ${expression}.events.push("register");
+        },
+        start({ realtime }) {
+          ${expression}.publisher = realtime;
+          realtime.publish("state", {
+            mode: "on",
+            currentSlide: 0,
+            previousSlide: -1,
+            slides: [${JSON.stringify(stableDeliveryUrl)}]
+          });
+          ${expression}.events.push("start");
+        },
+        stop() { ${expression}.events.push("stop"); }
+      };\n`,
+    ),
+  ]);
+  return { directory, symbol };
+}
+
+function services(): ModuleRuntimeServices {
+  return Object.freeze({ database: Object.freeze({}) as ModuleDatabase });
+}
+
+function identityRuntime(): EkklesiaIdentityRuntime {
+  return {
+    handleAuthRequest: vi.fn(),
+    resolvePrincipal: async (headers) => {
+      const cookie = headers.get("cookie");
+      if (cookie === "ekklesia-session=allowed") {
+        return createAuthenticatedPrincipal(allowedUserId);
+      }
+      if (cookie === "ekklesia-session=denied") {
+        return createAuthenticatedPrincipal(deniedUserId);
+      }
+      return ANONYMOUS_PRINCIPAL;
+    },
+  };
+}
+
+function authorization(): AuthorizationEvaluator {
+  return createAuthorizationEvaluator({
+    grants: { hasActiveGrant: async ({ userId }) => userId === allowedUserId },
+    platformOwners: { isPlatformOwner: async () => false },
+  });
+}
+
+async function bindLiveServer(
+  runtime: StartedModuleRuntime,
+  registry: PermissionRegistry,
+): Promise<{
+  readonly activeSubscriptions: () => number;
+  readonly origin: string;
+  readonly server: ServerType;
+}> {
+  const app = new Hono();
+  let activeSubscriptions = 0;
+  const observedRealtime: ModuleRealtimeRegistry = {
+    channels: runtime.realtime.channels,
+    closeSubscriptions: () => runtime.realtime.closeSubscriptions(),
+    publisherFor: (moduleId) => runtime.realtime.publisherFor(moduleId),
+    subscribe: (moduleId, channel): ModuleRealtimeSubscription => {
+      const subscription = runtime.realtime.subscribe(moduleId, channel);
+      activeSubscriptions += 1;
+      let closed = false;
+      return Object.freeze({
+        close: (): void => {
+          if (!closed) {
+            closed = true;
+            activeSubscriptions -= 1;
+          }
+          subscription.close();
+        },
+        read: () => subscription.read(),
+        snapshot: subscription.snapshot,
+      });
+    },
+  };
+  mountModuleRealtimeRoutes(app, {
+    evaluator: authorization(),
+    realtime: observedRealtime,
+    registry,
+    runtime: identityRuntime(),
+  });
+  app.notFound((c) => c.json({ code: "NOT_FOUND" }, 404));
+
+  let pendingServer: ServerType | undefined;
+  const server = await withinTransportDeadline(
+    new Promise<ServerType>((resolve, reject) => {
+      pendingServer = serve({ fetch: app.fetch, hostname: "127.0.0.1", port: 0 }, () =>
+        resolve(pendingServer as ServerType),
+      );
+      pendingServer.once("error", reject);
+    }),
+    "Realtime integration server bind timed out.",
+    () => pendingServer?.close(),
+  );
+  const address = server.address();
+  if (!address || typeof address === "string") {
+    throw new Error("Realtime integration server did not bind a TCP port.");
+  }
+  return {
+    activeSubscriptions: () => activeSubscriptions,
+    origin: `http://127.0.0.1:${address.port}`,
+    server,
+  };
+}
+
+async function connect(
+  origin: string,
+  cookie: string,
+): Promise<{
+  readonly connection: LiveSseConnection;
+  readonly response: Response;
+}> {
+  const abort = new AbortController();
+  const response = await withinTransportDeadline(
+    fetch(`${origin}/api/v1/module-realtime/announcements/state`, {
+      headers: { cookie },
+      signal: abort.signal,
+    }),
+    "Realtime integration connection timed out.",
+    () => abort.abort(),
+  );
+  return { connection: new LiveSseConnection(response, abort), response };
+}
+
+async function closeServer(server: ServerType): Promise<void> {
+  await withinTransportDeadline(
+    new Promise<void>((resolve) => server.close(() => resolve())),
+    "Realtime integration server close timed out.",
+    () =>
+      (
+        server as ServerType & {
+          closeAllConnections?: () => void;
+        }
+      ).closeAllConnections?.(),
+  );
+}
+
+async function requestJson(
+  url: string,
+  init?: RequestInit,
+): Promise<{ readonly body: unknown; readonly response: Response }> {
+  const abort = new AbortController();
+  const operation = (async (): Promise<{ readonly body: unknown; readonly response: Response }> => {
+    const response = await fetch(url, { ...init, signal: abort.signal });
+    const body = (await response.json()) as unknown;
+    return { body, response };
+  })();
+  return withinTransportDeadline(operation, "Realtime integration finite request timed out.", () =>
+    abort.abort(),
+  );
+}
+
+describe("native realtime over a live Node HTTP server", () => {
+  it("loads a real module and proves auth, snapshot, fanout, update, reconnect, and shutdown", async () => {
+    const control: FixtureControl = { events: [] };
+    const fixture = await createFixtureModule(control);
+    let runtime: StartedModuleRuntime | undefined;
+    let server: ServerType | undefined;
+    const connections: LiveSseConnection[] = [];
+    const failures: unknown[] = [];
+    try {
+      const modules = await discoverModules({
+        moduleSdkVersion: "0.1.0",
+        modulesDirectory: fixture.directory,
+        platformVersion: "0.1.0",
+      });
+      runtime = await startDiscoveredModuleRuntime(modules, services());
+      expect(control.events).toEqual(["register", "start"]);
+      const live = await bindLiveServer(runtime, composePlatformPermissionRegistry(modules));
+      server = live.server;
+
+      const anonymous = await requestJson(
+        `${live.origin}/api/v1/module-realtime/announcements/state`,
+      );
+      expect(anonymous.response.status).toBe(403);
+      expect(anonymous.body).toEqual({ code: "AUTHORIZATION_DENIED" });
+      const missingPermission = await requestJson(
+        `${live.origin}/api/v1/module-realtime/announcements/state`,
+        { headers: { cookie: "ekklesia-session=denied" } },
+      );
+      expect(missingPermission.response.status).toBe(403);
+
+      const first = await connect(live.origin, "ekklesia-session=allowed");
+      const second = await connect(live.origin, "ekklesia-session=allowed");
+      connections.push(first.connection, second.connection);
+      expect(first.response.status).toBe(200);
+      expect(first.response.headers.get("content-type")).toBe("text/event-stream; charset=utf-8");
+
+      const expectedInitial = {
+        currentSlide: 0,
+        mode: "on",
+        previousSlide: -1,
+        slides: [stableDeliveryUrl],
+      };
+      expect(await first.connection.readEvent()).toEqual({
+        event: "snapshot",
+        payload: expectedInitial,
+        sequence: 1,
+      });
+      expect(await second.connection.readEvent()).toEqual({
+        event: "snapshot",
+        payload: expectedInitial,
+        sequence: 1,
+      });
+      expect(live.activeSubscriptions()).toBe(2);
+
+      control.publisher?.publish("state", {
+        currentSlide: 1,
+        mode: "on",
+        previousSlide: 0,
+        slides: [stableDeliveryUrl],
+      });
+      const expectedUpdate = {
+        event: "update",
+        payload: {
+          currentSlide: 1,
+          mode: "on",
+          previousSlide: 0,
+          slides: [stableDeliveryUrl],
+        },
+        sequence: 2,
+      };
+      expect(await first.connection.readEvent()).toEqual(expectedUpdate);
+      expect(await second.connection.readEvent()).toEqual(expectedUpdate);
+
+      await first.connection.close();
+      await waitForTransportCondition(
+        () => live.activeSubscriptions() === 1,
+        "Realtime integration subscriber cleanup timed out.",
+      );
+      control.publisher?.publish("state", {
+        currentSlide: 2,
+        mode: "off",
+        previousSlide: 1,
+        slides: [stableDeliveryUrl],
+      });
+      expect(await second.connection.readEvent()).toMatchObject({ event: "update", sequence: 3 });
+
+      const reconnected = await connect(live.origin, "ekklesia-session=allowed");
+      connections.push(reconnected.connection);
+      expect(await reconnected.connection.readEvent()).toEqual({
+        event: "snapshot",
+        payload: {
+          currentSlide: 2,
+          mode: "off",
+          previousSlide: 1,
+          slides: [stableDeliveryUrl],
+        },
+        sequence: 3,
+      });
+      expect(live.activeSubscriptions()).toBe(2);
+
+      const secondClosed = second.connection.expectClosed();
+      const reconnectedClosed = reconnected.connection.expectClosed();
+      runtime.realtime.closeSubscriptions();
+      await Promise.all([secondClosed, reconnectedClosed]);
+      await waitForTransportCondition(
+        () => live.activeSubscriptions() === 0,
+        "Realtime integration shutdown cleanup timed out.",
+      );
+      // Stream shutdown happens before ordinary HTTP drain in production. A publisher must remain
+      // usable until that drain completes so an already-running command can publish its result.
+      expect(() => control.publisher?.publish("state", null)).not.toThrow();
+
+      const afterShutdown = await requestJson(
+        `${live.origin}/api/v1/module-realtime/announcements/state`,
+        { headers: { cookie: "ekklesia-session=allowed" } },
+      );
+      expect(afterShutdown.response.status).toBe(503);
+      expect(afterShutdown.body).toEqual({ code: "REALTIME_UNAVAILABLE" });
+      await runtime.stop();
+      expect(() => control.publisher?.publish("state", null)).toThrowError(
+        expect.objectContaining({ code: "REALTIME_PUBLISHER_STOPPED" }),
+      );
+    } catch (error) {
+      failures.push(error);
+    } finally {
+      try {
+        runtime?.realtime.closeSubscriptions();
+      } catch (error) {
+        failures.push(error);
+      }
+      const connectionCleanup = await Promise.allSettled(
+        connections.map((connection) => connection.close()),
+      );
+      for (const result of connectionCleanup) {
+        if (result.status === "rejected") {
+          failures.push(result.reason);
+        }
+      }
+      if (server) {
+        try {
+          await closeServer(server);
+        } catch (error) {
+          failures.push(error);
+        }
+      }
+      if (runtime) {
+        try {
+          await runtime.stop();
+        } catch (error) {
+          failures.push(error);
+        }
+      }
+      delete (globalThis as unknown as Record<PropertyKey, unknown>)[fixture.symbol];
+      try {
+        await rm(fixture.directory, { force: true, recursive: true });
+      } catch (error) {
+        failures.push(error);
+      }
+    }
+    if (failures.length > 0) {
+      throw failures[0];
+    }
+    expect(control.events).toEqual(["register", "start", "stop"]);
+  });
+});

apps/api/tests/module-realtime-routes.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,270 @@
+import {
+  ANONYMOUS_PRINCIPAL,
+  createAuthenticatedPrincipal,
+  ModuleRealtimeError,
+  moduleIdSchema,
+  parseEkklesiaUserId,
+  parsePermissionId,
+} from "@ekklesia/contracts";
+import { createPermissionRegistry, type PermissionRegistry } from "@ekklesia/core/authorization";
+import type { EkklesiaIdentityRuntime } from "@ekklesia/core/identity";
+import { type ModuleRealtimeRegistry, StagedModuleRealtimeRegistry } from "@ekklesia/core/modules";
+import { Hono } from "hono";
+import { describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest";
+import {
+  MODULE_REALTIME_KEEPALIVE_MS,
+  MODULE_REALTIME_MAX_CONNECTION_AGE_MS,
+  ModuleRealtimeConfigurationError,
+  moduleRealtimeBaseUrl,
+  mountModuleRealtimeRoutes,
+} from "../src/module-realtime-routes.js";
+
+const moduleId = moduleIdSchema.parse("announcements");
+const permission = parsePermissionId("announcements.slideshow.view");
+const userId = parseEkklesiaUserId("88888888-8888-4888-8888-888888888888");
+const endpoint = "/api/v1/module-realtime/announcements/state";
+
+function permissionRegistry(): PermissionRegistry {
+  return createPermissionRegistry([
+    {
+      baseline: "restricted",
+      description: "View the announcement slideshow.",
+      id: permission,
+    },
+  ]);
+}
+
+function realtimeFixture(initialPayload: unknown = { mode: "on" }): {
+  readonly publisher: ReturnType<StagedModuleRealtimeRegistry["publisherFor"]>;
+  readonly realtime: ModuleRealtimeRegistry;
+} {
+  const staged = new StagedModuleRealtimeRegistry();
+  const registration = staged.createRegistrationStage(moduleId, new Set([permission]));
+  registration.realtime.channel({ channel: "state", permission });
+  registration.commit();
+  const publisher = staged.publisherFor(moduleId);
+  publisher.publish("state", initialPayload as never);
+  return { publisher, realtime: staged.publish() };
+}
+
+function appFor(
+  realtime: ModuleRealtimeRegistry,
+  options: {
+    readonly allowed?: boolean;
+    readonly keepaliveMs?: number;
+    readonly maxConnectionAgeMs?: number;
+    readonly signedIn?: boolean;
+  } = {},
+): Hono {
+  const app = new Hono();
+  const runtime: EkklesiaIdentityRuntime = {
+    handleAuthRequest: vi.fn(),
+    resolvePrincipal: vi
+      .fn()
+      .mockResolvedValue(
+        options.signedIn === false ? ANONYMOUS_PRINCIPAL : createAuthenticatedPrincipal(userId),
+      ),
+  };
+  mountModuleRealtimeRoutes(app, {
+    evaluator: {
+      authorize: vi
+        .fn()
+        .mockResolvedValue({ allowed: options.signedIn !== false && options.allowed !== false }),
+    },
+    ...(options.keepaliveMs === undefined ? {} : { keepaliveMs: options.keepaliveMs }),
+    ...(options.maxConnectionAgeMs === undefined
+      ? {}
+      : { maxConnectionAgeMs: options.maxConnectionAgeMs }),
+    realtime,
+    registry: permissionRegistry(),
+    runtime,
+  });
+  return app;
+}
+
+async function readChunk(reader: ReadableStreamDefaultReader<Uint8Array>): Promise<string> {
+  let timer: ReturnType<typeof setTimeout> | undefined;
+  try {
+    const result = await Promise.race([
+      reader.read(),
+      new Promise<never>((_, reject) => {
+        timer = setTimeout(() => reject(new Error("Realtime test read timed out.")), 1_000);
+      }),
+    ]);
+    return result.done ? "" : new TextDecoder().decode(result.value);
+  } finally {
+    clearTimeout(timer);
+  }
+}
+
+describe("module realtime HTTP transport", () => {
+  it("builds one server-owned root and rejects an unenforceable channel snapshot", () => {
+    expect(moduleRealtimeBaseUrl("announcements")).toBe("/api/v1/module-realtime/announcements");
+    expect(MODULE_REALTIME_KEEPALIVE_MS).toBe(15_000);
+    expect(MODULE_REALTIME_MAX_CONNECTION_AGE_MS).toBe(300_000);
+
+    const { realtime } = realtimeFixture();
+    expect(() =>
+      mountModuleRealtimeRoutes(new Hono(), {
+        evaluator: { authorize: vi.fn() },
+        realtime,
+        registry: createPermissionRegistry([]),
+        runtime: { handleAuthRequest: vi.fn(), resolvePrincipal: vi.fn() },
+      }),
+    ).toThrow(ModuleRealtimeConfigurationError);
+  });
+
+  it("denies anonymous and unauthorized callers before allocating a subscription", async () => {
+    const { realtime } = realtimeFixture();
+    const subscribe = vi.fn(realtime.subscribe.bind(realtime));
+    const observed: ModuleRealtimeRegistry = {
+      channels: realtime.channels,
+      closeSubscriptions: () => realtime.closeSubscriptions(),
+      publisherFor: (owner) => realtime.publisherFor(owner),
+      subscribe,
+    };
+
+    const anonymous = await appFor(observed, { signedIn: false }).request(endpoint);
+    expect(anonymous.status).toBe(403);
+    expect(await anonymous.json()).toEqual({ code: "AUTHORIZATION_DENIED" });
+    expect(subscribe).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+
+    const unauthorized = await appFor(observed, { allowed: false }).request(endpoint);
+    expect(unauthorized.status).toBe(403);
+    expect(await unauthorized.json()).toEqual({ code: "AUTHORIZATION_DENIED" });
+    expect(subscribe).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  it("refuses Hono's implicit HEAD handling without allocating a stream subscription", async () => {
+    const { realtime } = realtimeFixture();
+    const subscribe = vi.fn(realtime.subscribe.bind(realtime));
+    const observed: ModuleRealtimeRegistry = {
+      channels: realtime.channels,
+      closeSubscriptions: () => realtime.closeSubscriptions(),
+      publisherFor: (owner) => realtime.publisherFor(owner),
+      subscribe,
+    };
+
+    const response = await appFor(observed).request(endpoint, { method: "HEAD" });
+
+    expect(response.status).toBe(405);
+    expect(response.headers.get("allow")).toBe("GET");
+    expect(response.headers.get("cache-control")).toBe("no-store");
+    expect(subscribe).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  it("opens an authorized snapshot-first stream with proxy-safe headers and unchanged URLs", async () => {
+    const deliveryUrl =
+      "https://objects.example.test/slides/welcome.png?X-Amz-Signature=byte-identical";
+    const { realtime } = realtimeFixture({
+      currentSlide: 0,
+      mode: "on",
+      previousSlide: -1,
+      slides: [deliveryUrl],
+    });
+    const response = await appFor(realtime).request(endpoint);
+
+    expect(response.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(response.headers.get("content-type")).toBe("text/event-stream; charset=utf-8");
+    expect(response.headers.get("cache-control")).toBe("no-store");
+    expect(response.headers.get("x-accel-buffering")).toBe("no");
+    expect(response.headers.get("vary")).toBe("Origin, Cookie");
+
+    const reader = response.body?.getReader();
+    expect(reader).toBeDefined();
+    const snapshot = await readChunk(reader as ReadableStreamDefaultReader<Uint8Array>);
+    expect(snapshot).toContain("event: snapshot\n");
+    expect(snapshot).toContain('"sequence":1');
+    expect(snapshot).toContain(deliveryUrl);
+    expect(snapshot).not.toContain("\nid:");
+    await reader?.cancel();
+  });
+
+  it("streams ordered updates, emits transport-only keepalives, and closes on shutdown", async () => {
+    const { publisher, realtime } = realtimeFixture({ currentSlide: 0 });
+    const response = await appFor(realtime, { keepaliveMs: 5 }).request(endpoint);
+    const reader = response.body?.getReader() as ReadableStreamDefaultReader<Uint8Array>;
+
+    expect(await readChunk(reader)).toContain("event: snapshot");
+    publisher.publish("state", { currentSlide: 1 });
+    const update = await readChunk(reader);
+    expect(update).toContain("event: update");
+    expect(update).toContain('"sequence":2');
+    expect(update).toContain('"currentSlide":1');
+    expect(await readChunk(reader)).toBe(": keepalive\n\n");
+
+    const closed = reader.read();
+    realtime.closeSubscriptions();
+    await expect(closed).resolves.toEqual({ done: true, value: undefined });
+  });
+
+  it("closes a stream at the host-owned maximum age so reconnect reauthorizes", async () => {
+    const { realtime } = realtimeFixture({ currentSlide: 0 });
+    let activeSubscriptions = 0;
+    const observed: ModuleRealtimeRegistry = {
+      channels: realtime.channels,
+      closeSubscriptions: () => realtime.closeSubscriptions(),
+      publisherFor: (owner) => realtime.publisherFor(owner),
+      subscribe: (owner, channel) => {
+        const subscription = realtime.subscribe(owner, channel);
+        activeSubscriptions += 1;
+        let closed = false;
+        return Object.freeze({
+          close: () => {
+            if (!closed) {
+              closed = true;
+              activeSubscriptions -= 1;
+            }
+            subscription.close();
+          },
+          read: () => subscription.read(),
+          snapshot: subscription.snapshot,
+        });
+      },
+    };
+    const response = await appFor(observed, {
+      keepaliveMs: 1_000,
+      maxConnectionAgeMs: 25,
+    }).request(endpoint);
+    const reader = response.body?.getReader() as ReadableStreamDefaultReader<Uint8Array>;
+
+    expect(await readChunk(reader)).toContain("event: snapshot");
+    expect(activeSubscriptions).toBe(1);
+    expect(await readChunk(reader)).toBe("");
+    expect(activeSubscriptions).toBe(0);
+    const replacement = realtime.subscribe(moduleId, "state");
+    replacement.close();
+  });
+
+  it("does not expose unknown module/channel combinations", async () => {
+    const { realtime } = realtimeFixture();
+    const app = appFor(realtime);
+    expect((await app.request("/api/v1/module-realtime/calendar/state")).status).toBe(404);
+    expect((await app.request("/api/v1/module-realtime/announcements/other")).status).toBe(404);
+  });
+
+  it("maps subscriber-capacity and unexpected allocation failures to fixed non-secret responses", async () => {
+    const { realtime } = realtimeFixture();
+    const observed = (failure: unknown): ModuleRealtimeRegistry => ({
+      channels: realtime.channels,
+      closeSubscriptions: () => realtime.closeSubscriptions(),
+      publisherFor: (owner) => realtime.publisherFor(owner),
+      subscribe: () => {
+        throw failure;
+      },
+    });
+
+    const atCapacity = await appFor(
+      observed(new ModuleRealtimeError("REALTIME_SUBSCRIBER_LIMIT")),
+    ).request(endpoint);
+    expect(atCapacity.status).toBe(503);
+    expect(await atCapacity.json()).toEqual({ code: "REALTIME_SUBSCRIBER_LIMIT" });
+
+    const detail = "secret-token-and-machine-path";
+    const unavailable = await appFor(observed(new Error(detail))).request(endpoint);
+    expect(unavailable.status).toBe(503);
+    const body = await unavailable.text();
+    expect(body).toBe('{"code":"REALTIME_UNAVAILABLE"}');
+    expect(body).not.toContain(detail);
+  });
+});

apps/api/tests/module-ui-host-e2e.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,779 @@
+import { mkdir, mkdtemp, rm, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises";
+import { tmpdir } from "node:os";
+import path from "node:path";
+import {
+  ANONYMOUS_PRINCIPAL,
+  createAuthenticatedPrincipal,
+  type EkklesiaPrincipal,
+  type ModuleDatabase,
+  type ModuleRuntimeServices,
+  parseEkklesiaUserId,
+} from "@ekklesia/contracts";
+import {
+  type AuthorizationStore,
+  createAuthorizationEvaluator,
+} from "@ekklesia/core/authorization";
+import type { EkklesiaIdentityRuntime } from "@ekklesia/core/identity";
+import {
+  composePlatformPermissionRegistry,
+  createModuleUiPublicationRegistry,
+  discoverModules,
+  startDiscoveredModuleRuntime,
+} from "@ekklesia/core/modules";
+import {
+  loadModuleUi,
+  MODULE_UI_ISOLATION_ATTRIBUTE,
+  MODULE_UI_ISOLATION_ROOT_ATTRIBUTE,
+} from "@ekklesia/module-ui-host";
+import { MODULE_UI_ABI_VERSION } from "@ekklesia/module-ui-sdk";
+import { Window } from "happy-dom";
+import {
+  bootstrapDisplayHost,
+  bootstrapHost,
+  createModuleUiContext,
+  type EkklesiaHostConfig,
+  moduleUiSourceUrl,
+} from "@ekklesia/shell";
+import { afterEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest";
+import { createInMemoryDashboardStore } from "./support/in-memory-dashboard-store.js";
+import { testDashboardHostAssets } from "./support/dashboard-host-assets.js";
+import { readyHealth } from "./support/ready-health.js";
+import { createApiApp } from "../src/app.js";
+import { createDisplayHostAssets } from "../src/display-host-assets.js";
+import {
+  createInMemoryModuleLifecycleStore,
+  moduleLifecycleSnapshotFor,
+} from "./support/in-memory-module-lifecycle.js";
+import { moduleConfigurationOptionFor } from "./support/in-memory-module-configuration.js";
+import { moduleStorageOptionFor } from "./support/in-memory-module-storage.js";
+
+/**
+ * The whole chain, with nothing between the halves faked:
+ *
+ * ```text
+ * module fixture on disk -> discovery -> module runtime started -> publication registry
+ *   -> inventory endpoint -> the shell's own bootstrap -> server-produced artifact URL
+ *   -> the generic loader -> mount -> the module calls its own API relatively
+ *   -> the shell resolves it to /api/v1/modules/<id>/... -> server permission enforcement
+ * ```
+ *
+ * Every step runs real code. The module is discovered and *started* by Core's real runtime, its
+ * routes are mounted by the real `createApiApp`, its artifact is published by the real ADR 0025
+ * route, its descriptor comes from the real inventory endpoint, and the browser half is
+ * `@ekklesia/shell`'s own exported protocol — the same functions the React shell calls — rather
+ * than a reimplementation of them here.
+ *
+ * Two things are deliberately *not* faked-around and are worth naming. The shell's `fetch` is the
+ * Hono app's own `request`, so requests really traverse routing, CORS, authorization middleware, and
+ * handlers without needing a socket. And Node cannot `import()` an `http:` URL, so the artifact is
+ * fetched over that same in-process HTTP path and the **bytes it returned** are handed to the
+ * generic loader through a `data:` URL — a genuine module URL, the same separation ADR 0025 used.
+ * No test here reads the artifact off the filesystem and calls that a proof of publication.
+ */
+const viewerId = parseEkklesiaUserId("22222222-2222-4222-8222-222222222222");
+const temporaryDirectories: string[] = [];
+
+afterEach(async () => {
+  await Promise.all(
+    temporaryDirectories
+      .splice(0)
+      .map((directory) => rm(directory, { force: true, recursive: true })),
+  );
+});
+
+/**
+ * A real, complete module: a manifest declaring a restricted permission and a UI entrypoint, a
+ * server entrypoint that registers a permission-gated route, and a compiled UI artifact that reads
+ * its host context and calls its own API relatively.
+ *
+ * The UI artifact is written as plain ESM rather than compiled from TSX here: ADR 0023's pipeline is
+ * already proven end to end by `templates/module`'s own tests, and what this test needs is a byte
+ * sequence whose journey through publication, inventory, and the loader can be asserted exactly.
+ */
+async function createFixtureModule(
+  modulesDirectory: string,
+  id = "example",
+  name = "Example module",
+  withDisplay = false,
+): Promise<void> {
+  const moduleDirectory = path.join(modulesDirectory, id);
+  await mkdir(path.join(moduleDirectory, "dist/server"), { recursive: true });
+  await mkdir(path.join(moduleDirectory, "dist/ui"), { recursive: true });
+  if (withDisplay) {
+    await mkdir(path.join(moduleDirectory, "dist/display"), { recursive: true });
+  }
+
+  await writeFile(
+    path.join(moduleDirectory, "package.json"),
+    JSON.stringify({
+      ekklesia: { layer: "module" },
+      name: `@test/module-${id}`,
+      type: "module",
+      version: "0.1.0",
+    }),
+  );
+  await writeFile(
+    path.join(moduleDirectory, "ekklesia.module.json"),
+    JSON.stringify({
+      compatibility: { moduleSdk: "^0.1.0", platform: "^0.1.0" },
+      entrypoints: {
+        server: "./dist/server/index.js",
+        ui: "./dist/ui/index.js",
+        ...(withDisplay
+          ? {
+              display: {
+                artifact: "./dist/display/index.js",
+                permission: `${id}.display.view`,
+              },
+            }
+          : {}),
+      },
+      id,
+      manifestVersion: 7,
+      name,
+      permissions: [
+        {
+          baseline: "restricted",
+          description: "Read example records.",
+          id: `${id}.records.read`,
+        },
+        ...(withDisplay
+          ? [
+              {
+                baseline: "restricted",
+                description: "View the example display.",
+                id: `${id}.display.view`,
+              },
+            ]
+          : []),
+      ],
+      version: "0.1.0",
+    }),
+  );
+  await writeFile(
+    path.join(moduleDirectory, "dist/server/index.js"),
+    `export default {
+      id: ${JSON.stringify(id)},
+      version: "0.1.0",
+      register({ http }) {
+        http.route({
+          method: "GET",
+          path: "/records",
+          permission: ${JSON.stringify(`${id}.records.read`)},
+          maxBodyBytes: 0,
+          async handler() {
+            return Response.json([{ id: "a" }, { id: "b" }]);
+          },
+        });
+      },
+    };\n`,
+  );
+  // The module UI: host-neutral, asks for a relative path, and renders from the host context. It
+  // hardcodes no origin, no prefix, and no permission decision of its own.
+  await writeFile(
+    path.join(moduleDirectory, "dist/ui/index.js"),
+    `export default {
+  abi: ${MODULE_UI_ABI_VERSION},
+  id: ${JSON.stringify(id)},
+  version: "0.1.0",
+  async mount(container, context) {
+    if (!context.permissions.has(${JSON.stringify(`${id}.records.read`)})) {
+      container.textContent = context.moduleId + ":denied";
+      return () => { container.textContent = ""; };
+    }
+    const response = await context.api.request("records");
+    const records = response.ok ? await response.json() : [];
+    container.textContent =
+      context.moduleId + ":" + response.status + ":" + records.length;
+    return () => { container.textContent = ""; };
+  },
+};\n`,
+  );
+  if (withDisplay) {
+    await writeFile(
+      path.join(moduleDirectory, "dist/display/index.js"),
+      `export default {
+  abi: ${MODULE_UI_ABI_VERSION},
+  id: ${JSON.stringify(id)},
+  version: "0.1.0",
+  async mount(container, context) {
+    const response = await context.api.request("records");
+    const records = response.ok ? await response.json() : [];
+    container.textContent =
+      context.moduleId + ":display:" + response.status + ":" + records.length;
+    return () => { container.textContent = ""; };
+  },
+};\n`,
+    );
+  }
+}
+
+interface HarnessOptions {
+  readonly display?: boolean;
+  readonly principal?: EkklesiaPrincipal;
+  readonly grants?: readonly string[];
+  /** Extra fixture modules, so grouping can be exercised with more than one — a folder containing a
+   * single module proves very little. */
+  readonly extraModules?: ReadonlyArray<{ readonly id: string; readonly name: string }>;
+  readonly platformOwner?: boolean;
+}
+
+interface Harness {
+  readonly config: EkklesiaHostConfig;
+  readonly moduleApiCalls: readonly string[];
+  stop(): Promise<void>;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Starts a real API over a real discovered-and-started module, and returns the `EkklesiaHostConfig`
+ * a browser would use — with `fetch` wired to the app itself.
+ */
+async function startHarness(options: HarnessOptions = {}): Promise<Harness> {
+  const modulesDirectory = await mkdtemp(path.join(tmpdir(), "ekklesia-host-e2e-"));
+  temporaryDirectories.push(modulesDirectory);
+  await createFixtureModule(modulesDirectory, "example", "Example module", options.display);
+  for (const extra of options.extraModules ?? []) {
+    await createFixtureModule(modulesDirectory, extra.id, extra.name);
+  }
+
+  const modules = await discoverModules({
+    moduleSdkVersion: "0.1.0",
+    modulesDirectory,
+    platformVersion: "0.1.0",
+  });
+  const services: ModuleRuntimeServices = Object.freeze({
+    database: Object.freeze({}) as unknown as ModuleDatabase,
+  });
+  // The module's real runtime: its server entrypoint is imported, registered, and started, and the
+  // route snapshot below is the one it actually published.
+  const moduleRuntime = await startDiscoveredModuleRuntime(modules, services);
+
+  const granted = new Set(options.grants ?? []);
+  const evaluator = createAuthorizationEvaluator({
+    grants: { hasActiveGrant: async (query) => granted.has(query.permission) },
+    platformOwners: { isPlatformOwner: async () => options.platformOwner === true },
+  });
+  const runtime: EkklesiaIdentityRuntime = {
+    handleAuthRequest: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(new Response(null, { status: 200 })),
+    resolvePrincipal: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(options.principal ?? ANONYMOUS_PRINCIPAL),
+  };
+  const store = {
+    createGrant: vi.fn(),
+    grantPlatformOwner: vi.fn(),
+    hasActiveGrant: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(false),
+    isPlatformOwner: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(false),
+    listGrantsForUser: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({ grants: [] }),
+    revokeGrant: vi.fn(),
+    revokePlatformOwner: vi.fn(),
+  } as unknown as AuthorizationStore;
+
+  const moduleUi = createModuleUiPublicationRegistry(modules);
+  const app = createApiApp({
+    authorization: { evaluator, registry: composePlatformPermissionRegistry(modules), store },
+    moduleRoutes: moduleRuntime.routes,
+    moduleRealtime: moduleRuntime.realtime,
+    moduleServices: services,
+    moduleUi,
+    ...(moduleUi.listDisplays().length === 0
+      ? {}
+      : {
+          displayHostAssets: createDisplayHostAssets(
+            '<!doctype html><div id="ekklesia-display"></div><script type="module" src="/assets/ekklesia-display/app.js"></script>',
+            "export const displayHost = true;\n",
+            "export const displayWorker = true;\n",
+          ),
+        }),
+    moduleLifecycle: {
+      snapshot: moduleLifecycleSnapshotFor(modules),
+      store: createInMemoryModuleLifecycleStore(),
+    },
+    moduleConfiguration: moduleConfigurationOptionFor(modules),
+    moduleStorage: moduleStorageOptionFor(modules),
+    dashboard: createInMemoryDashboardStore(),
+    dashboardHostAssets: testDashboardHostAssets(),
+    health: readyHealth(),
+    runtime,
+    trustedOrigins: ["https://dashboard.example.test"],
+  });
+
+  const moduleApiCalls: string[] = [];
+  const hostFetch = (async (input: Parameters<typeof fetch>[0], init?: RequestInit) => {
+    const url = new URL(String(input));
+    if (url.pathname.startsWith("/api/v1/modules/")) {
+      moduleApiCalls.push(`${init?.method ?? "GET"} ${url.pathname}${url.search}`);
+    }
+    return app.request(url.href, init);
+  }) as unknown as typeof fetch;
+
+  return {
+    config: { apiBaseUrl: "https://ekklesia.example.test", fetch: hostFetch },
+    moduleApiCalls,
+    stop: () => moduleRuntime.stop(),
+  };
+}
+
+/** Node cannot `import()` an `http:` URL, so the artifact is fetched over the real route and its
+ * exact bytes become a `data:` URL. The loader still performs a genuine dynamic import of a real
+ * module URL; only the transport differs, and the transport itself is asserted separately. */
+async function publishedArtifactUrl(harness: Harness, sourceUrl: string): Promise<string> {
+  const response = await (harness.config.fetch as typeof fetch)(sourceUrl);
+  expect(response.status).toBe(200);
+  expect(response.headers.get("content-type")).toBe("text/javascript; charset=utf-8");
+  const bytes = Buffer.from(await response.arrayBuffer());
+  return `data:text/javascript;base64,${bytes.toString("base64")}`;
+}
+
+/**
+ * A real host-owned container, built from `happy-dom` **as a library** rather than as this suite's
+ * test environment.
+ *
+ * Since ADR 0040 the generic loader builds an isolated Shadow DOM root inside whatever container it
+ * is given, so a plain object sink is no longer a faithful stand-in — and the isolation is exactly
+ * what an end-to-end proof should exercise rather than stub out. Installing happy-dom as the
+ * *environment* is not an option here: it replaces the module runner's resolution, and this suite
+ * dynamically imports real module server entrypoints from temporary directories, which then fail to
+ * resolve. Constructing one `Window` gives the DOM these few assertions need and leaves every global
+ * this server-side suite depends on exactly as Node provides it.
+ */
+function containerSink(): HostContainer {
+  return new Window().document.createElement("div") as unknown as HostContainer;
+}
+
+interface HostContainer {
+  readonly children: { readonly length: number };
+  querySelector(selectors: string): HostContainer | null;
+  readonly shadowRoot: { querySelector(selectors: string): { textContent: string } | null } | null;
+}
+
+/** What the mounted artifact rendered, read through its open isolated root. */
+function mountedText(container: HostContainer): string {
+  const shadowHost = container.querySelector(`[${MODULE_UI_ISOLATION_ATTRIBUTE}]`);
+  return (
+    shadowHost?.shadowRoot?.querySelector(`[${MODULE_UI_ISOLATION_ROOT_ATTRIBUTE}]`)?.textContent ??
+    ""
+  );
+}
+
+type LoaderContainer = Parameters<typeof loadModuleUi>[0]["container"];
+
+describe("end to end: a discovered module's UI mounts in the Ekklesia host", () => {
+  it("bootstraps, publishes, loads, mounts, and reaches the module's own API", async () => {
+    const harness = await startHarness({
+      grants: ["example.records.read"],
+      principal: createAuthenticatedPrincipal(viewerId),
+    });
+    try {
+      // 1. The shell's own bootstrap: principal, then inventory.
+      const bootstrap = await bootstrapHost(harness.config);
+      expect(bootstrap.principal).toEqual({ kind: "authenticated", userId: viewerId });
+      // A module nobody has arranged yet is ungrouped and visible — no initialization write.
+      expect(bootstrap.navigation.groups).toEqual([]);
+      expect(bootstrap.navigation.ungrouped).toHaveLength(1);
+      expect(bootstrap.navigation.ungrouped[0]?.name).toBe("Example module");
+
+      const descriptor = bootstrap.navigation.ungrouped[0]?.descriptor;
+      if (!descriptor) {
+        throw new Error("the inventory returned no module");
+      }
+      // 2. The URLs came from the server, not from anything the browser composed.
+      expect(descriptor).toEqual({
+        apiBaseUrl: "/api/v1/modules/example",
+        contributions: [],
+        id: "example",
+        permissions: ["example.records.read"],
+        realtimeBaseUrl: "/api/v1/module-realtime/example",
+        uiUrl: "/api/v1/module-ui/example/0.1.0",
+        version: "0.1.0",
+      });
+
+      // 3. The artifact really is served by the real publication route at that URL.
+      const sourceUrl = moduleUiSourceUrl(harness.config, descriptor);
+      expect(sourceUrl).toBe("https://ekklesia.example.test/api/v1/module-ui/example/0.1.0");
+      const artifactUrl = await publishedArtifactUrl(harness, sourceUrl);
+
+      // 4. The generic loader mounts it with the context the shell built.
+      const container = containerSink();
+      const mounted = await loadModuleUi({
+        container: container as unknown as LoaderContainer,
+        context: createModuleUiContext({
+          config: harness.config,
+          descriptor,
+          principal: bootstrap.principal,
+        }),
+        source: { moduleId: descriptor.id, url: artifactUrl, version: descriptor.version },
+      });
+
+      // 5. The module rendered, having reached its own backend through the host.
+      expect(mountedText(container)).toBe("example:200:2");
+      // 6. It asked for "records"; the host resolved that onto Ekklesia's module mount prefix.
+      expect(harness.moduleApiCalls).toEqual(["GET /api/v1/modules/example/records"]);
+
+      // 7. And it tears down cleanly.
+      await mounted.unmount();
+      expect(mountedText(container)).toBe("");
+      expect(mounted.mounted).toBe(false);
+    } finally {
+      await harness.stop();
+    }
+  });
+
+  it("opens the stable display route, resolves its real descriptor, and mounts the published display bytes", async () => {
+    const harness = await startHarness({
+      display: true,
+      grants: ["example.records.read", "example.display.view"],
+      principal: createAuthenticatedPrincipal(viewerId),
+    });
+    try {
+      // 1. A device keeps this version-independent host URL. It is a real permission-gated API route,
+      // not a test-only HTML wrapper around the browser functions below.
+      const page = await (harness.config.fetch as typeof fetch)(
+        "https://ekklesia.example.test/display/example",
+      );
+      expect(page.status).toBe(200);
+      expect(page.headers.get("content-type")).toBe("text/html; charset=utf-8");
+      expect(await page.text()).toContain("/assets/ekklesia-display/app.js");
+
+      // 2. The display surface's own bootstrap resolves principal first, then the singular protected
+      // descriptor. The browser constructs no artifact, API, or realtime URL itself.
+      const bootstrap = await bootstrapDisplayHost(harness.config, "example");
+      expect(bootstrap.status).toBe("ready");
+      if (bootstrap.status !== "ready") {
+        throw new Error("the authenticated display did not resolve");
+      }
+      expect(bootstrap.descriptor).toEqual({
+        apiBaseUrl: "/api/v1/modules/example",
+        contributions: [],
+        displayPageUrl: "/display/example",
+        id: "example",
+        permissions: ["example.records.read", "example.display.view"],
+        realtimeBaseUrl: "/api/v1/module-realtime/example",
+        uiUrl: "/api/v1/module-ui/example/0.1.0/display",
+        version: "0.1.0",
+      });
+
+      // 3. Fetch the exact role-specific bytes from the real publication route, then genuinely import
+      // those returned bytes. Reading the fixture file directly would not prove publication.
+      const sourceUrl = moduleUiSourceUrl(harness.config, bootstrap.descriptor);
+      expect(sourceUrl).toBe(
+        "https://ekklesia.example.test/api/v1/module-ui/example/0.1.0/display",
+      );
+      const artifactUrl = await publishedArtifactUrl(harness, sourceUrl);
+
+      // 4. The generic loader receives the host-owned browser context, including the canonical
+      // display page, and mounts the display artifact independently of the Dashboard artifact.
+      const context = createModuleUiContext({
+        config: harness.config,
+        descriptor: bootstrap.descriptor,
+        principal: bootstrap.principal,
+      });
+      expect(Object.keys(context).sort()).toEqual([
+        "api",
+        "contributions",
+        "display",
+        "moduleId",
+        "permissions",
+        "principal",
+        "realtime",
+      ]);
+      const container = containerSink();
+      const mounted = await loadModuleUi({
+        container: container as unknown as LoaderContainer,
+        context,
+        source: {
+          moduleId: bootstrap.descriptor.id,
+          url: artifactUrl,
+          version: bootstrap.descriptor.version,
+        },
+      });
+
+      expect(mountedText(container)).toBe("example:display:200:2");
+      expect(harness.moduleApiCalls).toEqual(["GET /api/v1/modules/example/records"]);
+      await mounted.unmount();
+      expect(mountedText(container)).toBe("");
+      expect(mounted.mounted).toBe(false);
+    } finally {
+      await harness.stop();
+    }
+  });
+
+  it("keeps server authorization authoritative when the UI ignores its own hint", async () => {
+    // Signed in, but holding no grant for the module's restricted permission.
+    const harness = await startHarness({
+      grants: [],
+      principal: createAuthenticatedPrincipal(viewerId),
+    });
+    try {
+      const bootstrap = await bootstrapHost(harness.config);
+      const descriptor = bootstrap.navigation.ungrouped[0]?.descriptor;
+      if (!descriptor) {
+        throw new Error("the inventory returned no module");
+      }
+
+      // The hint is honest about it...
+      expect(descriptor.permissions).toEqual([]);
+      const context = createModuleUiContext({
+        config: harness.config,
+        descriptor,
+        principal: bootstrap.principal,
+      });
+      expect(context.permissions.has("example.records.read")).toBe(false);
+
+      // ...and the hint is not what protects the route. Calling anyway — exactly what a buggy or
+      // hostile UI would do — is still refused by the server.
+      const response = await context.api.request("records");
+      expect(response.status).toBe(403);
+      expect(await response.json()).toEqual({ code: "AUTHORIZATION_DENIED" });
+      expect(harness.moduleApiCalls).toEqual(["GET /api/v1/modules/example/records"]);
+    } finally {
+      await harness.stop();
+    }
+  });
+
+  it("renders the module's own denied state from the hint, without calling the API", async () => {
+    const harness = await startHarness({
+      grants: [],
+      principal: createAuthenticatedPrincipal(viewerId),
+    });
+    try {
+      const bootstrap = await bootstrapHost(harness.config);
+      const descriptor = bootstrap.navigation.ungrouped[0]?.descriptor;
+      if (!descriptor) {
+        throw new Error("the inventory returned no module");
+      }
+      const artifactUrl = await publishedArtifactUrl(
+        harness,
+        moduleUiSourceUrl(harness.config, descriptor),
+      );
+      const container = containerSink();
+
+      await loadModuleUi({
+        container: container as unknown as LoaderContainer,
+        context: createModuleUiContext({
+          config: harness.config,
+          descriptor,
+          principal: bootstrap.principal,
+        }),
+        source: { moduleId: descriptor.id, url: artifactUrl, version: descriptor.version },
+      });
+
+      // Hiding a control is a usability improvement: the module simply did not ask.
+      expect(mountedText(container)).toBe("example:denied");
+      expect(harness.moduleApiCalls).toEqual([]);
+    } finally {
+      await harness.stop();
+    }
+  });
+
+  it("renders a configured arrangement, and a move changes presentation only", async () => {
+    const harness = await startHarness({
+      extraModules: [
+        { id: "video", name: "Video" },
+        { id: "calendar", name: "Calendar" },
+      ],
+      grants: ["example.records.read"],
+      platformOwner: true,
+      principal: createAuthenticatedPrincipal(viewerId),
+    });
+    const organize = (url: string, body: unknown) =>
+      (harness.config.fetch as typeof fetch)(`https://ekklesia.example.test${url}`, {
+        body: JSON.stringify(body),
+        headers: { "content-type": "application/json", origin: "https://dashboard.example.test" },
+        method: "PUT",
+      });
+
+    try {
+      // An administrator organizes the Dashboard, through the real mutation API.
+      await organize("/api/v1/dashboard/navigation/groups/media", { label: "Media", order: 10 });
+      await organize("/api/v1/dashboard/navigation/groups/planning", {
+        label: "Planning",
+        order: 20,
+      });
+      await organize("/api/v1/dashboard/navigation/placements/video", {
+        groupId: "media",
+        order: 10,
+      });
+      await organize("/api/v1/dashboard/navigation/placements/example", {
+        groupId: "media",
+        order: 20,
+      });
+      await organize("/api/v1/dashboard/navigation/placements/calendar", {
+        groupId: "planning",
+        order: 10,
+      });
+
+      // The shell's own bootstrap sees exactly that arrangement.
+      const before = await bootstrapHost(harness.config);
+      expect(
+        before.navigation.groups.map((group) => [
+          group.label,
+          group.modules.map((entry) => entry.name),
+        ]),
+      ).toEqual([
+        ["Media", ["Video", "Example module"]],
+        ["Planning", ["Calendar"]],
+      ]);
+      expect(before.navigation.ungrouped).toEqual([]);
+
+      // Mounting from inside a group uses the descriptor the group carried, untouched.
+      const groupedEntry = before.navigation.groups[0]?.modules[1];
+      if (!groupedEntry) {
+        throw new Error("the arrangement did not contain the expected module");
+      }
+      const container = containerSink();
+      const mounted = await loadModuleUi({
+        container: container as unknown as LoaderContainer,
+        context: createModuleUiContext({
+          config: harness.config,
+          descriptor: groupedEntry.descriptor,
+          principal: before.principal,
+        }),
+        source: {
+          moduleId: groupedEntry.descriptor.id,
+          url: await publishedArtifactUrl(
+            harness,
+            moduleUiSourceUrl(harness.config, groupedEntry.descriptor),
+          ),
+          version: groupedEntry.descriptor.version,
+        },
+      });
+      expect(mountedText(container)).toBe("example:200:2");
+      await mounted.unmount();
+
+      // Now move it somewhere else entirely.
+      await organize("/api/v1/dashboard/navigation/groups/sunday-production", {
+        label: "Sunday Production",
+        order: 5,
+      });
+      await organize("/api/v1/dashboard/navigation/placements/example", {
+        groupId: "sunday-production",
+        order: 10,
+      });
+
+      const after = await bootstrapHost(harness.config);
+      expect(
+        after.navigation.groups.map((group) => [
+          group.label,
+          group.modules.map((entry) => entry.name),
+        ]),
+      ).toEqual([
+        ["Sunday Production", ["Example module"]],
+        ["Media", ["Video"]],
+        ["Planning", ["Calendar"]],
+      ]);
+
+      const movedEntry = after.navigation.groups[0]?.modules[0];
+      if (!movedEntry) {
+        throw new Error("the moved module was not found in its new group");
+      }
+      // The whole point of the pass: the module is byte-identical across the move — same artifact
+      // URL, same API root, same permissions, same version, same name.
+      expect(movedEntry).toEqual(groupedEntry);
+
+      // And it still mounts the same artifact and reaches the same API.
+      const callsBeforeRemount = harness.moduleApiCalls.length;
+      const movedContainer = containerSink();
+      const remounted = await loadModuleUi({
+        container: movedContainer as unknown as LoaderContainer,
+        context: createModuleUiContext({
+          config: harness.config,
+          descriptor: movedEntry.descriptor,
+          principal: after.principal,
+        }),
+        source: {
+          moduleId: movedEntry.descriptor.id,
+          url: await publishedArtifactUrl(
+            harness,
+            moduleUiSourceUrl(harness.config, movedEntry.descriptor),
+          ),
+          version: movedEntry.descriptor.version,
+        },
+      });
+      expect(mountedText(movedContainer)).toBe("example:200:2");
+      expect(harness.moduleApiCalls.slice(callsBeforeRemount)).toEqual([
+        "GET /api/v1/modules/example/records",
+      ]);
+      await remounted.unmount();
+    } finally {
+      await harness.stop();
+    }
+  });
+
+  it("keeps a newly installed module visible beside an existing arrangement", async () => {
+    const harness = await startHarness({
+      extraModules: [{ id: "video", name: "Video" }],
+      platformOwner: true,
+      principal: createAuthenticatedPrincipal(viewerId),
+    });
+    try {
+      await (harness.config.fetch as typeof fetch)(
+        "https://ekklesia.example.test/api/v1/dashboard/navigation/groups/media",
+        {
+          body: JSON.stringify({ label: "Media", order: 10 }),
+          headers: {
+            "content-type": "application/json",
+            origin: "https://dashboard.example.test",
+          },
+          method: "PUT",
+        },
+      );
+      await (harness.config.fetch as typeof fetch)(
+        "https://ekklesia.example.test/api/v1/dashboard/navigation/placements/video",
+        {
+          body: JSON.stringify({ groupId: "media", order: 10 }),
+          headers: {
+            "content-type": "application/json",
+            origin: "https://dashboard.example.test",
+          },
+          method: "PUT",
+        },
+      );
+
+      const bootstrap = await bootstrapHost(harness.config);
+
+      expect(bootstrap.navigation.groups[0]?.modules.map((entry) => entry.name)).toEqual(["Video"]);
+      // `example` was never placed, and is still reachable rather than invisible.
+      expect(bootstrap.navigation.ungrouped.map((entry) => entry.name)).toEqual(["Example module"]);
+    } finally {
+      await harness.stop();
+    }
+  });
+
+  it("gives an anonymous visitor no inventory and therefore nothing to mount", async () => {
+    const harness = await startHarness();
+    try {
+      const bootstrap = await bootstrapHost(harness.config);
+
+      expect(bootstrap.principal).toEqual({ kind: "anonymous" });
+      expect(bootstrap.navigation).toEqual({ groups: [], ungrouped: [] });
+    } finally {
+      await harness.stop();
+    }
+  });
+
+  it("refuses a module UI that tries to address another module's API through the host", async () => {
+    const harness = await startHarness({
+      grants: ["example.records.read"],
+      principal: createAuthenticatedPrincipal(viewerId),
+    });
+    try {
+      const bootstrap = await bootstrapHost(harness.config);
+      const descriptor = bootstrap.navigation.ungrouped[0]?.descriptor;
+      if (!descriptor) {
+        throw new Error("the inventory returned no module");
+      }
+      const context = createModuleUiContext({
+        config: harness.config,
+        descriptor,
+        principal: bootstrap.principal,
+      });
+
+      await expect(context.api.request("../../grants?userId=someone")).rejects.toMatchObject({
+        code: "MODULE_API_PATH_INVALID",
+      });
+      // It never became a request at all.
+      expect(harness.moduleApiCalls).toEqual([]);
+    } finally {
+      await harness.stop();
+    }
+  });
+});

apps/api/tests/module-ui-inventory.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,634 @@
+import { mkdir, mkdtemp, rm, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises";
+import { tmpdir } from "node:os";
+import path from "node:path";
+import {
+  ANONYMOUS_PRINCIPAL,
+  createAuthenticatedPrincipal,
+  type EkklesiaPrincipal,
+  type ModuleDatabase,
+  type ModuleRuntimeServices,
+  parseEkklesiaUserId,
+} from "@ekklesia/contracts";
+import {
+  type AuthorizationStore,
+  createAuthorizationEvaluator,
+  type PermissionRegistry,
+} from "@ekklesia/core/authorization";
+import type { EkklesiaIdentityRuntime } from "@ekklesia/core/identity";
+import {
+  composePlatformPermissionRegistry,
+  createModuleUiPublicationRegistry,
+  type DiscoveredModule,
+  discoverModules,
+  EMPTY_MODULE_REALTIME_REGISTRY,
+} from "@ekklesia/core/modules";
+import type { Hono } from "hono";
+import { afterEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest";
+import { createInMemoryDashboardStore } from "./support/in-memory-dashboard-store.js";
+import { testDashboardHostAssets } from "./support/dashboard-host-assets.js";
+import { readyHealth } from "./support/ready-health.js";
+import { createApiApp } from "../src/app.js";
+import { moduleApiBaseUrl } from "../src/module-http-routes.js";
+import { moduleRealtimeBaseUrl } from "../src/module-realtime-routes.js";
+import { MODULE_UI_INVENTORY_PATH } from "../src/module-ui-inventory.js";
+import { moduleUiArtifactUrl } from "../src/module-ui-routes.js";
+import {
+  createInMemoryModuleLifecycleStore,
+  moduleLifecycleSnapshotFor,
+} from "./support/in-memory-module-lifecycle.js";
+import { moduleConfigurationOptionFor } from "./support/in-memory-module-configuration.js";
+import { moduleStorageOptionFor } from "./support/in-memory-module-storage.js";
+
+const trustedOrigin = "https://dashboard.example.test";
+const viewerId = parseEkklesiaUserId("11111111-1111-4111-8111-111111111111");
+
+const temporaryDirectories: string[] = [];
+
+afterEach(async () => {
+  await Promise.all(
+    temporaryDirectories
+      .splice(0)
+      .map((directory) => rm(directory, { force: true, recursive: true })),
+  );
+});
+
+interface ModuleFixture {
+  readonly id: string;
+  readonly version?: string;
+  /** Omit for a backend-only module: the manifest then declares no `entrypoints.ui` at all. */
+  readonly withUi?: boolean;
+  readonly permissions?: ReadonlyArray<{
+    readonly id: string;
+    readonly baseline: "authenticated" | "public" | "restricted";
+  }>;
+  readonly capabilities?: readonly { readonly id: string; readonly version: string }[];
+  readonly contributions?: readonly {
+    readonly localName: string;
+    readonly capability: string;
+    readonly capabilityRange: string;
+  }[];
+}
+
+async function createModule(modulesDirectory: string, fixture: ModuleFixture): Promise<void> {
+  const version = fixture.version ?? "0.1.0";
+  const moduleDirectory = path.join(modulesDirectory, fixture.id);
+  await mkdir(path.join(moduleDirectory, "dist/server"), { recursive: true });
+  await writeFile(
+    path.join(moduleDirectory, "package.json"),
+    JSON.stringify({
+      ekklesia: { layer: "module" },
+      name: `@test/module-${fixture.id}`,
+      type: "module",
+      version,
+    }),
+  );
+  await writeFile(
+    path.join(moduleDirectory, "ekklesia.module.json"),
+    JSON.stringify({
+      compatibility: { moduleSdk: "^0.1.0", platform: "^0.1.0" },
+      entrypoints: {
+        server: "./dist/server/index.js",
+        ...(fixture.withUi ? { ui: "./dist/ui/index.js" } : {}),
+      },
+      capabilities: fixture.capabilities ?? [],
+      contributions: (fixture.contributions ?? []).map((contribution) => ({
+        artifact: `./dist/contributions/${contribution.localName}/index.js`,
+        capability: contribution.capability,
+        capabilityRange: contribution.capabilityRange,
+        id: `${fixture.id}.${contribution.localName}`,
+        version: "1.0.0",
+      })),
+      id: fixture.id,
+      manifestVersion: 7,
+      name: `${fixture.id} module`,
+      permissions: (fixture.permissions ?? []).map((permission) => ({
+        ...permission,
+        description: `Test permission for ${fixture.id}.`,
+      })),
+      version,
+    }),
+  );
+  await writeFile(
+    path.join(moduleDirectory, "dist/server/index.js"),
+    `export default { id: ${JSON.stringify(fixture.id)}, version: ${JSON.stringify(version)} };`,
+  );
+  if (fixture.withUi) {
+    await mkdir(path.join(moduleDirectory, "dist/ui"), { recursive: true });
+    await writeFile(
+      path.join(moduleDirectory, "dist/ui/index.js"),
+      `export default { id: ${JSON.stringify(fixture.id)}, version: ${JSON.stringify(version)}, mount() {} };\n`,
+    );
+  }
+  for (const contribution of fixture.contributions ?? []) {
+    const contributionDirectory = path.join(
+      moduleDirectory,
+      "dist/contributions",
+      contribution.localName,
+    );
+    await mkdir(contributionDirectory, { recursive: true });
+    await writeFile(path.join(contributionDirectory, "index.js"), "export default {};\n");
+  }
+}
+
+interface InstallOptions {
+  readonly fixtures: readonly ModuleFixture[];
+  /** Anonymous by default, so every scenario has to opt in to being signed in. */
+  readonly principal?: EkklesiaPrincipal;
+  /** Permission ids the viewer holds an active grant for. Evaluated by Core's real evaluator, so
+   * baselines, the owner bypass, and deny-by-default all behave exactly as in production. */
+  readonly grants?: readonly string[];
+  readonly platformOwner?: boolean;
+  /** Makes the grant port fail, so the "a hint that could not be determined is never reported as
+   * denied" path can be exercised. */
+  readonly grantsUnavailable?: boolean;
+}
+
+interface Installation {
+  readonly app: Hono;
+  readonly modules: readonly DiscoveredModule[];
+  readonly modulesDirectory: string;
+  readonly permissionRegistry: PermissionRegistry;
+}
+
+/** A real installation: fixtures on disk, Core's real discovery, real permission composition, the
+ * real publication registry, the real authorization evaluator, and the real `createApiApp`. Only
+ * identity resolution and the two authorization ports are doubled, because neither needs PostgreSQL
+ * to answer the questions these tests ask. */
+async function install(options: InstallOptions): Promise<Installation> {
+  const modulesDirectory = await mkdtemp(path.join(tmpdir(), "ekklesia-api-ui-inventory-"));
+  temporaryDirectories.push(modulesDirectory);
+  for (const fixture of options.fixtures) {
+    await createModule(modulesDirectory, fixture);
+  }
+  const modules = await discoverModules({
+    moduleSdkVersion: "0.1.0",
+    modulesDirectory,
+    platformVersion: "0.1.0",
+  });
+
+  const granted = new Set(options.grants ?? []);
+  const evaluator = createAuthorizationEvaluator({
+    grants: {
+      hasActiveGrant: async (query) => {
+        if (options.grantsUnavailable) {
+          throw new Error("grant store unavailable");
+        }
+        return granted.has(query.permission);
+      },
+    },
+    platformOwners: { isPlatformOwner: async () => options.platformOwner === true },
+  });
+
+  const runtime: EkklesiaIdentityRuntime = {
+    handleAuthRequest: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(new Response(null, { status: 200 })),
+    resolvePrincipal: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(options.principal ?? ANONYMOUS_PRINCIPAL),
+  };
+  const store = {
+    createGrant: vi.fn(),
+    grantPlatformOwner: vi.fn(),
+    hasActiveGrant: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(false),
+    isPlatformOwner: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(false),
+    listGrantsForUser: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({ grants: [] }),
+    revokeGrant: vi.fn(),
+    revokePlatformOwner: vi.fn(),
+  } as unknown as AuthorizationStore;
+  const services: ModuleRuntimeServices = Object.freeze({
+    database: Object.freeze({}) as unknown as ModuleDatabase,
+  });
+  const permissionRegistry = composePlatformPermissionRegistry(modules);
+
+  const app = createApiApp({
+    authorization: { evaluator, registry: permissionRegistry, store },
+    moduleRoutes: Object.freeze([]),
+    moduleRealtime: EMPTY_MODULE_REALTIME_REGISTRY,
+    moduleServices: services,
+    moduleUi: createModuleUiPublicationRegistry(modules),
+    moduleLifecycle: {
+      snapshot: moduleLifecycleSnapshotFor(modules),
+      store: createInMemoryModuleLifecycleStore(),
+    },
+    moduleConfiguration: moduleConfigurationOptionFor(modules),
+    moduleStorage: moduleStorageOptionFor(modules),
+    dashboard: createInMemoryDashboardStore(),
+    dashboardHostAssets: testDashboardHostAssets(),
+    health: readyHealth(),
+    runtime,
+    trustedOrigins: [trustedOrigin],
+  });
+
+  return { app, modules, modulesDirectory, permissionRegistry };
+}
+
+function signedIn(): EkklesiaPrincipal {
+  return createAuthenticatedPrincipal(viewerId);
+}
+
+async function inventoryOf(app: Hono): Promise<{
+  readonly body: string;
+  readonly modules: ReadonlyArray<Record<string, unknown>>;
+  readonly response: Response;
+}> {
+  const response = await app.request(MODULE_UI_INVENTORY_PATH);
+  const body = await response.clone().text();
+  const parsed = (await response.json()) as { modules?: ReadonlyArray<Record<string, unknown>> };
+  return { body, modules: parsed.modules ?? [], response };
+}
+
+describe("module UI inventory — what it lists", () => {
+  it("describes a publishable module with exactly the fields a host needs", async () => {
+    const { app } = await install({
+      fixtures: [{ id: "example", permissions: [], withUi: true }],
+      principal: signedIn(),
+    });
+
+    const { modules, response } = await inventoryOf(app);
+
+    expect(response.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(modules).toEqual([
+      {
+        contributions: [],
+        api: { baseUrl: "/api/v1/modules/example" },
+        display: null,
+        id: "example",
+        permissions: [],
+        realtime: { baseUrl: "/api/v1/module-realtime/example" },
+        ui: { url: "/api/v1/module-ui/example/0.1.0" },
+        version: "0.1.0",
+      },
+    ]);
+  });
+
+  it("builds all host URLs with the server's own canonical helpers", async () => {
+    const { app, modules: discovered } = await install({
+      fixtures: [{ id: "example", version: "2.4.1", withUi: true }],
+      principal: signedIn(),
+    });
+    const module = discovered[0] as DiscoveredModule;
+
+    const { modules } = await inventoryOf(app);
+
+    // Not "looks like the right shape" — byte-identical to what the helpers produce, so a second
+    // hand-written template string anywhere would fail here.
+    expect(modules[0]?.ui).toEqual({
+      url: moduleUiArtifactUrl({ moduleId: module.manifest.id, version: module.manifest.version }),
+    });
+    expect(modules[0]?.api).toEqual({ baseUrl: moduleApiBaseUrl(module.manifest.id) });
+    expect(modules[0]?.realtime).toEqual({
+      baseUrl: moduleRealtimeBaseUrl(module.manifest.id),
+    });
+  });
+
+  it("omits a module that declares no UI entrypoint", async () => {
+    const { app } = await install({
+      fixtures: [{ id: "calendar" }, { id: "example", withUi: true }],
+      principal: signedIn(),
+    });
+
+    const { modules } = await inventoryOf(app);
+
+    expect(modules.map((module) => module.id)).toEqual(["example"]);
+  });
+
+  it("is empty, not an error, when no installed module provides a UI", async () => {
+    const { app } = await install({ fixtures: [{ id: "calendar" }], principal: signedIn() });
+
+    const { modules, response } = await inventoryOf(app);
+
+    expect(response.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(modules).toEqual([]);
+  });
+
+  it("orders modules deterministically, matching the publication registry", async () => {
+    const { app } = await install({
+      fixtures: [
+        { id: "signage", withUi: true },
+        { id: "announcements", withUi: true },
+        { id: "calendar", withUi: true },
+      ],
+      principal: signedIn(),
+    });
+
+    const first = await inventoryOf(app);
+    const second = await inventoryOf(app);
+
+    // Discovery order, which is sorted; the same on every request.
+    expect(first.modules.map((module) => module.id)).toEqual([
+      "announcements",
+      "calendar",
+      "signage",
+    ]);
+    expect(second.modules.map((module) => module.id)).toEqual(
+      first.modules.map((module) => module.id),
+    );
+  });
+
+  it("leaks no filesystem path, package root, or other manifest internal", async () => {
+    const {
+      app,
+      modules: discovered,
+      modulesDirectory,
+    } = await install({
+      fixtures: [{ id: "example", permissions: [], withUi: true }],
+      principal: signedIn(),
+    });
+    const artifactPath = (discovered[0] as DiscoveredModule).entrypoints.ui as string;
+
+    const { body, modules } = await inventoryOf(app);
+
+    expect(body).not.toContain(modulesDirectory);
+    expect(body).not.toContain(artifactPath);
+    expect(body).not.toContain(tmpdir());
+    expect(body).not.toContain("dist");
+    expect(body).not.toContain("@test/module-example");
+    expect(body).not.toContain("ekklesia.module.json");
+    // The exact key set, so a future field cannot be added without a deliberate decision here.
+    expect(Object.keys(modules[0] ?? {}).sort()).toEqual([
+      "api",
+      "contributions",
+      "display",
+      "id",
+      "permissions",
+      "realtime",
+      "ui",
+      "version",
+    ]);
+  });
+
+  it("carries no navigation or presentation metadata", async () => {
+    const { app } = await install({
+      fixtures: [{ id: "example", withUi: true }],
+      principal: signedIn(),
+    });
+
+    const { body } = await inventoryOf(app);
+
+    // ADR 0021 keeps Dashboard grouping an administrator's configuration, never a module
+    // declaration. The manifest's own `name` and `description` must not leak into it by accident.
+    for (const field of ["name", "description", "icon", "category", "folder", "order", "group"]) {
+      expect(body, field).not.toContain(`"${field}"`);
+    }
+  });
+});
+
+describe("module UI inventory — authentication", () => {
+  it("refuses an anonymous caller", async () => {
+    const { app } = await install({ fixtures: [{ id: "example", withUi: true }] });
+
+    const response = await app.request(MODULE_UI_INVENTORY_PATH);
+
+    expect(response.status).toBe(403);
+    expect(await response.json()).toEqual({ code: "AUTHORIZATION_DENIED" });
+  });
+
+  it("tells an anonymous caller nothing about what is installed", async () => {
+    const { app } = await install({
+      fixtures: [
+        { id: "example", withUi: true },
+        { id: "calendar", withUi: true },
+      ],
+    });
+
+    const body = await (await app.request(MODULE_UI_INVENTORY_PATH)).text();
+
+    expect(body).not.toContain("example");
+    expect(body).not.toContain("calendar");
+  });
+
+  it("admits any signed-in user without needing an explicit grant", async () => {
+    // `core.modules.ui.read` is baseline `authenticated`, so being signed in is enough — a shell
+    // that rendered nothing until an operator granted every user a permission would be unusable.
+    const { app } = await install({
+      fixtures: [{ id: "example", withUi: true }],
+      grants: [],
+      principal: signedIn(),
+      platformOwner: false,
+    });
+
+    expect((await app.request(MODULE_UI_INVENTORY_PATH)).status).toBe(200);
+  });
+
+  it("is never cached and varies on the caller's identity", async () => {
+    const { app } = await install({
+      fixtures: [{ id: "example", withUi: true }],
+      principal: signedIn(),
+    });
+
+    const response = await app.request(MODULE_UI_INVENTORY_PATH, {
+      headers: { origin: trustedOrigin },
+    });
+
+    expect(response.headers.get("cache-control")).toBe("no-store");
+    const vary = response.headers.get("vary")?.toLowerCase() ?? "";
+    expect(vary).toContain("origin");
+    expect(vary).toContain("cookie");
+  });
+});
+
+describe("module UI inventory — permission hints", () => {
+  const readPermission = { baseline: "restricted" as const, id: "example.records.read" };
+  const writePermission = { baseline: "restricted" as const, id: "example.records.write" };
+
+  it("returns only the permissions the server actually granted this principal", async () => {
+    const { app } = await install({
+      fixtures: [{ id: "example", permissions: [readPermission, writePermission], withUi: true }],
+      grants: ["example.records.read"],
+      principal: signedIn(),
+    });
+
+    const { modules } = await inventoryOf(app);
+
+    expect(modules[0]?.permissions).toEqual(["example.records.read"]);
+  });
+
+  it("returns none of them for a signed-in user holding no grant", async () => {
+    const { app } = await install({
+      fixtures: [{ id: "example", permissions: [readPermission, writePermission], withUi: true }],
+      grants: [],
+      principal: signedIn(),
+    });
+
+    const { modules } = await inventoryOf(app);
+
+    // Never a default of true, and never the module's full declared surface.
+    expect(modules[0]?.permissions).toEqual([]);
+  });
+
+  it("honours a baseline that needs no grant at all", async () => {
+    const { app } = await install({
+      fixtures: [
+        {
+          id: "example",
+          permissions: [{ baseline: "authenticated", id: "example.records.list" }, readPermission],
+          withUi: true,
+        },
+      ],
+      grants: [],
+      principal: signedIn(),
+    });
+
+    const { modules } = await inventoryOf(app);
+
+    expect(modules[0]?.permissions).toEqual(["example.records.list"]);
+  });
+
+  it("honours the platform-owner bypass, exactly like a real request would", async () => {
+    const { app } = await install({
+      fixtures: [{ id: "example", permissions: [readPermission, writePermission], withUi: true }],
+      grants: [],
+      platformOwner: true,
+      principal: signedIn(),
+    });
+
+    const { modules } = await inventoryOf(app);
+
+    expect(modules[0]?.permissions).toEqual(["example.records.read", "example.records.write"]);
+  });
+
+  it("scopes hints to each module's own declared permissions", async () => {
+    const { app } = await install({
+      fixtures: [
+        { id: "example", permissions: [readPermission], withUi: true },
+        {
+          id: "calendar",
+          permissions: [{ baseline: "restricted", id: "calendar.events.read" }],
+          withUi: true,
+        },
+      ],
+      grants: ["example.records.read", "calendar.events.read"],
+      principal: signedIn(),
+    });
+
+    const { modules } = await inventoryOf(app);
+
+    const byId = new Map(modules.map((module) => [module.id, module.permissions]));
+    // Neither module learns anything about the other's authorization state, and neither is told
+    // about Core's own permissions.
+    expect(byId.get("example")).toEqual(["example.records.read"]);
+    expect(byId.get("calendar")).toEqual(["calendar.events.read"]);
+    expect(JSON.stringify(modules)).not.toContain("core.authorization.grants.manage");
+    expect(JSON.stringify(modules)).not.toContain("core.modules.ui.read");
+  });
+
+  it("reports an evaluation outage as unavailable rather than as 'nothing granted'", async () => {
+    const { app } = await install({
+      fixtures: [{ id: "example", permissions: [readPermission], withUi: true }],
+      grantsUnavailable: true,
+      principal: signedIn(),
+    });
+
+    const response = await app.request(MODULE_UI_INVENTORY_PATH);
+
+    // A hint that silently read "denied" during an outage would blank the UI and look like a
+    // permissions problem.
+    expect(response.status).toBe(503);
+    expect(await response.json()).toEqual({ code: "AUTHORIZATION_EVALUATION_FAILED" });
+  });
+});
+
+describe("module UI inventory — it is not a module management API", () => {
+  it("routes no method other than GET", async () => {
+    const { app } = await install({
+      fixtures: [{ id: "example", withUi: true }],
+      principal: signedIn(),
+    });
+
+    for (const method of ["POST", "PUT", "PATCH", "DELETE"]) {
+      const response = await app.request(MODULE_UI_INVENTORY_PATH, { method });
+      expect(response.status, method).toBe(404);
+      expect(await response.json(), method).toEqual({ code: "NOT_FOUND" });
+    }
+  });
+
+  it("still refuses to serve an artifact under the collection path", async () => {
+    const { app } = await install({
+      fixtures: [{ id: "example", withUi: true }],
+      principal: signedIn(),
+    });
+
+    for (const suffix of ["/example", "/example/", "/example/0.1.0/index.js"]) {
+      const response = await app.request(`${MODULE_UI_INVENTORY_PATH}${suffix}`);
+      expect(response.status, suffix).toBe(404);
+    }
+  });
+});
+
+/**
+ * The inventory is how a consuming module learns what was contributed to its own capabilities
+ * (ADR 0041). It is the *only* way: a module never queries a registry and never builds a URL.
+ */
+describe("module UI inventory — contributions", () => {
+  const signage = {
+    capabilities: [{ id: "signage.slide-renderer", version: "1.2.0" }],
+    id: "signage",
+    permissions: [],
+    withUi: true,
+  };
+  const announcements = (capabilityRange = "^1.0.0") => ({
+    contributions: [
+      { capability: "signage.slide-renderer", capabilityRange, localName: "signage-slide" },
+    ],
+    id: "announcements",
+    permissions: [],
+    withUi: true,
+  });
+
+  it("gives the providing module the contribution and its server-produced URL", async () => {
+    const { app } = await install({
+      fixtures: [signage, announcements()],
+      principal: signedIn(),
+    });
+
+    const { modules } = await inventoryOf(app);
+    const consumer = modules.find((module) => module.id === "signage");
+
+    expect(consumer?.contributions).toEqual([
+      {
+        capability: "signage.slide-renderer",
+        id: "announcements.signage-slide",
+        url: "/api/v1/module-ui/announcements/0.1.0/contributions/announcements.signage-slide",
+        version: "1.0.0",
+      },
+    ]);
+  });
+
+  it("gives the contributing module nothing: it provides no capability that was targeted", async () => {
+    const { app } = await install({
+      fixtures: [signage, announcements()],
+      principal: signedIn(),
+    });
+
+    const { modules } = await inventoryOf(app);
+
+    expect(modules.find((module) => module.id === "announcements")?.contributions).toEqual([]);
+  });
+
+  it("withholds a contribution whose provider is outside its declared range", async () => {
+    const { app } = await install({
+      fixtures: [signage, announcements("^2.0.0")],
+      principal: signedIn(),
+    });
+
+    const { modules } = await inventoryOf(app);
+
+    expect(modules.find((module) => module.id === "signage")?.contributions).toEqual([]);
+  });
+
+  it("carries no filesystem path or domain vocabulary in a contribution descriptor", async () => {
+    const { app, modulesDirectory } = await install({
+      fixtures: [signage, announcements()],
+      principal: signedIn(),
+    });
+
+    const { body, modules } = await inventoryOf(app);
+    const consumer = modules.find((module) => module.id === "signage");
+    const contributions = (consumer?.contributions ?? []) as ReadonlyArray<Record<string, unknown>>;
+
+    expect(body).not.toContain(modulesDirectory);
+    expect(Object.keys(contributions[0] ?? {}).sort()).toEqual([
+      "capability",
+      "id",
+      "url",
+      "version",
+    ]);
+  });
+});

apps/api/tests/support/dashboard-host-assets.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+import {
+  createDashboardHostAssets,
+  type DashboardHostAssets,
+} from "../../src/dashboard-host-assets.js";
+
+/** A small, internally consistent Dashboard snapshot for compositions whose tests do not exercise
+ * the Dashboard host. Its own behavior is tested in `../dashboard-host-routes.test.ts`. */
+export function testDashboardHostAssets(): DashboardHostAssets {
+  return createDashboardHostAssets(
+    '<!doctype html><div id="ekklesia-host"></div><script src="/assets/ekklesia-dashboard/app.js" type="module"></script>',
+    "export const dashboardHost = true;\n",
+  );
+}

apps/api/tests/support/in-memory-dashboard-store.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+import type {
+  DashboardConfiguration,
+  DashboardGroupRecord,
+  DashboardPlacementRecord,
+  DashboardStore,
+  SetDashboardPlacementInput,
+  UpsertDashboardGroupInput,
+} from "@ekklesia/core/dashboard";
+import { DashboardStoreError } from "@ekklesia/core/dashboard";
+
+/**
+ * An in-memory `DashboardStore` for tests that exercise **routing and resolution**, not persistence.
+ *
+ * It reproduces only the two behaviours those tests depend on — a placement may not name a group
+ * that does not exist, and deleting a group ungroups its modules (the schema's
+ * `on delete set null`) — and deliberately reproduces nothing else. Everything the real store owns
+ * that this double would only be guessing at (identifier grammar, label trimming and bounds,
+ * ordering bounds, transactional behaviour, and the actual `on delete set null` constraint) is
+ * proven against real PostgreSQL in `core/tests/dashboard-store.integration.ts` instead, so this
+ * double can never quietly stand in for a persistence guarantee nobody checked.
+ */
+export function createInMemoryDashboardStore(
+  seed: Partial<DashboardConfiguration> = {},
+): DashboardStore {
+  const groups = new Map<string, DashboardGroupRecord>(
+    (seed.groups ?? []).map((group) => [group.id, { ...group }] as const),
+  );
+  const placements = new Map<string, DashboardPlacementRecord>(
+    (seed.placements ?? []).map((placement) => [placement.moduleId, { ...placement }] as const),
+  );
+
+  const sorted = <Record extends { readonly sortOrder: number }>(
+    records: readonly Record[],
+    key: (record: Record) => string,
+  ): readonly Record[] =>
+    Object.freeze(
+      [...records].sort(
+        (left, right) =>
+          left.sortOrder - right.sortOrder ||
+          (key(left) < key(right) ? -1 : key(left) > key(right) ? 1 : 0),
+      ),
+    );
+
+  return Object.freeze({
+    async deleteGroup(groupId: string): Promise<void> {
+      if (!groups.delete(groupId)) {
+        throw new DashboardStoreError("DASHBOARD_GROUP_NOT_FOUND");
+      }
+      for (const [moduleId, placement] of placements) {
+        if (placement.groupId === groupId) {
+          placements.set(moduleId, { ...placement, groupId: null });
+        }
+      }
+    },
+
+    async readConfiguration(): Promise<DashboardConfiguration> {
+      return Object.freeze({
+        groups: sorted([...groups.values()], (group) => group.id),
+        placements: sorted([...placements.values()], (placement) => placement.moduleId),
+      });
+    },
+
+    async setPlacement(input: SetDashboardPlacementInput): Promise<DashboardPlacementRecord> {
+      if (input.groupId !== null && !groups.has(input.groupId)) {
+        throw new DashboardStoreError("DASHBOARD_GROUP_NOT_FOUND");
+      }
+      const record: DashboardPlacementRecord = Object.freeze({
+        groupId: input.groupId,
+        moduleId: input.moduleId,
+        sortOrder: input.sortOrder,
+      });
+      placements.set(input.moduleId, record);
+      return record;
+    },
+
+    async upsertGroup(input: UpsertDashboardGroupInput): Promise<DashboardGroupRecord> {
+      const record: DashboardGroupRecord = Object.freeze({
+        id: input.id,
+        label: input.label.trim(),
+        sortOrder: input.sortOrder,
+      });
+      groups.set(input.id, record);
+      return record;
+    },
+  });
+}

apps/api/tests/support/in-memory-module-lifecycle.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+import type { ModuleEnablementRecord } from "@ekklesia/contracts";
+import type {
+  DiscoveredModule,
+  ModuleLifecycleConfiguration,
+  ModuleLifecycleSnapshot,
+  ModuleLifecycleStore,
+  SetModuleEnabledInput,
+} from "@ekklesia/core/modules";
+import { ModuleLifecycleStoreError, resolveModuleEligibility } from "@ekklesia/core/modules";
+
+/**
+ * An in-memory `ModuleLifecycleStore` for tests that exercise **routing and resolution**, not
+ * persistence.
+ *
+ * It reproduces only what those tests depend on — records survive a write and read back in
+ * module-id order, and an invalid identifier is rejected — and deliberately reproduces nothing
+ * else. The real table's constraints, the upsert's conflict target, and the fact that a record for
+ * an undeployed module is retained are proven against real PostgreSQL in
+ * `core/tests/module-lifecycle-store.integration.ts`, so this double can never quietly stand in for
+ * a persistence guarantee nobody checked.
+ */
+export function createInMemoryModuleLifecycleStore(
+  seed: readonly ModuleEnablementRecord[] = [],
+): ModuleLifecycleStore {
+  const records = new Map<string, boolean>(
+    seed.map((record) => [record.moduleId, record.enabled] as const),
+  );
+  return Object.freeze({
+    async readConfiguration(): Promise<ModuleLifecycleConfiguration> {
+      return Object.freeze({
+        modules: Object.freeze(
+          [...records.entries()]
+            .sort(([left], [right]) => (left < right ? -1 : left > right ? 1 : 0))
+            .map(([moduleId, enabled]) => Object.freeze({ enabled, moduleId })),
+        ),
+      });
+    },
+    async setEnabled(input: SetModuleEnabledInput): Promise<ModuleEnablementRecord> {
+      if (!/^[a-z][a-z0-9]*(?:-[a-z0-9]+)*$/u.test(input.moduleId)) {
+        throw new ModuleLifecycleStoreError("MODULE_LIFECYCLE_MODULE_ID_INVALID");
+      }
+      records.set(input.moduleId, input.enabled);
+      return Object.freeze({ enabled: input.enabled, moduleId: input.moduleId });
+    },
+  });
+}
+
+/**
+ * Builds the boot snapshot the same way `startApi` does — resolve eligibility from the discovered
+ * inventory and the stored configuration, then record what would have started — rather than
+ * hand-writing one, so a test can never assert against a snapshot the real composition would never
+ * produce.
+ */
+export function moduleLifecycleSnapshotFor(
+  discoveredModules: readonly DiscoveredModule[],
+  configuration: ModuleLifecycleConfiguration = { modules: [] },
+): ModuleLifecycleSnapshot {
+  const resolution = resolveModuleEligibility(discoveredModules, configuration);
+  return Object.freeze({
+    discoveredModules,
+    eligibility: resolution.entries,
+    startedModuleIds: Object.freeze(resolution.eligibleModules.map((module) => module.manifest.id)),
+  });
+}
+
+/** The lifecycle option for a `createApiApp` caller that exercises no modules at all — the explicit
+ * "no modules" statement the required option asks for, never an implicit default. */
+export function emptyModuleLifecycle(): {
+  readonly snapshot: ModuleLifecycleSnapshot;
+  readonly store: ModuleLifecycleStore;
+} {
+  return {
+    snapshot: moduleLifecycleSnapshotFor([]),
+    store: createInMemoryModuleLifecycleStore(),
+  };
+}

apps/api/tests/support/in-memory-module-storage.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,208 @@
+import {
+  type ModuleStorage,
+  type ModuleStorageBody,
+  ModuleStorageError,
+  type ModuleStorageListing,
+  type ModuleStorageListOptions,
+  type ModuleStorageObject,
+  type ModuleStorageObjectMetadata,
+  type ModuleStoragePutOptions,
+  type ModuleStorageReadUrl,
+} from "@ekklesia/contracts";
+import type { DiscoveredModule, ModuleStorageLookup } from "@ekklesia/core/modules";
+import { createModuleStorageLookup, type StorageProvider } from "@ekklesia/core/storage";
+
+/** Builds and drains Web streams without depending on DOM-only helper types, which this package's
+ * TypeScript configuration deliberately does not load. */
+function streamOf(bytes: Uint8Array): ReadableStream<Uint8Array> {
+  return new ReadableStream<Uint8Array>({
+    start(controller) {
+      controller.enqueue(bytes);
+      controller.close();
+    },
+  });
+}
+
+async function collect(stream: ReadableStream<Uint8Array>): Promise<Uint8Array> {
+  const reader = stream.getReader();
+  const chunks: Uint8Array[] = [];
+  let total = 0;
+  for (;;) {
+    const { done, value } = await reader.read();
+    if (done) {
+      break;
+    }
+    chunks.push(value);
+    total += value.byteLength;
+  }
+  const merged = new Uint8Array(total);
+  let offset = 0;
+  for (const chunk of chunks) {
+    merged.set(chunk, offset);
+    offset += chunk.byteLength;
+  }
+  return merged;
+}
+
+interface StoredObject {
+  readonly bytes: Uint8Array;
+  readonly contentType?: string;
+  readonly lastModified: Date;
+}
+
+/**
+ * An in-memory `StorageProvider` for tests that exercise **wiring, scoping, and routing** rather
+ * than the S3 protocol.
+ *
+ * It implements the same interface the real S3 provider does, so everything above the provider seam
+ * — binding resolution, the scoped facade, lifecycle eligibility, route wiring — is exercised
+ * unchanged. What it deliberately does *not* reproduce is the protocol itself: real SeaweedFS
+ * semantics (non-idempotent `CreateBucket`, `NoSuchKey` vs `NoSuchBucket`, ETag quoting, streaming
+ * bodies) are proven against a live server in `core/tests/module-storage.integration.ts`, so this
+ * double can never quietly stand in for a provider guarantee nobody checked.
+ *
+ * It keys everything by **physical** bucket, exactly as the real provider does, which is what lets a
+ * test assert that two modules declaring the same logical name really did land in different
+ * namespaces.
+ */
+export function createInMemoryStorageProvider(): StorageProvider & {
+  readonly buckets: ReadonlyMap<string, Map<string, StoredObject>>;
+  ensureBucketCalls: number;
+} {
+  const buckets = new Map<string, Map<string, StoredObject>>();
+  const state = { ensureBucketCalls: 0 };
+
+  const objectsIn = (physicalBucket: string): Map<string, StoredObject> => {
+    const bucket = buckets.get(physicalBucket);
+    if (!bucket) {
+      throw new ModuleStorageError("STORAGE_BUCKET_UNAVAILABLE");
+    }
+    return bucket;
+  };
+
+  const metadataFor = (key: string, stored: StoredObject): ModuleStorageObjectMetadata =>
+    Object.freeze({
+      contentLength: stored.bytes.byteLength,
+      key,
+      lastModified: stored.lastModified,
+      ...(stored.contentType === undefined ? {} : { contentType: stored.contentType }),
+    });
+
+  const provider: StorageProvider = {
+    async close(): Promise<void> {
+      // Nothing to release.
+    },
+    async createReadUrl(
+      physicalBucket: string,
+      key: string,
+      urlOptions: { readonly expiresInSeconds: number; readonly downloadFilename?: string },
+    ): Promise<ModuleStorageReadUrl> {
+      // Keyed by physical bucket like everything else here, so a route test can prove the URL a
+      // handler received belongs to that module's namespace and not another's.
+      return Object.freeze({
+        expiresAt: new Date(Date.now() + urlOptions.expiresInSeconds * 1000),
+        url: `https://delivery.test/${physicalBucket}/${encodeURIComponent(key)}?token=fake`,
+      });
+    },
+    async delete(physicalBucket: string, key: string): Promise<void> {
+      objectsIn(physicalBucket).delete(key);
+    },
+    async ensureBucket(physicalBucket: string): Promise<void> {
+      state.ensureBucketCalls += 1;
+      if (!buckets.has(physicalBucket)) {
+        buckets.set(physicalBucket, new Map());
+      }
+    },
+    async get(physicalBucket: string, key: string): Promise<ModuleStorageObject> {
+      const stored = objectsIn(physicalBucket).get(key);
+      if (!stored) {
+        throw new ModuleStorageError("STORAGE_OBJECT_NOT_FOUND", key);
+      }
+      return Object.freeze({
+        ...metadataFor(key, stored),
+        body: streamOf(stored.bytes),
+      });
+    },
+    async head(physicalBucket: string, key: string): Promise<ModuleStorageObjectMetadata> {
+      const stored = objectsIn(physicalBucket).get(key);
+      if (!stored) {
+        throw new ModuleStorageError("STORAGE_OBJECT_NOT_FOUND", key);
+      }
+      return metadataFor(key, stored);
+    },
+    async list(
+      physicalBucket: string,
+      options: ModuleStorageListOptions,
+    ): Promise<ModuleStorageListing> {
+      const entries = [...objectsIn(physicalBucket).entries()]
+        .filter(([key]) => options.prefix === undefined || key.startsWith(options.prefix))
+        .sort(([left], [right]) => (left < right ? -1 : left > right ? 1 : 0));
+      return Object.freeze({
+        objects: Object.freeze(entries.map(([key, stored]) => metadataFor(key, stored))),
+      });
+    },
+    async probe(): Promise<void> {
+      // Always reachable.
+    },
+    async put(
+      physicalBucket: string,
+      key: string,
+      body: ModuleStorageBody,
+      options: ModuleStoragePutOptions,
+    ): Promise<ModuleStorageObjectMetadata> {
+      const bytes =
+        typeof body === "string"
+          ? new TextEncoder().encode(body)
+          : body instanceof Uint8Array
+            ? body
+            : await collect(body as ReadableStream<Uint8Array>);
+      const stored: StoredObject = {
+        bytes,
+        lastModified: new Date(0),
+        ...(options.contentType === undefined ? {} : { contentType: options.contentType }),
+      };
+      objectsIn(physicalBucket).set(key, stored);
+      return metadataFor(key, stored);
+    },
+  };
+
+  return Object.assign(provider, {
+    buckets: buckets as ReadonlyMap<string, Map<string, StoredObject>>,
+    get ensureBucketCalls(): number {
+      return state.ensureBucketCalls;
+    },
+  });
+}
+
+export interface ModuleStorageOption {
+  readonly snapshots: ModuleStorageLookup;
+  readonly providerConfigured: boolean;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Builds the `createApiApp` storage option the same way `startApi` does — resolve every module's
+ * declared buckets against one provider and one prefix — rather than hand-writing a map, so a test
+ * can never assert against a shape the real composition would not produce.
+ */
+export function moduleStorageOptionFor(
+  discoveredModules: readonly DiscoveredModule[],
+  provider?: StorageProvider,
+): ModuleStorageOption {
+  return {
+    providerConfigured: provider !== undefined,
+    snapshots: createModuleStorageLookup(
+      provider,
+      "ekklesia",
+      discoveredModules.map((module) => ({
+        logicalBucketIds: module.manifest.storage.buckets.map((bucket) => bucket.id),
+        moduleId: module.manifest.id,
+      })),
+    ),
+  };
+}
+
+/** The storage option for a `createApiApp` caller that exercises no storage at all — the explicit
+ * "this installation has no object storage" statement the required option asks for. */
+export function emptyModuleStorage(): ModuleStorageOption {
+  return { providerConfigured: false, snapshots: new Map<string, ModuleStorage>() };
+}

apps/api/tests/support/ready-health.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+import type { ApiHealthOptions } from "../../src/health-routes.js";
+
+/** Readiness inputs for a composition whose tests do not exercise health: the database answers and
+ * module startup has completed. Health behavior itself is tested in `../health-routes.test.ts`. */
+export function readyHealth(): ApiHealthOptions {
+  return {
+    checkDatabase: async () => undefined,
+    isModuleStartupComplete: () => true,
+  };
+}

apps/api/tsconfig.build.json

@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+{
+  "extends": "./tsconfig.json",
+  "compilerOptions": {
+    "declaration": true,
+    "declarationMap": true,
+    "noEmit": false,
+    "outDir": "dist",
+    "rootDir": "src",
+    "sourceMap": true,
+    "types": ["node"]
+  },
+  "include": ["src/**/*.ts"],
+  "exclude": ["src/**/*.test.ts", "tests"]
+}

apps/api/tsconfig.json

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+{
+  "extends": "@ekklesia/typescript-config/node.json",
+  "compilerOptions": {
+    "noEmit": true,
+    "types": ["node", "vitest/globals"]
+  },
+  "include": ["src/**/*.ts", "tests/**/*.ts"]
+}

core/drizzle.config.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+import { defineConfig } from "drizzle-kit";
+
+export default defineConfig({
+  dialect: "postgresql",
+  schema: [
+    "./src/identity/schema.ts",
+    "./src/authorization/schema.ts",
+    "./src/dashboard/schema.ts",
+    "./src/modules/lifecycle-schema.ts",
+    "./src/modules/configuration-schema.ts",
+    "./src/devices/schema.ts",
+  ],
+  out: "./drizzle",
+  migrations: {
+    prefix: "index",
+  },
+  breakpoints: true,
+});

core/drizzle/0000_identity_core_tables.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+CREATE TABLE "ekklesia_core_account" (
+	"id" text PRIMARY KEY NOT NULL,
+	"account_id" text NOT NULL,
+	"provider_id" text NOT NULL,
+	"user_id" text NOT NULL,
+	"access_token" text,
+	"refresh_token" text,
+	"id_token" text,
+	"access_token_expires_at" timestamp,
+	"refresh_token_expires_at" timestamp,
+	"scope" text,
+	"password" text,
+	"created_at" timestamp DEFAULT now() NOT NULL,
+	"updated_at" timestamp NOT NULL
+);
+--> statement-breakpoint
+CREATE TABLE "ekklesia_core_session" (
+	"id" text PRIMARY KEY NOT NULL,
+	"expires_at" timestamp NOT NULL,
+	"token" text NOT NULL,
+	"created_at" timestamp DEFAULT now() NOT NULL,
+	"updated_at" timestamp NOT NULL,
+	"ip_address" text,
+	"user_agent" text,
+	"user_id" text NOT NULL,
+	CONSTRAINT "ekklesia_core_session_token_unique" UNIQUE("token")
+);
+--> statement-breakpoint
+CREATE TABLE "ekklesia_core_user" (
+	"id" text PRIMARY KEY NOT NULL,
+	"name" text NOT NULL,
+	"email" text NOT NULL,
+	"email_verified" boolean DEFAULT false NOT NULL,
+	"image" text,
+	"created_at" timestamp DEFAULT now() NOT NULL,
+	"updated_at" timestamp DEFAULT now() NOT NULL,
+	CONSTRAINT "ekklesia_core_user_email_unique" UNIQUE("email")
+);
+--> statement-breakpoint
+CREATE TABLE "ekklesia_core_verification" (
+	"id" text PRIMARY KEY NOT NULL,
+	"identifier" text NOT NULL,
+	"value" text NOT NULL,
+	"expires_at" timestamp NOT NULL,
+	"created_at" timestamp DEFAULT now() NOT NULL,
+	"updated_at" timestamp DEFAULT now() NOT NULL
+);
+--> statement-breakpoint
+ALTER TABLE "ekklesia_core_account" ADD CONSTRAINT "ekklesia_core_account_user_id_ekklesia_core_user_id_fk" FOREIGN KEY ("user_id") REFERENCES "public"."ekklesia_core_user"("id") ON DELETE cascade ON UPDATE no action;--> statement-breakpoint
+ALTER TABLE "ekklesia_core_session" ADD CONSTRAINT "ekklesia_core_session_user_id_ekklesia_core_user_id_fk" FOREIGN KEY ("user_id") REFERENCES "public"."ekklesia_core_user"("id") ON DELETE cascade ON UPDATE no action;--> statement-breakpoint
+CREATE INDEX "ekklesia_core_account_user_id_idx" ON "ekklesia_core_account" USING btree ("user_id");--> statement-breakpoint
+CREATE INDEX "ekklesia_core_session_user_id_idx" ON "ekklesia_core_session" USING btree ("user_id");--> statement-breakpoint
+CREATE INDEX "ekklesia_core_verification_identifier_idx" ON "ekklesia_core_verification" USING btree ("identifier");

core/drizzle/0001_authorization_core_tables.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+CREATE TABLE "ekklesia_core_authorization_audit" (
+	"id" uuid PRIMARY KEY DEFAULT gen_random_uuid() NOT NULL,
+	"action" text NOT NULL,
+	"actor_type" text NOT NULL,
+	"actor_id" text,
+	"subject_user_id" text NOT NULL,
+	"permission_id" text,
+	"scope" text,
+	"grant_id" uuid,
+	"created_at" timestamp with time zone DEFAULT now() NOT NULL,
+	CONSTRAINT "ekklesia_core_authorization_audit_action_check" CHECK ("ekklesia_core_authorization_audit"."action" in ('grant.create', 'grant.revoke', 'platform_owner.grant', 'platform_owner.revoke')),
+	CONSTRAINT "ekklesia_core_authorization_audit_actor_type_check" CHECK ("ekklesia_core_authorization_audit"."actor_type" in ('user', 'system')),
+	CONSTRAINT "ekklesia_core_authorization_audit_scope_check" CHECK ("ekklesia_core_authorization_audit"."scope" is null or length("ekklesia_core_authorization_audit"."scope") > 0)
+);
+--> statement-breakpoint
+CREATE TABLE "ekklesia_core_grant" (
+	"id" uuid PRIMARY KEY DEFAULT gen_random_uuid() NOT NULL,
+	"user_id" text NOT NULL,
+	"permission_id" text NOT NULL,
+	"scope" text,
+	"source_kind" text NOT NULL,
+	"source_ref" text,
+	"created_at" timestamp with time zone DEFAULT now() NOT NULL,
+	"created_by_actor_type" text NOT NULL,
+	"created_by_actor_id" text,
+	"expires_at" timestamp with time zone,
+	"revoked_at" timestamp with time zone,
+	"revoked_by_actor_type" text,
+	"revoked_by_actor_id" text,
+	CONSTRAINT "ekklesia_core_grant_source_kind_check" CHECK ("ekklesia_core_grant"."source_kind" in ('explicit', 'relationship')),
+	CONSTRAINT "ekklesia_core_grant_created_actor_type_check" CHECK ("ekklesia_core_grant"."created_by_actor_type" in ('user', 'system')),
+	CONSTRAINT "ekklesia_core_grant_revoked_actor_type_check" CHECK ("ekklesia_core_grant"."revoked_by_actor_type" is null or "ekklesia_core_grant"."revoked_by_actor_type" in ('user', 'system'))
+);
+--> statement-breakpoint
+CREATE TABLE "ekklesia_core_platform_owner" (
+	"user_id" text PRIMARY KEY NOT NULL,
+	"granted_at" timestamp with time zone DEFAULT now() NOT NULL,
+	"granted_by_actor_type" text NOT NULL,
+	"granted_by_actor_id" text,
+	"revoked_at" timestamp with time zone,
+	"revoked_by_actor_type" text,
+	"revoked_by_actor_id" text,
+	CONSTRAINT "ekklesia_core_platform_owner_granted_actor_type_check" CHECK ("ekklesia_core_platform_owner"."granted_by_actor_type" in ('user', 'system')),
+	CONSTRAINT "ekklesia_core_platform_owner_revoked_actor_type_check" CHECK ("ekklesia_core_platform_owner"."revoked_by_actor_type" is null or "ekklesia_core_platform_owner"."revoked_by_actor_type" in ('user', 'system'))
+);
+--> statement-breakpoint
+ALTER TABLE "ekklesia_core_authorization_audit" ADD CONSTRAINT "ekklesia_core_authorization_audit_subject_user_id_ekklesia_core_user_id_fk" FOREIGN KEY ("subject_user_id") REFERENCES "public"."ekklesia_core_user"("id") ON DELETE cascade ON UPDATE no action;--> statement-breakpoint
+ALTER TABLE "ekklesia_core_grant" ADD CONSTRAINT "ekklesia_core_grant_user_id_ekklesia_core_user_id_fk" FOREIGN KEY ("user_id") REFERENCES "public"."ekklesia_core_user"("id") ON DELETE cascade ON UPDATE no action;--> statement-breakpoint
+ALTER TABLE "ekklesia_core_platform_owner" ADD CONSTRAINT "ekklesia_core_platform_owner_user_id_ekklesia_core_user_id_fk" FOREIGN KEY ("user_id") REFERENCES "public"."ekklesia_core_user"("id") ON DELETE cascade ON UPDATE no action;--> statement-breakpoint
+CREATE INDEX "ekklesia_core_authorization_audit_subject_idx" ON "ekklesia_core_authorization_audit" USING btree ("subject_user_id");--> statement-breakpoint
+CREATE INDEX "ekklesia_core_grant_user_permission_idx" ON "ekklesia_core_grant" USING btree ("user_id","permission_id");

core/drizzle/0002_authorization_integrity.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+CREATE TABLE "ekklesia_core_platform_owner_bootstrap" (
+	"id" text PRIMARY KEY NOT NULL,
+	"consumed_at" timestamp with time zone DEFAULT now() NOT NULL,
+	"consumed_for_user_id" text,
+	CONSTRAINT "ekklesia_core_platform_owner_bootstrap_singleton_check" CHECK ("ekklesia_core_platform_owner_bootstrap"."id" = 'singleton')
+);
+--> statement-breakpoint
+ALTER TABLE "ekklesia_core_authorization_audit" DROP CONSTRAINT "ekklesia_core_authorization_audit_subject_user_id_ekklesia_core_user_id_fk";
+--> statement-breakpoint
+INSERT INTO "ekklesia_core_platform_owner_bootstrap" ("id")
+SELECT 'singleton'
+WHERE EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM "ekklesia_core_platform_owner")
+ON CONFLICT ("id") DO NOTHING;

core/drizzle/0003_dashboard_navigation_tables.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+CREATE TABLE "ekklesia_core_dashboard_group" (
+	"id" text PRIMARY KEY NOT NULL,
+	"label" text NOT NULL,
+	"sort_order" integer DEFAULT 0 NOT NULL,
+	"created_at" timestamp with time zone DEFAULT now() NOT NULL,
+	"updated_at" timestamp with time zone DEFAULT now() NOT NULL,
+	CONSTRAINT "ekklesia_core_dashboard_group_id_check" CHECK (length("ekklesia_core_dashboard_group"."id") > 0),
+	CONSTRAINT "ekklesia_core_dashboard_group_label_check" CHECK (length(btrim("ekklesia_core_dashboard_group"."label")) > 0)
+);
+--> statement-breakpoint
+CREATE TABLE "ekklesia_core_dashboard_placement" (
+	"module_id" text PRIMARY KEY NOT NULL,
+	"group_id" text,
+	"sort_order" integer DEFAULT 0 NOT NULL,
+	"created_at" timestamp with time zone DEFAULT now() NOT NULL,
+	"updated_at" timestamp with time zone DEFAULT now() NOT NULL,
+	CONSTRAINT "ekklesia_core_dashboard_placement_module_check" CHECK (length("ekklesia_core_dashboard_placement"."module_id") > 0)
+);
+--> statement-breakpoint
+ALTER TABLE "ekklesia_core_dashboard_placement" ADD CONSTRAINT "ekklesia_core_dashboard_placement_group_id_ekklesia_core_dashboard_group_id_fk" FOREIGN KEY ("group_id") REFERENCES "public"."ekklesia_core_dashboard_group"("id") ON DELETE set null ON UPDATE no action;--> statement-breakpoint
+CREATE INDEX "ekklesia_core_dashboard_group_order_idx" ON "ekklesia_core_dashboard_group" USING btree ("sort_order","id");--> statement-breakpoint
+CREATE INDEX "ekklesia_core_dashboard_placement_group_idx" ON "ekklesia_core_dashboard_placement" USING btree ("group_id","sort_order");

core/drizzle/0004_module_lifecycle_state.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+CREATE TABLE "ekklesia_core_module_state" (
+	"module_id" text PRIMARY KEY NOT NULL,
+	"enabled" boolean NOT NULL,
+	"created_at" timestamp with time zone DEFAULT now() NOT NULL,
+	"updated_at" timestamp with time zone DEFAULT now() NOT NULL,
+	CONSTRAINT "ekklesia_core_module_state_module_check" CHECK (length("ekklesia_core_module_state"."module_id") > 0)
+);

core/drizzle/0005_module_configuration.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+CREATE TABLE "ekklesia_core_module_configuration" (
+	"module_id" text NOT NULL,
+	"key" text NOT NULL,
+	"value" text NOT NULL,
+	"created_at" timestamp with time zone DEFAULT now() NOT NULL,
+	"updated_at" timestamp with time zone DEFAULT now() NOT NULL,
+	CONSTRAINT "ekklesia_core_module_configuration_module_id_key_pk" PRIMARY KEY("module_id","key"),
+	CONSTRAINT "ekklesia_core_module_configuration_module_check" CHECK (length("ekklesia_core_module_configuration"."module_id") > 0),
+	CONSTRAINT "ekklesia_core_module_configuration_key_check" CHECK (length("ekklesia_core_module_configuration"."key") > 0),
+	CONSTRAINT "ekklesia_core_module_configuration_value_check" CHECK (length("ekklesia_core_module_configuration"."value") <= 2048)
+);
+--> statement-breakpoint
+CREATE INDEX "ekklesia_core_module_configuration_module_idx" ON "ekklesia_core_module_configuration" USING btree ("module_id");

core/drizzle/0006_device_identity.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+CREATE TABLE "ekklesia_core_device" (
+	"id" uuid PRIMARY KEY DEFAULT gen_random_uuid() NOT NULL,
+	"name" text NOT NULL,
+	"credential_hash" text NOT NULL,
+	"created_at" timestamp with time zone DEFAULT now() NOT NULL,
+	"created_by_user_id" text,
+	"last_seen_at" timestamp with time zone,
+	"revoked_at" timestamp with time zone,
+	"revoked_by_user_id" text,
+	CONSTRAINT "ekklesia_core_device_name_check" CHECK (length("ekklesia_core_device"."name") between 1 and 128),
+	CONSTRAINT "ekklesia_core_device_credential_hash_check" CHECK (length("ekklesia_core_device"."credential_hash") = 64)
+);
+--> statement-breakpoint
+CREATE TABLE "ekklesia_core_device_pairing_request" (
+	"id" uuid PRIMARY KEY DEFAULT gen_random_uuid() NOT NULL,
+	"code" text NOT NULL,
+	"claim_secret_hash" text NOT NULL,
+	"module_id" text NOT NULL,
+	"permission_id" text NOT NULL,
+	"state" text DEFAULT 'pending' NOT NULL,
+	"created_at" timestamp with time zone DEFAULT now() NOT NULL,
+	"expires_at" timestamp with time zone NOT NULL,
+	"device_name" text,
+	"approved_at" timestamp with time zone,
+	"approved_by_user_id" text,
+	"consumed_at" timestamp with time zone,
+	"device_id" uuid,
+	CONSTRAINT "ekklesia_core_device_pairing_code_check" CHECK ("ekklesia_core_device_pairing_request"."code" ~ '^[0-9]{6}$'),
+	CONSTRAINT "ekklesia_core_device_pairing_claim_hash_check" CHECK (length("ekklesia_core_device_pairing_request"."claim_secret_hash") = 64),
+	CONSTRAINT "ekklesia_core_device_pairing_state_check" CHECK ("ekklesia_core_device_pairing_request"."state" in ('pending', 'approved', 'consumed'))
+);
+--> statement-breakpoint
+CREATE TABLE "ekklesia_core_device_permission" (
+	"id" uuid PRIMARY KEY DEFAULT gen_random_uuid() NOT NULL,
+	"device_id" uuid NOT NULL,
+	"permission_id" text NOT NULL,
+	"granted_at" timestamp with time zone DEFAULT now() NOT NULL,
+	"granted_by_user_id" text,
+	"revoked_at" timestamp with time zone,
+	CONSTRAINT "ekklesia_core_device_permission_id_check" CHECK (length("ekklesia_core_device_permission"."permission_id") between 1 and 128)
+);
+--> statement-breakpoint
+ALTER TABLE "ekklesia_core_device" ADD CONSTRAINT "ekklesia_core_device_created_by_user_id_ekklesia_core_user_id_fk" FOREIGN KEY ("created_by_user_id") REFERENCES "public"."ekklesia_core_user"("id") ON DELETE set null ON UPDATE no action;--> statement-breakpoint
+ALTER TABLE "ekklesia_core_device" ADD CONSTRAINT "ekklesia_core_device_revoked_by_user_id_ekklesia_core_user_id_fk" FOREIGN KEY ("revoked_by_user_id") REFERENCES "public"."ekklesia_core_user"("id") ON DELETE set null ON UPDATE no action;--> statement-breakpoint
+ALTER TABLE "ekklesia_core_device_pairing_request" ADD CONSTRAINT "ekklesia_core_device_pairing_request_approved_by_user_id_ekklesia_core_user_id_fk" FOREIGN KEY ("approved_by_user_id") REFERENCES "public"."ekklesia_core_user"("id") ON DELETE set null ON UPDATE no action;--> statement-breakpoint
+ALTER TABLE "ekklesia_core_device_pairing_request" ADD CONSTRAINT "ekklesia_core_device_pairing_request_device_id_ekklesia_core_device_id_fk" FOREIGN KEY ("device_id") REFERENCES "public"."ekklesia_core_device"("id") ON DELETE set null ON UPDATE no action;--> statement-breakpoint
+ALTER TABLE "ekklesia_core_device_permission" ADD CONSTRAINT "ekklesia_core_device_permission_device_id_ekklesia_core_device_id_fk" FOREIGN KEY ("device_id") REFERENCES "public"."ekklesia_core_device"("id") ON DELETE cascade ON UPDATE no action;--> statement-breakpoint
+ALTER TABLE "ekklesia_core_device_permission" ADD CONSTRAINT "ekklesia_core_device_permission_granted_by_user_id_ekklesia_core_user_id_fk" FOREIGN KEY ("granted_by_user_id") REFERENCES "public"."ekklesia_core_user"("id") ON DELETE set null ON UPDATE no action;--> statement-breakpoint
+CREATE UNIQUE INDEX "ekklesia_core_device_credential_hash_idx" ON "ekklesia_core_device" USING btree ("credential_hash");--> statement-breakpoint
+CREATE INDEX "ekklesia_core_device_revoked_idx" ON "ekklesia_core_device" USING btree ("revoked_at");--> statement-breakpoint
+CREATE UNIQUE INDEX "ekklesia_core_device_pairing_code_idx" ON "ekklesia_core_device_pairing_request" USING btree ("code") WHERE "ekklesia_core_device_pairing_request"."state" <> 'consumed';--> statement-breakpoint
+CREATE INDEX "ekklesia_core_device_pairing_claim_idx" ON "ekklesia_core_device_pairing_request" USING btree ("claim_secret_hash");--> statement-breakpoint
+CREATE INDEX "ekklesia_core_device_permission_lookup_idx" ON "ekklesia_core_device_permission" USING btree ("device_id","permission_id");

core/drizzle/0007_verified_bootstrap_owners.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+-- Email verification becomes a precondition for holding a session (ADR 0038). Any platform owner
+-- that already exists was created by the trusted operator-run bootstrap command before that command
+-- marked addresses verified, so without this they would be locked out of their own installation by
+-- an upgrade.
+--
+-- Deliberately narrow. It marks exactly the identities the authorization tables already record as
+-- currently-granted platform owners: an authority the deployment established through a command that
+-- required database credentials, which is the same authority the bootstrap verification exception
+-- rests on. Every other account is left untouched and must verify by email like any other.
+--
+-- Data-only and idempotent. It adds no column, drops nothing, and re-running it changes no row that
+-- is not already false.
+UPDATE "ekklesia_core_user"
+SET "email_verified" = true
+WHERE "email_verified" = false
+  AND "id" IN (
+    SELECT "user_id"
+    FROM "ekklesia_core_platform_owner"
+    WHERE "revoked_at" IS NULL
+  );

core/drizzle/meta/0000_snapshot.json

@@ -0,0 +1,362 @@
+{
+  "id": "42cf39d2-7833-4bf3-9043-4e5303da8a75",
+  "prevId": "00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000",
+  "version": "7",
+  "dialect": "postgresql",
+  "tables": {
+    "public.ekklesia_core_account": {
+      "name": "ekklesia_core_account",
+      "schema": "",
+      "columns": {
+        "id": {
+          "name": "id",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": true,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "account_id": {
+          "name": "account_id",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "provider_id": {
+          "name": "provider_id",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "user_id": {
+          "name": "user_id",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "access_token": {
+          "name": "access_token",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "refresh_token": {
+          "name": "refresh_token",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "id_token": {
+          "name": "id_token",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "access_token_expires_at": {
+          "name": "access_token_expires_at",
+          "type": "timestamp",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "refresh_token_expires_at": {
+          "name": "refresh_token_expires_at",
+          "type": "timestamp",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "scope": {
+          "name": "scope",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "password": {
+          "name": "password",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "created_at": {
+          "name": "created_at",
+          "type": "timestamp",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true,
+          "default": "now()"
+        },
+        "updated_at": {
+          "name": "updated_at",
+          "type": "timestamp",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        }
+      },
+      "indexes": {
+        "ekklesia_core_account_user_id_idx": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_account_user_id_idx",
+          "columns": [
+            {
+              "expression": "user_id",
+              "isExpression": false,
+              "asc": true,
+              "nulls": "last"
+            }
+          ],
+          "isUnique": false,
+          "concurrently": false,
+          "method": "btree",
+          "with": {}
+        }
+      },
+      "foreignKeys": {
+        "ekklesia_core_account_user_id_ekklesia_core_user_id_fk": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_account_user_id_ekklesia_core_user_id_fk",
+          "tableFrom": "ekklesia_core_account",
+          "tableTo": "ekklesia_core_user",
+          "columnsFrom": ["user_id"],
+          "columnsTo": ["id"],
+          "onDelete": "cascade",
+          "onUpdate": "no action"
+        }
+      },
+      "compositePrimaryKeys": {},
+      "uniqueConstraints": {},
+      "policies": {},
+      "checkConstraints": {},
+      "isRLSEnabled": false
+    },
+    "public.ekklesia_core_session": {
+      "name": "ekklesia_core_session",
+      "schema": "",
+      "columns": {
+        "id": {
+          "name": "id",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": true,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "expires_at": {
+          "name": "expires_at",
+          "type": "timestamp",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "token": {
+          "name": "token",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "created_at": {
+          "name": "created_at",
+          "type": "timestamp",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true,
+          "default": "now()"
+        },
+        "updated_at": {
+          "name": "updated_at",
+          "type": "timestamp",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "ip_address": {
+          "name": "ip_address",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "user_agent": {
+          "name": "user_agent",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "user_id": {
+          "name": "user_id",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        }
+      },
+      "indexes": {
+        "ekklesia_core_session_user_id_idx": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_session_user_id_idx",
+          "columns": [
+            {
+              "expression": "user_id",
+              "isExpression": false,
+              "asc": true,
+              "nulls": "last"
+            }
+          ],
+          "isUnique": false,
+          "concurrently": false,
+          "method": "btree",
+          "with": {}
+        }
+      },
+      "foreignKeys": {
+        "ekklesia_core_session_user_id_ekklesia_core_user_id_fk": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_session_user_id_ekklesia_core_user_id_fk",
+          "tableFrom": "ekklesia_core_session",
+          "tableTo": "ekklesia_core_user",
+          "columnsFrom": ["user_id"],
+          "columnsTo": ["id"],
+          "onDelete": "cascade",
+          "onUpdate": "no action"
+        }
+      },
+      "compositePrimaryKeys": {},
+      "uniqueConstraints": {
+        "ekklesia_core_session_token_unique": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_session_token_unique",
+          "nullsNotDistinct": false,
+          "columns": ["token"]
+        }
+      },
+      "policies": {},
+      "checkConstraints": {},
+      "isRLSEnabled": false
+    },
+    "public.ekklesia_core_user": {
+      "name": "ekklesia_core_user",
+      "schema": "",
+      "columns": {
+        "id": {
+          "name": "id",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": true,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "name": {
+          "name": "name",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "email": {
+          "name": "email",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "email_verified": {
+          "name": "email_verified",
+          "type": "boolean",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true,
+          "default": false
+        },
+        "image": {
+          "name": "image",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "created_at": {
+          "name": "created_at",
+          "type": "timestamp",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true,
+          "default": "now()"
+        },
+        "updated_at": {
+          "name": "updated_at",
+          "type": "timestamp",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true,
+          "default": "now()"
+        }
+      },
+      "indexes": {},
+      "foreignKeys": {},
+      "compositePrimaryKeys": {},
+      "uniqueConstraints": {
+        "ekklesia_core_user_email_unique": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_user_email_unique",
+          "nullsNotDistinct": false,
+          "columns": ["email"]
+        }
+      },
+      "policies": {},
+      "checkConstraints": {},
+      "isRLSEnabled": false
+    },
+    "public.ekklesia_core_verification": {
+      "name": "ekklesia_core_verification",
+      "schema": "",
+      "columns": {
+        "id": {
+          "name": "id",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": true,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "identifier": {
+          "name": "identifier",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "value": {
+          "name": "value",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "expires_at": {
+          "name": "expires_at",
+          "type": "timestamp",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "created_at": {
+          "name": "created_at",
+          "type": "timestamp",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true,
+          "default": "now()"
+        },
+        "updated_at": {
+          "name": "updated_at",
+          "type": "timestamp",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true,
+          "default": "now()"
+        }
+      },
+      "indexes": {
+        "ekklesia_core_verification_identifier_idx": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_verification_identifier_idx",
+          "columns": [
+            {
+              "expression": "identifier",
+              "isExpression": false,
+              "asc": true,
+              "nulls": "last"
+            }
+          ],
+          "isUnique": false,
+          "concurrently": false,
+          "method": "btree",
+          "with": {}
+        }
+      },
+      "foreignKeys": {},
+      "compositePrimaryKeys": {},
+      "uniqueConstraints": {},
+      "policies": {},
+      "checkConstraints": {},
+      "isRLSEnabled": false
+    }
+  },
+  "enums": {},
+  "schemas": {},
+  "sequences": {},
+  "roles": {},
+  "policies": {},
+  "views": {},
+  "_meta": {
+    "columns": {},
+    "schemas": {},
+    "tables": {}
+  }
+}

core/drizzle/meta/0001_snapshot.json

@@ -0,0 +1,683 @@
+{
+  "id": "dfd53f55-6e2a-45e1-9962-469ea6eca6e7",
+  "prevId": "42cf39d2-7833-4bf3-9043-4e5303da8a75",
+  "version": "7",
+  "dialect": "postgresql",
+  "tables": {
+    "public.ekklesia_core_account": {
+      "name": "ekklesia_core_account",
+      "schema": "",
+      "columns": {
+        "id": {
+          "name": "id",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": true,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "account_id": {
+          "name": "account_id",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "provider_id": {
+          "name": "provider_id",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "user_id": {
+          "name": "user_id",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "access_token": {
+          "name": "access_token",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "refresh_token": {
+          "name": "refresh_token",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "id_token": {
+          "name": "id_token",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "access_token_expires_at": {
+          "name": "access_token_expires_at",
+          "type": "timestamp",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "refresh_token_expires_at": {
+          "name": "refresh_token_expires_at",
+          "type": "timestamp",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "scope": {
+          "name": "scope",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "password": {
+          "name": "password",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "created_at": {
+          "name": "created_at",
+          "type": "timestamp",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true,
+          "default": "now()"
+        },
+        "updated_at": {
+          "name": "updated_at",
+          "type": "timestamp",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        }
+      },
+      "indexes": {
+        "ekklesia_core_account_user_id_idx": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_account_user_id_idx",
+          "columns": [
+            {
+              "expression": "user_id",
+              "isExpression": false,
+              "asc": true,
+              "nulls": "last"
+            }
+          ],
+          "isUnique": false,
+          "concurrently": false,
+          "method": "btree",
+          "with": {}
+        }
+      },
+      "foreignKeys": {
+        "ekklesia_core_account_user_id_ekklesia_core_user_id_fk": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_account_user_id_ekklesia_core_user_id_fk",
+          "tableFrom": "ekklesia_core_account",
+          "tableTo": "ekklesia_core_user",
+          "columnsFrom": ["user_id"],
+          "columnsTo": ["id"],
+          "onDelete": "cascade",
+          "onUpdate": "no action"
+        }
+      },
+      "compositePrimaryKeys": {},
+      "uniqueConstraints": {},
+      "policies": {},
+      "checkConstraints": {},
+      "isRLSEnabled": false
+    },
+    "public.ekklesia_core_session": {
+      "name": "ekklesia_core_session",
+      "schema": "",
+      "columns": {
+        "id": {
+          "name": "id",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": true,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "expires_at": {
+          "name": "expires_at",
+          "type": "timestamp",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "token": {
+          "name": "token",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "created_at": {
+          "name": "created_at",
+          "type": "timestamp",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true,
+          "default": "now()"
+        },
+        "updated_at": {
+          "name": "updated_at",
+          "type": "timestamp",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "ip_address": {
+          "name": "ip_address",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "user_agent": {
+          "name": "user_agent",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "user_id": {
+          "name": "user_id",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        }
+      },
+      "indexes": {
+        "ekklesia_core_session_user_id_idx": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_session_user_id_idx",
+          "columns": [
+            {
+              "expression": "user_id",
+              "isExpression": false,
+              "asc": true,
+              "nulls": "last"
+            }
+          ],
+          "isUnique": false,
+          "concurrently": false,
+          "method": "btree",
+          "with": {}
+        }
+      },
+      "foreignKeys": {
+        "ekklesia_core_session_user_id_ekklesia_core_user_id_fk": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_session_user_id_ekklesia_core_user_id_fk",
+          "tableFrom": "ekklesia_core_session",
+          "tableTo": "ekklesia_core_user",
+          "columnsFrom": ["user_id"],
+          "columnsTo": ["id"],
+          "onDelete": "cascade",
+          "onUpdate": "no action"
+        }
+      },
+      "compositePrimaryKeys": {},
+      "uniqueConstraints": {
+        "ekklesia_core_session_token_unique": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_session_token_unique",
+          "nullsNotDistinct": false,
+          "columns": ["token"]
+        }
+      },
+      "policies": {},
+      "checkConstraints": {},
+      "isRLSEnabled": false
+    },
+    "public.ekklesia_core_user": {
+      "name": "ekklesia_core_user",
+      "schema": "",
+      "columns": {
+        "id": {
+          "name": "id",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": true,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "name": {
+          "name": "name",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "email": {
+          "name": "email",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "email_verified": {
+          "name": "email_verified",
+          "type": "boolean",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true,
+          "default": false
+        },
+        "image": {
+          "name": "image",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "created_at": {
+          "name": "created_at",
+          "type": "timestamp",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true,
+          "default": "now()"
+        },
+        "updated_at": {
+          "name": "updated_at",
+          "type": "timestamp",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true,
+          "default": "now()"
+        }
+      },
+      "indexes": {},
+      "foreignKeys": {},
+      "compositePrimaryKeys": {},
+      "uniqueConstraints": {
+        "ekklesia_core_user_email_unique": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_user_email_unique",
+          "nullsNotDistinct": false,
+          "columns": ["email"]
+        }
+      },
+      "policies": {},
+      "checkConstraints": {},
+      "isRLSEnabled": false
+    },
+    "public.ekklesia_core_verification": {
+      "name": "ekklesia_core_verification",
+      "schema": "",
+      "columns": {
+        "id": {
+          "name": "id",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": true,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "identifier": {
+          "name": "identifier",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "value": {
+          "name": "value",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "expires_at": {
+          "name": "expires_at",
+          "type": "timestamp",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "created_at": {
+          "name": "created_at",
+          "type": "timestamp",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true,
+          "default": "now()"
+        },
+        "updated_at": {
+          "name": "updated_at",
+          "type": "timestamp",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true,
+          "default": "now()"
+        }
+      },
+      "indexes": {
+        "ekklesia_core_verification_identifier_idx": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_verification_identifier_idx",
+          "columns": [
+            {
+              "expression": "identifier",
+              "isExpression": false,
+              "asc": true,
+              "nulls": "last"
+            }
+          ],
+          "isUnique": false,
+          "concurrently": false,
+          "method": "btree",
+          "with": {}
+        }
+      },
+      "foreignKeys": {},
+      "compositePrimaryKeys": {},
+      "uniqueConstraints": {},
+      "policies": {},
+      "checkConstraints": {},
+      "isRLSEnabled": false
+    },
+    "public.ekklesia_core_authorization_audit": {
+      "name": "ekklesia_core_authorization_audit",
+      "schema": "",
+      "columns": {
+        "id": {
+          "name": "id",
+          "type": "uuid",
+          "primaryKey": true,
+          "notNull": true,
+          "default": "gen_random_uuid()"
+        },
+        "action": {
+          "name": "action",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "actor_type": {
+          "name": "actor_type",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "actor_id": {
+          "name": "actor_id",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "subject_user_id": {
+          "name": "subject_user_id",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "permission_id": {
+          "name": "permission_id",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "scope": {
+          "name": "scope",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "grant_id": {
+          "name": "grant_id",
+          "type": "uuid",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "created_at": {
+          "name": "created_at",
+          "type": "timestamp with time zone",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true,
+          "default": "now()"
+        }
+      },
+      "indexes": {
+        "ekklesia_core_authorization_audit_subject_idx": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_authorization_audit_subject_idx",
+          "columns": [
+            {
+              "expression": "subject_user_id",
+              "isExpression": false,
+              "asc": true,
+              "nulls": "last"
+            }
+          ],
+          "isUnique": false,
+          "concurrently": false,
+          "method": "btree",
+          "with": {}
+        }
+      },
+      "foreignKeys": {
+        "ekklesia_core_authorization_audit_subject_user_id_ekklesia_core_user_id_fk": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_authorization_audit_subject_user_id_ekklesia_core_user_id_fk",
+          "tableFrom": "ekklesia_core_authorization_audit",
+          "tableTo": "ekklesia_core_user",
+          "columnsFrom": ["subject_user_id"],
+          "columnsTo": ["id"],
+          "onDelete": "cascade",
+          "onUpdate": "no action"
+        }
+      },
+      "compositePrimaryKeys": {},
+      "uniqueConstraints": {},
+      "policies": {},
+      "checkConstraints": {
+        "ekklesia_core_authorization_audit_action_check": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_authorization_audit_action_check",
+          "value": "\"ekklesia_core_authorization_audit\".\"action\" in ('grant.create', 'grant.revoke', 'platform_owner.grant', 'platform_owner.revoke')"
+        },
+        "ekklesia_core_authorization_audit_actor_type_check": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_authorization_audit_actor_type_check",
+          "value": "\"ekklesia_core_authorization_audit\".\"actor_type\" in ('user', 'system')"
+        },
+        "ekklesia_core_authorization_audit_scope_check": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_authorization_audit_scope_check",
+          "value": "\"ekklesia_core_authorization_audit\".\"scope\" is null or length(\"ekklesia_core_authorization_audit\".\"scope\") > 0"
+        }
+      },
+      "isRLSEnabled": false
+    },
+    "public.ekklesia_core_grant": {
+      "name": "ekklesia_core_grant",
+      "schema": "",
+      "columns": {
+        "id": {
+          "name": "id",
+          "type": "uuid",
+          "primaryKey": true,
+          "notNull": true,
+          "default": "gen_random_uuid()"
+        },
+        "user_id": {
+          "name": "user_id",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "permission_id": {
+          "name": "permission_id",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "scope": {
+          "name": "scope",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "source_kind": {
+          "name": "source_kind",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "source_ref": {
+          "name": "source_ref",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "created_at": {
+          "name": "created_at",
+          "type": "timestamp with time zone",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true,
+          "default": "now()"
+        },
+        "created_by_actor_type": {
+          "name": "created_by_actor_type",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "created_by_actor_id": {
+          "name": "created_by_actor_id",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "expires_at": {
+          "name": "expires_at",
+          "type": "timestamp with time zone",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "revoked_at": {
+          "name": "revoked_at",
+          "type": "timestamp with time zone",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "revoked_by_actor_type": {
+          "name": "revoked_by_actor_type",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "revoked_by_actor_id": {
+          "name": "revoked_by_actor_id",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        }
+      },
+      "indexes": {
+        "ekklesia_core_grant_user_permission_idx": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_grant_user_permission_idx",
+          "columns": [
+            {
+              "expression": "user_id",
+              "isExpression": false,
+              "asc": true,
+              "nulls": "last"
+            },
+            {
+              "expression": "permission_id",
+              "isExpression": false,
+              "asc": true,
+              "nulls": "last"
+            }
+          ],
+          "isUnique": false,
+          "concurrently": false,
+          "method": "btree",
+          "with": {}
+        }
+      },
+      "foreignKeys": {
+        "ekklesia_core_grant_user_id_ekklesia_core_user_id_fk": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_grant_user_id_ekklesia_core_user_id_fk",
+          "tableFrom": "ekklesia_core_grant",
+          "tableTo": "ekklesia_core_user",
+          "columnsFrom": ["user_id"],
+          "columnsTo": ["id"],
+          "onDelete": "cascade",
+          "onUpdate": "no action"
+        }
+      },
+      "compositePrimaryKeys": {},
+      "uniqueConstraints": {},
+      "policies": {},
+      "checkConstraints": {
+        "ekklesia_core_grant_source_kind_check": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_grant_source_kind_check",
+          "value": "\"ekklesia_core_grant\".\"source_kind\" in ('explicit', 'relationship')"
+        },
+        "ekklesia_core_grant_created_actor_type_check": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_grant_created_actor_type_check",
+          "value": "\"ekklesia_core_grant\".\"created_by_actor_type\" in ('user', 'system')"
+        },
+        "ekklesia_core_grant_revoked_actor_type_check": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_grant_revoked_actor_type_check",
+          "value": "\"ekklesia_core_grant\".\"revoked_by_actor_type\" is null or \"ekklesia_core_grant\".\"revoked_by_actor_type\" in ('user', 'system')"
+        }
+      },
+      "isRLSEnabled": false
+    },
+    "public.ekklesia_core_platform_owner": {
+      "name": "ekklesia_core_platform_owner",
+      "schema": "",
+      "columns": {
+        "user_id": {
+          "name": "user_id",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": true,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "granted_at": {
+          "name": "granted_at",
+          "type": "timestamp with time zone",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true,
+          "default": "now()"
+        },
+        "granted_by_actor_type": {
+          "name": "granted_by_actor_type",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "granted_by_actor_id": {
+          "name": "granted_by_actor_id",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "revoked_at": {
+          "name": "revoked_at",
+          "type": "timestamp with time zone",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "revoked_by_actor_type": {
+          "name": "revoked_by_actor_type",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "revoked_by_actor_id": {
+          "name": "revoked_by_actor_id",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        }
+      },
+      "indexes": {},
+      "foreignKeys": {
+        "ekklesia_core_platform_owner_user_id_ekklesia_core_user_id_fk": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_platform_owner_user_id_ekklesia_core_user_id_fk",
+          "tableFrom": "ekklesia_core_platform_owner",
+          "tableTo": "ekklesia_core_user",
+          "columnsFrom": ["user_id"],
+          "columnsTo": ["id"],
+          "onDelete": "cascade",
+          "onUpdate": "no action"
+        }
+      },
+      "compositePrimaryKeys": {},
+      "uniqueConstraints": {},
+      "policies": {},
+      "checkConstraints": {
+        "ekklesia_core_platform_owner_granted_actor_type_check": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_platform_owner_granted_actor_type_check",
+          "value": "\"ekklesia_core_platform_owner\".\"granted_by_actor_type\" in ('user', 'system')"
+        },
+        "ekklesia_core_platform_owner_revoked_actor_type_check": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_platform_owner_revoked_actor_type_check",
+          "value": "\"ekklesia_core_platform_owner\".\"revoked_by_actor_type\" is null or \"ekklesia_core_platform_owner\".\"revoked_by_actor_type\" in ('user', 'system')"
+        }
+      },
+      "isRLSEnabled": false
+    }
+  },
+  "enums": {},
+  "schemas": {},
+  "sequences": {},
+  "roles": {},
+  "policies": {},
+  "views": {},
+  "_meta": {
+    "columns": {},
+    "schemas": {},
+    "tables": {}
+  }
+}

core/drizzle/meta/0002_snapshot.json

@@ -0,0 +1,710 @@
+{
+  "id": "fac36f3d-7551-42df-a967-aad65c2fe7f9",
+  "prevId": "dfd53f55-6e2a-45e1-9962-469ea6eca6e7",
+  "version": "7",
+  "dialect": "postgresql",
+  "tables": {
+    "public.ekklesia_core_account": {
+      "name": "ekklesia_core_account",
+      "schema": "",
+      "columns": {
+        "id": {
+          "name": "id",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": true,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "account_id": {
+          "name": "account_id",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "provider_id": {
+          "name": "provider_id",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "user_id": {
+          "name": "user_id",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "access_token": {
+          "name": "access_token",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "refresh_token": {
+          "name": "refresh_token",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "id_token": {
+          "name": "id_token",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "access_token_expires_at": {
+          "name": "access_token_expires_at",
+          "type": "timestamp",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "refresh_token_expires_at": {
+          "name": "refresh_token_expires_at",
+          "type": "timestamp",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "scope": {
+          "name": "scope",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "password": {
+          "name": "password",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "created_at": {
+          "name": "created_at",
+          "type": "timestamp",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true,
+          "default": "now()"
+        },
+        "updated_at": {
+          "name": "updated_at",
+          "type": "timestamp",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        }
+      },
+      "indexes": {
+        "ekklesia_core_account_user_id_idx": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_account_user_id_idx",
+          "columns": [
+            {
+              "expression": "user_id",
+              "isExpression": false,
+              "asc": true,
+              "nulls": "last"
+            }
+          ],
+          "isUnique": false,
+          "concurrently": false,
+          "method": "btree",
+          "with": {}
+        }
+      },
+      "foreignKeys": {
+        "ekklesia_core_account_user_id_ekklesia_core_user_id_fk": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_account_user_id_ekklesia_core_user_id_fk",
+          "tableFrom": "ekklesia_core_account",
+          "tableTo": "ekklesia_core_user",
+          "columnsFrom": ["user_id"],
+          "columnsTo": ["id"],
+          "onDelete": "cascade",
+          "onUpdate": "no action"
+        }
+      },
+      "compositePrimaryKeys": {},
+      "uniqueConstraints": {},
+      "policies": {},
+      "checkConstraints": {},
+      "isRLSEnabled": false
+    },
+    "public.ekklesia_core_session": {
+      "name": "ekklesia_core_session",
+      "schema": "",
+      "columns": {
+        "id": {
+          "name": "id",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": true,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "expires_at": {
+          "name": "expires_at",
+          "type": "timestamp",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "token": {
+          "name": "token",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "created_at": {
+          "name": "created_at",
+          "type": "timestamp",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true,
+          "default": "now()"
+        },
+        "updated_at": {
+          "name": "updated_at",
+          "type": "timestamp",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "ip_address": {
+          "name": "ip_address",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "user_agent": {
+          "name": "user_agent",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "user_id": {
+          "name": "user_id",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        }
+      },
+      "indexes": {
+        "ekklesia_core_session_user_id_idx": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_session_user_id_idx",
+          "columns": [
+            {
+              "expression": "user_id",
+              "isExpression": false,
+              "asc": true,
+              "nulls": "last"
+            }
+          ],
+          "isUnique": false,
+          "concurrently": false,
+          "method": "btree",
+          "with": {}
+        }
+      },
+      "foreignKeys": {
+        "ekklesia_core_session_user_id_ekklesia_core_user_id_fk": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_session_user_id_ekklesia_core_user_id_fk",
+          "tableFrom": "ekklesia_core_session",
+          "tableTo": "ekklesia_core_user",
+          "columnsFrom": ["user_id"],
+          "columnsTo": ["id"],
+          "onDelete": "cascade",
+          "onUpdate": "no action"
+        }
+      },
+      "compositePrimaryKeys": {},
+      "uniqueConstraints": {
+        "ekklesia_core_session_token_unique": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_session_token_unique",
+          "nullsNotDistinct": false,
+          "columns": ["token"]
+        }
+      },
+      "policies": {},
+      "checkConstraints": {},
+      "isRLSEnabled": false
+    },
+    "public.ekklesia_core_user": {
+      "name": "ekklesia_core_user",
+      "schema": "",
+      "columns": {
+        "id": {
+          "name": "id",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": true,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "name": {
+          "name": "name",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "email": {
+          "name": "email",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "email_verified": {
+          "name": "email_verified",
+          "type": "boolean",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true,
+          "default": false
+        },
+        "image": {
+          "name": "image",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "created_at": {
+          "name": "created_at",
+          "type": "timestamp",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true,
+          "default": "now()"
+        },
+        "updated_at": {
+          "name": "updated_at",
+          "type": "timestamp",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true,
+          "default": "now()"
+        }
+      },
+      "indexes": {},
+      "foreignKeys": {},
+      "compositePrimaryKeys": {},
+      "uniqueConstraints": {
+        "ekklesia_core_user_email_unique": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_user_email_unique",
+          "nullsNotDistinct": false,
+          "columns": ["email"]
+        }
+      },
+      "policies": {},
+      "checkConstraints": {},
+      "isRLSEnabled": false
+    },
+    "public.ekklesia_core_verification": {
+      "name": "ekklesia_core_verification",
+      "schema": "",
+      "columns": {
+        "id": {
+          "name": "id",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": true,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "identifier": {
+          "name": "identifier",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "value": {
+          "name": "value",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "expires_at": {
+          "name": "expires_at",
+          "type": "timestamp",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "created_at": {
+          "name": "created_at",
+          "type": "timestamp",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true,
+          "default": "now()"
+        },
+        "updated_at": {
+          "name": "updated_at",
+          "type": "timestamp",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true,
+          "default": "now()"
+        }
+      },
+      "indexes": {
+        "ekklesia_core_verification_identifier_idx": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_verification_identifier_idx",
+          "columns": [
+            {
+              "expression": "identifier",
+              "isExpression": false,
+              "asc": true,
+              "nulls": "last"
+            }
+          ],
+          "isUnique": false,
+          "concurrently": false,
+          "method": "btree",
+          "with": {}
+        }
+      },
+      "foreignKeys": {},
+      "compositePrimaryKeys": {},
+      "uniqueConstraints": {},
+      "policies": {},
+      "checkConstraints": {},
+      "isRLSEnabled": false
+    },
+    "public.ekklesia_core_authorization_audit": {
+      "name": "ekklesia_core_authorization_audit",
+      "schema": "",
+      "columns": {
+        "id": {
+          "name": "id",
+          "type": "uuid",
+          "primaryKey": true,
+          "notNull": true,
+          "default": "gen_random_uuid()"
+        },
+        "action": {
+          "name": "action",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "actor_type": {
+          "name": "actor_type",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "actor_id": {
+          "name": "actor_id",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "subject_user_id": {
+          "name": "subject_user_id",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "permission_id": {
+          "name": "permission_id",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "scope": {
+          "name": "scope",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "grant_id": {
+          "name": "grant_id",
+          "type": "uuid",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "created_at": {
+          "name": "created_at",
+          "type": "timestamp with time zone",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true,
+          "default": "now()"
+        }
+      },
+      "indexes": {
+        "ekklesia_core_authorization_audit_subject_idx": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_authorization_audit_subject_idx",
+          "columns": [
+            {
+              "expression": "subject_user_id",
+              "isExpression": false,
+              "asc": true,
+              "nulls": "last"
+            }
+          ],
+          "isUnique": false,
+          "concurrently": false,
+          "method": "btree",
+          "with": {}
+        }
+      },
+      "foreignKeys": {},
+      "compositePrimaryKeys": {},
+      "uniqueConstraints": {},
+      "policies": {},
+      "checkConstraints": {
+        "ekklesia_core_authorization_audit_action_check": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_authorization_audit_action_check",
+          "value": "\"ekklesia_core_authorization_audit\".\"action\" in ('grant.create', 'grant.revoke', 'platform_owner.grant', 'platform_owner.revoke')"
+        },
+        "ekklesia_core_authorization_audit_actor_type_check": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_authorization_audit_actor_type_check",
+          "value": "\"ekklesia_core_authorization_audit\".\"actor_type\" in ('user', 'system')"
+        },
+        "ekklesia_core_authorization_audit_scope_check": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_authorization_audit_scope_check",
+          "value": "\"ekklesia_core_authorization_audit\".\"scope\" is null or length(\"ekklesia_core_authorization_audit\".\"scope\") > 0"
+        }
+      },
+      "isRLSEnabled": false
+    },
+    "public.ekklesia_core_grant": {
+      "name": "ekklesia_core_grant",
+      "schema": "",
+      "columns": {
+        "id": {
+          "name": "id",
+          "type": "uuid",
+          "primaryKey": true,
+          "notNull": true,
+          "default": "gen_random_uuid()"
+        },
+        "user_id": {
+          "name": "user_id",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "permission_id": {
+          "name": "permission_id",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "scope": {
+          "name": "scope",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "source_kind": {
+          "name": "source_kind",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "source_ref": {
+          "name": "source_ref",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "created_at": {
+          "name": "created_at",
+          "type": "timestamp with time zone",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true,
+          "default": "now()"
+        },
+        "created_by_actor_type": {
+          "name": "created_by_actor_type",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "created_by_actor_id": {
+          "name": "created_by_actor_id",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "expires_at": {
+          "name": "expires_at",
+          "type": "timestamp with time zone",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "revoked_at": {
+          "name": "revoked_at",
+          "type": "timestamp with time zone",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "revoked_by_actor_type": {
+          "name": "revoked_by_actor_type",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "revoked_by_actor_id": {
+          "name": "revoked_by_actor_id",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        }
+      },
+      "indexes": {
+        "ekklesia_core_grant_user_permission_idx": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_grant_user_permission_idx",
+          "columns": [
+            {
+              "expression": "user_id",
+              "isExpression": false,
+              "asc": true,
+              "nulls": "last"
+            },
+            {
+              "expression": "permission_id",
+              "isExpression": false,
+              "asc": true,
+              "nulls": "last"
+            }
+          ],
+          "isUnique": false,
+          "concurrently": false,
+          "method": "btree",
+          "with": {}
+        }
+      },
+      "foreignKeys": {
+        "ekklesia_core_grant_user_id_ekklesia_core_user_id_fk": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_grant_user_id_ekklesia_core_user_id_fk",
+          "tableFrom": "ekklesia_core_grant",
+          "tableTo": "ekklesia_core_user",
+          "columnsFrom": ["user_id"],
+          "columnsTo": ["id"],
+          "onDelete": "cascade",
+          "onUpdate": "no action"
+        }
+      },
+      "compositePrimaryKeys": {},
+      "uniqueConstraints": {},
+      "policies": {},
+      "checkConstraints": {
+        "ekklesia_core_grant_source_kind_check": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_grant_source_kind_check",
+          "value": "\"ekklesia_core_grant\".\"source_kind\" in ('explicit', 'relationship')"
+        },
+        "ekklesia_core_grant_created_actor_type_check": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_grant_created_actor_type_check",
+          "value": "\"ekklesia_core_grant\".\"created_by_actor_type\" in ('user', 'system')"
+        },
+        "ekklesia_core_grant_revoked_actor_type_check": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_grant_revoked_actor_type_check",
+          "value": "\"ekklesia_core_grant\".\"revoked_by_actor_type\" is null or \"ekklesia_core_grant\".\"revoked_by_actor_type\" in ('user', 'system')"
+        }
+      },
+      "isRLSEnabled": false
+    },
+    "public.ekklesia_core_platform_owner": {
+      "name": "ekklesia_core_platform_owner",
+      "schema": "",
+      "columns": {
+        "user_id": {
+          "name": "user_id",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": true,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "granted_at": {
+          "name": "granted_at",
+          "type": "timestamp with time zone",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true,
+          "default": "now()"
+        },
+        "granted_by_actor_type": {
+          "name": "granted_by_actor_type",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "granted_by_actor_id": {
+          "name": "granted_by_actor_id",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "revoked_at": {
+          "name": "revoked_at",
+          "type": "timestamp with time zone",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "revoked_by_actor_type": {
+          "name": "revoked_by_actor_type",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "revoked_by_actor_id": {
+          "name": "revoked_by_actor_id",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        }
+      },
+      "indexes": {},
+      "foreignKeys": {
+        "ekklesia_core_platform_owner_user_id_ekklesia_core_user_id_fk": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_platform_owner_user_id_ekklesia_core_user_id_fk",
+          "tableFrom": "ekklesia_core_platform_owner",
+          "tableTo": "ekklesia_core_user",
+          "columnsFrom": ["user_id"],
+          "columnsTo": ["id"],
+          "onDelete": "cascade",
+          "onUpdate": "no action"
+        }
+      },
+      "compositePrimaryKeys": {},
+      "uniqueConstraints": {},
+      "policies": {},
+      "checkConstraints": {
+        "ekklesia_core_platform_owner_granted_actor_type_check": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_platform_owner_granted_actor_type_check",
+          "value": "\"ekklesia_core_platform_owner\".\"granted_by_actor_type\" in ('user', 'system')"
+        },
+        "ekklesia_core_platform_owner_revoked_actor_type_check": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_platform_owner_revoked_actor_type_check",
+          "value": "\"ekklesia_core_platform_owner\".\"revoked_by_actor_type\" is null or \"ekklesia_core_platform_owner\".\"revoked_by_actor_type\" in ('user', 'system')"
+        }
+      },
+      "isRLSEnabled": false
+    },
+    "public.ekklesia_core_platform_owner_bootstrap": {
+      "name": "ekklesia_core_platform_owner_bootstrap",
+      "schema": "",
+      "columns": {
+        "id": {
+          "name": "id",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": true,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "consumed_at": {
+          "name": "consumed_at",
+          "type": "timestamp with time zone",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true,
+          "default": "now()"
+        },
+        "consumed_for_user_id": {
+          "name": "consumed_for_user_id",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        }
+      },
+      "indexes": {},
+      "foreignKeys": {},
+      "compositePrimaryKeys": {},
+      "uniqueConstraints": {},
+      "policies": {},
+      "checkConstraints": {
+        "ekklesia_core_platform_owner_bootstrap_singleton_check": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_platform_owner_bootstrap_singleton_check",
+          "value": "\"ekklesia_core_platform_owner_bootstrap\".\"id\" = 'singleton'"
+        }
+      },
+      "isRLSEnabled": false
+    }
+  },
+  "enums": {},
+  "schemas": {},
+  "sequences": {},
+  "roles": {},
+  "policies": {},
+  "views": {},
+  "_meta": {
+    "columns": {},
+    "schemas": {},
+    "tables": {}
+  }
+}

core/drizzle/meta/0003_snapshot.json

@@ -0,0 +1,870 @@
+{
+  "id": "fd5d1b32-781c-43ed-9d53-98bd5d395e6a",
+  "prevId": "fac36f3d-7551-42df-a967-aad65c2fe7f9",
+  "version": "7",
+  "dialect": "postgresql",
+  "tables": {
+    "public.ekklesia_core_account": {
+      "name": "ekklesia_core_account",
+      "schema": "",
+      "columns": {
+        "id": {
+          "name": "id",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": true,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "account_id": {
+          "name": "account_id",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "provider_id": {
+          "name": "provider_id",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "user_id": {
+          "name": "user_id",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "access_token": {
+          "name": "access_token",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "refresh_token": {
+          "name": "refresh_token",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "id_token": {
+          "name": "id_token",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "access_token_expires_at": {
+          "name": "access_token_expires_at",
+          "type": "timestamp",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "refresh_token_expires_at": {
+          "name": "refresh_token_expires_at",
+          "type": "timestamp",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "scope": {
+          "name": "scope",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "password": {
+          "name": "password",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "created_at": {
+          "name": "created_at",
+          "type": "timestamp",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true,
+          "default": "now()"
+        },
+        "updated_at": {
+          "name": "updated_at",
+          "type": "timestamp",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        }
+      },
+      "indexes": {
+        "ekklesia_core_account_user_id_idx": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_account_user_id_idx",
+          "columns": [
+            {
+              "expression": "user_id",
+              "isExpression": false,
+              "asc": true,
+              "nulls": "last"
+            }
+          ],
+          "isUnique": false,
+          "concurrently": false,
+          "method": "btree",
+          "with": {}
+        }
+      },
+      "foreignKeys": {
+        "ekklesia_core_account_user_id_ekklesia_core_user_id_fk": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_account_user_id_ekklesia_core_user_id_fk",
+          "tableFrom": "ekklesia_core_account",
+          "tableTo": "ekklesia_core_user",
+          "columnsFrom": ["user_id"],
+          "columnsTo": ["id"],
+          "onDelete": "cascade",
+          "onUpdate": "no action"
+        }
+      },
+      "compositePrimaryKeys": {},
+      "uniqueConstraints": {},
+      "policies": {},
+      "checkConstraints": {},
+      "isRLSEnabled": false
+    },
+    "public.ekklesia_core_session": {
+      "name": "ekklesia_core_session",
+      "schema": "",
+      "columns": {
+        "id": {
+          "name": "id",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": true,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "expires_at": {
+          "name": "expires_at",
+          "type": "timestamp",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "token": {
+          "name": "token",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "created_at": {
+          "name": "created_at",
+          "type": "timestamp",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true,
+          "default": "now()"
+        },
+        "updated_at": {
+          "name": "updated_at",
+          "type": "timestamp",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "ip_address": {
+          "name": "ip_address",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "user_agent": {
+          "name": "user_agent",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "user_id": {
+          "name": "user_id",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        }
+      },
+      "indexes": {
+        "ekklesia_core_session_user_id_idx": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_session_user_id_idx",
+          "columns": [
+            {
+              "expression": "user_id",
+              "isExpression": false,
+              "asc": true,
+              "nulls": "last"
+            }
+          ],
+          "isUnique": false,
+          "concurrently": false,
+          "method": "btree",
+          "with": {}
+        }
+      },
+      "foreignKeys": {
+        "ekklesia_core_session_user_id_ekklesia_core_user_id_fk": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_session_user_id_ekklesia_core_user_id_fk",
+          "tableFrom": "ekklesia_core_session",
+          "tableTo": "ekklesia_core_user",
+          "columnsFrom": ["user_id"],
+          "columnsTo": ["id"],
+          "onDelete": "cascade",
+          "onUpdate": "no action"
+        }
+      },
+      "compositePrimaryKeys": {},
+      "uniqueConstraints": {
+        "ekklesia_core_session_token_unique": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_session_token_unique",
+          "nullsNotDistinct": false,
+          "columns": ["token"]
+        }
+      },
+      "policies": {},
+      "checkConstraints": {},
+      "isRLSEnabled": false
+    },
+    "public.ekklesia_core_user": {
+      "name": "ekklesia_core_user",
+      "schema": "",
+      "columns": {
+        "id": {
+          "name": "id",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": true,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "name": {
+          "name": "name",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "email": {
+          "name": "email",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "email_verified": {
+          "name": "email_verified",
+          "type": "boolean",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true,
+          "default": false
+        },
+        "image": {
+          "name": "image",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "created_at": {
+          "name": "created_at",
+          "type": "timestamp",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true,
+          "default": "now()"
+        },
+        "updated_at": {
+          "name": "updated_at",
+          "type": "timestamp",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true,
+          "default": "now()"
+        }
+      },
+      "indexes": {},
+      "foreignKeys": {},
+      "compositePrimaryKeys": {},
+      "uniqueConstraints": {
+        "ekklesia_core_user_email_unique": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_user_email_unique",
+          "nullsNotDistinct": false,
+          "columns": ["email"]
+        }
+      },
+      "policies": {},
+      "checkConstraints": {},
+      "isRLSEnabled": false
+    },
+    "public.ekklesia_core_verification": {
+      "name": "ekklesia_core_verification",
+      "schema": "",
+      "columns": {
+        "id": {
+          "name": "id",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": true,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "identifier": {
+          "name": "identifier",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "value": {
+          "name": "value",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "expires_at": {
+          "name": "expires_at",
+          "type": "timestamp",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "created_at": {
+          "name": "created_at",
+          "type": "timestamp",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true,
+          "default": "now()"
+        },
+        "updated_at": {
+          "name": "updated_at",
+          "type": "timestamp",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true,
+          "default": "now()"
+        }
+      },
+      "indexes": {
+        "ekklesia_core_verification_identifier_idx": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_verification_identifier_idx",
+          "columns": [
+            {
+              "expression": "identifier",
+              "isExpression": false,
+              "asc": true,
+              "nulls": "last"
+            }
+          ],
+          "isUnique": false,
+          "concurrently": false,
+          "method": "btree",
+          "with": {}
+        }
+      },
+      "foreignKeys": {},
+      "compositePrimaryKeys": {},
+      "uniqueConstraints": {},
+      "policies": {},
+      "checkConstraints": {},
+      "isRLSEnabled": false
+    },
+    "public.ekklesia_core_authorization_audit": {
+      "name": "ekklesia_core_authorization_audit",
+      "schema": "",
+      "columns": {
+        "id": {
+          "name": "id",
+          "type": "uuid",
+          "primaryKey": true,
+          "notNull": true,
+          "default": "gen_random_uuid()"
+        },
+        "action": {
+          "name": "action",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "actor_type": {
+          "name": "actor_type",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "actor_id": {
+          "name": "actor_id",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "subject_user_id": {
+          "name": "subject_user_id",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "permission_id": {
+          "name": "permission_id",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "scope": {
+          "name": "scope",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "grant_id": {
+          "name": "grant_id",
+          "type": "uuid",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "created_at": {
+          "name": "created_at",
+          "type": "timestamp with time zone",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true,
+          "default": "now()"
+        }
+      },
+      "indexes": {
+        "ekklesia_core_authorization_audit_subject_idx": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_authorization_audit_subject_idx",
+          "columns": [
+            {
+              "expression": "subject_user_id",
+              "isExpression": false,
+              "asc": true,
+              "nulls": "last"
+            }
+          ],
+          "isUnique": false,
+          "concurrently": false,
+          "method": "btree",
+          "with": {}
+        }
+      },
+      "foreignKeys": {},
+      "compositePrimaryKeys": {},
+      "uniqueConstraints": {},
+      "policies": {},
+      "checkConstraints": {
+        "ekklesia_core_authorization_audit_action_check": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_authorization_audit_action_check",
+          "value": "\"ekklesia_core_authorization_audit\".\"action\" in ('grant.create', 'grant.revoke', 'platform_owner.grant', 'platform_owner.revoke')"
+        },
+        "ekklesia_core_authorization_audit_actor_type_check": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_authorization_audit_actor_type_check",
+          "value": "\"ekklesia_core_authorization_audit\".\"actor_type\" in ('user', 'system')"
+        },
+        "ekklesia_core_authorization_audit_scope_check": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_authorization_audit_scope_check",
+          "value": "\"ekklesia_core_authorization_audit\".\"scope\" is null or length(\"ekklesia_core_authorization_audit\".\"scope\") > 0"
+        }
+      },
+      "isRLSEnabled": false
+    },
+    "public.ekklesia_core_grant": {
+      "name": "ekklesia_core_grant",
+      "schema": "",
+      "columns": {
+        "id": {
+          "name": "id",
+          "type": "uuid",
+          "primaryKey": true,
+          "notNull": true,
+          "default": "gen_random_uuid()"
+        },
+        "user_id": {
+          "name": "user_id",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "permission_id": {
+          "name": "permission_id",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "scope": {
+          "name": "scope",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "source_kind": {
+          "name": "source_kind",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "source_ref": {
+          "name": "source_ref",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "created_at": {
+          "name": "created_at",
+          "type": "timestamp with time zone",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true,
+          "default": "now()"
+        },
+        "created_by_actor_type": {
+          "name": "created_by_actor_type",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "created_by_actor_id": {
+          "name": "created_by_actor_id",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "expires_at": {
+          "name": "expires_at",
+          "type": "timestamp with time zone",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "revoked_at": {
+          "name": "revoked_at",
+          "type": "timestamp with time zone",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "revoked_by_actor_type": {
+          "name": "revoked_by_actor_type",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "revoked_by_actor_id": {
+          "name": "revoked_by_actor_id",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        }
+      },
+      "indexes": {
+        "ekklesia_core_grant_user_permission_idx": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_grant_user_permission_idx",
+          "columns": [
+            {
+              "expression": "user_id",
+              "isExpression": false,
+              "asc": true,
+              "nulls": "last"
+            },
+            {
+              "expression": "permission_id",
+              "isExpression": false,
+              "asc": true,
+              "nulls": "last"
+            }
+          ],
+          "isUnique": false,
+          "concurrently": false,
+          "method": "btree",
+          "with": {}
+        }
+      },
+      "foreignKeys": {
+        "ekklesia_core_grant_user_id_ekklesia_core_user_id_fk": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_grant_user_id_ekklesia_core_user_id_fk",
+          "tableFrom": "ekklesia_core_grant",
+          "tableTo": "ekklesia_core_user",
+          "columnsFrom": ["user_id"],
+          "columnsTo": ["id"],
+          "onDelete": "cascade",
+          "onUpdate": "no action"
+        }
+      },
+      "compositePrimaryKeys": {},
+      "uniqueConstraints": {},
+      "policies": {},
+      "checkConstraints": {
+        "ekklesia_core_grant_source_kind_check": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_grant_source_kind_check",
+          "value": "\"ekklesia_core_grant\".\"source_kind\" in ('explicit', 'relationship')"
+        },
+        "ekklesia_core_grant_created_actor_type_check": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_grant_created_actor_type_check",
+          "value": "\"ekklesia_core_grant\".\"created_by_actor_type\" in ('user', 'system')"
+        },
+        "ekklesia_core_grant_revoked_actor_type_check": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_grant_revoked_actor_type_check",
+          "value": "\"ekklesia_core_grant\".\"revoked_by_actor_type\" is null or \"ekklesia_core_grant\".\"revoked_by_actor_type\" in ('user', 'system')"
+        }
+      },
+      "isRLSEnabled": false
+    },
+    "public.ekklesia_core_platform_owner": {
+      "name": "ekklesia_core_platform_owner",
+      "schema": "",
+      "columns": {
+        "user_id": {
+          "name": "user_id",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": true,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "granted_at": {
+          "name": "granted_at",
+          "type": "timestamp with time zone",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true,
+          "default": "now()"
+        },
+        "granted_by_actor_type": {
+          "name": "granted_by_actor_type",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "granted_by_actor_id": {
+          "name": "granted_by_actor_id",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "revoked_at": {
+          "name": "revoked_at",
+          "type": "timestamp with time zone",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "revoked_by_actor_type": {
+          "name": "revoked_by_actor_type",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "revoked_by_actor_id": {
+          "name": "revoked_by_actor_id",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        }
+      },
+      "indexes": {},
+      "foreignKeys": {
+        "ekklesia_core_platform_owner_user_id_ekklesia_core_user_id_fk": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_platform_owner_user_id_ekklesia_core_user_id_fk",
+          "tableFrom": "ekklesia_core_platform_owner",
+          "tableTo": "ekklesia_core_user",
+          "columnsFrom": ["user_id"],
+          "columnsTo": ["id"],
+          "onDelete": "cascade",
+          "onUpdate": "no action"
+        }
+      },
+      "compositePrimaryKeys": {},
+      "uniqueConstraints": {},
+      "policies": {},
+      "checkConstraints": {
+        "ekklesia_core_platform_owner_granted_actor_type_check": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_platform_owner_granted_actor_type_check",
+          "value": "\"ekklesia_core_platform_owner\".\"granted_by_actor_type\" in ('user', 'system')"
+        },
+        "ekklesia_core_platform_owner_revoked_actor_type_check": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_platform_owner_revoked_actor_type_check",
+          "value": "\"ekklesia_core_platform_owner\".\"revoked_by_actor_type\" is null or \"ekklesia_core_platform_owner\".\"revoked_by_actor_type\" in ('user', 'system')"
+        }
+      },
+      "isRLSEnabled": false
+    },
+    "public.ekklesia_core_platform_owner_bootstrap": {
+      "name": "ekklesia_core_platform_owner_bootstrap",
+      "schema": "",
+      "columns": {
+        "id": {
+          "name": "id",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": true,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "consumed_at": {
+          "name": "consumed_at",
+          "type": "timestamp with time zone",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true,
+          "default": "now()"
+        },
+        "consumed_for_user_id": {
+          "name": "consumed_for_user_id",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        }
+      },
+      "indexes": {},
+      "foreignKeys": {},
+      "compositePrimaryKeys": {},
+      "uniqueConstraints": {},
+      "policies": {},
+      "checkConstraints": {
+        "ekklesia_core_platform_owner_bootstrap_singleton_check": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_platform_owner_bootstrap_singleton_check",
+          "value": "\"ekklesia_core_platform_owner_bootstrap\".\"id\" = 'singleton'"
+        }
+      },
+      "isRLSEnabled": false
+    },
+    "public.ekklesia_core_dashboard_group": {
+      "name": "ekklesia_core_dashboard_group",
+      "schema": "",
+      "columns": {
+        "id": {
+          "name": "id",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": true,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "label": {
+          "name": "label",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "sort_order": {
+          "name": "sort_order",
+          "type": "integer",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true,
+          "default": 0
+        },
+        "created_at": {
+          "name": "created_at",
+          "type": "timestamp with time zone",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true,
+          "default": "now()"
+        },
+        "updated_at": {
+          "name": "updated_at",
+          "type": "timestamp with time zone",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true,
+          "default": "now()"
+        }
+      },
+      "indexes": {
+        "ekklesia_core_dashboard_group_order_idx": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_dashboard_group_order_idx",
+          "columns": [
+            {
+              "expression": "sort_order",
+              "isExpression": false,
+              "asc": true,
+              "nulls": "last"
+            },
+            {
+              "expression": "id",
+              "isExpression": false,
+              "asc": true,
+              "nulls": "last"
+            }
+          ],
+          "isUnique": false,
+          "concurrently": false,
+          "method": "btree",
+          "with": {}
+        }
+      },
+      "foreignKeys": {},
+      "compositePrimaryKeys": {},
+      "uniqueConstraints": {},
+      "policies": {},
+      "checkConstraints": {
+        "ekklesia_core_dashboard_group_id_check": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_dashboard_group_id_check",
+          "value": "length(\"ekklesia_core_dashboard_group\".\"id\") > 0"
+        },
+        "ekklesia_core_dashboard_group_label_check": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_dashboard_group_label_check",
+          "value": "length(btrim(\"ekklesia_core_dashboard_group\".\"label\")) > 0"
+        }
+      },
+      "isRLSEnabled": false
+    },
+    "public.ekklesia_core_dashboard_placement": {
+      "name": "ekklesia_core_dashboard_placement",
+      "schema": "",
+      "columns": {
+        "module_id": {
+          "name": "module_id",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": true,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "group_id": {
+          "name": "group_id",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "sort_order": {
+          "name": "sort_order",
+          "type": "integer",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true,
+          "default": 0
+        },
+        "created_at": {
+          "name": "created_at",
+          "type": "timestamp with time zone",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true,
+          "default": "now()"
+        },
+        "updated_at": {
+          "name": "updated_at",
+          "type": "timestamp with time zone",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true,
+          "default": "now()"
+        }
+      },
+      "indexes": {
+        "ekklesia_core_dashboard_placement_group_idx": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_dashboard_placement_group_idx",
+          "columns": [
+            {
+              "expression": "group_id",
+              "isExpression": false,
+              "asc": true,
+              "nulls": "last"
+            },
+            {
+              "expression": "sort_order",
+              "isExpression": false,
+              "asc": true,
+              "nulls": "last"
+            }
+          ],
+          "isUnique": false,
+          "concurrently": false,
+          "method": "btree",
+          "with": {}
+        }
+      },
+      "foreignKeys": {
+        "ekklesia_core_dashboard_placement_group_id_ekklesia_core_dashboard_group_id_fk": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_dashboard_placement_group_id_ekklesia_core_dashboard_group_id_fk",
+          "tableFrom": "ekklesia_core_dashboard_placement",
+          "tableTo": "ekklesia_core_dashboard_group",
+          "columnsFrom": ["group_id"],
+          "columnsTo": ["id"],
+          "onDelete": "set null",
+          "onUpdate": "no action"
+        }
+      },
+      "compositePrimaryKeys": {},
+      "uniqueConstraints": {},
+      "policies": {},
+      "checkConstraints": {
+        "ekklesia_core_dashboard_placement_module_check": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_dashboard_placement_module_check",
+          "value": "length(\"ekklesia_core_dashboard_placement\".\"module_id\") > 0"
+        }
+      },
+      "isRLSEnabled": false
+    }
+  },
+  "enums": {},
+  "schemas": {},
+  "sequences": {},
+  "roles": {},
+  "policies": {},
+  "views": {},
+  "_meta": {
+    "columns": {},
+    "schemas": {},
+    "tables": {}
+  }
+}

core/drizzle/meta/0004_snapshot.json

@@ -0,0 +1,914 @@
+{
+  "id": "b153e7a4-3100-4610-b296-a1a0b3cbfff6",
+  "prevId": "fd5d1b32-781c-43ed-9d53-98bd5d395e6a",
+  "version": "7",
+  "dialect": "postgresql",
+  "tables": {
+    "public.ekklesia_core_account": {
+      "name": "ekklesia_core_account",
+      "schema": "",
+      "columns": {
+        "id": {
+          "name": "id",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": true,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "account_id": {
+          "name": "account_id",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "provider_id": {
+          "name": "provider_id",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "user_id": {
+          "name": "user_id",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "access_token": {
+          "name": "access_token",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "refresh_token": {
+          "name": "refresh_token",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "id_token": {
+          "name": "id_token",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "access_token_expires_at": {
+          "name": "access_token_expires_at",
+          "type": "timestamp",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "refresh_token_expires_at": {
+          "name": "refresh_token_expires_at",
+          "type": "timestamp",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "scope": {
+          "name": "scope",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "password": {
+          "name": "password",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "created_at": {
+          "name": "created_at",
+          "type": "timestamp",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true,
+          "default": "now()"
+        },
+        "updated_at": {
+          "name": "updated_at",
+          "type": "timestamp",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        }
+      },
+      "indexes": {
+        "ekklesia_core_account_user_id_idx": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_account_user_id_idx",
+          "columns": [
+            {
+              "expression": "user_id",
+              "isExpression": false,
+              "asc": true,
+              "nulls": "last"
+            }
+          ],
+          "isUnique": false,
+          "concurrently": false,
+          "method": "btree",
+          "with": {}
+        }
+      },
+      "foreignKeys": {
+        "ekklesia_core_account_user_id_ekklesia_core_user_id_fk": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_account_user_id_ekklesia_core_user_id_fk",
+          "tableFrom": "ekklesia_core_account",
+          "tableTo": "ekklesia_core_user",
+          "columnsFrom": ["user_id"],
+          "columnsTo": ["id"],
+          "onDelete": "cascade",
+          "onUpdate": "no action"
+        }
+      },
+      "compositePrimaryKeys": {},
+      "uniqueConstraints": {},
+      "policies": {},
+      "checkConstraints": {},
+      "isRLSEnabled": false
+    },
+    "public.ekklesia_core_session": {
+      "name": "ekklesia_core_session",
+      "schema": "",
+      "columns": {
+        "id": {
+          "name": "id",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": true,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "expires_at": {
+          "name": "expires_at",
+          "type": "timestamp",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "token": {
+          "name": "token",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "created_at": {
+          "name": "created_at",
+          "type": "timestamp",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true,
+          "default": "now()"
+        },
+        "updated_at": {
+          "name": "updated_at",
+          "type": "timestamp",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "ip_address": {
+          "name": "ip_address",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "user_agent": {
+          "name": "user_agent",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "user_id": {
+          "name": "user_id",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        }
+      },
+      "indexes": {
+        "ekklesia_core_session_user_id_idx": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_session_user_id_idx",
+          "columns": [
+            {
+              "expression": "user_id",
+              "isExpression": false,
+              "asc": true,
+              "nulls": "last"
+            }
+          ],
+          "isUnique": false,
+          "concurrently": false,
+          "method": "btree",
+          "with": {}
+        }
+      },
+      "foreignKeys": {
+        "ekklesia_core_session_user_id_ekklesia_core_user_id_fk": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_session_user_id_ekklesia_core_user_id_fk",
+          "tableFrom": "ekklesia_core_session",
+          "tableTo": "ekklesia_core_user",
+          "columnsFrom": ["user_id"],
+          "columnsTo": ["id"],
+          "onDelete": "cascade",
+          "onUpdate": "no action"
+        }
+      },
+      "compositePrimaryKeys": {},
+      "uniqueConstraints": {
+        "ekklesia_core_session_token_unique": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_session_token_unique",
+          "nullsNotDistinct": false,
+          "columns": ["token"]
+        }
+      },
+      "policies": {},
+      "checkConstraints": {},
+      "isRLSEnabled": false
+    },
+    "public.ekklesia_core_user": {
+      "name": "ekklesia_core_user",
+      "schema": "",
+      "columns": {
+        "id": {
+          "name": "id",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": true,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "name": {
+          "name": "name",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "email": {
+          "name": "email",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "email_verified": {
+          "name": "email_verified",
+          "type": "boolean",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true,
+          "default": false
+        },
+        "image": {
+          "name": "image",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "created_at": {
+          "name": "created_at",
+          "type": "timestamp",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true,
+          "default": "now()"
+        },
+        "updated_at": {
+          "name": "updated_at",
+          "type": "timestamp",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true,
+          "default": "now()"
+        }
+      },
+      "indexes": {},
+      "foreignKeys": {},
+      "compositePrimaryKeys": {},
+      "uniqueConstraints": {
+        "ekklesia_core_user_email_unique": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_user_email_unique",
+          "nullsNotDistinct": false,
+          "columns": ["email"]
+        }
+      },
+      "policies": {},
+      "checkConstraints": {},
+      "isRLSEnabled": false
+    },
+    "public.ekklesia_core_verification": {
+      "name": "ekklesia_core_verification",
+      "schema": "",
+      "columns": {
+        "id": {
+          "name": "id",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": true,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "identifier": {
+          "name": "identifier",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "value": {
+          "name": "value",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "expires_at": {
+          "name": "expires_at",
+          "type": "timestamp",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "created_at": {
+          "name": "created_at",
+          "type": "timestamp",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true,
+          "default": "now()"
+        },
+        "updated_at": {
+          "name": "updated_at",
+          "type": "timestamp",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true,
+          "default": "now()"
+        }
+      },
+      "indexes": {
+        "ekklesia_core_verification_identifier_idx": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_verification_identifier_idx",
+          "columns": [
+            {
+              "expression": "identifier",
+              "isExpression": false,
+              "asc": true,
+              "nulls": "last"
+            }
+          ],
+          "isUnique": false,
+          "concurrently": false,
+          "method": "btree",
+          "with": {}
+        }
+      },
+      "foreignKeys": {},
+      "compositePrimaryKeys": {},
+      "uniqueConstraints": {},
+      "policies": {},
+      "checkConstraints": {},
+      "isRLSEnabled": false
+    },
+    "public.ekklesia_core_authorization_audit": {
+      "name": "ekklesia_core_authorization_audit",
+      "schema": "",
+      "columns": {
+        "id": {
+          "name": "id",
+          "type": "uuid",
+          "primaryKey": true,
+          "notNull": true,
+          "default": "gen_random_uuid()"
+        },
+        "action": {
+          "name": "action",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "actor_type": {
+          "name": "actor_type",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "actor_id": {
+          "name": "actor_id",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "subject_user_id": {
+          "name": "subject_user_id",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "permission_id": {
+          "name": "permission_id",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "scope": {
+          "name": "scope",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "grant_id": {
+          "name": "grant_id",
+          "type": "uuid",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "created_at": {
+          "name": "created_at",
+          "type": "timestamp with time zone",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true,
+          "default": "now()"
+        }
+      },
+      "indexes": {
+        "ekklesia_core_authorization_audit_subject_idx": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_authorization_audit_subject_idx",
+          "columns": [
+            {
+              "expression": "subject_user_id",
+              "isExpression": false,
+              "asc": true,
+              "nulls": "last"
+            }
+          ],
+          "isUnique": false,
+          "concurrently": false,
+          "method": "btree",
+          "with": {}
+        }
+      },
+      "foreignKeys": {},
+      "compositePrimaryKeys": {},
+      "uniqueConstraints": {},
+      "policies": {},
+      "checkConstraints": {
+        "ekklesia_core_authorization_audit_action_check": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_authorization_audit_action_check",
+          "value": "\"ekklesia_core_authorization_audit\".\"action\" in ('grant.create', 'grant.revoke', 'platform_owner.grant', 'platform_owner.revoke')"
+        },
+        "ekklesia_core_authorization_audit_actor_type_check": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_authorization_audit_actor_type_check",
+          "value": "\"ekklesia_core_authorization_audit\".\"actor_type\" in ('user', 'system')"
+        },
+        "ekklesia_core_authorization_audit_scope_check": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_authorization_audit_scope_check",
+          "value": "\"ekklesia_core_authorization_audit\".\"scope\" is null or length(\"ekklesia_core_authorization_audit\".\"scope\") > 0"
+        }
+      },
+      "isRLSEnabled": false
+    },
+    "public.ekklesia_core_grant": {
+      "name": "ekklesia_core_grant",
+      "schema": "",
+      "columns": {
+        "id": {
+          "name": "id",
+          "type": "uuid",
+          "primaryKey": true,
+          "notNull": true,
+          "default": "gen_random_uuid()"
+        },
+        "user_id": {
+          "name": "user_id",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "permission_id": {
+          "name": "permission_id",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "scope": {
+          "name": "scope",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "source_kind": {
+          "name": "source_kind",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "source_ref": {
+          "name": "source_ref",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "created_at": {
+          "name": "created_at",
+          "type": "timestamp with time zone",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true,
+          "default": "now()"
+        },
+        "created_by_actor_type": {
+          "name": "created_by_actor_type",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "created_by_actor_id": {
+          "name": "created_by_actor_id",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "expires_at": {
+          "name": "expires_at",
+          "type": "timestamp with time zone",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "revoked_at": {
+          "name": "revoked_at",
+          "type": "timestamp with time zone",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "revoked_by_actor_type": {
+          "name": "revoked_by_actor_type",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "revoked_by_actor_id": {
+          "name": "revoked_by_actor_id",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        }
+      },
+      "indexes": {
+        "ekklesia_core_grant_user_permission_idx": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_grant_user_permission_idx",
+          "columns": [
+            {
+              "expression": "user_id",
+              "isExpression": false,
+              "asc": true,
+              "nulls": "last"
+            },
+            {
+              "expression": "permission_id",
+              "isExpression": false,
+              "asc": true,
+              "nulls": "last"
+            }
+          ],
+          "isUnique": false,
+          "concurrently": false,
+          "method": "btree",
+          "with": {}
+        }
+      },
+      "foreignKeys": {
+        "ekklesia_core_grant_user_id_ekklesia_core_user_id_fk": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_grant_user_id_ekklesia_core_user_id_fk",
+          "tableFrom": "ekklesia_core_grant",
+          "tableTo": "ekklesia_core_user",
+          "columnsFrom": ["user_id"],
+          "columnsTo": ["id"],
+          "onDelete": "cascade",
+          "onUpdate": "no action"
+        }
+      },
+      "compositePrimaryKeys": {},
+      "uniqueConstraints": {},
+      "policies": {},
+      "checkConstraints": {
+        "ekklesia_core_grant_source_kind_check": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_grant_source_kind_check",
+          "value": "\"ekklesia_core_grant\".\"source_kind\" in ('explicit', 'relationship')"
+        },
+        "ekklesia_core_grant_created_actor_type_check": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_grant_created_actor_type_check",
+          "value": "\"ekklesia_core_grant\".\"created_by_actor_type\" in ('user', 'system')"
+        },
+        "ekklesia_core_grant_revoked_actor_type_check": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_grant_revoked_actor_type_check",
+          "value": "\"ekklesia_core_grant\".\"revoked_by_actor_type\" is null or \"ekklesia_core_grant\".\"revoked_by_actor_type\" in ('user', 'system')"
+        }
+      },
+      "isRLSEnabled": false
+    },
+    "public.ekklesia_core_platform_owner": {
+      "name": "ekklesia_core_platform_owner",
+      "schema": "",
+      "columns": {
+        "user_id": {
+          "name": "user_id",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": true,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "granted_at": {
+          "name": "granted_at",
+          "type": "timestamp with time zone",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true,
+          "default": "now()"
+        },
+        "granted_by_actor_type": {
+          "name": "granted_by_actor_type",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "granted_by_actor_id": {
+          "name": "granted_by_actor_id",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "revoked_at": {
+          "name": "revoked_at",
+          "type": "timestamp with time zone",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "revoked_by_actor_type": {
+          "name": "revoked_by_actor_type",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "revoked_by_actor_id": {
+          "name": "revoked_by_actor_id",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        }
+      },
+      "indexes": {},
+      "foreignKeys": {
+        "ekklesia_core_platform_owner_user_id_ekklesia_core_user_id_fk": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_platform_owner_user_id_ekklesia_core_user_id_fk",
+          "tableFrom": "ekklesia_core_platform_owner",
+          "tableTo": "ekklesia_core_user",
+          "columnsFrom": ["user_id"],
+          "columnsTo": ["id"],
+          "onDelete": "cascade",
+          "onUpdate": "no action"
+        }
+      },
+      "compositePrimaryKeys": {},
+      "uniqueConstraints": {},
+      "policies": {},
+      "checkConstraints": {
+        "ekklesia_core_platform_owner_granted_actor_type_check": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_platform_owner_granted_actor_type_check",
+          "value": "\"ekklesia_core_platform_owner\".\"granted_by_actor_type\" in ('user', 'system')"
+        },
+        "ekklesia_core_platform_owner_revoked_actor_type_check": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_platform_owner_revoked_actor_type_check",
+          "value": "\"ekklesia_core_platform_owner\".\"revoked_by_actor_type\" is null or \"ekklesia_core_platform_owner\".\"revoked_by_actor_type\" in ('user', 'system')"
+        }
+      },
+      "isRLSEnabled": false
+    },
+    "public.ekklesia_core_platform_owner_bootstrap": {
+      "name": "ekklesia_core_platform_owner_bootstrap",
+      "schema": "",
+      "columns": {
+        "id": {
+          "name": "id",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": true,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "consumed_at": {
+          "name": "consumed_at",
+          "type": "timestamp with time zone",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true,
+          "default": "now()"
+        },
+        "consumed_for_user_id": {
+          "name": "consumed_for_user_id",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        }
+      },
+      "indexes": {},
+      "foreignKeys": {},
+      "compositePrimaryKeys": {},
+      "uniqueConstraints": {},
+      "policies": {},
+      "checkConstraints": {
+        "ekklesia_core_platform_owner_bootstrap_singleton_check": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_platform_owner_bootstrap_singleton_check",
+          "value": "\"ekklesia_core_platform_owner_bootstrap\".\"id\" = 'singleton'"
+        }
+      },
+      "isRLSEnabled": false
+    },
+    "public.ekklesia_core_dashboard_group": {
+      "name": "ekklesia_core_dashboard_group",
+      "schema": "",
+      "columns": {
+        "id": {
+          "name": "id",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": true,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "label": {
+          "name": "label",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "sort_order": {
+          "name": "sort_order",
+          "type": "integer",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true,
+          "default": 0
+        },
+        "created_at": {
+          "name": "created_at",
+          "type": "timestamp with time zone",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true,
+          "default": "now()"
+        },
+        "updated_at": {
+          "name": "updated_at",
+          "type": "timestamp with time zone",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true,
+          "default": "now()"
+        }
+      },
+      "indexes": {
+        "ekklesia_core_dashboard_group_order_idx": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_dashboard_group_order_idx",
+          "columns": [
+            {
+              "expression": "sort_order",
+              "isExpression": false,
+              "asc": true,
+              "nulls": "last"
+            },
+            {
+              "expression": "id",
+              "isExpression": false,
+              "asc": true,
+              "nulls": "last"
+            }
+          ],
+          "isUnique": false,
+          "concurrently": false,
+          "method": "btree",
+          "with": {}
+        }
+      },
+      "foreignKeys": {},
+      "compositePrimaryKeys": {},
+      "uniqueConstraints": {},
+      "policies": {},
+      "checkConstraints": {
+        "ekklesia_core_dashboard_group_id_check": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_dashboard_group_id_check",
+          "value": "length(\"ekklesia_core_dashboard_group\".\"id\") > 0"
+        },
+        "ekklesia_core_dashboard_group_label_check": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_dashboard_group_label_check",
+          "value": "length(btrim(\"ekklesia_core_dashboard_group\".\"label\")) > 0"
+        }
+      },
+      "isRLSEnabled": false
+    },
+    "public.ekklesia_core_dashboard_placement": {
+      "name": "ekklesia_core_dashboard_placement",
+      "schema": "",
+      "columns": {
+        "module_id": {
+          "name": "module_id",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": true,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "group_id": {
+          "name": "group_id",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "sort_order": {
+          "name": "sort_order",
+          "type": "integer",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true,
+          "default": 0
+        },
+        "created_at": {
+          "name": "created_at",
+          "type": "timestamp with time zone",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true,
+          "default": "now()"
+        },
+        "updated_at": {
+          "name": "updated_at",
+          "type": "timestamp with time zone",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true,
+          "default": "now()"
+        }
+      },
+      "indexes": {
+        "ekklesia_core_dashboard_placement_group_idx": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_dashboard_placement_group_idx",
+          "columns": [
+            {
+              "expression": "group_id",
+              "isExpression": false,
+              "asc": true,
+              "nulls": "last"
+            },
+            {
+              "expression": "sort_order",
+              "isExpression": false,
+              "asc": true,
+              "nulls": "last"
+            }
+          ],
+          "isUnique": false,
+          "concurrently": false,
+          "method": "btree",
+          "with": {}
+        }
+      },
+      "foreignKeys": {
+        "ekklesia_core_dashboard_placement_group_id_ekklesia_core_dashboard_group_id_fk": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_dashboard_placement_group_id_ekklesia_core_dashboard_group_id_fk",
+          "tableFrom": "ekklesia_core_dashboard_placement",
+          "tableTo": "ekklesia_core_dashboard_group",
+          "columnsFrom": ["group_id"],
+          "columnsTo": ["id"],
+          "onDelete": "set null",
+          "onUpdate": "no action"
+        }
+      },
+      "compositePrimaryKeys": {},
+      "uniqueConstraints": {},
+      "policies": {},
+      "checkConstraints": {
+        "ekklesia_core_dashboard_placement_module_check": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_dashboard_placement_module_check",
+          "value": "length(\"ekklesia_core_dashboard_placement\".\"module_id\") > 0"
+        }
+      },
+      "isRLSEnabled": false
+    },
+    "public.ekklesia_core_module_state": {
+      "name": "ekklesia_core_module_state",
+      "schema": "",
+      "columns": {
+        "module_id": {
+          "name": "module_id",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": true,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "enabled": {
+          "name": "enabled",
+          "type": "boolean",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "created_at": {
+          "name": "created_at",
+          "type": "timestamp with time zone",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true,
+          "default": "now()"
+        },
+        "updated_at": {
+          "name": "updated_at",
+          "type": "timestamp with time zone",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true,
+          "default": "now()"
+        }
+      },
+      "indexes": {},
+      "foreignKeys": {},
+      "compositePrimaryKeys": {},
+      "uniqueConstraints": {},
+      "policies": {},
+      "checkConstraints": {
+        "ekklesia_core_module_state_module_check": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_module_state_module_check",
+          "value": "length(\"ekklesia_core_module_state\".\"module_id\") > 0"
+        }
+      },
+      "isRLSEnabled": false
+    }
+  },
+  "enums": {},
+  "schemas": {},
+  "sequences": {},
+  "roles": {},
+  "policies": {},
+  "views": {},
+  "_meta": {
+    "columns": {},
+    "schemas": {},
+    "tables": {}
+  }
+}

core/drizzle/meta/0005_snapshot.json

@@ -0,0 +1,993 @@
+{
+  "id": "d41e490c-dbe1-4d73-9e11-6e79baa91908",
+  "prevId": "b153e7a4-3100-4610-b296-a1a0b3cbfff6",
+  "version": "7",
+  "dialect": "postgresql",
+  "tables": {
+    "public.ekklesia_core_account": {
+      "name": "ekklesia_core_account",
+      "schema": "",
+      "columns": {
+        "id": {
+          "name": "id",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": true,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "account_id": {
+          "name": "account_id",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "provider_id": {
+          "name": "provider_id",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "user_id": {
+          "name": "user_id",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "access_token": {
+          "name": "access_token",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "refresh_token": {
+          "name": "refresh_token",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "id_token": {
+          "name": "id_token",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "access_token_expires_at": {
+          "name": "access_token_expires_at",
+          "type": "timestamp",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "refresh_token_expires_at": {
+          "name": "refresh_token_expires_at",
+          "type": "timestamp",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "scope": {
+          "name": "scope",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "password": {
+          "name": "password",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "created_at": {
+          "name": "created_at",
+          "type": "timestamp",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true,
+          "default": "now()"
+        },
+        "updated_at": {
+          "name": "updated_at",
+          "type": "timestamp",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        }
+      },
+      "indexes": {
+        "ekklesia_core_account_user_id_idx": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_account_user_id_idx",
+          "columns": [
+            {
+              "expression": "user_id",
+              "isExpression": false,
+              "asc": true,
+              "nulls": "last"
+            }
+          ],
+          "isUnique": false,
+          "concurrently": false,
+          "method": "btree",
+          "with": {}
+        }
+      },
+      "foreignKeys": {
+        "ekklesia_core_account_user_id_ekklesia_core_user_id_fk": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_account_user_id_ekklesia_core_user_id_fk",
+          "tableFrom": "ekklesia_core_account",
+          "tableTo": "ekklesia_core_user",
+          "columnsFrom": ["user_id"],
+          "columnsTo": ["id"],
+          "onDelete": "cascade",
+          "onUpdate": "no action"
+        }
+      },
+      "compositePrimaryKeys": {},
+      "uniqueConstraints": {},
+      "policies": {},
+      "checkConstraints": {},
+      "isRLSEnabled": false
+    },
+    "public.ekklesia_core_session": {
+      "name": "ekklesia_core_session",
+      "schema": "",
+      "columns": {
+        "id": {
+          "name": "id",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": true,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "expires_at": {
+          "name": "expires_at",
+          "type": "timestamp",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "token": {
+          "name": "token",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "created_at": {
+          "name": "created_at",
+          "type": "timestamp",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true,
+          "default": "now()"
+        },
+        "updated_at": {
+          "name": "updated_at",
+          "type": "timestamp",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "ip_address": {
+          "name": "ip_address",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "user_agent": {
+          "name": "user_agent",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "user_id": {
+          "name": "user_id",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        }
+      },
+      "indexes": {
+        "ekklesia_core_session_user_id_idx": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_session_user_id_idx",
+          "columns": [
+            {
+              "expression": "user_id",
+              "isExpression": false,
+              "asc": true,
+              "nulls": "last"
+            }
+          ],
+          "isUnique": false,
+          "concurrently": false,
+          "method": "btree",
+          "with": {}
+        }
+      },
+      "foreignKeys": {
+        "ekklesia_core_session_user_id_ekklesia_core_user_id_fk": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_session_user_id_ekklesia_core_user_id_fk",
+          "tableFrom": "ekklesia_core_session",
+          "tableTo": "ekklesia_core_user",
+          "columnsFrom": ["user_id"],
+          "columnsTo": ["id"],
+          "onDelete": "cascade",
+          "onUpdate": "no action"
+        }
+      },
+      "compositePrimaryKeys": {},
+      "uniqueConstraints": {
+        "ekklesia_core_session_token_unique": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_session_token_unique",
+          "nullsNotDistinct": false,
+          "columns": ["token"]
+        }
+      },
+      "policies": {},
+      "checkConstraints": {},
+      "isRLSEnabled": false
+    },
+    "public.ekklesia_core_user": {
+      "name": "ekklesia_core_user",
+      "schema": "",
+      "columns": {
+        "id": {
+          "name": "id",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": true,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "name": {
+          "name": "name",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "email": {
+          "name": "email",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "email_verified": {
+          "name": "email_verified",
+          "type": "boolean",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true,
+          "default": false
+        },
+        "image": {
+          "name": "image",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "created_at": {
+          "name": "created_at",
+          "type": "timestamp",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true,
+          "default": "now()"
+        },
+        "updated_at": {
+          "name": "updated_at",
+          "type": "timestamp",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true,
+          "default": "now()"
+        }
+      },
+      "indexes": {},
+      "foreignKeys": {},
+      "compositePrimaryKeys": {},
+      "uniqueConstraints": {
+        "ekklesia_core_user_email_unique": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_user_email_unique",
+          "nullsNotDistinct": false,
+          "columns": ["email"]
+        }
+      },
+      "policies": {},
+      "checkConstraints": {},
+      "isRLSEnabled": false
+    },
+    "public.ekklesia_core_verification": {
+      "name": "ekklesia_core_verification",
+      "schema": "",
+      "columns": {
+        "id": {
+          "name": "id",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": true,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "identifier": {
+          "name": "identifier",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "value": {
+          "name": "value",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "expires_at": {
+          "name": "expires_at",
+          "type": "timestamp",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "created_at": {
+          "name": "created_at",
+          "type": "timestamp",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true,
+          "default": "now()"
+        },
+        "updated_at": {
+          "name": "updated_at",
+          "type": "timestamp",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true,
+          "default": "now()"
+        }
+      },
+      "indexes": {
+        "ekklesia_core_verification_identifier_idx": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_verification_identifier_idx",
+          "columns": [
+            {
+              "expression": "identifier",
+              "isExpression": false,
+              "asc": true,
+              "nulls": "last"
+            }
+          ],
+          "isUnique": false,
+          "concurrently": false,
+          "method": "btree",
+          "with": {}
+        }
+      },
+      "foreignKeys": {},
+      "compositePrimaryKeys": {},
+      "uniqueConstraints": {},
+      "policies": {},
+      "checkConstraints": {},
+      "isRLSEnabled": false
+    },
+    "public.ekklesia_core_authorization_audit": {
+      "name": "ekklesia_core_authorization_audit",
+      "schema": "",
+      "columns": {
+        "id": {
+          "name": "id",
+          "type": "uuid",
+          "primaryKey": true,
+          "notNull": true,
+          "default": "gen_random_uuid()"
+        },
+        "action": {
+          "name": "action",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "actor_type": {
+          "name": "actor_type",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "actor_id": {
+          "name": "actor_id",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "subject_user_id": {
+          "name": "subject_user_id",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "permission_id": {
+          "name": "permission_id",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "scope": {
+          "name": "scope",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "grant_id": {
+          "name": "grant_id",
+          "type": "uuid",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "created_at": {
+          "name": "created_at",
+          "type": "timestamp with time zone",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true,
+          "default": "now()"
+        }
+      },
+      "indexes": {
+        "ekklesia_core_authorization_audit_subject_idx": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_authorization_audit_subject_idx",
+          "columns": [
+            {
+              "expression": "subject_user_id",
+              "isExpression": false,
+              "asc": true,
+              "nulls": "last"
+            }
+          ],
+          "isUnique": false,
+          "concurrently": false,
+          "method": "btree",
+          "with": {}
+        }
+      },
+      "foreignKeys": {},
+      "compositePrimaryKeys": {},
+      "uniqueConstraints": {},
+      "policies": {},
+      "checkConstraints": {
+        "ekklesia_core_authorization_audit_action_check": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_authorization_audit_action_check",
+          "value": "\"ekklesia_core_authorization_audit\".\"action\" in ('grant.create', 'grant.revoke', 'platform_owner.grant', 'platform_owner.revoke')"
+        },
+        "ekklesia_core_authorization_audit_actor_type_check": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_authorization_audit_actor_type_check",
+          "value": "\"ekklesia_core_authorization_audit\".\"actor_type\" in ('user', 'system')"
+        },
+        "ekklesia_core_authorization_audit_scope_check": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_authorization_audit_scope_check",
+          "value": "\"ekklesia_core_authorization_audit\".\"scope\" is null or length(\"ekklesia_core_authorization_audit\".\"scope\") > 0"
+        }
+      },
+      "isRLSEnabled": false
+    },
+    "public.ekklesia_core_grant": {
+      "name": "ekklesia_core_grant",
+      "schema": "",
+      "columns": {
+        "id": {
+          "name": "id",
+          "type": "uuid",
+          "primaryKey": true,
+          "notNull": true,
+          "default": "gen_random_uuid()"
+        },
+        "user_id": {
+          "name": "user_id",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "permission_id": {
+          "name": "permission_id",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "scope": {
+          "name": "scope",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "source_kind": {
+          "name": "source_kind",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "source_ref": {
+          "name": "source_ref",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "created_at": {
+          "name": "created_at",
+          "type": "timestamp with time zone",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true,
+          "default": "now()"
+        },
+        "created_by_actor_type": {
+          "name": "created_by_actor_type",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "created_by_actor_id": {
+          "name": "created_by_actor_id",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "expires_at": {
+          "name": "expires_at",
+          "type": "timestamp with time zone",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "revoked_at": {
+          "name": "revoked_at",
+          "type": "timestamp with time zone",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "revoked_by_actor_type": {
+          "name": "revoked_by_actor_type",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "revoked_by_actor_id": {
+          "name": "revoked_by_actor_id",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        }
+      },
+      "indexes": {
+        "ekklesia_core_grant_user_permission_idx": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_grant_user_permission_idx",
+          "columns": [
+            {
+              "expression": "user_id",
+              "isExpression": false,
+              "asc": true,
+              "nulls": "last"
+            },
+            {
+              "expression": "permission_id",
+              "isExpression": false,
+              "asc": true,
+              "nulls": "last"
+            }
+          ],
+          "isUnique": false,
+          "concurrently": false,
+          "method": "btree",
+          "with": {}
+        }
+      },
+      "foreignKeys": {
+        "ekklesia_core_grant_user_id_ekklesia_core_user_id_fk": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_grant_user_id_ekklesia_core_user_id_fk",
+          "tableFrom": "ekklesia_core_grant",
+          "tableTo": "ekklesia_core_user",
+          "columnsFrom": ["user_id"],
+          "columnsTo": ["id"],
+          "onDelete": "cascade",
+          "onUpdate": "no action"
+        }
+      },
+      "compositePrimaryKeys": {},
+      "uniqueConstraints": {},
+      "policies": {},
+      "checkConstraints": {
+        "ekklesia_core_grant_source_kind_check": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_grant_source_kind_check",
+          "value": "\"ekklesia_core_grant\".\"source_kind\" in ('explicit', 'relationship')"
+        },
+        "ekklesia_core_grant_created_actor_type_check": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_grant_created_actor_type_check",
+          "value": "\"ekklesia_core_grant\".\"created_by_actor_type\" in ('user', 'system')"
+        },
+        "ekklesia_core_grant_revoked_actor_type_check": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_grant_revoked_actor_type_check",
+          "value": "\"ekklesia_core_grant\".\"revoked_by_actor_type\" is null or \"ekklesia_core_grant\".\"revoked_by_actor_type\" in ('user', 'system')"
+        }
+      },
+      "isRLSEnabled": false
+    },
+    "public.ekklesia_core_platform_owner": {
+      "name": "ekklesia_core_platform_owner",
+      "schema": "",
+      "columns": {
+        "user_id": {
+          "name": "user_id",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": true,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "granted_at": {
+          "name": "granted_at",
+          "type": "timestamp with time zone",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true,
+          "default": "now()"
+        },
+        "granted_by_actor_type": {
+          "name": "granted_by_actor_type",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "granted_by_actor_id": {
+          "name": "granted_by_actor_id",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "revoked_at": {
+          "name": "revoked_at",
+          "type": "timestamp with time zone",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "revoked_by_actor_type": {
+          "name": "revoked_by_actor_type",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "revoked_by_actor_id": {
+          "name": "revoked_by_actor_id",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        }
+      },
+      "indexes": {},
+      "foreignKeys": {
+        "ekklesia_core_platform_owner_user_id_ekklesia_core_user_id_fk": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_platform_owner_user_id_ekklesia_core_user_id_fk",
+          "tableFrom": "ekklesia_core_platform_owner",
+          "tableTo": "ekklesia_core_user",
+          "columnsFrom": ["user_id"],
+          "columnsTo": ["id"],
+          "onDelete": "cascade",
+          "onUpdate": "no action"
+        }
+      },
+      "compositePrimaryKeys": {},
+      "uniqueConstraints": {},
+      "policies": {},
+      "checkConstraints": {
+        "ekklesia_core_platform_owner_granted_actor_type_check": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_platform_owner_granted_actor_type_check",
+          "value": "\"ekklesia_core_platform_owner\".\"granted_by_actor_type\" in ('user', 'system')"
+        },
+        "ekklesia_core_platform_owner_revoked_actor_type_check": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_platform_owner_revoked_actor_type_check",
+          "value": "\"ekklesia_core_platform_owner\".\"revoked_by_actor_type\" is null or \"ekklesia_core_platform_owner\".\"revoked_by_actor_type\" in ('user', 'system')"
+        }
+      },
+      "isRLSEnabled": false
+    },
+    "public.ekklesia_core_platform_owner_bootstrap": {
+      "name": "ekklesia_core_platform_owner_bootstrap",
+      "schema": "",
+      "columns": {
+        "id": {
+          "name": "id",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": true,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "consumed_at": {
+          "name": "consumed_at",
+          "type": "timestamp with time zone",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true,
+          "default": "now()"
+        },
+        "consumed_for_user_id": {
+          "name": "consumed_for_user_id",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        }
+      },
+      "indexes": {},
+      "foreignKeys": {},
+      "compositePrimaryKeys": {},
+      "uniqueConstraints": {},
+      "policies": {},
+      "checkConstraints": {
+        "ekklesia_core_platform_owner_bootstrap_singleton_check": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_platform_owner_bootstrap_singleton_check",
+          "value": "\"ekklesia_core_platform_owner_bootstrap\".\"id\" = 'singleton'"
+        }
+      },
+      "isRLSEnabled": false
+    },
+    "public.ekklesia_core_dashboard_group": {
+      "name": "ekklesia_core_dashboard_group",
+      "schema": "",
+      "columns": {
+        "id": {
+          "name": "id",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": true,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "label": {
+          "name": "label",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "sort_order": {
+          "name": "sort_order",
+          "type": "integer",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true,
+          "default": 0
+        },
+        "created_at": {
+          "name": "created_at",
+          "type": "timestamp with time zone",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true,
+          "default": "now()"
+        },
+        "updated_at": {
+          "name": "updated_at",
+          "type": "timestamp with time zone",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true,
+          "default": "now()"
+        }
+      },
+      "indexes": {
+        "ekklesia_core_dashboard_group_order_idx": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_dashboard_group_order_idx",
+          "columns": [
+            {
+              "expression": "sort_order",
+              "isExpression": false,
+              "asc": true,
+              "nulls": "last"
+            },
+            {
+              "expression": "id",
+              "isExpression": false,
+              "asc": true,
+              "nulls": "last"
+            }
+          ],
+          "isUnique": false,
+          "concurrently": false,
+          "method": "btree",
+          "with": {}
+        }
+      },
+      "foreignKeys": {},
+      "compositePrimaryKeys": {},
+      "uniqueConstraints": {},
+      "policies": {},
+      "checkConstraints": {
+        "ekklesia_core_dashboard_group_id_check": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_dashboard_group_id_check",
+          "value": "length(\"ekklesia_core_dashboard_group\".\"id\") > 0"
+        },
+        "ekklesia_core_dashboard_group_label_check": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_dashboard_group_label_check",
+          "value": "length(btrim(\"ekklesia_core_dashboard_group\".\"label\")) > 0"
+        }
+      },
+      "isRLSEnabled": false
+    },
+    "public.ekklesia_core_dashboard_placement": {
+      "name": "ekklesia_core_dashboard_placement",
+      "schema": "",
+      "columns": {
+        "module_id": {
+          "name": "module_id",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": true,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "group_id": {
+          "name": "group_id",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": false
+        },
+        "sort_order": {
+          "name": "sort_order",
+          "type": "integer",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true,
+          "default": 0
+        },
+        "created_at": {
+          "name": "created_at",
+          "type": "timestamp with time zone",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true,
+          "default": "now()"
+        },
+        "updated_at": {
+          "name": "updated_at",
+          "type": "timestamp with time zone",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true,
+          "default": "now()"
+        }
+      },
+      "indexes": {
+        "ekklesia_core_dashboard_placement_group_idx": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_dashboard_placement_group_idx",
+          "columns": [
+            {
+              "expression": "group_id",
+              "isExpression": false,
+              "asc": true,
+              "nulls": "last"
+            },
+            {
+              "expression": "sort_order",
+              "isExpression": false,
+              "asc": true,
+              "nulls": "last"
+            }
+          ],
+          "isUnique": false,
+          "concurrently": false,
+          "method": "btree",
+          "with": {}
+        }
+      },
+      "foreignKeys": {
+        "ekklesia_core_dashboard_placement_group_id_ekklesia_core_dashboard_group_id_fk": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_dashboard_placement_group_id_ekklesia_core_dashboard_group_id_fk",
+          "tableFrom": "ekklesia_core_dashboard_placement",
+          "tableTo": "ekklesia_core_dashboard_group",
+          "columnsFrom": ["group_id"],
+          "columnsTo": ["id"],
+          "onDelete": "set null",
+          "onUpdate": "no action"
+        }
+      },
+      "compositePrimaryKeys": {},
+      "uniqueConstraints": {},
+      "policies": {},
+      "checkConstraints": {
+        "ekklesia_core_dashboard_placement_module_check": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_dashboard_placement_module_check",
+          "value": "length(\"ekklesia_core_dashboard_placement\".\"module_id\") > 0"
+        }
+      },
+      "isRLSEnabled": false
+    },
+    "public.ekklesia_core_module_state": {
+      "name": "ekklesia_core_module_state",
+      "schema": "",
+      "columns": {
+        "module_id": {
+          "name": "module_id",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": true,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "enabled": {
+          "name": "enabled",
+          "type": "boolean",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "created_at": {
+          "name": "created_at",
+          "type": "timestamp with time zone",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true,
+          "default": "now()"
+        },
+        "updated_at": {
+          "name": "updated_at",
+          "type": "timestamp with time zone",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true,
+          "default": "now()"
+        }
+      },
+      "indexes": {},
+      "foreignKeys": {},
+      "compositePrimaryKeys": {},
+      "uniqueConstraints": {},
+      "policies": {},
+      "checkConstraints": {
+        "ekklesia_core_module_state_module_check": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_module_state_module_check",
+          "value": "length(\"ekklesia_core_module_state\".\"module_id\") > 0"
+        }
+      },
+      "isRLSEnabled": false
+    },
+    "public.ekklesia_core_module_configuration": {
+      "name": "ekklesia_core_module_configuration",
+      "schema": "",
+      "columns": {
+        "module_id": {
+          "name": "module_id",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "key": {
+          "name": "key",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "value": {
+          "name": "value",
+          "type": "text",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true
+        },
+        "created_at": {
+          "name": "created_at",
+          "type": "timestamp with time zone",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true,
+          "default": "now()"
+        },
+        "updated_at": {
+          "name": "updated_at",
+          "type": "timestamp with time zone",
+          "primaryKey": false,
+          "notNull": true,
+          "default": "now()"
+        }
+      },
+      "indexes": {
+        "ekklesia_core_module_configuration_module_idx": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_module_configuration_module_idx",
+          "columns": [
+            {
+              "expression": "module_id",
+              "isExpression": false,
+              "asc": true,
+              "nulls": "last"
+            }
+          ],
+          "isUnique": false,
+          "concurrently": false,
+          "method": "btree",
+          "with": {}
+        }
+      },
+      "foreignKeys": {},
+      "compositePrimaryKeys": {
+        "ekklesia_core_module_configuration_module_id_key_pk": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_module_configuration_module_id_key_pk",
+          "columns": ["module_id", "key"]
+        }
+      },
+      "uniqueConstraints": {},
+      "policies": {},
+      "checkConstraints": {
+        "ekklesia_core_module_configuration_module_check": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_module_configuration_module_check",
+          "value": "length(\"ekklesia_core_module_configuration\".\"module_id\") > 0"
+        },
+        "ekklesia_core_module_configuration_key_check": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_module_configuration_key_check",
+          "value": "length(\"ekklesia_core_module_configuration\".\"key\") > 0"
+        },
+        "ekklesia_core_module_configuration_value_check": {
+          "name": "ekklesia_core_module_configuration_value_check",
+          "value": "length(\"ekklesia_core_module_configuration\".\"value\") <= 2048"
+        }
+      },
+      "isRLSEnabled": false
+    }
+  },
+  "enums": {},
+  "schemas": {},
+  "sequences": {},
+  "roles": {},
+  "policies": {},
+  "views": {},
+  "_meta": {
+    "columns": {},
+    "schemas": {},
+    "tables": {}
+  }
+}

core/drizzle/meta/_ekklesia.json

@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+{
+  "version": 1,
+  "moduleId": "core",
+  "entries": [
+    {
+      "tag": "0000_identity_core_tables",
+      "destructive": {
+        "mode": "none"
+      }
+    },
+    {
+      "tag": "0001_authorization_core_tables",
+      "destructive": {
+        "mode": "none"
+      }
+    },
+    {
+      "tag": "0002_authorization_integrity",
+      "destructive": {
+        "mode": "none"
+      }
+    },
+    {
+      "tag": "0003_dashboard_navigation_tables",
+      "destructive": {
+        "mode": "none"
+      }
+    },
+    {
+      "tag": "0004_module_lifecycle_state",
+      "destructive": {
+        "mode": "none"
+      }
+    },
+    {
+      "tag": "0005_module_configuration",
+      "destructive": {
+        "mode": "none"
+      }
+    },
+    {
+      "tag": "0006_device_identity",
+      "destructive": {
+        "mode": "none"
+      }
+    },
+    {
+      "tag": "0007_verified_bootstrap_owners",
+      "destructive": {
+        "mode": "none"
+      }
+    }
+  ]
+}

core/drizzle/meta/_journal.json

@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+{
+  "version": "7",
+  "dialect": "postgresql",
+  "entries": [
+    {
+      "idx": 0,
+      "version": "7",
+      "when": 1784668552522,
+      "tag": "0000_identity_core_tables",
+      "breakpoints": true
+    },
+    {
+      "idx": 1,
+      "version": "7",
+      "when": 1784819635300,
+      "tag": "0001_authorization_core_tables",
+      "breakpoints": true
+    },
+    {
+      "idx": 2,
+      "version": "7",
+      "when": 1785104670124,
+      "tag": "0002_authorization_integrity",
+      "breakpoints": true
+    },
+    {
+      "idx": 3,
+      "version": "7",
+      "when": 1787408382271,
+      "tag": "0003_dashboard_navigation_tables",
+      "breakpoints": true
+    },
+    {
+      "idx": 4,
+      "version": "7",
+      "when": 1787423121678,
+      "tag": "0004_module_lifecycle_state",
+      "breakpoints": true
+    },
+    {
+      "idx": 5,
+      "version": "7",
+      "when": 1787451496425,
+      "tag": "0005_module_configuration",
+      "breakpoints": true
+    },
+    {
+      "idx": 6,
+      "version": "7",
+      "when": 1787543773057,
+      "tag": "0006_device_identity",
+      "breakpoints": true
+    },
+    {
+      "idx": 7,
+      "version": "7",
+      "when": 1787543773058,
+      "tag": "0007_verified_bootstrap_owners",
+      "breakpoints": true
+    }
+  ]
+}

core/identity-schema-generator.config.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+import { betterAuth } from "better-auth";
+import { drizzleAdapter } from "better-auth/adapters/drizzle";
+
+/**
+ * Drives the pinned Better Auth CLI's canonical schema generator for
+ * `pnpm identity:schema:generate` and `pnpm identity:schema:validate`.
+ *
+ * This file is a development-time aid only: it is never imported by application, factory, or
+ * runtime code, never opens a database connection, and intentionally omits our custom table
+ * names so the generator always produces Better Auth's official default (unrenamed) schema for
+ * comparison against core/src/identity/schema.ts. Do not add plugins or providers here.
+ */
+export const auth = betterAuth({
+  database: drizzleAdapter({} as never, {
+    provider: "pg",
+  }),
+  secret: "0".repeat(32),
+  baseURL: "https://identity-schema-generator.invalid",
+});

core/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@ekklesia/core",
-  "version": "0.1.0",
+  "version": "0.1.1",
   "private": true,
   "type": "module",
   "files": [
@@ -14,20 +14,74 @@
     "./modules": {
       "types": "./dist/modules/index.d.ts",
       "import": "./dist/modules/index.js"
+    },
+    "./storage": {
+      "types": "./dist/storage/index.d.ts",
+      "import": "./dist/storage/index.js"
+    },
+    "./dashboard": {
+      "types": "./dist/dashboard/index.d.ts",
+      "import": "./dist/dashboard/index.js"
+    },
+    "./migrations": {
+      "types": "./dist/migrations/index.d.ts",
+      "import": "./dist/migrations/index.js"
+    },
+    "./diagnostics": {
+      "types": "./dist/diagnostics/index.d.ts",
+      "import": "./dist/diagnostics/index.js"
+    },
+    "./identity": {
+      "types": "./dist/identity/index.d.ts",
+      "import": "./dist/identity/index.js"
+    },
+    "./authorization": {
+      "types": "./dist/authorization/index.d.ts",
+      "import": "./dist/authorization/index.js"
+    },
+    "./database": {
+      "types": "./dist/database/index.d.ts",
+      "import": "./dist/database/index.js"
+    },
+    "./devices": {
+      "types": "./dist/devices/index.d.ts",
+      "import": "./dist/devices/index.js"
+    },
+    "./mail": {
+      "types": "./dist/mail/index.d.ts",
+      "import": "./dist/mail/index.js"
+    },
+    "./host": {
+      "types": "./dist/host/index.d.ts",
+      "import": "./dist/host/index.js"
     }
   },
   "scripts": {
     "build": "tsc --project tsconfig.build.json",
+    "identity:migration:generate": "drizzle-kit generate --config=drizzle.config.ts",
+    "identity:schema:generate": "auth generate --config=identity-schema-generator.config.ts --output=.identity-schema-reference.ts -y",
     "lint": "biome lint .",
     "test": "vitest run",
     "typecheck": "tsc --noEmit --project tsconfig.json"
   },
   "dependencies": {
-    "@ekklesia/contracts": "workspace:*"
+    "@aws-sdk/client-s3": "3.1116.0",
+    "@aws-sdk/s3-request-presigner": "3.1116.0",
+    "@ekklesia/contracts": "workspace:*",
+    "better-auth": "1.6.23",
+    "drizzle-orm": "0.45.2",
+    "nodemailer": "9.0.5",
+    "pg": "8.22.0"
   },
   "devDependencies": {
     "@biomejs/biome": "2.5.3",
     "@types/node": "24.13.3",
+    "@types/nodemailer": "8.0.1",
+    "@types/pg": "8.20.0",
+    "@types/smtp-server": "3.5.13",
+    "auth": "1.6.23",
+    "drizzle-kit": "0.31.10",
+    "smtp-server": "3.19.3",
     "typescript": "7.0.2",
     "vitest": "4.1.10"
   },

core/src/authorization/bootstrap.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,137 @@
+import type { EkklesiaUserId } from "@ekklesia/contracts";
+import { eq, sql } from "drizzle-orm";
+import { ekklesiaCoreUser } from "../identity/schema.js";
+import type { AuthorizationDrizzleDatabase } from "./database.js";
+import {
+  ekklesiaCoreAuthorizationAudit,
+  ekklesiaCorePlatformOwner,
+  ekklesiaCorePlatformOwnerBootstrap,
+  PLATFORM_OWNER_BOOTSTRAP_SINGLETON_ID,
+} from "./schema.js";
+
+export type PlatformOwnerBootstrapErrorCode =
+  | "PLATFORM_OWNER_BOOTSTRAP_ALREADY_CONSUMED"
+  | "PLATFORM_OWNER_BOOTSTRAP_FAILED"
+  | "PLATFORM_OWNER_BOOTSTRAP_USER_NOT_FOUND";
+
+const bootstrapErrorMessages: Readonly<Record<PlatformOwnerBootstrapErrorCode, string>> =
+  Object.freeze({
+    PLATFORM_OWNER_BOOTSTRAP_ALREADY_CONSUMED:
+      "Platform-owner bootstrap has already been used and cannot be used again.",
+    PLATFORM_OWNER_BOOTSTRAP_FAILED: "Platform-owner bootstrap could not be completed.",
+    PLATFORM_OWNER_BOOTSTRAP_USER_NOT_FOUND: "The target user does not exist.",
+  });
+
+/** Never carries the underlying database error, SQL text, host, port, path, or stack. */
+export class PlatformOwnerBootstrapError extends Error {
+  readonly code: PlatformOwnerBootstrapErrorCode;
+
+  constructor(code: PlatformOwnerBootstrapErrorCode) {
+    super(bootstrapErrorMessages[code]);
+    this.name = "PlatformOwnerBootstrapError";
+    this.code = code;
+    this.stack = `${this.name}: ${this.message}`;
+    Object.freeze(this);
+  }
+}
+
+function isPlatformOwnerBootstrapError(error: unknown): error is PlatformOwnerBootstrapError {
+  return error instanceof PlatformOwnerBootstrapError;
+}
+
+/** A fixed, sanitized, non-user actor identity for the audit trail — distinguishable from both an
+ * ordinary "system" action with no specific actor and from any real `EkklesiaUserId`, so an
+ * auditor can tell this owner grant came specifically from the bootstrap command. Never a real
+ * user id and never derived from caller input. */
+const BOOTSTRAP_ACTOR_TYPE = "system";
+const BOOTSTRAP_ACTOR_ID = "authorization-bootstrap-cli";
+
+// A dedicated advisory-lock key pair, distinct from `core/src/migrations/postgres-database.ts`'s
+// migration lock, so bootstrap serialization can never collide with or be blocked by unrelated
+// migration locking. `pg_advisory_xact_lock` is transaction-scoped: it is released automatically
+// on COMMIT or ROLLBACK, so no manual unlock is needed even if the transaction fails partway.
+const bootstrapLockNamespace = 1_500_000_001;
+const bootstrapLockKey = 1_500_000_002;
+
+export interface BootstrapPlatformOwnerInput {
+  readonly userId: EkklesiaUserId;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Core's dedicated, Hono-independent platform-owner bootstrap operation. Deliberately not a
+ * composition of "check, then call the existing grant function": the single-use claim, the target
+ * user's existence check, the owner-grant insert, and its audit entry are all one PostgreSQL
+ * transaction, serialized by a transaction-scoped advisory lock acquired as the very first
+ * statement — so two concurrent callers can never both observe "not yet consumed" and both insert.
+ * The second caller blocks on the lock until the first's transaction commits or rolls back, then
+ * re-evaluates against the now-current state.
+ *
+ * **Single-use authority lives in `ekklesia_core_platform_owner_bootstrap`, never in the continued
+ * existence of a platform-owner row.** The owner table's `user_id` cascades on user deletion, so
+ * treating "an owner row exists" as the consumed marker meant deleting the bootstrapped owner's
+ * user row silently reopened the one operation that establishes a platform's first administrator —
+ * along with the audit evidence that it had ever run. The dedicated singleton has no user foreign
+ * key, is never deleted by Core, and therefore survives owner revocation and user deletion alike.
+ *
+ * Consumption is deliberately tied to *success*: the sentinel is written inside the same
+ * transaction as the owner row and its audit entry, so a missing target user, a constraint
+ * violation, or any other failure rolls the sentinel back with everything else and leaves the one
+ * legitimate first use still available. There is no reset command, deletion path, HTTP endpoint,
+ * environment override, or force flag — by design, "consumed" is permanent.
+ */
+export async function bootstrapPlatformOwner(
+  db: AuthorizationDrizzleDatabase,
+  input: BootstrapPlatformOwnerInput,
+): Promise<void> {
+  try {
+    await db.transaction(async (tx) => {
+      await tx.execute(
+        sql`select pg_advisory_xact_lock(${bootstrapLockNamespace}, ${bootstrapLockKey})`,
+      );
+
+      const consumedRows = await tx
+        .select({ id: ekklesiaCorePlatformOwnerBootstrap.id })
+        .from(ekklesiaCorePlatformOwnerBootstrap)
+        .limit(1);
+      if (consumedRows.length > 0) {
+        throw new PlatformOwnerBootstrapError("PLATFORM_OWNER_BOOTSTRAP_ALREADY_CONSUMED");
+      }
+
+      const targetUserRows = await tx
+        .select({ id: ekklesiaCoreUser.id })
+        .from(ekklesiaCoreUser)
+        .where(eq(ekklesiaCoreUser.id, input.userId))
+        .limit(1);
+      if (targetUserRows.length === 0) {
+        throw new PlatformOwnerBootstrapError("PLATFORM_OWNER_BOOTSTRAP_USER_NOT_FOUND");
+      }
+
+      // The sentinel is claimed inside the same transaction as everything below it. The advisory
+      // lock already serializes concurrent callers; the singleton primary key is the independent,
+      // structural backstop that makes a second row impossible even if a future caller reached
+      // this insert without the lock.
+      await tx.insert(ekklesiaCorePlatformOwnerBootstrap).values({
+        consumedForUserId: input.userId,
+        id: PLATFORM_OWNER_BOOTSTRAP_SINGLETON_ID,
+      });
+
+      await tx.insert(ekklesiaCorePlatformOwner).values({
+        grantedByActorId: BOOTSTRAP_ACTOR_ID,
+        grantedByActorType: BOOTSTRAP_ACTOR_TYPE,
+        userId: input.userId,
+      });
+
+      await tx.insert(ekklesiaCoreAuthorizationAudit).values({
+        action: "platform_owner.grant",
+        actorId: BOOTSTRAP_ACTOR_ID,
+        actorType: BOOTSTRAP_ACTOR_TYPE,
+        subjectUserId: input.userId,
+      });
+    });
+  } catch (error) {
+    if (isPlatformOwnerBootstrapError(error)) {
+      throw error;
+    }
+    throw new PlatformOwnerBootstrapError("PLATFORM_OWNER_BOOTSTRAP_FAILED");
+  }
+}

core/src/authorization/database.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
+import { drizzle, type NodePgDatabase } from "drizzle-orm/node-postgres";
+import { Pool, type PoolConfig } from "pg";
+import {
+  type DatabaseTransportPolicy,
+  databaseTlsConnectionOptions,
+} from "../database/transport.js";
+import { authorizationSchema } from "./schema.js";
+
+export type AuthorizationDrizzleDatabase = NodePgDatabase<typeof authorizationSchema>;
+
+export type AuthorizationDatabaseErrorCode = "AUTHORIZATION_DATABASE_CONFIGURATION_INVALID";
+
+const maximumPostgresTimeoutMs = 2_147_483_647;
+
+/** Never carries the offending connection string, host, or underlying driver error. */
+export class AuthorizationDatabaseError extends Error {
+  readonly code: AuthorizationDatabaseErrorCode;
+
+  constructor(code: AuthorizationDatabaseErrorCode) {
+    super("Authorization database configuration is invalid.");
+    this.name = "AuthorizationDatabaseError";
+    this.code = code;
+    this.stack = `${this.name}: ${this.message}`;
+    Object.freeze(this);
+  }
+}
+
+export interface AuthorizationDatabaseOptions {
+  readonly connectionTimeoutMs?: number;
+  /** Bounds both `query_timeout` and `statement_timeout`, mirroring
+   * `core/src/identity/database.ts`: `connectionTimeoutMs` alone only bounds establishing a
+   * connection, not a hung query already running on one. */
+  readonly operationTimeoutMs?: number;
+  /** The validated transport policy (`core/src/database/transport.js`). Passed explicitly by
+   * every production executable; omitted by single-domain unit/integration factories that use
+   * the disposable loopback database, which keeps the pre-existing plaintext behavior. */
+  readonly transport?: DatabaseTransportPolicy;
+}
+
+export interface AuthorizationDatabaseHandle {
+  readonly close: () => Promise<void>;
+  readonly db: AuthorizationDrizzleDatabase;
+}
+
+function validateConnectionString(connectionString: string): string {
+  if (connectionString.trim().length === 0) {
+    throw new AuthorizationDatabaseError("AUTHORIZATION_DATABASE_CONFIGURATION_INVALID");
+  }
+  let protocol: string;
+  try {
+    protocol = new URL(connectionString).protocol;
+  } catch {
+    throw new AuthorizationDatabaseError("AUTHORIZATION_DATABASE_CONFIGURATION_INVALID");
+  }
+  if (protocol !== "postgres:" && protocol !== "postgresql:") {
+    throw new AuthorizationDatabaseError("AUTHORIZATION_DATABASE_CONFIGURATION_INVALID");
+  }
+  return connectionString;
+}
+
+/** Mirrors `core/src/identity/database.ts`'s timeout validation exactly: an explicit timeout must
+ * be a positive safe integer no larger than PostgreSQL's own maximum, or it is rejected as invalid
+ * configuration rather than silently passed through to `pg`. */
+function validateTimeout(value: unknown): number | undefined {
+  if (value === undefined) {
+    return undefined;
+  }
+  if (
+    typeof value !== "number" ||
+    !Number.isSafeInteger(value) ||
+    value <= 0 ||
+    value > maximumPostgresTimeoutMs
+  ) {
+    throw new AuthorizationDatabaseError("AUTHORIZATION_DATABASE_CONFIGURATION_INVALID");
+  }
+  return value;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Explicitly constructs the Core-owned Drizzle database instance backing the authorization store.
+ * Building the `pg.Pool` performs no network I/O until a query is issued, and this function is
+ * only ever invoked by explicit caller code — never during module import.
+ */
+export function createAuthorizationDrizzleDatabase(
+  connectionString: string,
+  options: AuthorizationDatabaseOptions = {},
+): AuthorizationDatabaseHandle {
+  const validatedConnectionString = validateConnectionString(connectionString);
+  const validatedConnectionTimeoutMs = validateTimeout(options.connectionTimeoutMs);
+  const validatedOperationTimeoutMs = validateTimeout(options.operationTimeoutMs);
+  const ssl =
+    options.transport === undefined
+      ? undefined
+      : databaseTlsConnectionOptions(validatedConnectionString, options.transport);
+  const poolConfig: PoolConfig = {
+    connectionString: validatedConnectionString,
+    ...(ssl === undefined ? {} : { ssl }),
+    ...(validatedConnectionTimeoutMs === undefined
+      ? {}
+      : { connectionTimeoutMillis: validatedConnectionTimeoutMs }),
+    ...(validatedOperationTimeoutMs === undefined
+      ? {}
+      : {
+          query_timeout: validatedOperationTimeoutMs,
+          statement_timeout: validatedOperationTimeoutMs,
+        }),
+  };
+
+  const pool = new Pool(poolConfig);
+  // Same rationale as core/src/identity/database.ts: pg's own documentation requires an error
+  // listener on the pool, or a server-initiated termination of an idle client becomes an
+  // unhandled Node.js error and can crash the process.
+  pool.on("error", () => undefined);
+  const db = drizzle(pool, { schema: authorizationSchema });
+
+  return Object.freeze({
+    close: () => pool.end(),
+    db,
+  });
+}
+
+/**
+ * A typed Drizzle view over an externally owned pool — for example one shared with the identity
+ * schema via `createValidatedPostgresPool` (`core/src/database/pool.ts`). Unlike
+ * `createAuthorizationDrizzleDatabase`, this function never constructs, registers an error
+ * listener on, or closes a pool itself: the caller retains that responsibility exactly once,
+ * regardless of how many typed views it creates over the same pool.
+ */
+export function createAuthorizationDrizzleView(pool: Pool): AuthorizationDrizzleDatabase {
+  return drizzle(pool, { schema: authorizationSchema });
+}

core/src/authorization/evaluator.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,177 @@
+import {
+  AUTHORIZATION_ALLOWED,
+  AUTHORIZATION_DENIED,
+  type AuthorizationDecision,
+  type AuthorizationScope,
+  type EkklesiaPrincipal,
+  isAuthenticatedPrincipal,
+  isDevicePrincipal,
+  permissionBaselineSchema,
+  safeParseAuthorizationScope,
+  safeParsePermissionId,
+} from "@ekklesia/contracts";
+import type {
+  AuthorizationDevicePort,
+  AuthorizationGrantPort,
+  AuthorizationPlatformOwnerPort,
+} from "./ports.js";
+
+export type AuthorizationEvaluationErrorCode = "AUTHORIZATION_EVALUATION_FAILED";
+
+/** Never carries the underlying port error, database error, cause, stack, or any other internal
+ * detail — defense in depth on top of whatever sanitization the injected ports themselves already
+ * perform (`core/src/authorization/store.ts` already sanitizes), exactly like
+ * `core/src/identity/runtime.ts`'s `resolvePrincipal` re-sanitizes on top of Better Auth's own
+ * error handling rather than trusting it exclusively. */
+export class AuthorizationEvaluationError extends Error {
+  readonly code: AuthorizationEvaluationErrorCode;
+
+  constructor() {
+    super("The authorization decision could not be evaluated.");
+    this.name = "AuthorizationEvaluationError";
+    this.code = "AUTHORIZATION_EVALUATION_FAILED";
+    this.stack = `${this.name}: ${this.message}`;
+    Object.freeze(this);
+  }
+}
+
+export interface AuthorizeRequest {
+  readonly principal: EkklesiaPrincipal;
+  /** Validated internally via the branded `PermissionId` schema *before any baseline can return an
+   * allowed decision* — a malformed or unrecognizable value denies rather than throwing, for
+   * `public` and `authenticated` baselines exactly as much as `restricted`. This is shape
+   * validation only: the evaluator has no registry and cannot tell a well-formed-but-unregistered
+   * permission from one that is actually registered. Only a trusted caller consulting a
+   * `PermissionRegistry` (`core/src/authorization/permissions.ts`) before calling `authorize` can
+   * make that distinction — see that module and `apps/api/src/authorization-middleware.ts`. */
+  readonly permission: unknown;
+  /** Validated internally against the known `public`/`authenticated`/`restricted` set; anything
+   * else denies rather than throwing, for the same fail-closed reason. */
+  readonly baseline: unknown;
+  /** Optional; validated internally when present. Absent means an unscoped check. */
+  readonly scope?: unknown;
+}
+
+export interface AuthorizationEvaluator {
+  authorize(request: AuthorizeRequest): Promise<AuthorizationDecision>;
+}
+
+export interface CreateAuthorizationEvaluatorOptions {
+  readonly grants: AuthorizationGrantPort;
+  readonly platformOwners: AuthorizationPlatformOwnerPort;
+  /** Device authority. Optional so every existing caller composes unchanged; when it is absent a
+   * device principal simply has no permissions and is denied, which is the correct answer for a
+   * deployment that has no device support wired at all. */
+  readonly devices?: AuthorizationDevicePort;
+  /** Injectable clock so expiration evaluation is deterministic and testable. Defaults to the
+   * real wall clock; production composition must leave this unset. */
+  readonly now?: () => Date;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Core's Hono-independent, deny-by-default authorization evaluator. It is the only place
+ * Ekklesia decides whether a principal may exercise a permission, and it never trusts anything
+ * the caller supplies beyond `principal`/`permission`/`baseline`/`scope` — there is no field for a
+ * caller to assert "I am the owner" or "I already have this grant." Owner and grant state are
+ * always re-derived from the injected ports for every call.
+ *
+ * A genuine infrastructure failure from either port (for example a database outage) is
+ * deliberately NOT swallowed into a `denied` decision here: it propagates to the caller as a
+ * thrown, sanitized `AuthorizationEvaluationError`, exactly like Core's identity
+ * `resolvePrincipal` never silently downgrades an outage to "anonymous." Only a genuinely
+ * malformed or unrecognized permission/baseline/scope — a deterministic, expected input problem,
+ * not an infrastructure failure — resolves to `denied` without throwing.
+ */
+export function createAuthorizationEvaluator(
+  options: CreateAuthorizationEvaluatorOptions,
+): AuthorizationEvaluator {
+  const now = options.now ?? (() => new Date());
+
+  return Object.freeze({
+    authorize: async (request: AuthorizeRequest): Promise<AuthorizationDecision> => {
+      const parsedBaseline = permissionBaselineSchema.safeParse(request.baseline);
+      if (!parsedBaseline.success) {
+        return AUTHORIZATION_DENIED;
+      }
+
+      // Shape-validated before any baseline is allowed to return `allowed` — a malformed
+      // permission id must deny under `public` and `authenticated` exactly as much as under
+      // `restricted`, even though neither of the first two ever reads `parsedPermission.data`.
+      // This is a pure, synchronous check: it never touches the grant or platform-owner ports, so
+      // `public`/`authenticated` still resolve with no database lookup at all.
+      const parsedPermission = safeParsePermissionId(request.permission);
+      if (!parsedPermission.success) {
+        return AUTHORIZATION_DENIED;
+      }
+
+      if (parsedBaseline.data === "public") {
+        return AUTHORIZATION_ALLOWED;
+      }
+
+      if (parsedBaseline.data === "authenticated") {
+        // A device deliberately does not satisfy this. The baseline means "a person is signed in",
+        // and every route that settles for it — the module UI inventory, anything a human is
+        // expected to be looking at — would otherwise open to an unattended screen (ADR 0036).
+        return isAuthenticatedPrincipal(request.principal)
+          ? AUTHORIZATION_ALLOWED
+          : AUTHORIZATION_DENIED;
+      }
+
+      let scope: AuthorizationScope | undefined;
+      if (request.scope !== undefined) {
+        const parsedScope = safeParseAuthorizationScope(request.scope);
+        if (!parsedScope.success) {
+          return AUTHORIZATION_DENIED;
+        }
+        scope = parsedScope.data;
+      }
+
+      // A device satisfies `restricted` only by holding that exact permission, and by no other
+      // route: there is no owner check here, no baseline that stands in for a grant, and no branch
+      // that returns `allowed` before this lookup. "Paired" is not authority — a device that was
+      // paired for one display has nothing else.
+      if (isDevicePrincipal(request.principal)) {
+        if (!options.devices || scope !== undefined) {
+          // A scoped check has no device meaning yet; denying is the honest answer rather than
+          // silently treating it as unscoped.
+          return AUTHORIZATION_DENIED;
+        }
+        try {
+          return (await options.devices.hasActivePermission(
+            request.principal.deviceId,
+            parsedPermission.data,
+          ))
+            ? AUTHORIZATION_ALLOWED
+            : AUTHORIZATION_DENIED;
+        } catch {
+          throw new AuthorizationEvaluationError();
+        }
+      }
+
+      // parsedBaseline.data === "restricted": requires an authenticated principal AND
+      // (an active matching grant OR platform-owner authority). Baseline alone never satisfies it.
+      if (!isAuthenticatedPrincipal(request.principal)) {
+        return AUTHORIZATION_DENIED;
+      }
+
+      const userId = request.principal.userId;
+      let isOwner: boolean;
+      let hasGrant: boolean;
+      try {
+        [isOwner, hasGrant] = await Promise.all([
+          options.platformOwners.isPlatformOwner(userId),
+          options.grants.hasActiveGrant({
+            now: now(),
+            permission: parsedPermission.data,
+            userId,
+            ...(scope === undefined ? {} : { scope }),
+          }),
+        ]);
+      } catch {
+        throw new AuthorizationEvaluationError();
+      }
+
+      return isOwner || hasGrant ? AUTHORIZATION_ALLOWED : AUTHORIZATION_DENIED;
+    },
+  });
+}

core/src/authorization/index.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+export * from "./bootstrap.js";
+export * from "./database.js";
+export * from "./evaluator.js";
+export * from "./initial-owner.js";
+export * from "./permissions.js";
+export * from "./ports.js";
+export * from "./store.js";

core/src/authorization/initial-owner.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,323 @@
+import type { EkklesiaUserId } from "@ekklesia/contracts";
+import { safeParseEkklesiaUserId } from "@ekklesia/contracts";
+import { and, eq, sql } from "drizzle-orm";
+import type { BootstrapIdentityCreator } from "../identity/bootstrap-identity.js";
+import { BootstrapIdentityError } from "../identity/bootstrap-identity.js";
+import type { IdentityDrizzleDatabase } from "../identity/database.js";
+import { ekklesiaCoreAccount, ekklesiaCoreUser } from "../identity/schema.js";
+import { bootstrapPlatformOwner, PlatformOwnerBootstrapError } from "./bootstrap.js";
+import type { AuthorizationDrizzleDatabase } from "./database.js";
+import { ekklesiaCorePlatformOwnerBootstrap } from "./schema.js";
+
+export type InitialPlatformOwnerErrorCode =
+  | "INITIAL_OWNER_ALREADY_COMPLETED"
+  | "INITIAL_OWNER_EMAIL_INVALID"
+  | "INITIAL_OWNER_IDENTITY_NOT_CREATED"
+  | "INITIAL_OWNER_IDENTITY_UNUSABLE"
+  | "INITIAL_OWNER_IDENTITY_NOT_VERIFIED"
+  | "INITIAL_OWNER_OWNERSHIP_GRANT_FAILED"
+  | "INITIAL_OWNER_PASSWORD_TOO_LONG"
+  | "INITIAL_OWNER_PASSWORD_TOO_SHORT"
+  | "INITIAL_OWNER_SCHEMA_UNAVAILABLE";
+
+const initialOwnerMessages: Readonly<Record<InitialPlatformOwnerErrorCode, string>> = Object.freeze(
+  {
+    INITIAL_OWNER_ALREADY_COMPLETED:
+      "This installation already has a platform owner. Initial-owner bootstrap runs once and cannot run again.",
+    INITIAL_OWNER_EMAIL_INVALID: "The email address is not a valid address.",
+    INITIAL_OWNER_IDENTITY_NOT_CREATED:
+      "The identity system reported success but no account exists for that address. Nothing was changed; the bootstrap is still available.",
+    INITIAL_OWNER_IDENTITY_UNUSABLE:
+      "An account already exists for that address but has no password and could never sign in. Choose a different address, or remove that account before retrying.",
+    INITIAL_OWNER_IDENTITY_NOT_VERIFIED:
+      "The identity exists but could not be marked as a verified address, so it could not sign in. Nothing was granted; the bootstrap is still available.",
+    INITIAL_OWNER_OWNERSHIP_GRANT_FAILED:
+      "The identity exists but platform ownership was not granted. Bootstrap is still available: run this command again with the same email address to finish it.",
+    INITIAL_OWNER_PASSWORD_TOO_LONG: "The password is longer than the identity system allows.",
+    INITIAL_OWNER_PASSWORD_TOO_SHORT: "The password is shorter than the identity system allows.",
+    INITIAL_OWNER_SCHEMA_UNAVAILABLE:
+      "The database is unreachable or has not been migrated. Apply migrations before creating the initial owner.",
+  },
+);
+
+/**
+ * Never carries the password, a hash, a connection string, SQL, a driver error, or a cause. The
+ * messages are written to be read by an operator at a terminal, so each one states what happened
+ * *and* what is still true about the installation — in particular whether bootstrap remains
+ * available, which is the only fact that determines what they should do next.
+ */
+export class InitialPlatformOwnerError extends Error {
+  readonly code: InitialPlatformOwnerErrorCode;
+
+  constructor(code: InitialPlatformOwnerErrorCode) {
+    super(initialOwnerMessages[code]);
+    this.name = "InitialPlatformOwnerError";
+    this.code = code;
+    this.stack = `${this.name}: ${this.message}`;
+    Object.freeze(this);
+  }
+}
+
+// A CLI-level advisory key distinct from `bootstrap.ts`'s: taking the same one would deadlock this
+// operation against the grant it performs. This serializes whole invocations; that one serializes
+// the grant transaction itself, and both remain in force.
+const initialOwnerLockNamespace = 1_500_000_003;
+const initialOwnerLockKey = 1_500_000_004;
+
+export interface CreateInitialPlatformOwnerDependencies {
+  readonly authorizationDb: AuthorizationDrizzleDatabase;
+  readonly identityDb: IdentityDrizzleDatabase;
+  readonly createIdentity: BootstrapIdentityCreator;
+  /** Injected so a partial failure — identity created, ownership not granted — can be exercised.
+   * Production composition leaves it unset and the real single-use bootstrap is used. */
+  readonly grantOwnership?: (userId: EkklesiaUserId) => Promise<void>;
+}
+
+export interface CreateInitialPlatformOwnerInput {
+  readonly email: string;
+  readonly password: string;
+  /** The display name the identity model requires. */
+  readonly name: string;
+}
+
+export interface InitialPlatformOwnerResult {
+  readonly email: string;
+  readonly userId: EkklesiaUserId;
+  /** `created` when this call made the identity; `adopted` when one already existed for that
+   * address and only ownership was granted. Reported so an operator is never told something was
+   * created when it was not. */
+  readonly identity: "adopted" | "created";
+}
+
+interface ExistingIdentity {
+  readonly userId: string;
+  readonly hasCredential: boolean;
+  /** As the identity system actually stored it, which is not necessarily as the operator typed it. */
+  readonly storedEmail: string;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Finds an identity by email, case-insensitively.
+ *
+ * Deliberately not an exact match on the caller's spelling: Better Auth lowercases the address it
+ * stores (verified against the pinned release — `[email protected]` persists as
+ * `[email protected]`), so an exact comparison would fail to find the very account this operation
+ * had just created and would report it missing.
+ */
+async function findIdentityByEmail(
+  db: IdentityDrizzleDatabase,
+  email: string,
+): Promise<ExistingIdentity | undefined> {
+  const rows = await db
+    .select({ email: ekklesiaCoreUser.email, id: ekklesiaCoreUser.id })
+    .from(ekklesiaCoreUser)
+    .where(sql`lower(${ekklesiaCoreUser.email}) = ${email.trim().toLowerCase()}`)
+    .limit(1);
+  const found = rows[0];
+  if (!found) {
+    return undefined;
+  }
+  // A row in `user` alone is not an account anyone can sign in as — the credential lives in
+  // `account`. The distinction matters: granting ownership to a passwordless row would consume the
+  // one-time bootstrap on an identity nobody can authenticate as, leaving the installation with an
+  // owner that cannot log in and no second chance.
+  const credentials = await db
+    .select({ id: ekklesiaCoreAccount.id })
+    .from(ekklesiaCoreAccount)
+    .where(
+      and(
+        eq(ekklesiaCoreAccount.userId, found.id),
+        eq(ekklesiaCoreAccount.providerId, "credential"),
+      ),
+    )
+    .limit(1);
+  return { hasCredential: credentials.length > 0, storedEmail: found.email, userId: found.id };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Marks one identity's address verified.
+ *
+ * A direct column update rather than an identity-system call, because the pinned release exposes no
+ * supported way to mark an address verified other than consuming a token it emailed — which is the
+ * one thing a pre-mail installation cannot do. The column is Better Auth's own `emailVerified`, the
+ * exact value its `/verify-email` endpoint writes, so the resulting row is indistinguishable from
+ * one that verified normally; nothing here invents a parallel notion of verification.
+ */
+async function markIdentityEmailVerified(
+  db: IdentityDrizzleDatabase,
+  userId: string,
+): Promise<void> {
+  await db
+    .update(ekklesiaCoreUser)
+    .set({ emailVerified: true })
+    .where(eq(ekklesiaCoreUser.id, userId));
+}
+
+function translateIdentityCreationError(error: unknown): InitialPlatformOwnerError {
+  if (error instanceof BootstrapIdentityError) {
+    if (error.code === "BOOTSTRAP_IDENTITY_PASSWORD_TOO_SHORT") {
+      return new InitialPlatformOwnerError("INITIAL_OWNER_PASSWORD_TOO_SHORT");
+    }
+    if (error.code === "BOOTSTRAP_IDENTITY_PASSWORD_TOO_LONG") {
+      return new InitialPlatformOwnerError("INITIAL_OWNER_PASSWORD_TOO_LONG");
+    }
+    if (error.code === "BOOTSTRAP_IDENTITY_EMAIL_INVALID") {
+      return new InitialPlatformOwnerError("INITIAL_OWNER_EMAIL_INVALID");
+    }
+  }
+  return new InitialPlatformOwnerError("INITIAL_OWNER_IDENTITY_NOT_CREATED");
+}
+
+/**
+ * Creates the first platform owner of a fresh installation: one identity, then the single-use
+ * ownership grant.
+ *
+ * ## Why the identity is verified rather than trusted
+ *
+ * Better Auth's sign-up returns a **fabricated success** when the address is already registered —
+ * a user object carrying an id that was never persisted, with the database left unchanged (verified
+ * against the pinned release). On a public endpoint that is correct: it refuses to tell an
+ * anonymous caller which addresses exist. Here it is a trap, because a caller that believed the
+ * response would report an owner it never created and then grant ownership to an id that does not
+ * exist. So the identity is always read back from the database, and that read — not the sign-up
+ * response — is what the grant uses.
+ *
+ * ## Why an existing identity is adopted rather than refused or overwritten
+ *
+ * If the address already has a usable account and bootstrap is still open, ownership is granted to
+ * it and **its password is left completely alone**. This is precisely the recovery path for the one
+ * partial failure this operation can have: sign-up commits through Better Auth's own connection and
+ * the grant runs in a separate transaction, so a crash between them leaves an identity with no
+ * ownership. Refusing would strand a fresh installation with no way forward but manual SQL; a
+ * password reset would be a silent takeover of an account the operator may not own. Adoption
+ * changes no credential, and it is reported as `adopted` so nobody is told an account was created
+ * when it was not.
+ *
+ * That is safe here specifically because production has **no** other way to create an identity —
+ * public signup cannot be enabled at all — so an account present on a fresh installation was put
+ * there by someone who already had database access.
+ *
+ * ## Ordering
+ *
+ * The bootstrap sentinel is checked before an identity is created, so a closed bootstrap never
+ * leaves a stray account behind. That check is an early exit, not the authority: `bootstrapPlatformOwner`
+ * re-checks it inside its own locked transaction, which is what actually makes the grant single-use.
+ */
+export async function createInitialPlatformOwner(
+  dependencies: CreateInitialPlatformOwnerDependencies,
+  input: CreateInitialPlatformOwnerInput,
+): Promise<InitialPlatformOwnerResult> {
+  const email = input.email.trim();
+  if (email.length === 0) {
+    throw new InitialPlatformOwnerError("INITIAL_OWNER_EMAIL_INVALID");
+  }
+
+  // Serializes entire invocations against each other. Without it two operators racing on a fresh
+  // installation would both pass the sentinel check and both create an identity, and only then
+  // would one lose the grant — leaving a stray account that can sign in and owns nothing. The grant
+  // alone was already safe; this makes the whole command safe.
+  return dependencies.authorizationDb.transaction(async (lockTx) => {
+    await lockTx.execute(
+      sql`select pg_advisory_xact_lock(${initialOwnerLockNamespace}, ${initialOwnerLockKey})`,
+    );
+
+    let alreadyConsumed: boolean;
+    try {
+      const consumed = await lockTx
+        .select({ id: ekklesiaCorePlatformOwnerBootstrap.id })
+        .from(ekklesiaCorePlatformOwnerBootstrap)
+        .limit(1);
+      alreadyConsumed = consumed.length > 0;
+    } catch {
+      // An unreachable database and a database without the authorization tables are the same
+      // situation to an operator running this on a fresh server: the deployment step before this
+      // one has not happened. Never migrated implicitly — see ADR 0035.
+      throw new InitialPlatformOwnerError("INITIAL_OWNER_SCHEMA_UNAVAILABLE");
+    }
+    if (alreadyConsumed) {
+      throw new InitialPlatformOwnerError("INITIAL_OWNER_ALREADY_COMPLETED");
+    }
+
+    let existing: ExistingIdentity | undefined;
+    try {
+      existing = await findIdentityByEmail(dependencies.identityDb, email);
+    } catch {
+      throw new InitialPlatformOwnerError("INITIAL_OWNER_SCHEMA_UNAVAILABLE");
+    }
+    if (existing && !existing.hasCredential) {
+      throw new InitialPlatformOwnerError("INITIAL_OWNER_IDENTITY_UNUSABLE");
+    }
+
+    // Captured before the read-back below, which cannot distinguish the two: an identity this call
+    // just created and one it adopted both come back with a credential.
+    const identity: "adopted" | "created" = existing ? "adopted" : "created";
+
+    if (!existing) {
+      try {
+        await dependencies.createIdentity({
+          email,
+          name: input.name,
+          password: input.password,
+        });
+      } catch (error) {
+        throw translateIdentityCreationError(error);
+      }
+      existing = await findIdentityByEmail(dependencies.identityDb, email).catch(() => undefined);
+      if (!existing) {
+        // Reached when sign-up reported success without persisting anything.
+        throw new InitialPlatformOwnerError("INITIAL_OWNER_IDENTITY_NOT_CREATED");
+      }
+    }
+
+    const parsedUserId = safeParseEkklesiaUserId(existing.userId);
+    if (!parsedUserId.success) {
+      throw new InitialPlatformOwnerError("INITIAL_OWNER_IDENTITY_NOT_CREATED");
+    }
+
+    /**
+     * The trusted-bootstrap verification exception (ADR 0038).
+     *
+     * Every other human account must verify its address by email before it may hold a session.
+     * This one cannot: it is created on a freshly provisioned server by an operator who already
+     * holds the database credentials, at a moment when SMTP may not be configured, may not be
+     * reachable, or may not yet have a DNS record to send from. Requiring an email round trip here
+     * would mean a working installation whose administrator can never get in — the platform's
+     * outbound mail would have to be configured and correct before anyone could sign in to
+     * configure anything.
+     *
+     * The exception is narrow and its authority is the same authority that already makes this
+     * command safe: possession of the database, not possession of the mailbox. It marks exactly one
+     * address, exactly once per installation, and it is deliberately performed **before** ownership
+     * is granted — if it fails, the sentinel and the grant roll back together and re-running the
+     * command adopts the identity and finishes, rather than leaving an owner who cannot sign in.
+     */
+    try {
+      await markIdentityEmailVerified(dependencies.identityDb, parsedUserId.data);
+    } catch {
+      throw new InitialPlatformOwnerError("INITIAL_OWNER_IDENTITY_NOT_VERIFIED");
+    }
+
+    try {
+      const grant =
+        dependencies.grantOwnership ??
+        ((userId: EkklesiaUserId) =>
+          bootstrapPlatformOwner(dependencies.authorizationDb, { userId }));
+      await grant(parsedUserId.data);
+    } catch (error) {
+      if (
+        error instanceof PlatformOwnerBootstrapError &&
+        error.code === "PLATFORM_OWNER_BOOTSTRAP_ALREADY_CONSUMED"
+      ) {
+        throw new InitialPlatformOwnerError("INITIAL_OWNER_ALREADY_COMPLETED");
+      }
+      // The identity is real and remains usable; the sentinel rolled back with the grant, so
+      // re-running this command with the same address adopts it and finishes.
+      throw new InitialPlatformOwnerError("INITIAL_OWNER_OWNERSHIP_GRANT_FAILED");
+    }
+
+    // The stored address, never the operator's spelling: the identity system lowercases what it
+    // persists, and telling someone to sign in as `[email protected]` when the account is
+    // `[email protected]` invites them to conclude the command failed.
+    return Object.freeze({ email: existing.storedEmail, identity, userId: parsedUserId.data });
+  });
+}

core/src/authorization/permissions.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,222 @@
+import {
+  type PermissionDeclaration,
+  type PermissionId,
+  parsePermissionId,
+  safeParsePermissionId,
+} from "@ekklesia/contracts";
+
+/**
+ * Core's registry consumes the one shared `PermissionDeclaration` shape
+ * (`packages/contracts/src/authorization.ts`) rather than declaring its own interface — a module
+ * manifest's `permissions` array parses into the exact same type, so a declaration a module ships
+ * and a declaration Core registers are provably interchangeable. Re-exported here so existing
+ * `@ekklesia/core/authorization` consumers keep importing it from this package.
+ */
+export type { PermissionDeclaration, PermissionDeclarationInput } from "@ekklesia/contracts";
+
+export interface PermissionRegistry {
+  readonly declarations: readonly PermissionDeclaration[];
+  /** Returns the declaration for a permission id, or `undefined` for anything malformed or not
+   * registered — the two are deliberately indistinguishable to callers, so "unknown permission"
+   * and "invalid permission" fail closed the same way. */
+  get(permissionId: unknown): PermissionDeclaration | undefined;
+  has(permissionId: unknown): boolean;
+}
+
+export type PermissionRegistryErrorCode = "PERMISSION_REGISTRY_DUPLICATE_DECLARATION";
+
+/** Thrown only at composition time (registry construction), never per-request. Carries the
+ * offending permission id deliberately — this is a startup-time programmer/configuration error
+ * message, not a runtime response, and a namespaced permission id is not sensitive. */
+export class PermissionRegistryError extends Error {
+  readonly code: PermissionRegistryErrorCode;
+  readonly permissionId: string;
+
+  constructor(permissionId: string) {
+    super(`Permission "${permissionId}" is already registered.`);
+    this.name = "PermissionRegistryError";
+    this.code = "PERMISSION_REGISTRY_DUPLICATE_DECLARATION";
+    this.permissionId = permissionId;
+    this.stack = `${this.name}: ${this.message}`;
+    Object.freeze(this);
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Builds an immutable permission registry from a fixed list of declarations, rejecting any
+ * duplicate permission id outright at composition time. Deliberately the smallest mechanism that
+ * distinguishes "registered" from "well-formed": no module discovery, no dynamic registration, no
+ * network or filesystem I/O. The module integration layer's composer
+ * (`composePlatformPermissionRegistry`, `core/src/modules/permissions.ts`) merges Core's own
+ * declarations with every discovered module's into one combined list and calls this same
+ * constructor, inheriting duplicate detection for free rather than reimplementing it.
+ */
+export function createPermissionRegistry(
+  declarations: readonly PermissionDeclaration[],
+): PermissionRegistry {
+  const byId = new Map<PermissionId, PermissionDeclaration>();
+  for (const declaration of declarations) {
+    if (byId.has(declaration.id)) {
+      throw new PermissionRegistryError(declaration.id);
+    }
+    byId.set(declaration.id, Object.freeze({ ...declaration }));
+  }
+  const frozenDeclarations = Object.freeze([...byId.values()]);
+
+  return Object.freeze({
+    declarations: frozenDeclarations,
+    get(permissionId: unknown): PermissionDeclaration | undefined {
+      const parsed = safeParsePermissionId(permissionId);
+      return parsed.success ? byId.get(parsed.data) : undefined;
+    },
+    has(permissionId: unknown): boolean {
+      const parsed = safeParsePermissionId(permissionId);
+      return parsed.success && byId.has(parsed.data);
+    },
+  });
+}
+
+/** Restricted: delegated grant administration is itself a privileged action, never public or
+ * merely authenticated. A platform owner always passes the evaluator's existing owner bypass and
+ * can delegate this permission to another account deliberately via the explicit-grant API. */
+export const CORE_AUTHORIZATION_GRANTS_MANAGE: PermissionId = parsePermissionId(
+  "core.authorization.grants.manage",
+);
+
+/**
+ * Authenticated: any signed-in user of this installation may learn which module UIs the platform is
+ * currently hosting, because that is exactly what a browser shell has to render before it can offer
+ * anything at all. It is deliberately not `public` — the anonymous artifact route (ADR 0025) is
+ * careful never to become an enumeration oracle, and an anonymous inventory would hand over the very
+ * listing that route withholds. It is deliberately not `restricted` either: a shell that rendered
+ * nothing until an operator granted every user this permission would make the platform unusable for
+ * its ordinary users, and the module UIs themselves already gate their own content on their own
+ * permissions.
+ *
+ * Listing a module UI is not permission to use that module. Every module route remains enforced
+ * against its own declared permission, unchanged.
+ */
+export const CORE_MODULES_UI_READ: PermissionId = parsePermissionId("core.modules.ui.read");
+
+/**
+ * Restricted: reorganizing the Dashboard is an administrative action, not something every signed-in
+ * user may do. It is deliberately a **platform** permission and never a module's own — grouping is
+ * Ekklesia's presentation configuration, so no module may gate, grant, or influence it (ADR 0027).
+ *
+ * Holding it confers no module authority whatsoever. Moving a module into a folder changes a
+ * presentation row; it grants nobody access to that module's data, and every module route stays
+ * enforced against its own declared permission exactly as before.
+ */
+export const CORE_DASHBOARD_NAVIGATION_MANAGE: PermissionId = parsePermissionId(
+  "core.dashboard.navigation.manage",
+);
+
+/**
+ * Restricted, and it gates **reading as well as changing**. Deciding which installed modules run is
+ * an administrative operation, and the read is not a milder version of it: the lifecycle view is the
+ * only place a *disabled* module, a *blocked* module, and the required-dependency edges between them
+ * are visible at all. `core.modules.ui.read` deliberately exposes the mountable set to every signed-in
+ * user; this exposes the parts of the installation that are deliberately not running, which is not
+ * the same audience. A second, weaker read permission over the same resource would be ceremony
+ * (ADR 0027's reasoning, applied in the other direction).
+ *
+ * It is a **platform** permission and never a module's. A module can neither declare it, gate it, nor
+ * observe it: whether a module runs is a decision its host makes about it, not a decision it takes
+ * part in (ADR 0028). Holding it confers no authority inside any module — every module route stays
+ * enforced against that module's own declared permission.
+ */
+export const CORE_MODULES_LIFECYCLE_MANAGE: PermissionId = parsePermissionId(
+  "core.modules.lifecycle.manage",
+);
+
+/**
+ * Restricted, and deliberately **separate from `core.modules.lifecycle.manage`**. The two authorize
+ * genuinely different actions: lifecycle decides *whether a module runs at all*, while this decides
+ * *how a running module behaves*. Someone trusted to tune a slideshow's timing need not be trusted
+ * to take modules offline, and the reverse is equally true, so folding them into one permission
+ * would grant authority nobody asked for in whichever direction it was used (ADR 0029).
+ *
+ * It gates reading as well as writing, because the read returns the module's declared schema
+ * together with every stored value — endpoints, bucket names, and whatever else an operator has
+ * configured. That is deployment detail, not something every signed-in user needs.
+ *
+ * **It never exposes secret material.** A `secret` key's value is deployment-supplied, is never
+ * persisted, and is never returned by any route; the API reports only whether one is configured.
+ * Holding this permission therefore confers no ability to read a credential — there is no code path
+ * that would serve one.
+ *
+ * Like every other Core permission it is a **platform** permission a module can neither declare,
+ * gate, nor observe, and holding it confers no authority inside any module.
+ */
+export const CORE_MODULES_CONFIGURATION_MANAGE: PermissionId = parsePermissionId(
+  "core.modules.configuration.manage",
+);
+
+/**
+ * Restricted, and deliberately a **platform** permission rather than a module's.
+ *
+ * A device is an identity the platform issues, so deciding that a screen in the foyer may exist —
+ * approving its pairing, seeing what has been paired, and taking it away again — is authority over
+ * Ekklesia itself, not over the module whose display happens to be shown. Letting a module declare
+ * or gate it would mean whoever administers a slideshow could mint credentials that outlive it.
+ *
+ * It gates approval, listing, and revocation together. Splitting "see the paired devices" from
+ * "revoke one" would be ceremony: the same person is trusted with both, and a reader who cannot act
+ * on what they see is not a role anyone has asked for (ADR 0027's reasoning, applied again).
+ *
+ * Holding it confers **no** authority inside any module and no ability to read a device credential
+ * — none is stored in a recoverable form, so there is no code path that could serve one (ADR 0036).
+ */
+export const CORE_DEVICES_MANAGE: PermissionId = parsePermissionId("core.devices.manage");
+
+/**
+ * Core's own declarations, exported in deeply immutable form so a trusted composer (the module
+ * integration layer, `core/src/modules/permissions.ts`) can build one combined registry from
+ * exactly these plus every discovered module's declarations, in a fixed, deterministic order,
+ * without reconstructing or guessing Core's own list. `CORE_PERMISSION_REGISTRY` below remains the
+ * registry Core-only code and existing tests use directly.
+ */
+export const CORE_PERMISSION_DECLARATIONS: readonly PermissionDeclaration[] = Object.freeze([
+  Object.freeze({
+    baseline: "restricted" as const,
+    description: "Create, list, and revoke another user's explicit authorization grants.",
+    id: CORE_AUTHORIZATION_GRANTS_MANAGE,
+  }),
+  Object.freeze({
+    baseline: "authenticated" as const,
+    description: "List the installed module UIs a browser host may mount.",
+    id: CORE_MODULES_UI_READ,
+  }),
+  Object.freeze({
+    baseline: "restricted" as const,
+    description: "Organize the Dashboard: create, rename, order, and delete navigation groups.",
+    id: CORE_DASHBOARD_NAVIGATION_MANAGE,
+  }),
+  Object.freeze({
+    baseline: "restricted" as const,
+    description: "Read and change which installed modules are enabled.",
+    id: CORE_MODULES_LIFECYCLE_MANAGE,
+  }),
+  Object.freeze({
+    baseline: "restricted" as const,
+    description: "Read and change an installed module's own configuration values.",
+    id: CORE_MODULES_CONFIGURATION_MANAGE,
+  }),
+  Object.freeze({
+    baseline: "restricted" as const,
+    description: "Approve display device pairing, list paired devices, and revoke a device.",
+    id: CORE_DEVICES_MANAGE,
+  }),
+]);
+
+/**
+ * Core's own permission registry, containing exactly the Core-owned permissions declared above.
+ * Production `apps/api` does not consult this constant directly: it enforces requests against the
+ * composed platform registry (`composePlatformPermissionRegistry`,
+ * `core/src/modules/permissions.ts`), which merges these same declarations with every installed
+ * module's. `CORE_PERMISSION_REGISTRY` remains for Core-only callers and tests that need Core's
+ * permissions in isolation, without composing in any module.
+ */
+export const CORE_PERMISSION_REGISTRY: PermissionRegistry = createPermissionRegistry(
+  CORE_PERMISSION_DECLARATIONS,
+);

core/src/authorization/ports.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+import type {
+  AuthorizationScope,
+  EkklesiaDeviceId,
+  EkklesiaUserId,
+  PermissionId,
+} from "@ekklesia/contracts";
+
+export interface ActiveGrantQuery {
+  readonly userId: EkklesiaUserId;
+  readonly permission: PermissionId;
+  /** Absent means an unscoped check. An unscoped grant satisfies either an unscoped or scoped
+   * check for the same permission; a scoped grant satisfies only the exact matching scope and
+   * never satisfies an unscoped check. */
+  readonly scope?: AuthorizationScope;
+  /** The instant to evaluate expiration against — injected so evaluation is deterministic and
+   * testable rather than reading the wall clock inside the lookup itself. */
+  readonly now: Date;
+}
+
+/**
+ * The only read dependency `createAuthorizationEvaluator` has for grant state. Narrow and
+ * Postgres-independent by design: a test can supply a fake implementation, and the evaluator
+ * itself never knows whether it is backed by `core/src/authorization/store.ts` or a test double.
+ */
+export interface AuthorizationGrantPort {
+  hasActiveGrant(query: ActiveGrantQuery): Promise<boolean>;
+}
+
+/** The only read dependency the evaluator has for platform-owner authority — deliberately a
+ * separate, narrower port from grants, since owner authority is not represented as a grant. */
+export interface AuthorizationPlatformOwnerPort {
+  isPlatformOwner(userId: EkklesiaUserId): Promise<boolean>;
+}
+
+/**
+ * The evaluator's only read dependency for **device** authority.
+ *
+ * Separate from `AuthorizationGrantPort` because the two answer questions about different kinds of
+ * subject, not because devices are a special case in the decision: `authorize` consults exactly one
+ * of them per call, by principal kind, and neither can be reached without going through it.
+ *
+ * There is deliberately no device counterpart to `AuthorizationPlatformOwnerPort`. A device is
+ * never a platform owner, so there is no port that could accidentally say it was.
+ */
+export interface AuthorizationDevicePort {
+  hasActivePermission(deviceId: EkklesiaDeviceId, permission: PermissionId): Promise<boolean>;
+}

core/src/authorization/schema.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,181 @@
+import { relations, sql } from "drizzle-orm";
+import { check, index, pgTable, text, timestamp, uuid } from "drizzle-orm/pg-core";
+import { ekklesiaCoreUser } from "../identity/schema.js";
+
+/**
+ * Core-owned authorization schema: grants (explicit or relationship-derived), platform-owner
+ * status, and an append-only audit log of every security-relevant mutation. Table and index names
+ * are explicit and namespaced so ownership is unambiguous inside the shared public PostgreSQL
+ * schema, exactly like `core/src/identity/schema.ts`. Foreign keys to `ekklesia_core_user` are
+ * safe here (unlike a module referencing another module's tables) because Core owns both sides.
+ */
+
+export const ekklesiaCoreGrant = pgTable(
+  "ekklesia_core_grant",
+  {
+    id: uuid("id").primaryKey().defaultRandom(),
+    userId: text("user_id")
+      .notNull()
+      .references(() => ekklesiaCoreUser.id, { onDelete: "cascade" }),
+    permissionId: text("permission_id").notNull(),
+    scope: text("scope"),
+    sourceKind: text("source_kind").notNull(),
+    sourceRef: text("source_ref"),
+    createdAt: timestamp("created_at", { withTimezone: true }).defaultNow().notNull(),
+    createdByActorType: text("created_by_actor_type").notNull(),
+    createdByActorId: text("created_by_actor_id"),
+    expiresAt: timestamp("expires_at", { withTimezone: true }),
+    revokedAt: timestamp("revoked_at", { withTimezone: true }),
+    revokedByActorType: text("revoked_by_actor_type"),
+    revokedByActorId: text("revoked_by_actor_id"),
+  },
+  (table) => [
+    index("ekklesia_core_grant_user_permission_idx").on(table.userId, table.permissionId),
+    check(
+      "ekklesia_core_grant_source_kind_check",
+      sql`${table.sourceKind} in ('explicit', 'relationship')`,
+    ),
+    check(
+      "ekklesia_core_grant_created_actor_type_check",
+      sql`${table.createdByActorType} in ('user', 'system')`,
+    ),
+    check(
+      "ekklesia_core_grant_revoked_actor_type_check",
+      sql`${table.revokedByActorType} is null or ${table.revokedByActorType} in ('user', 'system')`,
+    ),
+  ],
+);
+
+export const ekklesiaCorePlatformOwner = pgTable(
+  "ekklesia_core_platform_owner",
+  {
+    userId: text("user_id")
+      .primaryKey()
+      .references(() => ekklesiaCoreUser.id, { onDelete: "cascade" }),
+    grantedAt: timestamp("granted_at", { withTimezone: true }).defaultNow().notNull(),
+    grantedByActorType: text("granted_by_actor_type").notNull(),
+    grantedByActorId: text("granted_by_actor_id"),
+    revokedAt: timestamp("revoked_at", { withTimezone: true }),
+    revokedByActorType: text("revoked_by_actor_type"),
+    revokedByActorId: text("revoked_by_actor_id"),
+  },
+  (table) => [
+    check(
+      "ekklesia_core_platform_owner_granted_actor_type_check",
+      sql`${table.grantedByActorType} in ('user', 'system')`,
+    ),
+    check(
+      "ekklesia_core_platform_owner_revoked_actor_type_check",
+      sql`${table.revokedByActorType} is null or ${table.revokedByActorType} in ('user', 'system')`,
+    ),
+  ],
+);
+
+/**
+ * Append-only *by application convention*: Core's authorization store exposes no update or delete
+ * path for these rows. That is a property of this codebase, not a database guarantee — no
+ * PostgreSQL role, trigger, or rule prevents a database administrator, a future migration, or
+ * anything else holding the same credentials from modifying them. `scope` intentionally rejects an
+ * empty (but non-null) string — defense in depth matching the application-layer
+ * `AuthorizationScope` contract, which never produces one — so a coding defect that slipped an
+ * empty scope past that validation fails the whole grant-plus-audit transaction atomically instead
+ * of recording a meaningless audit entry.
+ *
+ * `subject_user_id` is a **retained historical snapshot**, deliberately carrying no foreign key to
+ * the live Better Auth user row. It previously cascaded on user deletion, which meant deleting a
+ * user destroyed exactly the security history describing what that user had been granted and who
+ * granted it — the audit trail disappeared precisely when it mattered most. The value stays a
+ * plain, non-null identifier string; no name, email, or other profile data is ever copied here.
+ */
+export const ekklesiaCoreAuthorizationAudit = pgTable(
+  "ekklesia_core_authorization_audit",
+  {
+    id: uuid("id").primaryKey().defaultRandom(),
+    action: text("action").notNull(),
+    actorType: text("actor_type").notNull(),
+    actorId: text("actor_id"),
+    subjectUserId: text("subject_user_id").notNull(),
+    permissionId: text("permission_id"),
+    scope: text("scope"),
+    grantId: uuid("grant_id"),
+    createdAt: timestamp("created_at", { withTimezone: true }).defaultNow().notNull(),
+  },
+  (table) => [
+    index("ekklesia_core_authorization_audit_subject_idx").on(table.subjectUserId),
+    check(
+      "ekklesia_core_authorization_audit_action_check",
+      sql`${table.action} in ('grant.create', 'grant.revoke', 'platform_owner.grant', 'platform_owner.revoke')`,
+    ),
+    check(
+      "ekklesia_core_authorization_audit_actor_type_check",
+      sql`${table.actorType} in ('user', 'system')`,
+    ),
+    check(
+      "ekklesia_core_authorization_audit_scope_check",
+      sql`${table.scope} is null or length(${table.scope}) > 0`,
+    ),
+  ],
+);
+
+/**
+ * The durable, single-row record meaning "platform-owner bootstrap was successfully consumed."
+ *
+ * Bootstrap's single-use authority previously came from the mere existence of a row in
+ * `ekklesia_core_platform_owner` — which cascades on user deletion, so deleting the bootstrapped
+ * owner's user row silently reopened the one-time operation that establishes the platform's first
+ * administrator. This table exists specifically so that authority survives owner revocation and
+ * user deletion: it has **no foreign key to any user**, and nothing in Core ever deletes from it.
+ *
+ * `id` is pinned by a check constraint to the single literal value `'singleton'`, so the primary
+ * key makes a second row structurally impossible rather than merely unwritten by convention —
+ * concurrent first attempts collide on the primary key inside their transactions.
+ *
+ * `consumed_for_user_id` is an optional historical snapshot of who bootstrap made an owner, in the
+ * same retained-identifier style as the audit subject and carrying no profile data. It is null for
+ * an installation whose consumed state was backfilled by migration, because a backfill cannot know
+ * which of several historical owner rows the original single use actually targeted, and guessing
+ * one would fabricate history.
+ */
+export const ekklesiaCorePlatformOwnerBootstrap = pgTable(
+  "ekklesia_core_platform_owner_bootstrap",
+  {
+    id: text("id").primaryKey(),
+    consumedAt: timestamp("consumed_at", { withTimezone: true }).defaultNow().notNull(),
+    consumedForUserId: text("consumed_for_user_id"),
+  },
+  (table) => [
+    check("ekklesia_core_platform_owner_bootstrap_singleton_check", sql`${table.id} = 'singleton'`),
+  ],
+);
+
+/** The only value `ekklesia_core_platform_owner_bootstrap.id` may ever hold. */
+export const PLATFORM_OWNER_BOOTSTRAP_SINGLETON_ID = "singleton";
+
+export const ekklesiaCoreGrantRelations = relations(ekklesiaCoreGrant, ({ one }) => ({
+  user: one(ekklesiaCoreUser, {
+    fields: [ekklesiaCoreGrant.userId],
+    references: [ekklesiaCoreUser.id],
+  }),
+}));
+
+export const ekklesiaCorePlatformOwnerRelations = relations(
+  ekklesiaCorePlatformOwner,
+  ({ one }) => ({
+    user: one(ekklesiaCoreUser, {
+      fields: [ekklesiaCorePlatformOwner.userId],
+      references: [ekklesiaCoreUser.id],
+    }),
+  }),
+);
+
+// `ekklesiaCoreAuthorizationAudit` deliberately declares no `relations(...)` to the user table:
+// its subject is a retained historical identifier that may name a user row that no longer exists,
+// so modelling it as a live relation would misdescribe the data.
+
+/** Explicit map passed to Drizzle, mirroring `identityAdapterSchema`'s explicit-mapping style. */
+export const authorizationSchema = {
+  authorizationAudit: ekklesiaCoreAuthorizationAudit,
+  grant: ekklesiaCoreGrant,
+  platformOwner: ekklesiaCorePlatformOwner,
+  platformOwnerBootstrap: ekklesiaCorePlatformOwnerBootstrap,
+} as const;

core/src/authorization/store.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,654 @@
+import type {
+  AuthorizationActor,
+  AuthorizationScope,
+  EkklesiaUserId,
+  GrantId,
+  GrantSourceKind,
+  GrantSourceRef,
+  PermissionId,
+} from "@ekklesia/contracts";
+import {
+  isUserActor,
+  parseAuthorizationScope,
+  parseEkklesiaUserId,
+  parseGrantId,
+  parsePermissionId,
+} from "@ekklesia/contracts";
+import { and, desc, eq, gt, isNull, or, sql } from "drizzle-orm";
+import type { AuthorizationDrizzleDatabase } from "./database.js";
+import type {
+  ActiveGrantQuery,
+  AuthorizationGrantPort,
+  AuthorizationPlatformOwnerPort,
+} from "./ports.js";
+import {
+  ekklesiaCoreAuthorizationAudit,
+  ekklesiaCoreGrant,
+  ekklesiaCorePlatformOwner,
+} from "./schema.js";
+
+export type AuthorizationStoreErrorCode =
+  | "AUTHORIZATION_GRANT_ALREADY_EXISTS"
+  | "AUTHORIZATION_GRANT_CREATE_FAILED"
+  | "AUTHORIZATION_GRANT_EXPIRATION_INVALID"
+  | "AUTHORIZATION_GRANT_LIMIT_INVALID"
+  | "AUTHORIZATION_GRANT_LIST_FAILED"
+  | "AUTHORIZATION_GRANT_LOOKUP_FAILED"
+  | "AUTHORIZATION_GRANT_NOT_FOUND"
+  | "AUTHORIZATION_GRANT_REVOKE_FAILED"
+  | "AUTHORIZATION_PLATFORM_OWNER_LOOKUP_FAILED"
+  | "AUTHORIZATION_PLATFORM_OWNER_MUTATION_FAILED"
+  | "AUTHORIZATION_PLATFORM_OWNER_NOT_FOUND";
+
+const storeErrorMessages: Readonly<Record<AuthorizationStoreErrorCode, string>> = Object.freeze({
+  AUTHORIZATION_GRANT_ALREADY_EXISTS:
+    "An equivalent authorization grant is already effective for this user.",
+  AUTHORIZATION_GRANT_CREATE_FAILED: "The authorization grant could not be created.",
+  AUTHORIZATION_GRANT_EXPIRATION_INVALID:
+    "The authorization grant expiration must be a valid instant in the future.",
+  AUTHORIZATION_GRANT_LIMIT_INVALID: "The authorization grant page size is invalid.",
+  AUTHORIZATION_GRANT_LIST_FAILED: "The authorization grant list could not be retrieved.",
+  AUTHORIZATION_GRANT_LOOKUP_FAILED: "The authorization grant lookup could not be completed.",
+  AUTHORIZATION_GRANT_NOT_FOUND: "The authorization grant was not found or is already revoked.",
+  AUTHORIZATION_GRANT_REVOKE_FAILED: "The authorization grant could not be revoked.",
+  AUTHORIZATION_PLATFORM_OWNER_LOOKUP_FAILED: "The platform-owner lookup could not be completed.",
+  AUTHORIZATION_PLATFORM_OWNER_MUTATION_FAILED: "The platform-owner change could not be recorded.",
+  AUTHORIZATION_PLATFORM_OWNER_NOT_FOUND:
+    "The platform-owner record was not found or is already revoked.",
+});
+
+/** The largest page any caller may request from `listGrantsForUser`, enforced identically by the
+ * store and by the HTTP surface so there is exactly one bound, not two that could drift. */
+export const AUTHORIZATION_GRANT_LIST_MAX_LIMIT = 100;
+
+/** Never carries the underlying database error, SQL text, host, port, path, or stack. */
+export class AuthorizationStoreError extends Error {
+  readonly code: AuthorizationStoreErrorCode;
+
+  constructor(code: AuthorizationStoreErrorCode) {
+    super(storeErrorMessages[code]);
+    this.name = "AuthorizationStoreError";
+    this.code = code;
+    this.stack = `${this.name}: ${this.message}`;
+    Object.freeze(this);
+  }
+}
+
+function isAuthorizationStoreError(error: unknown): error is AuthorizationStoreError {
+  return error instanceof AuthorizationStoreError;
+}
+
+export interface CreateGrantInput {
+  readonly userId: EkklesiaUserId;
+  readonly permission: PermissionId;
+  readonly scope?: AuthorizationScope;
+  readonly sourceKind: GrantSourceKind;
+  readonly sourceRef?: GrantSourceRef;
+  readonly actor: AuthorizationActor;
+  /** Absent means the grant never expires. */
+  readonly expiresAt?: Date;
+}
+
+export interface GrantRecord {
+  readonly id: GrantId;
+  readonly userId: EkklesiaUserId;
+  readonly permission: PermissionId;
+  readonly scope?: AuthorizationScope;
+  readonly sourceKind: GrantSourceKind;
+  readonly sourceRef?: GrantSourceRef;
+  readonly createdAt: Date;
+  readonly expiresAt?: Date;
+  readonly revokedAt?: Date;
+}
+
+export interface RevokeGrantInput {
+  readonly grantId: GrantId;
+  readonly actor: AuthorizationActor;
+  /** When provided, the revoke only matches a grant whose `sourceKind` equals this value — a
+   * grant of a different source kind is treated exactly like a nonexistent one
+   * (`AUTHORIZATION_GRANT_NOT_FOUND`). The generic explicit-grant HTTP API always passes
+   * `"explicit"` here, so it can never revoke a relationship-derived grant regardless of caller
+   * intent; internal Core callers that omit this may revoke any grant, matching pass 1's
+   * original, unconstrained behavior. */
+  readonly sourceKind?: GrantSourceKind;
+}
+
+/** One row's position in the `created_at DESC, id DESC` ordering, used as a strict keyset
+ * boundary. Both values are required: comparing on the timestamp alone would skip or repeat rows
+ * whenever two grants share a `created_at`, which concurrent creation makes routine. */
+export interface GrantPageBoundary {
+  readonly createdAt: Date;
+  readonly id: GrantId;
+}
+
+export interface ListGrantsForUserOptions {
+  /** Required. The maximum number of rows to return, 1 through
+   * `AUTHORIZATION_GRANT_LIST_MAX_LIMIT`. There is deliberately no default and no unbounded
+   * fallback anywhere: an unbounded listing returned a user's entire authorization history in one
+   * response, and a bound a caller may simply omit is not a bound. */
+  readonly limit: number;
+  /** When provided, only grants strictly *after* this position in the ordering are returned. */
+  readonly after?: GrantPageBoundary;
+  /** When provided, only grants with this exact `sourceKind` are returned. */
+  readonly sourceKind?: GrantSourceKind;
+}
+
+export interface GrantPage {
+  readonly grants: readonly GrantRecord[];
+  /** The last returned row's position when more rows exist, otherwise `undefined`. */
+  readonly nextBoundary?: GrantPageBoundary;
+}
+
+export interface CreateAuthorizationStoreOptions {
+  /** Injected only so expiration validation is deterministic under test. Production composition
+   * leaves this unset and the store reads real time. */
+  readonly now?: () => Date;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Core's Postgres-backed authorization persistence: grants, platform-owner status, and the
+ * append-only audit log, all behind one explicit factory — no environment reads, no connection
+ * attempt, and no query merely from importing this module or calling this factory; every method
+ * call is the only thing that ever touches PostgreSQL. Implements the narrow read ports
+ * `createAuthorizationEvaluator` depends on directly, so the same store instance is both Core's
+ * write API and the evaluator's read dependency.
+ */
+export interface AuthorizationStore extends AuthorizationGrantPort, AuthorizationPlatformOwnerPort {
+  createGrant(input: CreateGrantInput): Promise<GrantRecord>;
+  revokeGrant(input: RevokeGrantInput): Promise<void>;
+  /** One bounded page of the user's grants, active or revoked, ordered `created_at DESC, id DESC`.
+   * Never includes another user's grants. */
+  listGrantsForUser(userId: EkklesiaUserId, options: ListGrantsForUserOptions): Promise<GrantPage>;
+  grantPlatformOwner(userId: EkklesiaUserId, actor: AuthorizationActor): Promise<void>;
+  revokePlatformOwner(userId: EkklesiaUserId, actor: AuthorizationActor): Promise<void>;
+}
+
+function actorId(actor: AuthorizationActor): string | null {
+  return isUserActor(actor) ? actor.userId : null;
+}
+
+interface GrantRow {
+  readonly id: string;
+  readonly userId: string;
+  readonly permissionId: string;
+  readonly scope: string | null;
+  readonly sourceKind: string;
+  readonly sourceRef: string | null;
+  readonly createdAt: Date;
+  readonly expiresAt: Date | null;
+  readonly revokedAt: Date | null;
+}
+
+/** Re-validates a row this same store just wrote, rather than trusting raw column values by
+ * construction — defense in depth against a future schema/migration drift, matching the
+ * paranoid-by-default posture the rest of Core's persistence code already follows. */
+function toGrantRecord(row: GrantRow): GrantRecord {
+  return Object.freeze({
+    createdAt: row.createdAt,
+    id: parseGrantId(row.id),
+    permission: parsePermissionId(row.permissionId),
+    ...(row.scope === null ? {} : { scope: parseAuthorizationScope(row.scope) }),
+    ...(row.expiresAt === null ? {} : { expiresAt: row.expiresAt }),
+    ...(row.revokedAt === null ? {} : { revokedAt: row.revokedAt }),
+    sourceKind: row.sourceKind as GrantSourceKind,
+    ...(row.sourceRef === null ? {} : { sourceRef: row.sourceRef }),
+    userId: parseEkklesiaUserId(row.userId),
+  });
+}
+
+/**
+ * The five values that make two grant issuances the *same authorization source*: subject,
+ * permission, scope, source kind, and source reference — with `NULL` equal only to `NULL`.
+ * `expires_at`, creation metadata, actor metadata, and the grant id deliberately do **not**
+ * distinguish them: re-issuing the identical authority with a different expiry or by a different
+ * administrator is the same grant, not a second one.
+ */
+interface GrantEquivalence {
+  readonly userId: string;
+  readonly permissionId: string;
+  readonly scope: string | null;
+  readonly sourceKind: string;
+  readonly sourceRef: string | null;
+}
+
+function equivalenceOf(input: CreateGrantInput): GrantEquivalence {
+  return {
+    permissionId: input.permission,
+    scope: input.scope ?? null,
+    sourceKind: input.sourceKind,
+    sourceRef: input.sourceRef ?? null,
+    userId: input.userId,
+  };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Serializes every create/revoke touching one equivalence tuple against a transaction-scoped
+ * PostgreSQL advisory lock, so concurrent callers cannot both observe "no effective equivalent"
+ * and both insert. A process-local mutex would not do this — nothing constrains the number of API
+ * processes — and neither would an unlocked check-then-insert.
+ *
+ * The key is a 64-bit hash of the tuple encoded as a JSON array, which keeps `NULL` and the empty
+ * string distinct and makes separator forgery through a crafted scope or source reference
+ * impossible. A hash collision is harmless by construction: it can only make two unrelated tuples
+ * serialize against each other, never make a real conflict go unnoticed, because the authoritative
+ * decision is always the exact SQL predicate below and never the hash.
+ *
+ * `pg_advisory_xact_lock(bigint)` uses PostgreSQL's *single-key* advisory-lock space, which is
+ * verified to be disjoint from the two-key space used by the migration runner
+ * (`core/src/migrations/postgres-database.ts`) and by platform-owner bootstrap. Grant serialization
+ * therefore can never block, or be blocked by, migration or bootstrap locking. Being
+ * transaction-scoped, it is released on COMMIT or ROLLBACK with no manual unlock.
+ */
+async function lockEquivalence(
+  tx: Parameters<Parameters<AuthorizationDrizzleDatabase["transaction"]>[0]>[0],
+  equivalence: GrantEquivalence,
+): Promise<void> {
+  await tx.execute(
+    sql`select pg_advisory_xact_lock(hashtextextended(jsonb_build_array(
+      ${equivalence.userId}::text,
+      ${equivalence.permissionId}::text,
+      ${equivalence.scope}::text,
+      ${equivalence.sourceKind}::text,
+      ${equivalence.sourceRef}::text
+    )::text, 0))`,
+  );
+}
+
+/** Matches exactly the rows sharing an equivalence tuple. `is not distinct from` is what gives
+ * `NULL = NULL` for the two nullable members; plain `=` would silently match nothing. */
+function equivalenceCondition(equivalence: GrantEquivalence) {
+  return and(
+    eq(ekklesiaCoreGrant.userId, equivalence.userId),
+    eq(ekklesiaCoreGrant.permissionId, equivalence.permissionId),
+    sql`${ekklesiaCoreGrant.scope} is not distinct from ${equivalence.scope}::text`,
+    eq(ekklesiaCoreGrant.sourceKind, equivalence.sourceKind),
+    sql`${ekklesiaCoreGrant.sourceRef} is not distinct from ${equivalence.sourceRef}::text`,
+  );
+}
+
+/** A supplied expiration must be a real instant strictly later than the acceptance clock. A past
+ * or equal-to-now expiration produces a grant that is dead the moment it is written, which is
+ * never what a caller meant; rejecting it here means trusted internal callers get the same
+ * guarantee the HTTP surface enforces, rather than each validating separately. */
+function assertValidExpiration(expiresAt: Date | undefined, now: Date): void {
+  if (expiresAt === undefined) {
+    return;
+  }
+  if (
+    !(expiresAt instanceof Date) ||
+    Number.isNaN(expiresAt.getTime()) ||
+    expiresAt.getTime() <= now.getTime()
+  ) {
+    throw new AuthorizationStoreError("AUTHORIZATION_GRANT_EXPIRATION_INVALID");
+  }
+}
+
+function assertValidLimit(limit: number): number {
+  if (
+    typeof limit !== "number" ||
+    !Number.isSafeInteger(limit) ||
+    limit < 1 ||
+    limit > AUTHORIZATION_GRANT_LIST_MAX_LIMIT
+  ) {
+    throw new AuthorizationStoreError("AUTHORIZATION_GRANT_LIMIT_INVALID");
+  }
+  return limit;
+}
+
+export function createAuthorizationStore(
+  db: AuthorizationDrizzleDatabase,
+  options: CreateAuthorizationStoreOptions = {},
+): AuthorizationStore {
+  const now = options.now ?? ((): Date => new Date());
+
+  return Object.freeze({
+    createGrant: async (input: CreateGrantInput): Promise<GrantRecord> => {
+      // Validated before any transaction opens, so a rejected expiration performs no database work
+      // at all and can never leave a grant or an audit row behind.
+      assertValidExpiration(input.expiresAt, now());
+      const equivalence = equivalenceOf(input);
+      try {
+        return await db.transaction(async (tx) => {
+          await lockEquivalence(tx, equivalence);
+
+          // Under the lock, "currently effective" is authoritative: an equivalent that is revoked,
+          // or whose expiry has already passed, does not block a fresh issuance.
+          const effective = await tx
+            .select({ id: ekklesiaCoreGrant.id })
+            .from(ekklesiaCoreGrant)
+            .where(
+              and(
+                equivalenceCondition(equivalence),
+                isNull(ekklesiaCoreGrant.revokedAt),
+                or(
+                  isNull(ekklesiaCoreGrant.expiresAt),
+                  gt(ekklesiaCoreGrant.expiresAt, sql`now()`),
+                ),
+              ),
+            )
+            .limit(1);
+          if (effective.length > 0) {
+            throw new AuthorizationStoreError("AUTHORIZATION_GRANT_ALREADY_EXISTS");
+          }
+
+          const [row] = await tx
+            .insert(ekklesiaCoreGrant)
+            .values({
+              createdByActorId: actorId(input.actor),
+              createdByActorType: input.actor.type,
+              expiresAt: input.expiresAt ?? null,
+              permissionId: input.permission,
+              scope: input.scope ?? null,
+              sourceKind: input.sourceKind,
+              sourceRef: input.sourceRef ?? null,
+              userId: input.userId,
+            })
+            .returning();
+          if (!row) {
+            throw new Error("grant insert returned no row");
+          }
+
+          await tx.insert(ekklesiaCoreAuthorizationAudit).values({
+            action: "grant.create",
+            actorId: actorId(input.actor),
+            actorType: input.actor.type,
+            grantId: row.id,
+            permissionId: input.permission,
+            scope: input.scope ?? null,
+            subjectUserId: input.userId,
+          });
+
+          return toGrantRecord(row);
+        });
+      } catch (error) {
+        if (isAuthorizationStoreError(error)) {
+          throw error;
+        }
+        throw new AuthorizationStoreError("AUTHORIZATION_GRANT_CREATE_FAILED");
+      }
+    },
+
+    /**
+     * Revoking one grant revokes *every* currently unrevoked issuance sharing its equivalence
+     * tuple, in one transaction, with one `grant.revoke` audit row per grant actually changed.
+     *
+     * Addressing a single id and revoking only that row was actively misleading: an operator who
+     * revoked a grant received `success` while an equivalent duplicate kept authorizing the same
+     * user. Expired-but-unrevoked equivalents are included deliberately — they are already
+     * ineffective, but leaving them unrevoked would keep the history in two states for what is one
+     * authorization source. Grants with a different subject, permission, scope, source kind, or
+     * source reference are untouched.
+     */
+    revokeGrant: async (input: RevokeGrantInput): Promise<void> => {
+      try {
+        await db.transaction(async (tx) => {
+          // This first read exists only to discover the equivalence tuple, which is safe to read
+          // before the lock because those columns are immutable once written. It deliberately does
+          // *not* settle whether the revocation may proceed: everything it observed can change
+          // while this transaction waits for the lock below.
+          const [target] = await tx
+            .select({
+              permissionId: ekklesiaCoreGrant.permissionId,
+              scope: ekklesiaCoreGrant.scope,
+              sourceKind: ekklesiaCoreGrant.sourceKind,
+              sourceRef: ekklesiaCoreGrant.sourceRef,
+              userId: ekklesiaCoreGrant.userId,
+            })
+            .from(ekklesiaCoreGrant)
+            .where(
+              and(
+                eq(ekklesiaCoreGrant.id, input.grantId),
+                isNull(ekklesiaCoreGrant.revokedAt),
+                ...(input.sourceKind === undefined
+                  ? []
+                  : [eq(ekklesiaCoreGrant.sourceKind, input.sourceKind)]),
+              ),
+            )
+            .limit(1);
+          if (!target) {
+            throw new AuthorizationStoreError("AUTHORIZATION_GRANT_NOT_FOUND");
+          }
+
+          await lockEquivalence(tx, target);
+
+          // Revalidate the *addressed* grant now that the lock is held. Without this, a revocation
+          // that paused between the read above and the lock could wake after its target was
+          // revoked and a fresh equivalent created, and the tuple-matching update below would
+          // silently revoke that replacement — reporting success for a grant the caller never
+          // addressed, in an order no serial execution could produce, and losing the not-found
+          // result an already-revoked target must return.
+          //
+          // The check is deliberately narrow and re-asserts every condition the pre-lock read
+          // relied on: the exact addressed id, still unrevoked, still satisfying the caller's
+          // explicit/relationship source guard, and still carrying the same equivalence tuple the
+          // lock was taken for. It is a plain read, not `for update`: the tuple advisory lock
+          // remains the one create/revoke serialization order, so no second lock ordering — and no
+          // deadlock path — is introduced.
+          const [addressed] = await tx
+            .select({ id: ekklesiaCoreGrant.id })
+            .from(ekklesiaCoreGrant)
+            .where(
+              and(
+                eq(ekklesiaCoreGrant.id, input.grantId),
+                isNull(ekklesiaCoreGrant.revokedAt),
+                ...(input.sourceKind === undefined
+                  ? []
+                  : [eq(ekklesiaCoreGrant.sourceKind, input.sourceKind)]),
+                equivalenceCondition(target),
+              ),
+            )
+            .limit(1);
+          if (!addressed) {
+            throw new AuthorizationStoreError("AUTHORIZATION_GRANT_NOT_FOUND");
+          }
+
+          // Only now is the whole equivalence class cleared, which is what still removes genuine
+          // legacy duplicates — including expired-but-unrevoked ones. Narrowing this update to the
+          // addressed id instead would not have been a fix; it would have dropped that behavior.
+          const rows = await tx
+            .update(ekklesiaCoreGrant)
+            .set({
+              revokedAt: sql`now()`,
+              revokedByActorId: actorId(input.actor),
+              revokedByActorType: input.actor.type,
+            })
+            .where(and(equivalenceCondition(target), isNull(ekklesiaCoreGrant.revokedAt)))
+            .returning();
+          if (rows.length === 0) {
+            // Unreachable while the lock is held, since the row confirmed above satisfies this
+            // same predicate — kept as a fail-closed guard against a writer that bypasses the
+            // lock, rather than silently auditing nothing.
+            throw new AuthorizationStoreError("AUTHORIZATION_GRANT_NOT_FOUND");
+          }
+
+          await tx.insert(ekklesiaCoreAuthorizationAudit).values(
+            rows.map((row) => ({
+              action: "grant.revoke",
+              actorId: actorId(input.actor),
+              actorType: input.actor.type,
+              grantId: row.id,
+              permissionId: row.permissionId,
+              scope: row.scope,
+              subjectUserId: row.userId,
+            })),
+          );
+        });
+      } catch (error) {
+        if (isAuthorizationStoreError(error)) {
+          throw error;
+        }
+        throw new AuthorizationStoreError("AUTHORIZATION_GRANT_REVOKE_FAILED");
+      }
+    },
+
+    hasActiveGrant: async (query: ActiveGrantQuery): Promise<boolean> => {
+      try {
+        const scopeCondition =
+          query.scope === undefined
+            ? isNull(ekklesiaCoreGrant.scope)
+            : or(isNull(ekklesiaCoreGrant.scope), eq(ekklesiaCoreGrant.scope, query.scope));
+        const rows = await db
+          .select({ id: ekklesiaCoreGrant.id })
+          .from(ekklesiaCoreGrant)
+          .where(
+            and(
+              eq(ekklesiaCoreGrant.userId, query.userId),
+              eq(ekklesiaCoreGrant.permissionId, query.permission),
+              scopeCondition,
+              isNull(ekklesiaCoreGrant.revokedAt),
+              or(isNull(ekklesiaCoreGrant.expiresAt), gt(ekklesiaCoreGrant.expiresAt, query.now)),
+            ),
+          )
+          .limit(1);
+        return rows.length > 0;
+      } catch {
+        throw new AuthorizationStoreError("AUTHORIZATION_GRANT_LOOKUP_FAILED");
+      }
+    },
+
+    /**
+     * Deterministic keyset pagination over `created_at DESC, id DESC`. The boundary is a strict
+     * row-value comparison on *both* columns, so grants sharing a `created_at` — which concurrent
+     * creation makes routine — can neither be skipped nor repeated across pages. Offset pagination
+     * would do exactly that under concurrent writes, which is why it is not used.
+     *
+     * At most `limit + 1` rows are read: the extra row only answers "is there another page" and is
+     * never returned.
+     */
+    listGrantsForUser: async (
+      userId: EkklesiaUserId,
+      listOptions: ListGrantsForUserOptions,
+    ): Promise<GrantPage> => {
+      const limit = assertValidLimit(listOptions.limit);
+      const after = listOptions.after;
+      try {
+        const rows = await db
+          .select()
+          .from(ekklesiaCoreGrant)
+          .where(
+            and(
+              eq(ekklesiaCoreGrant.userId, userId),
+              ...(listOptions.sourceKind === undefined
+                ? []
+                : [eq(ekklesiaCoreGrant.sourceKind, listOptions.sourceKind)]),
+              ...(after === undefined
+                ? []
+                : [
+                    sql`(${ekklesiaCoreGrant.createdAt}, ${ekklesiaCoreGrant.id}) < (${after.createdAt}::timestamptz, ${after.id}::uuid)`,
+                  ]),
+            ),
+          )
+          .orderBy(desc(ekklesiaCoreGrant.createdAt), desc(ekklesiaCoreGrant.id))
+          .limit(limit + 1);
+
+        const page = rows.slice(0, limit).map(toGrantRecord);
+        const last = page.at(-1);
+        return Object.freeze({
+          grants: Object.freeze(page),
+          ...(rows.length > limit && last !== undefined
+            ? { nextBoundary: Object.freeze({ createdAt: last.createdAt, id: last.id }) }
+            : {}),
+        });
+      } catch (error) {
+        if (isAuthorizationStoreError(error)) {
+          throw error;
+        }
+        throw new AuthorizationStoreError("AUTHORIZATION_GRANT_LIST_FAILED");
+      }
+    },
+
+    grantPlatformOwner: async (
+      userId: EkklesiaUserId,
+      actor: AuthorizationActor,
+    ): Promise<void> => {
+      try {
+        await db.transaction(async (tx) => {
+          await tx
+            .insert(ekklesiaCorePlatformOwner)
+            .values({
+              grantedByActorId: actorId(actor),
+              grantedByActorType: actor.type,
+              userId,
+            })
+            .onConflictDoUpdate({
+              set: {
+                grantedAt: sql`now()`,
+                grantedByActorId: actorId(actor),
+                grantedByActorType: actor.type,
+                revokedAt: null,
+                revokedByActorId: null,
+                revokedByActorType: null,
+              },
+              target: ekklesiaCorePlatformOwner.userId,
+            });
+
+          await tx.insert(ekklesiaCoreAuthorizationAudit).values({
+            action: "platform_owner.grant",
+            actorId: actorId(actor),
+            actorType: actor.type,
+            subjectUserId: userId,
+          });
+        });
+      } catch {
+        throw new AuthorizationStoreError("AUTHORIZATION_PLATFORM_OWNER_MUTATION_FAILED");
+      }
+    },
+
+    revokePlatformOwner: async (
+      userId: EkklesiaUserId,
+      actor: AuthorizationActor,
+    ): Promise<void> => {
+      try {
+        await db.transaction(async (tx) => {
+          const [row] = await tx
+            .update(ekklesiaCorePlatformOwner)
+            .set({
+              revokedAt: sql`now()`,
+              revokedByActorId: actorId(actor),
+              revokedByActorType: actor.type,
+            })
+            .where(
+              and(
+                eq(ekklesiaCorePlatformOwner.userId, userId),
+                isNull(ekklesiaCorePlatformOwner.revokedAt),
+              ),
+            )
+            .returning();
+          if (!row) {
+            throw new AuthorizationStoreError("AUTHORIZATION_PLATFORM_OWNER_NOT_FOUND");
+          }
+
+          await tx.insert(ekklesiaCoreAuthorizationAudit).values({
+            action: "platform_owner.revoke",
+            actorId: actorId(actor),
+            actorType: actor.type,
+            subjectUserId: userId,
+          });
+        });
+      } catch (error) {
+        if (isAuthorizationStoreError(error)) {
+          throw error;
+        }
+        throw new AuthorizationStoreError("AUTHORIZATION_PLATFORM_OWNER_MUTATION_FAILED");
+      }
+    },
+
+    isPlatformOwner: async (userId: EkklesiaUserId): Promise<boolean> => {
+      try {
+        const rows = await db
+          .select({ userId: ekklesiaCorePlatformOwner.userId })
+          .from(ekklesiaCorePlatformOwner)
+          .where(
+            and(
+              eq(ekklesiaCorePlatformOwner.userId, userId),
+              isNull(ekklesiaCorePlatformOwner.revokedAt),
+            ),
+          )
+          .limit(1);
+        return rows.length > 0;
+      } catch {
+        throw new AuthorizationStoreError("AUTHORIZATION_PLATFORM_OWNER_LOOKUP_FAILED");
+      }
+    },
+  });
+}

core/src/cli/apply-migrations.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+import { formatMigrationApplyReport } from "./migration-report.js";
+import { discoverRepositoryMigrations } from "./migration-command-support.js";
+import { reportMigrationCommandError } from "./migration-command-errors.js";
+import { resolveExecutableDatabaseTransport } from "./database-transport-environment.js";
+import { applyModuleMigrations, createPostgresMigrationDatabase } from "../migrations/index.js";
+
+async function main(): Promise<void> {
+  const aggregate = await discoverRepositoryMigrations();
+  const databaseUrl = process.env.DATABASE_URL;
+  // Resolved and asserted before any client exists: an unsafe production transport fails
+  // here rather than after opening a connection.
+  const transport =
+    typeof databaseUrl === "string" ? resolveExecutableDatabaseTransport(databaseUrl) : undefined;
+  const database = createPostgresMigrationDatabase(databaseUrl, {
+    ...(transport === undefined ? {} : { transport }),
+  });
+  const result = await applyModuleMigrations({ aggregate, database });
+
+  for (const line of formatMigrationApplyReport(result)) {
+    console.log(line);
+  }
+}
+
+main().catch((error: unknown) => {
+  reportMigrationCommandError(error);
+  process.exitCode = 1;
+});

core/src/cli/bootstrap-platform-owner.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
+import path from "node:path";
+import { pathToFileURL } from "node:url";
+import { safeParseEkklesiaUserId } from "@ekklesia/contracts";
+import {
+  bootstrapPlatformOwner,
+  createAuthorizationDrizzleDatabase,
+  PlatformOwnerBootstrapError,
+} from "../authorization/index.js";
+import { resolveExecutableDatabaseTransport } from "./database-transport-environment.js";
+
+class BootstrapCliError extends Error {
+  constructor(message: string) {
+    super(message);
+    this.name = "BootstrapCliError";
+  }
+}
+
+const usage =
+  "Usage: pnpm authorization:bootstrap-owner -- --user-id <id> --confirm-user-id <same-id>";
+
+interface ParsedArgs {
+  readonly confirmUserId: string;
+  readonly userId: string;
+}
+
+/** A minimal, hand-rolled flag parser — this command takes exactly two required, named flags, so
+ * a general-purpose argument-parsing dependency is not warranted. */
+function parseArgs(argv: readonly string[]): ParsedArgs {
+  let userId: string | undefined;
+  let confirmUserId: string | undefined;
+  for (let index = 0; index < argv.length; index += 1) {
+    const flag = argv[index];
+    if (flag === "--user-id") {
+      userId = argv[index + 1];
+      index += 1;
+    } else if (flag === "--confirm-user-id") {
+      confirmUserId = argv[index + 1];
+      index += 1;
+    }
+  }
+  if (userId === undefined || confirmUserId === undefined) {
+    throw new BootstrapCliError(usage);
+  }
+  return { confirmUserId, userId };
+}
+
+async function main(): Promise<void> {
+  const { confirmUserId, userId: rawUserId } = parseArgs(process.argv.slice(2));
+
+  // Deliberately not "infer the first user" or "select by signup order" — the operator must name
+  // the exact, opaque Ekklesia user id twice, and both must match exactly, before anything else
+  // is even attempted.
+  if (rawUserId !== confirmUserId) {
+    throw new BootstrapCliError(
+      "--user-id and --confirm-user-id must match exactly. No changes were made.",
+    );
+  }
+
+  const parsedUserId = safeParseEkklesiaUserId(rawUserId);
+  if (!parsedUserId.success) {
+    throw new BootstrapCliError("The provided user id is not a valid Ekklesia user id.");
+  }
+
+  // Read only when this command actually executes — never merely by importing this module (see
+  // isDirectExecution() below) or any module it imports.
+  const databaseUrl = process.env.DATABASE_URL;
+  if (typeof databaseUrl !== "string" || databaseUrl.trim().length === 0) {
+    throw new BootstrapCliError("DATABASE_URL is required.");
+  }
+
+  // Asserted before the connection is constructed, so an unsafe production transport never opens
+  // a client at all.
+  const transport = resolveExecutableDatabaseTransport(databaseUrl);
+  const { close, db } = createAuthorizationDrizzleDatabase(databaseUrl, {
+    connectionTimeoutMs: 10_000,
+    operationTimeoutMs: 10_000,
+    transport,
+  });
+  try {
+    await bootstrapPlatformOwner(db, { userId: parsedUserId.data });
+    console.log(`Platform-owner bootstrap complete for user "${parsedUserId.data}".`);
+  } finally {
+    await close().catch(() => undefined);
+  }
+}
+
+function reportBootstrapCliError(error: unknown): void {
+  if (error instanceof BootstrapCliError) {
+    console.error(error.message);
+    return;
+  }
+  if (error instanceof PlatformOwnerBootstrapError) {
+    console.error(`[${error.code}] ${error.message}`);
+    return;
+  }
+  console.error("Platform-owner bootstrap failed unexpectedly.");
+}
+
+function isDirectExecution(): boolean {
+  const entrypoint = process.argv[1];
+  return (
+    entrypoint !== undefined && import.meta.url === pathToFileURL(path.resolve(entrypoint)).href
+  );
+}
+
+if (isDirectExecution()) {
+  main().catch((error: unknown) => {
+    reportBootstrapCliError(error);
+    process.exitCode = 1;
+  });
+}

core/src/cli/create-initial-owner.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,233 @@
+import path from "node:path";
+import { pathToFileURL } from "node:url";
+import {
+  createAuthorizationDrizzleDatabase,
+  createInitialPlatformOwner,
+  InitialPlatformOwnerError,
+} from "../authorization/index.js";
+import {
+  createBootstrapIdentityCreator,
+  createIdentityDrizzleDatabase,
+} from "../identity/index.js";
+import { resolveExecutableDatabaseTransport } from "./database-transport-environment.js";
+
+/**
+ * Creates the first platform owner of a fresh installation — one identity, then the single-use
+ * ownership grant — so a freshly deployed Ekklesia has a supported way to get its first
+ * administrator (ADR 0035).
+ *
+ * This exists because the login page has nothing to log in to on a new installation. Public signup
+ * is disabled in every environment and production cannot enable it at all, which is correct and is
+ * not changed here; the consequence was simply that no supported path created the first account.
+ * This is that path, and it is deliberately the same shape as `pnpm authorization:bootstrap-owner`
+ * and `pnpm modules:enable`: explicit, operator-invoked, never HTTP-exposed, never inferred, and
+ * reachable only by someone who already holds the database credentials.
+ *
+ * It creates no HTTP route, starts no server, and applies no migration.
+ */
+class InitialOwnerCliError extends Error {
+  constructor(message: string) {
+    super(message);
+    this.name = "InitialOwnerCliError";
+    this.stack = `${this.name}: ${this.message}`;
+  }
+}
+
+const usage =
+  "Usage: pnpm identity:create-initial-owner -- --email <address> [--name <display name>]\n" +
+  "The password is never taken from the command line. It is prompted for when a terminal is\n" +
+  "attached, and otherwise read from standard input:\n" +
+  "  printf '%s' \"$PASSWORD\" | pnpm identity:create-initial-owner -- --email [email protected]";
+
+interface ParsedArgs {
+  readonly email: string;
+  readonly name?: string;
+}
+
+/** A minimal, hand-rolled flag parser, exactly like `bootstrap-platform-owner.ts` and
+ * `set-module-enabled.ts`. There is deliberately no `--password`: see `readPassword`. */
+function parseArgs(argv: readonly string[]): ParsedArgs {
+  let email: string | undefined;
+  let name: string | undefined;
+  for (let index = 0; index < argv.length; index += 1) {
+    const flag = argv[index];
+    if (flag === "--email") {
+      email = argv[index + 1];
+      index += 1;
+    } else if (flag === "--name") {
+      name = argv[index + 1];
+      index += 1;
+    } else if (flag === "--password" || flag?.startsWith("--password=") === true) {
+      // Refused explicitly rather than ignored, so an operator who tries it learns why instead of
+      // wondering why their password was not used.
+      throw new InitialOwnerCliError(
+        "--password is not supported: a command-line password is visible in shell history and in the process list.\n" +
+          usage,
+      );
+    }
+  }
+  if (email === undefined || email.trim().length === 0) {
+    throw new InitialOwnerCliError(usage);
+  }
+  return name === undefined ? { email } : { email, name };
+}
+
+/** Reads one line without echoing it. No dependency is added for this: the command needs exactly
+ * one hidden field, and Node's own raw-mode stdin is enough. */
+function promptHidden(prompt: string): Promise<string> {
+  return new Promise<string>((resolve, reject) => {
+    const input = process.stdin;
+    process.stdout.write(prompt);
+    input.setRawMode(true);
+    input.resume();
+    input.setEncoding("utf8");
+    let value = "";
+    const finish = (settle: () => void): void => {
+      input.removeListener("data", onData);
+      input.setRawMode(false);
+      input.pause();
+      process.stdout.write("\n");
+      settle();
+    };
+    const onData = (chunk: string): void => {
+      for (const character of chunk) {
+        if (character === "\r" || character === "\n" || character === "\u0004") {
+          finish(() => resolve(value));
+          return;
+        }
+        if (character === "\u0003") {
+          finish(() => reject(new InitialOwnerCliError("Cancelled. No changes were made.")));
+          return;
+        }
+        // Backspace and delete, so a mistyped character can be corrected in a field nobody can see.
+        if (character === "\u007f" || character === "\b") {
+          value = value.slice(0, -1);
+          continue;
+        }
+        value += character;
+      }
+    };
+    input.on("data", onData);
+  });
+}
+
+/** Reads standard input to end, for automated deployment. */
+function readStdin(): Promise<string> {
+  return new Promise<string>((resolve, reject) => {
+    let buffer = "";
+    process.stdin.setEncoding("utf8");
+    process.stdin.on("data", (chunk: string) => {
+      buffer += chunk;
+    });
+    process.stdin.on("end", () => resolve(buffer));
+    process.stdin.on("error", () =>
+      reject(new InitialOwnerCliError("Standard input could not be read.")),
+    );
+  });
+}
+
+/**
+ * Obtains the password without it ever appearing in `argv`, an environment variable, or the
+ * terminal.
+ *
+ * A command-line password is visible in shell history and to every other process on the machine via
+ * the process list, and an environment variable tends to become permanent — a bootstrap password
+ * belongs to one invocation, not to the deployment's configuration, so this command deliberately
+ * reads no environment variable for it and none is added to `.env.example`.
+ *
+ * Interactive use asks twice and compares, because the field is invisible and a typo would create
+ * an owner nobody can sign in as, on an installation whose one bootstrap has now been consumed.
+ */
+async function readPassword(): Promise<string> {
+  if (process.stdin.isTTY === true) {
+    const password = await promptHidden("Password: ");
+    const confirmation = await promptHidden("Confirm password: ");
+    if (password !== confirmation) {
+      throw new InitialOwnerCliError("The passwords did not match. No changes were made.");
+    }
+    return password;
+  }
+  // A single trailing newline is stripped so `printf '%s\n'`, a here-string, and an editor-produced
+  // file all behave the same; nothing else is trimmed, because leading and trailing spaces are
+  // legitimate password characters.
+  const piped = await readStdin();
+  return piped.replace(/\r?\n$/u, "");
+}
+
+async function main(): Promise<void> {
+  const { email, name } = parseArgs(process.argv.slice(2));
+
+  // Read only when this command actually executes — never merely by importing this module.
+  const databaseUrl = process.env.DATABASE_URL;
+  if (typeof databaseUrl !== "string" || databaseUrl.trim().length === 0) {
+    throw new InitialOwnerCliError("DATABASE_URL is required.");
+  }
+
+  const password = await readPassword();
+  if (password.length === 0) {
+    throw new InitialOwnerCliError("A password is required. No changes were made.");
+  }
+
+  // Asserted before any connection is constructed, so an unsafe production transport never opens a
+  // client at all — identical to every other Core executable.
+  const transport = resolveExecutableDatabaseTransport(databaseUrl);
+  const databaseOptions = {
+    connectionTimeoutMs: 10_000,
+    operationTimeoutMs: 30_000,
+    transport,
+  };
+  const authorization = createAuthorizationDrizzleDatabase(databaseUrl, databaseOptions);
+  const identity = createIdentityDrizzleDatabase(databaseUrl, databaseOptions);
+  try {
+    const result = await createInitialPlatformOwner(
+      {
+        authorizationDb: authorization.db,
+        createIdentity: createBootstrapIdentityCreator(identity.db),
+        identityDb: identity.db,
+      },
+      { email, name: name ?? email, password },
+    );
+
+    // Never the password, its length, a hash, a session token, a user id, or the database URL.
+    console.log(
+      result.identity === "created"
+        ? "Initial platform owner created successfully."
+        : "An account already existed for that address; platform ownership was granted to it and its password was left unchanged.",
+    );
+    console.log(`Email: ${result.email}`);
+    console.log("You can now sign in to the Ekklesia dashboard.");
+  } finally {
+    await Promise.all([
+      authorization.close().catch(() => undefined),
+      identity.close().catch(() => undefined),
+    ]);
+  }
+}
+
+function reportInitialOwnerCliError(error: unknown): void {
+  if (error instanceof InitialOwnerCliError) {
+    console.error(error.message);
+    return;
+  }
+  if (error instanceof InitialPlatformOwnerError) {
+    console.error(`[${error.code}] ${error.message}`);
+    return;
+  }
+  // Deliberately generic: the caught value may carry SQL, a connection string, a driver detail, or
+  // the password itself if it were ever interpolated into a message upstream.
+  console.error("Initial platform owner creation failed unexpectedly.");
+}
+
+function isDirectExecution(): boolean {
+  const entrypoint = process.argv[1];
+  return (
+    entrypoint !== undefined && import.meta.url === pathToFileURL(path.resolve(entrypoint)).href
+  );
+}
+
+if (isDirectExecution()) {
+  main().catch((error: unknown) => {
+    reportInitialOwnerCliError(error);
+    process.exitCode = 1;
+  });
+}